ML20113G600
| ML20113G600 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 09/20/1989 |
| From: | Dorma R GEORGIA POWER CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20092F288 | List:
|
| References | |
| CON-IIT05-275-90, CON-IIT5-275-90, RTR-NUREG-1410 RQ-HO-12101-, RQ-HO-12101-00, NUDOCS 9202240341 | |
| Download: ML20113G600 (42) | |
Text
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GEORGIA POWER d
POWER GENERATION DEPARTMENT
. g <f. p VGGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT TRAINING STUDENT HANDOUT i
TITLE:
RHR SYSTEM NUMBER:
RO HO 12101-OH01 PROGRAM: LICENSE 0 OPERATOR REQUAL REVISION:
00 A;; THOR:
S. WILXERSON DATE:
WIN 89 APPROVED: g4)
DATE:
1/2</S;
REFERENCES:
LO-LP-12101 16 C LO LP 133010+C
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RQ LP4199101 C f
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9202240341 920116 ADOCK 0500 4
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DESCRIBE HOW THE RHR SYSTEM 15 PROTEC'.D FROM OVERPRESSURIZ INCLUDE SETPOINTS WHERE APPLICABLE. (005000K401) 2.
DESCRIBE THE INTERLOCKS ASSOCIATED WITH THE LHSI SYSTEM VALVES (006030K404,006000K409) 3.
DESCRIBE HOW THE FOLLOWING SYSTEMS INTERFACE WITH THE RHR SYS (005000KIO1,005000K104,005000K106,00S000K101,005000KI11) a.
RCS b
RWST c.
CONTAINMENT d.
CVCS e
SAFETY !NJECTION f.
PRT g.
BRS HUT h.
CCW 1
NSCW 4.
BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THF. FLOWPATH THROUGH THE RHR SYSTEM FOR THE FOLLOWING OPERATIONS: (00S000K411,00S000K412,00S000K402) a.
NORMAL C00LDOWN b.
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING ltOECTION c.
RECIRCULATION PHASE d.
HOT LEG ltOECTION 5.
EXPLAIN THE IMPORTANCE OF ACCURATE LOCAL LEVEL INDICATION FOR fH RCS DURING RCS DRAINING OPERATIONS. (00S000K409) 9 e
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j A.
Purpose / Function
-- Transfer heat from RCS to the CCW system to reduce RCS t
1.
temperature to cold shutdown conditions (140'F).
2.
Serve as part of the ECCS during the low pressure injection and i
recirculation phases during a LOCA.,
i 3.
Transfer Refueling water between the RWST and the refueling l
cavity before and af ter refueling.
- B.-
General Informatton 1.-
LQDA SMCllQn Valves (HV-8701 A/B, HV-8702A/B)
-i a.
Interlocks to open the valves 3
(1)
RVLIS pressure < 365 psig. One pressure transmitter for each of.the suction valves.
(2)
Train related RWST suction valve (8812) closed.
I (3)
Train related Sump suction valve (8811) closed.
(4)
Train related ECCS recirculation valve (0804)
Closed.'
- b. -
Valves will auto close if RVLIS pressure reaches S
750 psig.
=(1).
If the RCS is being drained belowl172 level, this Interlock _Is defeated via a temporary modification:
to preclude the loss of RHR due '.o unexpected.
closure of the loop suction valves.
~
r (2)-
Interlock 13 covered by. Technical Specifications for ECCS to prevent the rupture of low pressure ECCS components.
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At power the valves are closed and power removed to l
pr+;ent Inadvertent opening which could have disastrous c
effects on the RHR system (rupture outside of the
)
containment and Dossible loss of the rectrculation capability if Doth trains were renoered Inoperaole).
d.
SAf.tig Gradt C.Qld shutdown l
[
(1)
Original design nad an "A" train and a T train l
valve in each RHR train with 2 wide range pressure transmitters feeding theft train related valves.
(2)
Design allowed for both train 3 capable of being
[
Isolated on high pressure with a loss of a single IE bus.
i (3)
Safety grade cold shutdown required us to be able to take the plant to cold shutdown conditions using' c
only safety related eculpment.-
l (a)
Single failure criteria not satisfied with the pressure transmitter arrangement since a single f atture could Isolate both trains of RHR. Char.ged design to have a pressure transmitter for each valve.
t (b)
Had to be able to put a train in sefylce or.
Isolate both trains with a loss of power to a single IE bus. Added the DC supplied Inverters to the suction valves to allow the operator to put at least one train in service L
or to isolate either train if it were in -
service.
L
- c.,
Power Supplies
- (1) 8701A-ABE-(2) 87018-C0lls (3) 8702A-0Dil6 (4) 8702B-BBE l
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Suction Et,11 ell a.-
protect the RHR system from overpressurization.
b.
Also used in the C0ps system to provide overpressure protection to the ACS when cooled below 350*F.
c.
Lif t at 450 psig to the PRT.
3.
E!B Eumni a.
Powered from AA02/BA03 b.
Cooling:
(1)
Seal Cooler - CCW (2)
Motor Cooler - NSCW c.
Flow rates:
(1)
Design flow at 160 psi AP = 3000 gpm.
(2)
Runout flow at 140 pst AP = 4500 gpm.
(3)
Shutoff head = 195 osig.
NOTE: The E0Ps use the value of 300 psig as the shutoff head ior the RHR pumps; this value also takes In account the instrument errors, adverse containment ef fects, etc.
d.
Pump protected at low flow condittons by mini-flow-(1)
Opens - =700 gpm (2)
Closes - = 1400 gom -
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4 8B8BRAL Etchangerg a.
Shell - CCW b.
Tube - RCS 5.
BtAl hthangit Outlet valves (HV-606/607) a, Air operated - f all open on loss of alr/ electrical signal b.
Valve travel in the open direction is limited to prevent
- pump runout in conjunction with the discharge orifices.
(1)
Unit 1 flow orifices too large - valve limited to
=50-553 open at 100% controller demand.
(2)
Unit 2 orifices are sized correctly - valve limited to 60% open at 1002 controller demand.
' 6.
E10.w. Control Valyts (FV-618/619) 1 a.
Air operated - fall closed on loss of alr/ electrical signal.
b.
Flow setpoint determined by 10 turn pot setting
-t cooldown rate adjusted by HV-606/607 and flow control valves automatically operate to maintain set flowrate.
7.
EWSI Suction Valves (HV-8812A/8)
. a.
Interlocks to open the valves-l (1)
Train related Sump suction valve (8811) closed.
I (2)
Train related ECCS recirculation valve (8804) closed.
b.
Normally open - receives no auto open/close signals.
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Contalnment S [BQ hC1.12D Valves (HV-8811 A/8) a.
Interlocks to manually open t_he valves (1)
At least one loop suction closed in the respective train.
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(2)
Train related RWST sucticn valve (8812) closed b.
Semi-automatic Changeover (I)
Sump suction valves will automatically open if RWST level reaches =39% on 2/4 channels and the RESISi signal has not been reset.
(2)
Resetting the RWST SI signal requires additional action by the operator in conjunction with the resetting of the "maln' SI signal during plant recovery.
9.
ECCS. Rettrculatt0D Valves (HV-8804A/B))
a.
Inter'ocks to open the va'Ives (1)
Both SIP Individual mini-flow isolation valves (8814 & 8820) QB SIP common mini-flow Isolation (8813) closed.
(2)
At least one loop suction closed in the respective train.
(3)
At least one CCP alternate mint-flow isolation valve in EEb line closed (8508 A or 85098 /dl 85088 or 8509A)
(4)
Train related Sump suction valve (881 l) open.
b.
With the Si and Charging systems in their proper lineups, either cross tie valve is capable of supplying these systems during the recirculation phase of ECCS operation.
-S-
g Fire event analysts requires that HV-8804 A/B be c.
deenergized when RHR is in service to prevent these valves from inadvertently opening.
(1)
If these valves opened with RHR in service (suction on RCS loops), the possibility exists to overpressurtze the Si and/or Cnarging System.
(2)
De9nergizing the 8804 valves also deenergizes an
" aux" relay used in the Interlock circuits in various valves in the plaret With this relay deenergized, all circuits receiving Its input are told that the associated 8804 valve is open regardless of its actual position.
(3)
This affects the control of the following valves from the Control Room:
(a)
HV-8812 A/B (b)-
HV<8920 (c)
HV-87028 NOTE: Not all valves Interlocked to the 8804 valves are af fected due to the fact that some valves use limit switches in their interlock circuits Instead of the
" aux
- relay so they will continue to function even with power removed.
10.
QLScharge Relief y_alyn Designed to prevent overpressurlzing the system with a.
f the maximum expected check valve backleakage, b.
Lift at 600 psig with design capacity of 20 gpm,.
p.
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System Flowpaths 1.
Stando a Allanment 4
The only components activated on an Si are the RHR f
a,
- pumps, i
b.
' Placing System in Standby i
(1)
Cooldown system Delow 200'F using miril-f!ow only through the HX and back to the pump (discharge valve 3 do leak by 50 Some flow will t
continue to 90 to the RCS).
i (2)
Open RWST suction valves.
(3)
Close and lockout power to the 1000 suction valves, j
(4)-
If requiret depressurize the RHR System:
(1)
Open HV-8964 m
(2) 00en HV-8671 1
(3)
Open HV 8890A(B).
Q3 (4)
Havre chemistry open sample valve HV-3520(21).
(5):
Restore power to HV-8804A/B.
2/-
Shutdown (goldown
- a. '
Alignment for Cooldown T
-( t )
Close HV-8716A/B (2)
' Open the loop suction valves.
e.
(3)
Remove power from HV-8804A/B.
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Q (4)
Warm up the RHR System by starting the desired pump on minl-flow and estabitsh RHR letdown (S)
Commerce Re,S cooldown using the HX outlet and bypass valve.
t b.
Only one t aln of RHR shoL'd De aligned for letdown to prevent pressurizing the suction of the id!e RHR train (they are cross L0nnectCd for a brief period Lf time wnen switching RHR trains).
3.
COM LegiltcJmd?J10L a.
Initiated when the RWST level arcos to a395 vehica should provloe suf ficient water in conta!nment f or the RHR pumps NPSH requirenientc, b.
Alignment (1)
Verify sump suction valves have automatically (HV-88 I I A/B) opened, (2)
Close the RHR pump discharge cross-connect valves (HV-8716A/3).
(3)
Open the ECCS Recirculation valves (HV-8804A/0).
(4)
Close the RWST suctions (HV-8812A/0) and ensure flow remains proper.
4 tintLegEttitculitlion a.
Manually aligned by the operator 1 I hours af ter the event occurs for Unit I and 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> af ter the event for Unit 2 (1)
Mlntmlzes the etfects of boron prect.oltation which would occur af ter prolonged cold leg injection.
(2)
RHR and Si systems aligned to inject to the hot legs and the Charging system continues to inject to the cold legs...
p.
b.
Alignment (1)
Shut the cold leg injection valves (HV-8809A/B).
(2)
Open the discharge cross-connects (HV-8716A/B),
(3)
Open the hot leg injection valve (HV-8840).
D.
RHR Operation e fildloop 1.
Etnetallnformation 5
E RHR overa;.mn at midloop has received a large amount or a.
attention ano study recently due significant Industry events and the discovery of some prcyluuw unanalyzed conditions.
b.
Untti recently the Industry had expected that on a loss of RHR cooling approximately 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> were available before CG. a uncovery would occur.
Following the events at Diablo Canyon it was disco /ered c.
that in certain circumstances core uncovery could occur in as little as 15-20 minutes. The following ts a brter summary of the events that occurreo at Diablo Canyon, Unit 2.
(1).
The plant was operating at midloop with RCS temperature at approximately 87'F.
(a)
Work in progress to remove SG menways to install nozzle dams.
(b)
Containment equipment hatch was open throughout the event.
(2) plant Engineer entered containment to perform a LLRT on the RCP seal return penetration and began craining the penetration which had been tagged the day before.
(a)
Did not notify Control Room he had commenced draining the penetration.
_g.
(b)
One of the Isolation valves used in the clearance had been Improperly seated and a loss of coolant began through the drain valve that no one was aware of.
(3)
Control Room operators immediately noticed the leakage due to a crop in VCT level.
F (a)
Operators maintaining RCS/VCT lev 61 by controlling letdown 6r0 charging from tne VCT thrcugh an idle charging pump.
(b)
When VCT levet began dropping, the operators increased 'etdown flow to restore level (the cnarging flow Indicator was inoperable at this time)
(c)
Reactor vessel level began to decrease.
(4)
Due to the loss of inventory, the operators isolated the cnarging/ letdown systems to isolate the !?ak.
(a)
This isolated the RCS leakage but the VCT continued to drain via thc VCT outlet isolation.
(b)
ABO reported that leakage into the RCDT was approximately 30 gom.
(5)
Noticed running RHR pump was cavitating and shut it down. Started the stanoby pump and it started cavitating so they stopped it too.
-(a)
At this point all core cooling was ICst end the RCS begen to heatup.
(b)
Due to the work involved in iemoving t.he head for Refueling, the thermocouples were disconnected so 30 means was available to monitor RCS temperature.
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- (6)
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cperators had not expected vortexing/ cavitation at this level so they Questioneo the validity of the Control Room temporbry leveilndicators.
(a)
Sent operator to check the tygon tube reading.
(b)
Operators continued scarching for the.
4 4
source of the leak.
(7)
The crew did not immediately begin adoing water to the RCS because they were unsure of the status of tr.e SG manways (or persontal mside).
(a)- : Personnel sent to check the status of s
manways (bL Personnel sent to vent the RHR pumps.
(8)
Operators noticed that the temporary level
. indicators Weit incidasing sicWly. They correctly attributed this to the formation of steam in the
- t zvessel.
(9)
Af ter receiving reports that the tube agreed with the level Indicators; attempted to restart RHR
+
pump tnat had just Men vented but had to stop it-due to cavltation.-
(10) - Operators were nottfled that 'the manways had not -
been removed and oegan adding _ water to the RCS
^
via gravity fill from the RWST.
.(a)
Approximately ? 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> af ter the loss of RHR had occurred, the level was restored and a RHR pump restarted.
(b)
RCS temperature indicated 220'F on the RHR Indicatnrs when the pump was restarted.
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- Several Inoustry wide problems surfaced following the_
- d.
event at 010010 Canyon that had not been considered in the past:
(1)
The equipment hatch remalned open throughout this event.-
-(2)
The RCS is calculated to have reached 7-10 psig during the loss of RHR event which was an unanalyzed condition.
(3)
Many changes to Vogtle procedures / practices have occurred due to knowledge gained from Diablo Canyon, some of which are afscussed In the following material.
2.-
Plant Resconse in LQEg of. Blj831 Reduced ECS Leyf.1 at RCS Intact (1)
When cooling Is lost the Reactor heats to the bolling point and steam begins to form.
-(2)
The,iteam Initially condenses on the cooler metal surf aces of the upper plenum and loops and returns to the vessel via dralnage.
1 (3)
With the RCS at midloop there is alr/nttrogen in-E the RCS above the water level.1As the metal-surfaces heat the steam travels further before condensing. : As the steam travels the gases are compressed and form an "frisulating layer" on the --
heat transfer surfaces.
-(4)-
The result of this phenomena is that the RCS must b
pressur)2e to force the gases into the SG U-tuues so that the steam can be condensed by the cooler surfaces.'
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The pressurl%ation an prevent the use of some
- gravity feed paths and cause the rupture of low
' pressure components typically used when the plant is in this condition (f.e, no221e dams, tygon hose).
NOTE: This prassurization was a condition that had not-
' been analyzed for during a loss of RHR and can create severe problems for core cooling.
b.
' large Cold Leg Opening, Loops isolated (1)
.With the loss of RHR, water in the core will begin to boll as discussed above and pressure in the core
- outlet area will begin to rise as steam begins to
- form.
(2)-
As the RCS pressurl2es on the core outlet due to the hot legs being isolated, water will be (0rced out of the core area and out of the cold leg cpening.
(3).
With no vent path for the steam, core uncovery wlll occur In several minutes as the core outlet continues to pressurize.
(4)
A concern in this situation is that once the bolling has starl.ed and pressure Is increasing, cold leg Injection flow may not be suf ficient to cool the
-core,
.(a):
More water will flow out of the break than
(
Into the vessel oue to the pressure rise and will not be able to suppress the boiling and i
pressure increase 1
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(b) in this situatico, the most effective method of core cooling would be with hot leg injection. This flow path would provide cooling directly to the steaming creas and suppress the bolling as the core cools.
(5)_
If this situation arises in the plant, hot leg injection snould be started soon af ter bolling has started to prevent prolohged core uncovery, c.
Large Cold Leg Opening, Loops Not isolated (1) 9CS will again pressurize and force fluid out of the break, (2)
As the coolant is lost the RCP loop seal will finally clear and a steam vent path will then be established and the loss of coolant rate will be i:
only due to boll of f.
(3)
Core uncovery may occur but it will not be sustained. Cold leg injection to an intact loop is
[
the best option (ll'ne up charging to the loop
/
without the break) since only restoring inventory L
lost due to " boll off" es-.. -.
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3.
Lty111naleation at Reduced BCS Ley 11 a.
Many cases where RHR has been lost in the Industry has been due to air binding the Dumos due to the combined effects of vortexing and low loop level.
(1)
Need diverse level Indicators to allow the operator to compare readings to determine RCS level.
(2)
There are many factors that could afrect Indicated level and the operator should always be alert to abnormal trends.
(a)-
Valves obstructed by debris can give erroneous readings.
(b)
Improper route for tygon tube resulting in g
air trapped in tube.
(c)
When the RCS is not static, the temporary level Indicators may lag the actual level until the plant stabilizes.
(d)
For the Indicators to be accurate, the fluids in the system should be equal temperature or errors will result (i.e. a heatup due to loss of RHR).
jf (e)
The operator must reallze that flowrate l
through the RHR system affects the actual L
- level at the pump suction and the possibility L
of vortex formation increases with i
-Increased flow.
b.
If any Indications of pump cavitation are noted
~
(discharge pressure unstable, flow unstable, flow incorrect for pressure, etc.), operator should use AOP 18019-C for guidance.
o l-c.
Due the large number of uncertaintles In measuring 1000 L
level, we limit ourselves to the 188' elevation (l' above midloop) to prevent the possibility of vortexing. (We can
. go to 187' 6" for burping the tubes.)
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' d.
~ Three indicators used at Vogtle for level Indication:
1 (1)
Tygon tube is connected to the loop one crossover leg and a vent line on the Dressurizer to provide one method of determining RCS level.
NOTE: The RCDT pump loop drain which taps of f of the common line supplying the tygon tube is _" cleared' when the tube Is In use to prevent the draining from the penetration from affecting Indicated RCS level.
(2)
A narrow rarige and wide range level transmitter i
installed between the low pressure side of LT-459
-(pressurizer level) and the RVLIS hydraulle isolators which provide readout on 2 accumulator level channels in the Control Room provide diverse Indications and an alarm feature, e.
Procedural Requirements (1)
Tygon tube. watch required any time level being changed with RC$ level below 172 pressurizer.
1 level.
(2)
- The following apply when level Is below 17 and 4
level is not being _ changed:
(a)' _ Compare _ temporary level indicators and the
- tygon tube every 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, 7
- (b)
Control room monitors should agree within 2% of scale with the tygon tube.
(c)-
2 of the 3 level Indicators must agree before draining the RCS below the top of the hot _ leg.
(d)- -If neither Control Room level Indicator is available then a continU60s tygon tube watch should be estaDilshed.
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- ( 3)-
When operating below the reactor vessel flange, work activltles that have the potential for reducing RHR capability should be closely scrutinized, 4
- Dralning Greater Ihan 1 Etel de.]my. Lh.t F1ange
- l a.
Ensure equipment hatch is capable of being closed within
-l 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> or that it 1s closed prior to reaching 3 feet below the reactor vessel flange, b.
Generate info 1.C0 for any refueling containment.
i penetrations that may have been opened by manual means 1
(i.e, those which cannot be remotely actuated or which have been disabled in the open position).
- NOTE: 18019 requires that the containment be Isolated on a-loss of RHR If temperature reaches 200'F (possible
.l releases due to the formation of steam) or RHR cooling cannot be restored (antletpate the possibility of core uncovery).
c.
_ f11nimum of 2 Incore thermocouples avt.uable when the reactor vessel head is Installed.
(1)
In the past, long periods of time existed where the only available RCS. temperature Indications were the RUR temperatures. If RHR was lost, there was no way to monitor RCS temperature.
(2)
If RHR is lost and you are unable to monitor thermocouples at midloop, should refill the loops to the top of the not leg and _use. wide range Thot to monitor core exit temperature.-
- d. ~
I&C reset tne designated TC's ERF alarm to 10*F above the desired temperature. *
~ _ _
4 If hot-leg cams are to be Installed or a cold leg opening e.
is to be established then a vent path is required i 9m the reactor vessel upper plenum:
(1)
Remove pressurizer manway, or (2)
Remove SG manway on a hot leg that is not dammed, or (3)
Remove 3 pressurizer code safelles-NOTE: This will prevent the possibility of the hot legs pressurizing and forcing additional coolant out of opening by oroviding a large vent path for the steam formed if RHR lost.
f.
If the nozzle dams are Installed, ensure that i SI pump is capable of being racked in and operated in the hot leg injection mode.
(i)
The concern here Is that if the core outlet does pressurize and a cold leg opening existc (or is created due to the f ailure of low pressure component), the only effective way to ref t!1/ cool the core may be the hot leg injection mode.
(2)
Technical Specifications require the SI pumps to be Inoperable in this condition and oefore this change, the Si system has typ!cally been rendered completely Inoperable for maintenance.
(3)
Maintaining an operable flowpath durIng an outage could regulre considerable pre-planning and attention to detall by operations personnel.
NOTE: The NRC recommended that at least two means be available to add Inventory to the RCS at a sufficient rate to keep the core covered. The normal charging flowpath requirements sat!sfies one path and the SIP the other flowpath..
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RVLIS pressure < 365 psig.
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Train related RWST suction valve (8812) close 3.
Train related Sump suction valve (8811) closed.
- 4. - Train related ECCS recirculation valve-(8804
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8702B 8702A L
SAFETY GRADE COLD SHUTDOWN L
VALVE ARRANGEMENT
Mc i
F TO OPEN RWST SUCTION VALVES f.
Train related Sump suction valve (8811) closed.
2.
Train.related ECCS recirculation valve (8804) closed.
t as l
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s 3.
~ ik l LTO:0 PEN SUMP SUCTLON VA!_VES 1:.
At least one loop suction closed in the respective train.
2.
Train related RWST suction valve (8812) closed.
9 6
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TO OPETECCS REC'lCU_ATION VALVES 1,
50th SIP individual mini-flow isolation valves (8814 & 8820) 0R SIP common mini-flow isolation (8813) closed.
2.
At least one loop suction closed in the respective.
train.
3.
At least one CCP alternate mini-flow isolation valve in each line closed (8508A or 8509B ANQ 8508B or 8509A).
4.
Train related Sump suction valve (8811) open.
1
I NUCLEAR R
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SAMPLE 4 RWST 4
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a 611 HOT LEG RECIRCULATION
PROCEDURE NO.
REYtS$N PAQR 780.
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moc00um No.
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FICURE 2 - TIME'TO BOILING m
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_v TEMPORARY 7Q PRESSURE aAust PRESSURIZER
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PAGE No PTDB.1 TAB 8.0 1
3 of 3
\\
,i TAE 8.2 MID LOOP LEVEL INS 1'UMENTATION UNIT ?
1 m nyg...-_f.tg
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..__ _.g imHOSE LF957 L FtSO LI.950 RCS Loop 1 Ifot Lag Narrow Range Laval LI.957 RCS Loop 4 Rot Leg Wide Range Level NOTE: This Oserator Aid is to be used only u ten in mid-loop configuration
/
and tetaporary level instrumentation
, kv'/M
/ -#1I I
is installad.
asviave Date
"O N "O li \\ G LEVE _ S E _0W 17%
1.
Tygon tube watch required any time level being changed with RCS level below 17% pressurizer
^
f
- level, 2.
The following apply when level is below 178 and level is ao.L being changed:
a.
Compare temporary level indicators and the tygon tube every 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, b.
' Control room me;nitors should agree within 2% of scale with the tygon tube.
c.
2 of the 3 level indicators must agree before draining the RCS below the top of the hot leg d.
If neither Control Room level indicator is available then a continuous tygon tube watch should be established, s
- - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - ^ ^ - - - ~ ~ ^
\\
LOWEBEa LFREL DEYOND 3. EEEI BELGE IBE YESSEL ELMfGE 1.
Ensure equipment hatch is capable of bein' closed within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> or that it is closed prior to reaching 3 feet below the reactor veasel flenge.
2.
Generate info LCO for any refueling containment penetrations that may have been opened by manual means (i.e, those which cannot be remotoly actuated or which have been disabled in the open position),
Containment should be isolated on a loss of RHR if temperature t
reaches 200*F (possible releases due to the formation of steam) or RHR cooling cannot be restored (anticipate the possibihty of core uncovery).
3.
Minimum of 2 incore thermocouples available when the reactor vessel hecd is installed.
4.
I&C reset the designated TC's ERF alarm to 10'F above the desired temperature.
5.
If hot leg dams are to be installed or a cold leg opening is to be established then a vent pati:is required from the reactor vessel upper plenum:
Remove pressurizer manway, or a.
b.
Remove SG manway on a hot leg that is not dammed, or c.
Remoye 3 pressurizer code cafeties.
Prevents the possibility of the hot legs pressuring and forcing additional coolant out of opening by providing a large vent path for the steam formed if RHR lost.
6.
If the nozzle dams art installed, ensure that 1 Si pump is capable of being racked in and operated in the hot leg injection mode.