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m.e.q Jersey Central Power & Light Company j[I([
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- MORRISTOWN, N.J. 07960
- 201-539-6111 NiW0iB Of TM8 g',
- )*', Public Utilities Corporation o.nerai March 18, 1974 f-ll 1
-i Mr. A. Giambusso Deputy Director for Reactor Projects
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Directorate of Licensing
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United States Atomic Energy Commission i
Washington, D. C. 20545
Dear Mr. Giambusso:
Subject:
Oyster Creek Station albe nce Report No. 50-219/74/18 o
The purpose of this letter is to forward to you the attached Abnormal Occurrence Report in compliance with paragraph 6.6.2.a of the t
Technical Specifications.
Enclosed are forty copics of this submittal.
Very truly yours,
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Donald A. Ross Manager, Nuclear Generating Stations es Enclosures cc:
Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Director Directorate of Regulatory Operations, Region I 9604170281 960213 PDR FOIA DEKOK95-258 PDR
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OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION FORKED, RIVER, NEW JERSEY 08731 Abnormal Occurrence f
Report No. 50-219/74/18i Report Date March 18, 1974 Occurrence Date March 8,1974 Identification of Occurrence Inoperability of one (1) Bergen-Paterson hydraulic shock and sway arrestor located on the "A" isolation condenser in the drywell. This event is con-sidered to be an abnormal occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 1.15D.
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Conditions Prior to Occurrence
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The plant was shut down with reactor coolant at <212*F.
Description of Occurrence An inspection of the drywell snubbers, Bergen-Paterson type HSSA-10, located three inoperable units and four which were leaking.
They are as follows:
Unit System Condition Elev.
F93501 #2 A Isolation Condenser Inoperable 75' 487574 B Isolation Condenser Leaking 95' J
487502 B Isolation Condenser Leaking 95' 487495 Cleanup System Leaking 55' 487573 Shutdown Cooling Inoperable 51' 487489 North Electromatic Relief Leaking 51' 487446 South Electromatic Relief Inoperable 51' All of the above HSSA units were rebuilt in January 1974 with ethyle~ne propylene seals, except Unit #487489.
This unit'was rebuilt primarily with molded poly-urethane seals in-September 1973.
' Of the three inoperable units, only one - (F93501 #2) is associated with an engineered safeguard system ("A" Isolation Condenser).
It is not believed that temperatures above the normal ambient conditions for the drywell during operation-existed in the vicinity of any of the three inoperable units.
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Abnormal Occurrence No. 50-219/74/19 Page 2 l
Apparent, Cause of Occurrence The cause of snubber inoperability was a loss of the hydraulic fluid. An investigation is being initiated to determine why the fluid was expelled.
Analysis of Occurrence The safety significance of this occurrence was a partial loss of the seismic restraining at.'.lity for the affected systems.
Had the plant suffered a design basis earthquake, the probability that these systems would have suffered structural damage was increased.
Corrective Action The seven units were replaced 'with identical snubbers which were rebuilt with ethylene propylene seals.
In addition, pressure tests will be run on the 1
defective units in an attempt to determine the cause of their inoperability and then 6ach of the units will be dismantled to visually determine seal status.
The results of this program will provide additional information toward a res-olution of this problem.
Failure Data Manufacturer:
Bergen-Paters on Type:
HSSA-10 l
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er5e[ Centra Power & Light Company b9 MADISON AVENUE AT PUNCH BOWL ROAD
- MORRISTOWN, N.J. 07960
- 201530-6111 we w rus General e
Puolic Utilitie s Corporation.. -......-.,.......
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March 18, 1974 I
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Mr. A. Giatbusso
- Deputy Director for Reactor Projects Directorate of Licensing United States Atomic Energy Commission 4
Washington, D. C. 20545 i
Dear Mr. Gicnbusso:
l Subj ect:
0yster Creek Station Docket No. 50-219' Abnormal Occurrence Report No. 50-2*9/74/19 l
The purpose of this letter is to' forward to you the attached Abnormal Occurrence Report in compliance with paragraph 6.6.2.a of the Te dnical Specifications.
Enclosed are forty copies of this submittal.
Very truly yours, iUWh
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Donald A. Ross Manager, Nuclear Generating Stations 4
cs Enclosures cc: Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Director Directorate of Regulatory Operations, Region I r
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i e-OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATIO.N FORKED RIVER, NEW JERSEY 08731
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~"1 Abnormal Occurrence Report No. 50-219/74/19 Report Date
~ March 18,1974 Occurrence Date March 9,1974 Identification of Occurrence
" Violation of-the Technical. Specifications, paragraph 3.5. A.1, failure to main-tain pri.ary containment integrity with reactor water temperature cbove 212*F and fuel in~ the reactor vessel.
This event is considered to be an abnornal occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, parag: aph 1.15B.
Conditions Prior to Oct rrence
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The plant was shut dc*tn wi'th reactor coolant <212*F.
Description. of Occurrence -
At 1000 on March 8,1974, an orderly shutdown of the plant commenced to perform maintenance on six of the fourteen torus to drywell vacuum breaker valves. -
Although thirteen of the valves were considered to be operable at this time, the plant was shut down in order to effect more permanent repairs en the valves.
(See Abnormal Occurrence Report No. 50-219/74/16 dated Mar S 15, 1974).
In accordance with the requirements of paragraph 3.5. A.1 of the Technica'l Specif-ications, maintenance on these valves did not begin until reactor coolant tem-perature was below 212*F.
At cpproximately 0500 on March 9,1974, the control room operator noticed that
~ the reactor vessel head metal temperature was increasing at a rate of 10*F/hr after being stab 1c at 231*F for about - a 3-hour period.
A check of the recirculation-loop temperature recorder, which was being used as the primary indication of.
reactor water temperature, showed the recorder. trace to be constant at 160*F.
hh11c1this inconsistency was being investi' gated, a radiation protection technicinn reported to-the shift foreman that water, vapor appeared to be issuing' from a y
special manometer which had been installed for. monitoring of the pressure difference between the drywell and reactor vessel.
The shift foremants investi-gation revealed that the reactor' side of the manometer was hot.
The recirculatica loop temperature recorder was then rechecked and again indicated a temperature of 160*F. Ilowever, the ~ indication jumped to approximately 250*F when the recorder was bumped. - Since two of the torus to drywell vacuum breaker valves _
were undergoing maintenance 'at this time (0531. on' March ~ 9,1974), primary O
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- Abrvarmal Occurrence No. 50-219/74/19' Page 2-containment integrity was not in effect.
Shutdown co' ling system flow was then o
-increased to decrease the reactor water temperature.
Reactor. water temperaturc was reduced to less than 212*F within approximately 30 minutes.
Within appro.v,1-
.mately 130 minutes,.a reactor water temperature of 160*F was established and maintained.
, Apparent Cause of Occurrence This abnorcal occurrente is attributed to equipment malfunction ahd ope _rator
, error.
The-recirculation loop recorde: did stick and give a falso indication-of reactor. coolant tempera ure.
However, the control room operator failed to react properly to indicatior s that reactor water temperature _was increasing.
Specifically, a review of the chart paper from the recorder monitoring shutdown cooling system temperatures showed that the "C" loop heat exchanger inlet temperature was increasing at a rate of about 10*F/hr during the 3-hour period J
prior ~ to 0230 on March 9,1974.
At this time, the control rooh operator i
secured flou in t.his loop and thereby contributed to the rise in reactor water temperature.
g alysis of Occurrence The primary containment system provides a barrier against uncontrolled release -
of fission products to the environs in the event of a break in the~ reactor coolant systems.
Whenever the reactor cool' ant water temperature is above 212*F, failure I
of the reactor coolant system could cause rapid ~ expulsion of the coolant from the reactor with ;tn associated pressure rise in the primary containment.
Primary containi,ent is required, therefore, to contain the thermal energy of the expelled coolant and fission products which would be reicased from any fuel failures resulting from the accident.
The safety significance of this event is that primary containment integrity was not r.aintained during the period that the reactor coolant temperature was in excess of 212*F due to the maintenance being performed on the vacuum breaker valves.
At the condition that existed, the safety significance is considered minimal.
Correctiv.c Action The following correc,tive actions will be taken:
1.
The operator retraining program will emphasize that all available V
indications are to be used when critical parameters such as reactor water temperature are being monitored.
In additon, the operators will be. instructed in'their retraining to regard extremely straight recorder traces as suspect _and to view confirming indications whenever such suspicious recorder traces are encountered, both while operating and shut down.
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- Abnormal ' Occurrence No. 50-219/74/19 Page 3 2.
1hc shutdown log wil.
>e reviewed and modified to require the recording
- a of additional system terpcratures related to the reactor coolant ten-perature.
Failure Data Basic recorder data are as follows:
Manufacturer:
General Cicctric Cor.pany Type:
GE/MAC 531 Span:
4 inches e
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