ML20107A504
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James P. O'Reilly Directorate of Regulatory Operations Region I 631 Park. Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406 From:
Jersey Central Power 6 Light Company Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Docket #50-219 Porked River, New Jersey 08731 l
Subject:
Preliminary Abnormal occurrence Report No. _ 73-27 l
The following is, a preliminary report being submitted in complianco with the Technical Specifications paragraph 6.6.2.
Preliminary Approval:
844/
/18/73
- h. T. Carroll, Jr.[/
Date cc: Mr. A. Giambusso 9
9604150002 960213 PDR FOIA DEKOK95-258 PDR
Abnormal Occurrence Report rio. 73-27 SUPJErT; Pallure of 3/4" nipple connecting the relief valve to 1-3 contain-ven: spray llX cmcrgency ', service water sico.
This event is considered to be an abnormal occurrence as defined in the Tedinical Specifications, paragraph 1.15D. Notification of this event, as required by the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6,6,2.a, was nado to AEC Region I, Directorate of Benulatory Opera-tions, verbally to Mr. h,' Greesmian on Wednesday, October 17, 1973, st 3:30 p.m., and'.by telecopier on Thursday, October 18, 1973 at 9:10 a,n',
SITUATION:
During surycillance testing of #2 contalnment sprsy systen, the operator Elkned to visually check the systen noticed water issuing from under the HX insulation. He enlled the %ift Foreman who mado a closer examinati'on and discovered the water coming, from the service water relief valve nipplc.
CAUSE The cause appears to be cntro.; ion of the nlpple.
PDEDI AL ACTION:
The system was shutdwn and the redund;uit system tested. At pre.
Aent, the system is being drained and tagged to make repairs as found necessary.
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Abnortu! occurrence Report No. 73-27
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2-10ctober 17 -1973 t
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE:
The significence of this event would be the loss of redundancy of one containment spray system, l' roper cooling capacity is capable with one set of pumps in one system and the number one system hnd availability of two sets of plaps; one set which would start auto-
- matica11y and the second set able to be started by operator action.
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{.}.] Pubhc Utebbes Corporatiott General unn. 4 October 16, 1973 I 4 Mr. Giambusso A %U.\\4 Y e OCT go I3 Deputy Director for Reactor Projects 8 ' gv d Directorate of Licensing United. States Atomic Energy Commission g #gs Washington, D. C. 20545 g. 98 p (.f3
Dear Mr. Giambusso:
/- G g Subj ect: Oyster Creek Station Docket No. 50-219 APRM Set Point The purpose of this letter is to report a failure to set to average power rance monitor scram and rod block set points to the conservative Glues t specified in Technical Specifications 2.3(1)(a) and 2.3(2)(a). This event is considered to be an abnormal occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifi-cations, paragraph 1.15.A. Notification of this event, is required by the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.6.2.a, was made to AEC Region I, Directorate of Regulatory Operations by telephone on October 10, 1973, and by telecopier on October 11, 1973. On October 6,1973 at 2:00 p.m., the reactor startup te full power had been halted due to a lack of in-service condensate demineralizers. The core -thermal output at this time was approximately 567 MWt and the recirculation flow 6 rate was 30x10 lbs /h r. At this time, the maximum total peaking factor (PF) was estimated to be 4.54 and the average power range monitors (APRM's) were set conservatively such that 100% on the APRM's corresponded to 1200 MWt. This is equivalent to reducing the neutron flux scram by the amount 3.01/PF as specified in Technical Specifications 2.3.1.a, with some added margin. The 100%/1200 MNt setting allows for a neutron flux peaking up to a value of 4.84. At 5:30 p.m., after a heat balance calculation, the setting of the APRM's was inadvertently set such that 100% of the APRM's corresponded to 1400 MWt which accounts for peaking factors of only 4.15. Thus, the limiting safety system setting for the APRM neutron flux scram and rod block were set less con-servatively than specified in the Technical Specifications 2.3.1.a and 2.3.2.a. Near the conclusion of the reactor core operations, the engineer assisting in core monitoring perfomed a " quick" heat balance and performed the final peaking factor checks. He determined the maximum peak location and value 0gl IIA! SP/ 03070?M 3/y/
.~ k .) i. i October 16, 1975 4 Mr. Giambusso - and as a result advised the control room operator to adjust the APRM's to the conservative 100% - 1200 MWt setting. The control room operator nade the recommended adjustment and entered the new setting in the control room log. Four errors on the part of four individuals then occurred: 1. Prior to 1 caving the plant, the engineer failed to notify the shift foreman, whose presence was required in another part of the plant at the time, of the final condition of the reactor core. 2. Upon reviewing the control room log at the end of the shift, the shift foreman failed to notice the relevant log entry. 3. The control room operator failed to notify both the shift foreman upon his return to the control room and the relief control room operator of the new APRM setting. 4. The relieving control room operator failed to review the prior shift log entries. As a result of the " quick" heat balance, no documentation of the correct setting was provided on a heat balance power range work sheet. The relieving control room operator, after performing the he' balance power range for his shift, used the last documented heat balance a. the basis for the APRM setting. This setting was in agreement with the value forwarded to the relieving shift foreman. The final result was the 100% = 1400 FMt settiqg of the APRM's. At 10:30 a.m. on October 7, 1973, the reactor neutron flux peaking factor was estimated as required in Technical Specifications 4.1, Table 4.1.1., Note 2, and found to be 4.71. The APRM's were then correctly adjusted to the -conservative 100%/1200 FMt setting. Based on the neutron flux peaking factor of 4.71, as estimated at the time of the correction, the safegy limit can be shown to be at 1228 MWt for the recirculation flow rate of 30x10 lbs/hr. Using the 100'5/1400 MWt setting of the APRM's, the reactor at this condition would have scrammed at 1200 MWt, if required. Thus, the safety limit would not have been exceeded. To prevent a reoccurrence of this incident, the following actions will be taken: 1. The technical supervisor will issue a memorandum to the appropriate engineers re-emphasizing their advisory capacity in core oper-ations and the necessity of informing the shift foreman of plant status following any control rod manipulation or power level ch anges, s e k .;4 ..s
( l Mr. Giambusso October 16, 1973 2. The operations supervisor will review with the shift foremen all requirements for reading and initialing control room log book entries. This will be accomplished via a memorandum from the operations. supervisor. Enclosed are forty-(40) copies of this report. Very truly yours, WW /O s Dortald A. Ross Manager, Nuclear Generating Stations DAR:cs Enclosures cc: Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Director Directorate of Regulatory Operations, Region I l a i I $}}