ML20092E396
| ML20092E396 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 02/10/1992 |
| From: | John Miller, Repka D ALABAMA POWER CO., BALCH & BINGHAM (FORMERLY BALCH, BINGHAM, BAKER, WINSTON & STRAWN |
| To: | |
| References | |
| CON-#192-12572 91-626-02-CIVP, 91-626-2-CIVP, CIVP, NUDOCS 9202180104 | |
| Download: ML20092E396 (16) | |
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 9[NU NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION HiiERRr; Tile ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING IbhRUl D I In the Matter of: )
) Docket Nos. 50 348-CivP ALABAMA POWER COMPANY 50 364 CivP (Joseph M. Farley Nuclear )
g Plant, Units 1 and 2) ) ASLDP No. 91626 02 CivP I
I PRE HEARING BRIEF OF ALABAMA POWER COMPANY I
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OF COUNSEL:
BALCll & BINGHAM I James H. Miller,111 James H. Hancock. Jr, I Post Office Box 306 Birmingham, Alabama 35201 (205) 251-8100 WINSTON & STRAWN David A. Repka 1400 L Street, N.W. Alabama Power Company LI Washington, D.C. 20005 3502 (202) 371 5700 the southern electnc system 9202180104 920210 PDR G
ADOCK 05000348 -
I UNITED STATES OF AhiERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COhthilSSION .
BEFORE Tile ATOhilC SAFFTYI AND LICENSING ROARD in the Matter of: )
) Docket Nos. 50-348 CivP ALABAMA POWER COMPANY ) 50 364 CivP (Joseph M. Farley Nuclear )
g Plant, Units 1 and 2) ) ASLBP No. 91-626-02 CivP l
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PRE liEARING BRIEF OF ALABAMA POWER COMPANY I
I OF COUNSEL:
I BALCli & BINGilAM James 11. Miller,111 James 11. liancock, Jr.
I Post Office Box 306 Birmingham, Alabama 35201 (205) 251 8100 ig WINSTON & STRAWN David A. Repka ll l
1400 L Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005 3502 l (202) 371 5700 I
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UNITED STATES OF Ah1 ERICA i NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION I IlliFORE Tile ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING IlOARD in the Matter of: )
) Docket Nos. 50148 CivP ALABAMA POWER COMPANY 50 364 CivP (Joseph M. Farley Nuclear )
Plant, Units 1 and 2) ASLBP No. 91626-02 CivP g )
PRE HE6 RING BRIEF OF ALAHAMA POWEll COMPANY In this enforcement hearing, Alabama Power Company is contesting the imposition by the NRC Statf of a $450,000 civil monetary penalty for an alleged failure to comply with l the requirements of 10 CFR 50.49. This regulation, promulgated on January 21, 1983, established a November 30,1985 deadline for licensees to identify, qualify, and document such qualification for all safety related electrical equipment required to function in a design basis accident environment, The Staff, in imposing the civil penalty, has alleged that Alabarna Power Company did not comply with 10 CFR 50.49 by this deadline, in response to this allegation, Alabama Power Company contends that: (1) from a technical standpoint, Alabama Power Company had sufficient documentation to establish that its electrical equipment, requiring qualification, would perform its intended function in a design basis accident environment:(2) because the Statf relied on information that evolved after the deadline, it cannot meet the " clearly knew or should have known" standard required by its own Modified Enforcement Policy for implementing civil penalties for EO violations:
and (3) any alleged deficiency in doc ientation did not pose a significant safety harard that lI l
would warrant civil enforcement - " the Modified Enforcement Policy or, more l broadly, under Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act, in the case of each alleged violation, I
I the burden is on the Staff to prove the antithesis of each of these three points. As the evidence in this case will show, the Staff has failed to carry that burden and, as a result, the civil penalty assessed Alabama Power Company is due to be withdrawn, or drastically reduced.
g in addition, to the extent the Board disagrees with any of the above positions and concludes that the Staff has met its burden of proof regarding all prerequisites to escalated I enforcement (on some or all of the specific alleged violations), Alabama Power Company l requests that this Board reconsider both the Severity Category assigned by the Staff as well as the Staff's escalation / mitigation analysis. Alabama Power Company does not believe that I the Severity Category assigned by the Staff appropriately reflects the lack of safety l significance of the alleged violations still at issue. With respect to the escalation / mitigation analysis, Alabama Power Company disputes the 50% escalation of the base civil penalty applied for an alleged lack of best efforts and disputes the 25% escalation applied for allegedly insufficient corrective actions, in fact, when viewed in eppropriate perspective, Alabama Power Company believes that its corrective actions and its substantial efforts to comply with EO requirements entitled it to a substantial mitigation of any base civil penalty.
At the core of many of the Staff's allegations is one recurring issue: Alabama Power Company believes that it has been subjected to an evolving level of Staff expectations for EO compliance. As Alabama Power Company will establish m its Direct Written Testimony, the Staff applied two years worth of post deadline EO experience and knowledge to l Alabama Power Company's pre deadline state of mind to determine whether it complied with the EO rule. Using 1987 expectations, the Staff inspected Farley Nuclear Plant and I determined that Alabama Power Company no longer was in compliance with 10 CFR 50.49 2
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as it had declared on December 13, 1984, when the Staff issued to Alabama Power l
Company a Safety Evaluation Report evaluating the Parley EQ program. Alabama Power Company believes that for regulatory purposes, the Staf f has a right and obligation to review I a licensee's compliance with its regulations. Ilowever, for enforcement purposes, particularly under the Staffs own Modified Enforcement Policy, the Staff should not be allowed to revisit a pre deadline determination of compliance and, using post deadline knowledge, impose a I civil penalty claiming that Alabama Power Company no longer met the deadline.
l The balance of this brief will provide the Board with a succinct overview of the principal components of Alabama Power Company's position. First,it will present generally the undisputed factual history of Alabama Power Company's responsiveness to and compliar.ce with Staff EO requirements. This history will establish not only that Alabama Power Company exercised best etforts to meet the EO deadline, but also that the Staff, prior to the deadline, ackr'owledged Farley Nuclear Plant's compliance with 10 CFR 50.49.
Second, this brief will outline Alabama Power Company's argument that each item of electrical equipment at issue in this enforcement action was qualified to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.49 - at least as those requirements were understood by Alabama Power Company and the Staff prior to the EO deadline. Third, to the extent qualification remains l in dispute, this brief will highlij;ht the algument, which will be further developed in the Direct Written Testimony, that the Staff has failed to establish that on November 30,1985,
! Alabama Power Company " clearly knew or should have known" of those alleged violations.
l Finally, Alabama Power Company will present its argument that the alleged violations were strictly documentation related and not safety significant. Under the Modified Enforcement I
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I Policy as well as broader principles of law and policy, these " deficiencies" do not justify tho imposition of a civil penalty.
BCrtE OVERVIEW In its Direct Written Testimony, Alabama Power Company witnesses will present to the Board a detailed review of the development of the EO rule and of Alabama Power g
Compai., .
isponsiveness to each Staff requirement, inquiry and request. As a result, this brief will only mention the more significant milestones in Alabama Power Company's l compliance efforts from 1978 until November 30, I?85. It is important to underscore that, for enforcement purposes under the hiodified Enforcement Policy, November 30,1985 is I the cut off date for determining compliance with 10 CFR 50.49 and what Alabama Power l Company " clearly knew or should have known."
In January,1980, the Staff issued Bulletin 79-01B, which, in part, required licensees I to compile a Master List of all safety related electrical equipment required to ft.netion in a design basis accident, and to ensure that the licensee had documentation sufficient to establish that each item of equipment on this hiaster List was qualified to perform its intended function in a post. accident environment. In response to Bulletin 79 01B, Alabama Power Company submitted to the Staff a separate blaster List for Farley Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2. After reviewing these subrnittals, the Staff issued Safety Evaluation Reports in 1981 concluding that Alabama Power Company's Master Lists w.re " complete and acceptable "
g in 1980, the Staff conducted an evaluation of the Farley Nuclear Plant EO documentation files. This evaluation resulted in a Technical Evaluation Report, signed by I Mr. Norman hierriweather on December 10,1980, which concluded that several of the items i
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I at issue in this enforcement action were " qualified." Farley Nuclear Plant was elso the subject of two on site inspections in 1980. A primary purpose of the first inspection was to look at system interfaces, which by definition included a review of the % type taped cable terminatiors and the S to 1 pigtail terminations for the liydrogen Recombiners at issue in g this enforcement action. The second inspection was conducted under the direction of hir.
Phil DiBenedetto for the purpose of determining whether Unit 2 should receive its full power license. That audit found only insignificant deficiencies in Alabama Power Company's l EO program and, as a result, the Commission issued Unit 2 its license in hiarch,1981.
As part of the Statfs review of Alabama Power Company's compliance with 11ulletin 79-0113, the Staff retained Franklin Research Center to review the qualification documentation for each item of electrical equipment on the Niaster Lists. In response to a Staff request, Alabama Power Company submitted to Franklin Research Center certain test reports that it was using to establish qualification. At the conclusion of Franklin's review of the documentation, Frank!N submitted to the Staff a Technical Evaluation Report, which identified each item of electrical equipment on Alabama Power Company's hinster List as being either qualified, unqualified, or as having deficient qualification documentation.
Subsequently, the Staff submitted to Alabama Power Company an SER for each unit transmitting the Franklin Technical Evaluation Reports, and adopting the " bases and findings" of the Franklin TERs. Upon receipt of the SERs in the spring of 1983, Alabama Power Company began to resolve each deficiency identified by Franklin, and on January 11, 1984, met with the Staff in Washington, D.C. to discuss its proposed resolutions to these deficiencies. At this meeting, the Staff agreed that Alabama Power Company had either resolved each of the Franklin identified deficiencies or that the plan presented for resolving I 5-I
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such deficiencies was acceptable. The minutes of this meeting are documented in a letter from Alabama Power Company to the Staff dated February 29,1984.
As a result of the Staff 6 concunence in Alabama Power Company's iesolution to the Franklin deficiencies, Alabama Power Company beliesed that it was in compliance with 10 g CFit 50.49 and had achieved this compliance by the November 30,1985 deadline. Then, on December 13,1984, the Staf f issued a Safety Evaluation Iteport for Unit I and Unit 2, which clearly stated that the Staff agreed with Alabama Power Company that it had met the l requirements of 10 CFit 50.49. In those Safety Evaluation 1(eports, the Staff reached three conclusions:
I (1) Alabama Power Company's electrical equipment environmental qualification program complies with the requirements of 10 CFil 50.49; (2) The proposed resolutions from each of the environmental qualification deficiencies identified in the January 31,1983 Sell and FitC TElt are I acceptablet and, (3) Continued operation will not present undue risk to the public health and safety.
Despite this pre deadline proclamation by the Staff that Alabama Power Company was in compliance with 10 CFit 50.49, the Staff, after a 1987 inspection of Farky Nuclear Plant, determined that Alabama Power Company was not in compliance with 10 CFR 50A9 before the deadline and assessed a civil penalty for this "programrnatic Dreakdown."
II. IECllNICAl,AlgiBJENTS Alabama Power Company believes that for each item of electrical equipment alleged ll by the Staff to be in violation of 10 CFil 50.49, it had in its qualification files documentation sufficient to establish that the respective item would perform its intended function in a lI
! design basis accident environment. Several expert witnesses for Alabama Power Company L
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will proffer Direct Written Testimony supporting the Company's position that the documentation in its qualification files, along with reasonable engineering judgment, was !
sufficient to allow an engineer, knowledgeable in EO, to conclude that the item would perform its required function A summary of Alabama Power Company's technical position g for each item of equipment at issue is attached as Attachment 1. As this Attachment illustrates, many of the technical disputes are simply disagreements between Staff inspectors and Alabama Power Company engineers over documentation of technical conclusions and l engineering judgments.
Alabama Power Company also contends that many of the Staff's positions taken in I this enforcement action regarding what needed to be addressed in EO documentation were based on knowledge obtained after the EO deadline, and, therefore, cannot be used against a licensee for enforcement purposes under the Modified Enforcement Policy, To support this contention Alabama Power Company references the training seminar conducted at the Sandia Nationallaboratories sescral weeks before the Farley Nuclear Plant inspection. At this seminar, Staff inspectors were educated on the most up to date knowledge regarding EO compliance. Then, armed with the Sandia list of likely violations, the inspectors audited Farley Nuclear Plant to see if Alabama Power Company had hit .his " moving target" of Staff expectations. Though the Staff concluded that its 1987 expectations had not been met, l Alabama Power Company, nevertheless, conter ds that its engineering judgment and supporting documentation established compliance with 10 CFR 50.49. Additional l
l documentation provided in 1987 was necessary only to confirm this compliance, to address new, post deadline issues, or to meet higher standards for the level of detail required for EO
'I documentation.
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I I 111. Illi:lCLIMRLY_ KNEW OlLS110tti.I IIAVE KNOWN" STANDAlll!
To impose a civil penalty ender the Modified Enforcement Policy, the Staff must prove that prior to the November 30.1985 deadlint, Alabama Power Company"clemly knew or should have known" of the lack of proper environmental qualification for the electrical equipment at issue in this enforcement action. As Alabama Power Company will establish in its Direct Written Testimony, the Stalf has failed to meet this burden. For each individual item of electrical equipment, Alabama Power Company witnesses will discuss in detail why l Alabama Power Company believed such item was qualified to 10 CFR 50.49 by the deadline or why such item did not require qualification.
Alabama Power Company will present a distinguished panel of witnesses to explain its case on each of the alleged violations still at issue. These witnesses include experts from 13echtel and Alabama Power Company who have had longstanding involvement in the evolution of EO issues. The Company's witnesses also willinclude two consultants in private employment who were i' '.ved in the EO program at the NRC prior to tlje November 3R 1985 deadline. Taken together, these well qualified witnesses presen, a stokingly clear picture of what Alabama Power Company " knew or should have known" prior to the deadline. Their perspective stands in stark contrast to the overly simplistic, after the fact view adopted by the Staff in the Notice of Violation, Order, and in their direct testimony.
For their part, the Staff presents no witness with the detailed. pre deadline EO qualifications of the Alabama Power Company witnesses, instead, the Staff relies on cursory l statements and the specious logic that because violations were found in 1987, then certainly Alabama Power Company should have known of these violations prior to the deadline. The I Staff witnesses point broadly in some cases to generic communications as a basis for its I .g.
" clearly should have known" findings, llowever,in these cases, the Company's witnesses will put those communications in proper perspective indicating that the Staff has taken liberties with the generic correspondence by reading entirely too much into those communications in order to support a " clearly should have known" finding, g Alabama Power Company's " clearly knew or should have known" argument also focuses on the Staf f's December 13,1984 Safety Evaluation Report, which concluded that I Farley Nuclear Plant was in compliance with 10 CFR $0.49. This document is a clear and l tangible indication of Alabama Power Company's pre deadline understanding of its compliance with the EO rule, it also clearly establishes what the Staff thought of Alabama I Power Company's EO program af ter auditing all of Alabama Power Company's qualification file.s and conducting mo on site inspections. Incredibly, the Staf f failed to mention this SER in its direct writtr. wstimony. Instead, the Staff considered only the alleged lack of documentation at Farley Nuclear Plant in 1987 to determine what Alabama Power Company must have known prior to the deadline, in sum, because the Statt has failed to identify persuasively why Alabama Power _
Company should have known of these alleged violations, no civil penalty should issue under the Modified Enforcement Policy.
IV. 110iAl.i.EGl?D V101AT10NS' LACK SAmY SLcNIFICANCl Alabama Power Company's witnesses also will show that none of the alleged I violations posed any significant threat to the public health and safety, and, therefore, under l Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act, cannot result in a civil penalty. (See Atlantic Engltrch Corporation, CL180 7,11 NRC 413 (1980).) The evidence in this case will show I that each item of equipment was at all times completely operational and capable of I 9
I performing its intended function in a post accident environment. To Alabama Power Company, this enforcement action can be reduced to a disagreement over engineering judgment between Alabama Power Company engineers and Staff investigators regarding the adequacy of the qualification documentation files. Once the Staff determined the files to l be inadequate, they equated lack of paper with actual safety significance and imposed a civil penalty. Alabama Power Company believes that this practice is inconsistent with sound I regulatoly policy, does not advance any public interest and is violative of Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act.
In addition, for certain of the alleged violations still in issue, the Staff has I inappropriately ignored Section 111 of its own Modified Enforcement Policy. To the extent documentation deficiencies existed during the inspection, and where those " deficiencies" involved little safety significance, Section ill of the Modified Enforcement Policy specifically calls for the " violation" to be treated outside the context of civil penalties if the licensee produced sufficient documentation during the inpction. As Alabama Power Company's y.
witnesses will show, for certain items of equipm t issue, Alabama Power Company had _
sufficient documentation to establish operability an.1/or qualification by the conclusion of the EO inspection at Farley Nuclear Plant. Not only did this documentation prove the
" deficiency" was insignificant, it also proved that the standards for EO documentation had g
been met. As a result, under Section 111 of the Modified Enforcement Policy, these
" violations" should Da have been treated as a basis for a civil penalty.
l Y. CONCI.USION .
Due to the Staff's failure to present .rsuasive' testimony on any of the issues I discussed above, the Staff has failed to meet hburden of proving that the $450,000 civil
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penalty is justified. Alabama Power Company therefore requests that this lloard withdraw the civil penalty at the conclusion of the enforcement hearing.
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/ / blf t.., q James 11. Miller,111 g lad L David A. Repka '/
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l COUNSEL FOR ALAllAMA POWER COMPANY OF COUNSEL:
I BALCil & BINGI-IAM James 11. Miller,111 I James 11. Hancock, Jr.
Post Office Box 306 Birmingham, Alabama 35201 (205) 251 8100 WINSTON & STRAWN David A. Repka 1400 L Street, N.W.
I Washington. D.C. 20005 3502 (202) 371 5700 I
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! g;- SAFFTY EVOI.VING G ISSUE NRC POSITION AND POSTTION ON QUALIFICAT10N SIGNIFICANT ISSUE i <
- .# L V-Spbces Not en Master List, not Such sphces are not requ
- red to be on the Master Lr.t. NRC SIsR in 1981 Not Yes.
i < qu Mied.- approved the Master 139 wittumt spieces temg hsted. NRC mspected
- ' interface L.aegrity in 19N0 without xlentifymg visiiatums or deviatnms. Smcc quaMutan No twso a s
! Okonite testmg prmed sphce materials quahSeit ~1." nef gured spbces pronlesi ty Wyle questa m quahfiable tused am engmeermg pdgnent This engmeermg paigment was toimg. termmatzms m confirmed by test til such sp6ces by Wyle test. 1985_
- 2. 5-to-1 Tape Not on Master List, not Such sphces are rmW reqmred in be un the M.nser List. NRC SERs m IMI No. Yes.
Spbces quahbed. approved the Master tjst wittumt si daces bemg bied. NRC mspected
, interface integrity in l'M1 wittamt edentifymg ndatums or devutsms. NRC Since guMed by Pronmstv SERs m 19ti3 stated Ilydropess Ren=nbmers were quahfied_ Westa.gtunne smulaney su tested ypriard. **,e testing siwh proved Ilydrogen Renesbnen were qtr.ddied was omducted sptwe_ an usue en tuing identa:atly camispered spin es. Olam.se tessmg prmed sptwe masertals 1*m3. ;
, , ened at FFF were quahfied. lherciore sphces med at FNP were quahfied 1 by similarity.
< 3. Termmai Bk<ks in Documentation does exit NRC knew as canty as IWM cat FNP med termuut bksks in No. Yes
!. Imtrumentation derrumstrate terminal m>trumentatim ornuts. Frankhn armi NRC was agam miormed <4 this une Circuit bkwks would manatain in 1983 am! ft> nd termmal bkwks en mstrument nrctats so be quahfactL Artafys s has >!==n Instrument i acceptaNe instrument The cimcerns axumented en IN M-47 were addrened during the 1/1ist that terremnal bksks acruracy asson j accuracy. meetmg with the NRC Staff and axumented an the 2/2n* ictier from ==mk2 rwst & grade m em.hed J APCo to NRC The NRC 12/11H4 SER pniended anurance that the the pom =here g44nt cemsalerab9 resolutkm to this issue was acceptable to NRC operators ut=k! be post-deadime. ,
- maled. l i Termmal bkxks used m terrumentaram oremts are quah6ed at FNP samt the termmal bhxks wouki mamtain aneptable imtrument accuracy durmg the portions i4 the design trases events where operator actams were l
! necessary. Sami another way, the instruments asmcsated wuh the termma!
- t*xks in questum are not reqered dureag the g=wthm of the design basis events when unaaeptaNe imtrument acuracy coukt be apased.
- Operator acthms, based im these smtrunntnts. are ma reymred durmg grak advene ctmtainment umditmms.
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ISSUli NRC POSITION APO) K JSI110N ON QUAE 11 R'ATK)N SIGN!! K 'AN I i thM JI!
4 R.tyche m/Chwu iMe d:d not der vmstrate The bic adequattiv documented the qua:Caten oft N R.4g* nOmo No Yes Seah quahfecation. Ede dvJ scals arsed m Nanxo bmit swrit het to CI R $n 49. IM )R Gmdehnes arw!
conuder ;> ssible NURilG45M aik=s qual.ficaten usmg partul tesung and an.dgn. As Rr,sen m osu 3 seah were chcrmcal smeracten. steh. APCo tud Raythem testeg stW.: quahhrd the heat >hrmk breakout are qu M ed quam rd hut en FNP parameter > (raeuten. temperature. humday. themu! spr.r/ ! .htmwnta? n testmg t4 Outu A cement, whah quahteed it.n reatertd to INP parattrten whwn: un lcr (radiaten oMy. um e prottcted 13 Raythtm im and pape mpple), and 14.' or Iw?
APCnIkchte: testmg of Raghem tmt and Ch,cn A term nt when sned in standar h combmation wb* h proved that t!w comf una!"n would rot fad when i sulJeeted to prenure ia proNem akntdvd 17 Raythem and (*u; hated at I j I I '
FNP wittuut the Ont o tut kirW
- 5. 1 :mm n que T- bmmnque MOVs are l Umrtorque ic>ted MOW %eh . th an unho.. nm T draum he ven. lM hs i t>ra ns not quaused wahow yp& taken together m a:hr-ed ty to C1 R 50 41 err ek,w twr est- I drams. actw3ent a.rxhtaen and adequate!y demmstrate out T4 ham are ret W)W are qward Iisme o~hed acquired to ensure that bnutorque MOVs w.1: perform therr emer.ded uirthout sut h t%ms at aber dc.Jne sdery-reLited f untte.mv I arky %Aar PLmt i
n U mnorque Insta: e t compments not APCo h.4 ravm..hk awar. rxe ttut it< Mov m s cest o, were quau<d No. Ye s.
T er mmal rdenteud to that tested NRC adicated th.,e IN NL72 appkJ so MOW emdh-d ty third parts ,
lhks IN 83 72 hid base serr brs. APCo had ternwes 08 um!ornunte to a; propsute teu repe rrts Wre n remiNe N. ) him 1 > !
prompted waikdown. f rom Urmtorque, approprare res erpt mpte m, as =ril .n NRC .utepted esura we that M('an . dent:t y Mh es:, $
QC and QA programs APCo therettue tud ewrv reaum a tdeve ttut. wund h.rve prrt.nmed MOV rnternah I (1) Immtmi,ue MOW wpphed to I NP mcre the MOV, that were speutied. micnded f ur4 twm. pru r to (2) the MOW spcded. received, and antar!cd me the s me m the dea %oc.
MOW tested. and (3) :he MOVs =tre approptuidy insta!1cd. 13.tsed on ,
thrs akm(, at the :tme f 6t IN Mi-72 was wtd. APCo had suhrnt !
a3surante truet IN SL72 dd ret apph to lhP. M-wemer. er must f.e rs rrd that m pts 6 (atter the deadhr$e). NRC nsord IN w4tl wrm ermeg unquaht.ed Lemitorque mtern.d wirn; T bn ont pra mpt thsswmNy evpc wand wns at l'NP. Ad<hturuity, wwe the NRC Statt terr.uned from y escalated enhrrtement on the subyest frtaux si m.n tur tkar tfut bi ensco ,
sh.mid hase krewn of the tmtern and um e :he nae <rud .rmg of conurn ,
f to IN A03 termnutts on the th b of o% tin fxte. we lebeie tbn ta be j
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. SAIEIY EVOEVING ISSUE NRC POSITION - APCO POSfTION ON QUAlli ICATION - SIGNillCANT , !%UE O 6. (Commurd) clear evalence that Iaensees (inchalmg APCo) camma meet the
- dearly
]. should have knowtf starstard estaMe.hed ty the NRC in the Mothroed i
Poiry whwh must be sarnfaed before a cied penalty can he emposed.
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- 7. Gems Irvel Nn quahfied without Sec h I for V-spbee discusshwn. law nt mnsmg sdictme cd is at an EO lh Yes.
- Transmitter sdacune al or with V. program defwiency. The EO prtsram cataldahed that the mamtenance splice. program =tzsid address EO matters (et, perishc repixement, necessary Nat swimary meam of Mamtenance gasket replacements, installatim, m acenedance =ch venkw mstructum -AL g frtmi R%3T was ww an EO manuals, etc.). Furttermore, maintenance related to EQ cimiguments to cimaamment susep. essue prww to
- assumes that non-FO mamtena re actr reies (c4,cahbrathms) are EO de*Lne-j perkwmed. As such,if maintenance actreaties are saw pedsmed, a m no way imphcases the EO png; ram. Moreswer, thex transmaa rs are quahfaed to perform thest safety-tclased fanciam snimma sdem =L This is Nsed ort the absence of salcty-erlated functim e-4 tree trama.aters.
H. Premium RB Unqualdsed or mhed Grease serves amly a mechamcal compement subtraemm functawt As such, NL N>.
Grease grease (not identical to a cannot perform any cicctrical Iunctanit. Sece in CFR Sn49 clemly only
, tested). . requires quat.rcatum of electrical compmeras ty test or semitarwy. the use Grease used was issue cadwd 3' of a ddlererrt grease fremt that tewed catwnw be the satyxt of a fee under equnakne se that after deadinc.
a policy applicahic to ths rule. The venaar speciscaDy pates that an W amt t.ater slmme j equivalent grease is accepable. Tesacu Premnsm RB pesw as eqwvaient so be fuDy spuhfei
- j to the vetukw.recrm.metukd pease. Mornwer. P:rmmm RB pease was j Later shown to be fully quahfacd (cwn thoesgh such quahfacasim is sus
}- required). Moraner, the mimmg of greax, even alwwsgh mw an ideal j practice, den vast prevent the pease frems performmg ins meended j- lubncatkm fimctm i
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I t et i n t' UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v*C NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l '92 fE010 P2 :52 IlEOBE'lllE.AIO)ilC SAFETY AND 1ICENSING i's Gi,c! llOJ1Q D ,. i 4 ;@ 4 In the Matter of: )
I ALABAMA POWER COMPANY
)
)
Docket Nos. 50 348 CivP 50 364 CivP
)
l (Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2)
)
) ASLilP No. 91626-02 CivP I GRTIFICATF OE.SEIO'LG I 1 hereby certify that copies of the ' PRE IIEARING L1RIEF OF ALAllAMA POWER COMPANY"in the above captioned proceeding have been served on the following by Federal Express as indicated by an asterisk, or otherwise through deposit in First Class United States Mail, this 31st day of January,1992:
G. Paul Hollwerk,111 James 11. Carpenter Administsalive Judge Administrative Judge Atomic Safety and Liccasiag Board Atomic Safety and Licensing Iloard U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 Peter A. Morris Eugene J. lloller, Esq.*
Administrative Judge Office of the General Counsel 10825 South Glen Road U. S. Nuclear Regulatog Commission Potomac, Maryland 20854 Washington, D.C. 20555 Office of the Secretary (2) Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Panel Washington, D.C. 20555 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l Attn: Docketing and Service Section Washington, D.C. 20555 Adjudicatory File (2) Office of Commission Appellate Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
-l U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Adjudication U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555
Mr. W. G. Ilairston,111 itegional Administrator Southern Nuclear Operating Comnany, U S. Nuclear Itegulatory Commission. .
I Inc, Post Office llox 1295 Birmingham, Alabama 35201 llegion 11 101 Marietta Street i
Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 James Lieberman, Director l Office of linforcement U. S. Nuclear llegulatory Cornmission Washington, D.C. 20555 I /
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James 11. Miller,111 Counsel for Alabama Power Company lI iI i
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