ML20101G358

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Proposed Ts,Deleting Table 3.6-1 Re Secondary Containment Bypass Leakage Paths
ML20101G358
Person / Time
Site: Seabrook NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 06/11/1992
From:
PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
To:
Shared Package
ML20101G353 List:
References
NUDOCS 9206260004
Download: ML20101G358 (25)


Text

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INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE-REQUIREMENTS

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PAGE SECTION &

(TABLE 3.6-1 .

SECONDARY CONTAIW (T BYPASS LEAKAGE- PATHS. . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6 Co ntai nment Ai r Loc! . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6 .

Internal Pressure........................................ 3/4 6-9 Ait Temperature.....................,.................... 3/4 6-10 Containment Vessel Structural Integrity.................. 3/4 6 Containment Ventilation System........................... 3/4 6-12 3/4.6.". DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS Ccatainment Spray System................................. 3/4 6-14 Spray Additive System.................................... 3/4 6-15 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES.......................... .. 3/4 6-16 3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL Hyd ro g e n Mo n i to r s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-18 Electric Hydrogen Recombiners............................ 3/+ 6-19 Hydrogen Mixing System................................... 3/4 6-20 3/4.6.5 CONTAINMENT ENCLOSURE BUILDING

'1 Containment Enclosure Emergency Air Cleanup System....... 3/4 6-21 Containment Enclosure Building Integrity................. 3/4 6-24 Containment Enclosure Building Structural Integrity...... 3/4 6-25 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS l

3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE Safety Valves........... .......... .... ................ 3/4 7-1 l TABLE 3.7-1 MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE F0WER RANGE NEUTRON FLUX HIGH i

SETPOINT WITH INOPERABLE STEAM LINE SAFETY VALVES DURING FOUR-LOOP 0PERATION...................................... 3/4 7 TABLE 3.7-2 STEAM LINE SAFETY VALVES PER L00P..................... 3/4 7-2 Auxiliary Feedwater System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4-7-3 Condensate Storage Tank.................................. 3/4 7-6 Specific Activity............ ........................... 3/4 7-7  :

TABLE 4.7-1 SECONDARY COOLANT -SYSTEM SPECIFIC ACTIVITY SAMPLE AND AN A LYS I S Pi3G RAM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 7 Maim Steam l , ' solation Valves..... .................. 3/4 7-9 Atmospheric :c o.er Va1ves................................ 3/4 7-10 1

SEABROOK - UNIT 1

  • vii 9206260004 920611 PDR ADOCK 05000443 p PDR

3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEM 3 3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3. 6.1.1 Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY sha:1 be maintained.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, ?., 3, and 4.

ACTION:

' Without primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, restore CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> or be in at least 40T STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTOOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

7 SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.6.1.1 Primary CONTAIHMENT INT ~GRITY shall be demonstrated:

a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that all penetrations
  • not cepabis of being closed by OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valves and required to be closed during accident conditions are closed by valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in their positions except fs orov1'&d"To pecification 3.6.3;

[{o, guldos bt b. By verifying that each containment air lock is in compliance with Jer. the requirements of Specification 3.6.1.3; and adminir N # c. Aftcr each closing of each penetration subject to Type B testing, Co g las except the containment air locks, if opened following a Type A or B test, by leak rate testing the seal with gas at-a pressure not less parmi *8 b@ tnan P,, 49.6 psig, and verifying that when the maasured leakage rate for these seals is added to the leakage rates determined pursuant to Specification 4.6.1.2ds for all *:her Type B and C penetrations, the combined leakage rate is less than 0.60 L,.

  • Except valves, blind flanges, and deactivated automatic valves which are located inside the containment cnd are locked, serled, or othe mise secured in the .ased position. These penetrations shall be verifieb closed during each C D SHUTDOWN except that sucii verification need not be performed more aften t w , once per 92 days.

SEABROOK - UNIT 1 3/4 6-1 ,

I l

. CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS j

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT (

CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE 7

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 1

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3. 6.1. 2 Containment leakage rates shall be limited to:
a. An overall integrated leakage rate of:

Lest than or equal to L,, 0.15% by weight of the containment

air per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> at P,, 49.6 psig; j b. A combined leakage rate of less than 0.60 L a f r all penetrations j

and valves st.bject to Type B and C tests, when pressurized to P3.

No individual penetration will be allowed to exceed 5% of the

} total allowed (0.05 L,); and i c. A combined leakage rate of less than or equal to 0.60a L for all i htes j-penetration </iilentif_ied in Table 3.6-1 aosecondary containment bypass leaka e paths when pressurized- to Pg.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

l ACTION:

i With (a) the measured overall integrated containment leakage rate exceeding 0.75 L , or (b) the measured combined leekane rate for all penetrations and a

valves subject to Types B and C. tests exceeding 0.C9 La , r (c) the combined bypass leakage rate exceeding 0.60 La , restore the ove.::11 integrated laakage rate to less than or equal to 0.75 L the combined leakage rate for all penetrations and valves subject to Type B and C tests to less than 0.60 L,,

l and the combined bypass leakage rate to less than 0.L0a L pri r to increasing the Reactor Coolant System temperature above 200*T.

SEABROOK - UNIT 1 3/4 6-2

y' TABLE 3.6-1 ~-

[ SECONDARY CONTAINMENT BYPASS LEAKAGE PATHS

[ PENETRATION NO. FUNCTION RELEASE LOCATION X-16 Containment On-Line Purge Primary Auxiliary Building (Exhaust)

X-17 Equipment Vent (RCDT) Waste Processing Building X-18 Containment On-Line Puige Primary Auxiliary Building (Supply)

X-19 Post Accident Monitoring Primary Auxiliary Building Sample X-20 PCCW Loop A (Supply) Primary Auxiliary Building X-21 PCCW Loop A (Return) Primary Auxiliary Building X-22 PCCW Loop B (Return) Primary Auxiliary Building X-23 PCCW Loop B (Supply) Primary Auxiliary Building X-32 Equipment and Floor Drainage Waste Processing Building )

(RCDT)

X-34 Equipment and Floor Drainage Waste Processing Building (RC Sump)

X-35A Safety Injection (Test Line) Waste Processing Building X-35B Reactor Coolant (Pressurizer Primary Auxiliary Building Steam / Liquid Sample) -

X-35C Reactor Coolant Drimary Auxiliary Building (RC Sample Loop I)

X-350 Reactor Coolant Primary Auxiliary Building (RC Sample Loop III)

X-36A Demineralized Water Domineralized Water Storage Tank (Outside)

X-36B Nitrogen Gas (High-Pressure) - Primary Auxiliary Building X-36C Reactor Makeup Water-- -Waste Processing Building-

_(Tank Farm)

X-37A Cnemical and Volume Control Primary Auxiliary Building (Letdown) k,.

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j SEABR09K - UNIT l' 3/4 6-5

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< TABLE 3.6-1 (Continued) . . . . . .~x. '

SECONDARY CONTAINMENT BYPASS LEAKAGE PATHS .\ t [

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\ T PENETRATION \ '

NO. FUNCTION RELEASE LOCATION 4

X-37B Chemical and Volume Control Primary Auxiliary Building l

(Excess Letdown)

! X-38%/76A Fire Protection Fire Water Pumphouse/ Fire k Water Tanks X-38B/76B Combustible Gas Control Main Steam and Feedwater ,

Pipe Chase X-39 Spent fuel Pool Cooling and Fuel Storage Building Cleanup X-40A Nitrogen Gas (Low Pressure) Primary Auxiliary Building j X-40B PRT Sample Primary Auxiliary Building X-62 Fuel Transfer Tube fuel Storage Building i

X-67 Service Air Main Steam and Feedwater L

' Pipe Chase i

X-710/740 Leak Detection Main Steam and Feedwater '

Pipe Chase t

i HVAC-1 Containment Air Purge Primary Au<iliary Building HVAC-2 Containment Air Purge Primary Auxiliary Building..f Outtide N.A. Equipment Hatch N.A. Personnel Hatch Main Steam and Feedwater Pipe Chase X-72/75 Combustible Gas Control Main Steam and Feedwater Pipe Chase

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1 l SEABROOK - UNIT 1 3/4 6-6 -

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! l CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS l 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES ,

i LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION b

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j _3.6.3 EachfontainmentisolationvalveshallbeOPERABLQithisolationtimes]

, (less than or equal to required isolation times r --

l APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

j ACTION:

With one or more of the isolation valve (s) inoperable, maintain at least one isolation valve OPERABLE in each affected penetration that is open and:

a. Restore the inoperable valve (s) to OPERABLE status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, or
b. Isolate each af fected penetration within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> by use of at least one deactivated automatic valve secured in_the isolation position, or
c. Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> by use of at least l

one closed manual valve or blind flange; or

d. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN
within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMEN1s I CD Awnmt/ n1.-

4.6.3.1 Each g isolation valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE prior to returning the valve to service after maintenance, repair, or replacement work is performed i

on the valve or its associated actuator, control, or power circuit by perfor-mance of a cycling test and verification of isolation time.

I o, m & % ttu i Juk aast agmnum l

Anded.

i SEABROOK - UNIT 1 3/4 6-16

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'ONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

, C h { e.NT ISOLATION VALVES

9 M,,,s'ANCE n REQUIREMENTS i .6.3.2 Each3 isolation valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE during the COLD

? SHUTDOWN or REFUELING MODE at least once per 18 months by:

a. Verifying that on a Phase "A" Isolation test signal, each Phase "A" 4

Isolation valve actuates to its isolation position, I b. Verifying that on a Phase "B" Isolation test signal, each Phase "B" Isolation valve actuates to its isolation position, and l l

c. Verifying that on a Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation test i signal, each purge and exhaust valve actuates to its isolation l C c n Yit & > % 'l >

l 4.6.3.3 The isolation time of each power-operated or automatic 4 valve shall be

! determined to be within its limit when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

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V SEABROOK - UNIT 1 ' 3/4 6-17 1

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CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS 3/4.6.2.1 CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the Containment Spray System ensures that containment depressurization and cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA. The pressure reduction and resultant lower containment leakage rate are consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.

The two independent Containment Spray Systems provide post-accident cool-ing of the containment atmosphere. The Containment Spray Systems also provide a mechanism for removing iodine from the containment atmosphere, and, therefore, the time requirements for restoring an inoperable Spray System to OPERABLE status have been maintained consistent with those assigned other inoperable ESF equipment.

3/4.6.2.2 SPRAY ADDITIVE SYSTEM l

The OPERABILITY of the Spray Additive System ensures that suf ficient NaOH is added to the containment spray in the event of a LOCA. The limits on NaOH volume and concentration ensure a pH value of between 8.5 and 11.0 for the solution recirculated within containment af ter a LOCA. This pH bcnd minimizes

, the evolution of iodine and minimizes the ef fect of chloride and caustic stress I

corrosion on mechanical systems and components. The contained solution volume I limit includes an allowance for solution not usable because of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics. These assumptions are con-sistent with the iodine removal efficiency assumed in the safety analyses.

3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES l The OPERABILITY of the containment isolation valves ensures that the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in the event of a release of radioactive natcrial to the containment atmosphere or pressurization of the containment and is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criteria 54 through 57 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.

IMf t2T (M UEXT PA(nE '7 Containment isolation within the time limits specified for those isolation ,alves designed to close automatically ensures that the release of radioactive uaterial to the environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses l

for a LOCA.

3/4.6.4 COMBU3TIBLE GAS CONTROL l

The OPERAB1LITY of the cquioment a.nd systems required for the detection and control of ' hydrogen 'ts ensyes that this equipment will be available to j maintain the hydrogen cori entrat'cn within containment below its flammable limit during post-LOCA conditions. Either recombiner unit is capable of con-trolling the expected hydrogen generation associated with: (1) zirconium-water SEABROOK - UNIT 1 B 3/4 6-3

4 k

19ssRT t

t The opening of locked or sealed closed containment isolation valves on an intermittent basis under administrative control includes the following . considerations: (1) stationing an operator, who is in constant communication with control room, at the valve controls,

(2) instructing this operator to close these valves in an accident

' situation, and (3) assuring that environmental conditions will.not preclude access to close the valves and that this action will prevent the release of radionctivity outside the containment.

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, Ill. J!ctype of Proposed Channes ,

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See attached retype of proposed changes to Technical Specifications. The attached i

retype reflects the currently issued version of Technical Specifications. Pending i Technical Specification changes or Technical Specification changes issued subsequent to this submittal are not reflected in the enclosed retype. The enclosed retype should be checked for continuity with Technical Specifications prior to issuance.

Revision bars are provided in the right hand margin to designate a change .in the text.

l No revision bars are utilized when the page is changed solely to accominodate the - 4 shifting of text due to additions or deletions.

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INDEX i

1 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVFillANCE RE0VIREMENTS J

SECTION PAGE j Containment Air Locks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-7

Internal-Pressure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-9 Air Temperature. . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-10

{ Containment Vessel Structural Integrity. . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-11 Containment Ventilation System . ............ 3/4 6-12 j 3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS l

l Containment Spray System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-14 j Spray Additive System. . . . .............. 3/4 6-15

{ 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-16 i

1 3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL I Hydrogen Monitors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-18

! Electric Hydrogen Recombiners. . . . . . . . . .- . . . 3/4 6-19 Hydrogen Mixing System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-20 f 3/4.6.5 CONTAINMENT ENCLOSURE BUILDING

! Containment Enclosure Emergency Air cleanup System . . . 3/4 6-21 Containment Enclosure Building integrity . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-24 i Containment Enclosure Building Structural Integrity. . . 3/4 6-25  !

i 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 1

! 3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE Safety Valves. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 7-1 TABLE 3.7-1 MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE POWER RANGE NEUTRON FLUX HIGH i

SETP0 INT WITH INOPERABLE STEAM-LINE SAFETY VALVES DURING .i FOUR-LOOP OPERATION . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4'7-2  !

j TABLE 3.7-2 STEAM LINE SAFETY VALVES PER LOOP. . . . . . . . . . 3/4 7-2 l Auxiliary Feedwater System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 7-3 Condensate Storage Tank. . . .-. . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 7-6

Specific Activity. . . . ... . . . , .

. . . . . . . . . 3/4 7-7 TABLE 4.7-1 SECONDARY C0OLANT SYSTEM SPECIFIC ACTIVITY SAMPLE AND ANALYSIS PROGRAM , . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 7-8 Main Steam Line Isolation Valves -. . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 7-9 Atmospheric Relief Valves'. . , , . . . . . . . . . .. 3/4-7-10

-SEABROOK - UNIT 1 vii Amendment No.

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,. ,'3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION t 3.6.1.1 Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be maintained.

ApPLICABillTY: MODES 1, 2, 3. and 4.

ACTION:

Without primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, restore CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY within I hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUT 00WN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />, f

i SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS 4.6.1.1 Primary CONTAINMENT INTEMITY shall be demonstrated:

a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that all penetrations
  • not capable of being closed by OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valves and required to be closed during accident conditions are closed by valves, blind fitnges, or deactivated automatic- valves 4 secured in their positions except for valves that are open under administrative control as permitted by Specification 3.6.3;_
b. By verifying that each containment a'r lock is in compliance with '

l the requirements of Specification'3.6.1.3; and I

c. After each closing of each penetration subject to Type B testing, except the containment air locks, if opened following a Type A or B test, by leak rate testing the seal with gas at a pressure not less I than P.,- 49.6 psig,- and verifying that when the measured leakage-l rate for these seals is added to the leakage rates determined _

pursuant to Specification 4.6.1.2d. for all other Type B- and C penetrations, the combined leakage rate'is less than 0.60 L,.

  • Except--valves,-blind flanges, and deactivated automatic valves which are i located inside the containment and are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured i in the closed position. These penetrations shall be-verified closed during each COLD SHUTDOWN except that-such verification need not be performed more often.than once per'92 days.

SEABROOK - UNIT 1_ 3/4 6-1 Amendment No.

,s. , ' CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS ,

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ,

CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE llMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION a 3.6.1.2 Containment leakage rates shall be limited to: >

An overall integrated leakage rate of:

a.

Less than or equal to L., 0.15% by weight of the containment air per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> at P., 49.6 psig;

b. A combined leakage rate of less than 0.60 L, for all penetrations and valves subject to Type B and C tests, when pressurized to P,.

No indivi6ual penetration will be allowed to exceed 5% of the total allowed (0.05 L.); and

c. A combined leakage rate of less than or equal to 0.60 L, for all penetrations that are secondary containment bypass leakage paths when pressurized to P..

APPLICADILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With (a) the measured overall integrated containment leakage rate exceeding 0.75 L., or (b) the measured combined leakage rate for all penetrations and valves subject to Types B and C tests exceeding 0.60 L, or'(c) the combined i bypass leakage rate exceeding 0,60 L , restore the overall integrated leakage rate to less than or equal to 0.75 L, the combined leakage rate for all penetrations and valves subject to Type B and C tests to less than 0.60 L,, and the. combined bypass leakage rate to less than 0.60 L, prior to increasing the Reactor Coolant System temperature above 200*F.

L SEABROOK UNIT 1 3/4 6-2 Amendment No.

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-SEABROOK -- UNIT 1- 3/4 6 Amendment No.

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SEABRGvK - UNIT 1- 3/4 6 6 Amendment No.-

= - _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ . _ __ _._,_,

,_.. . 'CONTAINHENT SYSTEMS i

! 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVEE j

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.3 Each containment isolation valve shall be OPERABLE *.

! APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With one or more of the isolation valve (s) inoperable, maintain at least one isolation valve OPERABLE in each affected penetration that is open and:

a. Restore the inoperable valve (s) to OPERABLE status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, or
b. Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> by use of at least one deactivated automatic valve secured in the isolation position, or l c. Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> by use of at least one closed manual _ valve or blind flange; or
d. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SNUTDOWN within the-following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

l I

SURVEILLANCE REUUIREMENTS l n

4.6.3.1 Each containment isolation valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE prior _  ;

to returning the valve to service after maintenance, repair,- or replacement work is performed on the valve or its associated actuator,- control, or power circuit by performance of a cycling test and verification of isolation time.

  • Locked or sealed closed valves may be opened on an intermittent basis _under administrative control-.

SEABROOK - UNIT l' 3/4 6-16 Amendment No. ,

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, .. . . CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS I

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES I

SURVEltlANCE REOUIREMENTS r

'l 4.6.3.2 Each containment isolation valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE during j the COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING MODE at least once per 18 months by: 1

}

a. Verifying that on a Phase "A" Isolation test signal, each Phase "A" Isolation valve actuates to its isolation position,
b. Verifying that on a Phase "B" Isolation test signal, each Phase "B" Isolation valve actuates to.its isolation position,-and
c. Verifying that on a Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation test signal, each purge and exhaust valve actuates to its isolation position.

I 4.6.3.3 The isolation. time of each power-operated or au'tomatic containment-isolation valve shall be determined to be within its limit when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

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SEABROOK - UNIT 1 3/4 6-17 Amendment No.

,s. . CONTAINMENT SYSTEME BASES 3/4,6,2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND C00llNG SYSTEMS 3/4.6.2.1 CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the Containment Spray System ensures that containment depressurization and cooling capability will be available in the. event of a LOCA. The pressure reduction and resultant lower containment leakage rate are consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.

The two independent Containment Spray Systems provide post-accident cool-ing of the containment atmosphere. The Containment Spray Systems also provide a mechanism for removing iodine from the containment atmosphere, and,-

therefore, the time requirements for restoring an inoperable Spray System to OPERABLE status have been maintained consistent with those assigned "her inoperable ESF equipment.

3/4,6.2.2 SPRAY-ADDITIVE SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the Spray Additive System ensures that sufficient NaOH is added to the containment spray in the event of a LOCA. _The limits _on.NaOH volume and concentration ensure a pH value of between 8.5 and 11.0 for.the solution recirculated within containment after a LOCA. :This pH band minimizes i the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress .

corrosion on mechanical systems and components. The contained solution volume  !

limit includes an allowance for solution not usable because of tank-discharge line location or other physical characteristics. These assumptions are con-sistent with the iodine removal efficiency assumed in the safety analyses.

3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES.

The OPERABILITY of the containment isolation valves ensures that the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in the event of a release.of radioactive material to the containment atmosphere or pressurization of the containment--and is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criteria 54 through 57 of Appendir A to 10 CFR Part 50.

The opening of locked or sealed closed containment isolation valves on an intermittent basis under administrative control includes.the following considerations: (1)_ stationing an operator, who is in constant communication- '

i with control room, at-the valve controls, (2) instructing this operator-to close these valves in an accident situation, and-(3) assuring that environmental conditions will not preclude access to close the valves and that this action will prevent the release of radioactivity outside the containment.

Containment isolation within the time limits specified for those isolation valves designed to close automatically ensures that the release of radioactive material to the environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for a LOCA.

SEABROOK - UNIT 1 B 3/4 6-3 . iendment No.

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_ BASES 3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL The OPERABILITY of the equipment and systems required for the detection and control of hydrt, gen gas ensures that this equipment will be available to maintain the hydrogen concentration within containment below its flammabic limit during post-LOCA conditions. Either recombiner unit is capable of con-trolling the expected hydrogen generation associated with: (1) zirconium water t

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IV. Safet y Auenment of Prormed Channes_

The proposed Technical Specification changes included in License Amendment Requett 9106 implement the guidance of NRC Generic Letter 9108 " Removal of Comrmncnt Iists From Technical Soccificatiorg,." Generic Letter 9bO8 is intended to improve Technical Specifications as it provides an acceptable alternative means to identifying i

evey component by itt. plant identification numb-r as it is currently listed in the tables of Technical Specifications. The Technical Specification changes proposed herein by NHY implement the guidance of Generic Letter 9108 by removing the i listing of Secondary Containment Ilypass Leakage Paths (Technical Specification Table

, 3.6-1). Additionally, NilY proposes herein to revise Technical Specification 3.6.3,  ;

Containment isolation Yalves, to add a footnote that specifies that locked or sealed

! closed containment isolatior, valves may be opened on an intermiticut basis under administrative control. As discussed below, the list of containment isolation valves j has already been removcd from Technical Specifications and is currently located in )

the NHY Technical Requirements Manual. The proposed addition of this footnote to Technical Specification 3.6.3 is- recommended by Generic Letter 91-08 for the purpose of clarifying that locked or scaled closed containment isolation valves are to be considered OPERABLE when they are opened on an intermittent basis under administrative control. The NRC requirements for adn inistrative control have been reiterated in Generic Letter 9108. New ilampshire Yankee has specilled these administrative control requirements in its proposed changes to the 11ases for Technical Specification 3.6.3. Technical Specification 3.6.3 is also revised to delete the. current requirement regarding isolation times as the inservice testing requirements referenced by Technical Specification 4.0.5 include the verification of valve stroke times for containment isolation valves. New llampshire Yankee has also proposed revisions to ,

Technical Spcification Surveillance Requirement 4.6.1.1 as recommended by Generic - 1 Letter 91-08 to reflect that Primary Containment Integrity continues to be maintained although a locked or sealed closed containment isolation valve is opened under administrative control.

The proposed Technical Specification changes . included in License Amendment  !

Rcquest 9106 are administrative in nature and do not involve the _ elimination or reduction of any current requirements. The changes merely serve to improve Technical Specifications by relocating unnecessary detail to another NHY document which is subject to the change control provisions of ;he Administrative Controls (Section 6) of the Scabrook Station Technical Specifications. The list of Secondary i Containment Bypass Leakage Paths, upon removal from the Technical Specifications, will be located in the NHY Technical Renuirements Manual which is duplicated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (Section 16.3) The removal of the list of i Secondary Containment flypass Leakage Paths does not affect the requirement that

he leakage from these containment penetrations be less than or equal to 0.6 La when pressurized to Pa (49.6 psig) as provided in Tcchnical Specification 3.6.1.2. The NHY Technical Requirements Manual currently includes numerous plant specific lists which were previously removed from the Technical Specifications in association with N H Y's Technical Specification Improvement Program. The NilY Technical Requirements Manual currently cot.tains three lists addressed by Generic Letter 9108 including- - the listing of - Containment -Isolation Valves, - Containment - Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protection - Devices and Motor Operated Valve Thermal
Overload Protection. All changes to the NilY Technical Requirements Manual are l

evaluated pursuant to 10CFR50.59 and are reviewed and approved by the Station ,

Operation Review Committee (SORC), the Nuclear Safety Audit Review Committee-6

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(NS AR C) and the N it'l 12xecutive Dir;ctor - Nuclear Product;an prior to implementation 4 The proposed Technical Specification changes included in License Amendment Request 9106 will not reduce or climinate any current requirernent. 't he general requirements h" Secondary Containment Espass Leakage Paths and for Containtoent Isolation Valves will continue to reside in the Technical Specifications while unnecessary plant specilic detail will be placed in the NilY Technical Requirements hianual which is duplicated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Rt. port Section 16.3. The benefit af removing unnecessary plant specific detail from the Technical Specifications has been previously recognized by the NRC and Nit Y and has been previously imnlemented by NilY's Technical Specification improvement Program. New flampshire Yankee has several years of experience with its Technicai Requirements hianual and has 3hown it to be an effective, well. controlled method to reduce unnecessary plant.

apecine detail froni the Technical Specifications. NRC approvo; Gi License Amendne rti Request 91 06 will further enhance !be Seabrook Statian Technical Specificatics.

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V. Determination of Sinnifiennt linrards for ilernse Amendment Reaurst 9106 Propose (

Chances (1) The proposed changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The proposed Technical Specification changes included in License Amt .iment Request 91-06 are administrative in nature and do not involve the climination or reduction of any current requirements. The changes merely serve to improve Technical Specifications oy relocating unnecessary plant specific detail to another NilY document which is subject ta the chany control provisions of the Administrative Controls (Section 6) cf the Seabrook Stelion Technical Specifications. 'i he proposed removal of Technical Specification Table 3.61, Secondary Containment hypass Leakage Paths, and the proposed revisions *o Technical Specification 3.6.3, Containment Isolation Valves, and Surveillance P.ccuirement 4.6.1.1 implement the guidance of NRC Generic Letter 9108. The proposed changes ha 'e no relationship to the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

, (2) The proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of

, accident from any accident previously evaluated.

Ths pupmed Technical Specification changes included in License Amendment Request 91-06 impiec nt tha guidance of NRC Generic Letter 91-08 by removing the listing of Secondary Containtnent Hypm Leakage Paths (Technical Specification Table 3.61) and by revising Technical Specification 3.6.3, Containment isolation Valves and Surveillance Requircment 4.6.1.1. The proposed changes are administrative in nature and do not involve the elimination or reduction of any current requirements. The general requirements associated with these Technical Specifications are unaffected by the proposed changes. i<or example, the removal of the list of Secondary Containment Ilypass Leakage Paths does not affect the requirement that the leakage from these containment penetrations be less than or equal to 0.6 La when pressurized to Pa (49.6 psig) as provided in Technical Specification 3.6.1.2. Although the list of Secondary Containment Hypass Leakage Paths will no longer be located in the Technical Specifications, it will be located in c NHY document which is subject to the change control provisions of the Administrative Controls (Section 6) of the Seabrook Station Technical Specifications. Changes to this document require the performance of an evaluation pursuant to 10CFR50.59 to ensure that the proposed change does not introduce an unreviewed safety question and review and approval by the Station Operation Review Committee, the Nuclear Safety Audit Review Committee and the Executive Director Nuclear Production. The Technical Specification changes proposed in License Amendment Request 9106 have no relationship to plant accidents and therefore have no potential to c cate a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

(3) The proposed changes do not result in a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

The proposed Technical Specification changes included in License Amendment Request 91-06 do not red ec or eliminate any current requirements. The proposed changes merely eliminate unnecessary plant specific detail in the interest of improving the Seabrook Station Technical Specifications. The margin of safety associated with the affected Technical Specifications is not reduced in any way because the general requirements of the affected Technical Specifications remain intact.

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VI. ,Prnpngd ScSedule for I.icense Amendment issuance nud Effectisegen New Hampshire Yankee requests NRC review of License Annendment Request 91-06 and issuance of a licence a nenda.cnt having immediate effectiveness by September 7, 1492.

As specified in Section 1, the Technical Specification changes proposed herein have been developed based on the NRC guidance contained in Gencric Letter 91-08. The proposed Technical Specification changes are intended to improve Technical Specifications by removing unnecessary details. Sucii detailed information will be

-located in a NilY manual which is subject to the change control provisions of the Administrative Controls section of the Technical Specifications. T he proposed Technical Specification changes will in no way involve a significant hazards consideration pursuant to 10CFR50.92.

NRC review and approval of License Amendment Request 9106 is requested by -

September 7,1992. New llampshire Y&nkee is developing a plant modification to allow the Containment Compiessed Air Systeni to be cross connected to the Plant Compressed Air System in order to improve safety and reliability. It is intended that the modification, which would require updating Technical Specification Tabic 3.6-1, he implemented after approval of this License Amendment Request, thereby reducing the number of License Amendments sought by NilY and freeing NRC resources for other activities.

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i Yll, l':nsirontnental Imnact Assessmen,1 1 New flampshire Yanker (NilY) has reviewed the proposed license amendment against j the criteria of 10CFR$1.22 for environinental considerations. The proposed changes j do not insolve a significant hazards consideration, nor increase the types and amounts j of _ efflue..;s that may be released offsite, not significantly increase individual or

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cumulative occupational radiation exposures. Ilased on the foregoing, NilY concludes j that the proposed change meets the criteria delineated in 10CFR$1.22(c)(9) for a

categorical exclusion from the requirements for an Environmental Impact Statement.

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