ML20107A325
See also: IR 05000219/1973012
Text
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, , . U. S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION . DIRECTORATE OF REGULATORY OPERATIONS , REGION I ,, , . . . RO Inspection Report No.: 50-219/73-12 50-219 Docket No.: Licensee: Jersey Central Power & Light Company DPR-16 License No.: Oyster Creek Priority: ' C Category: Location: Forked River, New Jersey
Type of Licensee: 1930 MWT, BWR S ecial, Unannounced P Type of Inspection: Dates of Inspection: August 3 & 6, 1973 , Dates of Previous Inspection: June 26-29, 1973 4 / [[ Reporting Inspector:
F. S. CantreII, Reactor # nspector 'DATE ~ I $2.- // } o E. Greeamak,/ Reactor Ins /ector DATE
Accompanying Inspectors: None DATE DATE Other Accompanying Personnel: None DATE n , - Reviewed By: O [ / / 'D. 1.' Capht M, denior Reactor Inspector / #IE D . , h 9604120225 960213 PDR FOIA DEKOK95-258 PDR - - - - - - - - .
. e 1: ,.. ., .~ , . , . , , , . ' SUMMARY OF FINDINGS , 44 ff *, Enforcement Action Paragraph 6.6.2 of the Technical Specification requires " Notification ~ shall'be made within 24 hours by telephone and telegraph to the Director ' of the Regional Regulatory Operations Office -- followed by a written report within 10 days to the Director of Licensing --- in the event of the abnormal occurrences as defined in Section 1.15 -- " Section 1.15 ' defines an abnormal occurrence as: "D. ' Failure of one or more components of an engineered safety feature or plant protection system that causes or threatens to r;< ?' cause the feature or system to be incapable of performing its intended function." Contrary to the above requirements, the Directorate of Regulatory- Operations was not notified until July 26,1973 that 88 of 132 shock - suppressors were found defective during the 1973 refueling oatage - (April 15 - June 5, 1973), and that 8 of the repaired shock < suppressors had failed'again when examined on July 22, 1973. j . A written report of these failed shock suppressors was not submitted ., gar to Licensing until August 6,1973. (A preliminary copy of the j , " Summary Report on St.obber Repair Activities during Spring 1973 1 Refueling Outage" was supplied to RO:I on July 27, 1973). Licensee Action on Previously Identified Enforcement Items Not inspected .j Design Changes ' ' , None . Unusual Occurrences During the 1973 refueling outage, 88 of 132 shock suppressors on main steam lines and auxiliary cooling lines were found defective. Eight of the repaired shock suppressors were found defective again ~ after six and one half weeks of reactor operation. ,, , 9,; . . - - - --- .
..} . - , ' - , . . -2- Other Significant Findings , j,$ .j A. Current Findings .P: A check of AEC documents and correspondence in the Ocean County Library (Local Public Document Room for Oyster Creek and Forked River No.1) showed that the library was receiving copies of correspondence and commission documents relating to the Oyster Creek and the Forked River facilities. B. Status of Previously Reported Unresolved Items Not Inspected Management Interview The following persons were present during the exit interview on August 6, 1973. Mr. J. T. Carroll Mr. E. G. Greenman Mr. F. S. Cantrell The following items were discussed: M 1. The inspector stacea that the General Office Review Board (GORB) should review the available data on the shock suppressors in a special meeting, and evaluate the significance of additional failures of shock suppressors on safe reactor operations. The GORB should either approve the course of action stated in the August 6,1973 report to Licensing or recommend an alternate program. A licensee's representative stated that the available information would be supplied to all of the members of the GORB, that the GORB secretary would poll the members to see if a special meeting should be held, and would act accordingly. He stated that a regular meeting of the GORB was scheduled August 14, 1973. 2. The inspector stated that the failure to report the problems found with the shock suppressor was considered to be a serious violation of the reporting section of the Technical Specifications (Paragraph 6.6.2). He stated that this applied to both the initial observations , 0
. .-t . , ' i . . -3- during the refueling outage (April 15 - June 5,1973) and the sub , sequent findings on July 22, 1973. d[fh 3. The inspector stated that the statement in the JCPL August 6,1973 letter to Licensing that " Notification of this event, as required by the Technical Specification (TS) Paragraph 6.6.2.a. was made to AEC Region I, Directorate of Regulatory Operations (RO), -- " was not technically correct. The licensee's representative stated that this statement was intended to mean that RO was notified by telephone as required by the T.S., not that the notification was timely. 4. The licensee's representative confirmed the inspector's understanding .. that the shock suppressors would be reinspected during any reactor 1 shutdown that occurs subsequent to August 24, 1973, but not later ' than September 8,1973, and that Region I will be promptly notified of the results of the inspection. Ollid . $
.. . . DETAILS , '; " 1. Persons Contacted Mr. J. T. Carroll, Station Superintendent Mr. D. L. Reeves, Operations Supervisor Mr. E. I. Riggle, Maintenance Supervisor Mr. W. Spoulos, Operating Foreman Mr. A. H. Rone, Engineer 2. Hydraulic Shock Suppressor Failures (JCPL Letter to Directorate of Licensing dated August 6,1973) . During the April 15 through June 5,1973 refueling outage all of the hydraulic shock suppressors in the drywell and those suppressors in the reactor building associated with safeguard equipment were in- spected and rebuilt as necessary. Eighty-eight of one hundred thirty two suppressors required replacement of one or more seals and re- placement of the hydraulic fluid to restore the suppressor to an operable condition. The shock suppressors in the drywell were re-examined July 21-22, 1973 af ter the reactor had been operating six and one half weeks. 344J The seals in eight suppressors were found to have deteriorated sufficiently to allow the suppressors to lose enough fluid to become inoperable. Deterioration of one or more seals in each suppressor allowed the hydraulic fluid in the suppressor to leak out thus rendering the suppressor incapable of dampening movement of the connected pipe. These suppressors were installed to restrict a rapid movement of the pipe line such as could occur during an earthquake. An investigation of the failure mechanism of the shock suppressors with the vendor of the shock suppressors and the manufacturers of the seals indicated that the seal material was being attacked by the hydraulic fluid. Two types of hydraulic fluid are used in. the shock suppressors depending on the location where they are installed. A methyl phenyl silicone, which tests show has a greater resistance to radiation caused degradation, is used in the drywell and a dimethyl polysiloxane silicone is used in non radiation areas. The radiation resistant hydraulic fluid appears to react with the plasticizer used in the gum polyurethane seals causing a loss of , f
.g .. 6 ni > a-a> 4 ,_rJd, 4-4..F .,3 - +>--h -.N* .c.=.se .w - M*. 44--e. a,4 - 4.w--d e , . . . . ' . o 5 -- - volume and seal effectiveness. L Both molded polyurethane seals and- gun polyurethane seals are used . in each shock suppressor depending ' on the function of the seals.- . The non radiation resistant fluid (dimethyl polysiloxane' silicone) does not appear to seriously react with, either type seal; however, 'after a period of exposure to radiation, the fluid has a tendancy to " gel." One licensee representative believes this period is on the order of 8-10 years. under operating condition. Another cause of seal degradation is extended exposure to temperatures above , 1500F. ' (The seal manufacturer is reported to have stated that 1500F should be considered the maximum operating temperature; however, the supplier of the shock suppressor says that the suppres- sors are capable of operating at up to 2000F for extended periods - without loss of function. Based on the recommendation of the vendor of the shock suppressors and the availability of replacement seals, the shock suppressors were rebuilt with the same material that failed, and the same hydraulic fluid was installed, i.e., radiation resistant fluid in the drywell and non-radiation resistant fluid outside the drywell. The vendor of the shock suppressor. recommended that the gum polyurethane seals be eventually replaced with molded polyurJ: Sane , seals. (Molded polyurethane seals are not currently available in gggg the number and shapes required). Even though the non-radiation ' resistant fluid degraded over an extended period in a radiation i field (reported to be up to 10 years), the vendor of the shock suppressors specifically did not recommend the non-radiation re- i sistant fluid for use in the drywell. I I In discussion, the licensee's representative agreed that the drywell would be deinerted for a reinspection of the shock suppressors ' during any shutdown 5 to 7 weeks af ter July 21, 1973. If the shock suppressors have not been reinspected, a special shutdown will be scheduled September 8, 1973 for reinspection, and RO:I will be promptly notified of'the findings. In discussions concerning reporting the observed failures of -the shock suppressors, the licensee's representative stated that he did not initially think of the safety significance of this type
, ! - failure, or that other facilities would be subject to the same 3 failures. At the time the plant was shutdown for refueling (6-8
weeks), his prime concern was to find out why the shock suppressors , j , f i i _.. _ - _, - _ _ , .
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-6- i i failed and to get'all of them repaired prior to schaduled startup.' He stated'that there had been some concern as to whether'the 3, g'. , suppressors had received proper storage prior to installation; how- - ' .ever, he had been assured by the person responsible for installation that the suppressors had not been lef t out in the weather while awaiting installation. . The licensee's representative stated that j he originally planned to report the repair work in the semiannual ' report; however, it was subsequently decided that the findings ' l should be submitted to the Commission in a separate technical report.
This report was in preparation when additional failures were J experienced July 22, 1973. It was not until that time that the failure was considered to be a-generic problem,'and the immediate
reportability was not considered a requirement until July 20, 1973 ' when informed by Region I that the same problem had been experienced at other facilities. It was at that time when the suppressor failures experienced at Oyster Creek were first related to RO:I.
3. Local Public Document Room (PDR) , The inspector stopped in the Ocean County Library which is the local PDR for Oyster Creek and Forked River No. 1. A check showed that i various documellts and correspondence relating to the two facilities were being maintained. ' An envelope was opened by the' inspector, and showed that the inspection reports were being transmitted to the j gggg PDR with the related correspondence between Regulatory Operations H and the Licensee. . , 0 }}