ML20117A804

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Proposed Tech Specs for Incore Detector Sys
ML20117A804
Person / Time
Site: Seabrook NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 11/25/1992
From:
NORTH ATLANTIC ENERGY SERVICE CORP. (NAESCO)
To:
Shared Package
ML19310D497 List:
References
NUDOCS 9211300363
Download: ML20117A804 (35)


Text

. _ . . ._. . __ - . . _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ .

INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMEN15 _

SECTION PAGE TABLE 3.3-2 (This table number ir not used)

TABLE 4.3-1 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS.......................................... .. 3/4 3-9 3/4.3.2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATIP.......................................... 3/4 3-14 TABLE 3.3-3 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION.......................................... 3/4 3-16 TABLE 3.3 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETP0lNTS.............. ............ 3/4 3-24 TABLE 3.3-5 (This table number is not used)

TABLE 4.3-2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS................ 3/4 3-31 3/4.3.3 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION Radiation Monitoring For Plant Operations................ 3/4 3-36 TABLE 3.3-6 RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION FOR PLANT 0PERATIONS..................................... 3/4 3-37 TABLE 4.3-3 RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION FOR PLANT OPERATIONS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS..................... 3/4 3-39

-Hmrab4e Incore Detector.s . 5; 3/4 3-40 SeismicInstrumentation........M.s'.v...................

.......................... 3/4 3-41 TABLE 3.3-7 SEISMIC MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION.................... 3/4 3-42 TABLE 4.3-4 SEISMIC MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS............................................. 3/4 3-43 Meteorological Instrumentation........................... 3/4 3-44 TABLE 3.3-8 METEOROLOGICAL MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION............. 3/4 3-45 Remote Shutdown System................................... 3/4 3-46 TABLE 3.3-9 REMOTE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM.................. ............. 3/4 3-47 Accident Monitoring Instrumentation...................... 3/4 3-49 TABLE 3.3-10 ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION.................. 3/4 3-50 TABLE 3.3-11 (This table number is not used)..... .............. 3/4 3-53 Radioactive Liquid Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation... 3/4 3-55 TABLE 3.3-12 RADI0 ACTIVE LIQUID EFFLUENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION 3/43-5' S$ABR00K - UNIT 1 . iv ggg 9l 9211300363 921125 3 Q* _

PDR. ADOCK 0500 P

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES GROUP HEIGHT LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1. 3.1 ACTION b.3 (Continued) q.de m c) A power distribut map is obtained from the moveHe-incoredetector/"andF(Z)andF 9 g are verified to be within their limits within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />; and d) The THERMAL POWER level is reduced to less than or equal to 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next hour and within the following 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> the High Neutron Flux Trip Setpoint is reduced to less than or equal to 85%

of RATED THERMAL POWER.

c. With more than one rod trippable but inoperable due to causes other than addressed by ACTION a. above, POWER OPERATION may continue provided that:
1. Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, the remainder of the rods in the bank (s) with the inoperable rods are aligned to within 12 steps of the inoperable rods while maintaining the rod seque'nce and insertion limits of Specification 3.1.3.6. The THERMAL POWER level shall be restricted pursuant to Specification 3.1.3.6 during subsequent operation, and
2. The inoperable rods are restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />,
d. With more than one red misaligned from its group step counter demand height by more than 12 steps (indicated position), be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS i

l 4.1.3.1.1 The position of each full-length rod shall be determined to be

} within the group demand limit by verifying the individual rod positions l at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, except during time intervals when the red position I

deviation monitor is inoperable; then verify the group positions at. least once per 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

4.1.3.1.2 Each full-length rod not fully inserted in the core shall be determined to be OPERABLE by movement of at least 10 steps in any one direction at least once per 31 days.

l SEABROOK - UNIT 1 3/4 1-16 Amendment No. 9

, REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS '

, MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES POSITION INDICATION SYSTEMS - OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.3.2 The Digital Rod Position Indication System and the Demand Position Indication System shall be OPERABLE and capable of determining the control rod positions within 12 steps.

_ APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.

5 ACTION:

a. With a maximum of one digital rod position indicator per bank L inoperable, either:
1. Determine the position of the n nindicating rod (s) indirectly by the movebic- incore detector / at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> and immediatAy after any motion of the nonindicating rod which exceeds 24 steps in one direction since the last determinatior, of the rod's position, or 2.

Reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 50% of. RATED THERMAL POWER within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.

b. With a maximum of one demand position indicator per bank inoperable, either:
1. Verify that all digital rod position indicators for the affected bank are OPERABLE and that the most withdrawn rod ar.d the least withdrawn rod of the bank are within a maximum of 12 steps of each other at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, or
2. Reduce TF MAL POWER to less than 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER within 8 wurs.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.3.2 Each digital rod position indicator shall be determined to be OPERABLE Dy verifying that the Demand Position Indication System and the Digital Rod Position Indication System agree within 12 steps ut least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, except during time intervals when the rod position deviation monitor is inoperable; then compare the Demand Position Indication System and the Digital Rod Position Indication System at least once per 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

SEABROOK - UNIT 1 3/4 1-18 N

_ l

POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMfTS HEA1FLUXHOTCHANNELFACTOR-Fg SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS .

4.2.2.1 The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable.

4.2.2.2 F,y shallbegvalu is within its limit by:

a' Using th w.th incore detectordo obtain a power distribution map at any riE 6 M N TED THERMAL POWER,

b. Increasing the measured F,y component of the power (istribution map by 3% to account for manufacturing tolerances and further increasing the value by 5%gte account for measurement uncertainties,
c. Comparing the F xy computed (F, ) obtained in Specification 4.2.2.2b.,

above, to:

P

1) The F limits for RATED THERMAL POWER (Ffy ) for the appropriate xy measured core planes given in Specification 4.2.2.2e. and f. ,

below, and

2) The relationship:

F, = F,RTP p pp (1.p) l Where F is the limit for fractional THEFXAL POWER operation XY RTP expressed as a function of F xy , PF xy is the Power Factor Multiplier for F,y specified in the COLR and P is the l fraction of RATED THERMAL POWER at which F xy was measured.

d. Remeasuring F,y according to the following schedule:

P

1) When F,C is greater than the F limit for the appropriate measured cure plane but less than the F l relationship, additional C RTP power distribution maps shall be taken dF xy compared to F xy L

and F,y either:

I

! a) Within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after exceeding by 20% of RATED THERMAL l

C POWER or greater, the THERMAL POWER at which F*Y was last i determined, or l b) At least once per 31 Effective Full-Pcwer Days (EFPD),

j whichever occurs first. _

f when using the movable incore detectors cv 5.21Z vhen using the fixed incore detectors

[ ..

SEABROOK - UNIT dment No. 9 L n

POWER DISTRfBUTTON LIMITS HEATFLUXHOT-CHANNELFACTOR-Fp SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS , 4.2.2.2d. (Continued)

2) When the F x is less than or equal to the F RTP limit for the-appropriate measured core plane, additional power distribution maps shall be taken and F x compared to F P once per 31 EFPD.

andx F h at least

e. The F limits for RATED THERMAL POWER (F P) shall be provided for xy all core planes containing Bank "0" control rods and all unrodded core planes in the CORE OPERATING LIMIT 5 REPORT per Specification 6.8.1.6;
f. The F xy limits of Specification 4.2.2.2e., above, are not appitcable in the following core planes regions as measured in percent of core height from the bottom of the fuel: .
1) Lower core region from 0 to 15%, inclusive,
2) Upper core region from 85 to 100%, inclusive,
3) Grid plane regions at 17.8 t 2%, 32.1 t 2%, 46.4 2%, 60.6 1 2%,

and 74.9 2%, inclusive, and

4) Core plane regions within i 2% of core height ( 2.88 inches) about the bank demand position of the Bank "0" control rods.
g. With F axceeding Fx , the effects of Fxy on F9 (Z) shall be evaluated to determine if F q (Z) is within its limits.

4.2.2.3 When Fq(Z) is measured for other than F xy -determinations, an overall measured F (Z) shall be obtained from a power distribution map and increased q

by 3% to account for manufacturing tolerances and further increased by 5%^to account for measurement uncertainty. .

x when using the movable incore detectors o c 5.21: when using the fixed incore detectors A A SEABROOK - UNIT 1 3/4 2-7 Amendment No. 9

1

.l i

~

POWER DISTRfBUTTON LIMfTS

[ 3/4.2.3' NUCLEAR ENTHALPV RISE HOT CHANNEL FACTOR

)

l LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION ,

RTP

3. 2.- 3 FhshallbelessthanF3g [1.0 + PFAH (1-P)].

Where: P= THERMAL POWER , and RATED THERMxL POWER RTP F = the F limit at RATE!. THERMAL POWER (RTP),

AH H specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT (COLR), and PF 3g=thePowerFactorMultiplier_forFhspecifiedinthe COLR.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1.

ACTION:

WithFhexceedingitslimit:

a. Within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> reduce the-THERMAL POWER to the level where the LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION is satisfied.
b. Identify and correct the cause of the out-of-limit condition prior to increasing THERMAL POWER above the limit required by ACTION a.,

abo"e;THERMALPOWERmaythenbeincreased,providedFhis demonstrated through incore mapping to be within its limit.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.2.3.1 The provisions of Specification 4.0,4 are not applicable.

4 .2.3.2 Fh shall be demonstrated to be within its limit prior to operation-I above 75% RATED THERMAL POWER after each fuel loading and at leastL once per

-31 EFPD thereafter_by: s

a. -Using the moveMe incore detectors %fobtain a power distribution map at any THERMAL POWER greater than 5% RATED THERMAL POWER _.
b. Using the measured value of Fhwhich does not. include an allowance for measurement uncertainty.

L . .

f-SEABROOK - UNIT 1 3'/4 2-8 Amendment No. 9 y -, __ ..

^

POWER DlSTRIBUTION LIMITS 3/4.2.4 QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO V .

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.2,4 The QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO shall not exceed 1.02.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1, above 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER *.

ACTION:

With the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO determined to exceed 1.02:

a. Within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> reduce THERMAL POWER at least 3% from RATED THERMAL POWER for each 1% of indicated QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO in excess of I and similarly reduce the Power Range Neutron Flux-High Trip 5etpoints within the next 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
b. Within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and every 7 days thereafter, verify that Fq(Z) (by xy evaluation) and Fh are within their limits by performing Surveil-F lance Requirements 4.2.2.2 and 4.2.3.2. THERMAL POWER and setpoint reductions shall then be in accordance with the ACTION statements of Specifications 3.2.2 and 3.2.3.

l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4,2.4.1 The QUADRANT POL'ER TILT RATIO shall be determined to be within the limit above 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER by:

a. Calculating the ratio at least once per 7 days when the alarm is OPERABLE, and
b. Calculating the ratio at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> during steady tate operation when the alarm is inoperable. g ,.

4.2.4.2 The QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO shall be ermined to be within the limit when above 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER with ne Power Range channel inoperable by using the-movaMe-incore detector $ o confirm indicated QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> by either:

d dede.r

a. Using the four pairs of symmetric thimble-locations or ddedce
b. Using the meveMe-incore deteet4ee system to monitor the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO subject to the requirements of Specification 3.3.3.2.
  • See'Special Test Exceptions Specification 3.10.2.

3/4 2-9 SEABROOK - UNIT 1 f

-- . . . - - . . ..u...- -.

fMSTRUMENTAT10N I v

,, MONITORING INSTRUMENTATON 440VABL-E-INCORE nETECTOR/ < YSIT M LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION b e.t ec h e-3.3.3.2 The-HoveMe-Incore Detection System shall be. OPERABLE with:

locdic as cud,

a. At least 75% of the detector tMmMen l ec.c6 c a s
b. A minimum of- two detector thimbles per core quadrant, -and.

y - c. Su ffief ent-mo v a M e-de t ec t oesrd el v er nd-reedout-equipment-to a msp-

-the:c tMmMest h eterhp r APPLICABILITY: When the NoveMe Incore Dete<-t4sn System is used for:

a. Recalibration of the Excore Neutron Flux Detection System, or
b. Monitoring the QUADRANT POWER TILT P.ATIO, or N
c. Measurement of F 3g, pq(Z) and F xy, ACTION:

With the HoveMe- Incore Octection System inoperable, do not use the system for the above applicable mor.:toring or calibration functions. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

% W6c c-(Plant procedures are used to determine that the NeveMe. Incore Octcction, System is OPERABLE.)

- ~~ v ^

An OPERABLE incore detector location shall consist of a fuel assembly' N-\

containing a fixed detector string with a minimum of three OPERABLE detectors or an OPERABLE movable incore detector capable of mapping the location.

'N -% ,.

f -

L c

C SEABROOK - UNIT 1 3/4 3-40 A

I I

l

POWER DXSTafBUTION-LIM 2TS BASES l

l

.3/4.2.2 and 3/4.2.3 HEAT FLUX HOT CHnNNEL FACTOR and NUCLEAR ENTHALPY- RISE HOT CHANNEL FACTOR (Continued)

Fh will be maintained within its limits provided Conditions a. through

d. above are maintained. The relaxation of F g as a function of THERMAL POWER allows changes in the radial power shape for all permissible rod insertion limits.

Fuel rod bowing reduces the value of DNBR. Credit is available to offset ~

this reduction in the generic margin. Tne generic margins', totaling 9.1% DNBR completely offset any rod bow penalties. This margin includes the following:

a. Design limit DNBR of 1.30 vs. 1.28,
b. Grid spacing (K,) of 0.046 vs. 0.059,
c. Thermal diffusion coefficient of 0.038 vs. 0.059,
d. DNBR multiplier of 0.86 vs. 0.88, and .
e. Pitch reduction.

The applicable values of rod bow penalties are referenced in the FSAR.

When an gF measurement is taken, an allowance for both experimental error and manufacturing tolerance must be dt N g apprcoria a full-core map taken with th a, c J: _0:t::ter f1= .",;;;y ..., ,7;t a,, _-2 ,  :

3% llowance is appropriate for manufacturing tol jg The Radial Peaking Factor, Fxy(Z), is measured periodically to provide assurance that the Hot Channel Factor, F (2), remains within its limit. The F

xy limit for RATED THERMAL POWER (F RTP)q as provided in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT per Specification 6.8.1.6 was determined from expected power control- maneuvers over the full range of burnup conditions-in the core.

When RCS Fh is measured, no ad i na llowances are necessary p or to comparison with the established li been allowed for in determination f the d k/ surement error of 4% fo M 3,,

gn DNBR value.

N g

"E fg, 3/4.2.4 QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO 4 g ggg.

The purpose of this speg at ss changes in core power .

distributionbetweenmonthlyQncorefonistodetect fl= q;?- uring normal- operatica the-QUADRANT POWER TILT RATI0'is se b Eiusi ro once ace ility of core

- peaking factors has been established by: review of incon limit of 1.02'is established as an indication trot the power di dbution s changed enough to warrant further investigation.

G eves % ces e SEABROOK - UNIT 1- B 3/4 2-3 Amenoment No. W. 12 FEB 18 d ,

)

p

.* =

INSYRT A movable inwre detectors, while 5.212 is appropriate for surveillance results determined with the fixed incore detectors.

INSERT B when determined with the movable incore detectors or 4.13% when determinod with the fixed incore detectors 3

INSTRUMENTATION BASES l

M01,41TORING INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.3.1 RADIATION MONITORING FOR PLANT OPERATIONS (Continued) and abnormal conditions. Once the required logic combination is completed, the system sends actuation signals to initiate alarms or automatic isolation action and actuation of Emergency Exhaust or Ventilation Systems. .

bcTccrot sysre m 3/4.3.3.2 40VAM4 INCORE CETECTORG qd e The OPERABILITY of the avable-incore detectord44--the-spee4f4ed-ehMm-cynplement-of-equipment ensures that the measurements obtained from use of this system accurately represent the spatial neutron flux distribution of the _

Core.

For the purpose of measuringgF (Z) or F g, a full incore flux map is used.

Quarter-core. flux maps, as defined in WCAP-8648, June 1976, may be used in recalibration of the Excore Neutron Flux Detection System, and full incore flux maps or symmetric incere %ktAes may be used for monitoring the QUADRANT POWER TILT RA110 when one Power Ran e cb '.nel is inoperable.

3/4.3.3.3 SEISMIC INSTRUMENTATION ",

The OPERABILITY of the seismic instrumentation ensures that sufficient capability is available to promptly determine the magnitude of a seismic event and evaluate the response of those features important to safety. This capa-bility is required to permit comparison of the measured response to that used in the design basi's for the facility to determine if plant shutdown is required pursuant to Appendix A of 10 CFR Part 100. The instrumentation is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.12., " Instrumentation for Earth- .

quakes," April 1974. _

3/4.3.3.4 METEOROLOGICAL INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the meteorological instrumentation ensures that sufficient meteorological data are available for estimating potential radiation doses to the public as a result of routine or accidental release of radioactive materials to the atmosphere. This capability is required to evaluate the need for initiating protective measures to protect the health and safety of the public and is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.23, "0nsite Meteorological Programs," February 1972.

3/4.3.3.5 REMOTE SHUTOOWN SYSTEM The CPERABILITY of the Remote Shutdown System ensures that sufficient capability is available to permit safe shutdown of the facility from locations outside of the control room. This capability is required in the event control room habitability is lost and is consistent with General Design Criterion 19 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.

SEABROOK - UNIT ) B 3/4 3-4

- - -__-.- _ ____ ,,___ _______u__ .

4 Ill. Hetnic of Proposed Chancti See attached retype of proposed changes to Technical Specifications. The attached retype reflects the currently issued version of the Technical Specifications. Pending Technical Specification changes or Technical Specification changes issued subsequent to this subrnitial are not reflected in the enclosed retype. The enclosed retype should be checked for continuity with the current Technical Specifications prior to issuance.

Itevislen bars are provided in the right hand rnargin to designate a change in the text. No revision bars are utilized when the page is changed solely to accommodate the shifting of text due to additions or deletions.

O 7

l

1NDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVElltANCE RE0VIREMENTS g.

SECTION PJ_G{

TABLE 3.3 2 (This table e is not used) .

I TABLE 4.3 1 REACTOR TRIF ,,itM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 3-9 3/4.3.2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 3-14 TABLE 3.3-3 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 3-16 TABLE 3.3-4 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 3-24 TABLE 3.3-5 (This table number is not used)

TABLE 4.3-2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACT4AT10N SYSiEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE h"QVihEMENTS. . . . . . . . 3/4 3-31 ,

3/4.3.3 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION Radiation Monitoring for Plant Operations. . . . . . . . 3/4 3-36 l TABLE 3.3-6 RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION ,

FOR PLANT OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 3-37  :

TABLE 4.3-3 RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION FOR PLANT OPERATIONS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 3 39 Incore Detector System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 3-40 Seismic Instrumentation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 't 3-41 ,

TABLE 3.3-7 SEISMIC MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION . . . . . . . . . 3/4 3 42 TABLE 4.3 4 SEISMIC MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SVRVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/43-43 Meteorological Instrumentation . . . . . . . . . , . . . 3/4 3-44 >

TABLE 3.3-8 METEOROLOGICAL MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION . ... . . 3/4345 Remote Shutdown System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 3-46 TABLE 3.3-9 REMOTE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 3-47 Accident Monitoring Instrumentation. . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 3-49 TABLE 3.3-10 ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMEN1ATION . . . . . . . . 3/4 3-50

-TABLE 3.3-11 (This table number is not used) . . . . . ..... 3/4 3-53  :

Radioactive Liquid Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation . 3/4 3-55 TABLE 3.3-12 RADI0 ACTIVE LIQUID EFFLUENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION -3/4 3-56 -

lSEABROOK --UNIT 1 iv ' Amendment No.

' REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTIMS MOVABtE CONTR0t ASSEMBLlES fil' d HEIGHT llMITING COND1110N FOR OPf FLAT 10N 3.1.3.1 A TION b.3 (Continued) c) A power distribution map is obtained from the incore Detector System andq F (Z) ac Th are verified to be within their limits within M hours; and d) The THERMAL POWER level is reduced to less than or equal to 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next hour and within the following 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> the High Neutron -

flux Trip Setpoint is reduced to less than or equal to 85% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

c. With more than one rod trippable but inoperable due to causes other than addressed by ACTION a. above, POWER OPERATION may continue provided that:
1. Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, the remainder of the rods in the bank (s) with the inoperable rods are aligned to within i 12 steps of the inoperable rods whfle maintaining the rod sequence and insertion limits of Specification 3.1.3.6.

The THERMAL POWER level shall be restricted pursuant to Specification 3.1.3.6 during subsequent or7 ration, and

2. The inoperable rods are restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. '
d. With more than one rod misaligned from its group step counter demand height by more than 1 12 steps (indicated position),

~

be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

SURVflLLANCE RE0VIREMENTS The position of each full-length rod shall be determined to be 4.1.3.1.1 within the group demand limit by verifying the individual rod positions at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, except daring time intervals when the rod position deviation monitor is inoperable; then verify the group positions at least once per 4 houts.

4.1.3.1.2 Each full-length rod not fully inserted in the core shall be determined to be OPERABLE by movement of at least 10 steps in any one direction at least once per 31 days.

SEABROOK " NIT 1 3/4 1-16 Amendment No. 9,

~ _ _ _ . _ . . . - _

t l

' REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS  !

MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES )

-1 POSITION INDICATION SYSTEMS OPERATINE ,

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.3.2 The Digital Rod Position Indication System and the Demand Position  !

Indication System shall be OPERABLE and capable of determining the control rod positions within i 12 steps. ,

APPLICABillTY: MODES 1 and 2.

ACTION:

a. With a maximum of one digital rod position indicator per bank l inoperable, either:

e

1. Determine the position of the nonindicating_ rod (s) indirectly by the Incore Detector System at least-once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> and immediately after any motion of the nonindicating rod which exceeds 24 steps in one direction since the last determination of the rod's position, or
2. Reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER ,

within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.

b. With a maximum of one demand position indicator per bank i

-inoperable, either:

1. Verify that all digital rod position indicators for the affected bank are OPERABLE and that the most withdrawn rod and the least withdrawn rod of the bank are within a maximum of 12 steps of each other at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, or
2. Reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER -

within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.

SVRVEltlANCE RE0VIREMENTS 4.1.3.2 Each digital rod position indicator shall be determined to be OPERABLE  ;

by verifying that the Oemand Position Indication System and the. Digital Rod  ;

Position Indication System agree within 12 steps at least-once_per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />,- ,

except_during time intervals when the rod position deviation monitor is inoperable; then compare the Demand Position Indication System and the Digital Rod _ Position Indication System at least once per 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, i:

SEABROOK - UNIT 11 3/4 1-18 Amendment No.

o

1

  • POBER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS HEAT TLVX HOT CHANNEL FACTOR - Fom l LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 4.2.2.1 The prnvisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable.

4.2.2.2 F,y shall be evaluated to determine if Fq(Z) is within its limit by:

a. Using the Incore Detector System to obtain a power distribution map at any THERP.AL POWER greater than 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER,
b. Increasing the measured F,# component of the power distribution map- l by 3% to account for manufacturing tolerances and further -

increasing the value by 5% when using the movable incore detectors  ;

cr 5.21% when using the fixed incore detectors, to account for measurement uncertainties.

c. Comparing the F,y computed (Ffy) obtained in Specification '

4.2.2.2b., above, to:

1) The F,y limitsforRATEDTHERMALPOWER(F"l)forthe appropriatemeasuredcoreplanesgiveninl Specification 4.2.2.2e, and f., below, and t
2) The relationship:

F fy = F"ll (1+PF,y(1-P)),

Where Ff is the limit for fractional THERMAL POWER operation

" PF,y is the Power Factor expressed as a function of specified F"En, the-COLR and P is the MultiplierforF,dTHERMALPOWERatwhichF,y fraction of RATE was measured.

+

d. Remeasuring F,, according to the following schedule:

1) measuredcoreplanebutlessthlantheFfyWhen relationship, F[ is greater th, additional power distribution maps. shall be taken and F fy comparedtoF","andFfy either:

a) Within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after exceeding by 20% of RATED THERMAL

  • POWERorgreater,theTHERMALPOWERatwhichFfy was last determined, or b)' At. least once per 31 Effective Full-Power Days (EFPD),

whichever occurs first. .

t SEABROOK - UNIT 1 3/4 2-6 Amer' ment.No. 9,

_ __. _ ___ - _ . . _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ . . _ . _ . _ . _ . _ . . _ _ . . . . _ . _ . -2,. t

' POWER DISTRIBUTION tIMITS HE AT JJJM HOT CHAT 1Nfl FAC10R ffll SURVElttANCE RE0VIREMENTS 4.2.2.2d. (Continued)

2) Whenthef[y appropriate measured core plane, additional lpoweris less than or equ distribution maps shall be taken and fl, compared to f"ly" and F fy at ieast once per 31 EfPD.
e. T he F,y limits for RATED THERMAL POWER (F"ll) shall be provided for all core planes containing Bank "D" co,1 trol rods and all unrodded core planes in the CORE OPERAllNG LIMITS REPORT per Specification 6.8.1.6;
f. Tiie f,y limits of Specification 4.2,s.2e., above, are not applicable in the following core planes regions is measured in percent of core height from the bottom of the fuel:
1) Lower core region from 0 to 15%, inclusive,
2) Upper core region from 85 to 100%, inclusive,
3) Giid plane regions at 17.8 1 2%, 32.1 t 2%, 46.4 1 2%, 60.6 1 2%, and 74.9 1 2%, inclusive, and
4) Core plane regions within i 2% of core height (i 2.88 inches) about the bank demand position of the Bank "D" control rods.

g, Withffy exceedingffy, the effects of f, on F9 (Z) shall be evaluated to determine if nF (Z) is within' its limits.

4.2.2.3 When qf (Z) is measured for other than F, determinations, an overall measured qf (Z) shall be obtained frcm a power dis,tribution map and increased by -

3% to account for manufacturing tolerances cnd further increased by 5% when using the movable intore detectors or 5.21% when using the fixed incore detectors, to account for measurement uncertainty.

SEABROOK - UNIT 1 3/4 2-7 Amendment No. 9,

+ POWER DISTRIBVil0N LIMITS 3/4.2.3 NUCLEAR ENTHAtPY RISE HOT CHANNEL FACTOR LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.2.3Fln shall be less than F'in (1.0 + PFtn (1-P)).

Where: P= _ THERMAL POWER

, and RAlED THERMAL POWER F"$n - theffnlimitatRATEDTHERMALPOWER(R1P),

specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT (COLR),

and PFtn - thePowerFactorMultiplierforFln

specified in the COLR.  !

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1.

ACTION:

WithFln exceeding its limit:

a. Within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> reduce the THERMAL POWER to the level where the LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION is satisfied.
b. Identify and correct the cause of the out of limit condition prior toincreasingTHERMALPOWERabovethelimitrequiredbyACTION.a.,

above; THERMAL POWER may then be increcsed, provided 3Fn is demonstrated through incore mapping to be within its limit.

4 SVRVElliANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.2.3.1 The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable.

4.2.3.2 fln shall be demonstrated to be within its limit prior to-operation above 75% RATED THERMAL POWER after each fuel loading and at least once per 31 EFPD ther9after by:

a. Using the incore Detector System to obtain a-power' distribution map at any THERMAL POWER greater than 5% RATED THERMAL POWER.
b. Usingthemeasuredvalueofflu which does not include an allowance for measurement uncertainty.

l L

r.

SEABROOK - UNIT 1 3/4 2-8 Amendment No. 9,

__m____._. . _ . _ _ _ . _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ .

' POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS 3/4.2.4 OVADRANT POWER TILT RA11Q LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.2.4 The QUADRAN1 POWER TILT RATIO shall not exceed 1.02.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1, above 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER *.

ACTION: l With the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO determined to exceed 1.02: ,

a. Within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> reduce THERMAL POWER at least 3% from RATED THERMAL POWER for each 1% of indicated QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO in excess of I and similarly reduce the Power Range Neutron Flux High Trip Setpoints within the next 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />,
b. Within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and every 7 days thereaf ter, verify that fo(Z) (by i f,y evaluation)rdFlu are within their limits by performing ->

Surveillance Requirements 4.2.2.2 and 4.2.3.2. THERMAL POWER and '

setpoint reductions shall then be in accordance with the ACTION '

statements of Specifications 3.2.2 and 3.2.3.

SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS  :

4.2.4.1 The QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO shall be determined to be within the limit above 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER by:

a. Calculating the ratio at least once per 7 days when the alarm is OPERABLE, and
b. Calculating the ratio at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> during steady-state operation when the alarm is inoperable.

4.2.4.2 The QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO shall be determined to be _within the limit when above 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER with one Power Range channel inoperable by using the Incore Detector System to confirm indicated QUADRANT i

POWEP, TILT RATIO at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> by either:

j a. Using the four pairs of symmetric detector locations or -

b. Using the Incore Detector System to monitor the QUADRANT POWER TILT-RATIO subject to the requirements of Specification 3.3.3.2.
  • See Special Test E3ceptions Specification 3.'10.2 1 SEABROOK;- UNIT l= 3/4 2-9 Amendment.No, i

L b- .

INSTRUMENTATION HONITORING INSTRUMENTATION JNCORE DETECTOR SYSHM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION  ;

3.3.3.2 The incore Detector System shall be OPERABLE with:  :

a. At least 75% of the detector locations and, I
b. A minimum of two detector locations per core quadrant.  ;

An OPERABLE incore detector location shall consist of a fuel assembly "

containing a fixed detector string with a minimum of three OPERABLE detectors  !

or-an OPERABLE movable incore detector capable of mapping the location, j APPLICABILITY: When the incore Detector System is used for:  !

a. Recalibration of the Excore Neutron flux Detection System, or
b. Monitoring the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO, or
c. Measurement of Fluif q(Z) and f,y ACTION:

With the Incore Detector System inoperable, do not use the system for the above applicable monitoring or calibration functions. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable. .

SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS ____ _

(Plant procedures are used to determine that the incore Detector System is OPERABLE.)

t

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l SLABR00K UNIT 1 3/4 3-40 AmendmentLNo,

. -,_,__a._..__._._._____-- ._,..._.___.__.u..__ . _ _ . _ _ . _ . . . . _ _ _ ._ .m . : . -

,_ ~. _ _ _ _ _ .. _ . _

aPOWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS BASES f 3/4.2.2 and 3/4.2.3 HEAT FLUX HOT CHANNEt FACTOR and NUCLEAR ENTHALPY RISE HOT CHANNEL FACTOR (Continued)

Fh will be maintained within its limity provided Conditions a. through  ;

d. above are maintained. The relaxation of f a as a function of THERMAL POWER i allows changes in the radial power shape for all permissible rod insertion limits. ,

Fuel rod bowing reduces the value of Df4BR. Credit is available to offset  :

this reduction in the generic margin. The generic margins, totaling 9.1% DNBR completely offset any rod bow penalties. This margin includes the following: ,

a. Design limit DNBR of 1.30 vs. 1.28,
b. Grid spacing (Ks) of 0.046 vs. 0.059, ,
c. Thermal diffusion coefficient of 0.038 vs. 0.059,
d. DNBR multiplier of 0.86 vs. 0.88, and
e. Pitch reduction. i The applicable values of rod bow penalties are referenced in the FSAR. )

When an Fq measurement is taken, an allowance for both experimental error and manufacturing toleranco must be made. An allowance of 5% is appropriate for a full-core map taken with the movable incore detectors, while 5.21% is >

appropriate for surveillance results determined with the fixed incore -

detectors. A 3% allowence is appropriate for manufacturing tolerance.

The Radial Peaking Factor, F,y(Z),- is measured periodically to provide assurance that- the Hot Chennel Factor F The F,, limit for RATED THERMAL POWER as (F"g) n(Z),

provided remains in the CORE OPERATING within its limit.

LIMITS REPORT per Specification 6.8.1,.6 was determined from expected power- l control maneuvers over the full range of burnup conditions in the core.

When RCS Th is measured, no additional allowances are necessary grior to comparison with the established limit. A measurement error of 4% for F iwhen determined with the movable incore detectors or 4.13% when determined dth the fixed incore detectors has been allowed for in determination of the design DNBR I

value.- ,

3/4.2.4 OVADRANT POWER TILT RATIO The purpose of this specification is to detect gross changes in core l power distribution between monthly Incore Detector System surveillances. -l During normal operation the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO is set equal to zero once acceptability of core peaking factors has been established by review of incore  :

surveillances. The limit of 1.02.is established as an indication that-the power distribution has changed enough to warrant further investigation.  ;

SEABROOK 4 UNIT 1 B 3/4~2-3 Amendment No. Gr-M ,  ;

. _ . _ . - . - - _ . . . - . . - , _ _ . , , , . ~ . . _ _ , , . _ _ _ . . .._ _. ..,__...,_ _ _ , , . _ - _ ~ _ - - _ . _ . - , _ _ . _ . , . . - . _ _ _ _ _ _ . -

.)

i

  • lMJf0MfNTATION BASES j MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION i 3/4.3.3.1 RADIATION MONITORING FOR PLANT OPERATIONS (Continued)-

and abnormal conditions. Once the required logic combination is completed, the i system sends actuation signals to initiate alarms or automatic isolation action and actuation of Emergency Exhaust or Ventilation Systems.  !

3/4.3.3.2 INCORE DE1ECTOR SYSTEM l The OPERABILITY of the incore Detector System ensures that the measurements obtair.ed from use of this system accurately represent the spatial 1 neutron flux distribution of the core.

l For the purpose of measuringnF (Z) or FL a full incore flux map is used, l Quarter-core flux maps, as defined in WCAP-8648, June 1976, may be used in recalibration of the Excore Neutron Flux Detection System, and full incore flux maps or symmetric incore detectors may be used for monitoring the QUADRANT

  • POWER TILT RATIO when one Power Range channel is inoperable. ,

I 3/4.3.3.3 SEISMIC INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the seismic instrumentation ensures that sufficient  ;

capability is available to promptly determine the magnitude of a seismic event and evaluate the response of those features important to safety. This capa-bility is required to permit comparison of the measured response to that usel  :

in the design basis for the facility to determine if plant shutdown is requ', red.

pursuant to Appendix A of 10 CfR Part 100. The instrumentation is consistent ,

with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.12. " Instrumentation for Earth. 1 quakes," April 1974.  ;

3/4.3.3 4 METEOROLOGICAL INSTRUMENTATION i

The OPERABILITY of the. meteorological instrumentation ensures that i sufficient meteorological data are available for estimating potential radiation 3 do:.es to the public as a result of routine or accidental release of radioactive materials to the atmosphere. This capability is required to evaluate the need for initiating protective measures to protect the health and safety of the

.public and is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.23, ,

"Onsite Meteorological Programs," February 1972.

3/4.3.3.5 REMOTE SHUTOOWN SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of th6 Remote Shutdown System ensures that sufficient- l capability is available to permit safe shutdown of the facility from locations l outside of the control room.. This capability is required in the event control room habitability is lost-and is consister,t with General Design Criterion 19 of-

~

Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.

l I

-SEABROOK UNIT.1- B 3/4 3-4' Amendment No. ,

. -. _ .. . -- - ._ - _ ~ - - - , - . - - - - - - . - - - - , . -

IV. Safety 1 valuation of 1.lcense Amendment llequest 9? 11 Proposed Chanen The Seabrook Station incore Detector Sptem is comprised of two complete and independent incore detector systems. TLe first is the movable incore detectors which use movable fission (hambers designed by Westinghouse for reactors similar to Seabrook Station. The second is the fixed incore detectors which are self-powered platinum detectors. The fixed and movable incore detectors wert ;nstalled during plant construction.

The Incore Detector System provides inforrnation on the neutron flux distribution at selected core locations. The data obtained from the incore Detector System, in conjunction with previously determined analytical information, is used to confirm the reactor core design pararneters and calculate the hot channel f actors.

The purpose of License A rne n d me nt Request 92-14 is to revise the Scabrook Station Technical Specifications to allow the fixed incore detectors to be utilized to perform Technical Specification surveillances.

An analysis of the fixcd incore detutors was performed by Yankee Atomic tilectric Company ,

(YAEC). The attached YAi!C report, YAEC-1855P, "Seabrook Station Unit 1 Fixed Incore Detector Syeem Analysis", provides the calculational method and uncertainty analysis for the fixed incore detectors. The calculational rnethod includes the conversion of signal to power and the determination of Technical Specificatien surveillance parameters. The uncertainty analysis considers contributions from reproducibility, analytical methads and signal processing.

The report also addreases detector operability and signal repir.:ement. The conclusion of the report is that the fixed incore detedors are acceptable for performing power distribution surveillances currently performed by the movable incore detectors.

The proposed revision to the Technical Specifications will continue to require that the incore Detector System be OPl!RABLil with at least 75% of the detector locations and a minimum of two detector locations per core quadrant. O P ER AllLE. An OPERABLE incore detector location shall consist of a fuel assembly containing a fixed detector string with a minimum of three OPER ABLil detectors or an OPERABLE movable incore detector.

~

Like the movable incore detectors, the fixed incore detectors will be verified to be OPER ABLE in accordance with Station procedures. The Fixed incore Detector Code (FINC) will determine which detectors are inoperable Msed upon the predicted detector signal and the signal from the detectors symmetric partner (if any). A complete detector string will be inoperable when three out of the five detectors on that string are inoperable. The status of each detector is an output from the FINC computer code which informs the user which detectors were declared inoperable. The FINC computer code is discussed in the attached Y AEC 1855P.

The movable incore detectors rely upon mechanical stitching devices to route the detectors into the various reactor core locations. The movable incore d acctors are prone to mechanical failure and require a signifiant amount of maintenance. During Seabrook Station's first two fuel cycles, greater than four hundred thousand dollars, 600 man-hours and 1 man-rem was expended in maintaining th: hanical portics of the movable incore detectors. The majority of this work involvel rep) .mg movable incore detectors which had failed and clearing blockages from some oi the movable incore detector drive paths. In comparison, the the fixed incore detectors are en integral part of the instrument tube and are not mechanictly inserted into and removed from the reactor core cael time they are used. To date, through two cycles of operation, the fixed incore detectors have been iciatively maintenance free. Therefore, incore Detector System maintenance will be 8

significantly decreased with the use of the fixed incore detectors. This decrease will result in savings of time and man tem exposure.

in addition, the fixcd incore detectors are operationally superior to the movable incore detectors. The fixed incore detectors have the capability of providing almost continuous reactor core flux monitoring. The fixed incore detectors provide flux map data every minute.

Using the movable incore detectors it takes greater than two hours to obtain equivalent data.

1 1

The D ASES of Technical Specifications 3/4.3.3.2 state, in part, that the OPEllAlllLITY of the movable incore detectors ensures that the measurements obtained from their use accurately represent the spatial neutron flux distribution of the (reactor) core. The ability of the fixed incore detectors to also accurately deterrnine core power distribution provides additional assurance of fuel integrity during condition 1 (normal operations) and condition 11 (incidents of moderate f requency) events by: (1) maintaining the minimum DNDR in the (reactor) to greater than or equal to 1.30 during normal operation and in short -term transients, and (2) limiting the fission gas release, and cladding mechanical propcides to within assumed design criteria. in addition, limiting the peak linear power density during condition 1 events provides assurance that the initial conditions assumed for the LOCA analyses are met and the ECCS acceptance criteria of 2200' ,cak cladding temperature is not exceeded.

The proposed LCO for the fixed incore detectors will ensure that an OpERAllLE incore Detector System is used to measure reactor core power distribution. it has been demonstrated by the analysis of % 'C 1855P that the fixed incore detectors are capable of -

accurately measuring reactor core power distribution and are acceptable for performing power distribution surveillances which are currently performed using the movable incore detectors. There are no changes made to any reactor core power distribution limits by the -

proposed change to Technical Specifications. Therefore the assumptions in the Bases of the Technical Specifications are not affected by the proposed revision to the Technical Specifications In conclusion, it has been demonstr'ted by the analysis of YAEC-1355P that the fixed incore detectors are acceptable for perfoming power distribution surveillances. Use of the fixed incore detectors will greatly reduce the time spent maintaining the movable incore detectors -  ;

which will reduce personnel exposure. In addition, personnel safety will be improved by reducing the time spent in the ' nigh temperature environment of containment. Use of the fixed incore detectors may also reduce the potential for a plant shutdown caused by ,

inoperable movable incore detectors and the corresponding inability to perform required surveillances. The proposed use of the fixed detectors will ensure an equivalent level of plant safety currently afforded by the movable incore detectors. Therefore, there in no _ .,

increase in the safety consequences associated with the requested amendment.

+

9

. _ . , _ . _ _ . . ~ . - . _ _ _ _ _ __ _ - . _ _ - _ _ . _ . ~ . ~ . . - . - . _ _

- - . _ . - ~ . - - - -

4 6

V. Determinution of Nicnifhant llan dn for license Amendment Itrunest 9211 Pronosed Chances

1. The proposed changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or to sequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The proposed Technical Specification revision does not involve any physical changes to Seabrook Station. Neither the movable incore detectors nor fixed incore detectors are used to mit gate any of the accidents described in UFSAR Chapter 15. No changes to any reactor 2

core power distribution limit is made by the proposed change and accurate power distribution measurements will still be obtained by using the fixed incore detectors. Therefore, the proposed Technical Specification revision does not increase the probability of an accident previously evaluated.

An analysis of the fixed incore detectors was performed for North Atlantic Energy Service Corporation (North Atlantic) by Yankee Atomic Electric Company (YAEC). The results are provided in YAEU report YAEC 1855P, *Scabrook Station Unit 1 Fixed tr core Detector Analysiv, which determined that the fixed incore detectors are acceptable for performing power distribution surveillances which are currently performed using the movable incore detectors.

The ability of the fixed incore detectors to accurately determine core power distribution provides assurance of fuel integrity during condition I (normal operations) and condition 11 (incidents of moderate frequency) events, in addition, hmiting the peak linear power density during condition i events provides assurance that tiie initial conditions assumed for the LOCA analyses are met and the ECCS acceptance criteria of 2200'F peak cladding temperature is not exceeded. l Since the plant response to an accident will not change, there is no change in the potential for an increase in the release of radiation to the public f om the use of the fixed incore detectors. Therefore, the consequences of an accident, as measured in terms of dose, will not increase due to the use of_ the fixed incore detcetors to determine reactor core po'ver distribution.

2. The proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

No modifications to plu t equipment or to the procedures used to operate plant equipment are being made as a result of the proposed Technical Specification revision. The fixed incore detectors were part of the L'ginal plant design and have operated in parallel with the movable incore detectors. Being able to use both the fixed incore detectors and the movable incore detectors will decrease the probability of not obtaining incore data.

Presently, the Technical Specifications allow only the data from the mcvable incore detectots to be used for determining reactor core power distribution. This change will permit the data from the already installed and functioning fixed incore detectors to be used for the same purpose, it has been determined by the analysis of YAEC-1855P that the fixed incore detectors are acceptable to use in determining reactor core power distribution. A Technical Sp cification LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) is proposed for the fixed incore detutors. This proposed LCO is similar to the LCO for the movable incore detectors and 10

1 v

ensures that an OPER ABLE incore Detector System is available for determining reactor' core <

power distribution.

The proposed revision will permit the data from the fixed incore detectors to be used to verify Technical Specification reactor core power distribution. The fixed incore detectors are fully capable of accurately determining reactor core power distribution. Accurately determining the reactor core power distribution ensures that the assumption in the BASES of Technical Specifications and the UFSAR are valid. No changes are being made to plant  !

equipment, reactor core power distribution limits or operating methods, as such, no new failure mechanisms are created by using the fixed incore detectors to monitor reactor core power distribution. Therefore, the possibility of a new or- different kind of accident from any previously - evaluated, is not created by the proposed revision to the Technical Specifications.

3. The proposed changes do not result in a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

The HASES of Technical Specification 3/4.3.3.2 state, in part, that the OPERABILITY of the movable incore detectors ensures that the measurements obtained from their use accurately represent the spatial neutron flux distribution of the '(reactor) core. The ability of the fixed incore detectors to also accurately determine core power distribution provides additional assurance of fuel integrity during condition I (normal operations) and condition II (incidents of moderate frequency) events by: (1) maintaining the minimum DNHR in the (reactor) to greater than or equal to 1.30 during normal eperation and in short term transients, and (2) limiting the fission gas release, atid cladding mechanical properties to within assumed design criteria. in addition, limiting the peak linear power density during condition 1 events provides assurance that LSc initial conditions assumed for the LOCA analyses are met and the ECCS acceptance criteria of 2200*F peak cladding temperature is not exceeded.

The proposed LCO for the fixed incore detectors will ensure that an OPERABLE incore Detector System is used to measure reactor core power distribution. Analysis has demonstrated that the fixed incore detectors are capable of- accurately measuring reactor core power distribution and are acceptable for performing power distribution surveillances which currently are performed using the movable incore detectors. . No changes to any.

reactor core power distribution limits are made by the proposed change to Technical Specifications. Therefore, the assumptions in the BASES of Technical Specifications remain valid and the proposed revision does not result'in a significant reduction in the margin of-sa fe ty. j i

l I

11

VI. Proposed Schedule for Ilrense Amendment issuance und Effect <corss North Atlantic requests NI(C review of 1.icense Amendment It eq ue til 92-14 and issuance of a license amendmert having immediate effectiveness by May 31, 1993.

The Technical Specification changes proposed herein will enhance the safe operation of the plant by reducing the time spent maintaining the movable incore detectors which will reduce personnel exposure. In addition, personnel safety will be improved by reducing the time spent in the high ternperature environment of containment, Use of the fixed incore detectors may also reduce the potential for a plant shutdown caused by inoperable movable incore detectors and the corresponding inability to perform required surveillances, l

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Vil. 1:nstroninental Imnert Annessment j

i North Atlantic has reviewed the proposed license amet.dment at,ainst the criteria of 10CI'It51.22 for environrnental consideration The proposed changes do not involve a significant hazards cons,ideration, nor increase the types and amounts of effluent

that may be released offsite, nor significantly increase individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposures. 11ased on the foregoing, North Atlantic concludes ,

~

that the proposed changes meet the criteria delineated in 10CFitSt.22(c)(9) for a categorical exclusion hom the requirements for an IInvironmental Impact Statement, t

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Yllt. inher Suriportine Docurnentation

. Figure 1, Radial Location of instrument Thirnbles

. Figure 2, Instrument Thimble Design

. Figure 3, Axial Position of Platinum Incore Detectors

. Propriety information Notice

. YAEC 1855P, (Propriety), Scabrook Station Unit 1 Fixed Incore Detcetor Systern Analysis

. Proposed changes to the Seabrook Station Cycle 3 Core Operating Limits Report L

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FIGURE 1 Seabrook Station Radial Locations of Instrument Thimbles R P N M l. K J 11 0 F E D C D A O O 2 O O O 2 O O O O 4 O O O s O O O O 6 O O O O O 7 O O O O 8 O O O O O O O O 9 O O O O '

to O O O 11 O O O O O O

12 O O 13 O' O O O-14 O O O O '

is o o O Denotes Instrument '!Wmble Containing Both A Movable Path And AI4*ed Detector String j

. FIGURE 2 Instrument nimble Design  ;

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8. Fcsico Ourrbcr c

Path

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IrUtTUTGit ThifTt43 l Crocs Scctional Vm i.

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-- trcorci Shceth j

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E1 Titter ITJJlator i

L P.atirun De'.tctor Tc - Thermocouple i

L- Drawing Not To Scale g gg y, L

FIGURE 3 l Axial Positions of Platinum locore Dete: tors I 1 1

/ Top Of Active Ftr4 ,

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-4 Phthrn Dotcctcra

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Grid Strags ,

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APFIDAVIT PttPSUANT 70 10019?.790 Yankee Atomic Electric Company)

Huclear Services Division )

Cormnonwealth of Massachusetts )

Worcester County ) SS:

I, Stephen P. Schultz, depose and say that I am the Vice President of Yankee Atomic Electric Company, duly authorized to make this atfidavit, and have reviewed or caused to have reviewed thi inf ormation which is identified as proprietary. I am submitting this affidavit in conformance with the provisions of 10CrR2.790 of *he Commission's 'egulations for withholding this information.

The informr. tion ior which proprietary treatment is sought is contained in the report, YAEC-1855P, dated October 199' Pursuant to the provisions of Paragraph (b) (4) of Section 2.790 of the Conenission's regulstions, the f ollowing is f urnished f or consideration by the Commission in deterwining whether the information sought to be withheld from public disclosure, included in the above referenced document, should be withhold.

1. The material contained in this transmittal was obtained at considerable expense to Yankee Atomic Electric Company and North Atlantic Energy Service Corporation and the release of which would seriously affect our competitive position.
2. The material contained in this transmi.ttal is of the type customarily held in confidence and not customarily disclosed to the public.
3. This information is being transmitted to the Commission in confidence under the provisions of 10CFR2.790 with the understanding that it is to be received in confidence by the b Commission.
4. This information is for Commission internal use only and should not be released to persons or erganizations outside the Directorate of Regulation and the ACRS without prior approval of Yankee Atomic Electric Company. Should it become necessary to release this information to such persons as part of the review procedure, please contact Yankee Atomic Electric Company.

Further deponent sayeth not.

Sworn to before me this lat day of October 1992

.".hed .

I. P.~ Schultz j Vice President CO o _ d cc b Kathryn Gates, Notary Public My Commission Expires 01/24/97

s Core Operating Limits Report North Atlantic has submitted to the NRC the Scabrook Station Cycle 3 Core operating Limits Report (COLR) (Ref. NYN.92133). Issuance of L/.R 9214 will necessitate a revision

to the Cycle 3 COLR due to the slight increase in the measurement uncertainties associated with tbc fixed incore detectors. Specifically, COLR item 2.8.1 will be revised to indicate that the value for the Nuclear Enthalpy Rise llot Channel Factor is associated with the movable incore detectors. A new value, reflecting the fixed incore detector measurement uncertainty is being added. This value is derived by removing the measurement uncertainty -

of 4.13% (as given in YAEC 1855P) from the Nuclear Enthalpy Rise llot Channel Factor safety analysis limit of 1.55.

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  • 2.7.2 K(Z) is specifled in Figure 3.

2.7.3 PFu = 0.2 2.7.4 The Fw limits for Rated Thermal Power within specific core planes shall be:

2.7.4.1 Fu (RTP) less than or equal to 1.850 for all planes containing banks D + C control rods 2.7.4.2 Fu (RTP) less than or equal to 1.800 for all planes containing bank D control rods:

2.7.4.3 Fu (RTP) less than or equal to 1.640 for all unrodded planes for cycle burnup from 0 up to 1,000 hBVD/hm);

2.7.4.4 Fu (RTP) less than or equal to 1.670 for all unrodded planes for cycle burnup from 1,000 up to 2,000 MWD /hmJ:

2.7.4.5 Fu (RTP) less than or equal to 1.680 for all unrodded planes for cycle burnup from 2.000 up through 8.000 hnVD/hm3; 2.7.4.6 Fn (RTP) less than or equal to 1.630 for all unrodded planes for cycle burnup from 8,000 up through 12,000 hnVD/hmJ:

2.7.4.7 Fu (RTP) less than or equal to 1.620 for all unrodded planes for cycle burnup from 12.000 hnVD/MTU onward; and 2.7,4.8 See Figure 4 for a plot of F 9(Z) x P(REL) versus aMal core height.

I e 2.8 Nuclear Enthalpy Rise Hot Channel Factor: (Specification 3.2.3)

'l 2.8.1 F""a = 1.49 o f or 6M "" O '"'"C cleb'd # # Y*

F  : 1. %4 Vo c & hed dcort d<lec W 'Y'b**

2.8.2 PFm = 0.2

- - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ - - - .