ML20115E715
| ML20115E715 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 12/31/1986 |
| From: | WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9210220090 | |
| Download: ML20115E715 (120) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:- - - - _ - - _ - - _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ L
%* , I ?f 0 ru, an --, ,,, - ,~
W oa Mu/?ocy e,vp e n p o c e.ar6 w.r llYt' YR 0FC 4 ll^*9 rr p 6Tx) P&CA'& n'T' (f s e r, ,/& e x'9 f pucker ,,r , ,vic.<v/cas rg ff C , fA+bnt 9
$Of 944W6vlXf' 200024 9210220090 861231 ADOCK 0S000266, lf PDR
" """' (,j f' G%J . , O\
/j;bf).* )
0 cl/ d i n.r4 T f /) / l
s l .. . IL l l 11 'I g WISCONSIN ELECTRIC ANNUAL RESULTS AND l POWER COMPANY ^'^""" "' 1986 I POINT BE ACH NUCLE AR PL ANT I UNIT NOS.1 AND 2 I I I I I U S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Docket Nos. 50-266 and 50-301 g.k. Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-24 and DPR-27
c, ;. ll) g I IL g g: WISCONSIN ELECTRIC ANNUAL RESULTS AWD.
^'^""""'
l:- POWER COMPANY- - 1986-I g: POINT BEACH NUCLE AR PL ANT ., I UNIT NOS. I AND-2 LI lI-I 1
;g-I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ~ {
Docket Hos. 54-266 and 50-301 - A Facility Operating License Nos. 3 .DPR-24 and DPR-27
E I I PREFACE (E This Annual Results & Data Report for 1986 is submitted in accordance with ,I Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit Nos. 1 & 2, Technical Specification 15.6.9.1.B and filed under Docket Nos. 50-2(6 & 50-301 for Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-24 & DPR-27, respectively.
- I I
I I . I I I I lI .I i l LI
i TABLE OF CONTENTS Page 1
1.0 INTRODUCTION
2.0 HI L IGHTS 2.1 Unit 1 1 2.2 Unit 2 1 3.0 L 'ILITY CHANGES, TESTS & EXPERIMENTS 3.1 Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses 2 3.2 Facility or Procedure Changes Requiring NRC Approval 3 1 3.3 Tects or Experiments Requiring NRC Appre"41 7 3.4 Design Changes 8 3.5 Temporary Hodifications 37 4.0 NUMBER OF DERSONNEL & MAN-REM BY WORK GROUP & JOB FUNCTION 61 5.0 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE INSERVICE INSPECTION 5.1 Unit 1 62 5.2 Unit 2 63 6.0 REACTOP COOLANT SYSTEM RELIEF VALVE CHALLENGES 6.1 Overpressure Protection During Normal Pressure & Temperature Operation 103 6.2 Overpressure Protection During Low Pressere & Temperature Operation 103 7.0 R2 ACTOR COOLANT ACTIVITY ANALYSIS
-E June 12, 1986 103 R 7.1 7.2 November 17, 1986 111 I
I I I I " I -
] i
1.0 INTRODUCTION
7he Point Beach Nuc. ear Plant, Units 1 and 2, utilize identical L ' pressurized water reactors rated at 1518 MWt each. Each turbine-generator is capable of producing 497 MWe net (524 HWe gross) of electrical power. The plant is located ten miles north of Two Rivers, Wisconsin, on the west shore of Lake Michigan. 2.0 HIGHLIGHTS
; 2.1 Unit 1 Higblights for the period January 1, 1986, through December 31, 1986, incladed a 38-day refueling / maintenance outage, a brief I outage to make veld repairs to a moisture separator reheater, a brief outage caused by inverter diode failures, and a brief
~
outage causeu by an equipment return to service procedural deficiency l Unit 1 operated at an average capacity factor of 88.7% and a net electric / thermal efficiency of 32.7%. The t. nit and reactor availability were 89.2% and 90.4% respectively. Unit 1 generated its 49 billionth kilowatt hour on March 10, 1986; its 50 billionth kilowatt hour on July 13, 1986; its 51 billionth kilowatt hour on October 4, 1986; and its 52 billionth kilowatt hour on December 24_ 1986. 2.2 Unit 2 Highlights for the period January 1, 1986, through December 31, 1986, included a 65-day refueling /mair anance outage, a brief outage to repair a steam generator manway gasket, and a brief outage caused by a personnel erro ~ during safeguards logic tests. Unit 2 operated at an serage capacity factor of 80.4% cnd a net electric / thermal efficiency of 32.3%. The unit and reactor I availability were 82.2% and 82.9% respectively. Unit 2 generated its 49 billionth kilowatt imr on February 18, 1986; its 50 billionth kilowatt hour un May 13, '.986; and its 51 biilienth kilowatt hour on August 5, 19 % I 1
I 3.0 FACILITY CHANGES, T.STS, AND EXPERIMENTS 3.1 Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses During the year 1986, there were 5 license amendments issued by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conunission to Facility Operating License DPR-24 for Point Beach N" clear Plant Unit 1 and 5 license amenchents issued to Facility Operating License DPR-27 for Point Beach Nuclear Plant Unit 2. These license amendments are listed by date of issuance and are summarized as follows: 3.1.1 06-17-86, Amendment 100_ to DPR-24, Amenchnent 103 t o DPR-27 These amendments add additional surveillance requirements for reactor trip breakers. Yhe amendments also add reference to maintenance of sampling and analysis equipment as part of the post-accident sampling program. 3.1.2 06-25-86, Amendment 101 to DPR-24, Amendment 104 to DPR-27 These amendments provide a temporary change to the limiting condition for operation of the component cooling water system to permit installation of an additional component cooling water heat exchanger. 3.1.3 06-27-86, Amendment 102 to DPR-24, Amendment 105 to DPR-27 These amendments revise the reporting requirements for primary coolant activity levels due to iodine spikes. They also delete the requirement to shut down the reactor if primary coolant activity levels exceed 1.0 microcuries per gram (dose equivalent I-131) for 800 hours during any consecutive 12-month period. 3.1.4 07-03-86, Amendment 103 to DPR-24, Amendment 106 to DPR-2] These amendments revise the limiting conditions for operation for the reactor coolant pumps to provide more restrictive limits for critical and suberitical operation. 3.1.5 08-27-86cAmendment 104 to DPR-24, Amendment 107 to DPR-27 These amendments revise the requirements for conducting containment integrated leak rate testing to allow for reduced duration testing (less than 24 hours); to allow inclusion of purge supply and exhaust under Type "B" l testing; to allow one of two in-series purge supply and ! exhaust valves to be open for repairs. 2 g n
I 3.2 Procedure changes There were no procedure changes made during 1986 beyond those authorized with license amendments as noted above, which required I Nuclear Regulatory Commission approval. The following procedure changes made at Point Beach Nuclear Plant during 1986, required a 10 CFR 50.59 review: 3.2.1 Furmanite N-86070, To Seal On-line P,ody-to-Donnet Leak on 2PCV-4318, Revision 1, dated February 24, 1986. Summary of Safety Evaluations The activity is a potential change to the facility or its operation as descr ibed in the FSAR. The studn that connect the body I to the bonnet on 2PCV-431B are made of stainless steel. Therefore, contact with boric acid that has leaked out of the valve will not have degraded the stud I strength. The stua strength has been judged to be acceptable. The Furmanite procedure will not challenge the integrity of the primary system or its protection I equipment. encapsulating them in a p>tential boric acid Since the studs are :^iinless steel, environment will not increase the corrosion poteatial of the stuus. Drilling for the injection path is through the flange face joint which is not the pressure-retaining I (stressed) metal. Therefore, the drilling does not affect the load carrying capability of the flange. I The change does not pose an unreviewed safety question. The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety is not increased. The change does I not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction which has not been previously evaluated. The margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications is not reduced. (SER 86-076) 3.2.2 RMP M47 (Minor), Unit 2 2XO4 Haintenance, Revision 0, I dated October 17, 1986. of the precedure is to control work associated with the removal of 2X04 low voltage station auxiliary (New Procedure) The purpose transformer and its subsequent return to service such that offsite power is maintained to station 4160 V buses. I Summary of Safety Evaluation: An evaluation is required because this procedure defeats interlocks described in the FSAR not described in the FSAR. Maintaining the I 4160 V fast bus transfer capability for Unit 1, while all Unit 2 buses are supplied by the 1X04 transformer, I I '
I requites bypassing an interlock ior beeakess 1A52-37 (IA01 to 1A03 tie breaker) anid 1A52-55 (IA02 to IA04 tie breaker). This is an abnormal configuration and ar. such requires a safety evaluation. The fout bus transfer capability itself is not required to inaintain safety-t elated functions, and as such, its I' oper ation does not require analysis. However, the l potential for overload of the IXO4 transformer must be m analyzed to ensure that the primary emer gency power source is not adversely affeeted. In a conservative load analysis using a Unit 1 full power r.afeguardo actuation and Unit 2 in cold shutdown (present Unit 1 4160 V loadr, a Unit I safeguards actuation, fully loaded Unit I and Unit 2 480 V buses, and no Unit 2 4160 V loads due to cold shutdown), the total ~ load on IX04 will be approximately 35.7 HVA. gl
'XO4 is rated at 37.3 HVA with forced ventilation. This 3 shows that the worst. case is not detrimental to the primary emergency power source. Even upon a fault in l the IXO4 transformer, the backup emergency power source 1 (emergency diesel generators) ir available to maintain at least one train of safeguards in an accident unit and cold shutdown in the other unit.
ihe change does not pose an unreviewed safety questior The probability of occurrence or the 3 consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment 5 important to safety is not increased. The change does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction which has not been previously evaluated. The margin of safety as defined in the Technical , Specifications is not reduced. (SER 86-062) 3.2.3 FSAR Section 11.1, This section would be revised to agree with the Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications (Section 15.7) for on-service gas decay 3 tard oxygen limits and required actions. Statements referring to a 1% alatm limit would be deleted. 5 Setpoint Document, Section 12.0, Page 5 would be revised to change the gas analyzer oxygen alarm from 1% to 3% and add a second oxygen analyzer channel. I I I I 4 5 m
o Sunenary of Safety _ Evaluation: These changes constitute - a change to procedures described in the FSAH. Page 11.1-8 of the FSAR states that, "During operation, gas samples can be drawn automatically from the gas decay tanks and automatically analyzed to determine their hydrogen and oxygen content .. and an alarm will warn the operator if any sample shows 2% or higher by I volun.e of oxygen. This allows time to take required action before the combustible limits of the hi drogen/ oxygen mixtures are reached. Another tank is placed in service while the operator locates and I eliminates the source of oxygen." The above section of the FSAR should be revised to I agree with the limits and required actions of RETS (Section 15.7.5, "Fxplosive Gas Hixture"). RETS only requites the on-service GDT to be sampled for oxygen I (not hydrogen) with an upper lin.it of 4% oxygen before requiring action. The required actions include switching to another on-service GDT and reducing the I oxygen content to less than 4%. The 4% limit would probably allow operation with an alarm setpoint of 4%. However, it in prudent to select I a setpoint somewhat lower to al)cv some time for action to avoid going over 4% during a slowly rising oxygen situation. Since normal c?:ygen content runs between 1-2%, a 3% alarm setpoit.t is more appropriate than the 2% limit specified ir the FSAR and in the setpoint document. During a rapidly rising oxygen situation, i.e., open-ended air leak on a waste gas compressor, there would not be sufficient warning time no matter what the _ alarm setpoint. For example, with compressor capacity of 40 cfm, GDT capacity of about 700 cfm at $ psig, and oxygen concentration in air of 20%, the GDT oxygen concentration would increase at a rate of about 1%/ minute. Section 14.2.3 of the FSAR analyzes the consequences of a GDT tupture, and states, "This analysis shows that even with the worst case expected conditions, the off-site doses following release of this gaseous activity would be very low." Therefore, since the oxygen alarm setpoint change frcm 2-3% does not pose an unresolved safety question, and because RETS specifies a 4% limit prior to required actions, the recommended setpoint document change and FSAR changes do not need prior NRC approval. 5
~- , . , . . _ _ . I' Additionally, the llatulbook of Chemist ry and Physics, l' Chemical Rubber Company, Cleveland, Ohio, 49th Ed., E liuts the limits of inflammability foi oxygen in j hydrogen as 6-95%,. Thus, the revised setpoint for the gl oxygen analyzer alarm remains below the lower limit. g; The change does not inctease the probe.bility of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or , malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR. There is no possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than evaluated previously in the FSAR. g The margin of safety as defined in the Technical y' Specifications is not t educed. (SER 86-0271 3.2.4 Furmanite N-86173, Sp ay Valve 2-431B Body-to-Bonnet Leak Repair, Revision 0, dat ed June 26,1986. l JNew Procedure) ] The put pose of the proce care is to provide guidance for the repair of valve body-to-honnet leaks by the Furmanite ptocess. Holes will be drilled in the valve g flange and scalant will be injected into the stud g holes. The work will he performed via MWR #51610. Summary ^f Safety Evaluatiotj: A 50.59 evaluation is l required because this repair constitutes a potential = change to the facility or its operation as described in the FSAR. Calculations were performed to show that the stresses associated with the holes that must be drilled in the g flange are acceptable. Design temperature and pressure g were used in the calculations. Also, two different situations were looked at: (1) the condition that will exist when the valve is Furmanited and the effective area which pressure acts on is increased, and (2) the cundition that will exist when the valve is disassembled, cleaned, and reassembled as designed, Allowable stresses from ASME Section III were used. The exact flange thickness was not known; thus the a calculations were done to determine the acceptable g location of the holes based on thickness and procedure limitations will be applied to check thickness and locate the holes accordingly. Acceptability justification was also provided by Furmanite. The studs which will be encapsulated have been verified as being stainless steel and thus potential boric acid attack is not a concern. t E w
6 This change does not pose an unee.iewed safety r question. The probability of occurrence or the [ consequences of an accident or realfunction of equipment important to safety is not increased. The change does not cicate the possibility f or an accident or malfunction which has not been previously evaluated. The margin of safety as defined in the Technical I Specifications is not reduced. (SER 86-043J 3.2.5 Fuimanite N-861L4_, Unit 2 "A" Steam Getietator Inboard I secondary Side Hanway Leak Hepain, Revision 0, dated June 26, 1986. (New Procedutel The procedure provides guidatice for repair of a leak to I the Unit 2 "A" steam gener ator inboar d secondar y side manway by w illita holen in the manway cover and injecting sealant via the Furmanite process. I flununary of Saf ety Evaluat iorp The "A" steam generator inboar d secandary r.ide manway repair in a potential I change to the facility or its operation as described in the FSAR. The Futmanite method and procedute have been accepted I and used pteviously including the other secondary manways on the subject steam generator and the pressurizer manway. Based on this, using the same method and procedute are considered acceptable. Furmanite has provided some calcu:.ations showing that I the increased stresses associated with the holes are insignificant. Furmanite also provided calculations to show that bolt _ loading will also Iensin with)n the allowable limits for the bolt materia? per ASMb Section III. This change does not pose an unreviewed safety question. The probability of occutrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important t o safety is not increased. I not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction which hat. not been previously evaluated. The change does The matgin of safety as defined it. the Technical I 3.3 Specifications is not reduced. rests ot Experiments Requiring Nuclear kcqulatory Commission (SER 86-044)_ Approval _ There were no tests or experiments performed at Point Beach Nuclear Plant in 1986 which required Nuclear Regulatory commission approval. 7
I The following testu or experiments performed at Point Beach l Nucleat Plant during 1906 requit ed a 10 CFR 50.59 review E WHTP 11_.44 (Major), Unit 2 Tut bine Runback Vet ificat ion, Revision 0, dated July 3, 1986. plew Procedure)
'Ihe purpose of this new test procedure is to actuate a planned turbine turdanck of Unit 2 when the unit is being taken out of service for a scheduled maintenance outage in order to determine whether the load reference turbine tunback circuit is operable.
Summary _of Safet.y Evaluation: The proposed procedure provides guidance f or conduct of a test or experiment not described in the FSAR. The procedule initiater, a turbine load r ef erence t unback by simulating an NIS dtopped iod signal. The method of initiation is a normal NIS test method and plant design providers for control system tesponse to this event without advetse affects. This change does t ot pot.e an una eviewed safety question. The probability of occurrence ot the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety is not increased. The change does not create the por,sibility for an accident or malfunction vnich hat, not been previously evaluated. The margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications is not reduced. (SER 86-045) 3.4 Design _ Changes There wer e no plant modifications made during 1906, beyond those authorized with license amendments au noted above, which t equit ed Nuclear Regulatory Conunission approval. The following modifications made at Point Beach Nuclear Plant dur ing 1986 requit ed a 10 CFR 50.59 review: 3,4.1 MR 86-123 (Unit 2}, Main Steam System. The inodification g changed the vor m-to-worm gear ratio fr om 45:1 to 76:1 3 for MOV-2019 and MOV-2020 (steam supply valves to the steam-driven auxiliary feedwater pumns) to increase the a valve's stroke time g Summary of Safety Evaluation: The modification is a potential change to the facility or its operation as described in the FSAk. This modification improved the capability of the motor operators to deliver the design
- r. tem thrust for the valves. As a result of the g modification, the valve stroke time was incteased from E apptoximately 13 seconds to approximately 21 seconds.
The change does not have a significant impact on seismic concerns (less than four ounces difference in weight) or on environmental qualification concerns. I 3 5 w _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _-__-_ ._ .. .. . ...w
-) Incr easing the str oke time of MOV-2019 and 2020 will y not adversely affect the presently installed low l suction pressure trip or settings for the motor-driven and turbine-driven auxilisry feedwater pumps. Also, the condentate storage tank level will not be adversely affected by the increased closing stroke time of MOV-2019 and 2020. This summary is suppotted by the I design review performed on November 11, 1986, and the additional analysis perfortned on Novenber 13, 1986. The change does not pot.e an unreviewed safety I question. The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety is not increased. The change does I not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction which has not been previously evaluated. The margin of safety an defined in the Technical Specifications is not reduced. {SER 86-072) 3.4.2 Mk 86-118 (Unit 21, Reactor Core. The modification removes leaking fuel rod SS-3 f om fuel assently P54. I As a result, assenbly P54 has 178 fuel rods instead of 179. Summary of Safety Evaluation; The modification was a change to the f acility as desc.ribed in FSAR Section 3.2.3. Technical specification 15.5.3.A.1, I Reactor Core, states, "Where safety limits are not violated, individual fuel rods suspected of leaking may be replaced with an inett tod or the assembly left with I a water hole 20 prevent possible reinsertion of leaking fuel tods. No more than one fuel rod may be replaced in any single assembly and no more than sitt such inodified assemblies may reside in the core at any I time." Ascenbly P54 had only one rod removed and will be the only such modified assembly in the Unit 2, Cycle 13 core. This change does not pose an unreviewed safety question. The probability of occurrence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment irnportant to safety, is not increased. The change does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction which has not been previously evaluated. The margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications is not reduced. (SER 86-065) 9
I t i 3.4.3 86-059 (Unit 2), Reactor coolant System. The modification changes the reactor vessel lower internals by plugging existing holes in the core battel and machining new holes in the top former plate to reduce g the differential prenure acr oss the baffle plates. l The modification results in lower flow velocity across tne baffle plates and thus, prevents damage to fuel assemblies stored in areas of the core where baffle joints are present. Summary of Safety Evaluation: The modification is a g change to the facility as described in the FSAR. 'I be W upflow modification does not affect FSAR Chapters 1 thr ough 14, including appendices, Technical 3 Specifications, or NRC commitmentr. found in the safety g evaluation teports. FSAR Section 3.2.3 As affected in that Figure 3.2.3-5 shows the core barrel flow holes that were plugged as patt of the upflow conversion. All other design criteria and accident analysis = assumptions are not violated. Based upon a satisfactory Westinghouse safety evaluation and the supporting analysis, the upflow q conversion does not result in an unreviewed safety question or Technical Specification change. HER 86-034) a 3.4.4 MR 86-124 (Unit 2), Reactor Coolant System. The l modification temoved the RCS "B" loop decon line (45' u fitting, piping, valve 2RC-544, and flanges) and capped the nozzle. (The Unit I decon line was previously g removed during replacement of that unit's steam g generators in 1983.) W Summary of Safety Evaluation: The modification is a change to the facility as described in the FSAR. 5~ Capping of the "B" hot leg decon line does not affect the safe operation of the plant. The change was done g to the requirements of B31.7-1969, and the additional 3 Westinghouse equirements found in Section 4 of the FSAR. These requirements include evaluating the change of the original seismic qualification, inspection criteria, and hydrostatic testing requirements. The decon line has not been used in the plant and it serves as a radiation trap. Tne change eliminates some mechanical pressure-retaining joints in the RCS and improves the system's integrity. I I i 10 g
This change does not- po<,e an unreviewed safety question. - The pr obability of occurrence, or the consequences of an ! accident, or malf unction of equipment important to " safety, is not increased. The change does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction which has
~
not been previously evaluated. The margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications is not reduced. I (SER 86-075) 3.4.5 84-046 (Unit 2), Feedwater System. The modifications changed the main feed regulating valves' trim and I increased the stroke from 2.5" to 3" Summary of SafettE valuation: This modification I constituted potential change to the facility as described in the FSAR. The new valve operator will be the same design and coniiquration of the existing operator The main change is increasing the stroke from 2.5" to 3", An extra large air port and an auxiliary vent port will be I provided on the operatc r to eu.pensate, as required, for an effect the increased operator stroke will have on openir.g and closing times. FSAR closing time of I 15 seconds was not affected. The proposed change does not increase the probability of a DBA nor prc m t an unreviesed safety question. No I changes to the FSAR or Technical Specifications are required. (SER 86-005-01) 3.4.6 HR 84-046-01 (Unit 2), Feedwater System (otiginal modification reviewed and approved in MSSH 86-20; see SEks 86-005 and 85-005-01). The addendum replaces the regulated instrument air supply at 80 psig to the normally closed port of 1(2)SV-466/476A with a direct instrument air supply of approximately 100 psig. Summary of safety Evaluation The modification is a potential change to the facility or its operation as described in Figure 10.2-2A of the FSAR. The proposed addendum allows a main feed reg valve opening time of 8-9 seconds being achieved upon a reactor trip when Tavg is >554 F (slugging feature). This change was needed in support of the modification for retrimming the main feed reg valves which resulted in a longer valve stroke (approximately 3\"). The longer valve stroke resulted in longer time requirements to achieve full open. With the change, the resulting valve operating times have been shown to be approximately 4-4.5 seconds to close upon SI or high level trips, 8-8.5 seconds to open upon a reactor trip with Tavg
>554 F: and 20 seconds to c40se upon a reactor trip with Tavg (554 F 11
I 1 The proposed change is acceptable and does not present ll s an unreviewed safety question in view of the following 5l ) considerations: The SI and high level closing times will remain s5 seconds. Fifteen-second closing times have been shown to be acceptable (reference !!R 84-129). This is the only requirement which may have any association with the safety analyses steam line break cooldown concerns. The SI trip of the main i feed pumps also minimizes cooldown (excessive g cooldown). 3 The opening time of 8 seconds upon a reactor trip g with Tavg >554*F is very close to 5 seconds. g Five seconds is referenced only on the logic diagram, and not in the FSAH; thus, it is not a i commitment. This feature is intended to ease I system transients after a reactor trip, however, it is not a safety feature and no credit is taken for it in the analysis. In the past, 8-10 second E opening times have been accepted with no adverse g i consequences noted. The logic diagram was changed to reflect this opening time. l The closing time is approximately 20 seconds upon a reactor trip with Tavy (554'F. This is in I I accordance with the logic diagrams. This time is g I not described in the FSAR; and thus, it is not a g commitment. It is not a safety feature. We are, however, meeting the previously accepted times. The slightly longer opening time may even ease post-trip system cooldown transients in relation to , the approach to the SI setpoint from reduced pressure operations. 5
- All times are conservative since they are obtained g from a fully closed to fully open position. In 3
, reality, events resulting in initiating the j specific feature would start from a mid-stroke a valve position. Pressure effects are negligible g due to the force of the spring in relation to the stem diameter pressure force (balanced valve disc). The original opening time was based on a 2h" stroke l valve. The new valve stroke witnin the first 2" E l of travel is relatively quick (comparable to the 3; old valve), i l Inst rument air system quality without a regulatm, is acceptable (95-105 psig). , I I , i 12 g'
='
Notmal valve operation is with regulated instrument ~ air, and only the slugging (opening) feature is ! affected. L All components are capable of the extra 25 psig.
'Iher e is no impact on the seismic mounting of the solenoid-operated valves.
The valve operating logic does not change. The valves remain fail closed devices. The changes does not pose an unreviewed safety I question. The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment ~ impo-tant to . safety is not 2ncreased. The change does not ireate the possibility for an accident or malfunction which has not been previously evaluated. The mar gin of safety as defined in the Technical Spe:ifications is not r educed. ISER 86-005-02) 3 A.7 ltR 86-119 (tInit 2J, Waste Disposal System. The modification replaced globe valve 2WD-1793 with a I diaphragm valve to bring this penetration to the original design specified configuration. Summary of Safety Evaluation: The modification was a change to the facility as described in the FSAR. The new diaphragm valve meets the pressure / temperature requirements (Westinghouse Class 151) of the system. The new diaphragm valve was installed to the requirements of B31.1-1967, and was tested per ORT 1830. The new diaphragm was seismically qualified ~ in the system. This change does not pose an unreviewed safaty question. The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety is not increased. The change does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction which has not been previously evaluated. The margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specification is not reduced. ISER 86-066)
? '.8 83-151-01, Fire Protection. This modification prov3ded additional fire dampers to upgrade auxiliary building fire barriers to meet the WE commitment to 10 CFR 50 Appendix R.
Summary of Safety Evaluation: The dampers provide improved ventilation and area isolation in a fire event without compromising safety in = non-fire event. 13
. - ~ . - . ~ . . - - . - . - . - ..- . - - . . - . _ . _ . -
I ~ 3.4.9 85-108 1 Unit 7J, Auxiliary Coolant CVCS Crossconnect. l The modification crosaconnects the reactor cavity drain " via the spent fuel pool cooling systeto and the CVCS in order to: (1) allow for cor,tinuous purification of the g lower cavity while the RilR system is not available; 3 (2) provide more circulation for crud control in the lower cavity; and (3) provide greater flexibility for filtration. 1 i Summary of Safety Evaluation: In addition to considerations contained in the accident analyses: l (1) all work was performed in accordance with 5 ANSI B31.1-1967; (2) the modification will not affect t he ability to pur ify fr om RilR: (3) the containment g boundary will not be affected by the modifications; and E (4) tM safety flow paths of CVCS and RilR will not be affected by the modifications. 3.4.10 83-111-01* (Unit 2), feedwater System. This I modification changed out existing Asco solenoid-operated valves (SOV) 2SV-466C, 2SV-476C, 2SV-480, and 2SV-481 to E i hodel L206-381-6F and added new SOVs 2SV-466D and 5 2SV-476D to operate in parallel with 2SV-466C and 2SV-476C, respectively. ! Summary o_f_ Safety Evaluation: Replacement of the original solenoid-operated valves with those specified ir. this addendum is considered satisfactory since the new valves are fully qualified (per IEEE-323, IEEE-344, NUREG-0588, and IE Bulletin 79-OlB) and are equivalent or better than the existing configurations. The g ? additional air dump SOVs ensure rapid closure 3 ($15 seconds) of the main feed regulating valves on a safety injection signal (or high-high steam generator n level) to show adequate margin to DND for an MSLB accident. Operability of all valves were verified g by operational testing. The new SOVs will be normally energized and, therefore, failure of a solenoid coil or power supply will result in the conservative action of closure of the main feed regulating valves, Installation was controlled by written procedure. l *This modification was inttalled in 1984 and is now
- documented with modifications installed this year.
3.4.11 85-016 (Unit 2), 480 V Switchgear. The modification installed local open and close pushbt.ttons on I Breaker 33C, provided an additional terminal, and g I modified the rear bottom panel to permit installation 3 of special receptacles for multi-amp power supplies. l I 1 14 l w
Summary of Safety _ Evaluation: This modification used a spate 400 V breaker off bus 2B03 for testing purposes to power the multi-amp test unit. All normal protection for the breaket will be maintained (10 amp fuses for protection of the 125 V DC power supply: 2B03
~
lockout, 2B03 undervoltage and breaker overcurrent ! tripping for protection of the 480 V AC power supply) I and the load imposed on the system will be small and only for a shor t time duration during outage testing. Diesel safeguards loading will not be affected since the breaker will trip on an SI signal. The
.I modification does not constitute an unreviewed safety question and does not reauire a change to the Technical Installation was done using written I
Specifications. instructions and/or design drawings.
.4.12 1C-325 (Unit Q, IC-3' if2 IUnit 2), & IC-327 (Common),
Auxiliary Feedwater System. The modifications provided 8 for automatic auxiliary feedwater pump trips on low suction pressure for pump protection following a I hypothesized seismic event or tornado where there is an unprotected normal auxiliary feedwater system water supply, such as the condensate storage tanks. The modifications respond to NukEG-0737, Item II.E.1.1 as responded to by Wisconsin Electric, September 14,
~I 1981.
I Summary of Safety Evaluation: These modifications installed automatic trin, automatic start block and override capability for the motor-Jriven and turbine-driven auxiliary ( AFW) pumps when a sustained I low suction pressure condition exists at each pump individually. Installation and testing of the modification was controlled by a special maintenance procedure and done l one train at a time. After installation, testing of the bistables, time delays, and operability of the pumps and MOVs will be done on a periodic basis, at least once per refueling interval. This modification I does not constitute an unreviewed safety qusation and does not require a change to plant Technical Specifications. An addition te the FSAR will be implemented. 3.4.13 85-103 (Unit 1), Main Control Boards. The modification provided individual train 51 block status lights on the main cont ol boards such that positive indication is provided to the control operator that SI actuation is blocked. 15
r i;. I. Sununat y of Saf ety Evaluation: Splitting the S1 block l,
- light into two lights vilf give the oper7 tor a more 3 l accurate indication of safety injection system status.
; No tiain separation is iequired between these g l connections as the indications are considered to not be 5' j safety ielated. An Inst umentation & Contiol procedure was used to control the installation. The modifications do not r equit e Technical Specification or FSAR changes.
l The modifications do not constitute an unteviewed safety question.
- 3.4.14 85-140 (Common), contaitimerit flydrogen Analyzer. The I modification r eassigned the containment hydrogen 1 analyzer power supplies at the relay tray assemblies to be unit specific such that all of he monitors for a given unit a.e supplied by that unit 's instr ument bus.
l This problem was identified in LER 85-001 (Unit 2), Nls Runback. Summaty of Safety Evaluation: 1his modification
- provided further separatioii~between instrument buses. g
' The modification does not requite a change to the FSAR g or Technical Specifications. It does not constitute an unteviewed safety question. 3.4.15
'. The modifIc M ]on installed ceismic iestraints on the85-200 (Common , S l 1&2832/42 motor conttol centers .in accordance with NRC g Generic Letter 81-14 requirements dealing with auxiliary Wi feedwater system concerns. 1he adequacy of the current anchorage was not evaluated for SSE loading; however, a it was advntageous to provide supports versus performance of a d(tailed analysis of the existing configuration, g'
um Summary of Safety Evaluation: 1he engineering calculation (85-010) shows that thei addition of the 5 brackets protects the units from se smic events. The brackets were installed to not affect the safete g considerations of the walls and motor control centers. 3 Addition of the brackets does not present an unreviewed safety question or require a change to the Technical Specifications. , 3.4.16 84-157 (Unit 1) & 84-158 (Unit 2), Component Cooling Water System. The modIiications replaced the "A" and >
"C" component cooling water heat exchangers with new heat exchangers having improved design characteristics.
The previous heat exchangers had suffered tube-to-l tubesheet crevice corrosion. l 8' 1 n
Summary of Saf ety Evaluation: lteplacement of component
~
- 5017ing heat exchangers HX-1.'A atid C d(es not affect a [ previously evaluated safety question not et eate att unteviewed r.afety question. The design specifications ~ of the new heat exchangeis are essentially the same as the original design with the exception of tube and tubenheet matetial, a higher shell side design pressure (250 psig veisus 150 psig), and flow (2.103 x 10" ]bm/ hour versus 1.475 x 10" lbm/ hour). The new heat exchangetu were also designed and lp fabr icated to withst and design SSE acceler ations f or El . 46'0" of the pr imar y auxiliar y building, 3.4.17 & 84-lW-01, Component Cooling Wate I 84-l%9 System.(Common)dilTc"TtliUeplaced
'llii mo the exist ing component cooling water heat exchariger and Addendum 1 "B"
~
to the modificat ton added a second " swing" heat exchanger to provide aihlitional operating flexibility. The new heat exchatajor s have impr oved design characteristars lhe previous "U" heat exchanger suffered tube to-tubesheet etevice cotrouion. Replacing component gmm[ing cool water heattry of Saf!!X-12B exchanger ety_lyluat with ioin two heat I exchangers will not affect a pieviously evaluated sai :y quest ion. 'lhe additional heat exchanger will also be used as a swing heat exchanger for either unit and vill increase the flexibility and redundancy of the component cooling water system. The design specifications of each new heat exchanger are essentially the same as original design with the I except ions of tube and tubecheet materia), higher shell design piessute (250 psig versus 150 psig), and flow (2.103 x 10' Ibm /h versus 1.475 x 10'lbm/hr). The new I heat exchangels were designed and fabricated to withst and design SbE accelerations for El . 4b'0" of the auxiliary building. 3.4.18 65-187 (tini t 1) & a5-188 2J, Saf e t y Itgection System. 1htToIfi[IFit3idis(Unichangedt the existing MOV-851A&B/AnV-897A&R interlock scheme such that the 851A&B valves cannot be opened unless at least one of the 697 valves is fully shut, Valves 897A&D wi11 be normal]y operated in the manually open position. In addit ion, to provide reliable opetator indication and to correct the problem with the 897AAb valve position indication / safety injection test line isolated annunciat or, the present 33X t elay was changed from noimally deenergized to a imrmally ener gized with NC contact configuration. 17
i i
- Suramany of Safety Evaluation
A loss of valve position " i monitor indication and annunciation due to a single =; failure in the 097A&B valve circuitry caused by a loss of control power was corrected by thatiging the alarm 3' 1 logic to a normally ener gized relay with normally c.losed 5 contact. l The modificationu do not constitute an unteviewed ' l safety question and no changes to the Technical Specifications are requited. Special maintenance procedures were used to control liistallation of the ' modifications. ' 3.4.19 83-152-01 (Unit 1) & 83-153-01 (Unit 2}, CVCS Charging Pump control. The modifications installed switching i capability to interconnect charging pumps 3P2B and 2P2B such that either pu.'np can be operated from 1803 or l 2B03. The interconnect is identical to that planned for the IP2A and 2P2A pumpu. I Summary of Safety Pvaluationi These modifications g l f urther fulfill the requir ements of 10 CFR 50 g l Appendix R, in regard to safe shutdown opett,bility of the charging pumps. Also, the installation futther ensures that physical train separation is rnintained. l With the new charging pump switch alignment, the present ! operation of IP2B and 2P2B is unaffected. All l protection and administra+.ive controls to be provided by the parent modification exist with this addendum. . Installation of the addendum was completed with the g parent modification. These addendums do not constitute 3 an unreviewed safety question nor do they require a change to the Technical Specifications. g, 3.4.20 85-53 (Unit 1) & 85-54 (Unit 21, 480 V AC Safeguards. This modification wired in a set of apare contacts fr0m 1-86/B04 (Unit 1) and 2-86/B04 (Unit 2) in parallel with those from 2-86/B03 (Unit 1) and 2-86/B03 (Unit 2). l Summary of Safety Evaluation: The potentiel did exist, with the 803 and B04 tie breaker shut (1852-16C for Unit 1, 2B52-40C for Unit 2l and the normal styply breaker to B03 open, that an SI signal could occur arid safeguard train separation would g occur. Because , the 803 to B04 tie breaker would not ip on a train "B" SI signal, this event could happen if or1y 3 "B" train SI occurred with the safeguards buses B03 and E-B04 both being supplied by ste. tion service traaaformet X14. It could also occtar if the tripping contact from the train "A" bus lockout (off train "A" SI) did not actuate to cause the tie braaker to trip. Ia either cir etau, t ance , electrical separation of safeguards 1 1e L_
trains would not occut as required by IEEE-3f14 and , llegulator y Guide 1.75 for l'hysical Independence of { Electrical Systems. Therefore, it is desirable to have the 1303 ana B04 bus tle bt eaker trip on both train "A" and train "B" SI signal actuation. This was achieved by placing a train "B" tripping contact in parallel with the train "A" tripping contact in the bus tie breaker control scheme. This modification does not require a change to g Technical Specifications and does not constitute an 3 unreviewed safety question. Installation was controlled by a special maintenance procedure. 3.4.i1 85-052 (Common), control Room Cleanup Fans - W14A&B, This modification installed a time delay (Agastat) to prevent turbulence induced cycling of the motor starter. It also evaluated the position of flow switches to elirainate flow-telated problems. Summary of Safety Evaluation: The air flow switches were relocated to assure proper performance. Limiting conditions of operation are from Technical Specification 15.3.12, Item 4 (if the fans cannot meet operating conditions then the unit s must be brought to a cold shutdown af ter 7 days) . All work associated with this modification requiring the fans to be shut off will be completed within the 7 day limit. This modification does not involve any changes to the Technical Specifications and involves no unresolved safety questions. 3.4.22 85-17 (Unit 1), 480 V AC Suitchgear. This modification parallels the load sides of breakers 14B and 11B at 1803 (Unit 1). It also parallels the load sides of breakers 23A and 23C at IB04 (Unit 1). Local open and c hse pushbuttons were installed on breakers 118 and 23A (Unit 1). lireakers 118 and 23A (Unit 1) can be ' administratively controlled to allow operation only during refueling outages fot normal safeguards MCC 6 supply breaker maintenance and to minimize time of parallel operation. Summsg of oafety Evaluation: The paralleling cf __ 1852-148 and IBS2-11B and 1803 and of IB52-23A and II152-23C at Ib04 allow the removal of the notmal supply breakers for MCC 1B32 and 1B42 for routine ' maiatenance. Since the cupply and load sides of both breakers were connected, and the electrical protection relaying of both bienkers are identical, paralleling the breakers did not present any problems. This modification increases the reliability of MCC 1832 and 1842 An SMP was requited to control the removal of IB32 and 1842 from service during installation of this modification. 19
l
- I; 3.4.23 85_0yJjunit 1) & 85'080 (Uni,t J , Component Cooling.
g The modification resets va}ve 1(2)-779 to relieve at 3 65 psi to maintain containment integrity in response to
- Westinghoute concerns conce ning component cooling
, water system potential overptessurization. , 1 i Sunmia r y o f Sa f e t y Evaluation: The modification does i
- not t' feet the safe opetation of the plant because
i (1) Ar..flyhis shows that the modification pr otect s the sis %m against serpr essurication; (2) Code rcquit ements have been (net; (3) Containment isolation 3 requirements have been met. Ho Technical Specification 3, chango are requireJ. 3.4.24 35-009 (Unit 1) & 85-010 (Unit 2), ~ strument Power i !$[iplies. The modITi d ions retut' ,1 munbe t of i ins t r ument channels which were or!v v 11y desigm.ted as i white and yellow to their orlyinal cnm..:als. 1he B channels have been switched to battery-backed sources W , l on the opposite unitP red or blue bus per niodificatian j j IC-194. With completion of the inst rwnent bun ! upgrcde, these channels are now returned to the i original white and yellow instrument buses. In I ad6ition, channels which were switched to l mini-inverters 162MQ-400 were returned to the white and , I yellow buses, with 1&2MQ-400 being permanently removed l from service. l Summary of Safety Evaluation: These modifications l ensure continued H TiabilTt} of white onJ yellow I instrument channels when they are powered by the new a l white and yellow instrument bus battery-backed power g staurces which were installed by the instrument bus upgrade modification. Also, each unit powers its own instrument channels rather than having unit l crossconnection as was previously installed. This also = increases reliability of the new system, After all instrument channels were removed from the 1&2Hg-400 g inverters, these units were removed from service. 5 These modifications do not constitute an unreviewed safety question and do not require a change to plant a Technical Specifications. Installation was controlled per special maintenance procedures. I 3.4.25 84-143 (Unit 1) & 84-144 (Unit 2), Secondary Sampling. The modifications installed a steam generator chemical addition and sparging system with permanent piping from the demineralized water system and nitrogen headers. g 5-Sununary of Safety Evaluation: The addition of a chemical addition tank to the secondaty sampling system i provides the ability to more precisely maintain steam l generator chemistry while in wet layup. The chemical 1 1 20 g a
~ addition tank does not increase the picbability of a previously analped accident not create the possibility [ of an unanalyzed accident. All components used meet or exceed original design i equit ement s and do not degrade system integtity. 3.4.26 83-152 (Utilt 1)~% U3- 153 (thii t 2) , Chemical Volume Control system. ih7.'i6Mf iFiiiE$s inst alled J mechanically interlotked breakers et local control panels IN04 and 2N04 to ptovide alteinative powe! supply f or pumps ll'2A and 21'2A to ensut e saf et y shutdowti I operability. Summat y_ o f Sal e t y, Eva lua t ion : The modiiications supply I emer geticy power to the "A" charging pumps to mitigate the fire loss of a unit 's 1i03 and B04 bute.c, and provide .cie chut down operability of the char ging ptuti})s I fot 10 CfH Sd Appendix 1( tequirements. Notmal operation of the chat ging pumps is unaf f ected, lhe iltstallation maintains tilin separ at ion and also ptevents unit powet cr ossconnec tion- Due to the I complexity of new switching operation, changes to opetating 2nsttuction and administiative contIols were implemented. System t ie-itis and testing wet e I controlled by a special maintenance procedure, lhe modification does not constitute an unteviewed safety question. 3.4.27 84- 142JConunoni , Bu i l di ngs/St ruc tures . The modificaiihiMt't ached an "1" beam to the ceiling of the emer gency diesel genet at or rooms N permit lifting of I the tutbochargets. Summaty of_ Safety Evaluation: The lifting device will not be used whil( the emetgency diesel generators are in setvice T% temporary beam assembly will be removed while the diesels ate in service The permanent stiuctutes have been analyzed to assure that they iemain intact dat ing a DBE Use of the lifting device will not jetgardize any othet safety-related equipment not solely associated with the emetgency diesel generators. 3.4.28 P 3- I S'l (Unit 1) & 83 158] Unit 2), I?it e l'i ot ec t ion .
'Ihe modifications installed alternate shutdown instrumentation including necessary power supp'ies and ttat.sfers switches for icactor coolant loop "ll" pressure, hot leg "nd cold leg temperatures; pressurizet level, and steam generator level and pressure. The instruments are located near 1(2)N11 and 1 ( 2 )liK- 30. Sound power ed phone capability was also installed between the local control stations. The modifications meet 10 CI'It 50 Appendix R alternate shutdown capability commitments.
21
I Summery of Safety Evaluatica Switching channels l 1(2)L426 or 1(2)P420C to lor ' without proper 5 administrative contr ols coul result in a Technical Specification violation for itiling to meet a minimum 3 degree of redundancy. However, if these switches are g selected to local for testing while at power, their bistables will first be placed in the trip condition per procedure. To assist in preventing the switches from being selected to local while at power, the access door was placarded and annunciates an ASIP alarm via an attached microswitch when opened. This occurs at the 3 time of switch access and prior to actual switch 5 operation. Routine testing vill be scheduled during shutdowns and emergency operation of the switch would only be necessary wl.en fire has disabled the normal control . room instrumentation or made it inaccessible. In either case, the reactor will be in hot shutdown at a minimum. Installation of these modifications was controlled by a special maintenance procedure. - 3.4.29 83-154 (Unit 1), CVCS. The modification changed the-control circuitry for excess letdown valve IMOV-1299 m to prevent spurious operation by installing a double break circuit in the opening coil portion of the g circuitry. Summary _of Safety Evaluation: The modification installed a double break circuit in the opening coil portien of the control circuitry te arevent spurious 3 operation of the valve. Under bis sci.eme, spurious operation would require the indepenoent shorting of two 3 new fire retardant cables as described in the April 27, 1984, lettet from C. W. Fay to H. R. Denton. This is not considered to be a credible accident. The new circuit design inhibits spurious valve operation even during a fire external to the control room. The new g control switch on the main control board is at least y equivalent to the previous configuration. Installation was contralled L;: an S!!P. 3.4.30 84-24 (Unit 2), Fire Protection. The modification wrapped conduit ZP426 between 2LT-426 and the El. 46'0" floor. 't fire sealed all conduit connections to the junction box in this conduit area. S_ummary of Safety Evaluation: This modification 3 improves / maintain; reliability in a fire event and does g not adversely affect system operability. E l 8 22 g' 1 e
I I 3.4.31 84-25 (Common), Fire Protection. The modification installed cable tray and conduit fire barriers in the auxiliary feed pump room. Summary of Safety Evaluation: This modification improves / maintains the reliability of these trays in a fire event and does not adversely affect system operability. I 3.4.32 83-71-01 (Common), Fire Protection. This modification concerns the service water pump room fire barrier. This I modification permanently closed the fire wall with the addition of a Cem-Fil panel and installed a second set of double doors to the north half of tl.c room. Summary of Safety Evaluation: Design and installatio... of the new doors and firewall panel are in accordance with applicable seismic and fire protection criteria. 3.4.33 84-132 (Unit 1) & 84-133 (Unit 2), Reactor Coolant System. The modification added two additional nests, 8 modules, and wiring to the Foxboro Spec 200 racks and wiring to the computer room to complete the reactor vessel water level and cubcooling monitoring systems I . independently of the plant computer system. Summary of Safety Evaluation: The new modules fit directly into the Spec 200 racks and are the same style B and general construction and are qualified to the same requirements as the existing modules. Additional loading to the affe;ted instrument buses (white and I yellow) is minimal. 3.4.34 83-160 (Unit l' & 83-161 (Unit 2), Fire Protection. The modifications relocated local control panel INll (2N04) and : outed "B" train ("A" train) charging pump cables betkeen IP2C and bus 1804 (2P2A, 2P2B, & 2B03). Summary of Safety Evaluation: Cable touting and control panel relocation do not result in any changes to the operation or function of the CVCS. Design and I installation were consistent with established seismic and fite protection criteria. 3.4.35 84-21 (Common), Fire Protection. The modification installed penetration seals in the ceiling and walls of the auxiliary building at El. 8'. It also installed I cable tray fire stops. Both installations were required in order to meet Appendix R commitments. Summary of Safety Evaluation: The modification is I an improvement to safet.y by limiting the possible spread of a fire. Fire stops and seals do not affect system operability. 23 I.
I 84-22 (Common), Fire Protection. The modification 3.4.36 wrapped cable tray PV07 and .onduits 2P2C1 and 2NP2Cl 5 3> with material which has passed a one-hour fire test. Summary of Safety Evaluation: This modification improves and/or maintains the reliability of these cables in a fire event and does not adversely affect system operability. 3.4.37 8p 23 (Unit IJ, Fire Protection. The modification wrapped conduit 1-57A between ILT-426 and the El. 21'0" - floor. Summary of Safety Evaluation: This modification improves / maintains reliability in a fire event and does not adversely affect systems operability. 3.4.38 83-150, Fuel oil. The modification installed a bypass g line around the emergency fuel tank and the fuel oil 3 transfer pumps with a manual isolation valve to enable the gravity feed of oil from the fuel oil storage tanks g to the diesel room day tanks. It also provides loca leve] indication at the day tanks to enable operators 5 to prevent overflow of the tanks, without relying on control room level indication. Summary of Safety Evaluation: The new piping and instrumentation meets or exceeds established design and g construction criteria for the fuel oil system, thus g ensuring that the integrity and reliability of the system will be maintained. The modification has no effect upon existing system controls or operation a'id provides a means of fueling the emergency diesel generators without the fuel oil transfer pumps. 3.4.39 Ic-261-06 upgrades the CT to a "CT2B" which provides dual processors, printer buffer, better printer, and improved software (EPROMS). The modification was approved with the provision that an SMP be utilized to install the new equipment and verify the software. This modification was needed to improve the CT time response as well as provide desired interface with the new computer system. Syunary of Safety Evaluation: The CT upgrade did not g iemove any existing RMS functions bat improves time 5 response and printer response. An SMP was required to verify correct system operation after modification. I I 24 s1
3.4.40 03-162 (tinit 1), !!airi Contr ol Board. The modification changed safeguards status light power supplies to power ' Channel I with the led instrument bus, 2 with the white, 3 with the blue hus, and Channel 4 with the yellow bus. Previously, Channels 1 and 3 were powered by the white bus and Channels 2 and 4 wete powered by { the yellow bus. s Summary of Safety Evaluation: Bictable trip status lights provide iridication of logic matrix relay lB a positions only. Operation of matrix relays is not affected by this modification. Status light operation remains the same, except after loss of power. Indication of a loss of instrument bus power is I provided primarily by channel alert annunciators. The modification does not pose an unreviewed safety I question in that there is no increase in the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction, or for a malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated. The margin I of safety as defined in the Technical Specification is not reduced. 3.4.41 85-189 (Unit 2), Auxiliary Coolant System. This modification added a 2" bypass (globe valve) around 2-742. Summary of Safety Evaluation: The modification has no eTfect on the sate operation of the plant because all work was done in accotdance with the requirements of I B31.1-1967 and NRC El Dulletin 79-14 (for seismic requirements). The full flow to the refueling water storage tank is not affected. The bypass valve is ~ locked shut to prevent inadvertent crossflow between the containment sump and refueling water storage tank. The bypass globe valve has as good or better shutoff / sealing characteristics as the 742 valve The flow is I from under the seat and only sees RWST pressure. The valve ill be shut during an accident; therefore, no double packing and leakoff is provided. No Technical Specification changes are r equired. 3.4.42 1C-324^ (Common), Auxiliary feedwater. The modification installed new pressure transmitters on the suction header of I'38A&B, motor-dr iven auxiliary feed pumps. 25
E i Summaty of Salety Evaluation: Design and installation g i of the siew ptensure trausmitters and their pip ag B connections meet or exceed original system req itements and therebv ensure that the integrity of the au . ial y 3 feedwater system is not reduced. B
Ihis modification was instalh d in 1984 and is now documented with modifications installed this year.
3.4.43 10-245* (Unit 2), Reactor vessel Level Indication. The iiRITication iiiistalled f ull range reactor vessel level
~
3 sensing and indication using diffcrential pressure. 5 Summary of Safety Evaluation: Design, installation, Eri~d testitig requirements meet or exceed those specified for original plant construction. Loss of reactor - coolant system inventory on level system break is limited to less than normal char ging inventory by small l size restticting flow orifices on both upper and lower 15 tap connections.
*This modification was installed in 1984 and is now documented with modifications installed this year, 3.4.44 1C-218* (Unit _l) & IC-219 (Unit 2), Heactor Coolant System Pressure. The requests installed a wide range pressure monitoring system for each unit in accordance with Short-Ter m TM1 Lessons Lean ned requir ements.
Summary of Safety Evaluation: The modifications provide redundant wide range (0-3000 psig) reactor g coolant pressure transmitters tc fulfill the redundant g inputs to the subcooling monitors required by NUREG-0578 and Regulatory Guide 1.97. , _
*This modification was installed in 1904 and is now documented with modifications installed this year.
3.4.45 IC-288 (Unit 11, Pressurizer Safety Valve Direct Position IniII2ation. This modification installed position switches on each pressurizer safety valve to a provide direct indication of valve position. Position g indication was previously provided by an acoustic monitoring systeu but was unsatisfactory because it did not meet environmental qualification requirements. Appr oval of the direct position indication system was recommended subject to the successful qualification of all components and vetification that installation clearances for the position switches ar e adequate. I I 6 5
Summary of Safety Evaluation: The system only provides - indication; no control functions, and is therefore, not l nuclear safety related. The system's importance to ^ safety is recognized and therefore seismic,
~
environmental qualification, and single failure criteria apply to the extent prt.ticable. 3.4.46 82-107 (Unit 2), Atmospheric Steam Dump. The modification installed bushings on the fo.tr spacers in the steam dump valve actuators and reduced closing I spring precompression by modifying the spring adjusting plate. The modification was necessary because the atmospheric steam dumps tend to stick in the closed position, particularly if steam pressure is high. The I horizontal mounting of the positioner / valve stem compounds the problem.
~
I Summary of Safety Evaluation: The chanes, reduce the force required to open an atmospheric dur-p valve, but do not prevent reclosure since there is still adequate I spring force available for va;ve shutoff. frictional forces in the actuator should improve actuator operation in both the opening and closing Reducing directions. 3.4.47 86-049 (Common), Fire Protection System. The modification installed orifice plates at the base of all fire protection hoses to reduce flowing paessures to 100 psig, with a design flow of 100 gpm for class II standpipes. Summary of Safety Evaluation: The modification is a change to the facility as described in the FSAR.
~
The addition of orifice plates is necessary to meet requirements of NFPA codes WE has voluntarily committed to. This addition decreases the chance for a hose handling problem caused by high pressure from the new electric motor-driven fire protection system pump. The decrease in pressure does not pose a safety problem unless serious degradation of the fire pump occurs. The new pressure will be in the range set by the NFPA code. This change does not pose an unreviewed safety question The probability of o:currence or the consequences of an accident malfunction or equipment important to safety is not increased. The change does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction which has not been previously evaluated, The margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications is not reduced. {SER 86-048) 27
B 3.4.48 86-045 (Unit 2), Reactor Coolant System. The g modification permits installation of nozzle dams in the a linit 2 steam generators to provide a positive barrier which allows RCS levels to be independent of steam generator maintenance operations. The basic design of the dam consists of two ring segments which are welded to the steam generator channelhead cladding upon which the two active seals and one passive seal are installed. The diaphragm seals are placed on the aluminum support frame prior to g insertion into the hot and cold leg nozzles. Each 3 steam generator is provided with a control console which provides leak detection capability. The control console is equipped with both audio and visual alarm functions. Summary of Safety Evaluation: Discussion of Postulated Events: The operating conditions of the plant are unaffected by the use of nozzle dams since the dams are used only during reactor shutdown. The nozzle dam a system is designed te ~!0 psig with safety factors 5 greater than 2. Each dam was hydrostatically tested to 25 psig. When installed, each nozzle dam is under a static loading of 13 psig, which corresponds to a load of 9800 pounds on the dam structure, suppor+ frame, and nozzle ring or ring segments. For the evaluation, an ever,t is postulated baced upon the worst case consequences of the use of nozzle dams. Since the nozzle dam is a single barrier between the a open channelhead and the reactor primary coolant, the g' worst case consequenzes are taken to be the loss of primary coolant and draindowr. of the flooded reactor , cavity and 5'rT. These consequences are postulated l l based on the instantaneous and complete failure of a 5' ( siagle nozzle dam. The failure postulaM J is considered extremely unlikely l due to the safety factors in design and the structural l loads emected. The safety factors will also allow the I nozzle dams to withstand minor dynamic loadings caused by RHR and movement within the cavity. 1
\nalysis of Total Nozzle Dam Failure:
Fail fe of a . nozzle dam would result in draining the volume of the l ilooded cavity and spent fuel pool under their own head through the open steam generator manway. The worst esse g under these conditions would be a failure in either E reactor hot leg. This results in the fastest draindown i rate since the reactor coolant pump in the reactor cold leg would act as a significant flow restrictor if a cold leg nozzle dam failed. Bl 28 g, w>
I
- E An engineering analysis was performed on the draindown E rate of the flooded cavity and SFP in the event of a nozzle dam failure in a reactor hot leg. The scenario postulated assumes failure of the nozzle dam at time I t=0 followed by a draindown of the coolant volumes under their own head. The scenarios developed indicate that an assembly can . returned to a safe position within the time t=12 minutes 24 seconds. This corresonnds I to the time at which the coolant elevation is at the maximum manipulator / assembly elevation of 55'2". As a result of the maximum horizontal travel distance that I may be required to traverse the refueling cavity, the fuel assembly in the cavity is expected to tc the more limiting case. In the situation where the assembly in I question is in the SFP, i.e., all core assemblies are in a safe position, the draindre of the SFP can be prevented by isolating the SFF from the cavity. This will reduce the volume of contaminated coolant released I by approximately 50%. Draining of the SFP and flooded cavity will result in an estimated 500,000 -11 ors of contaminated c olant released through the steam I generator manway into the containment. ,
In all cases, the active fuel will be covered. The geometry of the RCS and RV results in a coobnt level of approximately 6'6" over the top-of-corf elevation of 30'6" No change in the reactor's suberitical I condition will result and no release of radiation or contamination to the eraironment is predicted. Since the analysis is for a bounding case, the assumptions taken are conservative and as such, the calculated B draindown rates are conservative. Additional sources of coolant in the pressurizer and fuel transfer canal are available and will lengthen the actual draindown ,
~
time. The response times are conservatively estimated. As estimated, these response times approximate the time required to perform the actual transfer operations. Under actual conditions, the I response time would be significantly less. Thus, total scenario time and personnel exposure would be much less than implied by this cnalysis. Seismic Loading: Under a seismic laading, the nozzle ' dam will act as a rigid body in conjunction with the steam generator. Since the steam generator is I restrained from motion during such an event, the only credible increase in nozzle dam loading would result from the dynamic load caused by shifting coolant in the I- cavity. The geometry of the cavity is such that a maximum 1 M" increase in head above the normal 30' could result before the coolant spills over the edge of the cavity. This pressure (31'4") is well below the I values of the nozzle dam hydrostatu test pressure of 25 psig (60') and ring segnent load test pressure of 30 psig (70'). Thus, the nozzle dam would not fail. 29 I
E Dropping of Upper Internals: A conceptual evaluation determined that even in the event this shock was sufficient to fail the nozzle dam, the result would be a situation no more severe than the draindown event g postulated. Consequently, the analysis for draindown 3 of the cavity would remain valid as a worst case. Attachment Failure: The strength of the attachment is directly related to the strength of the bonding between cladding and base metal. A low heat cladding process ; does not penetrate deeply into the base metal but does result in fusion with the base metal. This process
$i Wi avoids dilution through mixing, which could reduce the corrosion resistance of the cladding. The degree of g penetration, however, does not affect the strength of E the bonding, i.e., only fusion is required for bond strength. Any delamination which might exist is expected to occur along the edges of the bead, i.e.,
between two beads and the base metal. This area is a l very small part of the total clad area (less than 5%). Potential Debonding of Cladding: Tests and analyses performed by the vendor on the proposed welding process , show that the base metal temperature will not be g' greater than 500 F during welding, wh.ch is less than RCS operating temperature. In addition, the 5 , heat-affected zone will not extend into the base n.etal J and no phase changes or migration at grain boundaries will occur as a result. Consequently, if debonding already exists, future operational thermal cycles may propagate cracks at the bond lines, but the welding of g segments will not contribute to the potential for g further degradation of the interface bonding. A structural evaluation was performed by the vendor assuming that a 1" x 2" portion of the clad was deboaded directly under the ring segment. The 5 analysis, under dam operating loads, has shown that the ring segment is comparatively rigid and distributes the stresses into the bonded regions only, and that the debonded area essentially acts as a soft spot under the ring where no stresses are transferred. It was g concluded that the ring segment weldments and g associated dam operational loads can easily accommodate local debonding, even directly underneath the segments themselves. It was further noted that only a bonding surface on the order of one square inch is required to withstand the operational load. While the failure of a nozzle dam as the result of debonding is not expected, such a failure would not be any more severe than the postulated draindown everit. g The analysis for draindown of the cavity would remain 5 valid as a worst case. I 30 g a:
Reactor Coolant Pump Start: In the event of an inadvertent startup of an RCP, the nozzle dam in the RV i cold leg would be subjected to a pressure opposite to the design load. As the pump starts, the pressure in . the cold leg decreases until the vapor pressure of the I coolant is reached. At this point, pump cavitation L- begins and the cold leg press"re remains constant. For pure water at 68 F, this pressure is 0.34 psia. The
" resultant pressure on the nozzle dam is then the difference between atmospheric and vapor pressure; i 14.4 psia in the opposite direction to the design loading of 20 psid. A conceptual analysis indicated that this pressure will result in reversing tensile lo is into compression and compressive loads into I tension. Since metals are generally stronger under compression, failure is not expected. Of special concern are the locking pins securing the dam I segments. The pins are normally under tension with the shank under shear loading. In this event, the tensile load will be reduced and possibly removed, while the I shank remains in shear at a loading less than design.
For these reasons, the pins will not fail. While it is not probable the EPDM diaphragm seal would be damaged due to reduced pressure in the cold leg, < I this situation would be no more severe than the postulated draindown event. This change does not pose an unreviewed safety question. The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety is not increased. The change does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction which has not been previously evaluated. - The margin of safety as iefined in the Technical Specification is not reduced. (SER 86-047) 3.4.49 84-048-01 (Common), Radwaste Steam System. This modification routed the radwaste steam line in the area of the operating floor northeast quadrant to avoid interferences with the component cooling heat exchanger I modifications. Summary of Safety Evaluation: This addendum constitutes a change to the facility as described in the FSAR. The revised routing of the radwaste steam lines does not affect the safe operation of the plant. This conclusion is based upon the following considerations: (1) the work was done in accordance with the original codes (B31.1-1967, 1969, and 1971). (2) The modification was analyzed for deadweight, thermal, and seismic loadings. (3) Analyses were done-to show that the modified design does not change the conclusions of the S&W rupture analysis report dated May 4, 1983, and PBNP FSAR Appendix E. 11
I The modification addendum does not pose an unreviewed safety question. There is no increase in the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to g safety. Lere is not a possibility for an accident or g malfunction of a different type than previously-evaluated. The margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications is not reduced. 3.4.50 86-002 (Unit 1) & 86-003 (Unit 2), Waste Disposal System. The modification installed an isolation valve g test connec tion, piping, valve and threaded cap outside 3 of containment between valve 1793 and valve 1713. The modification meets a regulatory commitment with respect to 10 CFR 50 Appendix J leakage testing. Summary of Safety Evaluation: The modification does not affect the safe operation of the plant because (1) All work was done to the requirements of B31.1-1967; l (2) the tap was designed for seismic considerations;
- (3) the resulting configuration meets or exceeds 3 l shutoff requirements for the containment boundary and 5 l was verified by testing.
No Technical Specifica' ion changes are required for l this modification. 3.4.51 86-007 (Unit 2), Steam Generator Blowdown System. The j modification removes the "T" signal from valves 2042 and 2045 by eliminating relay 2045X contacts from the valve control circuit. This also removes the high 3 radiation auto close feature for these valves. The g pressure interlock from PS-5955 will not be affected by the modification. g l Summary of Safety Evaluation: Although the steam B l generator blowdown line is part of the Appendix E l analycis, there is no safety equipment in the area and g l the "T" signal on CV-2042/2045 has nothing to do with 3 i protection from this failure. In accordance with FSAR Chapter 5.2, " Containment l Isolatiei System," this line penetration is a class 4 l penetrataon which requires at least one manual isolation ! valve located outside of containment in conjunction with the closed system inside containment. With removal of the "T" signal from CV-2042/2045, the combination of the CV-5958/5959 (inside containment) and the blowdown g I system being a closed system exceed the requirements for 3 a class 4 penetration, The steam generator blowdown l l I I l l 32 g es . 1
line isolation valves inside containment (CV-5958 and 5959) receive an auto-close signal on receipt of a high L radiation signal from RE-219 or RE-222 via the same safeguards circuit as CV-2042 and 2045. The proposed modification will not affect the auto-close feature of CV-5958 and 5959. Therefore, this modification will not increase the probability of an effluent release via the I steam generator blowdown system. Therefore, removal of the "T" signal from CV-2042/2045 does not involve a change in the Technical Specifications nor does it constitute an unreviewed safety question. 3.4.52 86-028 (Unit 1) & 86-027 (Unit 2), Reactor Protection. These modifications installed jumpers between the R9 I resistor mounting stud and the dual source casing in the reactor protection drawers to minimize the affects J-of electronic " noise." Summary of Safety Evaluation: The modifications help to provide a more stable and reliable input signal to I the reactor protection circuits from the byp r-manifold RTDs. The grounding of the mounting post bes not affect circuit operation in any way. The I modifications do not constitute an unreviewed safety question and do not require a change to the Technical Specifications. 3.4.53 85-241 (Unit 1), Handling Equipment / Fixtures. This modification changes the method of attaching the reactor vessel flange protective ring to the internals lifting rig by installing a quarter turn lock to replace the existing threaded adapters. Summary of Safety Evaluation: The change does not _ structurally degrade the integrity of the protective ring pick-points. 3.4.54 MR 86-28, Unit 1, Reactor Protection System. This modification made the lead resistances for the TC RTD qual and allow the output of the Dana amplifier to be consistent with its RTD input. Summary of Safety Evaluation: Swapping of the common leads makes the lead resistances of the RTDs equal; thus providing a better indication of actual temperature and making the Dana amplifier output consistent with the other cold leg RTD outputs. Swapping of the leads does not degrade the circuit operation in any way. This modification does not result in an unreviewed safety question nor does it affect a previously reviewed safety question. No changes to Technical specifications are required. 33
I 3.4.55 86-017 (Common), Instru.nent Air / Service Air Systems. This modification installed a cross-tie between the service air and instrument air systems (3/4" diameter line) to provide continuous feed to the instrument air system from service air. Summary of Safety Evaluation: The modification does not affect the safe operation of the plant because: (1) all work was performed in accordance with the requirements of B31.1-1967; (2) the cross-tie will not cause a loss of instrument air; (3) the cross-tie g lowers instrument air compressor use, thus improves 5 compressor maintenance requirements and reliabil.ity. No Technical Specification changes are required for this modification. 3.4.56 84-254 (Common), Plant Process Computers. The modification replaced the existing P-250 computer system with a new system (including multiplexer hardware, host computers, printers, CRTs, and support g peripherals) in order to meet NUREG-0696 and 0737 g requirements. Summary of Safety Evaluation: This computer complex performs the function of the safety assessment system (SAS) as required in NUREG-0737 and the plant process computer system (PPCS). Redundant displays will be available in the TSC, the EOF, and the control room. A seismically qualified front-end data acquisition system was also included to provide a tie-in to Class 1E systems. The design of SAS/PPCS is consistent with present . operating philosophy of providing supplementary g information and does not change any accident analysis presently considered in the FSAR. This also does not constitute an unreviewed safety question and no changes g to the Technical Specifications are required. W 3.4.57 85-179 (Common), Instrument Buses. The radification g reconnected the automatic synchronization feature on the Elgar inverters (DYOC&D, 1&2 DYO3, and 1&2DYO4). g The synchronization signal was taken from lighting panel 36E, breaker 12, which supplies emergency lighting to the area of the inverters; a safeguards powered source. Summary of Safety Evaluation: The connection of all inverters to the same external synchronizing source will not adversely affect the inverter operation. If the external synchronizing signal increases or decreases in supply voltage. or deviates in frequency past preset 34 5 s
i I l I limits, the inverter reference frequency will switch from " external syne" to " internal sync" and the output frequency is slowly adjusted toward the internal reference ftequency. No perturbation in instrument operation should be felt on the buses, which are being powered by these inverters when this switch occurs (reference Elgar Corporation, Inverter technical manual, Section 4.6.2). External synchronization signal connec-tion was controlled by special maintenance procedure since it required the shifting of the instrument buses and connections within the inverter. An FSAR change I is not required nor is a Technical Specification change required. The modification does not constitute an unreviewed safety question. 3.4.58 86-093 (Unit 2), Reactor Protection System. The modification relocated the reactor trip breaker test I pushbuttons for the shunt trip and shunt block functions on the panels in the rod drive rooms. Summary of Safety Evaluation: No evaluation required. I Relocation of the shunt trip and shunt block pushbuttons to the side of the shunt trip panel did not change their intended function or design purpose. The I exact location of these pushbuttons is not described in the FSAR because it is not important to their function. The design of the shunt trip panel as seismic is maintained. 3.4.59 85-280-02 (Unit 2), Containment. The addendum to the j modification installed a leak verification system composed of tubing connected to the post-accident g containment ventilation system. Summary of Safety Evaluation: The modification constituted changes to the facility as described in the FSAR. Installation of this modification will have no effect upon the containment boundary during periods when containment integrity is established if the proper I administrative controls are followed. FSAR Figure 5.3.1 will be revised to show attachment points of the leak verification system. I These changes do not pose an unreviewed safety question. The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment I important to safety is not increased. The change does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction which has not been previously evaluated. I The margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications is not reduced. (SER 86-054) I I
e B 3.4,60 MR 85-090, Amphenol Connectors for the Containment g polar Crane (Unit 2). Quick disconnect connectors were E added to the radio control / crane control interface to aid in mainenance efficiency. Summary of Safety Evaluation: The addition of amphenol connectors to the receiver unit for the polar crane provides for easy installation and removal of the l receiver unit. This increases the availability of the W crane. No change to the plant FSAR or plant Technical Specifications is required. This does not constitute g an unreviewed safety question. The amphenol connectors g used are equivalent to or better than the existing terminal strip connections and do not alter the failure mode of the crane. 3.4.61 MR 84-019, ' ternate DC Control Power to the Emergency Diesel Generators (common). The modification installed l 125 V DC control power cables between station batteries W D105 and D106 and emergency diesel generator control panels C34 and C35. The inodification provided isolation g via transfer switches in order to isolate the cabling g during normal plant operation. The cabling must be routed through non-Class 1 plant areas. The modific:ation is required in order to meet Appendix "R" fire protection requirements concerning separation of cabling to safe shutdown equipment such that an alternate means of starting the diesel generators is g provided, 5 Summary of Safety Evaluation: All of the controls, a accessories, and systems required to start and operate the diesel generators are contained in the diesel g generator room except for a DC power supply. The , present DC supplies for both units is f rom the cable g spreading room and the main control room. Power cables W for both units also pass through the 4.16 kV switchgear room and the auxiliary feed pump room. A fire in any of g these common areas had the potential of severing the DC g power supply and rendering both diesel generators inoperable. This modification provided an alternate source of DC power to each diesel generator. The addition of this source increases the reliability of the diesel generators and improves the safety of the plant. In implementation of this modification, positive measures were taken to ensure adequate separation between normal g and alternate sources and isolation at the transfer g panel. Control of the change and testing were done via a special maintenance procedure. This change does not involve an unreviewed safety question and does not involve a change to the plant Technical Specifications. I 36 g
=
3.4.62 I C-30(9 Containment Spray Flow Indication (Unit 2). This modification installed flow orifices, l transmitters, and associated instrumentation to allow -' for measuring containment spray discharge header flow. Flow information was added in the control room. I Summary of Safety Evaluation: Engineering analyses L-were performed to verify that orifice flange
- installation did not degrade the integrity of the containment spray system. This included a seismic review / analysis of the piping and verification that I orifice plate differential pressure will not reduce spray flow below design requirements.
Material and installation meets or exceeds original system specifications and code requirements. - 3.5 Temporary Modifications NOTE: THE 1984 TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS INCLUDED BELOW WERE I INADVERTENTLY OMITTED FROM THE 1984 ANNUAL REPORT AND ARE INCLUDED HERE FOR INFORMATION. 3.5.1 TM 84-08 (Unit 1), HVAC. The temporary modification lifted leads on W35 PAB supply air fan to prevent the fan's outside air damper from opening during the period. Only one fan heater was operable and the unit I placed on recirculation (installed 01/31/84; removed 02/08/84). Summary of Safety Evaluation: The temporary modification is a change to the facility as described in the FSAR.
~
This temporary modification isolated air flow to the PAB supply fan (W35) and initiated recire flow (approximately 62% of normal flow) due to subzero outdoor air temperatures. The FSAR in Section 9.6.3, in regard to the auxiliary building vent system states, " Sufficient outside air is supplied to maintain a once through system." The facility, as described by the above sentence, was altered by the temporary modification. The effect of this temporary change would have been to reduce air changing rate and lower the wbsolute air pressure inside the PAB. This would not constitute an unreviewed safety question because the FSAR does not reference the air changing rate in the safety analysis section. In addition, a lower than atmosphere pressure inside the PAB is intentionally maintained. The FSAR, in Section 14.21 (Fuel Handling Accidents), states, "The whole aody dose . to personnel in the fuel storage building, were they to remain in the 37
I accident area, would be 4,0 REH. [Thej dose is l calculated on the basis of the ... area ventilation W rate, 21,000 cfm, and 0.5 REM /MPC (Xe-133)." The ventilation : ate referenced in this section vould be affected by a change in absolute air pressure inside the PAB. However, the effect on the analysis is negligible and no unreviewed safety question exists. The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to I safety le not inciensed. The change does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction which has not been previously evaluated. The margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications is g not educed. ISER_86-077) g 3.5.2 TH 84-29 (Unit lj,, Rod Position Indication, The temporary modification jumpered the rod bottom bistable for Rod C9 (installed April 18, 1984; removed May 18, 1984). Summary of Safety Evaluation: The RPIs will be available. The rod bottom bistable provides no protective function for nuclear safety. NIS power a range runback will still be available. g 3.5.3 TM 84-40 (Common), Radwaste System. A differential pressure gauge was installed across the tube side of the reboiler heat exchanger utilizing the Calgon injection line at valve BE-130 for the high pressure leg and an unnumbered high point vent valve at the 3 bottoms return line penetration into the rebo11er 3 output for the low pressure leg. (The modification was removed on January 3, 1985.) g Summary of Safety Evaluation: The principal concern with this temporary modification would be the effect of a leak in the pressure sensing line. The components g used will be equal to the presently used instrument 5 lines and as described in the technical ieview will have a pressure rating greater than the cystem design pressure. Additionally, the sensing lines and gauge will be valved out at all times except when data is being trien, thus further reducing the chance of unobserved leakage. Any leakage that might develop would be collected in sump tank Tl? and would be handled as described in FSAR 14. 2. No Technical Specification changes are required and no unreviewed g safety questions are initiated. 3 I I 33 5 w
I I 3.5.4 TM 84-43 (Commonl, Service Water System. The temporary modification installed a spoolpiece from the bonnet of valve 2-819A to the two-inch stub connection on the service water inlet to the SFP HXs to discharge "B" holdup tank per WMTP 11.30. The temporary modification was required to implement Modification Request 83-125 (installed June 2 , 1984: removed June 24, 1984). Summary of Safety Evaluation: The auxiliary coolant / service water crossconnect will be e temporary installation. A seismic evaluation of the service I water connection and a hydrostatic test will be performed to ensure the integrity of the two systems is not degraded. Use of the crossconnect will be I controlled by procedure. Corrosion effects on the carbon steel piping will be negligible due to the short time duration and flushing action of the service water flow. 3.5.5 TM 84-62 (Unit 1), Rod Control. The temporary
.g modifica! ion removed the automatic rod withdrawal block j defeat function from the turbine runback defeat switch. (The modification was removed June 7, 1985.)
Summary of Safety healuation: By liftina wire No. 159 from the turbine runbaH / rod stop defeat switch (switch No. 3-S) termitil block in RPI rack 1C120, any g possibility for automatic rod withdrawal with an actual 5 dropped rod is eliminated. There no longer will exist a bypass of this function as was available when the turbine runback / rod stop defeat switch was selected to I " defeat." The temporary modification will ensure that the requirement of FSAR 14.1.3, " Rod Cluster Control Assembly (RCCA) Drop," concerning automatic rod withdrawal block is strictly maintained, The lifted I lead is controlled by the temporary modification procedure which also delineates the installation process. This temporary modification does not require I a change to Technical Specification and does not constitute an unreviewed safety question. The safety concern of selecting the turbine runback / rod stop defeat switch to " defeat" in connection with blocking turbine runback has been answered by the July 6, 1984, telephone conversation between PBNP staff and i Westinghouse. It has been concluded that turbine runback is not necessary to demonstrate core protection provided automatic rod withdrawal stop is in effect. I Therefore, operation of the turbine runback / rod stop defeat switch to " defeat" is considered satisfactory for dealing with spurious rod position indications when the temporary modi.fication is performed. I 8 39 I
I 3.5.6 TM 84-72 (Unit 2), Incore Flux Mapping System. The g temporary modification installed 36 special 31 adapter / bonnet los pressure seals at the seal table (installed October 16, 1984; removed Noved>er 2, gi 1984). g Summary of Safety Evaluation: The design of the low i pressure seals meets or exceeds the origir.a1 design ; specifications. No unreviewed safety question exists. i 3.5.7 TM 84-76 (Unit 2), Reactor Protection System. The g modit'ication installed 3/8" SS Swagelok plugs in 8 g; bypass manifold RTD holes. (The modification was removed on October 15,1985, when the spare RTDs were , installed perwenently per MR 85-210.) Summary of Safety Evaluation: Plugging 8 of 20 bypass manifold RTD positions with stainless steel Swagelok E plugs will meet or exceed RCS design ratings and will 5 not degrade system integrity. The following RTD positions are being plugged: 2TE-406A&B, 2TE-408A&B, 2TE-409A&3, 2TE-410A&B. RTDs 2TE-409A&B and 2TE-410A&B are not used to provide an input to any circuit / system. RTDs 2TE-406A&B and 2TE-408A&B and installed spares and serve as backup for the bypass loop RTDs that provide an input into the RPS. Not installing these RTDs will reduce the g flexibility of the system by reducing the number of 3 installed t, pares. However, this will not adversely affect the performance or the capability of the RPS. Since only the 8 active bypass loop RTDs are considered in the FSAR safety analysis, not installing the previously listed RTDs and plugging their bypaas manifold position will not increase the probability of a previously reviewed safety question nor create an unreviewed safety question. 3.5.8 TM 84-80 (Unit 2), Incore Flux Mapping System. The modification installed a 5/8" Swagelok cap on the thimble tube conduit at the seal table at core location I-5. (The modification was removed October 17, 1985.) Summary of Safety Evaluation: The modification does l not pose an unreviewed safety question. The loss of 5 one thimble tube will not prevent the acquisition of adequate flux mapping data nor will it reach the limit 3 of two thimbles per quadrant as specified in g TS 15.3.11. The primary system pressure boundary at the seal table is adequately maintained with the use of the tubing cap as described in the modification. No Technical Specification changes are required. (SER 86-015) 40 g a
I 3.5.9 TH 84-84 (Unit 2J, Reactor Protection System. The I'- modification hooked up spare blue channel RTD 2TE-407B to feed the primary yellow protection rack temperature (The modification was removed October 19, I circuits. 1985.) Suinmary of Safety Evaluation: The modification reconnects the spare bypass RTDs from their present blue instrument cabling to spare yellow instrument cabling, both of which exist in the same loop bypass I RTD jur,etion boxes, and then connects the spare RTDs into the operational yellow instrument loop. The reconnection from blue to yellow cabling will not change the existing separation (physical / electrical) .I which presently exists between the blue and yellow instrument cabling; and placing the spare RTD into
~
operation will also maintain the yellow loop I instrt: mentation equivalency. The modification does not constitute an unreviewed safety question and does not require a change to the Technical Specifications. control of the instal 19 tion of the modification will be I accomplished via radiation work permit and maintenance work request with attached sketch of the configuration. (SER 86-016) I. 3.5.10 TM 84-86 (Unit 1), Rod Position Indication. The temporary modification jumpers the bottom bistable for rod F8. (The modification was removed May 21, 1985.) Summary of Safety Evaluation: Technical Specification 15.3.10 allows one control rod to be I inoperable including the rod position indication, The balance of the RPI rod drop system will be operable. The NIS rod drop system will also be operable. ~ (SER 86-017) I 3.5.11 TM 85-05 (Commonl, Ventilation. The modification installed a relay in the control circuit from the W14A _I control room emergency filter fan in series with a flow switch relay normally closed contact and included a delay open contact in parallel with the fan flow switch I seal-in contact (installed February 7, 1985; removed July 10, 1986). Summary of Safety Evaluation: Implementation of the temporary modification corrects the problem with the W14A fan tripping due to excessive turbulent flow I transients experienced by its respective flow discharge switch. Use of qualified materials maintains reliability of the system. Added features of the modification ensure continuous fan cperation and I automatic switchover in both manual and automatic cperating modes. Failures in all cases would result in conservative action compared to potential failure with I
I the present configuration. The temporary modification l does not constitute an unreviewed safety question and W does not require a change in Technical Specifications. Installation is controlled via written and approved instructions. 3.5.12 TH 85-17 (Unit 1), Upper Internals Storage Stand. The temporary modification installed four spacers on top of the upper internals storage stand in the refueling cavity to provide sufficient clearance under the upper internals when they are placed in the stand (installed g March 27, 1585; removed May 27, 1985). 3 Summary of Safety Evaluation: The control rod guide a tube split pin replacement project required that g seven-inch clearance exist between the bottom of the lower guide tube flange and the cavity floor. Four, 1 " stainless steel plates were placed on the internals storage stand ring (one above each leg) to provide this required clearance. The spacers had side tabs to prevent them from moving. The spacers remained on the g storage stand during core unload and reload. A 50.59 evaluation was previously performed for one foot 5 spacers (designed by Westinghouse). The 1\" spacers are less likely to fail than the l' spacers. The safety aspects were reviewed and it was concluded that there is no impact on refueling Technical Specifications; there is no possibility of increasing E the likelihood of the fuel handling accidents analyzed E in the FSAk; and the possibility of an unanalyzed accident was created. 3.5.13 TM 85-19 (Unit 1), Incore Flux Mapping System. The modification installs 36 new special adapter / bonnet low pressure seals at the incore flux mapping seal table (installed April 11, 1985; removed May 31, 1985). Summary of Safety Evaluation: The difference in g elevations of the reactor vessel flange and the seal 3 table is such that if the seals did not function and the installed push rods were ejected, the water in the a cavity would drain to a level of the seal table. The g seal table is at El. 41'. The reactor vessel flange is at El. 40'-7.125". Thus, the core would remain covered at all times. The special adapter / bonnet low pressure seals are made up of Swagelok fittings and are compatible with the Swagelok ferrules on the thimble-tube conduits. Thus, the possibility of damaging the g ferrules i s minimized. If a fuel assembly was being 5 moved when a low pressure seal failure occurred, there would be sufficient time to place the fuel assembly
. back into the vessel and remain covered.
11 42 g
E 3.5.14 85-35 (Unit 1), Instrument Buses. The modification connects receptacles for 1DYO3 in 120 V instrument bus 1Y203 to permit post-maintenance testing. After the test was completed, the unqualified receptacles and I load were removed (installed June 28, 1985; removed
.Tuly 3, 1985).
Summary of Safety Evaluation: Connection of receptacles to spare breaker #6 in 1Y203 will temporarily place an unqualified load onto a qualified source. This is satisfactory for testing the inverter I after post-maintenance as long as there are no other
- qualified loads placed on the inverter at the same time. The maintenance and post-maintenance testing lI procedures specified 1DYO3 not be used as a qualified power supply until testing is satisfactorily completed.
i The temporary modification does not pose an unreviewed I safety question and does not require a change in the Technical Specifications. 3.5.15 TM 85-39 (Unit 1), Reactor Protection System. The I temporary modification swapped wires for TE-402B (white Tcold channel) to equalize lead resistances (installed July 12,1985). Summary of Safety Evaluation: Swapping of the common leads makes the lead resistances of the RTDs equal; thus providing a better indication of actual I temperature and making the Dana amplifier output consistent with the other cold leg RTD outputs. Swapping of the leads will not degrade the circuit I operation in any way. This temporary modification will not result in an unreviewed safety question nor affect a previously reviewed safety question. No changes to - Technical Specifications are required. (SER 86-036) I 3.5.16 TM 85-52 (Unit 1), Residual Heat Removal System. The I temporary modification installed pressure gauges on Valves 1-856A&B (refueling water storage tank to RHR pump suction) to deterinine if the valve bonnets were being pressurized during plant cycles (installed I September 4, 1985). Summary of Safety Evaluation: The modification alters the upper bonnet assembly pressure boundary for the subject valves. This is accomplished by adding a gauge on the packing leakoff connection and removing the sealing capability from the lower packing set. I I I
I The subject valves are located in the line to the RilR g pump suction f r om the RWST. The valves serve two 3 functions. They serve as a maintenance ir,olation valve for the Riin pumps and also provide a secondary barrier 3 for isolating the RWST from recirculation fluid flow g
- l. (the primary barrier is the check valve). These valves j ere not containment isolation valves.
i l W l During normal operatlon, the subject valves are open. l They are shut just prior to placing the RllR system into normal decay heat removal service or in the event of a DBA, just prior to establishing recirculation flow. The modificat. ion will not affect the performance of the valve bonnet assembly sealing capabilities. Installation of the gauge will be seismic. The pressure / temperature rating of the components will be equal to or bettet than the high pressure side of the valve. The overall sealing characteristics of the packing was not degraded as the lower packing set has proven to not. be needed. Installation will not impact the operation of the valve. It should be noted that the only time the valve bonnet assembly could be exposed to recirculation fluid flow - is when both the downstream check valve and the subject valve discs leak. Thus, any leakage would be extremely small and would be into the monitored and filtered E primary auxiliary building leak path prior to release. E The modification does not present any unreviewed safety g questions nor does it require a change to the Technical g Specifications. 3.5.17 TM 85-54 (Unit 1), Rod Position Indication System. The temporary modification jumpered the rod bottom bistable for Rod F6 (installed September 16, 1985; removed May 16, 1986). Summary of Safety Evaluation: The NIS rod drop system will be operable. Since the NIS is redundant to the a rod pooition indication system in detecting a dropped g RCCA, the NIS is fully capable of providing a turbine runback when a dropped RCCA occurs. 3.5.18 TM 85-059 (Unit 1), RMS, The TM provided a temporary AC power supply from lighting panel 10L to improve DAM signal processing. The temporary modification had been installed on September 30, 1985. I L I 44 g a
~ Summary of Safety Evaluation: The temporary modification is a change to the facility as described in the FSAR. The temporary modification removed RMS dats acquisition module (DAM) #3, C253, from its normal power supply, 1Y114, and connected it to lighting panel 10L. The original safety evaluation report stated that ~ C253 has an internal battery-supplied backup power I
- supply which will provide for eight hours of operation, which will provide sufficient time to reenergize C253 from an AC power supply.
The backup battery maintains power to the microprocessor unit to allow for data acquisition and retrieval. It will not, however, provide power to operate any pumps I powered from C253. Therefore, if power is lost to panel 10L the sample pump for 1RE-229, Unit 1 service water overboard monitor, will be lost and 1RE-229 will be out of service due to low sample flow. This condition is covered by RETS Section 15.7.3.A.2 requires grab samples to be collected and analyzed at least once every 12 hours if 1RE-229 is out of service. Addition-I ally, RETS requires that best efforts be made to restore
- 1RE-229 to service in 30 days. Therefore, the eight-hour time frame of the backup battery power supply is '
I still the limiting factor, and as stated previously, this will provide sufficient time to restore AC power to C253. , The change does not pose an unreviewed safety , question. The probability of occurrence or the I consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety is not increased. The change does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction which which has not been previously evaluated. The margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications is not reduced. (SER 86-050-01) 3.5.19 TM 85-66 (Unit 2), Incore Flux Mapping System. The temporary modification installed a b" Whitey ball valve and hose at seal table core location 15 to flush debris I from the subject thimble conduit (installed October 17, 1985; removed November 11, 1985). Summary of Safety Evaluatien: The modification uoes not involve an unreviewed safety question. The primary system pressure boundary was adequately maintained with the use of the 2500 psi ball valve and following the flush with a Swagelok plug. The flush h ne was constructed to catch a potentially radioactive piece of material and health physics instruments provided to detect and monitor the same. 45
I 3.5.20 TM 85-73 (Common), CVCS. The temporary modification l changes the power supply for one train of boric acid W tank level from 2MQ-400-to 1YO3 and 2YO3 (installed November 22, 1985; removed May 23, 1986). Summary of Safety Evaluation: Changing the power source for one train of boric acid tank level and associated circuitry from inverter 2MQ-400 to 1YO3 (Unit 1 and 2YO3 (Unit 2) will more than adequately maintain operability for that train of boric acid tank level. shifting the power source will place this one g train of boric acid tank level onto a qualified power 5 source, specifically the white instrument bus. Also, power source separation will still be maintained since the other boric acid tank level channel (s) are powered from red and yellow instrument bus power. Therefore, adequate train separation is maintained. Also, the additional loading to the white instrument bus will not degrade it as a qualified power source. The temporary modification does not constitute an 3 unreviewed safety question and does not require a 3 change to the Technical Specifications or the FSAR. 3.5.21 TM 85-82 (Unit 1), Rod Position Indication System. The temporary modification jumpered the rod bottom bistable for Rod 15 (installed December 30, 1985; removed ! May 14, 1986). Summary of Safety Evaluation: The NIS rod drop system will be operable. Since the NIS is redundant to the rod position indication system in detecting a dropped - RCCA, the NIS is fully capable of providing a turbine runback when a dropped RCCA occurs. , 3.5.22 TM 85-7S, Unit 1 Yellow RMS Power Supply 1Y114. The i temporary modification will install a filter capacitor across the 120 V isolation transformer supp y M the g i RMS system and neutral to minimize the short duration 3 spikes of approximately 60 V which have been observed in the out.put of the RMS isolation transformers. These l i voltage. spikes have adversely affected calibration l efforts and have induced stresses on the 120 V motor l insulation and RMS power supply components. A combination of capacitor types will be installed to determine the best combination. > l ! Summary of Safety Evaluation: Installation of this g temporary modification can result in an improved power g supply to the radiation monitoring system. Failure mechanisms are such that there would be no worse -{' perturbations on the system than already exist, and would give no additional perturbations. Therefore, I 46 1
a this installation does not present an unreviewed safety question, nor does it require a change to plant Technical Specifications. 3.5.23 TH 86-002 (Unit 2), Rod Position Indication. The modification installed a jumper on the rod bottom bistable of Rod Ill (installed January 8, 1986). - Summary of Safety Evaluation: Technical Specification IS.3.10.D.3.a allows for the failure (s) of the RPI(s). The balance of the RPI system will be I operable. The NIS rod drop system will also be operable. _SER ( 86-037) 3.5.24 TM 86-28 (Unit 2), Rod B6 Position Indication. The temporary modification jumpers relay 14 CR terminals 6&7 =- (wires 100 and 101) in RPI cabinet #3 to defeat the turbine runback signal from the rod bottom bistable I (installed April 15, 1986). Summary of Safety Eva' . tion: A 50.59 review is I required becaus: this temporary modification constitutes a change to the facility as described in the FSAR. TS 15.3.10.D.3.a allows for the failure of the RPIs. The balance of the RPI system will be operable The NIS red drop system will also be operable. The temporary modification does not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an i accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety. There is no possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than evaluated ~ previously. The morain of safety as defined in the TS is not reduced. (SER 86-020) 3.5.25 TM 86-30 (Unit 1), Component Cooling System. The temporary modification places a clamp on the stem of
! valve 1HOV-815 to maintain the valve is the shut position while the valve operator is removed for maintenance (installed April 25, 1986).
Sammary of Safety Evaluation: This evaluation is required in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59 because it constitutes a potential change to the facility or its operation as described in the FSAR. This temporary modification does not pose an unreviewed safety question because there is no increase in the probability or consequences of an accident. nor a malfunction or equipment important to safety; there is no possibility created for an accident or malfunction than those previously evaluated, and the margin of , safety of the plant as defined in the Technical Specifications is not reduced. 47
I Valve-IMOV-815 provides a remotely-operated emergency l makeup water path to the Unit I component cooling a system. Removing the operator and clamping the valve shut will renic ibis capability. The normal makeup g-water path still remains. how% There is no FSAR g. description or accident aaalysis assumption that requires an emergency makeup water capability. The valve is normally shut as described by the FSAR for systems tied to the component cooling system. This closed valve provides a boundary between the g component cooling system and the reactor makeup water 5 system. The component corling system outside the containment is described as a " closed" system in the B FSAR. Thus, it must be Leismic class I and thut, g 1-815A must be seismic also. By inspection, it can be said that removal of the operator will reduce the weight of the component and thus, reduce the seismic stresses. The weight of the clamp is insignificant in comparisor, to the valve and operator. The clamp will be designed to not damage the valve shaft and to provide adequate force to keep the valve closed at design pressure. (SER 86-024) 3.5.26 TM 86-31 (Unit 1), Residual Heat Removal System. The temporary modification will install a clamp on the stem for valve IMOV-700 such that the valve remains in the open position during the period maintenance is being performed on the valve's motor operator. Summary of Safety Evaluation: This temporary modification constitutes a change to the facility as described in the FSAR. The temporary modification is , only applicable during the period Unit 1 is in refueling shutdown when the reactor vessel head is l removed while the cavity is flooded and tied to the spent fuel pit. During this period, administrative -E controls will be required to ensure that the subject 5 i valve is returned to its "as desigt.ed" configuration l with the locking device removed prior to Unit 1 being i placed into any mode other than that described above. l Clamping open 1MOV-700 will ensure that the common RHR sucti^n path remains available for decay heat removal. l A redundant, remote means of isolating the line will no longer exist in containment. Valve 701 will still be l evailable for remote isolation of the line. If needed, E
- . eaintenance action'could be used to shut valve 1Mov-700 g if it becomes necessary. In view of the operating mode, this approach is adequate.
I
<a ,
'I 1MOV-700 is interlocked with primary system pressure to prevent opening when the RCS pressure is above 425 psig. Considering the operating mode and the open position of the valve, loss of this interlock feature is not a concern. In the event of a breach of the cavity boundary, the RHR system will still be capable of a " recirculation" alignment. I The lock shall be seismically designed to ensure decay heat removal capability following a seismic event. The lock shall be designed such that no damage to the I stem will occur (if the stem is to be reused). No lead shall come into contact with the stem for material -- compatibility reasons. The potential impact upon the seismic capability of the residual heat removal and reactor coolant systems due I to the removal of mass on the MOV was evaluated. Inspection determines the impact to be negligible in the nonconservative direction. The temporary modification does not increase the probability of the occurrence nor the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to I safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR. The possibility for an accident or malfunction different. than those previously analyzed is not created. The margin of safety as defined in the Technical I Specifications is not reduced. (SER 86-025) 3.5.27 TM 86-32 (Unit 1), Residual Heat Removal System. The ~ temporary modification installs a clamp on tha stem of valve IMOV-720 such that the valve is mainta aed in the ' apen position during the period the motor operator is removed for maintenance. Summary of Safety Evaluation: This temporary modification is a change to the facility as described I in the FSAR. The proposed modification is needed to support maintenance action. The resultant configuration is only applicable to the refueling mode when the reactor vessel head is removed and the cavity is flooded and tied to the spent fuel pit. l This safety evaluation is limited to that mode. W Administrative controls will be required to ensure that valve IMOV-720 is returned to its "as designed" configuration with the locking device removed prior to I the unit being placed into any mode other than that described above. I I - _
i I Clamping open the valve will ensure that the RHR return line to the loop "B" cold leg remains available. Redundant means (remote and check) of isolating the line will no longer exist in contairenent. Check valve g 1-867D will provide isolation from the RCS. Other 3 means outside of contairunent could be used to isolate the line (manual valves, remote valves, stopping the pumps, etc.). Maintenance action could be used to shut i valve IMOV-720 if it becomes necessary in view of .he , operating mode. This approach is adequate. I IMOV-720 it interlocked with primary system pressure j preve: i opening when PCS pressut e is above 425 psig. Considering the operating mode and the open position of g the valve, the loss of this interlock feature is not a g concern. In the event of a breach of the cavity boundary, the RHR system will still be capable of a " recirculation" alignment. The lock shall be seismically designed to ensure decay heat removal capability following a seismic event. l Removal of the MOV will not significantly impact the seismic capabilities of the system in this operating mode (low pressure and temperature stresses). Removal of the weight will lower peak seismic stresses. The lock shall be designed such that no damage to the stem will occur (if the stem is to be reused without E repair or further analysis). No lead shall come into 5 contact with the sten for material compatibility , reasons. m The temporary modification does not increase the probability of the occurrence nor the consequenceu of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR. The possibility for an accident or malfunction differeat than those previously analyzed is not created. The g margin of safety as defined in the Technical g Specifications is not reduced. The original 50.59 analysis limited the mode of clamping opea 1HOV-720 to refueling, reactor vessel head removed, cavity flooded and tied to the spent fuel pit. These conditions were specified from a conservative star %oint, as a cold shutdown condition I I 50 g a
with the RCS open to atmosphere, PORVs open, or with the LTOP system in service would be satisfactory. This is acceptable since the clamp is qualified to hold the " valve open (ensuring redundant decay heat removal means) and RHR system overpressurization protection would be provided. (SER 8f-026) TM 86-040 (llrit 2), Reactor Protection System. The I 3.5.28 temporary modification retaoves 1MQ-400 cables from white protection rack 2C114 (and adds jumpers) to provide interim white instrument bus power from the new I inverters for containment pressure channel 2P946. Summary of Safety Evaluation: The temporary modifica-I tion is performing the same function as the permanent modification to be installed during U2R12 but was performed on a temporary basis so the unit can be I maintained at power without taking the entire white protection channel out of service. It was highly desirable to maintain a reliable interim power-source. No safety concerns are raised by the installation I differences between the temporary modification and the permanent modification. The modification will ensure continued reliability of white and yellow instrument channels when they are powered by the new white and yellow instrument bus I battery backed power sources which are being installed by the instrument bus upgrade modification. Also, each unit will only power its own instrument channels rather than having unit crossconnection as is presently I installed. This will also increase reliability of the new system. After all instrument channels have been removed from the 1&2MQ-400 inverters, these units may be removed from service. This modification does not - constitute an unreviewed safety question and does not i require a change to plant Technical Specifications. I The installation will be controlled by a special maintenance procedure. (SER 86-049) 3.5.29 TM 86-045 (Unit 2), Rod Position Indication. The I modification installed a jumper on the bottom bistable of Rod E11 (installed May 20, 1986; removed November 7, 1986). Summary of Safety Evaluatij: Technical Specification 15.3.10.D.3.a allows for the failure (s) of the RPI(s). The balance of the RPI system will be I operable. The NIS rod drop system will also be operable. I 51
'f I
3.5.30 TH86-065(Common],componentCoolingSystem. The g temporary modification adds pressure gauges to the g inlet and outlet vents to the component cooling heat I exchangers (HX-12B&C) on the component cooling water a side to measure the differential pressure across the g shell -ide of the new heat exchangers. (Approved September 25, 1986).
- Summary of Safety Evaluation: The temporar" modification is a potential change to the facility or its operation as described in the FSAR. Adding g pressure gauges to the inlet and outlet vents to the 3; component cooling water side will extend the component cooling closed system Loundary. This classification ai must be maintained. Thus, the lines must remain g seismic and the pressure capability must be greater than containment design pressure of 60 psig.
The gauges will have a pressure capability of greater than the component cooling water system design pressure of 150 psig. Seismic capability will be verified using g the method in the "Bechtel Pipe Supports 2" & Smaller 5 for Class Seismic Lines" pipe support instructions. The change does not pose an unreviewed safety question. The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident er malfunction of equipment important to safety is not increased. The change does E not create the possibility for an accident or E malfunction which has not been previously evaluated. The margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications is not reduced. ISER 86-056,' 3.5.31 TH 86 ')68 (Unit 2), Reactor Vessel Level Indication. The temporary modification installs a tee, valve, and "g "P" tubing between L'l-447 and RC-500H to provide an W alternate reference leg for LT-447. (Approved October 2, 1986.) Summary of Safety Evaluatiorp The temporary modification is a change to the facility as described - in the FSAR, The proposed temporary modification to provide additional level indication will not affect the safe operation of the plant. This is based upon the i following considerations: (1) the tie-in will only be used during refueling shutdown; (2) the valving in of the cross-tie will be administratively controlled such ! LFat an operator _will man the isolation valve while the g reading is being taken (i.e., crossconnection is valved g , in); (3) the tie-in (valve and tee) shall be made to I the requirements of the system; (4) the system will be returned to normal following closecut of the temporary modification, before power operation. s2 g
=
l
I The change does not pose an unreviewed safety I l question. The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety is not increased. The change does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction which has not been previously evaluated. The margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications is not reduced. (SER 86-057) 3.5.32 TM 86-69, Containment Ventilation. -The temporary modification replaces the existing HSA steam generator
'I. channelhead ventilation blower unit with a Numanco 1000 scfm unit with HEPA/ charcoal filters. (Approved October 2, 1986.)
I Summary of Safety Evaluation: The temporary modification is a potential change to the facility or I its operation. The existing MSA blower units used in the steam generator channelhead ventilation system will be replaced by Numanco units with charcoal filters. g The new units are essentially the same as the existing g units with the exception of the filters. The new units should result in improved system performance and a reduction in the iodine discharged to the purge exhaust I filters. As a result, there should be a reduction in the radiological releases via the channelhead ventilation system. Standard industrial practices will I be used in installing the subject equipment. The seismic capabilities of the containment HVAC system will not be degraded. The operation of the containment
)
ventilation systems will remain the same. The change does not pose an unreviewed safety question. The probability of occurrence or the I consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment - important to safety is not increased. The change does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction which has not been previously evaluated. I The margin of safety as defined in the-Technical Specifications is not reduced. (SER 86-059) 3,5.33 TH 86-72 (Unit 2), Main Control Boards. The temporary , modification lifts leads for RTD bypass flow gauges 2FIA-458 and 459 and installs leads from the steam generator nozzle dam control panels to provide remote
.I indication on 2C04 in the event.of any nozzle dam malfunction.
I I I 53 I _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _
I Summary of Safety Evaluation: The temporary j modification constitutes q change to the facility and a M. change to its operation as described in the FSAR. The chans e should not have any bearing on plant operation g as Unit 2 is in cold shutdown and the RTDs are out of g service. The system will be returned to normal conditions prior to the Unit 2 RCS being filled and vented. Nozzle dam alarms are to be tested prior to floodup. The RTD bypass flow meters are to be tested for operability prior to restoration. The change does not pose an unreviewed safety question. The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment 3 important to safety is not increased. The change does g not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction which has not been previously evaluated. The margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications is not reduced. (SER 86-058) 3.5.34 TM 86-073, Fuel Transfer System. The temporary g modification installs a toggle switch which performs the function of the fast / slow proximity switch in order 5 to permit use of the fuel transfer system because leakage into the fast / slow proximity switch enclosure resulted in switch failure. (Approved october 6, 1986.) Summary of Safety Evaluation: The temporary E. modification is c o tential change to the facility or E its operation as uscribed in the FSAR. The failed limit switch in the spent fuel pit for the fuel g transfer cart will be replaced by a toggle switch. The g limit switch was provided to switch the fuel transfer cart air motor from fast to slow speed prior to the , cart arriving at its stop location. An operator will be stationed near the toggle switch to change air motor g speed as appropriate. The operator responsible for toggle switch manipulation will have no other duties or 3 be involved in no other activities while the cart is 5 traveling in fast speed to the spent fuel pit. The limit switch and its function are not described in the a FSAR. Additionally, the use of a toggle switch under g administrative control will not increase the likelihood of a fuel handling accident. The change does not pose an unreviewed safety question. The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of. equipment 3 important to safety is not increased. The change does g not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction which has not been previously evaluated. The margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications is not reduced. (SER 86-061] I 54 g s
I l l 3.5.35 TM 86-074 (Unit 2), Reactor Coolant System. The temporary modification inst ils a strongback on "B" reactor coolant pump to raioe the shaft so the seals can be made up with the pwnp motor removed; (installed I October 9, 1986). Summary of Safety Evaluation: The temporary I modification is a potential change to the facility or its operation as described in the FSAR. When the RCP motor is removed, the pump shaft drops down approximately one inch. In order to provide a seal I when the cavity is flooded, the shaft must be lifted back into proper position. When the shaft is lifted, it will be held up by a pair of strongbacks. Each I strongback consists of a pair of four-inch channels arranged back to back with one-inch threaded rod that is screwed into the pump coupling and held on the strongback with a nut. At no point would the core be encovered by a leak through the RCP seals. The discharge elevation is I several feet above the top of the vessel flange. Even if the pump shaft would drop, the leakage out I through the pump seals would still be restricted. This leak rate would be relatively slow and would be detected by the seal leakoff alarm or the containment sump alarm. 9 I Action could then be taken to provide makeup to the RCS and to place a fuel assembly, if one is in the manipulator, back into the core. If the shaft should fall, the shaft has a step machined on that sits on a ledge in the thermal barrier. This was designed into the pump to be a leak limiting seal I and is used by some plants to allow seal work with the ca"ity flooded. I The change does not pose an unreviewed safety question. .'he probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety is not increased. The change does I not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction which has not been previously evaluated. The margin of safety as defined in the Technical I 3.5.36 Specifications is not reduced. (SER 86-073) TH 86-080 (Unit 2), CRDH Cooling System. The temporary I modification provides a welding power supply from 2W3A&B CRDM fan power supply during the period ORT #3 (Loss of AC Simultaneous with S1) is being performed so performance of Modification Request 86-059 can continue I uninterrupted during that period (approved, installed, and removed November 4, 1986). I I
I Summary of Safety Evaluation: The temporary l modification is a potential change to the facility,as 3 described in the FSAR. The unit is in the refueling shutdown condition with the RV head removed and the a cavity flooded. The W3 fans are CRDid fans intended to g primarily cool the CRDris during operation. Therefore, they are not necessary during this plant condition. The temporary modification will be removed and the system returned to its normal configuration prior to replacing the RV head and heating up the RCS. The enange does not pose an unreviewed safety question. The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment a important to safety is not increased. The change does not create the possibility for an accident or 5 malfunction which has not been previously evaluated. The margin of safety as defined in the Technical l W Specifications is not reduced. (SER 86-074) 3.5.37 TM 86-79 (Unit 1), CVCS. The temporary modification g blocks 1A0V-313A in the open position such that seal g return flow is maintained during the period the valve's air regulator is being changed out (installed November 3, 1986; removed November 3, 1986). Summary of Safety Evaluation: The temporary modification is a change to the facility as described l in the FSAR. Since Section 5.2 of the FSAR requires a B second containment isolation valve, an operator will be designated to provide this boundary by closing 315A&C g (seal return filter inlet and bypass isolation g valves). Also, Technical Specifications define containment integrity as existing when: ".. all , valves are operable or are secured closed " When the clamp is placed on the valve, it will be inoperable and g not secured closed. Therefore, the valve clamp must be removed within three hours, otherwise, the unit will g be taken to the hot shutdown condition within three 3 hours of clamping. This change does not pose an unreviewed safetv question. The probability of occurrence er the consequences of an accident ualfunction of equipment important to safety is not increas?d. The change does l l not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction which has not been previous 2 / evaluated. The margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications is not reduced. ,(SER 86-067) I I 56 E
=
I 3.5.38 TH Bf>-88, Condensate Drains from HX-100 and liX-101. This temporary modification installs rubber plugs in drain opening in-lower condensate pan for HX-100 and I HX-101 to prevet.t drawing air in through drain line, bypassing filters. Summarygf Safety Evaluatior!r Plugging the condensate I will in no way effect the operation of the heat exchangers, but it would prevent unfiltered bir from being drawn back through the drain line. No overflow ' I problems should be encountered with these drains plugged due to the low humidity levels during the winter months. The control room ventilation system is described in Section 7.7-1 and shown on Figure 12-4 Appendix "I" of the FSAR. The condensate drains from the air handlers are not described in the FSAR. The installation of the plugs in the drain connections I from the condensate pans from HX-100 and HX-101 will reduce the possibility of drawing unfiltered air into the control room ventilation system bypassing the cleanup and HEPA filters. Drawing unfiltered air into the air handling system could be ccnstrued to be a violation of Technical Specification 15.3.12. I There should be no problems experder;c:?. with excessive water building up in the condensate 7an b reen the installation of the temporary modi'icat on nd the completion of a permanent equipmer.;. rap (e.g. , 'at.er I seal) in the condensate drain line. Control room relative humidity should be low enougl to prevent condensation on the chilled water coils (HX-100 and HX-101). The drain pan will be checked (and dreined) for the presents of excessive water on a weekly basis. I There are nc unreviewed safety considerations that will be caused by the installation of this temporary modification. No changes to Technical Specifications or the FSAR are required. 3.5.39 TM 86-89 (Unit 2), 2HX-11A. This temporary modification installs closure bolting with single nuts versus double I nuts en each end of HX-11 A. The technical manual inst n.c Sons call for inst . ling backing nuts. I Summary of Safety Evaluation: The temporary modifi-cation as requested is acceptable. The heat axchanger without all of the double nuts passed the leak test without leakage. The nuts were torqued to the vendor's ,I requirements. The second nuts do not provide extra
- strength but do function to lock the primary nuts. The double nuts should ,e replaced as soon as they are obtained.
57
I The component ins'ruction manual for the RHR heat l exchangers does call for installing backing nuts on the W
- nain flange studs.
The second nuts do not add any extta strength but merely serve a locking function. The primary nuts were torqued to the vendor's recommended value, and it is the opinion of this review that one set of nuts sufficiently torqued is adequate for the short time period until new locknuts can be obtained and installed. Section 6.2.2 of the FSAR, Safety Injection System Design and Operation, describes the design of the RHR heat exchange:s including the " main flange studs with 3 two nuts on each end to ensure permanent leaktightness" g (page 6.2-20). Thus, this temporary modification does-involve a change to the facility as described in the FSAR. Section 9.3 also gives a general description of the RHR syt; tem and components but does not mention the locknuts on the heat exchangers. A review of the Technical Specifications and NRC conunitments as found E in SERs was performed and no descriptions or 5 commitments affecting this tempora y modification were found. As stated above, the single nuts on the RHR heat exchanger flange studs are adequate for the short duration involved. Thus, this temporary modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question and no permanent changes to the FSAR or Technical Specifications is required. 3.5.40 TM 86-093 (Common), Fuel Handling. The temporary modification replaces the existing 3 KVA, 480 V to g 240/120 V transformer for Zl7, spent fuel pit bridge crane, with a QA 15 KVA 480 V to 240/120 trantformer. g Summary of Safety Evaluation: The temporary l mo:lification is a potential change to the facility as E described in the FSAR. The 15 KVA transformer is electrically equivalent to the existing ? KVA g , transformer except for its larger capacity. It will g not present any changes to the control circuit operation or its failure modes. The single failure-praof criteria of the crane is not degraded. The transformer will be mounted securely to prevent it from falling into the spent fuel pit. The additional' weight of this transformer will not affect the seismic capability of the bridge. I I 5a g w<
L F b The change does not pose an unreviewed safety - que.a t i on . The probability of occurrence or the consequences of at. 6ccident or malfunction of equipment important to safety is not increased. 'Ihe change does I not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction which has not been previously evaluated. The margin of safety as uefined in the Technical I Specifications is not reduced. (SER 86-083) The temporary 3.5.41 TH 86-094_(Common), Radwaste System. meditication provides a flush connection between the w blowdown evaporator distillate pump and the bottoms sample heat exchanger (installed December 19, 1986). Summar y of Safety Evaluation: The temporary modification is a change to the facility as described in the FSAR. Fittings on the hose will meyt the design temperature and pressute ratings of the related piping system. The hose will be disconnected at one end following each use, Actual discharge pressure for the distillate system is approximately 75 psig and is approximately 35 psig for the bottoms loop. Operating temperatures for both systems are +200 F. The temperature and prescure ratings of the hoce are 3?O F and 200 psi, respectively. Therefore, the hose and fittings will a hold up under these conditions. The differential 3 pressure between the distillate and bottoms will prevent backflow of the bottoms fluid into the distillate system isolated from the blowfown evaporator. The proposed jumper is truly an operational evolution in that a piece of equipment will be isolated from the system and flushed for interim system layup. Thus, a 10 CFR 50.59 analysis is not necessary in the opinion of the modification engineer. The change does not pose an unreviewed safety question. The probability of occurrence or the I consequences of an accident of malfunction of equipment irnportant to safety is not increat.ed. The change does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction which has not been previously evaluated. The margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications is not reduced. (SER 86-086) 3.5.42 TH 86-095 (Unit 2J, Rod Position Indication. The temporary modification installs a jumper in Rod K7 RPI (installed December 22, 1986). 59
I I Summat y of Salety Evalunt loin 1he tempot ary g modification as a change to the facility as described 3 in th; FSAll. Techtilcal Specification 15.3.10.D.3.a allowu f or the failut e(s) of itPI(s). The balance of the Id'l system vill be oper able. 1he S tod drop system vill also be operable. The chat:ge does not pose an unt eviewed saf ety l que s t ion. 1hc probability of occut ence or the W consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment itnpo r t atit to safety is not inct eased. The thatige does 3 not create the possibility for an accident or g taalfunction which has not been pteviously evaluated. The mat gin of saf ety as defined 11: the Technical Specifications is not ieduced. ISFR 66-004} 3.5.43 TH B6-097 (Unit 2}, Itod Pouition Indicat ion. The teinpot ary modification installed a jumper oli Itod D6 RPI (inttalled December 30, 1986). Summary of Safety Evaluatioti: The t etnpot at y nTd[Tication is a change to the f acility at. described in the FSAR. Technical Specification IS.3.10.D.3 allows foi the f allut e(s) of RPl(ts). The balance of the itP1 system vill be operable with the exception of K7. The HIS rod drop system will also be operable. The change does not pose an unteviewed safety E c;ue s t ion . The probability of occurrence or the 3 consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety is, not increased. The change does - not create the pos.sibility for an accident or malfunction which has siot been previously evaluated. The margin of safety as defined in the Technical Speciffcations is n(t educed. ISER 86-085) I I I I I I! se ,
ll,l ;l1,l Jlj l ll llJ il i! I l l M g n 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 i 6 7 4 1 5 1 - 4 l 3 5 9 9 6 1 - 5 e . u 7 6 1 1 0 0 - 8 M f F e 2 - 3 g n M ei t s 0 1 0 8 0 9 0 8 ss 9 - 2 - - 0 2 ae - - - - Wco 0 - 0 - - - 6 7 r P e l c an - 0 - 0 -
- 0 0 M ia cn ee 5
1 7 8 5 8 0 6 pt - 6 - 0 - - 0 7 S n - 2 - - - 5 7 i 1 1 a M M s n o 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 i 7 3 2 3 7 5 7 M t c 2 0 - 1 0 3 1 9 e 9 0 - 0 0 6 8 3 p 1 - 4 7 s n Y M R A I TM e NM c AU en - 0 - 0 - - - 0 LS na - 6 - 3 - - - 9 M P N in t e 9 - 7 - 6 RO ut - 9 - 1 - - - 1 N A I on - 2 - - - - 3 O T Ri I C a M T C MN UU M 1 N NF 6 U F HB &e CO c B AJ sn O E rna 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 M J BL A ool til 5 6 8 9 5 0 9 6 3 0 0 4 D TU cti - - N NN aae 5 - 8 - 0 1 0 6 A I N OA erv Rer 2 - 1 - 4 pu M P U O P 6 8 OS R 9 G 1 K p M R O l oo ru 0 0 W aFr 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 8 t G 9 1 0 3 3 7 Y B om 1 7 2 6 7 1 6 4 Tek . 8 4 5 Rr 3 2 1 4 0 M M E W o 4 9 2 0 2 7 3 R N , A r M M D e t nR m e N A aam eh 3 5 1 9 8 2 4 1 3 5 1 7 7 1 8 rT0 2 4 L G 0 M E N 1 s N ye O g S t c R n dii E i nl v M P dc e n r e aar ue s r F nn s o e nQS e O aa / c i n o
,y k
n ni t i i r S R h ee asy al g t gr o L cs s t o n ano Wsr M E B M p u ae ee n o ct nn ai yh rP nr et E rit t ra t e T O U o B y i na t mn uo r o sel ch T N r o t eM sh i eu nng at D G tl c t i t rC t rO np r nk ml t c ii e t N a A M 0 im oE e p ia ae ea he CH sd nn R e m gR d n AE& nd on Ca R G 4 P O MP I a
I
- 5.0 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE INSERVICE INSPECTION I
The results of the findings from steam generator tube inspections are as follows: l 5.1 Unit 1 j 5.1.1 Inspection I'lan 3 During the Unit 1 Refueling 13 outage, eddy current < testing was per formed from April 14 to April 19, 1966. 3 The Technical Specification required 6% inspection g
, program was performed on both steam generators (3% in each generator).
. In the "A" steam generator a total of 141 tubes were inspected which included 122 full length ten,ts and 19
- U-bend testa. No indicat!vns were found which required tube plugging.
In the "B" steam generator a total of 424 tubes were inspected; 146 full length tests, 19 U-bend tests, 11 tests to the fourth tube aupport plate, and 248 tests to the third tube support plate. No indications were found which required tube plugging. 5.1.2 Inspection Results I The following is a summary of the resulting eddy current inspection showing the number of tubes with indications 17 the ranges listed. Results of Eddy Current Inspection I
"A" SG "B" SG Inlet Outlet Inlet 0,utlet 100-90% 0 0 0 0 80-89% 0 0 0 0 70-79% 0 0 0 0 60-69% 0 0 0 0 l 50-59% 0 0 0 0 m 40-49% 0 0 0 0 30-39% 0 0 0 0 4
20-29% 0 0 0 0 , (20% 0 0 0 0
*DI O O 2 1 Total 0 0 2 1
*DI = Distorted indication - indications whose qu&ntitative analysis has not been possible but in past instances have not necessite.ted plugging.
62 E
=
5.1.3 Repaired or Plugged Tubes No tubes were plugged or repaired in either the "A" or "B" steam generator as a result of the eddy current inspection perfotmed in 1986. 5.1.4 Tubes With Indications Not Plugged The following is a list of tubes which had indications but were not plugged as a result of eddy current inspection performed in 1986:
"B" Steam Generator Row - Column Indication % Location Origin 40-55 **DI 28" A #1 TSP llL OD DI 10" A #1 TSP lit OD DI 29.8" A #2 TSP CL OD 39-63 DI 35.5" ATS HL OD I 5.2 Unit 2 5.2.1 Inspection Plan During the Unit 2 Refueling 12 outage eddy current testing was performed from OcteSer 10 to October 23, 1986. The extent of the inspection programs in each steam generator is as follows:
Eddy Current Inspection Plan Extent of Inspection ljumber of Tubes Inspected "A" SG "B" SG llot Leg (Cold Leg) Hot Leg (Cold Leg) Full Length (96) 80 Sleeves 61 59 To Top of Sleeve (SIf (67) U-Bend 4 (16) 23 l 5 #1 TSP 1540(2943) 1566(3040)
#2 TSP 9 (31) 37 (12)
#3 TSP 2 (3) l, I #4 TSP
#5 TSP 2 (1)
(3)
#6 TSP (1) i W 1765(3126)
TOTALS 1618(3139) 63 l-L
1 1 5.2.2 Inspection 1(esults ; 2 The f ollowing is a sununar y of the t eaults of eddy { ' current inspection showing the number of tubes with 3 indications in the ratiges listed: l Eddy Current Itu.pection Results flot Leg (lold Leg)
~
l "A" SG "B" SG ;
<20% 16(127) 12(198) l' ; 20-291, 3 (47) 2(280) 3 30-391 4 (4) 1(336) 40-49% (0) (46) :
50-59% (0) (5) 60-69% 1 (0) (2) 70-79% 3 (0) 1 (1) 1 80-89% 2 (0) 1 (0) l 90-100% 2 (0) (0) , AUDI 6 (0) 2 (0)
**DI L (IL 3 (32)
TOTALS 42(179) 22(900)
*UDI indications are those whose quantitative analysis has not been possible but in previous instances have necessitated plugging.
- **D1 - indications whose quantitative analysis has not been possible but in previous instances have not necessitated plugging.
R i 1 I I I t 64 g a<
<l a 5.2.3 Repaired or Plugged Tubes The following is a list of tubes which were mechanically .g plugged at, a result of indications found during eddy '
Ig current inspection pet f or med in 1986. - j Plugged Tubes in the "A" Steam _ Generator
' Row - Column Indication % Location Origir; l-3 UDI 3.2" ATE IIL OD 16-7 UDI 5.5" ATE Ill CD I 4-17 931. 11.9" ATE Ill CD 32-33 7.3" ATE IIL OD
.I 36-36 42-38 74% 94'i, 61% 4.0" ATE 111. 7.3" ATE I{L OD OD I 37-39 89% 3.9" A7E IIL OD I 43-40 44-40 40-44 UDI 78% 74't 10.1" ATE IIL 5.0" ATE IIL 6.7" ATE IIL OD OD OD 3.0" ATE Ill I 41-56 4-73 4-79 UDI 891, UDI 11.4" ATE ill 6.2" ATE IIL OD OD OD 13-84 UDI 6.2" ATE IIL OD ATE - Above Tube End liL - llot Leg UD1 - Undefined Indication Plugged Tubes in the "B" Steam Generator Row - Column Indication 1, Location Origin 1 ! 10-27 46% 1.3" ATS CL OD 13-27 47% 0.4" ATS CL OD 12-29 43% 1.4" ATS CL OD 18-29 43% 0.3" ATS CL OD
- I 18-32 7-43 14-43 42t 44%
531, 1.0" ATS CL 0.6" ATS CL 0.4" ATS CL OD OD OD 7-44 43% 0.8" ATS CL OD E 19-44 439, 1.0" ATS CL OD 5-45 45% 0.6" ATS CL OD 6-45 02% 0.9" ATS CL OD 8-45 52 . 1.1" ATS CL OD 11-45 43% 1.2" ATS CL OD l-46 72% 0.9" ATS HL OD I 5-46 12-46 14-46 45% 4 59 46% 0.4" ATS CL 0.9" ATS CL 0.5" ATS CL OD OD OD 5-47 75% 1.5" ATS CL OD 10-47 44% 1.2" ATS CL OD 15-47 48% 'O.8" ATS CL OD 16-47 41% 2.0" ATS CL OD 5-48 42% 0.6" ATS CL OD I _
I 1 i I , l How - Column Indication % Locaticn Origin , 6-48 43% 0.6" ATS CL OD i 21-48 46% 0.9" ATS CL OD g 18-49 44% 0.7" ATS CL OD g 20-49 409 0.8" ATS CL OD 22-49 48% 0.4" ATS CL OD 18-50 41% 1.1" ATS CL OD i 19-50 51% 0.7" ATS CL OD l 18-51 43% 0.7" ATS CL OD 20-51 46% 0.7" ATS CL OD l 21-51 40% 0.6" ATS CL OD m 23-51 44s 0.8" ATS CL OD r 21-52 45% 0.8" ATS CL OD 23-52 43% 0.9" ATS CL OD 24-52 44% 0.6" ATS CL OD , 15-53 45*6 0.8" ATS CL OD l 16-53 40% 0.9" ATS CL OD 22-53 48% 0.7" ATS CL OD " 24-53 44% 0.4" ATS CL OD l 25-54 48% 0.3" ATS CL OD g l 24-55 4,4% 1.)" ATS CL OD g 23-57 42% 0.7" ATS CL OD 7-58 46% 0.5" ATS CL OD 6-59 45% 0.7" ATS CL OD 7-59 62% 0.5" ATS CL OD , 24-59 46% 1.0" ATS CL OD 4-60 44% 0.3" ATS CL OD i 7-62 48% 0.3" ATS CL OD l 22-64 46% 0.7" ATS CL 'D 22-67 42% 0.3" ATS CL 0, g 11-68 47% 0.5" ATS CL OD 3 i 7-69 42% 0.0" ATS CL OD 18-69 54% 0.3" ATS CL OD l 18-70 54% 0.2" ATS CL OD i 23-78 UDI 7.3" ATE HL OD 23-80 UDI 3.7" ATE HL OD 23-82 87% 3.2" ATE HL OD ATS - Above Tubesheet CL - Cold Leg ! HL - Hot Leg ATE - Above Tube End I UDI - Undefined Indication
- 5.2.4 Tubes with Indications Not Plugged ,
The following is a list of tubes which had indications , but were not plugged as a result of eddy current inspections performed in 1986.
"A" Steam Generator Row - Column Indication % Location Origin 7-1 29S. #1 TSP CL OD 8-3 DI 8.5" ATE HL OD
- 56 g' u
I i<ow - Column Indication % Location Origin 18-5 26't #1 TSP llL OD 18-6 38% #1 TSP llL OD 23-8 31't #1 TSP HL OD 25-8 33% #1 TSP 1(L OD g 4-16 (20% 0" ATS IIL OD g ' 3-17 <20% 0.0" ATS !!L OD 3-19 (20% 0.0" ATS IIL OD 4-19 (20% 0.0" ATS IIL OD 18-24 (20% 1.6" ATS CL OD j 10-25 (20% 0.5" ATS CL OD 11-25 < 20't 0.9" ATS CL OD I 11-26 12-26 24% 21% (20't 0.5" ATS CL 0.4" ATS CL 0.4" ATS CL OD OD OD 13-26 ( 20't 0.5" ATS CL OD 11-27 22't, 0.5" ATS CL OD 13-27 25% 0.7" ATS CL OD 14-27 23't 0.8" ATS CL OD I 10-28 11-28 13-28
< 2 0't 20't
< 20't 0.9" ATS CL 0.d" ATS CL 0.6" ATS CL OD OD OD I 15-28 16-28 7-29 22't 23%
(20% 0.8" ATS CL 0.6" ATS CL 0.4" ATS CL OD OD OD 10-29 20't 0.7" ATS CL OD
<20% 0.4" ATS CL OD 13-29 <20% 0.6" ATS CL OD 14-29 (20% 0.7" ATS CL OD I 15-29 16-29 17-29
<20%
20% (20't 0.7" ATS CL 0.5" ATS CL 0.7" ATS CL OD OD OD I 18-29 6-30 (20't (20't (20% 0.7" ATS CL 0.4" ATS CL 0.5" ATS CL OD OD OD 7-30 (20% 0.4" ATS CL OD I 8-30 9-30
<20%
<20%
< 20'h 0.5" ATS CL 5,7" ATS CL 0.6" ATS CL OD OD OD I 10-30 13-30 (20%
<20%
(20% 2.3" ATS CL 0.5" ATS CL 0.8" ATS CL OD OD OD 14-30 0.6" ATS CL I 23't OD 15-30 (20% 0.7" ATS CL OD 16-30 <20't 0.8" ATS CL .J 17-30 21% 0.8" ATS CL OD 18-30 (20% 0.6" ATS CL OD
.I 6-31 (20% 0.4" ATS CL OD 7-31 (20% 0.4" ATS CL OD 8-31 (20% 0.4" ATS CL OD ,I 9-31 <20% 0.5" ATS CL OD 10-31 (20% 0.6" ATS CL OD 11-31 <20% 0.8" ATS CL OD 15-31 <20% 0.8" ATS CL OD 67
. _ . . . - _ - - . - . - _ ~ . - . - . - . - - - . - - - _ .- - - - -
I Row - Column Indicalion % Location i 0_d g_ir3 16-31 <20% 0.9" ATS CL OD i 17-31 24% 0.8" ATS CL OD 18-31 21S. 0.7" ATS CL OD 19-31 <20% 0.7" ATS CL OD 6-32 (20% 0.5" ATS CL OD 7-32 <20% 0.5" ATS CL OD 8-32 (20% 0.3" ATS CL OD i 9-32 21% 0.5" ATS CL OD l 10-32 20% 0.6" ATS CL OD 1 11-32 (20% 0.6" ATS CL OD 12-32 <20% 0.6" ATS CL OD 13-32 33% 0.7" ATS CL OD 14-32 <20% 0.8" ATS CL OD i 15-32 (20% 0.9" ATS CL OD 16-32 (20% 0.8" ATS CL OD 17-32 <20% 0,5" ATS CL OD 18-32 31% 0.6" \TS CL OD ! 19-32 21% 0.8" ATS CL OD l 20-32 20% 0.8" ATS CL OD g i 43-32 (20% 10.9" ATS CL OD g
<20% 10.4" ATS CL OD
<20% 8.5" ATS CL OD 6-33 (20% 0.6" ATS CL OD 7-33 <20% 0.6" ATS CL OD 8-33 <20% 0.3" ATS CL OD 9-33 <20% 0.5" ATS CL OD
<20% 1.6" ATS CL OD l
( (20% 1.1" ATS CL OD i l 10-33 <20% 0.6" ATS CL OD j 11-33 20% 0.6" ATS CL OD j 12-33 <20% 0.7" ATS CL OD i 13-33 (20% 0.5" ATS CL OD 1 i 18-33 21% 0.9" ATS CL OD l 19-33 23% 0,9" ATS CL OD ! 26% 1.0" ATS CL OD l l 20-33 24% 0.8" ATS CL OD l 21-33 <20% 0.8" ATS CL OD E 41-33 33% 3.3" ATE !!L OD 7-34 <20% 0.4" ATS CL OD ! 8-34 <20% 0.6" ATS CL OD l 9-34 (20% 0.5" ATS CL OD l 10-34 279t 0.8" ATS CL OD 11-34 23% 0.7" ATS CL OD 12-34 (20% 0.8" ATS CL OD 17-34 <20% 0.7" ATS CL OD
<20% 1.1" ATS CL OD 18-34 <20% 0.9" ATS CL OD 19-34 21% 0.8" ATS CL OD 20-34 22% 0.8" ATS CL OD.
21-34 20% 0.7" ATS CL OD 6-35 <20% 0.5" ATS CL OD 9-35 <20% 0.7" ATS CL OD 68 g 71
- - - - . - - - . - . . - . - _ - - . . - ~ _ . - _ - . , - . - - . - - .
I How - Column Indicat son 't, Location Ortgin i 10-35 (20% 0.8" ATS CL OD I 11-35 29% 21%
<20%
0.6" ATS CL 1.0" ATS CL 1.5" ATS CL OD OD
')
13 12-35 (20% 0.5" ATS CL OD 13-35 (20% 0.8" ATS CL !g 17-35 20% 0.8" ATS CL OD OD 10-35 29% 0.9" ATS CL OD-I 19-35 21-35 24% 24%
<20%
0.5" ATS CL 0.7" ATS CL 0.5" ATS CL OD OD OD 7-36 (20% 0.5" ATS CL OD <I (/0% 1.7" ATS CL OD 38% 0.8" ATS CL OD i (20% 5.3" ATS CL OD { 8-36 (20% 1.1" ATS CL OD (20% 0.4" ATS CL OD 9-36 (20% 0.7" ATS CL CD I 10-36
<20%
<20%
(20% 1.6" ATS CL 0.0" ATS CL 1.7" ATS CL OD OD OD lg 11-36 261 0.9" ATS CL OD ! l (20% 1.8" ATS CL OD 12-36 28% 0.6" ATS CL OD (20% 1.3" ATS CL OD I 18-36 19-36
<20%
22% 1.7" ATS CL 0.6" ATS CL OD OD 21% 0.5" ATS CL OD I 20-36 21-36 24% (20%
<20%
1.0" ATS CL 0.6" ATS CL 0.4" ATS CL OD OD OD 6-37 2.4" ATS CL I 7-37 (20% (20% (20% 0.9" ATS CL 0.7" ATS CL OD OD OD 9-37 <20% 0.5" ATS CL OD I <20% (20%
<20%
1.1" ATS CL 1.7" ATS CL 1.0" ATS CL OD OD OD I 10-37 24% 24% (20% 0.5" ATS CL 1,0" ATS CL 1.3" ATS CL OD OD OD 5.5" ATS CL I
<20% OD (20% 4.5" ATS CL OD
<20% 4.1" ATS CL OD
<20% 3.9" ATS CL OD I 11-37
<20%
(20%
<20%
2.0" HTS CL 0.5" ATS CL 3.3" ATS CL OD OD OD I 12-37 <20%
<20%
(10% 1.1" ATS CL 0.5" ATS CL (1.4" ATS CL OD OD OD 14-37 <20% 0.9" ATS CL OD (20% 3.1" ATS CL OD ll
l I flow - Colttmn Indicalion 'i Location Or i, gin 16-37 (20*6 3.4" ATS CL OD ! ! < 2 0't 0.B" A'1S CL OD , ) (20% 0.6" ATS CL OD 17-37 26% 0.5" ATS CL OD i l (20% b.5" ATS CL OD I (20% (20% 5.9" ATS CL 3.0" Als CL OD OD l4 E' 19-37 2 5't 0.5" ATS CL OD l 20-37 <20% 0.6" ATS CL OD gj 21-37 (20% 6.6" A7S CL OD g , <20% 5.8" Als CL OD l (20% 5.2" ATS CL OD 42-37 ( 20't HITSP CL OD 8-38 (201 1.1" ATS CL OD 9-30 (20% 1.9" ATS CL OD (20% 1.0" ATS CL OD i 10-38 (20% 2.0" ATS CL OD , (20% 1.6" ATS CL OD (20% 1.1" ATS CL OD 3 11-3b <20% 0.6" ATS CL OD g 12-38 < 2 0't 1.2" ATS CL OD ; 15-38 (20% 0.6" ATS CL OD , 17-38 ( 20't 0.7" ATS CL OD (20't 3.3" ATS CL OD
<20't 5.0" ATS CL OD 18-38 D1 0.3" ATS CL OD E 19-38 <20't 4.5" ATS CL OD E
<205 2.6" ATS CL OD i
, 21-38 (20't 3.2" ATS CL OD 38-38 <20% #1 TSP CL OD 41-38 <20% #1 TSP CL OD 2-39 < 2 0't 7.9" ATS CL OD l 9-39 <20% 2.0" ATS CL OD l' 11-39 <20*d 1.9" ATS CL OD us 13-39 <2096 0.9" ATS CL OD j 14-39 <20% 0.7" ATS CL OD gi 15-39 <20% 0.7" ATS CL OD g' 20-39 < 20't 3.9" ATS CL OD
, 41-39 (20% 4.4" ATS 11L OD l 4
(20% 4.0" ATS IIL OD I
<20% 3.4" ATS IIL OD t 9-40 <20% 1.2" ATS CL OD 11-40 < 2096 1.7" ATS CL OD l 12-40 (20% 0.7" ATS CL OD E 13-40 (20% 0.8" ATS CL OD 42-40 (20% 5.0" ATS }{L OD g
, 24% 3.1" ATS IIL OD E (20% 10.4" ATS lil OD i (20% 2.3" ATS }{L OD $ < 20't 1.9" ATS IIL OD j 3-41 <20% 1.2" ATS CL OD j 10-41 (20% 1.4" ATS CL OD I 70 g w.
I Row - Column Indication % Location Oriain 9-42 <20% 1.2" ATS CL OD I 10-43 17-43 6-44 (20% (20% (20% 1.2" ATS CL 4.6" ATS CL 3.0" ATS CL OD OD OD (20% 0.4" ATS CL OD
<20% 0.5" ATS CL OD 8-44 <20% 1.0" ATS CL OD 10-44 (20% 1.4" ATS CL OD I 43-44 7-45 (20%
(20% (20% 0.5" ATS CL
#1 TSP HL 2.5" ATS CL OD OD OD I 9-45
<20%
(20%
<20%
1.4" ATS CL
#1 TSP CL 0.7" ATS CL OD OD OD 13-45 <20% 0.5" ATS CL OD I 14-45 20-45
<20%
(201 2.0" ATS CL 0.6" ATS CL 3.3" ATS CL OD OD OD
<20%
l I 30-45 (20%
<20%
<20%
3.1" ATS CL 1.1" ATS CL 0" ATS CL OD OD to 0" ATS CL I 31-45 <20% OD 8-46 <20% 3.3" ATS CL OD (20% 2.2" ATS CL OD 9-46 (20% 5.2" ATS CL OD I 10-46 11-46 (20%
<20%
20% 0.5" ATS CL 0.9" ATS CL 0.B" ATS CL OD OD OD
<20% 4.7" ATS CL OD 12-46 33% 0.8" ATS CL OD D1 0.5" ATS CL OD
<20% 1.6" ATS CL OD
'I 14-46 (20% 26% 1.2" ATS CL 0.5" ATS CL OD OD
<20% 2.6" ATS CL OD I 15-46 16-46 21%
21% 25% 0.9" ATS CL 1.4" ATS CL 0,6" ATS CL OD OD OD { 0.8" ATS CL OD
- <20%
21-46 <20% 9.6" ATS CL OD
<20% 3.8" ATS CL OD 9-47 <20% 1.0" ATS CL OD I 10-4, 11-47 26%
<20%
0.8" ATS CL 0.7" ATS CL 1.5" ATS CL OD OD OD 12-47 25% I 13-47 (20%
<20%
<20%
1.1" ATS CL 0.0" ATS CL 0.8" ATS CL OD OD OD
<20% 1.1" ATS CL OD >I 14-47 <20% 1.8" A15 CL OD 15-47 <20% 1.3" ATS CL OD 16-47 <20% 1.2" ATS CL OD
.I
] 4 I How - Column Indica' ion % Location Origin I 17-47 (20% 0.6" ATS CL OD DI 4.4" ATS CL OD g . 18-47 <20% 1.2" ATS CL OD g i ' (20% 0.5" ATS CL OD 10-48 (20% 0.8" ATS CL OD 18-48 (20% 1.5" ATS CL OD 33-48 DI 0" ATS HL OD .i 34-49 < 201, 0" ATS IIL OD 33-50 DI 1.8" ATS liL OD g 43-50 (20% #1 TSP liL OD g l 7-63 2 2*t 0.0" ATS CL OD 6-69 1.4" ATS CL
<20% OD E 7-69 <20% 1.3" r*S CL OD E
j 6-72 (20% 0" ATS OD 35-73 DI 3.2" Ai OD 6-76 (20% 0" A'IS H OD 3-77 < 20't 0" ATS 11L OD 8-77 DI 0" ATS ILL OD 10-78 <20% 0" ATS IIL OD 3 10-79 24% 0" ATS HL OD g 6-80 <20% 0" ATS HL OD . 9-80 (20% 0" ATS HL OD l 21-87 <20% 3.9" ATS IIL OD "B" STEAH GENERATOR 3-1 37% #1 TSP CL OD 6-1 30% #1 TSP CL ed 1-2 23% #1 TSP CL OD g 5-2 (20% #1 TSP CL OD g 10-2 38*5 #1 TSP CL OD 12-2 37% #1 TSP CL OD 10-3 DI #1 TSP CL OD l 13-4 31t #1 TSP CL OD = 20-6 27% #1 TSP CL OD 22-9 (20% 22./" ATS HL OD g (20% 23.2" ATS HL OD 3 22-12 28% #1 TSP CL OD 6-16 <20% 0" ATS HL OD g 29-16 35% #1 TSP CL OD g 5-18 37% 0.3" ATS HL OD 1-21 <20% #1 TSP CL OD 34-22 <20% 0.3" A #1 TSP HL OD l 28-23 D1 0.3" ATS HL OD llE 8-24 (20% 0.4" ATS CL OD 9-24 <20% 0.3" ATS CL OD g 10-24 <20% 0.3" AIS CL OD 3 11-24 (20% 0.3" ATS CL OD 7-25 <20% 0.5" ATS CL OD 8-25 25% 0.9" ATS CL OD l 27% 0.4" ATS CL OD I 72 g a
Row - Column Indication % tocation Origin 9-25 (20% 0.9" ATS CL OD 25% 0.5" ATS CL OD 10-25 26% 0.9" ATS CL OD 39% 0.4" ATS CL OD 11-25 30% 0.6" ATS CL OD 12-25 31% 0.8" ATS CL OD (20% 0.1" ATS CL OD 13-25 36% 0.6" ATS CL OD 14-25 <20% 0.6" ATS CL OD 1 5-26 24%. 1.2" ATS CL OD 6-26 (20% 1.5" ATS CL OD g 34% 1.2" ATS CL OD g 7-26 351 1.0" ATS CL OD 31% 0.4" ATS CL OD 9-26 22% 1.2" ATS CL OD 34% 0.8" ATS CL OD 39% 0.4" ATS CL OD 11-26 36% 0.5" ATS CL OD , i 12-26 13-26 37% 39% 341 0.8" ATS CL 0.3" ATS CL 0.5" ATS CL OD OD OD 14-26 27% 0.7" ATS CL OD I 15-26 22%
<20%
0.5" ATS CL 0.4" ATS CL OD OD 5-27 <20% 0.5" ATS CL OD 2.6" ATS CL I 6-27 <:20%
<20%
DI 1.2" ATS CL 0.4" ATS CL OD OD OD 8-27 <20% 1.4" ATS CL OD I 9-27 DI 30% 0.4" ATS CL 1.3" ATS CL OD OD j 11-27 <20% 1.3" ATS CL OD 36% 0.5" ATS CL OD 12-27 (20% 2.0" ATS CL OD 34% 1.3" ATS CL OD 36% 0.6" ATS CL OD , 38% 0.3" ATS CL OD 14-27 34% 0.7" ATS CL OD 15-27 30% 0.4" ATS CL OD 4-28 (20% 0.6" ATS CL OD 5-28 26% 0.9" ATS CL OD 25% 0.5" ATS CL OD (20% 1.5" ATS CL OD 6-28 0.9" ATS CL OD { 28% 33% 0.4" ATS CL OD 7-28 <20% 1.9" ATS CL OD
<20% 1.7" ATS CL OD
<20% 1.3" ATS CL OD 22% 1.0" ATS CL OD 8-28 <20% 2.1" ATS CL OD
<20% 1.3" ATS CL OD 25% 0.5" ATS CL OD I
73
- . _ _ . - _ _ - . - . - . - - - . - - - - - - - . _ _ - ~..-.~.- ..- - ---. -
I Row - Colu.nn Indication 't Location origin 9-28 (20% 2.4" ATS CL OD l (20% 2.2" ATS CL OD gl (20% 1.6" ATS CL OD gl i 30% 1.3" ATS CL OD 1 28% 0.4" ATS CL OD i 10-28 (20% 2.2" ATS CL OD , t 30% 1.5" A1S CL OD 11-28 (20% 1.5" ATS CL OD 20't 1.0" ATS CL OD g 12-28 <20% 2.8" ATS CL OD 3 ( 20't 2.5" ATS CL OD (20% 1.6" ATS CL OD E
- <20% 0.4" ATS CL OD
, 36% 0.9" ATS CL OD E 13-28 <20% 1.3" ATS CL OD 37% 0.5" ATS CL OD 14-28 36% 0.8" ATS CL OD 28% 0.3" ATS CL OD
<20% 1.3" ATS CL OD 3 15-28 341 0.8" ATS CL OD g 16-28 39% 0.6" ATS CL OD 29-28 (20% #1 TSP CL OD 4-29 (20% 0.8" ATS CL OD (20% 0.4" ATS CL OD 5-29 <20% 1.6" ATS CL OD (20% 1.3" ATS CL OD E
25% 0.9" ATS CL OD W 6-29 (20% 1.3" ATS CL OD 36% 1.0" ATS CL OD g 33% 0.6" ATS CL OD g 7-29 (20% 1.7" ATS CL OD 24% 1.1" ATS CL OD , 0.5" ATS CL , 8-29 37% (20% 1.9" ATS CL OD OD g 27% 1.3" ATS CL OD 31% 0.7" ATS CL OD E 9-29 (20% 2.1" ATS CL OD 3 38% 1.3" ATS CL OD
<20% 0.7" ATS CL OD 10-29 (20% 2.4" ATS CL OD (20% 2.1" ATS CL OD
, 27% 1.3" ATS CL OD 28% 0.8" ATS CL OD l 11-29 (20% 2.6" ATS CL OD u 32% 1.3" ATS CL OD 34% 1.0" ATS CL OD E 32% 0.7" ATS CL OD g 3-29 34% 1.0" ATS CL OD 14-29 30% 0.6" ATS CL OD 15-29 (20% 1.3" AT5 CL OD 31% 0.6" ATS CL OD I 74 g
L Row - Copjmn Indication % Location origi,n 16-29 24% 1.3" ATS CL OD 36% 0.6" ATS CL OD 17-29 (20% 0.6" ATS CL OD [ 23-29 4-30 (20%
<20%
#1 TSP CL 0.9" ATS CL OD OD 20% 0.5" ATS CL OD
~
5-30 22% 1.1" ATS CL OD (20% 0.9" ATS CL OD l5 6-30 D1 24% 0.4" ATS CL 1.2" ATS CL OD OD (20% 0.0" ATS CL OD g 39% 0.3" ATS CL OD g 8-30 <20% 2.1" ATS CL OD (20% 1.2" ATS CL OD 38% 0.5" ATS CL OD 9-30 30% 2.0" ATS CL OD (20% 1.3" HTS CL OD 35% 0.9" ATS CL OD 0.5" ATS CL I 10-30 (20%
<20%
22% 1.7" ATS CL 1.0" ATS CL OD OD OD (20% 0.6" ATS CL OD l- 11-30 ~20% 2.2" ATS CL OD 23% 1.6" ATS CL OD (20% 1.1" ATA CL OD I 12-30 24% (20% 0.8" Als CL 2.7" ATS CL 2.3" ATS CL OD OD OD 20% 26% 1.5" ATS CL OD I 13-30 26% 0.9" ATS CL 2.6" ATS CL OD OD
<20%
g <20% 2.2" ATS CL OD g <20% 0.9" ATS CL OD 38% 0.5" ATS CL OD 24% 1.4" ATS CL OD 14-30 (20% 1.5" ATS CL OD 1 15-30 (20% 1.4" ATS CL OD 23% 1.1" ATS CL OD 16-30 20% 1.3" ATS CL OD 37% 0.7" ATS CL OD 17-30 24% 0.9" ATS CL OD 18-30 35% 0.8" ATS CL OD 19-30 24% 0.5" ATS CL OD
<20% 0.3" ATS CL OD 4-31 <20% 0.5" ATS CL OD 5-31 <20% 1.8" ATS CL OD
<20% 1.2" ATS CL OD T-'
6-31 <20% 1.1" ATS CL OD 29% 0.4" ATS CL OD 7-31 <20% 2.1" ATS CL OD 26% 1.7" ATS CL OD 26% 1.1" ATS CL OD 30% 0.7" ATS CL OD 75
- - _ _ . - ~ . - - - . . -
I Row - Coltma Indication % Location Origin 8-31 35% 1.2" ATS CL OD 32%, 0.7" ATS CL OD g i 24% 1.9" ATS CL OD g l 9-31 36% 1.2" ATS CL OD i 23% 0.7" ATS CL OD l 30% 1.9" ATC CL OD 10-31 <20%. 1.7" ATS CL OD 30% 1.0" ATS CL OP
- 11-31 (20% 2.3" ATS CL OD
<20% 1.1" ATS CL OD 12-31 (20% 0.9" ATS CL OD
,' (20% 2.4" ATS CL OD E (20% 1.5" ATS CL OD 13-31 <20% 2.4" ATS CL OD E 35% 1.4" ATS CL OD 22% 0.8" ATS CL OD
- 14-31 <20% 0.5" ATS CL OD i 15-31 22% 1.3" ATS CL OD 16-31 (20% 1.4" ATS CL OD g 36% 0.9" ATS CL OD g 17-31 <20% 0.6" ATS CL OD 18-31 31% 1.2" ATS CL OD 28% 0.7" AT5 CL OD 19-31 <20% 0.4" ATS CL GD 4-32 <20% 1.0" ATS CL OD (20% 0.4" ATS CL OD l l 5-32 29% 1.0" ATS CL OD E DI 0.4" ATS CL OD 6-32 (20% 1.9" ATS CL OD g 25% 1.1" ATS CL OD g 35% 0.5" ATS CL OD 7-32 <20% 2.7" ATS CL OD
<20% 2.6" ATS CL OD 27% 2.0" ATS CL OD 22% 1.0" ATS CL OD 8-32 <20% 1.1" ATS CL OD g
<20% 0.9" ATS CL OD 3 9-32 (20% 1.9" ATS CL OD i <. 20% 1.4" ATS CL OD i 39% 1.0" ATS CL 00
- 10-32 <20% 2.0" ATS CL OD
<20% 1.4" ATS CL OD 32% 1.1" ATS CL OD
<20% 0.8" AT3 CL OD 11-32 38% 1.5" ATS CL OD 28%
<20%
1.1" ATS CL 0.7" ATS CL OD OD E' g 12-32 22% 1.5" ATS CL OD l <20% 1.1" ATS CL OD 13-32 <20% 2.4" ATS CL OD 24% 1.1" ATS CL OD
<20% 0.8" ATS CL OD E
76 g
"]
Row - Column Indication 16 Location Origin 14-32 22% 1.0" ATS CL OD 16-32 (20% 1.3" ATS CL OD
<:20% 0.5" ATS CI. OD 17-32 (20% 1.0" ATS CL OD 19-32 26% 0.6" ATS CL OD 21-32 DI 0.2" ATS CL OD 22-32 32% #1 TSP CL OD 4-33 28% 0.4" ATS CL OD 0.5" ATS CL OD I 5-33 32%
22% 32% 1.2" ATS CL 0.8" ATS CL OD OD 6-33 28% 1.2" ATS CL OD 20% 0.9" ATS CL OD I <20% 0.5" ATS CL OD 7-33 27% 1.3" ATS CL OD I 8-33 35%
<20%
31% 0.7" ATS CL 1.9" ATS CL 1.0" ATS CL OD OD SD (20% 1.9" ATS CL OD E 9-33 24% 1.9" ATS CL VD 29% 1.3" ATS CL OD 36% 1.0" ATS CL OD I 10-33 25% 37% 2.0" ATS CL 1.1" ATS CL 0.8" ATS CL OD OD OD 23% I 11-33 <20% (20% (20% 1.6" ATS CL 1.0" ATS CL 0.7" ATS CL OD OD OD 12-33 <20% 2.5" ATS CL OD 5 36% 26% 1.5" ATS CL 0.9" ATS CL OD OD 22% 0.5" ATS CL OD 13-33 27% 1.4" ATS CL OD 35% 0.8" ATS CL OD 14-33 <20% 1.3" ATS CL OD I 15-33 16-33
<20%
<20%
<20%
1.4" ATS CL 2.1" ATS CL 1.4" ATS CL OD OD OD 0.9" ATS CL OD I 18-33
<20%
<20%
27% 1.3" ATS CL 0.9" ATS CL OD OD 29% 0.3" ATS CL OD 19-33 27% 0.8" ATS CL OD I DI 0.4" ATS CL OD 20-33 DI 0.3" ATS CL OD 21-33 24% 0.9" ATS CL OD DI 0.3" ATS CL OD 4-34 <20% 0.8" ATS CL OD 5-34 33% 0.9" ATS CL OD 22% 0.7" ATS CL OD 6-34 23% 1.1" ATS CL OD 20% 0.6" ATS CL OD (20% 1.8" ATS CL OD 77
/
I Row - Column Indication % Location Origin i 7-34 (20% 2.4" ATS CL OD 2 21% 1.1" ATS CL OD g 29% 0.7" ATS CL OD g
<20% 3.8" ATS CL OD 3-34 (20% 1.3" ATS CL OD 20% 0.8" ATS CL OD
! 9-34 20% 2.0" ATS CL OD l 261 1.2" ATS CL OD 1 10-34 <20% 1.9" ATS CL OD g
- 33% 1.1" ATS CL OD g i
11-34 (20% 0.9" ATS CL OD (20% 0.5" ATS CL OD 12-34 23% 1.0" ATS CL OD :
<20% 1.5" ATS CL OD
, 13-34 24% 1.3" ATS CL OD i 22% 0.8" ATS CL OD , 14-34 <20% 1.1" ATS CL OD l l 15-34 (20S. 1.1" ATS CL OD ! (20% 1.4" ATS CL OD 3 16-34 <20% 0.8" ATS CL OD g' i <20% 2.0" ATS CL OD 17-34 <20% 0.6" ATS CL OD l 18-34 23% 0.8" ATS CL OD , l 19-34 27% 0.7" ATS CL OD ' 5-35 (20% 0.9" ATS CL OD 6-35 26% 1.0" ATS CL OD ! l D1 0.5" ATS CL OD lI E l 7-35 20% 1.9" ATS CL OD 30% 0.6" ATS CL OD g 8-35 <20% 0.9" ATS CL OD g 9-35 (20% 2.0" ATS CL OD 29% 1.0" ATS CL OD
<20% 0.5" ATS CL OD l 10-35 21% 1.8" ATS CL OD l 33% 1.0" ATS CL OD l 11-35 <204 1.0" ATS CL OD g
! (20% 0.5" ATS CL OD 3 12-35 <20% 1.4" ATS CL OD l 30% 1.1" ATS CL OD
<2( 1.9" ATS CL OD 13-35 < 2 t, 6 1.5" ATS CL OD (20% 1.1" ATS CL OD
<20% 0.5" ATS CL OD 14-35 <20% 0.8" ATS CL OD 15-35 <20% 1.0" ATS CL OD 16-35 24% 0.9" ATS CL OD g 18-35 38% 0.8" ATS CL OD g 23% 0.4" ATS CL OD
<20% 5.6" ATS CL OD 19-35 (20% 0.8" ATS CL OD 20-35 (20% 0.8" ATS CL OD DI 0.3" ATS CL OD I-78 3
, *j
Itow - column Indication % Location Origin 21-35 23% 0.7" ATS CL 09 ~ D1 0.3" ATS CL OD 4- 20% 0.7" ATS CL OD ~ (20% 1.1" ATS CL OD 5-36 (20% 1.3" ATS CL OD I 6-36 27% (20% 0.6" ATS CL 0.4" ATS CL 0.9" ATS CL OD OD OD B-36 (20% 2.3" ATS CL OD I 9-36
<20%
24% 29% 1.0" ATS CL 1.2" ATS CL OD OD
<20% 0.8" ATS CL OD I (20%
<20%
2.3" ATS CL 2.0" ATS CL 1.7" ATS CL OD OD 10-36 31% OD I 11-35 29%
<20%
29% 1.0" ATS CL 1.4" ATS CL 1.7" ATS CL OD OL' OD 1.5" ATS CL I 34% OD 26% 1.0" ATS CL OD 12-36 24% 1.6" ATS CL OD 27% 0.8" ATS CL OD 13-36 26% 1.1" ATS CL OD 14-36 28% 1.2" ATS CL OD (20% 0.7" ATS CL OD 15-36 <20% 0.9" ATS CL OD 16-36 <20% 1.4" ATS CL OD 29% 0.8" ATS CL OD 17-36 <20% 0.7" ATS CL OD 18-36 (20% 0.6" ATS CL OD 19-36 <20% 0.7" ATS CL OD 20-36 23% 0.6" ATS CL OD
<20% 1.2" ATS CL OD 21-36 <20% 0.6" ATS CL OD 22-36 (20% 0.4" ATS CL OD 23-36 <20% 1.1" ATS CL OD 4-37 <20% 0.7" ATS CL OD 5-37 29% 1.6" ATS CL OD 0.5" ATS CL OD I
30% 6-37 <20% 1.3" ATS CL OD 22% 0.5" ATS CL OD 7-37 (20% 2.1" ATS CL OD 38% 0.4" ATS CL OD I (20% 0.9" ATS CL OD 8-37 (20% 2.2" ATS CL OD I 9-37 24% 22% (20% 1.1" . S CL 0.7" ATS CL 2.2" ATS CL OD OD OD (20% 1 "" ATS CL OD 27% 0.6- ATS CL OD 10-37 34% 0.7" ATS CL OD
<20% 1.2" ATS CL OD 79
I How - Column Indication 3 Location Origin 11-37 30% 0.8" ATS CL OD 12-37 (20% 2.1" A'IS CL OD g (20% 1.4" ATS CL OD g , 29% 0.7" ATS CL OD 13-37 26% 0.8" ATS CL OD
- 14-37 33% 0.9" ATS CL OD l l
15-37 <20% 0.7" ATS CL OD =
- 16-37 23% 0.6" ATS CL OD
! 17-37 <20% 0.7" ATS CL OD g 18-37 (20% 1.0" ATS CL OD g
<20% 0.6" ATS CL OD
! 20-37 <20% 1.0" ATS CL OD l 21-37 29% 0 7" ATS CL OD
- (20% 1.8" ATS CL OD l 22-37 <20% 0.4" ATS CL OD 23-37 36% 0.5" ATS CL OD (I 22% 0.6" ATS CL OD E i <20% 1.1" ATS CL OD 3-38 (20% 0.8" ATS CL OD g l
<20% 1.2" ATS CL OD g l <20% 0.4" ATS CL OD 5-38 39% 0.4" ATS CL OD 6-38 31% 0.6" ATS CL OD I
7-38 32% 1.9" ATS CL OD l 30% 0.5" ATS CL OD 8-38 35% 2.1" ATS CL OD l 9-38 <20% 2.1" ATS CL OD W 23% 0.7" ATS CL OD (20% 0.5" ATS CL OD g 10-38 37% 0.6" ATS CL 2.1" ATS CL OD g' (20% OD 11-38 22% 1.0" ATS CL OD , 0,5" ATS CL 12-38 25% 30% 0,6" ATS CL OD OD g 13-38 33% 0.9" ATS CL OD 14-38 20% 0.9" ATS CL OD g 15-38 (20% 0.7" ATS CL OD 3
<. 20% 0.5" ATS CL OD 16-38 251. 0.6" ATS CL OD E
<20% 1.0" ATS CL OD g 17-38 24% 0.7" ATS CL OD 18-38 27% 1.1" ATS CL OD
<20% 0.6" ATS CL OD 22% 1.3" ATS CL OD 19-38 24% 1.2" ATS CL OD 20-38 29% 0.6" ATS CL OD g
<20% 1.7" ATS CL OD g 21-38 25% 0.6" ATS CL OD 22-38 23% 0.5" ATS CL OD g 23-38 (20% 0.5" ATS CL OD g 4-39 27% 0.7" ATS CL OD l
I 80 g e,
Row - Column Indication % Location Origin 5-39 29% 0.8" ATS CL OD 31% 0.4" ATS CL OD ~ 6-39 D1 0.5" ATS CL OD 7-39 33% 2,0" ATS CL OD g 35% 0.6" ATS CL OD 1.7" ATS CL OD l 8-39
<20%
(20% 2.3" ATS CL OD (20% 0.4" ATS CL OD 9-39 (20% 2.0" ATS CL OD I 24% 0.8" ATS CL OD 10-39 29% 0.6" ATS CL OD g 11-39 23% 1.4" ATS CL OD g 33% 0.6" ATS CL OD 12-39 34% 1.0" ATS CL OD 23% 0.6" ATS CL OD 13-39 38% 0.9" ATS CL OD 14-39 (20% 0.7" ATS CL OD 15-39 21% 0.6" ATS CL 'D 24% 0.8" ATS CL OD I 16-39 20% (20% 0.6" ATS CL 0.5" ATS CL OD OD 17-39 21% 1.1" ATS CL OD 0.6" ATS CL OD 1 18-39 23% (20% 1.3" ATS CL OD (20% 0.9" ATS CL OD 19-39 (20% 0.5" ATS CL OD 1 20-39 (20% 3.0" ATS CL OD 37% 0.7" ATS CL OD 21-39 34% 0.4" ATS CL OD I 22-39 23-39 34%
<20%
0.3" ATS CL 0.7" ATS CL OD OD 39% 0.4" ATS CL OD I 4-40 5-40 22% 36% 0.8" ATS CL 0.6" ATS CL OD OD
<20% 1.7" ATS CL OD 6-40 <20% 0.6" ATS CL OD 7-40 31% 2.2" ATS CL OD 38% 0.5" ATS CL OD D1 0.3" ATS CL OD (20% 1.8" ATS CL OD 8-40 24% 2.2" ATS CL OD 30% 0.7" ATS CL OD 9-40 (20% 2.2" ATS CL OD 28% 0.7" ATS CL OD 10-40 29% 0.6" ATS CL OD (20% 2.1" ATS CL OD 11-40 28% 0.6" ATS CL OD 12-40 37% 1.3" ATS CL OD 29% 0.6" ATS CL OD 13-40 36% 0.9" ATS CL OD 14-40 22% 0.7" .TS CL OD 15-40 26% 0.7" ATS CL OD DI 0.4" ATS CL OD 81
Row - Column Indication % Location Origin 16-40 23% 0.6" ATS CL OD 17-40 <20% 0.4" ATS CL OD g 19-40 22% 0.7" ATS CL OD g 20-40 (20% 0.4" ATS CL OD 21-40 33% 0.5" ATS CL OD 30% 0.1" ATS CL OD 22-40 <203 0.6" ATS CL OD ! 23-40 (20% 0.7" ATS CL OD 4-41 (20% 0.8" ATS CL OD l 23% 0.4" ATS CL OD ur 5-41 (20% 0.6" ATS CL OD 39% 0.7" ATS CL OD E 6-41 D1 34% 0.2" ATS CL 0.6" ATS CL OD OD E' 7-41 371, 0.6" ATS CL OD 8-41 <: 20% 2.1" ATS CL OD (20%, 1.1" ATS CL OD "' 22% 0.5" ATS CL OD 9-41 30% 0.7" ATS CL OD E 10-41 <201 2.1" ATS CL OD E, (20% 1.4" ATS CL OD 35% 0.6" ATS CL OD g 11-41 30% 0.7" ATS CL OD g 13-41 28% 0.8" ATS CL OD 14-41 28% 1.1" ATS CL CD 32% 0.5" ATS CL OD 15-41 24% 0.4" ATS CL OD 16-41 293, 0.5" ATS CL OD 17-41 (20% 0.5" ATS CL OD g 18-41 30% 0.7" ATS CL OD g 19-41 273, 0.6" ATS CL OD 20-41 271 0.5" ATS CL OD g 22-41 26% 0.5" ATS CL OD g 23-41 (20% 0.0" ATS CL OD 5-42 30% 0.8" AT1 CL OD 6-42 303, 0.6" ATS CL OD 7-42 35% 0.6" ATS CL OD
<204, 3.4" ATS CL OD
<20% 2.0" ATS CL OD E (201, 1.2" ATS CL OD g 8-42 32% 0.4" ATS CL OD
< 20%, 1 9" ATS CL OD 9-42 (20% 1.9" ATS CL OD (20% 0.7" ATS CL OD 10-42 24% 1.8" ATS CL OD 37% 0.7" ATS CL OD l 23% 1,3" ATS CL OD W 11-42 24% 1.4" ATS CL OD 20% 0.6" ATS CL OD g 12-42 (20% 1.6" ATS CL OD g 26% 1.0" ATS CL OD 36% 0.5" ATS CL OD I
e2 g
.- - - . - -_ .. _ ~
. I How - Colitmti Indication 1 Location oriqit! 13-42 32't 1.5" ATS CL OD I 14-42 31't 30% 31% 0.8" ATS CL 1.2" ATS CL 0.5" ATS CL OD OD OD 15-4? Vt 0.5" ATS CL OD 16 - 4,. <20% 0.9" ATS CL OD 10-4*e 31't 0.6" ATS CL OD 19-42 31% 0.5" Als CL OD I 20-42 21-42 (20% 36% 27% 0.a" ATS CL 0.5" ATS CL 1.0" ATS CL OD OD OD I 37-42 4-43 5-43 21't (20% 31% HITSP CL 0.5" ATS CL 0.7" ATS CL OD OD OD
~
6-43 37% 0.6" ATS CL OD 8-43 !.9" ATS CL I' (20%
< 2 0't 0.8" ATS CL OD OD 35*5 0.5" ATS CL OD -
9-43 23% 1.6" Als CL OD 24% 0.6" ATS CL OD 10-43 39"5 1.4" ATS CL OD
; 27% 0.6" ATS CL M 12-43 (205 1.7" ATS CL i 35't 0.9" ATS CL '
32't 0.6" ATS CL ) I 13-43 15-43 26*t 32% DI 1.6" ATS CL 0.6" ATS CL 0.2" ATS CL
.0 OD OD I 16-43 26%
26% D1 0.4" ATS CL 0.6" ATS CL 0.3" ATS CL OD OD OD 17-43 D1 0.5" ATS CL OD I 18-43 19-43 35% 26% 0.7" ATS CL 1.1" ATS CL OD OD 36% 0.7" ATS CL OD I 20-43 21-4? DI (20% 22% 0.3" ATS CL 0.6" ATS CL 1.1" ATS CL OD OD OD I 23-43 26*s 22% 24% 0.6" ATS CL 0.9" ATS CL 0.5" ATS CL OD OD OD 3-44 (20% 1.0" ATS CL OD 4-44 (20% 0.8" ATS CL OD (20% 0.5" ATS CL OD 5-41 30% 0.8" ATS CL OD I 8-44 (20% 37% 38% 1.7" ATS CL 1.0" ATS CL 0.5" ATS CL OD OD OD 1.7" ATS CL I 9-44 <.2 0't OD (20% 0.8" ATS CL OD 10-44 28*t 1.1" ATS CL OD 11-44 36% 1.1" ATS CL OD 31't 0.5" ATS CL OD e3 g u -- _ -_ _ - -
- m. . _ _ .. _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
{ I. Hcw - Col mn Indication % y-cation Origi_n 12-44 (20% 1.0" ATS CL OD 31% 0.8" ATS CL OD g 13-44 32% 0.8" ATS CL OD g, 14-44 <20% 1.4" Als CL OD q 16% 0.7" ATS CL OD l l 15-44 <20% 1.2" ATS CL OD ' 20% 0.7" ATS CL OD I DI 0.3" ATS ti OD 22% 1.1" ATS CL OD g> (20% 1.7" ATS CL OD g 16-44 32% 0.7" ATS CL OD : D1 0.3" ATS CL OD 17-44 245, 0.9" ATS CL OD 24% 0,9" ATS CL OD D1 0.3" ATS CL OD 18-44 32% 0.6" ATS CL OD - 20-44 24% 0.9" ATS CL OD 21-44 31% 1.0" Als CL OD 22-44 28% 1.2" ATS CL OD g 23 44 </0% 0.9" ATS CL OD gi 24-44 203 0.6" ATS CL OD 3-45 20% 1.2" ATS CL OD 32% 0.8" ATS CL OD 4-45 22% 1.1" ATS CL OD 9-45 38% 0.7" ATS CL OD 39% 1.8" ATS CL OD 12-45 261, 2.1" ATS CL OD 26% 0.9" ATS CL OD 13-45 38% 2.0" ATS CL OD g 30% 1.6" ATS CL OD g i (20% 0.8" ATS CL OD l 14-45 23% 2.3" ATS CL OD (20% 1.5" ATS CL OD
<20% 1.0" ATS CL OD i 361, 0.5" ATS CL OD 15-45 <20% 1.5" ATS CL OD g (20% 0.8" ATS CL OD 3 DI 0.4" ATS CL OD 16-45 36% 1.8" ATS CL OD g 25% 0.5" ATS CL OD g 17-45 (20), 1.0" ATS CL OD 38% 1.1" ATS CL OD 18-45 28% 1.7" ATS CL OD l 35% 0.8" ATS CL OD W DI 0.5" ATS CL OD 19-45 32% 0.8" ATS CL OD g 20-45 <20% 1.0" ATS CL OD g DI 0.4" ATS CL OD 21-45 DI 0.5" ATS CL OD i' 22-45 30% 1.1" ATS CL OD 23-45 36% 0.9" ATS CL OD 24-45 24% 0.7" ATS CL OD 29-45 (20% 2.0" ATS CL OD 84 g w-
2 Row - Column Indication % Location Origin 3-46 DI 0.8" ATS CL OD 4-46 32% 1.2" ATS CL OD 35% 0.5" ATS CL OD 13-46 27 % 1.6" <..TS CL OD 35% 0.8" ATS CL OD 15-46 (201 ' 9" ATE CL
. OD 27% 0.6" ATS CL CD 16-46 <20% 2.5" ATS CL *n 39% 1,9" ATS CL 32% 1.1" ATS CL 34% 0.d" TS CL OD 17-46 <20% 2.6" ArS CL OD
<20% 2.3" ATS CL OD 27% 2.0" ATS CL OD 20% 1.6" ATS CL OD 37% 0.9" ATS CL OD 18-46 (20% 2.1" ATS CL OD 24% 0.9" ATS CL OD I
39% 0.5" ATS CL OD 36% 1.5" ATS CL OD 19-46 22% 2.1" ATS CL OD 37% 0.8" ATS CL OD 20% 0.5" ATS CL OD 20-46 <20% 1.9" ATS CL OD 21-46 <20% 2.4" ATS CL OD 22-46 <20% 2.7" AIS CL OD 23-46 <20% 1.5" ATE CL OD
<20% 1.1" ATS CL OD 25-4f. <20% 0.9" ATS CL OD 29-46 31% #1 TSP CL OD ,
33-46 27% #1TSF CL OD 41-46 <20% #1 TSP CL OD
?-47 <?O% 1.5" ATS CL OD 36% 0.6" ATS CL OD 4-47 27% 1.5" ATS CL OD 1/% 1.0" ATS CL OD 37% 0.4" A*S CL OD 13-47 27% 2.0" AIS CL OD 36% 0.8" ATS CL OD 4 14-47 30% 1.9" ATS CL OD 38% 0.9" ATS CL OD 17-47 20% 2.7" ATS CL OD 27% 2.0" ATS CL OD 31% 1.2" ATS CL OD DI 0.6" ATS CL OD '
18-47 39% 2.0" ATS CL OD 36% 0.5" ATS CL OD 37% 1.1" ATS CL OD 19-47 39% 1.2" ATS CL OD 20% 0.6" ATS CL OD 20-47 120% 2.2" ATS CL OD
<20% 1.1" ATS CL OD 85
. . .~ -
l l l ll t Row - Column Indication % Location Origin 21-47 23% 2.4" ATS CL OD l 24% 1.8" ATS CL OD 1.1" ATS CL E l <20% OD E l 22-47 <20% 1.8" ATS CL OD , 23% 1.3" ATS CL OD l <20% 0.2" ATS CL OD i 23-47 30% 1.9" ATS CL OD 27% 1.0" ArS CL OD 41-47 21% #1 TSP CL OE g 3-48 (20% 1.4" ATS CL OD W 4-4r <20% 1.6" ATS CL OD
<20% 1.0" ATS CL OD E 7-48 37% 1.7" ATS CL OD g
<20% 1.0" ATS CL OD 32% 0.7" ATS CL OD 8-48 <20% 2.0" ATS CL OD
[ 37% 1.5" ATS CL OD l 22% 0.9" ATS CL OD 10-48 34% 1.3" ATS CL OD 3 12-48 22% 1.7" ATS CL OD E 39% 0.9" ATS CL OD 35% 0.4" ATS CL OD g 13-48 <20% 2.0" ATS CL OD 39% 1.0" ATS CL OD E
<20% 0.6" ATS CL OD 14-48 (20% 2.2" ATS CL OD 35% 1.9" ATS CL OD 38% 0.9" ATS CL OD 37% 0.5" ATS CL OD 15-48 23% 1.9" ATS CL OD 38% 0.8" ATS CL OD 36% 0.5" ATS CL OD 16-48 (20% 1.8" ATS CL OD _
32% 0.7" ATS CL OD 17-48 28% 0.6" ATS CL OD
<20% 1.9" ATS CL OD g 19-48 38% 1.1" ATS CL OD W 28% 0.5" ATS CL OD 20-48 .20% 2.1" ATS CL OD g 28% 1.7" ATS CL OD g 3PS 1.2" ATS CL OD 22-48 26% 0.3" ATS CL OD 23-48 23% 1.7" ATS CL OD 32% 0 9" ATS CL OD DI 0.2" ATS CL OD 24-48 DI 0.5" ATS CL OD g 39% 0.9" ATS CL OD g 25-48 (20% 0.6" ATS CL OD 30-48 22% #1 TSP CL OD g 33-48 26% #1 TSP CL OD g 37-48 <20% #1 TSP CL OD 41-48 <20% #1 TSP CL OD I
86 Il
=
I I Row - Colten Indication % Location origin 6-49 25% 1.0" ATS CL OD 29% 0.6" ATS CL OD 'I 7-49 <20% 1.7" ATS CL 0.5" ATS CL OD OD 28% 8-49 35% 1.2" ATS CL OD 0.5" ATS CL vI 9-49
<20%
35% 1.8" ATS CL OD OD 35% 1.3" ATS CL OD I 10-49 25% 28% 30% 0.3" ATS CL 1.9" ATS CL 1.4" ATS CL OD OD OD (20% 0.7" ATS CL OD
~I 11-49 32% 1.3" ATS CL 0.9" ATS CL OD OD (20%
12-49 28% 1.3" ATS CL OD I 13-49
<20%
28% 0.B" ATS CL 1.1" ATS CL 1.7" ATS CL OD OD OD 28% I 14-49 15-49 32% 31%
<20%
0.8" ATS CL 0.6" ATS CL 1.9" ATS CL OD OD OD 0.6" ATS CL I 16-49 (20% OD (20% 0.8" ATS CL O! 17-49 <20% 0.7" ATS CL OD 19-49 38% 0.9" ATS CL OD 21-49 30% 1.3" ATS CL OD 38% 0.6" ATS CL OD 23-49 28% 1.1" ATS CL OD I 24-49 25-49 30% 32% 35% 0.8" ATS CL 0.9" ATS CL 0.3" ATS CL OD OD OD 0.5" ATS CL OD I 6-50 7-50 (20% 20% 26% 2.1" ATS CL 0.5" ATS CL OD OD 8-50 <20% 1.1" ATS CL OD I 9-50 28% 23% 33% 0.5" ATS CL 1.1" ATS CL 0.5" ATS CL OD OD OD 10-50 <20% 1.3" ATS CL OD l' 11-50 24% (20% 1.2" ATS CL 0.6" ATS CL OD OD 12-50 1.1" ATS CL OD I 21% (20% 0.7" ATS CL OD 13-50 32% 1.0" ATS CL OD 14-50 24% 0.7" ATS CL OD I 15-50 16-50 17-50 25% (20%
<20%
0.7" ATS CL 0.6" ATS CL 0.8" ATS CL OD OD OD 21-50 36% 0.9" ATS CL OD I 22-50 27% 1.0" ATS CL OD 39% 0.6" ATS CL OD 27% 1.3" ATS CL OD I 8' ll
I Row - Column Indication $ Location Origin 23-50 36% 1.0" ATS CL OD 39% 0.6" ATS CL OD g 24-50 30% 0.6" ATS CL OD g 4-51 <20% 0.7" ATS CL OD 5-51 25% 0.5" ATS CL OD 6-51 23% 1.9" ATS CL OD 20% 1.5" aTS CL OD 25% 0.8" ATS CL OD 7-51 26% 2.2" ATS CL OD $ 22% 0.9" ATS CL OD EN 27% 0.4" ATS CL OD 8-51 <20% 1.2" ATS CL OD g
<20% 0.3" ATS CL OD g 1.5" ATS CL
~ - -
9-51 <20% OD 37% 0.3" ATS CL OD 10-51 <20% 0.4" ATS CL OD 31% 0.9"ATfCl OD
<20% 1.6" A 6 CL OD 11-51 28% 0 8" A M CL OD E
<20% 2.1" A 5 ct OD 3 12-51 (20% 0.8" $78 CL OD 13-51 24% 0.5" ATS CL OD g 28% 1.1" ATS CL OD g 14-51 21% 0.9" ATS CL OD 15-51 DI 0.3" ATS CL OD 38% 0.8" ATS CL OD 16-51 38% 0.7" ATS CL OD
<20% 1.3" ATS CL OD 17-51 21% 0.7" ATS CL OD g 19-51 35% 0.9" ATS CL OD 5 35% 0.4" ATS CL OD 22-51 32% 0.7" ATS CL OD gn "
24-51 0.5" ATS CL OD 25-51 39% 36% 0.3" ATS CL OD ll 3-52 <20% 0.6" ATS CL OD 4-52 31% 0.7" ATS CL OD 5-52 31% 0.4" ATS CL OD 6-52 <20% 2.5" ATS CL OD 33% 0.7" ATS CL OD E 7-52 <20% 2.2" ATS CL OD g 29% 0.5" ATS CL OD 8-52 <20% 2.0" ATS CL OD 39% 0.4" ATS CL OD k, 1.8" ATS CL " 9-52 23% OD 37% 0.4" ATS CL OD 10-52 DI 0.3" ATS CL OD g 24% 0.6" ATS CL OD E 11-52 <20% 0.8" ATS CL OD
<20% 1.4" ATS CL OD g 21% 0.5" ATS CL OD 5
12-52 28% 0.5" ATS CL OD (20% 1.3" ATS CL OD I l 88
=
Il
I Indication % Location Origin
! Row - Column 13-52 28% 0.5" ATS CL OD 14-52 0.5" ATS CL OD I
25%
<20% 0.9" ATS CL OD (20% 1.4" ATS CL OD
~5-52 39% 0.6" ATS CL OD
( <20% 2.0" ATS CL OD [' 0.7" ATS CL OD 16-52 36% 17-52 DI 0.4" ATS CL OD I 18-52 27%
<20%
28% 0.8" ATS CL 1.3" ATS CL 0,8" ATS CL OD OD OD g 25% 1.4" ATS CL OD 0.9" ATS CL g 19-52 36% 28% 1.4" ATS CL OD OD c-20-52 24% 0.4" ATS CL OD I 25-52 38-52
<20%
39%
<20%
0.8" ATS CL 0.3" ATS CL 0.1" bTS HL OD OD OD 0.6" ATS CL I 3-53 <20% OD 4-53 DI 0.2" ATS CL OD 5-53 (20% 0.8" ATS CL OD 6-53 22% 2.1" ATS CL OD I 23% 23% 35% 1.6" ATS CL 0.9" ATS CL 0.6" ATS CL OD OD OD I 7-53 (20% 25% 29% 2.2" ATS CL 0.6" ATS CL 0.3" ATS CL OD LD OD 8-53 2.0" ATS CL OD I 10-53
<20%
36% 34% 0.5" ATS CL 0.4" ATS CL OD OD 28% 1.1" ATS CL OD I 11-53 22% 0.8" ATS CL OD 39% 1.3" ATS CL OD
<20% 2.2" ATS CL OD 24% 0.6" ATS CL OD "l
as 12-53 21% 0.5" ATS CL OD (20% 1.6" ATS CL OD 13-53 38% 1.1" ATS CL OD
<20% 0.6" ATS CL OD I 14-53 31% 1.0" kTS CL OD 17-53 28% 0.7" ATS CL OD 18-53 3d% 0.8" ATS CL OD 24% 1.4" ATS CL OD (20% 2.0" ATS CL OD 0.8" ATS CL I 19-53 34% OD 22% 2.0" ATS CL OD
<20% 1.5" ATS CL OD 20-53 22% 0.5" ATS CL OD I 35% 1.0" ATS CL OD I
se y
I Row - Column Indication % Location Origin 21-53 31% 0.7" ATS CL OD
<20% 1.6" ATS CL OD g 23-53 39% 0.6" ATS CL OD g
<20% 1.3" ATS CL OD 25-53 36% 0.3" ATS CL OD 26-53 26% 0.4" ATS CL OD 3-54 25% 0.2" ATS CL OD 6-54 37% 0.8" ATS CL OD 7-54 25% 2.2" ATS CL OD g 32% 0.8" ATS CL OD E 30% 0.4" ATS CL OD 8-54 31% 1.1" ATS CL OD E 25% 0.6" ATS CL OD g 25% 0.3" ATS CL OD 9-54 36% 1.8" ATS CL OD 36% 1.2" ATS CL OD 36% 0.4" ATS CL OD 10-54 34% 0.3" ATS CL OD 21% 1.5" ATS CL OD g
<20% 2.4" ATS CL OD g l
11-54 28% 1.4" Alf CL OD 24% 0.4" ATS CL OD 12-54 <20% 1.8" ATS CL OD 14-54 28% 0.9" ATS CL OD 25% 0.6" ATS CL OD 15-54 34% 0.4" ATS CL OD E 35% 0.9" ATS CL OD E
<20% 2.4" ATS CL OD 16-54 <20% 0.4" ATS CL OD g 34% 0.9" ATS CL OD g
<20% 1.3" ATS CL OD 17-54 32% 0.8" ATS CL OD l <20% 2.1" ATS CL OD i
18-54 30% 1.0" ATS CL OD
- <20% 2.2" ATS CL OD 19-54 28% 1.0" ATS CL OD g 27% 1.3" ATS CL OD 3 25% 2.2" ATS CL OD l 20-54 27% 1.3" ATS CL OD g l <20% 2.4" ATS CL .OD g 21-54 35% 0.6" ATS CL OD 30% 1.1" ATS CL OD
<20% 1.7" ATS CL OD
<20% 2.2" ATS CL OD l 22-54 <20% 0.7" ATS CL OD 21% 1.6" ATS CL OD g 24-54 39% 0.4" ATS CL OD g 34% 0,8" ATS CL OD 26-54 35% 0.5" ATS CL OD l 38-54 24% #1 TSP CL OD l 3-55 DI 0.2" ATS CL OD 4-55 <20% 0.6" ATS CL OD I
90 g f
I Row - Column Indication % Location origin 5-55 (20% 0.7" ATS CL OD I 6-55 7-55 22% 26% 22% 0.7" ATS CL 0.5" ATS CL 0.9" ATS CL OD OD OD 0.2" ATS CL 'I DI OD 8-55 20% 1.2" ATS CL OD 26% 0.5" ATS CL OD 9-55 (20% 1.4" ATS CL OD I 10-55 11-55 32% 32% 28% 0,5" ATS CL 1.7" ATS CL 1.5" ATS CL OD OD OD I 13-55 14-55 15-55
<20t 35%
<20%
1.3" ATS CL 1.2" ATS CL 2.4" ATS CL OD OD OD (20% 1.3" ATS CL OD I 16-55 22% 22% 0.9" ATS CL 1.0" ATS CL OD OD 17-55 (20% 2.2" ATS CL OD I 18-55 (20% 22%
<20%
1.2" ATS CL 0.8" ATS CL 2.2" ATS CL OD OD OD I 19-55 (20%
<20%
<20%
1.0" ATS CL 2.3" ATS CL 1.8" ATS CL OD OD OD 21% 1.1" ATS CL OD , 21-55 <20% 0.8" ATS CL OD 22-55 39% 0.7" ATS CL OD 32% 1.3" ATS CL OD I 23-55 25-55 32% 37% 3t$ 1.0" ATS CL 0.9" ATS CL 0.4" ATS CL OD OD OD 4-56 DI 0.1" ATS CL OD I 5-56 DI 0.1" ATS CL OD 6-56 (20% 0.7" ATS CL OD 7-56 33% 0.6" ATS CL OD I 9-56 9-56 DI DI
<20%
0.2" ATS CL 0.2" ATS CL 1.4" ATS CL OD OD OD I 10-56 D1 22% 22% 0.2" ATS CL 1.7" ATS CL 1.1" ATS CL OD OD OD 25% 0.4" ATS CL OD I 11-56 27% 1.5" ATS CL OD 12-56 <20% 1.5" ATS CL OD 13-56 30% 1.2" ATS Cli OD I. 14-56
<20%
24% 0.6" ATS CL 1.1" ATS CL OD OD 15-56 32% 1.4" ATS CL OD I 16-56 17-56
<20%
<20%
<20%
1.6" ATS CL 1.1" ATS CL 1.7" ATS CL OD OD OD 1.1" ATS CL OD I
<20%
. . - . -. .- . - . . - - . . - ... .- -- ._.__ -. - . . . . _ ~ ~ . . . .- I Row - Column Indication % Location Origin 18-56 22% 1.6" ATS CL OD 27% 0.8" ATS CL OD g 19-56 22% 1.6" ATS CL OD g
<20% 0.8" ATS CL OD 21-56 24% 1.5" ATS CL OD 22-56 <20% 1.4" ATS CL OD 35% 0.8" ATS CL OD 23-56 34% 1.3" ATS CL OD 39% 0.7" ATS CL OD g 24-56 27% 0.8" ATS CL OD 3 39% 0.6" ATS CL OD 25-56 25% 0.9" ATS CL OD 3-57 37% 0.4" ATS CL OD 4-57 33% 0.4" ATS CL OD DI 0.1" ATS CL OD 5-57 DI 0.2" ATS CL OD l 6-57 <20% 1.5" ATS CL OD E 37% 0.5" ATS CL OD 7-57 <20% 0.6" ATS CL OD g DI 0.2" ATS CL OD g 8-57 DI 0.2" ATS CL OD 9-57 (20% 1.5" ATS CL OD 39% 0.3" ATS CL OD 10-57 DI 0.4" ATS CL OD "
11-57 <20% 1.4" ATS CL OD DI 0.8" ATS CL OD g
<20% 2.3" ATS CL OD E (20% 2.0" ATS CL GC 12-57 27% 0.9" ATS CL OD g 13-57 <20% 1.5" ATS CL OD g' (20% 1.1" ATS CL OD
<20% 0.5" ATS CL OD g 14-57 22% 1.2" ATS CL OD g1 15-57 20% 1.3" ATS CL OD 16-57 28% 1.1" ATS CL OD 17-57 25% 1.2" ATS CL OD g 18-57 <20% 1.5" ATS CL OD g 36% 1.1" ATS CL OD 19-57 25% 1.3" ATS CL OD E 30% 0.9" ATS CL OD g 21-57 39% 1.0" ATS CL OD 23% 0.7" ATS CL OD 22-57 <20% 1.5" ATS CL OD 30% 1.3" ATS CL OD 33% 0.8" ATS CL OD 24-57 <20% 0.6" ATS CL OD g DI 0.3" ATS CL OD g 25-57 DI 0.3" ATS CL OD 27% 0.6" ATS CL OD 3-58 20% 0.4" ATS CL OD 4-58 25% 0.3" ATS CL OD 8-58 31% 0.5" ATS CL OD 9-58 <20% 0.5" ATS CL OD e2
,J
Row - Coltmm Indication % Location Origin 10 58 22% 0.7" ATS CL OD ,] 11-58 <20% 1.6" ATS CL OD 33% 0.8" ATS CL OD ~~ 12-58 <20% 0.9" ATS CL OD
- 13-58 25% 1.1" ATS CL OD 14-58 (20% 1.0" ATS CL OD 15-58 23% 1.0" ATS CL OD 17-58 25% 1.1" ATS CL OD 18-58 1.2" ATS CL I 19-58 25%
38% 35% 0.9" ATS CL 1.4" ATS CL OD OD OD 33% 0.8" ATS CL OD 20-58 DI 0.7" ATS CL OD B 21-58 <20% 1.2" ATS CL OD 30% 0.6" ATS CL OD I 22-58 23-58 22% DI
<20%
0.5" ATS CL 1.0" ATS CL 0.5" ATS CL OD OD OD I 24-58 25-58 39%
<20%
DI 0.6" ATS CL 0.6" ATS CL 0.2" ATS CL OD OD OD 33-58 #1 TSP CL OD I 27% 3-59 22% 0.5" ATS CL OD 5-59 26% 0.6" ATS CL OD 8-59 23% 1.1" ATS CL OD I 10-59 39% 39% D1 0.3" ATS CL 1.1" ATS CL 0.4" ATS CL OD OD OD 11-59 28% 0.9" ATS CL OD I- 12-59 27% 1.3" ATS CL OD 14-59 <20% 1.0" ATS CL OD 15-59 <20% 1.2" ATS CL OD I
~
28% 0.9" ATS CL OD l 16-59 25% 1.0" ATS CL OD l 23% 0.7" ATS CL OD 17-59 25% 0.8" ATS CL OD 18-59 39% 0.9" ATS CL OD 19-E9 23% 1.2" ATS CL OD 27% 0.7" ATS CL OD 20-59 28% 0.7" ATS CL OD 21-59 23% 0.6" ATS CL OD 22-59 (20% 1.6" ATS CL OD 23% 0.6" ATS CL OD 23-59 25% 0.7" ATS CL OD 25-59 (20% 0.6" ATS CL OD DI 0.2" ATS CL OD 3-60 29% 0.4" ATS CL OD 5-60 <20% 1.0" ATS CL OD 38% 0.4" ATS CL OD 6-60 33% 0.6" ATS CL OD 37% 0.3" ATS CL OD I 93
Row - Column Indication % Location Origin 7-60 36% 0.7" ATS CL OD 23% 2 3" ATS CL OD g 8-60 31% 1.2" ATS CL OD g 39% 0.4" ATS CL OD 9-60 (20% 1.0" ATS CL OD 37% 0.4" ATS CL OD 10-60 26% 1.0" ATS CL OD 33% 0.6" ATS CL OD 22% 1.6" ATS CL OD l 11-60 <20% 1.7" ATS CL OD E 20% 1.1" ATS CL OD 12-60 20% 1.3" ATS CL OD g 13-60 <20% 1.1" ATS CL OD g 14-60 <20% ).1" ATS CL OD 15-60 20% 1.2" ATS CL OD 16-60 22% 1.1" ATS CL OD l 17-60 <20% 0.9" ATS CL OD = i 18-60 28% 0.9" ATS CL OD 19-60 <20% 1.2" ATS CL OD g 27% 0.8" ATS CL OD g 20-60 36% 0.8" ATS CL OD l 21-60 30% 1.1" ATS CL OD DI 0.4" ATS CL OD 22-60 30% 0.9" ATS CL OD
<20% 0.4" ATS CL OD 24-60 39% 1.1" ATS CL OD 25% 0.7" ATS CL OD 20% 0.6" ATS CL OD DI 0.3" ATS CL OD E
25-60 <20% 1.0" ATS CL OD g
<20% 0.6" ATS CL OD DI 0.3" ATS CL OD en 3-61 0.4" ATS CL OD 4-61
<20%
22% 1.0" ATS CL OD ll 25% 0.3" ATS CL OD 5-61 23% 0.9" ATS CL OD g 31% 0.3" ATS CL OD W 6-61 (20% 0.9" ATS CL OD
<20% 0.5" ATS CL OD g 7-61 22% 1.1" ATS CL OD g 23% 0.5" ATS CL OD 8-61 <20% 1.3" ATS CL OD 31% 0.6" ATS CL OD 9-61 <20% 1.7" ATS CL OD 31% 0.9" ATS CL OD 28% 0.4" ATS CL OD g 10-61 <20% 0. 8 ATS CL OD g DI 1.4" ATS CL OD
<20% 1.8" ATS CL OD g 11-61 35% 1.7" ATS CL OD E
DI 2.4" ATS CL OD I 94 ll
=
~ W Row - Column Indication % Location Origin 13-61 <20% 1.5" ATS CL OD 14 (20% 1.4" ATS CL OD 23% 2.1" ATS CL OD F 15-61 35% 1.4" ATS CL OD L 16 61 23% 1.0" ATS Ct OD 17-61 <20% 1.1" ATS CL OD 18-61 <20% 0.9" ATS CL OD [ 19-61 21-61 20%
<20%
0.6" ATS CL 0.6" ATS CL OD OD _ 20% 1.0" ATS CL OD 22-61 DI 0.9" ATS CL OD g 23-61 30% 1.1" ATS CL OD 24-61 22% 0.9" ATS CL OD l 27% 0.4" ATS CL OD .< 37-61 <20% #1 TSP CL OD s 39-61 (20% #1 TSP CL OD
= 3-62 DI 0.2" ATS CL OD 4-62 <20% 0.9" ATS CL OD DI 0.3" ATS CL OD I 6-62 <20%
27% 0.8" ATS CL 0.3" AT3 CL OD OD 8-62 <20% 1.6" ATS CL OD I 9-62
<20%
20% 0.6" ATS CL 1.8" ATS CL OD OD 22% 0.7" ATS CL OD ' (20% 1.1" ATS CL OD 10-62 30% 1.8" ATS CL OD 11-62 DI 1.2" ATS CL OD g 25% 1.6" ATS CL OD g (20% 1.9" ATS CL OD 23% 2.3" ATS CL OD 12-62 <20% 1.3" ATS CL OD ~ 13-62 DI 1.0" ATS CL OD
<20% 1.5" ATS CL OD
<20% 2.1" ATS CL OD 14-62 23% 1.3" ATS CL OD 1 15-62 <20% 0.7" ATS CL OD 16-62 20% 0.8" ATS CL OD 17-62 (20% 0.6" ATS CL OD 19-62 22% 0.7" ATS CL OD
; 20-62 D1 1.0" ATS CL OD 21-62 <20% 0.8" ATS CL OD
<20% 1.1" ATS CL OD 22-62 23% 0.6" ATS CL OD 20% 1.2" ATS CL OD 23-62 DI 0.4" ATS CL CD 24-62 30% 0.6" ATS CL OD 30% 1.0" ATS CL OD 39-62 <20% 1.0" ATS CL OD 95
. - . .- - -- - . . ~ - . _ - . ~ - - - - . - .- .. . .. . - . - . . _
I; Row - Column Indication % Location Origin 3-63 DI 0.2" ATS CL OD 4-63 <20% 0.6" ATS CL OD gi DI 0.2" ATS CL OD El 5-63 (20% 0.7" ATS CL OD ;
<20% 0.3" ATS CL OD 6-63 <20% 0.8" ATS CL OD 7-63 <20% 2.5" ATS CL OD
<20% 1.7" ATS CL OD 31% 1.4" ATS CL OD E 7-63 35% 0.7" ATS CL OD E 31% 0.2" ATS CL OD l 8-63 <20% 1.8" ATS CL OD gl
<20% 1.0" ATS CL OD gl '
20% 0.4" ATS CL OD 9-63 <20% 1.7" ATS CL OD
<20% 0.9" ATS CL OD l 35% 0.5" ATS CL OD W l
10-63 <20% 1.1" ATS CL OD
<20% 1,9" ATS CL OD 11-63 22% 1.6" ATS CL OD 12-63 22% 2.1" ATS CL OD 14-63 (20% 1.9" ATS CL OD 15-63 25% 0.9" ATS CL OD
<20% 1.9" ATS CL -OD 16-63 25% 0.B" ATS CL OD
<20% 1.4" ATS CL OD
<20% 1.9" ATS CL OD 17-63 35% 0.5" ATS CL OD 25% 0.7" ATS CL OD g 18-63 28% 0.7" ATS CL OD g (20% 2.1" ATS CL OD 19-63 30% 0.7" ATS CL OD g
<20% 2.1" ATS CL OD g
<20% 1.0" ATS CL OD 21-63 27% 0.8" ATS CL OD 22-63 20% 0.4" ATS CL OD g l <20% 0.9" ATS CL OD B
<20% 1.4" ATS CL OD 23-63 27% 0.8" ATS CL OD g, 24-63 27% 0.8" ATS CL OD gl 33% 0.4" ATS CL OD '
3-64 <20% 0.5" ATS CL OD l 4-64 <20% 1.0" ATS CL OD l 31% 0.7" ATS CL OD ' I 5-64 <20% 0.3" ATS CL OD 6-64 1.2" ATS CL l <20%
<20% 0.5" ATS CL OD OD gl E
7-64 (20% 1 7" ATS CL OD 20% 0.6" ATS CL OD g. 8-64
<20% 1.1" ATS CL 1.8" ATS CL OD OD g
22% 25% 0.5" ATS CL OD I 96 g
- t. .
Row - Column Indication,) Location Origin 10-64 <20% 0.8" ATS CL OD
<20% 1.3" ATS CL OD
<20% 1.9" ATS CL OD 11-64 <20% 1.6" ATS CL OD 25% 1.3" ATS CL OD I 12-64 28%
<20%
2.2" ATS CL 2.2" ATS CL OD OD 14-64 DI 0.7" ATS CL OD I 15-64 32%
<20%
<20%
0.6" ATS CL 1.0" ATS CL 2.0" ATS CL OD OD OD I 16-64 33% 0.8" ATS CL OD 17-64 (20% 1.3" ATS CL OD 0.7" ATS CL
=
27% OD 18-6A 29% 2.2" ATS CL OD I 14-64 (20% 37% 28% 1.4" ATS CL 0.7" ATS CL 0.7" ATS CL OD OD OD I 20-64 21-64
<20%
<20%
31% 1.2" ATS CL 1.7" ATS CL 1.4" ATS CL OD OD OD 26% 0.6" ATS CL OD
<20% 0.3" ATS CL OD I 23-64 22% 1.6" ATS CL OD 22% 1.1" ATS CL OD
<20% 0.6" ATS CL OD DI 0.4" ATS CL OD j' 24-64 <20% 0.9" ATS CL OD
<20% 0.3" ATS CL OD 25-64 <20% 0.7" ATS CL OD 27-64 <20% 0.5" ATS CL OD 3-65 <20% 0.7" ATS CL OD -
4-65 DI 0.4" ATS CL OD
<20% 1.0" ATS CL OD 5-65 22% 1.0" ATS CL OD DI 0.3" ATS CL OD 6-65 29% 0.6" ATS CL OD 7-65 25% 1.3" ATS CL OD 35% 0.5" ATS CL OD I 8-65 26% 1.6" ATS CL OD 39% 0.8" ATS CL OD
<20% 0.4" ATS CL OD 10-65 23% 1.2" ATS CL OD I 29% 0.6" ATS CL OD 11-65 (20% 2.1" ATS CL OD I 12-65
<20%
37% 23% 1.3" ATS CL 0.5" ATS CL 0.5" ATS CL OD OD OD 13-65 28% 1.2" ATS CL OD 22% 0.9" ATS CL OD 14-65 <20% 0.8" ATS CL OD E ll
I Row - Co1ag L Indicetion % Lccation Origin 15-65 <20% 2.0" ATS CL OD 27% 0.8" ATS CL OD g 16-65 31% 0.7" ATS CL OD g
<.20% 1.5" ATS CL OD 17-65 <20% 1. 3" ATS CL OD 25% 0.7" ATS CL OD 18-65 (20% 2.1" ATS CL OD
<20% 1.3" ATS CL OD 26% 0.6" ATS CL OD E 19-65 <20% 1.8" ATS CL OD E 20% 0,," ATS CL OD 20-65 <20% 0.5" ATS CL OD g 21-65 29% 0.6" ATS CL OD g-22-65 26% 1.4" ATS CL OD 33% 0.5" ATS CL OD 24-65 22% 0.8" ATS CL OD 40-65 <20% 34.8" ATS HL OD -
<20% 26.7" ATS HL OD 3-66 DI 0.4" ATS CL OD g 4-66 <20% 0.9" ATS CL OD g 32% 0.4" ATS CL OD 5-66 <20% 1.2" ATS CL OD 28% 0.5" ATS CL OD 6-66 31% 1.3" ATS CL OD 31% 0.6" ATS CL OD 7-66 25% 1.3" ATS CL OD l 37% 0.4" ATS CL OD E 8-66 (20% 1.5" ATS CL OD 36% 0.5" ATS CL OD E 9-66 <20% 1.7" ATS CL OD g
<20% 1.4" ATS CL OD 32% 0.7" ATS CL OD g ~
10-66 <20% 0.8" ATS CL OD g 11-66 (20% 1.7" ATS CL OD 32% 1.1" ATS CL OD (20% 0.6" ATS CL OD g DI 0.2" ATS CL OD 5 12-66 31% 0.6" ATS CL OD 13-66 28% 0.8" ATS CL OD g 23% 0.5" ATS CL OD g 14-66 28% 0.8" ATS CL OD 15-66 <20% 2.0" ATS CL OD 4 23% 0.7" ATS CL OD 16-66 <20% 1.4" ATS CL OD 23% 2.1" ATS CL OD 29% 0.7" ATS CL OD g 17-66 <20% 1.0" ATS CL OD g
<20% 0.6" ATS C'. OD 18-66 26% 1.2" ATS CL OD 35% 0.5" ATS CL OD I
98 5.
Row - Column Indication 'l Location Origin 19-66 25% 1.4" ATS CL OD l 0.6" ATS CL OD 28% (20% 0.6" ATS CL OD B 20-66 27% 0.9" ATS CL OD 21-66 28S. 1.5" ATS CL OD 22% 0.6" ATS CL OD 22-66 25% 0.8" ATS CL OD 22% 0.4" ATS CL OD I 23-66 4-67 20% 22% 26% 0.8" ATS CL 0.4" ATS CL
- 0. 8" A'IS CL OD OD OD DI 0.5" ATS CL OD I, 5-67 6-67 (20%
28% 0.5" ATS CL 1.2" ATS CL OD OD 23% 0.7" ATS CL OD I 7-67 <20% 20% 35% 1.7" ATS CL 1.1" ATS CL 0.5" ATS CL OD OD OD 0.6" ATS CL I 8-67 9-67 29% 32% 32% 1.0" ATS CL 0.6" ATS CL OD OD OD 10-67 <20% 0.9" ATS CL OD I 11-67 29% (20% 25% 0.5" ATS CL 1.7" ATS CL 0.6" ATS CL OD OD OD I 12-67 13-67 14-67 (20% 25%
<20%
0.6" ATS CL 0.5" ATS CL 0.7$ ATS CL OD OD OD 2.0" ATS CL I 15-67 <20% OD 39% 0.8" ATS CL CD 16-67 23% 0.7" ATS CL OD 17-67 <20% 0.8" ATS CL OD 18-67 <20% 1.3" ATS CL OD 35% 0.6" ATS CL OD 19-67 37% 1.3" ATS CL OD I 20-67 21-67 37% 23% 26% 0.6" ATS CL 0.7" ATS CL 0.6" ATS CL OD OD OD 4-68 0.8" ATS CL OD I 22% 5-68 <20% 0.6" ATS CL OD 6-68 26% 0.6" ATS CL OD 7-68 <20% 1.7" ATS CL OD I 8-68 35% (20%
<20%
0.8" ATS CL 1.0" ATS CL 0.8" ATS CL OD OD OD I 9-68 10-68
<20%
35% 23% 1.7" ATS CL 0.9" ATS CL 0.8" ATS CL OD OD OD 0.4" ATS CL OD I 37% 12-68 35% 0.6" ATS CL OD 13-68 (20% 0.8" ATS CL OD 32% 0.4" ATS CL OD 99
I Row - Column , Indication % Location Origin 14-66 31% 0.7" ATS CL OD 22% 0.5" ATS CL OD g' 15-68 32% 0.5" ATS CL OD g 16-68 (20% 1.0" ATS CL OD , 26% 0.6" ATS CL OD 17-68 28% 1.0" ATS CL OD
- 32% 0.5" ATS CL OD 18-68 (20% 1.2" ATS CL OD 36% 0.5" ATS CL OD l 20-68 <20% 0.6" ATS CL OD 3 DI 0.2" ATS CL OD 21-68 DI 0.3" ATS CL OD g 4-69 <20% 0.8" ATS CL OD g 5-69 DI 0.5" ATS CL OD 6-69 <20% 1.8" ATS CL OD l 33% 0.8" ATS CL OD l 8-69 (20% 1.1" ATS CL OD E 28% 0.8" ATS CL OD 9-69 35% 0.9" ATS CL OD g.
10-69 <20% 0.8" ATS CL OD E 28% 0.3" ATS CL OD 11-69 39% 0.8" ATS CL OD
'20% 0.5" ATS CL OD 12-69 (20% 1.9" ATS CL OD 31% 0.6" ATS CL OD 13-69 30% 0.6" ATS CL OD l 14-69 28% 1.1" ATS CL OD E 35% J.5" ATS CL OD 15-69 <20% 0.4" ATS CL OD g 16-69 39% 0.4" ATS CL OD g 11-69 39% 0.3" ATS CL OD 19-69 32% 0.5" ATS CL OD ,,
28% 0.3" ATS CL OD 20-69 DI 0.2" ATS CL OD 4-70 <20% 1.1" ATS CL OD 23% 0.6" ATS CL OD g 5-70 <20% 1.0" ATS CL OD E
<20% 0.4" ATS CL OD 6-70 22% 0.6" ATS CL OD g 7-70 31% 0.9" ATS CL OD g 8-70 39% 0.9" ATS CL OD 9-70 32% 0.9" ATS CL OD 10-70 32% 0.8" ATS CL OD 11-70 <20% 1.0" ATS CL OD 12-70 35% 0.8" ATS CL OD 13-70 <20% 0.8" ATS CL OD g 22% 0.3" ATS CL OD g 14-70 <20% 0.8" ATS CL OD 36% 0.3" ATS CL OD g 15-70 39% 0.4" ATS CL OD g 16-70 <20% 1.0" ATS CL OD 23% 0.3" ATS CL OD I
100 gg
I Row - Column Indication _) Location Origin 17-70 <20% 1.1" ATS CL OD DI 0.3" ATS CL OD .I 19-70 DI 0.1" ATS CL OD 35-70 <20% 7.7" ATS IIL OD (20% 6,7" ATS IIL OD I 4-71 5-71
<20%
(20% 0.5" ATS CL 1.0" Als CL OD OD 26% 0.7" ATS CL OD 6-71 (20% 1.1" ATS CL OD 26% 0.6" ATS CL OD 7-71 <20% 1.1" ATS CL OD I 8-71 9-71
<20%
(20% 31% 0.7" ATS CL 0.8" ATS CL 0.9" ATS CL OD OD OD
=-
23% 0.7" ATS CL OD I 10-71 11-71 12-71 35% 28%
<20%
0.8" ATS CL 0.7" ATS CL 1.1" ATS CL OD OD OD I 13-71 14-71 D1
<20%
(20% 0.1" ATS CL 0.5" ATS CL 1.1" ATS CL OD OD OD 0.6" ATS CL OD I 15-71 16-71 28% D1 DI 0.4" ATS CL 0.2" ATS CL OD OD 17-71 DI 0.2" ATS CL OD 18-71 D1 0.2" ATS CL OD 4-72 (20% 0.5" ATS CL OD 6-72 (20% 0.9" ATS CL OD I 7-72 9-72
<20%
36% 37% 0.5" ATS CL 1.2" ATS CL 0.8" ATS CL OD OD OD ~ 0.5" ATS CL OD I D1 10-72 25% 1.1" ATS CL OD 32% 0.5" ATS CL OD 11-72 26% 0.6" ATS CL OD I <20% DI
<20%
0.8" ATS CL 0.2" ATS CL 1.1" ATS CL OD OD OD I 12-72 14-72
<20%
<20%
(20% 1.3" ATS CL 0.6" ATS CL 0.9" ATS CL OD OD OD t DI 0 2" ATS CL OD I 33-72 4-73
<20%
22% 1.0" ATS CL 0.6" ATS CL OD OD 8-73 <20% 0.6" ATS CL OD DI 0.3" ATS CL OD I. 9-73 DI 0.3" ATS CL OD 10-73 (20% 0.8" ATS CL OD 0.5" ATS CL I 22% OD 26-73 (20% 5.2" ATS HL OD 33-73. 31% #1 TSP CL OD 4-74 (20% 0.4" ATS CL OD I 101
Row - Colwnn Indication ) Location Origin 5-74 D1 0.3" ATS llL OD 19-74 (20% 0.4" ATS IIL OD 9-75 D1 0,0" ATS HL OD 26-75 (20% 1.9" ATS IIL OD 10-76 24% 0.1" ATS IIL OD 9-77 <20% 2.0" ATS HL OD 31-77 25% 3.8" ATS I!L OD 26-81 (20% 2.2" ATS HL OD
<20% 7.7" ATS HL OD g 27-83 (20% 1. 5" ATS 11L OD g I
I I E I I I I I I 102 g "J
I 6.0 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM RELIEF VALVE CHALLENGES 6.1 Overpressure Protection During Normal Pressure & Temperature operation There 4-re no challenges to the Unit 1 or Unit 2 reactor coolant , - ver-operated relief valves or safety valves at normal $ I syste-operating pressure and temperature in 1986. 4. 2 6.2 Overpressure Protection During Low Pressure f, Temperature Operstion During low pressure and temperature operation, the low I temperature overpressure protection circuit momentarily opened a Unit 1 power-operated relief valve on May 10, 1986, at 1455 hours following an inadvertent isolation of letdown.
~
There were no challenges to the Unit 2 power-operated relief valves during low pressure and temperature operation. 7.0 REACTOR COOLANT ACTIVITY ANALYSIS 7.1 June 12, 1986 The PBNP Unit I reactor entered a limiting condition of opention (LCO) on July 12, 1986, at 0747 hours when the reactor coolant a.ase equivalent I-131 exceeded 1.0 pCi/ gram. The dose I equivalent I-131 peaked at 1.30 pCi/ gram. The LCO cleared at 2230 hours on July 12, 19E , when the dosa equiv lent I-131 was measured at 0.984 pCi/ gram. The total time above 1.0 pCi/ gram was 14.7 hours. Plant Technical Specifications permit operation for up to 48 continuous hours above 1.0 pCi/ gram before requiring reactor shutdown and coold 'n to an average reactor coolant temperature of less than 500"F. See attached tables and I graphs for pertinent data required by Technical Specifications. I I I I I I 103 1 1
r a,m,., A e Hnna-,a-=+>a A - , 4 A u W,-- +a-- s-a- ^ - 4<m *AAiw- L & A Mn'a- m.%B ^ " - e m--nL
- 4 a d 4-e m4 A- -A '4i--
I! I wt aem Pm ESmy t
- m. m. u_ g 07/05/86 0700 100.0 07/06/86 1330 100.0 07/07/86 0752 100.0 l 07/08/86 0741 100.0 l 07/09/86 0735 100.0 i
07/10/86 0812 100.0 07/11/86 0735 100.0 l 07/11/86 1905 100.0 j 07/11/86 2100 72.0 j 07/11/86 2300 42.0 07/12/86 0100 20.0 07/12/86 0300 6.0 E l 07/12/86 0500 2.0 W i 07/12/86 1930 12.0 07/12/86 2030 17.0 07/12/86 2300 30.0 07/13/86 0830 30.0 07/13/86 1202 73.0 07/13/86 1430 95.0 1 07/13/86 1435 100.0 l 07/14/86 0813 100.0 07/16/86 0815 100.0 l 07/16/86 2300 100.0 07/17/86 0200 57.0 07/17/86 0400 59.0 m 07/17/86 0600 77.0 g 07/17/86 0736 100.0 07/18/86 0730 100.0 1 l r I l E i ! I I' 104 3 j l
q~g~@ M M L I \ F\ l UNIT I IODINE
SUMMARY
I-131 I-134 I-135 1-132 I-133 Equiv. I-131 pCi/cc pCi/cc pCi/cc pCi/cc pCi/cc Date Time pCi/cc 0.0773 0.1050 0.0896 0.0811 0822 0.1160 0.0763 07/11/86 0.0814 0.1070 0.0892 0.0789 2100 0.1200 0.0079 07/11/86 0.0709 0.1120 0.0596 0.0699 2302 0.1280 0.0882 07/11/86 0.1o90 0.0384 0.0848 0102 0.2020 0.1450 0.0828 07/12/86 1 0.0665 0.1260 0.0138 0.0626 i 0307 0.1570 0.1150 07/12/86 0.6070 <MDA 0.2300 0500 0.7040 0.5140 0.1990 l 07/12/86 l 0.2120 1.0000 <MDA 0.3170 0747 1.0900 0.7820 07/12/86 0.1990 1.2200 <MDA 0.3400 1000 1.3000 0.9370 07/12/86 0.1750 1.2000 <MDA 0.3060 1204 1.2900 0.9350 07/12/86 0.1470 1.06C0 <MDA 0.2230 1412 1.170 0.8540 07/12/86 0.1440 0.9990 <MDA 0.1840 1550 1.1400 0.8470 07/12/86 0.2060 1.0500 <MDA 0.1400 2050 1.2700 0.9710 07/12/86 0.1220 0.7740 <MDA 0.0889 07/12/86 2230 0.9840 0.7630 l 105
I POINT BEACil NUCLEAR PLANT - UNIT 1 CLEANUP FLOW llISTORY C}lARGING AND LETDOWN FLOW DATA (07-10 to 07-12-86) I 07/10/86: Charging Letdown Flow Flow ilme (gpm) (gpm) 0100 62.27 73.15 0200 62.03 73.17 l 0300 62.27 73.16 = 0400 62.02 73.22 0500 62.24 73.18 g 0600 62.04 73.14 3 0700 62.19 73.17 0800 62.14 73.14 g 0900 62.50 73.19 g 1000 62.17 73.14 1100 61.99 73.15 1200 62.33 73.16 1300 62.01 73.14 1400 62.46 73.18 1500 62.09 73.13 E 1600 62.24 73.12 g 1700 62.16 73.17 1800 62.13 73.13 m 1900 62.16 73.13 g 2000 62.16 73.15 2100 62.08 73.14 2200 62.26 73.14 g 2300 62.07 73.13 5 0000 62.28 73.13 I l I I I 106 E
=
1-I
- I POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 CLEANUP FLOW HISTORY CHARGING AND LETDOWN FLOW DATA (07-10 to 07-12-86) 07/11/86
Charging Letdown Flow Flow I Time (gpm) (gpm) 0100 62.02 73.11 I 0200 0300 0400 62.27 61.98 62.20 73.10 73.07 73.05 0500 62.05 73.07 0600 62.22 73.07 0700 62.09 73.10 0800 62.30 73.1: I 0900 1000 62.53 62.09 62.07 73.12 73.12 73.10 1100 'g I 1200 1300 1400 62.15 62.05 62.18 73,07 73.08 73.08 73.05 I 1500 1600 1700 61.99 62.28 62.05 73.10 73.07 1800 . 17 73.12 I 1900 2000 2100 62.17 62.36 62.08 73.11 73.11 73.11 I 2200 2300 0000 62.17 62.68 64.70 73.18 73.05 73.09 I I I I I 107 I
l I! I POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT - UNIT 1 CLEANUP FLOW HISTORY CHARGING AND LETDOWN FLOW DATA (07-10 to 07-12-86) I 07/12/86: Charging Letdown Flow Flow g Time (gpm) (qpm) g 0100 63.00 73.02 i 0200 64.39 73.05 l 0300 62.03 73.00 i 0400 66.91 73.08 l 0500 60.15 72.81 g 0600 63.09 73.01 g j 0700 63.06 73.07 ; 0800 62.39 73.05 , 0900 62.99 73.05 j 1000 62.75 73.04 1100 62.92 73.03 1200 62.92 73.03 1300 62.53 73.01 i
)400 62.67 72.99 1500 62.41 72.99 E' 1600 61.77 72.90 g 1700 63.07 72.90 1800 64.31 72.93 1900 61.52 72.92 2000 61.00 72.84 2100 60.19 72.90 2200 59.18 72.85 g 2300 63.53 72.96 3 0000 62.79 72.95 I
I I 108 O
60I , RCS ACTIVITY (pCi/cc)
- I O O s O m O P O O g P O O O O O O O
- : : : ::::l : : : : ::::l : : : : ::::l I 0822 07-11-86 --
2100 07-l'.-86 1 2302 07-11-86 k 0102 __ g 07-12-86 / 0307 __ 07-12-86 9 l 0500 A B 07-12-86 -- O
]
0747 o
" 3 07-12-86 --
N
$ 1000 m * ~~
l us 07-12-86 h 1204 < g 07-12-86 ~~ g 1412 ~~ x0 ' 07-12-86 i i s s _ 1550 ~' 1 1 07-12-86 d U ! M = 2050 Q I, 07-12-86 ~~ y 2230 ~~ 07-12-86
- : : : ::::l : : : :s::l : : : : : ::H I
I I Il
60I . RCS ACTIVITY (pCi/cc) P l O O P O m' O P O O g s O O O O O O O
- : : : ::::l : : : : ::::l : : : : :::4 l 3822 07-11-86 --
C 2100 07-11-86
~~
k 2302 07-11-86 __ g 0102 __ g 07-12-86 0307 __ 07-12-86 5 E 0500 4 3 d 07-12 - O 5 " 0747 o " S 07-12-86 -- N 1000 m l 07-12-86 ~~ O 5 1204 g
~~
07-12-86 , 1412 ,, y 0 l l 07-12-86 i t s s
.350 d d I I
'<-12-86
~~
d d 1 g! m WI 2050 @ l 07-12-66 ~~ y X . 2230 07-12-86 -- XO Il g I;
I 7.2 Novernber 17, 1986 The PENP Unit I reactor entered a limiting condition of operation (LCO) on November 17, 1986, at ?.230 hours when the reactor g coolant dose equivalent I-131 exceeded 1.0 pCi/ gram. The dose 3 equivalent peaked at 2.674 pCi/ gram. The LCO cleared at 0605 hours on November 18, 1986, when the dose equivalent -131 g was measured at 0.833 pCi/ gram. The total time above g 1.0 pCi/ gram was 7.0 hours. Plant Technical Specifications permit operation for up to 48 continuous hours above 1.0 pCi/gran before requiring reactor shutdown and cooldown to an average reactor coolant temperature of less than 500*F. See the attached tables and graphs for pertinent data required by Technical Specifications. I I I I-E> I I I I 110 E a
'I Unit 1 Reactor Power Summary Dmte Time % Power 11/15/86 0000 100.0 I 11/15/86 11/15/86 11/16/86 0800 1600 0000 100.0 100.0 100.0 I 11/16/86 11/16/86 11/17/86 0800 1000 0000 100.0 100.0 99.8 11/17/86 0600 100.4 11/17/86 1200 99.9 lI 11/17/86 11/17/86 1800 1820 99.9 0.0
- l :W 11/17/86 11/17/86 1840 1900 0.0 0.0 11/17/86 1920 0.0 j 11/17/86 1940 0.0
- 11/17/86 2000 0.0 11/17/86 2020 0.0 11/17/86 2040 0.0 t -
I 11/17/86 11/17/86 2100 2120 2140 0.0 0.0 0.0 i 11/17/86
- l 11/17/86 2200 0.0 5 11/17/86 2220 0.0 11/17/86 2240 1.6
- g 11/17/86 2300 4.7 lg 11/17/86 2320 8.6 2340 10.8 11/17/86
( 11/18/86 0000 11.0 11/18/86 0100 12.3 l
- 11/18/86 0200 21.3 l 11/18/86 0300 29.4 11/18/86 0400 29.0 ll 28.6 iB 11/18/86 0500 11/18/86 0600 29.6 g 11/18/86 0700 29.2 11/18/86 0800 29.3 I'l 11/18/86 0900 44.4 11/18/86 1000 47.5
- 11/18/86 1100 48.0 l
- = 1200 52.7 11/18/86 11/18/86 1300 68.5 11/18/86 1400 80.6 11/18/86 1500 93.8 11/18/86 1600 99.7 7
!I i: 111
. !! II,f.lll!l l!!! .:!!l!l m
_ m 5 c 3/
)
c 0 1 0 4 0 4 0 8 0 1 0 6 0 4 9 9 8 4 3 7 7 9 3 5
* , - a 1i 2 2 2 8 4 5 9 6 7 7 8 9 C 1 1 1 9 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 I p
( 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 m 4c
)
c 0 0 0 8 4 2 4 2 0 0 0 0 m 3/ 7 6 8 1 2 1 0 4 0 0 0 0 1 i 'i 5 5 3 1 3 5 8 2 3 2 4
- C I p
(
. '. 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
)
c M 3c 8 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 9 3/ 7 0 6 0 0 0 8 6 1 6 6 5 1i 6 7 6 0 3 6 0 6 0 6 6 4
- C 0 0 0 9 1 4 3 1 1 0 0 0 1 p
( 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Y R A M M ) U c S 2 c 4 7 6 0 0 3 1 5 8 4 5 3 3/ 7 6 0 1 5 1 1 2 8 3 9 8 E 1i 6 8 9 8 6 7 7 7 5 6 5 6 N - C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 1 0 0 I D I p ( 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 2M 1 1 O I 1 T I ) W N c U 1 c 3 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 7 - 3/ 8 6 7 0 0 3 3 8 0 6 3 9 1i 1 2 2 6 3 9 8 6 5 8 8 2
- C I p
( 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 1 6 0 4 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 W
) 4 7 8 5 1 2 5 7 8 0 0 7 W
.e 5 5 6 9 2 9 5 1 8 5 2 3
0 1 vc 5 1 6 6 2 3 4 7 6 7 7 3i/ 2 1 1 3 8 0 7 2 7 5 3 4 1 ui 5 6 6 7 7 0 7 2 8 1 1 5 '
- qC 0 0 0 6 7 3 5 3 1 1 1 0 IE p .
( 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 M e 3 2 2 3 0 5 0 0 2 6 2 8 m 5 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 i T 7 0 7 0 7 0 2 2 2 0 6 0 0 1 4 1 8 1 2 2 2 0 7 0 M 6 6 M 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
/ / / / / / / / / / / /
e 1 3 4 7 8 8 8 8 8 8 9 9 1 t 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 a / / / / / / / / / / / / D 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 E l
POINT SEAcil NUCLEAR PLANT - tfNIT 1 F CLLANUP FLOW ll1 STORY L CilARGING AND LETDOWN FLOW DATA 4 Charging Letdown Flow Flow I Time (gpm) (qpm) 11/15/86 0000 28.0 37.0 0800 28.0 37.0 l 28.0 37.0 88 ~ "- 1600 11/16/86 0000 28.0 37.0 28.0 37.0 I 11/17/86 0800 1000 0000 28.0 28.1 37.0 37.0 0600 28.3 36.9 I 1200 1800 1820 27.9 27.8 25.9 36.9 36.9 37.2 I 1840 1900 1926 22.5 22.6 46.2 36.8 36.6 37.0 , 30.9 36.6 I 1940 2000 2020 33.1 24.4 36.8 36.8 2040 28.1 36.6 2100 29.8 36.6 2120 34.0 36.8 2140 31.7 36.7 I 2200 2220 2240 60.8 60.1 56.4 73.5 73.0 73.0 2300 64.8 73.6 2320 53.6 72.9 2340 60.9 72.9 11/18/86 0000 60.3 73.0 I 0100 0200 0300 60.1 59.2 59.6 73.1 72.8 73.4 73.3 I 0400 0500 0600 61.1 62.0 61.5 72.9 73.1 0700 61.7 73.1 I 0800 0900 1000 62.7 61.7 62.1 73.2 73.1 73.3 I 1100 1200 62.2 62.7 73.1 73.1 113
VII ln g RCS ACTIVITY (uci/cc) r O O P O O s O O I P O O O O O O O
- : : : ::::l : : : : : : : +l : : : : : :::{
0753 ~~ 11-11-86 0742 11-13-86 --
)
0742 11-14-86 2203 _, 11-t7-86
.b 0200 11-18-86 O
g I x 0605 , y' 0 H 11-18-86 -~ I@ $ "n 1000 $ h 11-18-86 -- O ~ fj
$ IS L 1400 d 11-18-86 --
O d 1802 / 11 .8-86 -- O Q O 2206 4 11-18-86 -- ( O 1 4 Ya U I 2202 11-18-86 -~
> 0 m
#S c
E 075E 11-19-86 -~
- : : : ltl : : : : :::ll : : ; ; ; f+t{
.I}}