ML20092B439
| ML20092B439 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Byron  |
| Issue date: | 05/31/1984 |
| From: | Cahn R, Dick C, Jordan C BECHTEL GROUP, INC. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20092B432 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8406200216 | |
| Download: ML20092B439 (200) | |
Text
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BYRON STATION l
I INDEPENDENT DESIGN REVIEW FOR COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY l
I INTERIM REPORT MAY 1984 l
BECHTEL POWER CORPORATION
$$86%88EA'ol$88is4 PDR G
i i
i BYRON STATION INDEPENDENT DESIGN REVIEW FOR C0!NONWEALTH EDISON C0f4PANY.
INTERIf4 REPORT 4
BECHTEL POWER CORPORATION
!%Y 1984 (1097o)-
Y k
This report is submitted on behalf of the IDR team by the Level Internal Review Committee.
L Submitted by:
R. S. Cahn C. W. dor n Licensing Electri 1 Sy tems Leader Bechtel - San Francisco Bechtel - S Francisco
=nm C. W. Dicif G. L. Parkinson
~ Project Manager Deputy Project Manager Bechtel - San Francisco Bechtel - San Francisco k aA E. M. Hughes N R. S. Powell CCW Systems Leader ESW Systems Leader Bechtel - Ann Arbor Bechtel - San Francisco Concurrence by:
P. Karpa Manager of Engineering SPC - San Francisco (10970)
l TABLE OF C0llTENTS Section Ti t1e Page ilumber
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EXECUTIVE SlHMARY fii 1 INTRODUCTI0ll 1 1.1 Purpose 1 1.2 Scope 1 1.3 Description of the Review and Status 3 1.4 Organization and Staffing 5 1.5 Activities 5 1.6 Schedule 6 1.7 Definitions 6 2 OBSERVATI0llS AllD RESOLUTI0llS 8 2.1 Observation Reports ,
8 2.2 Component Cooling Water (CCW) System 0 2.3 Essential Service Water (ESW) System 9 2.4 DC Class 1E Distribution System 15 2.5 Common Requirements 17 2.6 General Assessments 18 3 PROGRAM 20 3.1 Review for Identification / Implementation of 20 Commitments and Criteria 3.2 Review of Design Adequacy 21 3.3 Review of the Design Process 22 3.4 Review of Design Interfaces with Westinghouse (!() 22 and Nuclear Power Services (llPS) 3.5 Review of Design Change Control 23 3.6 Review of Sargent & Lundy Design Review 24 i
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t TABLE OF CONTENJS '(Cont)
I Section Title Page Appendices A COMPONENT COOLING WATER (CCW) SYSTEll A-1 Identification / Implementation of Commitments A.1 -1 and Criteria -
A-2 Design Adequacy A.2-1 A-3 Adequacy of Design Process A.3-1 A-4 Design Interfaces with Westinghouse (W) and -
A.4-1 Nuclear Power Services A-5 Design Change Control A. 5-1 B ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER (ESW) SYSTEM B-1 Identification / Implementation of Comnitments B.1-1 and Criteria B-2 Design Adequacy B . 2-1 B-3 - Adequacy of Design. Process B.3-1 B-4 Design Interfaces with Westinghouse (W) and B.4-1 Nuclear Power Services B-5 Design Change Control B.5-1 B-6 Sargent & Lundy (S&L) Design Reviews B.6-1 C DC DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM C-1 Identification / Implementation of Commitments C .1 -1 and Criteria C-2 Design Adequacy C.2-1 C-3 Adequacy of Design Process C.3-1 C-4 Design Interfaces with Westinghouse (W) and ~
C.4-1 Nuclear Power Services C-5 Design Change Control C.5-1 C-6 Sargent & Lundy (S&L) Design Reviews C.6-1 D COMMON REQUIREMENTS D-1 Identification / Implementation of Commitments D.1 -1 and Criteria D-2 Design Adequacy D.2-1 D-3 Adequacy of Design Process D.3-1 D-5 Design Change Control 0.5-1 E PROGRAll PLAN F LIST OF GENERAL HEETIllGS II (1097o)
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l EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
Background
This Interim Report, dated May 1984, covers the initial phase of work performed under the Independent Design Review (IDR) for the Byron Generating Station, Units 1 and 2, of Commonwealth Edison Company. The purpose of this review is to provide an additional level of confidence in the adequacy of the design of the Byron Station by Sargent & Lundy Engineers (S&L).
Under die IDR, Bechtel Power Corporation has been engaged to review the design by S&L of three selected safety systems for adherence to design requirements, for technical adequacy, for the design process, and to draw broader conclusions as appropriate.
The systems selected for review are the essential service water (ESW) system, the component cooling water (CCW) system, and die 125 Volt (V) de distribution system. Included in the review are facilities for supporting and enclosing the systems (e.g., structures), for serving the systems (e.g., electric power supply and control systems), and safeguard requirements for protecting the systems against external effects (e.g., fire protection).
The IDR is being perferned Ly a dedicated team of qualified personnel, in accordance wi'.h the Bechtel Program Plan dated April.1984. The Plan includes d' an approved quality assurance program.
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Plans and Activities The IDR effectively began on April 17, 1984. It is expected that the work will be completed and a final report submitted by July 31, 1984.
A strategy was chosen whereby the selected systems would initially be reviewed on an overall basis to determine which areas should receive greatest attention. These areas will be reviewed in greater depth in the latter stages of the IDR.
Work completed and reflected in this Interim Report covers the initial overall review and some detailed investigations. During this time, the IDR team expended approximately 6000 total manhours and reviewed more than 570 documents.
The remaining work entails completing review work in progress, analysis of unresolved matters, and identification and assessment of the remaining areas for in-depth review.
Resul ts To date, a total of 13 potential Observations has been identified. These are listed on Table 1 and status identified. Eight of these were ruled valid and forwarded as Observation Reports to S&L for response. Five were determined not valid by the Level-1 Internal Review Committee, based on careful consideration of the scope of the IDR and interpretation of the Byron commitments and design. Of the eight valid Observations, four are considered iv (1097o) c 1
essentially resolved on the basis of responses and corrective action proposed by S&L. Four are still under review, awaiting further information from S&L and assessment by the IDR team.
None of the Observations is regarded as safety significant at present.
Further, there are no negative trends evident in the Observations.
To develop the eight Observations, 542 points of evaluation were assessed.
The overall work was generally found to reflect accepted professional standards as to technical adequacy and the design process. ,
Conclusions V1til the review is complete, only limited conclusions can be drawn and even these must be regarded as tentative. However, the review work covered by this report tends to confirm the adequacy of the design of the Byron Station. This confidence relates primarily to the three systems reviewed, but the nature of the results suggests that similar conclusions could be drawn for other areas ,
of the S&L design.
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I TABLE 1 LISTING AND STATUS OF POTENTIAL OBSERVATIONS Potential Observation Report flo. Subject Status 8.1 SRV Discharge Path Response accepted / closed-out 8.2 Column Baseplate Thickness Under review 8.3 Alarms for Makeup Pump Response accepted / closed-out f 0.4 Burial Depth of ESW Pipes Response accepted / closed-out 8.5 Seismic Analysis for Screenhouse Under review 8.6 Valve Disc Requirements Response accepted / closed out j 8.7 Valve Classification Determined invalid 8.8 Valve Testing Determined invalid 8.9 Isolation Devices in 125 V dc Under review System 8.10 Battery Capacity Under review 8.11 Battery T0nperature Environment Determined invalid 8.12 DC Short Circuit Calculations Determined invalid 8.13 CCW System Isolation Determined invalid vi (10970)
i Section i INTRODUCTION 1.1 PURPOSE Comonwealth Edison Company (Ceco) has requested Bechtel Power Corporation (BPC) to conduct an independent design review (IDR) of the Byron Station, Units 1 and 2. The purpose of this IDR is to provide an additional level of confidence in the design of the Byron Station through a review of selected systems and the design process employed by the architect / engineer, Sargent and Lundy Engineers (S&L).
This Interim Report covers the IDR progress from its beginning on ,
April 17,1984 through May 31, 1984.
1.2 SCOPE The scope of the IDR is to review the following three systems:
component cooling water (CCW), essential service water (ESW) and Class 1E 125 V de distribution. The system boundaries are as generally described in the FSAR. The review covers only that design work done by Sal as well as their interfaces with others performing design work, such as Westinghouse (W) and Nuclear Power Services (NPS).
Included in the review, as applicable to the three systems, are mechanical process (1097o)
- i. design; piping design, including. stress analysis; electrical design; instrumentation and control systems design; civil / structural design; heating, ventilating and air conditioning (HVAC) design; support design
. for piping, electrical conduits and trays, and HVAC ducts; equipment and valve qualification; relevant nuclear engineering; and other design considerations, such as fire protection and high and moderate energy line breaks (HELB and IELB). The design of Unit 2 is reviewed to the
- extent appropriate to assure that common systems are adequate and the quality of design is consistent with that of Unit 1.
The scope of work for the three systems is as follows:
- 1. Identification / implementation of comitments and criteria;
- 2. Design adequacy;
- 3. Adequacy of the S&L design process, including evaluations of engineering judgements and assumptions, use of standard design
- methods and the adequacy of the documentation of design calculations;
- 4. S&L design interfaces with Westinghouse and NPS;
- 5. Design change control; and
- 6. S&L design reviews.
Construction verification is not included in the scope of the IDR.
The IDR essentially covered S&L design work completed through April 1, 1984, but some S&L work in progress was considered after this date.
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l.3 DESCRIPTI0ll 0F THE REVIElf AtJD STATUS ,
The program was structured to review design requirements, design adequacy and the design process, and then to make overall assessments based on these system reviews. The strategy for the IDR is to perform an initial review consisting of an overview, taken to an appropriate depth to identify those areas that should be reviewed further, flajor emphasis is placed on the adegaacy of the design of the final product.
The IDR work, to date, is described in detail in Appendices A, B, C and D. The basic scope and methodology of program tasks is given in Appendix E (Program Plan) as are the team organitation, strategies employed and the quality program.
e The status of the areas under review, cross-referenced to the Program Plan, is shown on Table 2. !!ost of the work should be regarded as still in progress. Where work is shown as not included, it is intended that this be performed prior to completion of the IDR.
To date, the level of effort has been significant, flore than 570 documents have been reviewed, and almost 6000 manhours have been expended by the IDR team (most of these in direct-review activities).
Results, from a count of items in the Appendices, indicate approximately 542 points of evaluation were completed. In addition, an important number of items is now under review and partially completed.
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F TABLE 2 CROSS-REFERENCE BETWEEN ACTIVITIES IN PROGRAM PLAN AND INTERIM REPORT Key X - Area included in report Program Plan Task 0 - Area not included in report NA - Not applicable Design Require- Design Design General Report Section ment Adequacy Process Assessment Interim Report (text) '
X i
Appendix A,(CCW System)
A-1 X A-2 X A-3 X
- f. A-4 X A-5 _
X A-6 0 Appendix B (ESW System)
B-1 X B-2 X B-3 X B-4 X B-5 X B-G X Appendix C (DC System)
C-1 X C-2 X C-3 X C-4 X C-5 X C-6 X Appendix D (Common Req.)
D-1 X D-2 X D-3 X D-4 IIA D-5 X D-6 . 0 (10970)
l.4 ORGANIZATION AND STAFFING The personnel comprising the 10R team are qualified engineering personnel, primarily from BPC's San Francisco Power Division. A listing of these team members is included in Appendix E. Addi t'ional ,
short-term assistance is provided by specialists from the San Francisco Power Division and Corporate management.
Staffing of the IDR team is designed to meet the CECO requirements for independence as specified in the lotter dated April 12, 1984 from Messrs. D.R. Shelton and R.E. VanDerway to ifr. P. Karpa.
1.5 ACTIVITIES Initially, the Byron Station FSAR was sent to San Francisco, and the IUR team began reviewing it during the week of April 11, 1984. On April 17, 1984, a kick-off meeting was held in the S&L offices in Chicago attended by representatives fro:n CECO, S&L and Dechtel. The purpose of this meeting was to familiarize the IDR team with S&L's organization, and the S&L personnel responsible for designing the systems being reviewed; to provide an overview of the systems being reviewed, and the job status; and to clarify and reach agreement on the <
scope of the IDR and how it was to be conducted.
On April la,1984 the IDR team members met with their S&L counterparts for further orientation regarding available design information.
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Specific design documents were selected for the IDR team to review in Chicago during the week of April 23, 1984. The IDR team spent April 23-27,1984 in Chicago, and then made subsequent ~ trips to the S&L offices, as necessary, to review documents and meet directly with S&L personnel. Some members of the IDR team visited the Byron jobsite during the weeks of April 23, 1984 and May 7,1984 to meet with S&L site personnel and to review their design process, their interface with the S&L office in Chicago, and their interface with NPS. A list of general meetings is shown in Appendix F.
Communications and cooperation with the S&L organization are excellent.
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l.6 SCHEDULE Th'e total IDR team effort will span approximately 3-1/2 months. The schedule requires an interim report to be submitted by May 31, 1984 and a final report to be submitted by approximately July 31, 1984.
1.7 DEFINITIONS Observation - A condition wherein the IDR, Level-1 Committeo believes there is a failure to meet licensing commitments or other safety-related design requirements Potential Observation Report - A preliminary internal report for the documentation of an observation (1097o)
Observation Report - Level-1 Internal Review Committee documentation of its evaluation of an Observation Resolution Report - Documentation of the resolution of an Observation Completion Report - Documentation of action taken (disposition) to complete the review effort associated with an Observation Level-1 Internal Review Committee - A committee made up of key IDR tean members Level-2 Internal Review Committee - A committee made up of senior members of Bechtel Power Corporation who are not part of the IDR team f
Safety Significant Condition - A condition confirmed to exist which results in a loss of safety function to the extent that there is a major reduction in the degree of protection provided to public health 1
and safety 4
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Section 2 OBSERVATIONS AND RESOLUTIONS 2.1 OBSERVATION REPORTS The IDR team has issued Observation Reports (0Rs) for items which either uniquely affect the system or other review area, or are of a
. general nature. Each OR is summarized below, its significance noted, and a status of resolution described. The ors have been numbered to correspond to the project file system, which begins numbering when a potential Observation is issued. The gaps in the sequence are due to Potential ors determined invalid but which are Ifsted elsewhere in this report. ,
2.2 COMPONENT COOLING WATER (CCW) SYSTEM i
Observation Report 8.1 Observation:
FSAR Section 9.2.2.4.1 inconsistently describes the CCW surge tank relief valve as discharging to the chemical and volume control system (CVCS) waste recycle holdup tank. In the as-issued design, the relief l valve actually and properly discharges to the chromated drains portion of the auxiliary butiding equipment drain system.
The Observation is not safety significant, based on adequacy of the existing design.
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Resolution:
Sal has responded to state that the FSAR is being revised to indicate that the CCW surge tank relief valve discharges to the chromated drain system.
This resolution is acceptable to the IDR team and the item is closed out.
L 2.3 ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER (ESW) SYSTEM Observation Report 8.2 Observation:
A review of the calculations for the river screenhouse structural steel indicated that a column baseplate may be overstressed. There appeared to be a potential that the baseplate in an overstressed condition could affect the structural stability of the column and baseplate connections. S&L was asked to provide calculations to justify the adequacy of the existing base plate and to evaluate the impact of this Observation on all other column base plate designs.
Based on information available, die Observation is regarded as not safety significant, because further calculations will be forthcoming, and these are expected to confirm adequacy.
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Resolution:
S&L has reviewed the base plate design for Column A-1 and provided the IDR team with a recent calculation which is based on the final design configuration and confirmed the adequacy of the base plate. S&L has i
also provided in their calculation the application of the AISC formula for calculating base plate thickness. Prior to completion of the IDR, S&L will also confirm the adequacy of the other base plates in the river screenhouse, and provide their assessment to the IDR team.
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. Pending completion of review of all calculations by the IDR team, this issue is regarded as still under review.
Observation Report 0.3 1
Observation:
An auto fail-to-start alann has not been inplemented for the ESW makeup l pumps as described in FSAR Section 9.2.5.5. Two alarms identified as engine trouble alarm and start alarm in the control room are believed sufficient for the operator to detect pump failure to start.
The Observation is not safety significant, based on adequacy of the existing design. l Resolution:
S&L has responded to state that the F5t,R is being revised to identify the alarms in the control room associated with the ESW makeup pump l
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diesels. Annunciation is transmitted to the control room indicating engine trouble, auto-start, and auto-trip for each engine.
This response is acceptable to the IDR team and the item is closed out.
Ob:ervation Report 8.4 Observation:
There appears to be an inconsistency between a statement in the FSAR (Response to Question 10.8) and an S&L calculation regarding the burial depth of the ESW makeup lines. The FSAR response to Question 10.8 states that those lines are buried a minimum of 25 foot below grade while the S&L calculation indicates a depth of 16.5 foot. If the 25-foot depth of the ESW piping is necessary to maintain piping integrity during a soismic event, burial of the pipo to a lessor depth could affect this integrity. However, it is stated in the response to FSAR Question 10.21 that a seismic event will havo no adverso effect upon the ESW buried lines, and it seems likely that there is a discrepancy in the FSAR.
This Observation is not regarded as safety significant, based on the FSAR response to Question 10.21, and the Itkelihood that it represents acceptable design.
Rosolution:
S&L responded that the 25-foot depth indicated in Question 10.8 is not correct. Question 10.21 providos drawings identifying the depth of the ESW piping. S&L reviewed their calculations and datormined that tho (1097o)
calculations are consistent with the depth information provided on drawings included in response to Question 10.21. The response to Question 10.8 will be revised to indicate that the question has boon answered by the response to Question 10.21. The IDR accepts this i
resolution.
Observation Report 0.5 Observation:
In 1901, the seismic response analysis of the river scroonhouse was revised as the result of NRC FSAR Questions 130.9 and 130.9A dealing with soil modeling. The revised seismic spectra and resulting loads woro higher than thoso of the provfoJs design analysis. Although the structural stool design of the river scroonhouse was reviewed for the now loads, there has boon no evidenco provided that the reinforced concreto portions of this structure woro reviewed for the revised building soismic responta. Also, the same situation holds true for the piping and equipment components.
Since the revised seismic analysis of the river scroonhouse resulted in higher loads, verification of the building structural integrity, and for the components, is appropriato. Otherwise, there is an olomont of uncertainty in mooting commitments.
This Observation has Ilmited significanco, sinco it portains only to the river scroonhouso. Other Seismic Category I structures are founded on rock, where a combination of responsos from both the finito (10970)
l element a2d soil spring approaches was not a licensing requirement. !
And finally, the S4L system provides for routinely making reviews for such analysis.
Resolution:
{
S4L responded that a comparison of the results of the shearwall -
analysis from the finite element and soil spring approaches had boon made, as evidenced by the response to Question 130.9. Also, as evidenced by the response to Question 130.9a, ne modifications to the concrete structure were judged to be required. However, the extent of reviews and related judgements on the concrete structure and equipment l components is not clear to the IDR team from examining those question responses and other material provided. To confirm these judgements, S&L has provided additional design calculations which woro made to review the original river screcr.h:use design using the envelope spectra based on the half-space (soil spring) and finite element methods for soil-structure interaction.
Pending completion of the review of the calculations, this item is regarded as still under review but the IDR team tentatively concurs with the S&L statement.
Observation Report 8.6 Observation:
In FSAR Question 110.57, the flRC requirco that floto 4 of FSAR Tablo ;
i 3.9-9 be expanded to show.that valve discs will not fail if subjected top (max). The response to the FSAR Question states that the table is l
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intended to cover valve pressure boundary items as defined by ASfE l Sect. !!!, BAPV Code which does not include valve discs. This ;
statement is in conflict with NC-2110(b) which states that "the term pressure retaining material as used in this subsection applies to I
... valve bodies, bonnets, and discs." Failure of the valve disc in the closed position could be a violation of the pressure boundary.
This Observation is not regarded as safety significant, since the ,
response to Question 110.57 also cites extensive hydrostatic testing at pressures to ensure leak-tightness. Also, experience indicates that the valve disks are not expected to fail. '
Resolution:
S&L responded that FSAR Table 3.9-9 is based on AS!!E Section !!!, ;
Subsection NC, Table NC-3521-1, which was added in the Winter 1976 Addendum. Note 3 of Table NC-3521-1 states " Design requirements listed ,
in this table are not applicable to valve discs..." Further, this ;
table is not intended to define the presture toundary components of the valve. The Dyron/Braidwood procurement specifications for Category I [
valves define the pressure boundary components which include the valve disc. SAL proposed that Note 4 of Table 3.9-9 would be revised to agree with the wording in Table NC-3521-1, and the phrase "...or otherwise not part of the pressure boundary..." will be deletod. Also, the response to Question 110.57 was accepted by the NRC and nood not be revised.
The procurement specifications include the disc as a pressure boundary ,
part; therefore, thf s response is acceptable and the item is closed out.
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h
The 125 Y de safety-related (SR) control center has two nonsafety-related (NSR) components (undervoltage relay and ground f detector recording voltmeter). Circuits to these components are isolated from the SR bus by one interrupting device actuated by fault
! current. The Byron FSAR constitment (Table 8.1-1 and Appendix A Reg.
Guide 1.75) is to of ther provide two inter opting devices, actuated by fault current, ir series, or one interrupting device actuated by safety I injection cefncident with a loss of offsite power signal. ;
I Although the design does not strictly satisfy the FSAR commitment, this observation does on' t have safety s gnificance. The failure of the isolation device coincident with a fault in the associated NSR circuit will only result in the loss of a single train of the 125 Y de system.
- The redundant trafn will perfom to required safety functions.
Resolution:.
54L responded that their letter to General Electric Company dated I April 19,1978 documents that Sergent & Lundy approved thf s app 1tcation; however, the basis for this approval is not documented. t An acceptable alternative to the documentation is to provide an analysis that demonstrates that the appitcation of the non-Class IE :
components does not degrade the Class It circuits below an acceptable l
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I level. Prior to the completion of the IDR, an analysis will be !
i' providea to verify that the designed appitcation of the non-Class IE components does not degrade the Class IE circutts below an acceptable level.
Whfle awaiting receipt of the forthcoming analysis, this item is regarded as still under review.
l Observation ReMrt 8.10 i
1 Observation:
The design process associated with the 125 V de system does not document veriffcation of the actual loads connected to the battery.
The verf fication of the actual battery loads is necessary to verify the I
duty cycle used in the battery staing design calculation. Wf thout this vert fication, there is an element of uncertainty in the final design. !
$4L responded that load tabulations providing vertfication of all dc ,
system loads (f.e., control valve, auxilf ary relay, and indicating If ght loads) are not available. Also, the Sergent a Lundy destgn Process does include other procedures that vertfy that the battery has sufficient capactty to energize the de system loads.
This Observation is not presently considered as safety significant, because of other information forthcoming, and the evidence of procedures and actions to review battery loads.
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Resolution:
Load tabulations for various plant operating conditions will be provided by $4L to the IDR team in order to be able to confirm the i design.
While awaiting receipt of the forthcoming analysis, this item is regarded as still under evaluation.
4 2.5 CO M N REQUIREMENTS 2.5.1 Hf gh Energy Line Breaks / Moderate Energy Line Breaks (HELB/NELB)
No Observation Reports for items resulting from consideration of HELB/MLB effects on the systems in the IDR scope have been issued.
2.5.2 Fire Protection No Observation Reports for items resulting from consideration of the
, adequacy of fire protection for the s/ stems in the IDR scope have been issued.
2.5.3 Other No Observation Reports for items resulting from consideration of the other comon requirements, such as design change control and separation ,
requirements, have been issued. ,
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2.6 GENERAL ASSESSMENTS Due to the incomplete status of the IDR, and the Observation Reports not closed-out, it is premature to draw general Observations or conclusions at this time. However, based on the Observations and the overall review performed thus far, there are no trends or patterns of problems in design adequacy, nor any general breakdowns in the overall design process. The Observations are of relatively minor, random discrepancies and seem mostly to relate to questions of documentation.
All the Observations reported to date have been initially assessed as not significant to safety. Several of the Observations involve inconsistencies between documents, or FSAR commitments that are not literally met. However, the basic elements of the FSAR commitments appear to be met. Also, some Observations require additional information to be provided by S&L. Although the review of some of these is still ongoing, the existing evidence permits the Level-1 j
Internal Review Committee to tentatively agree that the Observations are not important to safety.
These conclusions are primarily applicable to the three systems within the scope of the IDR. However the nature of the Observations suggests that similar conclusions could be drawn for other areas of the S&L design. The overall work was generally found to reflect accepted professional standards as to technical adequacy and the design process.
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i Accordingly, the results of the IDR review work covered by this Interim .
Report tend to confirm the adequacy of the design of the Byron Station.
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Section 3 PROGRAM 3.1 REVIEW FOR IDENTIFICATION / IMPLEMENTATION OF COMMITMENTS AND CRITERIA One of the f!rst tasks of the IDR program was to review the Byron FSAR i and other pertinent documents to determine and identify licensing commitments and safety-related design requirements applicable to the systems selected for review. In addition to the FSAR, a review was made of the Byron SER (NUREG-0867, Feb.1982), the Fire Protection Report, and the Environmental Report. As a result of these initial reviews, a set of conmitment lists was developed and are reflected in Appendices A-1, B-1, C-1 and D-1. These lists were used by the various IDR team members to form the basis for determining if the Byron system designs meet the specified licensing connitments and design :
requirements. Commitment reviews for selected safety requirements j common to the three selected systems, such as fire protection and pipe break, were also made and used by the IDR team. From the commitment lists, selected design requirements were evaluated for proper implementation. Requirements considered significant by the reviewer or for which a specific concern had been expressed were verified. In addition, when an individual reviewer determined that there were appropriate commitments in addition to those listed, the implementation of these commitments was pursued as appropriate.
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i Various design documents were reviewed to verify the implementation of design requirements. These documents included, but were not limited to, drawings, calculations, specifications, Project correspondence, and
- vendor documents. The methodology used to identify design requirements is given in Task-1 in Appendix E (Program Plan).
3.2 REVIEW 0F DESIGN ADEQUACY Selected design documents for the three systems were reviewed for -
adequacy in meeting licensing and safety-related design requirements.
The total system design was reviewed including mechanical, nuclear, control and instrumentation, electrical and civil / structural aspects.
Portions of other systems that service the three selected systems, and E
other systems or accident effects that can affect the selected systems are also included in the IDR. Accordingly, the scope' includes
[ auxiliary steel for support structures, electrical power and controls that uniquely serve a selected system, HVAC that must maintain a required environment for a selected system component, fire protection, and high energy line breaks / medium energy line breaks (HELB/MELB).
Documents reviewed include design criteria, calculations, drawings, procurement specifications, ASME Section III Design Specifications and vendor-furnished infonnation.
The methodology used to review for design adequacy is detailed under Task-2 in Appendix E.
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, The results of the review for design adequacy are shown in Appendices A-2, B-2; C-2 and D-2, 3.3 REVIEW 0F THE DESIGN PROCESS Selected documents for the three systems are being reviewed for adequacy of the design process used in the final design. Where procedural requirements were not available, the actual process is evaluated to determine the extent to which the design is adequately ccitrolled. The' documents reviewed include those related to design criteria, calculations, drawings,. specifications and design change control.
The methodology used to review the adequacy of the design process is given in detail under Task-3 in Appendix E.
The results of the review for adequacy of the design process are shown in Appendices A-3, B-3, C-3 and D-3.
3.4 REVIEW 0F DESIGN INTERFACES WITH WESTINGHOUSE (W) AND NUCLEAR POWER l
SERVICES (NPS)
The design interfaces between S&L and Westinghouse and between S&L and NPS, as applicable to the three systems, were reviewed to determine the
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adequacy of control by S&L of the flow of design information that passes between them and the other two organizations. Included in this review are the implementation of Westinghouse requirements with the S&L design, and evidence that S&L requirements were incorporated in the NPS designs. The adequacy of the Westinghouse and NPS designs was excluded from this review. In general, the methodology used for this review was similar to that used for the review of adequacy of the design process.
The results of the review of design interfaces with Westinghouse and NPS are shown in Appendices A-4, B-4 and C-4.
3.5 REVIEW 0F DESIGN CHANGE CONTROL The S&L procedures associated with the control of design changes were reviewed to detennine the adequacy of control and compliance with Quality Assurance Program requirements. Selected design documents were reviewed to determine the adequacy of revision control.
The methodology used to review design change control is covered under Task-3 in Appendix E, Program Plan.
The results of the review of design change control are shown in Appendix D-5.
(1097o)
3.6 REVIEW 0F SARGENT & LUNDY DESIGN REVIEW S&L internal review reports were examined to assess the effectiveness of the S&L design review for the three systems and the review process in general. The methodology used for this review is similar to that used for the review of adequacy of the design process.
The results of the review of S&L design reviews are shown in Appendices B-6 and C-6.
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' APP' E ND'IX . A-l ' (Cont)
Mechanical - Process (Cont)
Acceptabi li ty .
Covered By Design Document / Requirement Yes No FSAR/ Licensing Commitment
.X Excess letdown heat exchanger }[ P&ID 1094E27, Rev. 7 CCW side is ASME III Class 2 .
( FS AR Fi g. 9. 2-1 ) -
'P&ID N-66-3, Rev. Z X
, Pressure in CCW deaders doun-stream of pumps is indicated }[ Precaution, Limitation and Setpoint document, Section llB, Pg. 93 -
locally and with alarm in control room that actuates at preset limit (FSAR 9.2.2.2.2.6)
P&ID M-66-4, ~ Rev. AE X CCWS is sampled (FSAR 9.2.2.3.1)
X A corrosion inhibitor is (capable P&ID H-66-2, Rev.- W of being) added (FSAR 9.2.2.6)
P&ID M-66-1, Rev. /UL X Air-operated containment isolation valves are desi9ned to close on }[ P&ID 1094E27, Rev. 7 loss of either electrical power or air supply (FSAR 6.2.4.1.2)
P&ID M-66-4, Rev. AE X Each surge tank is connected to CCUS by two 4 lines through locked open }{ SD-CAE-291, Rev. 2 valves (FSAR Section 3.4.C )
A.1-11 (10980)
~. _ . . _
APPEL0lX A-1 (Cont)
Piping Engineering Acceptability Covered By Design Document /Requirment Yes No FSAR/ Licensing Connitment System is safety category / quality S&L P&ID 11-66 group (FSAR 9.2.2.2) Shts 1, 2, 3, 4 X
Mech. Dept S&L Piping line list 8/30/83 - Page 17 etc.
X )
Design basis max temp-200*F Mech Dept S&L (FSAR 9.2.2.1) Piping line list 8/30/83 X
Design pressure-150 psig Mech Dept S&L (FSAR Table 9.2-3) Piping line list 8/30/83 X
Piping materials-carbon steel S&L piping design, Table 10SBB Rev. E,1.1 & l.2,1/28/77 (FSAR 9.2.2.2.1)
Piping joints-essentially all welded S&L piping design, Table 105BB Rev. E,1/28/77 X
(FSAR 9.2.2.2.1) Type of fabrication X Flanged joints Relief valves - set pressure equal S&L P&ID M-66 Shts 1, 2, 3, 4 X to or lower than system design pres- Set pressure shown as 150 psig sure or component design pressure X
All valve bodies B/11 carbon steel S&L piping design Table 10500 Rev. E,1/28/77 with stellite or stainless steel trim valves - Purchase descriptions (FSAR 9.2.2.2.2)
A.1 -12 f
(10980)
APPENDIX A-1 IDENTIFICATI0ll/INPLElENTATION OF C0ll!!ITHENTS AllD CRITERI A Civil / Structural Acceptabili ty Covered By Design Document / Requirement Yes No FSAR/ Licensing Commitment l Seismic Design & Analysis Seismic input motion & response 1. Structural Design Criteria DC-ST-03-BY-BR, Rev.11 X spectra (FSAR 2.5.2, 3.7.1.1 2. Response Spectra Design Criteria DC-ST-04-BB, Rev. 2
& 3.7.1.2 & NRC Reg. Guide 1.60, 3. S&L Calc. #8.11.4.2, Rev. 0 & 1 NRC Q130.5,130.6,130.6a) 4. S&L Calc. #4.2.1.1 BY & 4.2.1.2 BY
- 5. S&L Calc. EMD-033898 (10/21/81) for buried line & tunnels X
Damping values used (FSAR 3.7.1.3 &
WCAP-7921-AR, May 1974)
X Use of constant vertical static factors (FSAR 3.7.3.10)
Torsional effects of eccentric X casses (FSAR 3.7.3.11)
A.1 -1 (10930)
APPEllDIX A (Cont)
Civil / Structural (Cont) l l
l Acceptabi li ty Covered By Design Document / Requirement Yes No.
FSAR/ Licensing Commitment Expansion Anchors X
IE Bulletin 79-02 Standard SDS-E11 Rev. 0 Standard specification for concrete expansion anchor work form BY/BR/CEA, Rev.19 Report on static, dynamic and relaxation testing of expansion anchors in response to NRC I.E. Bulletin 79-02, July 20,1981 A.1 -2 (10980)
APPEllDIX A-1. (Cont)
Control Systems Acceptability Covered by Design Document / Requirement Yes No FSAR/ Licensing Coumitment H-66 Sht. 3, Rev. Z 3/5/84 X A temperature detector in the compo-nent cooling pump suction line vidi 11-2066 Sht.1, Rev. H 12/14/83 alarm in the main control room (HCR)
(FSAR 9.2.2.2.2.6a)
X Temperature detectors in the outlet M-66 Sht. 3, Rev. Z 3/5/84 lines for the component cooling heat H-2066 Sht. 3, Rev. G 2/15/84 exchangers with alann in the ICR (FSAR 9.2.2.2.2.6b) if-66 Sht. 3, Rev. Z 3/5/84 X Pressure detectors on the lines .
b2 tween die component cooling pumps 71-2066 Sht. 2, Rev. L 12/14/83 and the component cooling heat exchangers with alarm in die MCR (FSAR 9.2.2.2.2.6c)
X Safety-related flow indication from f1-66 Sht.1, Rev. Z 5/17/83 the reactor coolant (RC) pump motor 11-2066 Sht. 5, Rev. G 12/14/83 I oil coolers and flow indication from H-2066 Sht. 2, Rev. L 12/14/83 the RC pump thennal barrier with alarm B/B instrument index (yellow) CC Sht. 5, Rev. 24 11/15/83 in the IER (FSAR 9.2.2.2.2.6)
A.1 -3 (10980)
F APPENDIX A-1 (Cont)
Control' Systems (Cont)
Acceptabili ty Covered By Design Document / Requirement Yes no FSAR/ Licensing Commitment M-66 Sht. 4, Rev. AE 3/29/84. X
~
Water level indicators on the compo-nent cooling surge tank with alann in M-2066 Sht. 3, Rev. G , 2/15/84 the MCR (FSAR 9.2.2.2.2.6)
R:diation monitor on the outlet of M-66 Sht. 4, Rev. AE 3/29/84 X cach component' cooling iieat exchanger B/B Unit 1 instrument. index, BOP (llhite) PR, Sht. 2 & 26, with alarm in the 11CR Rev. 26 3/30/84 (FSAR 9.2.2.2.2.6)
Flow indicators on the charging and H-2066 Sht.1,, Rev. H 12/14/83 X RHR pump seal: lines with alarm in the NCR
( FSAR 9. 2. 2. 2. 2.6 )
If a component cooling pump fails M-66 Sht. 3, Rev. Z 3/5/84 X during operation, the resulting low f1-2066 Sht. 2, Rev. L 12/14/83 pressure starts one of the standby pumps (FSAR 9.2.2.2.2.6)
A local pressure indicator is pro- fi-66 Sht. 3, Rev. Z 3/5/84 X vided in each component cooling pump suction line
. (FSAR 9.2.2.2.2.6)
A.1 -4 (10980) . . . . . . .
's APPENDIX A-1 (Cont)
Control Systems (Cont)
Acceptability Covered By Design Document / Requirement Yes. No FSAR/ Licensing Cor.witment li-2066 Sht. 3, Rev. G 2/15/84 X-The component cooling surge tank water level is indicated locally and in the main control room (FSAP 9.2.2.2.2.6) l M-66 Sht. 4, Rev. AE 3/29/84 X-R2dundant instruments are provided to indicate if the level in one of M-2066 Sht. 3, Rev. G 2/15/84 the two sides of the surge tank falls b310w the low-level setting (FSAP 9.2.2.2.2.6)
The atmosphere vent on the tank is M-66 Sht. 4, Rev. AE 3/29/84 X automatically closed in the event of high radiation level at the component cooling heat exchanger discharge (FSAR 9.2.2.4.2)
A.1 -5 (10980)
APPENDIX A-1 (Cont) -I Equipment Qualification - Seismic (Cont)
Accepta0111ty no Covered By Design Document / Requirement Yes FSAR/ Licensing Commitment . _
Seismic Analysis of Pumps (FSAR 3.9.3.2.1.1 )
Nozzle loads for the applicable Section 10.5 of Form 350-B, " Standard Specification for Seismic X plant conditions must be applied Quali fication".
Analysis of interaction between Section 10.6 of Form 350-B, " Standard Specification for Seisnic X pump and motor is considered Qualification".
Fcr pumps having a natural Section 10.7 of Form 350-B, " Standard Specification for Seismic X frequency greater than 33 Hz, Qualification",
static analysis is acceptable.
For pumps with a natural fre-quency less than 33 Hz, a dy-namic hype analysis is performed Active valve operability S/L Form 350-B, Active valve operability demonstrated by analysis X (FSAR Question 110.8) (no actual testing done)
-Velan Seismic Report 6633 Rev.1 X Valve upper structure assembly stresses (active valves) Item not within IDR scope - evaluation of concern continuing.
A.1-6
-(10980) i
~ -
APPEllDIX A-1 (Cont)
Equipment Qualification - Seismic Acceptability Yes No FSAR/ Licensing Commitment Covered By Design Document / Requirement Seismic qualification of balance of Form 350-8 " Standard Specification for Seismic Qualification" X plant safety-related mechanical equip- 9/19/75 ment (testing or analysis)
(FSAR 3.9.2.2.2)
Seismic qualification of pumps and Fom 350-B '*Otandard Specification for Seismic Qualification" X motors (BOP), reference IEEE-344-75 refers to latest revisions of IEEE standards listed in (testing or analysis) project purchase specification. IEEE-344 is referenced
( FSAR 3. 9. 3. 2.1.1 ) in purchase specifications. The Component Qualification Division checklist for seisaic review indicates whether reports meet requirements of 344-75.
Design loading combination for ASIE Form 350-B " Standard Specification for Seismic Qualification". X Csde Class 2 and 3 components and Section 1.2.1 specifies the loading combinations for upset and supports (FSAR Tabic 3.9-5) faulted conditions.
Stress criteria for safety-related Form 350-B " Standard Specification for Seismic Qualification". X ASIE Class 2 and Class 3 vessels. Section 10.3 states "The stress limits for nonactive fluid system
(
Reference:
ASME III, Subsection equipment shall be as stated in the ASME BPVC Section III".
NC & ND or Code Case 1607) (Current revision per Form 350-B. )
(FSAR Table 3.9-6)
Stress criteria for ASTE Class 2 and Form 350-B " Standard Specification for Seismic Qualification". X Class 3 inactive pumps and pump sup- Section 10.3 states "The stress limits for nonactive fluid system ports (FSAR Table 3.9-7) equipment shall be as stated in the ASi1E BPVC Section III".
(
Reference:
ASIE III, Subsections ilC & (Current revision per Form 350-B.)
ND or Code Case 1607)
A.1 -7 (10980)
APPENDIX A-1 (Cont)
Equipment Qualification - Seismic (Cont)
Acceptabili ty I Covered By Design Document / Requirement Yes No FSARD fcensing Commitment l
Design criteria for active pumps and Form 350-B, Section 10.3.2, " Stress Limits for Active Fluid System X pump supports (FSAR Table 3.9-6) Equipment", lists stress limits for upset and faulted conditions.
Upset stress limits reference ASME Section III. Faulted stress Note: Stress limits specified are Ifmits are held to emergency condition stress levels specified more restrictive dian die ASilE III in FSAR.
limits to provide assurance of opera-bility.
Stress criteria for safety-related Form 350-B " Standard Specification for Seismic Qualification" X ASME Code Class 2 and Class 3 inactive Section 10.3 states "The stress limits for nonactive fluid 80P valves. (Reference ASfE III system equipment shall be as stated in the ASliE BPVC Subsections NC and UD or Code Section III." (Current revision per Form 350-B.)
Case 1635. ) (FSAR Table 3.9-9)
X BOP design criteria for active valves. Fonn 350-B, Section 10.3.2, " Stress Limits for Active Fluid (Reference ASME Section III, Subsec- System Equipment", lists stress limits for upset and faulted tions HC3500 and HD3500. conditions. Upset stress limits reference ASitE Section III.
(FSAR Table 3.9-10) Faulted stress limits are held to emergency condition stress levels specified in the FSAR.
Applicant will comply with IEEE-382- Purchase Spec. F/L 2884 Attachment "E" (Limitorque motor operator) X 1972 " Trial Use Guide for the Type- references IEEE-382-72.
Test of Class 1 Electric Valve Opera-ters for Nuclear Power Generating Stations"
( FSAR Al .73 Reg. Guide 1.73)
A.1 -8 (10980)
APPENDIX A-1 (Cont)
Ibchanical-Pipe Support Acceptabili ty FSAR/ Licensing Couraiteent Covered By Design Document / Requirement- Yes No ASi1E Sect. III, NF,1977 F/L 2906 Rev. 2, 5/16/03 Installation and support X selection guidelines for process piping, instrument piping, and tubing in Cat. I b1dg. (2" and smaller Cat. I, instrumentation piping, 4" and smaller Cat. II piping and tubing)
HRC IE 79-02 Bulletin liechanical Component Support Design Ref. Manual, Rev. 4, X i FS AR 3.8.4.2 3/30/84 (No designated document number) 1 3.8.4.5.2
- 3.9.3 FSAR 3.8.4.2 TTDP-SED-06 Rev. O, 2/24/84, llech. component supports X 3.8.4.5.2 3.9.2 A.1 -9 (10980)
APPEllDIX A-1 (Cont)
Mechanical - Process Acceptabi li ty Yes No FSAR/ Licensing Connidaent Covered By Design Document / Requirement X
-RCP thermal barrier cooling water P&ID f1-66-1, Rev AA return high flow automatically throttles down the containment isolation valve (FSAR 9.2.2.2.2.2)
~
RCP thermal barrier CCW has W Precautions, Limitations and Setpoint document, Section 11, X relief valve with set pressure Fage 96 equal to system design pressure P&ID M-66-1, Rev AA or component desi n pressure (FSAR 9.2.2.2.2.2 P&ID l1-66-3, Rev Z X The CCWS may not be shared during cooldown or recirculation phase because CCW temperature will exceed 1050F (FSAR 9.2.2.4.4)
X CCW surge tank relief valves P&ID 11-66-4, Rev. AE discharge to die CVCS waste recycle holdup tank (FSAR 9.2.2.4.1)
X Single failure analysis of lines P&ID 11-66-1, Rev. AA penetrating containment states that redundant isolation valves are used to secure flow (FSAR Table 9.2-5)
A.1 -10 (10980)
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APPENDIX A-1 (Cont)
Piping Engineering Acceptability Covered By Design Document /Requirment Yes No FSAR/ Licensing Conmitment System is safety category / quality S&L P&ID 11-66 group (FSAR 9.2.2.2) Shts 1, 2, 3, 4.
Mech. Dept S&L X Piping line list 8/30/83 - Page 17 etc.
Mech Dept S&L X Design basis max temp-200*F
( FSAR 9. 2. 2.1 ) Piping line list 8/30/83 Mech Dept S&L X Design pressure-150 psig (FSAR Table 9.2-3) Piping line list 8/30/83 Piping materials-carbon steel S&L piping design, Table 105B8 Rev. E,1.1 & l.2,1/28/77 X (FSAR 9.2.2.2.1)
Piping joints-essentially all welded S&L piping design, Table 105BB Rev. E,1/28/77 X
(FSAR 9.2.2.2.1) Type of fabrication X
- Flanged joints Relief valves - set pressure equal S&L P&ID M-66 Shts 1, 2, 3, 4 X to or lower than system design pres- Set pressure shown as 150 psig sure or component design pressure X
All valve bodies B/W carbon steel S&L piping design Table 105BB Rev. E,1/28/77 with stellite or stainless steel trim valves - Purchase descriptions (FSAR 9.2.2.2.2)
A.1 -12 (10980)
APPENDIX A-2 DESIGN ADEQUACY Civil / Structural Areas Reviewed Acceptability Fcr Adequacy- Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comments Yes No Seismic input motion FSAR, relevant sections as Review of ground response spectra based on 0.2g for X and ground response stated in Appendices A-1, SSE and 0.099 for 00E is in agreement with HRC Reg.
spectra B-1 and C-1. Guide 1.60.
NRC Reg. Guide 1.60 SER Section 3.7 li Deep wells seismic FSAR 3.8.4.3 Deep wells are designed to withstand tornado X analysis ~but not seismic loads.
Expansion Anchors l Base plate flexi- IE Bulletin 79-02 Ref.1 (11.5.1) and Table 11.5-1 conservatively X bility and increase loads. calculated by rigid plate theory prying loads multiplying them by an amplification factor determined by comparing ri.gid plate models with finite element models although Ref. 4 states that j the Wiss, Janney, Elstner & Assoc. tests showed j that at ultimate load the base plates were not in contact with the concrete so there was no prying action. .
Ref. 1 Structural Standard Document Standards, SDS-Ell, Rev. 0 -
! Ref. 2 Standard Specification for Concrete Expansion Anchor Work For i BY/BR/CEA, Rev.19 Re f. 3. Report on Static, Dynamic and Relaxation Testing of Expansion Anchors in Response to NRC IE Bulletin 79-02, July 20,1981 Ref. 4 B/B - FSAR Response to HRC Question 110.71 A.2-1 l (10980)
.~ _ --
APPENDIX A-2 (Cont)
Civil / Structural (Cont)
Areas Reviewed Acceptability Fcr Adequacy Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comments Yes No Expansion Anchors (Cont)
QC documentation IE Bulletin 79-02 Ref. 2 (4.0) establishes inspection, testing, fre- X quency of testing and documentation.
. Factors of safety IE Bulletin 79 Ref.1. Table 11.1-1, ultimate capacities for wedge X (concrete) type anchors in concrete for tension and shear are lower than the values for the same concrete strength and embedment shown on Hilti's Report No. 8784 File No. H2189-SI. The factors of safety (F.S. ) are normally above 4. The 3/4" anchor has a F.S. practically equal to 4.
Factors of safety IE Bulletin 79-02 Ref.1. Table 11.1-1, shows ultimate capacities X (masonry) for sleeve anchors in masonry walls. The values for 1/2" and 3/4" diameters are similar to Bechtel's test data for block ualls. The 3/8" and 5/8" diameters compared values are different.
This is expected since Bechtel's experience shows considerable variations on the test results of expansion anchors installed in block walls at different sites. The ultimate capacities shown on Table 11.1-1 are based on project unique tests and are lower than the test data shown in Ref. 3.
The allowable loads have a minimum factor of safety equal to 4.2.
A.2-2 (10980)
O APPEllDIX A-2 (Cont) l l
Civil / Structural (Cont)
~
Acceptability Areas Reviewed Yes No For Adequacy Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comments l
Expansion Anchors (Cont)
IE Bulletin 79-02 Ref. 2 (4.2.2.6) A minimum of one anchor per X Sampling method for testing assembly selected at random is tested.
IE Bulletin 79-02 Ref.1 (11.1.2) reduces allowable loads by 50% X l
Design require- for wind, seismic loads and mechanical vibrations.
ments for cycle This approach for wind and seismic which are low loads cycle is acceptable based on Ref. 3 (2.5.2) and the FFTF tests where expansion anchors successful-ly withstood simulated seismic loads consisting of a minimum of 6000 cycles at 20% of the ultimate capaci ty.
Ref. 3 (2.S.2) and Teledyne Report 3501-1 " Summary X Preload IE Bulletin 79-02 Report -- Expansion Anchors" concur that anchor preload is not required in order to withstand cyclic loads. Ref.2 (3.3) establishes tightening requirements.
A.2-3 (10980)
APPENDIX A-2 (Cont)
Control Systems Acceptabi11ty Areas Reviewed Yes No Fer Adequacy Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comments Westinghouse flow diagram for CCW 1094E28, Rev.11, X Independent process Regulatory Guide 1.151, taps for instruments July 1983 3/29/83.
cf redundant trains S&L Diagram of CCW M-66, ISA Standard S67.02, June 1980 Sht. 3, Rev. Z, 3/5/84 S&L C&I Diagram N-2066 Sh. 2, Rev. L,12/14/83 S&L N-66 Sh. 3 is a redraw of Westinghouse 1094E28, Rev.11 to S&L format. The SSL redraw shows the instruments of each train connected to independent root valves a,d taps.
Procedure / Calculation EMD 015140, Rev. 4 X Seismic instrument ASIE B&PV Section III tube span support Article NC-3650 Calc. 810 015139, Rev. O calculation Calc. DtD 030898, Rev. O Calc. EMD 030653, Rev. O Calc. DID 019583, Rev. O Calc. EMD 042097, Rev. O A.2-4 (1098o)
APPElBIX A-2 (Cont)
Mechanical-Process Acceptability-Areas Reviewed Yes 51 0 For ?d:7f ry Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comments W P8101094E27, Rev. 7 X RCP thennel barrier Auto signal to valve to cooling water re- protect low pressure CCW T,4I diag. M-2066/1, Rev. M turn overpressure piping external to SD-CAE-291, Rev. 2, page 16 protection containment High flow on FIS 1G closes containment isolation valve (gate) H0-ICC-685-2 Design implementation follows W input. Wording in FSAR imprecisely states a throttling rather than an isolation function.
PAID Pf-66-1, Rev. AA X RCP thermal barrier Set pressure, equal CCW piping relief to the lower of system Piping Design Table 150588, Rev. B, 7/1/76 valve set point or component design Valva List, CCW System, Rev. 51, 2/15/84
- pressure Line List, Page 31, 8/30/83 W Precautions, Limitations and Setpoints, 3ection 11, page 96.
Relief valve set pressure equal to system design pressure of 2485 psig.
PAID N-66-3, Rev. Z X CCW sharing The CCWS may not be shared during cool-down or recir- W 1094E28, Rev.11 h because CCW culation.P ase By using manual and remote manual valves, splitting temperature will exceed the units can be done.
1050F Design provides sufficient number of valves to ac-complish isolation.
A.2-5 (10980)
APPENDIX A-2 (Cont)
Mechanical-Process (Cont) l Acceptability Areas Reviewed Yes No For Ade-my Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comments CCW sharing (Cont) The SER (9.2.2 of NUREG 0876, 2/82) states "during the limiting mode of plant operation ... the CCWS is split on receipt of an ESFAS."
This SER description is incorrect in that the CCWS is not split on ESFAS*, neither automatically nor by the operator. The SER wording does not indicate this as "must meet" requirement. ;
The Byron design consistently indicates that no automatic splitting occurs.
- ESFAS = engineered safety features actuation signal CCW surge tank Acceptable dischanje path P&ID 11-66-4, Rev. AE relief for surge tank relief PAID H-82-11, Rev. Z P&ID M-48-29, Rev. J W PAID 1094E28. Rev.11 XD-CAE-291, Rev. 2 Design consistently shows discharge goes to auxiliary X b1dg. equipment systems chromated drain tank, and not to the CVCS.
Because the CCWS is chromated, and because chromated waste should not be sent to the CVCS, the actual design appears correct (and consistent with other PWR designs).
A.2-6 (10980)
APPENDIX A-2 (Cont)
Mechanical-Process (Cont) e Acceptabili ty Areas Reviewed Yes No For Adequacy Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comments P&ID H-66-1, Rev. AA X CCW lines pene- Conformance to GDC for trating containment containment isolation W P&ID 1094EZ7, Rev. 7 TSAR Table 6.2-58 Both the CCW supply and return for the excess letdown Hx have single valve isolation. r Table 6.2-58 states that GDC 57 is met for d' these lines. Section 3.1.2.5.8 and the GDC clearly state that for closed systems, one outside containment automatic isolation valve -
is acceptable ~.
The design is adequate with respect to the ap-plicable GDC for containnant isolation. Redun-dant isolation valves are not required to pro-vide adequate containment isolation because this CCW line constitutes a closed system.
Excess letdown ASi1E III Class 2 P&ID M-66-1, Rev. AA X heat exchanger W P&ID 1094E27, Rev. 7 CCW side II Heat Exchanger Specification Data Sheet:
F/L 27020210, 3/1/78 Consistently shown as ASME III Class 2. ,
A.2-7 (10980)
APPENDIX A-2 (Cont) flechanical-Process (Cont)
Acceptability Areas Reviewed Yes No Fsr Adequacy Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comments CCW pump discharge P&ID M-66-3, Rev. Z W P&ID 1094E28, Rev.11 pressure instrumen- V Precaution, Limitation and Setpoint document, tation ~Section llB (Page 93)
C&I M-2066-2, Rev. L Local indication exists Local indication is provided, one for each unit. X X
Main control room alarm There are four pressure switches on the CCW pump at preset limit common discharge header, two for each unit, each with an alarm at 85 psig.
P&ID M-66-4, Rev. AE X CCWS sampling Grab sample exists capability }f P&ID 1094E28, Rev.11 Corrosion inhi- Capable of adding cor- P&ID 11-66-2, Rev. U X
bitor addition rosion inhibitor A chemical addition tank with connection to the CCWS provides this capability.
P&ID M-66-1, Rev. AA X Failure of air- Fail closed on loss of -
operated contain- either electrical power }f P&ID 1094E27/7 ment isolation or air Valves do fail closed as required.
valves P&ID M-66-4, Rev. AE X Surge tank con- tach tank has two 4" lines to pump suction. W P&ID 1094C28, Rev. 11 nection to CCWS Valve list, Rev. 51 (2/15/84)
Each line has locked open valve (s). Line list (8/30/83) Pg. 26 A.2-8 (10980)
.= _ _ _ - _ .
APPENDIX A-2 (Cont)
Hechanical-Stress Acceptability Areas Reviewed Yes No For Adequacy Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comments X
Adequacy of rod hanger There should be no resultant Stress calculation ICC01, Rev. OlF0, support support for seismic uplift load under seismic No.1 CC01046 R, Rev. B is a rod hanger in l
loading loading. the safety-related system with seismic loadings.
Seismic response The input spectra for This calculation report is reviewed for the use of X the analysis should con- seismic response spectra identified in the " Response fona with the response Spectra Design Criteria", Document No. DC-ST-04-BB, spectra design criteria. Rev. 2, and " Lesson Plan", DtD-TP-2, Rev. 4.
A.2-9 (10980)
APPENDIX A-2 (Cont)
Piping Engineering Acceptability Areas Reviewed
~ Acceptante Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comments Yes No Fcr Adequacy Piping Codes & standards ASME B&PV Code Sec. III, Design Spec Rev. 2," DS-CC-01-BB X 1974, and Summer of 1975 Art. 301 & 302 & 303 Addenda Code cases Reg. Guides 1.84 & 1.85 Design Spec DS-CC-01-BB, Art. 3 & Div.10 X of F/L 2741 & F/L 2739 Material s Piping Design Tables- Design Spec DS-CC-01-BB, Rev. 2, Art. 503 &
F/L 2741. Design Tables 105BB & 1505BB-Tables & Art. 402 of X Wall thickness Press / Temp & Material Stress DS-CC-01-BB, Rev. 2 Design Spec DS-CC-01-BB, Rev. 2, Art. 503 & Design X Fittings F/L 2741 - Lgr than 2" F/L 2739 - 2" a under Tables 105BB & 1505 BB Fabrication ASME B&PV Code Sec. III, F/L 2741, F/L 2739 - Design Spec DS-CC-01-BB Art.108 X 1974, and Sumner of 1975 Addenda Design Spec DS-CC-01-BB Rev. 2, Art. 801 X Overpressure ASTE B&PV Code Sec. III, protection 1974, and Summer of 1975 Spec F/L 2702 Addanda Design Spec DS-CC-01-BB Rev. 2, Art. 305 X Inspection / stamping ASIE B&PV Code Sec. III, 1974, and Summer of 1975 -
Addenda A.2-10 (1098o)
APPENDIX A-2 (Cont)
Piping Engineering (Cont)
Acceptability .
Areas Reviewed Yes- No Fcr Adequacy Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comments Piping (Cont)
X Hydrotest reqmt. ASME B&PV Code Sec. III, Design Spec DS-CC-01-BB Rev. 2, Art. 404, &
1974, and Summer of 1975 Art. 701, 702, 704 -
Addenda X
Code data report ASME B&PV Code Sec. III, See Inspection / stamping 1974, and Summer of 1975 Addenda NOTE: All piping components are carbon steel Valves (line)
- Design Spec F-2718-01, Art.108.1 X Codes & standards ASi1E B&PV Code Sec. III, 1974, and Summer of 1975 Addenda & AllSI B16.5 Code cases Reg. guides Design Spec F-2718-01, Art.108.1 X Response to FSAR X llaterials (pressure ASME B&PV Code Sec. III, Piping Design Tables 105BB & 1505BB.
boundary) 1974, and Summer of 1975 Question 110.57 states that disc is not a pressure Addenda boundary Construction rqmts. ASi1E B&PV Code Sec. III Design Spec F-2718-01, Art. 301, 300.6, & Art.110.11 X 1974, and Sumer of 1975 Addenda ,
- Does not apply to control, safety or relief valves A.2-ll (10980)
m _
APPENDIX A-2 (Cont)
Piping Engineering (Cont)
Acceptability Areas Reviewed .
Yes No For Adequacy Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comments Valves (line) (Cont)
Hydrotesting ASTE B&PV Code Sec. III, . Design Spec F-2718-01, Art.110.11g X 1974, and Sumer of 1975 Addenda Ccde data reports AStE B&PV Code Sec. III,1974 Design Spec F2718-01, Art.110.10 X
& Summer 1975 Addenda Centainment Penetrations (Nos. P-22, P-25, P-48) ,
Codes & standards ASE B&PV Code, Sec. III-1974 Design Spec F-2787 (6/23/83) Art.108 & Art. 303 X Design Spec F-2787 (6/23/83), Art.108-Dwg H-197 X Code cases Reg. Guides 1.84 & l.85 Materials ASE D&PV Code, Sec. III-1974 Design Spec F-2787 (6/23/83), Art. 304 - Dwg if-197 X X
Ccnstruction rqmts. ASME B&PV Code, Sec. 111-1974 Design Spec F-2787 (6/23/83), Art.110.10 -111.3 & ,
Dwg 11-197 X
Cede data reports ASME B&PV Code, Sec. III-1974 Design Spec F-2787 (6/23/83), Art.111.3 Penetration type / class ASlE B&PV Code Class 2 & MC Design Spec F-2787 (6/23/83), Art.111.3(a) X Stress report ASME_B&PV Code 1974 Design Spec F-2787 (6/23/83), Art.111.3(a) X Data report ASME B&PV Code 1974 Design Spec F-2788 (6/23/83), Art.111.3(d)2 X A.2-12 (10980)
"----- ----T w= , - - - _m-,
w APPENDIX A-2 (Cont)
Plant Design Acceptability: ,
Areas F.eviewed Yes No Fcr Adequacy Acceptance Criteria Procedures /Docuraents Reviewed and Conunents CCW System Inside C:ntainment
- Pipe Whip H-155 Sh.1 of 2 Rev. L Line No.
1 CC 54AA-2" Line not damaged Reviewed high energy line INSOIAD-30.25" for pipe whip impact effects on CCW system. FSAR Figure 3.6-32 shows break and restraint locations evaluated:
Break No. Code
- X C-9 (P-8)
C-9X B (P-11) X B (P-11) X C-ll C-12 B (P-10, P-15) X.
C-15 8 (P-10, P-15) X B (P-14) X C-16 (P-14) X C-16A
- Codes For Review of Documents A. Pipe whip poses no danger (i.e.: whips in safe direction, protected by barrier).
B. Pipe whip restraint No. ( ) required to protect essential system.
C. System could be damaged by high energy pipe due to lack of existing restraint.
A. 2-13 (10980)
APPENDIX A-2 (Cont)
Plant Design (Cont)
Acceptability Areas Reviewed Yes No Fer Adequacy Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comments CCW System Inside ,
C:ntainment
- Pipe Whip - (Cont)
H-155 Sh.1 of 2 Rev. L Line No.
1 CC 548A-4" Line not damaged No high energy lines in close proximity. X M-155 Sh. 2 of 2 Rev. J
- Line No.
1 CC 54AA-2" Line not damaged 1 CV 15CA-2" high energy line routed parallel to X ,
subject piping. There is no cause for failure due to criteria in FSAR 3.6.2.3.3.3.
Line not damaged Reviewed and found no high energy line in X 1 CC 54BA-4" close proximity.
1 CC 39CA-2" Line not damaged 1 RC 22AA-1-1/2" high energy line routed near to X subject piping. There is no cause for failure due to criteria in FSAR 3.6.2.3.3.3.
H-156 Sh. 2 of 2 Rev. J Lir:e No.
Line not damaged Reviewed and evaluated high energy line No. X 1 CC 54AB-2" 1 CV 15CV-2". There is no cause for failure due to criteria in FSAR 3.6.2.3.3.3.
A. 2-14 (10980)
APPENDIX A-2 (Cont)
Plant Design (Cont)
Areas Reviewed Acceptability Fer Adequacy Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comments Yes No CCW System Inside C:ntainment
- Pipe Whip (Cont)
M-157 Sh.1 of 2 Rev. N Line No.
1 CC 54AB-2" Line not damaged Reviewed piping and found no high energy lines in X 1 CC 54AC-2" close proximity that will damage CCW system piping.
1 CC 5488-2" The only high energy line near the reviewed 1 CC 03E-3" piping (1 CC 548B-4") is 1 CV 01E-3". There is no 1 CC 548B-4" cause for failure due to criteria in FSAR 3.6.2.3.3.3.
4 I
. H-157 Sh. 2 of 2 Rev. N Line No.
1 CC 54AC-2" Line not damaged Reviewed piping and found no high energy piping X
! 1 CC 54AB-2" that will cause failure to the CCW system piping.
1 1 CC 548B-4" There is no cause for failure due to criteria in FSAR 3.6.2.3.3.3.
I j
i A. 2-15 (10980)
m APPENDIX A-2 (Cont)
Plant Design (Cont)
Areas Reviewed Acceptability Fer Adequacy Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comments Yes No CCW System Inside Containment
- Pipe Wiip (Cont)
M-158 Sh.1 of 2 Rev. N Line No.
1 CC 83A-3/4" Line not damaged Reviewed piping and found no high energy piping X 1 CC 82A-3/4" in close proximity.
1 CC A3A-3" 1 CC 54C-4" 1 CC 540-4" 1 CC 54E-4" 1 CC 548A-4" 1 CC 56A-3/4" 1 CC 568-3/4" 1 CC 388-6" 1 CC 38C-6" 1 CC 50C-6" 1 CC 50E-6" 1 CC 50C-3" 1 CC 528-3/4" 1 CC 500-6" 1 CC 548A-4" 1 CC 54AD-2" A.2-16 (10980)
APPENDIX A-2 (Cont)
. Plant Design (Cont)
Acceptab11ity Areas Reviewed Yes No Frr Adequacy Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comments CCW System Inside Containment
- Pipe hip (Cont)
M-158 Sh. 2 of 2 Rev. N Line No.
X Line not damaged Reviewed piping and found no high energy piping 1 CC 38C-6" in close proximity.
1 CC 54D-4" 1 CC 568-3/4" 1 CC 56A-3/4" 1 CC A3A-2" 1 CC A38-2" 1 CC 70A-3/4" 1 CC 52A-3/4" 1 CC 79A-3/4" 1 OC 528-3/4" 1 CC 05D-6" 1 CC 39CD-2" 1 CC 54AD-2" 1 CC 54BA-4"
.1 A. 2-17 (10980)
r-APPENDIX A-2 (Cont)
Plant Design (Cont)
Acceptability Areas Reviewed Yes No Fdr Adequacy Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comments CCW System Inside Containmenc
- Pipe Whip (Cont)
M-161 Sh.1 of 1 Rev. L .
Line No.
1 CC 50AA-3" Line not damaged Reviewed high energy line No.1FWO3DA-16" for pipe 1 CC 39AA-3" whip effects on CCW system. FSAR Figure 3.6-25 1 CC 38FA-3" shows pipe break & restraint locations:
1 CC 39BA-2" Code 1 CC F7AA-3/4" Break No.
A, B (R238, R308) X B20A ,
1 CC D6AA-2" A, B (R300) X B200 1 CC 39CA-2" X B40A B (R408) 1 CC 40AA-3/4" X B (R458) 1 CC 53AA-3/4" X B (R30A)
M-162 Sh.1 of 1 Rev. L Line Ho.
1 CC 3988-2" Line not damaged Reviewed high energy line No.1FWO3DB-16" for pipe 1 CC 50AB-3" whip effects on CCW system. FSAR Figure 3.6-26 1 CC 39AB-3" shows pipe break and restraint locations:
1 CC 38FB-3/4" Code 1 CC 50AB-3/4" Break No.
A, B (R60B) X B55A 1 CC 53AB-3/4" X B308 B (R358) 1 CC 40AB-3/4" 8 (R45A) X 1 CC 39CB-2" A. 2-18 (10980)
3 APPENDIX A-2 (Cont)
~
Plant Design (Cont).
Acceptability Areas Reviewed Yes No Fer Adequacy Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comments CCW System Inside C:ntainment *
? - Pipe Whip (Cont)
M-163 Sh.1 of 1 Rev. N Line No. l 1 CC 03GA-3" Line not damaged Reviewed piping and found no high energy piping X 1 CC H6BA-4" in area. CCW piping isolated in compartment with 1 CC 03GB-3" excess letdown heat exchangers.
1 CC H6AA-4" 1 CC 05AA-3" 1 CC 05AS-3" M-163 Sh.1 of 1 Rev. N .
Line No.
1 CC 3fFC-3" Line not damaged Reviewed high energy line No.1FWO3DC-16" for pipe 1 CC 39AC-3" whip effects on the CCW system. FSAR Figure 3.6-27 1 CC 50AC-3" shows pipe break and restraint locations:
1 CC F7AC-3/4" Break No. Code 1 CC D6AC-2" 1 CC 53AC-3/4" 880A A, B (808) X B808 8 (80B) X 1 CC 4(MC-3/4" X 1 CC 39BC-2" B (R95A)
B (R958) X 1 CC 53AC-3/4" X B110A A 1 CC 38FE-3" X B115A A A.2-19 (10980) t- - . -
APPENDIX A-2 (Cont)
Plant Design (Cont)
Areas Reviewed Acceptability Fcr Adequacy Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comnents Yes No CCW System Inside Ccntainment
- Pipe Whip (Cont)
H-164 Sh.1 of 1 Rev. L Line No.
1 CC 38C-6" Line not damaged Reviewed piping and found no high energy piping X 1 CC 05C-3" in area.
1 CC 50C-6" 1 CC A7A-2" H-164 Sh.1 of 1 Rev. L Li ne No.
1 CC 50AD-3" Line not damaged Reviewed piping and found pipe whip from X 1 CC 39CD-2" 1 FWO3DD-16 poses no danger because reactor 1 CC 53AD-3/4" coolant pump acts as barrier.
1 CC 3980-2."
1 CC D6AD-2" 1 CC 40AD-3/4" A.2-20 (10980)
APPENDIX A-2 (Cont)
Plant Design (Cont)
Acceptability Arcas Reviewed Yes No For Adequacy Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Convaents i
l CCW System Inside Containment '
- Pipe Whip (Cont)
H-164 Sh.1 of 1 Rev. L Line No.
1 CC 38FD-3" Line not damaged Reviewed high energy line No.1FWO3DD-16" for pipe 1 CC 39AD-2" whip effects on the CCW system. FSAR Figure 3.6-28 shows pipe break and restraint locations:
Break No. Code X
B80A B (R808)
B (R85A) X X
B (R858)
X B95A B (R85A)
B (R95A) X 895B H-165 Sh.1 of 2 Rev. L Line No.
1 CC 300-4" Line not damaged Reviewed CCW system piping and found no high energy X 1 CC 508-4" line in close proximity.
1 CC 50C-6" 1 CC 38C-6" H-166 Sh.1 of 2 Rev. K Line No.
1 CC 508-4" Line not damage'd Reviewed piping and found no high energy piping X 1 CC 380-4" in close proximity.
A.2-21 (10980)
~ w -
APPENDIX A-2 (Cont)
Plant Design (Cont)
Acceptability Areas Reviewed Yes No Fcr Adequacy Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Coaments CCW System Inside Containment
- Pipe lenip (Cont) tf-167 Sh.1 of 2 Rev. P ewe Ik.
Reviewed piping and found no high energy piping X 1 CC 508-4" Line not damaged i that will cause failure to the CCW system piping.
1 CC 380-4" 1 CC 05BA-3" 1 CC 0 1 -3" 1 CC 84AA-3/4" 1 CC 84AB-3/4" 1 CC 05B8-3" 1 CC 05B8-3" 1 CC 43A8-3" 1 CC 36A-3" 1 CC 03GB-3" 1 CC 43AA-3" 1 CC 05AB-3" 1 CC 05C-3" 1 CC 3FC-3" 1 CC 504C-3" 1 CC 05AB-3" 1 CC 05AA-3" 1 CC H7BA-4" 1 CC H7AA-4" 1 CC 05C-3" 1 CC 03E-3" A.2-22 (10980)
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APPENDIX A-3 ADEQUACY OF DESIGN PROCESS Civil / Structural (Seismic)
Acceptabi11ty Yes No Design Process Reviewed Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comnents X
Seismic response spectra Project QA manual, Response spectra were developed by three different for Category I structures Rev. 7, Section 4.3 divisions of the structural department. All data G d components are put together in a controlled criteria document titled " Response Spectra Design Criteria" and distribu-ted to all departments for use in the design of struc-tures and components.
A.3-1 (10980)
l APPENDIX A-3 (Cont)
Mechanical - Pipe Support and Stress Acceptability Yes No Design Process Reviewed Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comuments X
Meets the design PI-BB-14 Rev. 2, 9/14/81; Interface and info. flow Pipe support and between pipe support and pipe stress pipe stress requirements of ASME X
- B&PV Code, Sec. III, PI-BB-16 Rev. 2, 5/16/83; Formal piping analysis and
'1974, & Summer 1975 component support design Addenda PG. 3 Rev. O, 7/28/81; Guidelines for piping analysis X X
Subsystem ISX072 was reviewed against the above documents (PI-BB-14 Rev. 2, PI-BB-16, Rev. 2 and PG-3 Rev. 0) to verify the design process PI-BB-15 Rev. 2, 8/21/79; Component support design X PI-BB-21 Rev. O,11/2/81 Piping, piping analysis, X piping support design organization PI-BB-34 Rev. O, 3' /2/83; Documentation of hanger loads X PI-BB-25 Rev. O, 8/29/83; Onsite stress design X PI-BB-28 Rev. 3, 8/4/83; Piping design, support design X and analysis, field personnel PI-BB-29 Rev. 3, 8/2/83; Distribution & control of X design documents A.3-2 ,
(1098o)
. ~. - - - - -
APPENDIX A-3 (Cont)
Mechanical - Pipe Support and Stress (Cont)
Acceptability Yes No Design Process Reviewed Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comments Pipe support and Meets the des 19n Status list of pipe support elements (This computer- X requirements of ASME ized list was checked for traceability of the status of pipe stress (Cont)
B&PV Code, Sec. III, supports) 1974, & Summer 1975 Addenda PI-BB-32 Rev. O, 8/5/83; Organization of S&L personnel X assigned to the field PI-BB-08 Rev. 5, 2/9/84; Processing of NCR & ECN X X
PI-BB-13 Rev. 9, 3/16/84; FCRS ECH 9916, 3/20/84, for support ISX17 053G Rev. C X ECH 9053,11/5/83, for support CC01010X Rev. G Above ECNs were reviewed to check the procedurc PI-BB-08 Rev. 5 Validation & certification for computer programs. X Aux. STL. 20.1 896-0.00/09.7.; 191.4.00 8/26/83 Frame, 20190500 D/09.7.20G-1.01; 10/20/83 Sups / cinch 20 1870/09.7.200 - 1.0; 7/29/83 Pipsys 09.5.065-5.5/205730-0.0; 2/10/83 A.3-3 (10980)
APPENDIX A-4 DESIGN INTERFACES WITH WESTINGHOUSE (W) AND NUCLEAR POWER SERVICES (NPS)
Control Systems Acceptability Yes No
-Compani Interface Reviewed Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comments X l W Westinghouse P&ID redraw to Westinghouse flow diagram CCW S&L fomat 1094E28 Rev.11, 3/29/82 S&L diagram of component cooling water M-66, Sheet 3 of 4 i Rev. Z, 3/5/83 A.4-1 (10980) .
APPENDIX A-4 Mechanical-Pipe Support Acceptability Yes No Company Interface Reviewed Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Coments X
NPS Criteria for small pipe sup- The following S&L standard documents are provided to port and stress analysis NPS to meet the project commitments o Spec.109 with Amendnent #2,11/29/83 o D4D Calc. 015140, dead wt. thennal & seismic Icadings o EMD Calc. 021574, Rev. 4, support location o MSS 6.1.D, Std. Spec. for pipe support o Mech. Component Support Design Ref. Manual, Rev. 4 '
o Seismic criteria and respnse spectra i
o Request for infonaation forms l
A.4-2 (10980)
~ '
APPENDIX A-4 (Cont)
Mechanical-Pipe Support (Cont)
Acceptability Yes No Company Interface Reviewed Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comments X
S&L reviews of small pipe o Following QA audits were conducted by S&L to meet NPS (Cont) support and stress analysis project requirements ,
i Audit # E-ll 5/13-16/83 E-10 11/18/82 E-7 4/22/82-E-5 9/21 -22/81 E-4 5/15-18/81 Audit # E-ll was reviewed Stress analysis technical audit by S&L and the reports provided via the following interoffice menos:
10M from L.G. Vetter to W.C. Cleff, 12/11/81 IOM from S. A. Boline to E.8. Branch,1/19/83 A.4-3 (10980)
APPENDIX A-5 DESIGN CHANGE' CONTROL
~
Mechanical-Stress Acceptability Area of Change _
Yes No Control Reviewed - Documents / Procedures Reviewed and Comments The pertinent FCRs/ECNs have been addressed and the X FCRs/ECHs reconciliation practice is acceptable. The applicable documents are listed in Appendix A-3.
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APPENDIX B-1 IDENTIFICATION /IMLEENTATION OF C(MMITENTS AND CRITERIA Civil / Structural (Seismic)
Acceptability
- Covered By Design Document / Requirement Yes 11 0 FSAR/ Licensing Commitment Seismic Design & Analysis Same as Appendix A-1. X Seismic input motion & response spectra (FSAR 2.5.2, 3.7.1.1 (Seismic design and analysis)
& 3.7.1.2 & NRC Reg. Guide 1.60, NRC Q130.5,130.6,130.6a) ,
X Dasping values used (FSAR 3.7.1.3 & WCAP-7921-AR, May 1974)
~
X Use of constant vertical static l factors (FSAR 3.7.3.10)
Torsional effects of eccentric X
masses (FSAR 3.7.3.11) ,
4 M
i s
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\
- B.1-1 (11360) ,
APPENDIX B-l (Cont)
Civil / Structural Acceatab111ty Yes No FSAR/ Licensing Comunitment Covered By Design Document / Requirement Expansion Anchors Refer to Appendix A-1 (Expansion Anchors) X Stability of Subsurface & Slope River screenhouse, Makeup line, deep wells Responses to MRC Questions 241.1 thru 241.6 Evaluation of liquefaction potential and factor X of safety. Calc. file # SAD 8.11.4 Earthquake design basis (FSAR 2.5.4.9) Structural design criteria, seismic response X spectra criteria Calculation file # SAD 8.11.4 X Static and dynamic stability (FSAR-2.5.4.10)
Calculation file # SED 2.1.2 X River screenhouse slopes Minf am factor of safety for SSE+
rapid drawdown is larger than 1.1 FSAR 3.7, SER 3.7.1, 1) Structural design criteria # DC-ST-03-BY/BR X M9C Questicas 130.9 & 130.9A 2) Response spectra design criteria # DC-ST-04-BB
- 3) S&L calculation # SED, 2.1.1 and 2.1.2.
B.1-2 (1106o)
I APPENDIX B-1 (Cont)
Civil / Structural (Cont)
Acceptability Yes No FSAR/ Licensing Commitment Covered By Design Document / Requirement X
The river screenhouse is designed for the These load combinations are considered in the evalu-following extreme loading conditions: ation of the stability of river screenhouse.
- SSE + max. flood of record Refer to calc. No. 2.1.2.1 dated 12/14/76
- OBE + combined event flood (FSAR 3.8.4.3) ,
The river screenhouse is supported on a This FSAR commitment is satisfied. Refer to following X 3 foot 0 inch thick mat foundation resting drawings.
at elevation 666 feet 0 inch and 660 feet 6 inches. (FSAR 3.8.5.1.4) S-412-BY, Rev. G S-413-BY, Rev. J S-414-BY, Rev. E The following load combinations for. over- The river screenhouse is evaluated for overturning, X turning, sliding and flotation have sliding and flotation for load combinations been considered: (FSAR 3.8.5.3) a, b, c, and e. Refer to calc. No. L2.1.2.1 dated 12/14/76 (a) D+H+E Load combination d is not considered. Refer to FSAR (b) D+H+W Table 3.2-1, Note 1, for justification.
(c) D+H+El (d) D+H+Wt (e) D+FI l
D= dead load; H= lateral earth pressure; E=SSE; E =0BE; W= design wind load; W t= design basis Where:
l tornado; F = design basis flood B.1-3 (1106o)
t APPENDIX B-1 (Cont)
Civil / Structural (Cont)
Acceptability Yes No FSAR/ Licensing Commitment Covered By Design Document / Requirement l
i l
Buried Essential Service Water Piping -
Makeup lines 12" and 48" dia. X Analysis of buried ESW 48" dia. piping (min. 25')
(FSAR 2.5.4 Question 10.8)
Stability of subsurface materials and File EMD-033898, Oct. 21,1981 saismic refraction survey X
Groundwater control Dwg. M-900-2 & 3 Rev. E. outdoor piping backfill surveillance M-900-1,4,6,7,8,9,13 outdoor piping X
Evalua. tion of liquefaction FSAR Attachment 2.5H patential Slope stability SER licensing condition-groundwater monitoring letter-report l (FSAR 2.5.5) X
! To J.T. Westermeier (CECO) from R. J. Netzel (S&L) Dec. 15, 1983 File 1.1/3.3.5 f X Soil / structure interaction Q/R 241-1 thru 241-6 (FSAR 3.7.2)
B.1-4 (1.1060)
APPENDIX B-1 (Cont)
Control Systems Acceptability Covered By Design Document / Requirement Yes No FSAR/ Licensing Commitment X
Placing the local selector switch in the M-4042-lSX03 Rev. E 12/28/83 local operating position gives an 0-4030-SX09 Rev. F 2/10/84 annunciating alarm in the control room
( FSAR 7. 4.1. 2.1. d)
M-4042-lSX02 Rev. C 12/28/83 X Leak detection is provided by means of system flow and pressure drop instrumen- M-42 Sht. 5 Rev. T 9/12/83 tation and by means of leak detection sumps in tne auxiliary building basement.
Radiation monitors are provided to detect inleakage of radioactive material as discussed in Section 11.5.
(FSAR 9.2.1.2.4)
M-4042-1SX03 Rev. E 12/28/83 X A control switch is provided for each pump on the main control board 11-42 Sht.1 Rev. S 12/23/82 (FSAR 7.3.1.1.7.a)
X A transfer switch (remote, local) and a M-4042-lSX03 Rev. E 12/28/83 control switch are provided on the remote M-42 Sht.1 Rev. S 12/23/82 shutdown panel for each pump (FSAR 7.3.1.1.7.a)
X The pump can be started manually provided 11-4042-lSX03 Rev. E 12/28/83 that the pump suction val ~v e and RCFC inlet and outlet valves of the corresponding safety train are open
( FSAR 7.3.1.1.7.a.1 )
B .1 -5 (1106o)
\____
APPENDIX B-1 (Cont)
Control Systems (Cont)
Acceptability Ytts No
-FSAR/ Licensing Commitment Covered By Design Document / Requirement X
(he pump can be started automatically M-4042-1SX03 Rev. E 12/28/83 by a safety injection signal provided that the suction valve is open (FSAR 7.3.1.1.7.a.1 )
X Protective reles will trip the motor M-4042-1SX03 Rev. E 12/28/83 breaker open on over current conditions (FSAR 7.3.1.1.7.a.1 )
X Low suction pressure at the pump will trip M-4042-1SX03 Rev. E 12/28/83 the pump off the line automatically and 1-4030-SX01 Rev. J 2/21/84 will sound a low suction pressure alarm on the main control board (FSAR 7.3.1.1.7.a.1 )
X The pump can be stopped manually, provided 1-4030-SX01 Rev. J 2/21/84 the safeguards actuation relays are reset (FSAR 7.3.1.1.7.a.1 )
A pressure gauge and transmitter are M-42 Sht. 1 Rev. S 12/23/82 X provided in each pump discharge line M-2042 Sht. 2 Rev. E 12/28/83 for pressure indication locally and on the main control board (FSAR 7.3.1.1.7.a.2)
X An ammeter is provided on the main control 1-4030-SX01 Rev. L 2/18/84 board to display motor current (FSAR 7.3.1.1.7.a.3)
B.1-6 (11060)
7 APPENDIX B-1 (Cont) l I
Control Systems (Cont) 1.cceptability Covered By Design Document / Requirement Yes ,No l FSAR/ Licensing Commitment X
Bearing temperatures for each pump and 1-4031-SX07 Rev. A 12/10/80 l
motor are sensed by themocouples and monitored by the computer. Motor stator winding temperature is sensed by an RTD and monitored by the computer I
(FSAR 7.3.1.1.7.a.4) l X l A main control board alam is annunciated 0-4030-SX09 Rev. F 2/10/84
! whenever the transfer switch on the remote 4042-1SX08 Rev. C 12/28/84 shutdown panel is in the local position.
' Placing the main control board control switch in pull-to-lock provides a signal to the ESF display system (FSAR 7.3.1.1.7.a.5)
X A control switch is provided on the main fi-4042-1SX02 Rev. C 12/28/83 l board for each (suction) valve. Limit
! switches on each valve will provide (suction)
! valve position indication on the main
! control board l (FSAR 7.3.1.1.7.b)
X Two switches are provided on the main M-4042-1SX12 Rev. C 12/28/83 control board for each cooling tower M-4042-lSX13 Rev. C 12/28/83 fan, one for high speed and one for low speed (FSAR 7.3.1.1.7.h.1 )
B.1-7 (11060)
APPEN0lX B-1 (Cont)
Control Systems (Cont)
Acceptability Yes No FSAR/ Licensing Commitment Covered By Design Document / Requirement X
A control and transfer switch are provided M-4042-1SX12 Rev. C 12/28/83 for the fan low speed winding on the remote shutdown panel. A local control alarm is annunciated at the main control board whenever the transfer switch is placed in the local position (FSAR 7.3.1.1.7.h.2)
X Contacts on each circuit breaker are used M-4042-lSX12 Rev. C 12/28/83 to prevent both high and low speed breakers M-4042-lSX13 Rev. C 12/28/83 from being closed at the same time (FSAR 7.3.1.1.7.h. 3)
X The service water riser valve in the corres- M-42 Sht. 7 Rev. G 1/2/80 ponding cooling tower section must be fully H-4042-lSX12 Rev. C 12/28/83 cpen to start the fan M-4042-lSX13 Rev. C 12/28/83
~
(FSAR 7.3.1.1.7.h.4)
Category I level controllers (switches) are M-42 Sht. 6 Rev. V 4/4/84 X provided in each ESW cooling tower basin. H-4042-lSX08 Rev. C 12/28/84 In the event of low level in a cooling M-2042 Sht. 5 Rev. E 1 /1 6/81 tower basin, the corresponding makeup Byron Station Unit 1 Instrument pump is started Index (Blue) SX Rev. 34 Pg 12 3/30/84 (FSAR 9.2.5.5)
B.1-8 (1106o)
APPENDIX B-1 (Cont)
Control Systems-(Cont) ;
Acceptability Covered By Design Document / Requirement Yes No FSAR/ Licensing Commitment X
Annunciation is transmitted to the main M-4042-1SX08 Rev. C 12/28/83 control room indicating " engine trouble" 0-4030-SX09 Rev. F 2/10/84 (shutdown) for each engine 0 4030-SX23 Rev. F 12/9/83 (FSAR 9.2.5.5)
X A fail to start signal is also transmitted M-4042-1SX08 Rev. C 12/28/84 to the main control room if a diesel engine 0-4030-SX09 Rev. F 2/10/84 fails to start subsequent to receipt of 0-4030-SX23 Rev. F 12/9/83 an automatic signal to start 0-4030-SX24 Rev. C 11/20/80 (FSAR 9.2.5.5)
A Category I sensing element and temper- M-42 Sht. 7, Rev. G 1/2/80 X ature controller is provided for each M-42 Sht.1, Rev. S 12/23/82 cooling tower train for each unit. The Byron Station Unit 1 Instrument controller provides visual indication Index (Blue) SX Page 13 Rev. 54 of temperature in the control room 3/30/84 (FSAR 9.2.5.5)
X The controller also maintains the cooling S&L instrument data sheet TS 21 Rev. G 1/27/84 water temperature between 500 and 800F in the basins by operating the bypass valves B.1-9 .
(11060)
APPENDIX B-1 (Cont)
Equipment Qualification - Seismic Acceptability Yes No FSAR/ Licensing Commitment Covered By Design Document / Requirement Seismic Analysis of Pumps
( FSAR 3.9. 3. 2.1.1 )
Nozzle loads for the applicable Section 10.5 of Form 350-B, " Standard Specification for X plant conditions must be applied Seismic Qualification".
Analysis of interaction between Section 10.6 of Form 350-B, " Standard Specification for X pump and motor is considered Seismic Qualification".
For pumps having a natural Section 10.7 of Form 350-B, " Standard Specification for X frequency greater than 33 Hz, Seismic Qualification".
static analysis is acceptable.
For pumps with a natural fre-quency less than 33 Hz, a dynamic or pseudodynamic analysis is performed Seismic qualification of balance-of- Form 350-B " Standard Specification for Seismic Qualification" X plant safety-related mechanical equip- 9/19/75 ment (testing or analysis)
(FSAR 3.9.2.2.2)
Seismic qualification of pumps and Form 350-B " Standard Specification for Seismic Qualification" X motors (80P), reference IEEE-344-75 refers to latest revisions of IEEE standards listed in project (testing or analysis) purchase specification. IEEE-344 is referenced in purchase
( FSAR 3. 9. 3. 2.1.1 ) specifications. The Component Qualification Division checklist for seismic review indicates whether reports meet requirements of 344-75.
B.1-10 (11060)
- .- - - - - . .1 APPENDIX B-1 (Cont)
Equipment Qualification - Seismic (Cont)
Acceptab111ty Yes No FSAR/ Licensing Commitment Covered By Design Document / Requirement Design loading combination for ASE Form 350-B " Standard Specification for Seismic Qualification". X Code Class 2 and 3 components and Section 1.2.1 specifies the loading combinations for upset and supports (FSAR Table 3.9-5) faulted conditions.
Stress criteria for safety-related Form 350-8 " Standard Specification for Seismic Qualification" X ASME Class 2 and Class 3 vessels Section 10.3 states "The stress limits for nonactive fluid system (Reference ASIE III, Subsections NC equipment shall be as stated in the ASME BPVC Section III."
& ND or Code Case 1607) (Current revision per Form 350-B.)
(FSAR Table 3.9-6)
Stress criteria for ASME Class 2 and Form 350-B " Standard Specification for Seismic Qualification" X Class 3 inactive pumps and pump sup- Section 10.3 states ."The stress limits for nonactive fluid system ports (Reference ASME III, Subsec- equipment shall be as stated in the ASME BPVC Section III."
tions NC & ND or Code Case 1607) (Current revision per Form 350-B.)
(FSAR Table 3.9-7)
Design criteria for active pumps and Form 350-B, Section 10.3.2, " Stress Limits for Active Fluid System X pump supports (FSAR Table 3.9-8) Equipment", lists stress limits for upset and faulted conditions.
Upset stress limits reference ASME Section III. Faul ted Note: Stress limits specified are stress limits are held to emergency condition stress levels more restrictive than the ASME III specified in FSAR.
limits to provide assurance of opera-bility.
Stress criteria for safety-related Form 350-B " Standard Specification for Seismic Qualification". X ASME Code Class 2 and Class 3 inactive Section 10.3 states, "The stress limits for nonactive fluid system B0P valves (Reference ASME III, Sub- equipment shall be as stated in the ASME BPVC Section III."
sections NC and ND or Code Case 1635) (Current revision per Form 350-B.)
(FSAR Table 3.9-9)
B.1.11 (11060)
APPENDIX B-1 (Cont) f Equipment Qualification - Seismic (Cont)
Acceptability Yes No FSAR/ Licensing Commitment Covered By Design Document / Requirement X
80P design criteria for active valves Form 350-B, Section 10.3.2, " Stress Limits for Active Fluid System (Reference ASHE III Subsections NC3500 Equipment", lists stress limits for upset and faulted conditions.
and ND3500) (FSAR Table 3.9-10) Upset stress limits reference ASME Section III. Faulted stress limits are held to emergency condition stress levels specified in FSAR. ,
Applicant will comply with Purchase Spec. F/L 2884 attachment "E" (Limitorque motor X IEEE-382-1972 " Trial Use Guide for . operator) references IEEE-382-72.
the Type-Test of Class 1 Electric
, Yalve Operators for Nuclear Power Generating Stations".
(FSAR A1.73 Reg. Guide 1.73) 8.1-12.
(11060)
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APPENDIX B-1 (Cont)
Mechanical - Process Acceptability Yes No FSAR/ Licensing Commitment Covered By Design Document / Requirement X
TWo full-capacity coolers for each piece of P&ID M-42 Sh 1, Rev. S essential equipment are available in each P&ID M-42 Sh 3, Rev. AC unit (FSAR Table 9.2-2) P&ID M-42 Sh 4, Rev. AC ,
l P&ID M-42 Sh 5, Rev. T P&ID M-42 Sh 6, Rev. V P&ID M-42 Sh 7. Rev. G P&ID M-42 Sh 8, Rev. D S&L Design Criteria, DC-SX-01-BB., Rev. 3 System satisfies single-failure criteria P&ID M-42 Sh 1, Rev. S X since all its components are multiple and P&ID M-42 Sh 2, Rev. Y redundant. (FSAR 9.2.1.2.3) P&ID M-42 Sh 3, Rev. AC P&ID M-42 Sh 4, Rev. AC P&ID M-42 Sh 5, Rev. T P&ID M-42 Sh 6, Rev. V P&ID M-42 Sh 7, Rev. G P&ID M-42 Sh 8, Rev. D S&L Design Criteria, DC-SX-0?-BB, Rev. 3 P&ID M-42, Sh 1, Rev S X Leak detection is provided by means of flos and pressure drop instrumentation and by P&ID M-42, Sh 2, Rev. Y leak detection sumps in auxiliary buildin; P&ID M-42, Sh 3, Rev AC basement. (FSAR 9.2.1.2.4) P&ID M-42, Sh 4, Rev AC P&ID M-42, Sh 5, Rev T P&ID M-42, Sh 19, (FSAR fij 11.2-20)
P&ID M-42, Sh 28, (FSAR Fig.11.2-27)
B.1 -14 (1106o)
APPENDIX B-1 (Cont)
Mechanical - Process, (Cont)
Acceptability Covered By Desigr Document / Requirement 'Yes no FSAR/ Licensing Commitment P&ID M-42, Sh 1, Rev. S X Emergency power is available to each ESW pump from its respective ESF bus. (FSAR 9.2.1.2.2) One line diagrat 6E-1-4001 A, Rev. D l Scheme diagram 1-4030 SX01, Rev. J Scheme diagram 1-4030 SX02, Rev. J X
Pump suction supply is from basin located at S&L Calc No. SX-2-76. Rev.1 grade level of cooling towers. Pumps are 70 Outdoor Piping Dwg. No:
feet below grade in lowest area of auxiliary M-900, Sh 8 Rev. U building. Each pump has 81 feet of available M-900, Sh 9 Rev. N NPSH based on minimum basin water level and Aux. Bldg. Piping Plan Elev. 330'-0",
21 feet of friction loss in supply line. The M-206, Sheet 1, Rev. N 81 feet NPSH meets the 32 feet required by S&L Spec F-2758A, Amendment 2, 6/2/83 pumps at design capacity. (FSAR 9.2.1.2.3)
X ESW system, including supply lines, pumps, S&L Spec F-2758A, Amendment 2, 6/2/83 and return lines is designated Safety Class 1, S&L Spec F-2749, Amendment 1, 6/15/83 Quality Group C (FSAR 9.2.1.2.3) S&L Design Criteria, DC-SX-01-BB, Rev. 3 P&ID M-42, Sh 1, Rev. S P&ID M-42, Sh 2, Rev. Y P&ID H-42, Sh 3, Rev. AC PSID M-42, Sh 4, Rev. AC P&ID H-42, Sh 5, Rev. T P&ID M-42, Sh 6, Rev. V P&ID M-42, Sh 7, Rev. G B.1 -15 (11060) e
-- ~. -
APPENDIX B-1 (Cont)
' Mechanical - Process (Cont)
Acceptabili ty Yes No FSAR/ Licensing Commitment Covered By Design Document / Requirement-Each loop in each unit is supplied by a S&L Spec F-2758A, Amendment 2, 6/2/83 Bingham-Willamette Pump Performance Curve No.
single pump rated at 24,000 gpm at 180 X !
feet TDH ( FS AR 9. 2.1. 2. 2 ) 35484, 6/27/78 P&ID M-42 Sh 1, Rev S Discharges from each loop are separate P&ID M-42 Sh 2, Rev. Y .
P&ID M-42 Sh 7, Rev. G X and fed to two separate and redundant return lines to the cooling towers (FSAA 9.2.1.2.2) Piping Arrangement Dwg:
M-900 Sh 1A Rev AC M-900 Sh 1C Rev AH Each of the two pumps in a given unit takes P&ID M-42 Sh 1, Rev. S X suction from a separate supply line running P&ID M-42 Sh 6, Rev. Y from the cooling towers to the auxiliary Piping Arrangement Dwg:
building ( FSAR 9. 2.1. 2. 2 ) M-900 Sh 1A Rev AC M-900 Sh IC Rev AH P&ID M-42, Sh 3, Rev AC X Radiation monitors are proviced to detect inleakage of radioactive material P&ID M-42, Sh 5, Rev T (FSAR 9.2.1.2.4)
Rev. S X The crosstie header valves on the discharge P&ID M-42 Sh 1 of each pair of ESW pumps a:e powered from Scheme diagram 1-4030 SX13 Rev. C separate ESF buses (FSAR 9.2.1.2.2)
B.1-16 (11060)
APPENDIX B-1 (Cont)
Mechanical - Process (Cont)
Acceptability Covered By Design Document / Requirement Yes No FSAR/ Licensing Commitment P&ID M-42 Sh 1, Rev. S X-The suction line valves are each assigned to the same ESF bus as the associated pump Scheme diagram 1-4030 SX05, Rev. C (FSAR 9.2.1.2.2)
Design Criteria, DC-SX-01-BB, Rev. 3 X System is treated periodically to control organic slime buildup (FSAR 9.2.1.2.5) P&ID M-42 Sh 1, Rev. S P&ID M-42 Sh 6, Rev. V P&ID M-42 Sh 8, Rev. D.
Drawing M-42 (Sh 1-Rev S, Sh 2-Rev Y, Sh 3-Rev AC, X Only essential heat loads are rejected to the cooling towers during nonnal or Sh 4-Rev AC, Sh 5 - Rev T, Sh 6-Rev Y, Sh 7-Rev S emergency operation (FSAR 9.2.5.1) and Sh 8-Rev D)
Drawing M-42 (Sh 1-8, revision as noted above) X System diagram is provided as FSAR Figure 9.2-2 (FSAR 9.2.5.2) ,l l
X Each cooling tower is supplied by a separate Drawing M-42 (Sh 6-Rev V) cakeup train consisting of a pump and supply 1ine (FSAR 9.2.5.2)
X Deep well system is available as a Dwg M-83 (Sh 1-Rev D)
Seismic Category II, Quality Group D makeup system (FSAR 9.2.5.2)
B.1-17 (11060)
APPENDIX B-1 (Cont)
Mechanical - Process (Cont)
Acceptability Yes No FSAR/ Licensing Connitment Covered By Design Document / Requirement X
Onsite well system is not effected by a FSAR Table 2.4-12 and FSAR Figure 2.4-24, providing flood more severe than the combined event the defined flood levels and showing the deep well flood (FSAR 9.2.5.2) locations and elevations Dwg M-42 (Sh 7-Rev G) X Blowdown system for the towers is non-essential and is Seismic Category II (FSAR 9.2.5.2)
Failure of Oregon Dam concurrent with low SER 2.4.8 accepts the hydrology presented in X river discharge results in a Rock River FSAR 2.4.8 elevation of 664 ft asl (FSAR 9.2.5.3)
X A Category I temperature controller is pro- Dwg. M-4042-18x10-Rev C vided to activate each of two bypass valves Instrument Index, Byron Station Unit 1 (Blue),
per tower (FSAR 9.2.5.3) Rev 54 dated 3/30/84 Bypass valves open at 50* and close at 80* F S&L Instrument Data Sh$et TS21, Rev. G X (FSAR 9.2.5.3)
X The average wind speed across the tower basin is FSAR Chapter 2.3 Meteorological Data 10.7 mph (FSAR 9.2.5.3)
Specification F-2848 Amendnent 2 (2/9/79) X A 4.2 mph wind speed results from use of the half-speed fans (FSAR 9.2.5.3)
There are four cells per tower, each rated at Specification F-2848 Amendment 2 (2/9/79) X 13,000 gpm with a 98*F cold water supply temp, a 138*F post-accident return temp and a 78'F wet bulb (FSAR 9.2.5.3)
B.1-18 (11060)
APPENDIX B-1 (Cont)
Mechanical - Process (Cont)
Acceptability Covered By Design Document / Requirement Yes No FSAR/ Licensing Commitment X
Assuming loss of one tower, the second tower Specification F-2848 Amendment 2 (2/9/79), and can lose one cell and still provide adequate Memo: 8. H. Yee to J. C. Lavallee dated 3/18/75, cooling for one unit undergoing post LOCA file MAD 75-081 J cooldown & the other unit undergoing hot shutdown (FSAR 9.2.5.3)
Table 9.2.-6 shows heat loads rejected to Memo: B. H. Yee to J. C. Lavallee dated 3/18/75, X the tower for the unit undergoing post-LOCA file 1%D 75-081 cooldown (FSAR 9.2.5.3)
Figure 9.2-5 shows the energy input to Memo: B. H. Yee to J. C. Lavallee dated 3/18/75, X the containment vs. time (FSAR 9.2.5.3) file IMD 75-081 Figure 9.2-6 shows the heat removal rate Memo: B. H. Yee to J. C. Lavallee dated 3/18/75, X vs. time for one reactor containment fan file MAD 75-081 cooler and one RHR heater (FSAR 9.2.5.3)
Figure 9.2-7 shows the LOCA and cold Memo: B. H. Yee to J. C. Lavallee dated 3/18/75, X shutdown heat rejection rate to the file MAD 75-081 essential service water system (FSAR 9.2.5.3)
SER 2.4.8 accepts the meteorological data presented X Worst case 3 hr meteorology is 76*F wet bulb, 110*F dry bulb (FSAR 9.2.5.3) in FSAR 2.4.8 SER 2.4.8 accepts the meteorological data presented X Worst case 24 hr meteorology is 73*F average wet bulb, and 90.5'F average' dry bulb in FSAR 2.4.8 (FSAR 9.2.5.3)
B.1-19 (11060)
4 APPENDIX B-1 (Cont)
Mechanical - Process (Cont)
Acceptability FSAR/ Licensing Commitment Covered By Design Document / Requirement Yes No Based on above meteorology,10.4 gpm of Hemo: B. H. Yee to J. C. Lavallee dated 3/18/75, X drift losses,1000 ppm o TDS and continuous file MAD 75-081 heat rejection of 580x10{ Btu /hr post-LOCA:
24 hr 3 hr Evap rate, gpm 970.4 1092.4
- Blowdown rate, gpm 564.8 636.0
. Makeup rate, gpm 1545.6 1738.8
( FSAR 9. 2. 5. 3)
Worst case heat transfer to atmosphere of Memo: B. H. Yee to J. C. LaVallee dated 3/18/75, X 82*F wet bulb (3 hrs) results in a cold file MAD 75-081 water outlet temp of 94.g*F at a heat rejection rate of 580x10 based on predicted 1 tower perfonnance (FSAR 9.2.5.3) j SX makeup pumps can be started manually from M-4042-lSX08, Rev. C X j the control room, or locally at the river 0-4030-SX09, Rev. F
{
screenhouse, or automatically via level 0-4030-SX23, Rev. F controls in the cooling tower basins 0-4030-SX30, Rev. C (FSAR 9.2.5.3)
Category I level controllers are provided M-42 (Sheet 6, Rev. Y), M-4042-lSX08, Rev. C, X a in each essential service water cooling M-2042 (Sheet 5, Rev. E) and Byron Station Unit 1 tower basin (FSAR 9.2.5.5) Instrument Index (Blue), SX, Rev. 34, page 12 B.1-20 (11060)
APPENDIX B-1 (Cont)
Mechanical - Process (Cont)
Acceptabili ty Yes No FSAR/ Licensing Commitment Covered By Design Document / Requirement X
The SX makeup pump is automatically started Dwg il-4042-ISX08 Rev C upon low level in the corresponding tower basin (FSAR 9.2.5.5) 0-4030-SX24, Rev. C X Local alarms and shutdown equipment in the SX makeup pump diesel drivers are provided for: 0-4030-SX09, Rev. F
- High cooling water temp in closed cooling water system
- Low lubricating oil pressure
- Engine overspeed (FSAR 9.2.5.5)
Annunciation is transmitted to CR indicating M-4042-lSX08, Rev. C X engine trouble" for each SX makeup pump diesel 0-4030-SX09, Rev. F engine (FSAR 9.2.5.5) 0-4030-SX23, Rev. F l
B.1-21 (11060)
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Piping Engineering Acceptability Yes No FSAR/ Licensing Commitment Covered By Design Document / Requirement X
System is Safety Category I/ Quality Group C S&L P& ids (FSAR 9.2.1.2.3) M-42 Sheets 1-7 Mech. Dept S&L piping line list, page 147 (Rev. not shown)
Mech. Dept. S&L piping line 1f st, page 147 X Design basis Max temp 189"F (Design Spec DS/SX-01/BB Rev. 4)
Art. 403)
Design pressure 125 psig-pump shut Pump curve Bingham-Willamette #35437 '
off head 115 psig Piping materials (Not in FSAR) S&L piping design, Table 1058B Rev. E,1.1 & 1.2 X 1/28/77 Piping joints (Not in FSAR) S&L Piping Design Table 10588 Rev. E 1/28/77 Type of fabrication X X
Relief valves Piping design spec D.^-SX-01-BB Rev. 4 (none) 12/22/83 X
All valve bodies B/ll-Carbon steel- S&L piping design Table 105BB Rev. E stellite or stainless steel trim (Not in FSAR)
B.1-23 (11060)
APPENDIX B-2 DESIGN ADEQUACY Civil / Structural Acceptability l Areas Reviewed Yes No For Adequacy Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comments River Screenhouse AISC Manual, Structural Calculation 2.1.1.14, structural X Structural steel design, Calculation design criteria steel framing included revised 2.1.1.14 response spectra and loads due to the increased responses as a result of NRC Q130.9 & 130.9A.
Substructure Calc. ACI' 318.71, Structural Calculation 2.1.2.7, page 18 X 2.1. 2. 7 design criteria indicates that OBE loads are not considered with the screenhouse partially dewatered. 110 wever, since the water level drops down only during building maintenance and the system will not be in operation, the calculation assumption is reasonable.
Substructure Calc. Structural design cri- Cal c. 2.1. 2. 7, Rev. O, considers the X 2.1.2, Rev. O teria dynamic water pressure effects of Dynamic water pressure the vertical earthquake component.
The formulas given on page 12-6 of the structural design criteria were used in the calculations and are acceptable based on information given in References 83 and 84, Sec. 2.5.7 of the FSAR.
B.2-1 (11010)
APPENDIX B-2 (Cont)
Civil / Structural (Cont) l acceptaoiii ty Areas Reviewea Yes No For Adequacy Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comments River Screenhouse (Cont)
Check a sample of AISC Handbook Eighth Ed. Calc. 2.1.1.6, pg 5. Our indepen- X fillet welds design dent check of fillet weld shear har to plate. for combined shear force &
bending indicated a 10% overstress which was determined to be within acceptable range.
Structural steel de- Structural design cri- Calc. 2.1.1.16, page 2 infers underdesigned X sign of floor beams teria, AISC Handbook condition, but this is misleading.
The revised cross sections are included in Calc. 2.1.1.17, pg. 6, Rev. 2.
Horizontal steel The stresses and strains of Calc. No. 2.1.1.2 dated 1/27/77 bracing members structural steel are limit-at el. 744-4, ed to those specified in Design of horizontal steel bracing X 716-0, 702-0 and AISC specification, members is reviewed. The forces in 699-6 the bracing members are computed and No overstress is allowed for 2L3x3x14 are provided for all brac-severe environmental load ing members. It is verified to be f combination. The allowable adequate by independent calculation.
loads are increased to 1.6 times the AISC allowable but not more than 0.95 times the steel yield strength for abnormal, extreme environmental, B.2-2 (11010)
APPENDIX B-2 (Cont)
Civil / Structural (Cont)
Acceptabili ty Areas Reviewed Yes No For Adequacy Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comments River Screenhouse (Cont)
Hori zontal . . . (Cont) abnormal / severe environ-mental and abnonnal/ extreme environmental load combina-tions.
The steel yield strength can be actual average material yield strength based on mill certiff-cation.
Design of column Same as in previous item Calc. No. 2.1.1.14, page 255, dated 2/24/82. X base plate Bending stress in the base plate for column A-1 seems to exceed the committed allowable of (0.95 Fy) = 40.2 ksi.
Our independent calculations indicate that a thicker base plate is required.
X Design of concrete The allowable stresses and Portions of Calculations structures, walls, strains of various struc- 2.1.2.1 thru 2.1.2.12 are slabs and mat tural components are based reviewed. The design is foundation on the ultimate strength found to be generally ade-design provisions in quate ACI-318.
B.2-3 (11010)
APPENDIX B-2 (Cont)
Civil / Structural (Cont)
Acceptabili ty Areas Reviewed Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comments Yes No
- For Adequacy River Screenhouse (Cont)
Factor of safety Factor of safety shall be Calc. No. 2.1.2.1 dated 12/14/76 against flotation 1.1 minimum.
overturning and Factor of safety against flotation X sliding overturning and sliding under various loading condition is in excess of 1.2.
Stability of Subsurface and Slope River screenhouse, makeup line & deep wells Envelopes of three FSAR 2.5.4.8.3.4, Calculations related to HRC Question X earthquakes to study Minimum factor of safety 241.4 & response presented in the liquefaction effects specified below foundation SER,Q241.4-1 level is 1.7.
Ex'ansion p Anchors Refer to Appendix A-1 (expansion anchors) X B.2-4 (11010)
APPENDIX B-2 (Cont)
Civil / Structural (Cont)
Acceptability Areas Reviewed Yes No For Adequacy Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comments Buried Essential Service Water Piping -
fukeup lines 12" and 48" dia.
Pipe stresses ASME Section III EMD File 033898 Appendix A indicates that X due to 0BE shear wave velocities were assumed higher and SSE than the test data, resulting in pipe stress reduction of factor of safety by 10% but it is Soil / structure negligible since the lowest FS = 4.5.
interaction -
liquefaction potential X Groundwater level should A system of four observation wells was be below El. 840 ft (msl) installed indicating levels below El 809 ft.
B.2-5 (11010)
APPENDIX B-2 (Cont)
.s Control Systems Acceptabili ty Areas Reviewed flo Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comments Yes For Adequacy X l Seismic instrument ASME B&PV Section III Procedure / calculation EMD tube span calculation Article IJC-3650 015140, Rev. 4 Calc. DID 015139, Rev. O Calc. D1D 030898, Rev. O Calc. EMD 030653, Rev. O Calc. DID 019583, Rev. O Calc. 010 042097, Rev. ,0 e
i
\
s 1
4 h
s 4 9 B.2-6 (11010)
APPENDIX B-2 (Cont)
Equipment Qualification-Seismic Areas Reviewed Acceptability For Adequacy Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comments Yes No Qualification report IEEE-344-1975 CQD File 012090 Rev. 0 X temperature switch Purch. Spec. F/L 2906 CQ0 File 012462 Rev. O supplier - United Wyle Report # 17619-1 Electric. (Inst. #'s OTS-SX090 through
-SX093)
Qualification report IEEE-344-1975 EMD File 013705 X ESW cooling tower fan Purch. Spec. F/L 2848 EMD File 014044 motor Supplier - Reliance Electric Qualification report IEEE-344-1975 EMD File 019783, Wyle Report X 200 hp water make-up Purch. Spec. F/L 2891 # 44490-1 (Note - Revised 1982 pump drive and control river screenhouse spectra were panel considered. )
Supplier - Stewart &
Stevenson Services Qualification report IEEE-344-1975 CQD File 006450 Rev. 0 X Limitorque motor IEEE-382-1972 operators - generic Purch. Specs. F/L 2718, qualification 2794, 2884 B.2-7 (11010)
APPENDIX B-2 (Cont)
Mechanical - Process Areas . Reviewed Acceptability ~~
For Adequacy Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comments Yes No System redundancy to All essential components Design Criteria DC-SX-01-BB Rev. 3 and FSAR X satisfy single-failure are multiple and redun- Table 9.2-1 ( Amendment 43) have been reviewed and dant compared to P&ID H-42 Sh 1 to 8 for general com-pleteness and consistency in meeting the component redundancy requirement. Safety Category I Class C components in the ESW system are redundant as re-flected in P&ID H-42 except as follows:
a) P&ID M-42 Sh 2, Rev. Y. The redundant CCW heat exchanger is actually on standby which is a backup to both Units 1 and 2. If ESW train A failed during a LOCA or LOP / shutdown, the backup CCW HX will be -
re-aligned ta ESW- train B, thus, meeting the redundan-cy requircpent.
b) P&ID H-42, Sh. 3 Rev. AC- Train A provides cool-ing to the motor-driven AFW pump cooler unit while train B provides cooling to the engine-driven AFW pump unit. This arrangement of redundancy meets the commitment.
c) P&ID H-42 Sh 3, Rev. AC - The primary containment refrigeration unit, although redundant, is not a safety-related ~ component and is isolated (Logic diagram H-042-lSX06 Rev. C) during LOCA/ LOP.
This is only needed during normsl operation as indicated in FSAR Table 9.2-1.
B.2-8 (11010)
APPE!JDIX B-2 (Cont)
Mechanical - Process (Cont)
Areas Reviewed Acceptabili ty For Adequacy Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comments Yes flo d) P&ID H-42 Sh 4, Rev. AC - Positive displacement
! charging pump cubicle cooler is only connected to train A. However, this is only needed during normal operation as shown in FSAR Table 9.2-1. This can also be cooled by train B via interties during normal mode. During LOCA/ LOP, the redundant centrifugal charging pumps start upon receipt of a safety injection signal.
e) P&ID M-42 Sh 4, Rev. AC-Spent fuel pit pump cubicle coolers are connected to train B. Like the other cubicle coolers, this can also be cooled by train A
! via interties during normal operation. As shown in i FSAR Figure 9.1-8 (P&ID M-63), Amendment 37, and para. 9.1.3.2, Amendment 43, the Safety Category I spent fuel pool cooling system consists of two complete trains, one per unit. Each train is designed to service the spent fuel pool.
The system is not directly associated with either plant start-up, nonnal operation or shutdown but is operated when there is a need to cool, clarify or purify the pool water. Thus, although there is no redundancy within the unit, there is a 100% redundancy in relation to the other unit.
i B.2-9 (11010)
APPENDIX B-2 (Cont)
Mechanical - Process (Cont)
Acceptability Areas Reviewed Yes No For Adequacy Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comments X
Each ESW pump per loop The specified capacity and (a) P&ID M-42-Sh 1, Rev. S, reflects single pump is rated at 24,000 gpm TDH should be adequate to per loop arrangement.
at 180 feet TDH support the system re-quirement (b) Bingham-Willamette pump performance curve No. 35484 (6/27/78) demonstrates the specified capacity and TDH of .the pump.
(c) Design Criteria DC-SX-01-BB, Rev. 3 and Spec F-2758A, Amendment 2, 6/2/83 specifies pump rating at 24,000 gpm at 180 feet TDH. Pump adequacy has been confinned in the pre-operational test No. 2.76.10, ESW, Rev. 2.
X Discharges from each Separation of loops should (a) Separate discharge line arrangement is re-ESW loop are separate be demonstrated flected in Drawings M-900 Sh. l A, Rev. AC and with redundant return Sh.1C, Rev. AH as well as P&ID H-42 Sh. 2, Rev. Y lines to the cooling and Sh. 7 Rev. G.
system (b) Interties between the two loops downstream of the ESW pumps are provided with double isolation valves, thus meeting the separation criteria.
(Note that each of the discharge headers going to the cooling tower is also being shared by the corresponding loop from Unit 2).
X Each ESW pump in a Separate suction lines (a) P&ID H-42 Sh.1 Rev. S and Sh. 6 Rev. V reflect given unit takes suc- should be demonstrated the separate suction line arrangement.
tion from a separate supply line from the (b) Piping arrangement Dwg H-900, Sh. lA, Rev. AC and cooling tower to the Sh.1C Rev. AH also reflect this arrangement, auxiliary building B.2-10 (11010) .
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APPENDIX B-2 (Cont)
Mechanical - Process (Cont)
Areas Reviewed Acceptability For Adequacy Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comments Yes No (c) P&ID M-42, Sh.1 shows the branching of each suction header to the corresponding Units 1 and 2 ESW pumps.
ESW pump suction supply NPSH available should meet (a) Piping drawings M-900, Sh. 8, Rev. U and St. 9, X from the cooling tower or exceed the 32 feet NPSH Rev. N, and M-206 Sh.1, Rev N, indicate the rela-basin to the pump lo- required tive location of the suction inlet at the cooling cated at auxiliary tower and the ESW pumps at El 330'0" building provides the required HPSH (b) S&L Calc. No. SX-2-76, Rev.1, estimated the available NPSH = 84.43 ft which sufficiently exceeds the required NPSH of 32 ft at rated con- '
dition.
(c) Bingham-Willamette pump performance Curve No.
35484, 6/27/78, confirms the required NPSH to be 32 feet at rated capacity (40 feet at 31,000 gpm)
(d) S&L Spec F-2758A, Amendment 2, 6/2/83, speci-fied minimum available NPSH = 40 feet. For pro-l curement purposes, this value is acceptable pro-vided the vendor accepted it. In this case the vendor, Bingham-Willamette, required 32 feet NPSl1 at rated capacity.
B. 2-11 (11010)
APPENDIX B-2 (Cont)
Mechanical-Stress Areas Reviewed Acceptability For Adequacy Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comments Yes No Loading combinations, Loading combinations meet Stress calculation report ISX-16, Rev. 04F0 has complied X design transients and the stress limits speci- with the load combinations and stress limits set by the stress limits fled in FSAR 3.9.3.1 FSAR commitments Piping design specifica- To meet the requirements The piping design specification for indoor ESW system, X tion of NA-3250, ASME Section DS-SX-01-BB, Rev. 4 is in accordance with the require- ,
III Code ments of the ASME Code.
Calculation of ESW Stress Calculation ISX-16, Rev. 04F0 piping system
- Code compliance 1974 ASME Code through Stress calculation has complied with the Code require- X Summer 1975 Addenda ments.
- Seismic modeling of Adequacy of modeling Proper modeling is used for mass point spacing X piping techniques for mass Decoupling practice based on the run to branch pipe point spacing based on moment of inertia ratio greater than 7 is acceptable.
the cut-off frequency of 33 Hz. Coupled analysis for run to branch pipe moment of inertia ratio less than 10.
- ASME Code stress ASME Code,Section III, The calculation report includes a summary of all the X allowables Subsection NC-3600. loading conditions for the piping and piping components.
The stress results comply with the Code requirements.
- Pipe support design Adequate data for the Pipe support design loads and displacements summary is X loads and displace- design of pipe supports provided in the calculation report.
ments B . 2-12 (11010)
APF2NDIX B-2 (Cont)
Mechanical-Stress (Cont)
Acceptability Areas Reviewed Yes No For Adequacy Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comments
- Seismic response The input spectra for The stress calculations report ISX-16, Rcy. 04F0 was X spectra the analysis should con- reviewed for the use of appropriate spectra identified form to the response in " Response Spectra Design Criteria", DC-ST-04-88, spectra design criteria. Rev. 2 and " Lesson Plan", D4D-TP-2, Rev. 4. These spectra curves were reviewed and found to be in agreement with the input spectra used in the analysis except for the SSE N-S direction where the analysis used a more conservative spectrum.
B. 2-13 (11010)
APPENDIX B-2 (Cont)
Piping Engineering Acceptabili ty Areas Reviewed No For Adequacy Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comments Yes Piping Design Spec. DS-SX-01-BB, X Codes & standards ASME Sec. III, B&PV Code 1974 Addenda Sammer of 1975 Rev. 4, Art. 301 & 302 & 303 Code cases Reg. Guides 1.84 & l.85 Design Spec. DS-SX-01-BB, Rev. 4, X Art. 303; Spec F/L 2741 - F/L 2739 Design Spec. DS-SX-01-BB, Rev. 4, X Materials Piping design tables-F/L 2741 Art. 503 & design tables X
Wall thickness Press / temp regats 10588 & 1505BB-Tables & Art. 402 Hati stress regmts of Design Spec. DS-SX-01-BB, Rev. 4 X
Fittings F/L2741-Lgr than 2" Tables 105BB & Art. 402 of F/L 2739 2" a under Design Spec. DS-SX-01-BB, Rev.4 Fabrication F/L2741 - Lgr than 2" F/L 2741, F/L 2739, Design Spec. X F/L2739 - 2" & under DS-SX 01-88, Rev. 4
\
Design Spec. DS-SX-01-BB, Rev. 4 X Overpressure protection ASME Sec. III,1974 &
Summer 1975 Addenda Div 8 Design Spec. DS-SX-01-BB, Rev. 4, X Inspection / stamping ASME Sec. III,1974 &
Summer 1975 Addenda Art. 305 Design Spec. DS-SX-01-BB Rev. 4 X Hydrotest regmt. ASME Sec. III 1974 &
Summer 1975 Addenda Code data report ASHE Sec. III,1974 & See Inspection / stamping X Summer 1975 Addenda Note: All piping components are carbon steel B.2-14 (11010)
l APPEllDIX B-2 (Cont)
Piping Engineering (Cont)
Acceptability Areas Reviewed Yes No For Adequacy Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comments Line Valves *
(*Does not apply to control, safety or relief valves)
Codes & standards ASME III B&PV Code-1974, Design Spec. F-2718-01, Art 108.1 X Addenda Summer of 1975 &
ANSI B16.5 Design Spec. F-2718-01, Art 108.1 X Code cases Reg guides 1.84 & 1.85 X
Materials (pressure boundary) ASME III B&PV Code 1974 & Piping Design Tables 10588 & 15058B Summer 1975 Addenda Note: S&L Response to FSAR Question 110.57 states that disc is not pres-sure boundary Construction rgets. ASME III B&PV Code 1974 & Design Spec. F-2718-01, Art. 301 &
Summer 1975 Addenda Art.110.11 Requirements & Art. 301.6 X
ltydrotesting ASME III B&PV Code 1974 & Design Spec. F2718-01, Art.110.llg Summer 1975 Addenda Code data reports ASME III B&PV Code 1974 & Design Spec. F2718-01, Art.110.10 X l Summer 1975 Addenda i
Stress reports ASME III B&PV Code 1974 & Design Spec. F-2718, Art.110.10. X Summer 1975 Addenda B. 2-15 (11010)
APPENDIX B-2 (Cont)
Piping Engineering (Cont) l Acceptability Areas Reviewed Yes No For Adequacy Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comments Containment penetrations l Codes & standards ASE III B&PV Code-1974 Design Spec. F-2787 (6-23-83) Art.108 X
& Art. 303 Design Spec. F-2787 (6/23/83) X Code cases Reg. Guides 1.84 & l.85 Art.108-Dwg. M-197 Design Spec. F-2787 (6-23-83) X flaterials ASIE III B&PV Code 1974 Art. 304 - Dwg. M-197 Design Spec F-2787 (6/23/83) X Construction rgnts. ASE III B&PV Code 1974 Art.110.10-111.3 & Dwg. M-197 Design Spec F-2787 (6/23/83) X Code data reports ASE III B&PV Code 1974 Art.111. 3(a)
Design Spec F-2787 (6/23/83) X Penetration type / class ASE III B&PV Code Class 2 & HC Art. lli.3(a)
Design spec F-2787 (6/23/83) X Stress report ASE III B&PV Code 1974 Art. Ill.3(a)
Data report ASE III B&PV Code Design Spec F-2788 (6/23/83) X 1974 Art,111.3 (d)2 B.2-16 (11010)
APPENDIX B-2 (Cont)
Plant Design Acceptability Areas Reviewed Yes No For Adequacy Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comments SX System Inside Containment
- Pipe Whip M-155 Sh.1 of 2 Rev. L Li ne No.
1 SX 07EA-14" Line not damaged Reviewed high energy line IMS01AA-30.25" &
1 SX 07EB-14" INSOIAD-30.25" for pipe ship effects on SX 1 SX 08AA-10" system. Figure 3.6-32 in FSAR Sect. 3.6 shows 1 SX 08Cll-4" break & restraint locations for IMS01AD-30.25" 1 SX 07EB-14" Break No. Code
C-9X B (P-11) X 1 SX 06Gil-4" X 1 SX 07BA-10" C-11 B (P-11)
C-12 B (P-15, P-10) X X
C-15 B (P-10)
C-16 B (P-14) X X
C-16A (P-14)
- Codes For Review of Documents A. Pipe whip poses no danger (i.e.: whips in safe direction, protected by barrier).
B. Pipe whip restraint No. ( ~~~)required to protect essential system.
C. Essential system could be damaged by high energy pipe due to lack of existing restraint. i B-2-17 l
(11010)
APPENDIX B-2 (Cont)
Plant Design (Cont)
Areas Reviewed Acceptability For Adequacy Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Coments Yes No SX System Inside Containment
- Pipe Whip Figure 3.6-29 in FSAR Sect. 3.6 shows break and M-155 Sh.1 of 2 Rev. L (Cont) restraint locations for IMS01AA-30.25" Break No. Code
- C-1 (P-1) X C-2 B (P-3) X C-3 8 (P-3) X C-4 B (P-7) X C-7 B (P-2) X C-8 B (P-6) X C-8A (P-6) X B. 2-18 (11010)
APPENDIX B-2 (Cont)
Plant Design (Cont)
Areas Reviewed Acceptabili ty For Adequacy Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comments Yes No SX System Inside Containment
-Pipe Whip M-155 Sh. 2 of 2 Rev. J llo SX piping on this drawing X M-156 sh.1 of 2 Rev. K Line No.
1 SX 07CB-10" Line not damaged Reviewed piping and found no high energy lines in X 1 SX 0788-10" this area.
1 SX 06EB-10" 1 SX 07AP-4" 1 SX 09CB-10" 1 SX 07EB-14" M-155 Sh. 2 of 2 Rev. J l SX 07EA-14" Line not damaged Reviewed piping and found high energy lines X 1MSOAC-30.25", I FWO3DC-16", I FWO3DB-16" and IFW87CB-6" for pipe whip effects on SX system.
Figures 3.6-31, 3.6-30, 3.6-27, 3.6-26, 3.6-28c &
3.6-28b in FSAR Section 3.6 show break and restraint locations.
H-156 Sh. 2 of 2 Rev. J No SX piping on this drawing X B.2-19 (11010) c
APPENDIX B-2 (Cont)
Plant Design (Cont)
Acceptabili ty Areas Reviewed Yes No For Adequacy Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comments SX System Inside Containment
-Pipe Whip M-157 Sh.1 of 2 Rev. N Line No.
1 SX 07AQ-4" Line not damaged Reviewed piping and found no high energy lines in X 1 SX 06GQ-4" close proximity.
1 SX 06DC-10" 1 SX 07CC-10" 1 SX 07BC-10" 1 SX 07EA-14" 1 SX 08CQ-4" 1 SX 08AC-10" 1 SX 09AQ-4" ,
i SX 09CC-10" M-157 Sh.1 of 2 Rev. N Line No.
1 SX 07FA-16" Line not damaged Reviewed piping and found high energy line X 1CVOIE-3" routed 4'0" below. In accordance with FSAR 3.6.2.3.3.3, no line break will occur because line hitting equal or larger lines of the same schedule will not cause failure of line being hit.
H-157 Sh. 2 of 2 Rev. L X
No SX piping on this drawing B.2-20 (11010)
APPENDIX B-2 (Cont)
Plant Design (Cont)
Acceptability Areas Reviewed Yes No For Adequacy Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comments SX System Inside Lentainment
-Pipe Whip M-158 Sh.1 of 2 Rev. M Line No.
1 SX 07EB-14" Line not damaged Reviewed piping and found no high energy lines in X 1 SX 07BD-10" close proximity.
1 SX 07AR-4" 1 SX 08CR-4" 1 SX 08AD-10" 1 SX 09AR-4" 1 SX 06D0-10" H-158 Sh. 2 of 2 Rev. K X
No SX piping on this drawing H-161 Sh.1 of 1 Rev. L Line No.
1 SX 08AA-10" Line not damaged Reviewed piping and found no high energy lines in X 1 SX 06CB-14" close proximity.
1 SX 06EA-10" M-162 Sh.1 of 1 Rev. L Line No 1 SX 06CA-14" Line not damaged Reviewed piping and found no high energy lines in X 1 SX 06C8-10" close proximity.
_ - ~ ._ _. - __
APPENDIX B-2 (Cont)
Plant Design (Cont)
Acceptability Areas Reviewed Yes No For Adequacy Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comments SX System Inside Containment
-Pipe Whip H-163 Sh.1 of 1 Rev. N Line No 1 SX 06CA-14" Line not damaged Reviewed piping and found no high energy lines in X 1 SX 08AC-10" close proximity.
1 SX 06DC-10" 1 SX 06BA-16" 1 SX 07FA-16" M-164 Sh.1 of 1 Rev. L Line No.
1 SX 06BB-16" Line not damaged Reviewed piping and found no high energy lines in X 1 SX 07FB-16" close proximity.
1 SX 06DD-10" 1 SX 08AD-10" 1 SX 06CB-14" H-165 Sh.1 of 2 Rev. L X
No SX piping an this drawing M-166 Sh.1 of 2 Rev. K X
No SX piping on this drawing B.2-22 (11010)
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APPENDIX B-3 ADEQUACY OF DESIGN PROCESS Civil / Structural Acceptabili ty Yes No Design Process Reviewed Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comments River Screenhouse S&L's General Quality Assurance Procedure X Design process for sub- General Q/A Hanual Pro-structure reinforced cedure GQ-3.08, Rev. 4 GQ-3.08, Rev. 4, Sections 3.0 " Preparation, concrete design Review & Approval" (A.1) and 4.0 " Revisions" do not appear to have been complied with as explained below.
Reinforced concrete Calc. 2.1.2 was performed in 1976 based on seismic forces obtained from finite element representation of soil media.
As a result of NRC Q130.9 & 9A, the seismic analysis of the structural steel was reviewed in 1981. The new response spectra and forces were transmitted from the Structural Analysis Division to the Structural Engineering . Division through controlled criteria DC-ST-04-BB.
However, the Structural Engineering Division e failed to provide any evidence of reviewing the reinforced concrete calculations for the increased loads.
Revision 2 of Calculation 2.1.2 was transmitted for IDR team review on 5/21/84. Although this calculation is still under review, IDR concurs tentatively with S&L that the design of the
~ reinforced concrete substructure is adequate.
However, it should be noted that a subsequent qualification of the piping and components is in progress.
B.3-1 C1010)
APPENDIX B-3 (Cont)
Civil / Structural (Cont) i Acceptability Design Process Reviewed Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comments Yes No Buried Essential Service Water Piping
- Makeup lines 12" and 48" dia. "
Design of makeup pipes, ASME Section III FSAR Attachement 2.5H X concrete encasement, Stresses The pipe design is done hy trench excavation, ACI-318-71 Engineering Mechanics Div.
backfill, compaction ASTM-D1557 and reviewed by same independently.
testing FSAR 2.5.4.5.1.4 Drawings are produced by the Project Mechanical Group showing geotechnical design for backfill and testing, and structural design of concrete encasement of the ESW pipes.
B.3-2 (11010)
_. _ _ _ . ~ . _
APPENDIX B-3 (Cont)
Civil / Structural (Seismic)
Acceptability Design Process Reviewed Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comments Yes No Evaluation of steel and/or All the structural members Project Instruction PI-BB-34 " Documentation X concrete structural members should be evaluated for any of Hanger Loads" is reviewed.
for attachment loads such as major attachment loads.
pipe hangers, cable trays, conduits, ducts, etc Minor attachment loads should be provided for in miscellaneous uniform load or in the design live load.
Evaluation of equipment Equipment foundation should Project Instruction PI-8B-43 " Equipment X foundation and preparation be designed for most cri- Foundation Evaluation" is reviewed.
of equipment foundation de- tical load combinations and tails the supporting member should be evaluated for the reac-tions Equipment foundation de-tails should be shown on
- the structural drawings.
Seismic response spectra for Refer to Appendix A-3 (Seismic)
Category I structures and components B.3-3 (11010)
APPENDIX B-3 (Cont)
Mechanical - Process Acceptabili ty Design Process Reviewed Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comments Yes no ESW pump design The specified ESW 1) Calc. No. SX1-75 Rev. O, 3/24/75 established X pump design rating, preliminary pump rating of 26,000 gpm at 155 ft as committed to in TDH.
FSAR 9. 2.1.2.2, i.e. , 24,000 gpm at 2) Design Criteria DC-SX-01-BB, Rev. 3. Initially X 180 feet TDH, should issued Rev. O on 4/30/75 for comments, the be demonstrated latest revision reflects pump rating at 24,000 satistactory for the gpm at 180 ft TDH.
ESW system.
- 3) Calc. No. SX2-76, Rev. O,12/30/76. Provided X more detailed calculation, pump rated at 24,000 gpm at 180 feet TDH.
- 4) S&L Spec. F-2758A, Amendment 2, 6/2/83. This X ESW pump spec. was issued Revised, 5/27/76.
Amendment I was issued 5/4/77 reflecting the design capacity at 24,000 gpm at 180 feet TDH.
- 5) Calc. SX2-76, Rev.1, 4/20/84. This supersedes X SX2-76 Rev.0; SX1-75, Rev. O, further demon-strates the adequacy of the procured ESW pump.
I', 25W pump performance curve No. 35484, 6/27/78, X which is attached to Calculation SX2-76, Rev.1, meets the specified pump capacity / head of 24,000 gpm at 180 feet TDH.
B.3-4 (11010)
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APPENDIX B-4 DESIGN INTERFACES WITH WESTINGHOUSE AND NUCLEAR POWER SERVICES Civil / Structural Acceptabili ty Yes No Company Interface Reviewed Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comments Westinghouse Loads transferred to struc- Project Instruction PI-BB-34 " Documentation of X Electric Corp. tural members by hangers Hanger Loads" is reviewed within the scope of Westing- .q house Electric Corp.
X Nuclear Power Loads transferred to struc- Same as above Services tural members by hangers within the scope of Nuclear Power Services.
l B.4-1 (11010)
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APPENDIX B-5 DESIGN CHANGE CONTROL Mechanical - Stress Area of Change Acceptability Control Reviewed Documents / Procedures Reviewed and Comments Yes No Sample calculation of Stress calculation report No. ISX-16, Rev. 04F0 ESW piping system FCRs/ECNs The pertinent FCRs/ECNs have been addressed and the recon- X ciliation practice is acceptable. The applicable documents are listed in Appendix A-3.
B.5-1 (11010)
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APPENDIX B-6 SARGENT & LUNDY DESIGN REVIEWS Civil / Structural Acceptability S&L Design Review S&L Review Report Reviewed and Comments Yes No Byron river screenhouse foundation Report # DRR-SD-041-BY, Rev. O. X (substructure) and sheet piling. The review was perforued on 6/8/77 by SAD. We agree Calculation # 2.1.2, Rev. O with the review consideration and comments presented in this report.
(Please note this review was performed for the unrevised q concrete calc. "Rev. 0".
Seismic analysis - river screenhouse Review report #DRR-SD-053-88, Rev. O. The error in X Calc. 4.2.1, Item No. 3. the input data for the damping value is determined The calculation mainly covers soil- to be on the conservative side.
structure interaction analysis tsing the finite element approach cnd the SHAKE computer program.
Original cales were performed by SES Division and review was performed by SA Division.
System & structure design review of Review report #DRR-SD-076-BB, Rev. O. Since the river X river screenhouse - structure has been strengthened, changes to seismic soil structure interaction (SSI) models were addressed. Calculation # 8-11-4.2, cnalysis by soil spring method. Rev.1 incorporated the adoition of bracing in the revised model.
This analysis was perfomed as a response to URC Question 130.9 and 9A; analysis was performed by SAD cnd review performed by SESD. ,
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APPENDIX C-1 IDEM f/ *5 . A TMF'a HON OF COMMITMENTS AND CRITERIA Civil / Structural (Seismic)
Acceptability Covered By Design Document / Requirement Yes No FSAR/ Licensing Commitment Seismic Design & Analysis Seismic input motion & response Refer to Appendix A-1 (Seismic Design and Analysis) X spectra (FSAR 2.5.2, 3.7.1.1
& 3.7.1.2 & NRC Reg. Guide 1.60, NRC Q130.5,130.6,130.6a)
X Damping values used (FSAR 3.7.1.3 & WCAP-7921. _.,
May 1974)
X Use of constant vertical static factors (FSAR 3.7.3.10)
Torsionai s! Tects of eccentric X masses (F5Ax 3.7.3.11)
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APPENDIX C-1 (Cont)
Electrical Acceptability FSAR/ Licensing Commitment Covered By Design Document / Requirement Yes No FSAR 8.1.6; 8.3.2.1; Table 8.1-1; Table 14.2-13; Appendix A; Q40.72; Q40.182 SER 8.1 10CFR50, GDC 5,17,18 IEEE 308-1974; NRC RG 1.32, Rev. 2 Redundancy of load groups These licensing commitments X are covered by following Independence of safety actions by design documents: X cach redundant load group
- Design criteria Power supplies to each redundant
- Single-line diagrams X load group
- Key diagrams
- Logic diagrams Connon. power supply to redundant
- Design calculations X load groups
- Equipment specifications
- S&L standards Common failure mode
- Schematic diagrams X Provision of protective devices For identification of X to limit degradation of Class 1E these documents refer to power system Appendix C-2 Battery supply -
- Availability X
- Independence of each battery X supply C.1-3 (10990)
APPENDIX C-1 (Cont)
Electrical (Cont)
Acceptability FSAR/ Licensing Commitment Covered By Design Document / Requirement Yes No Battery charger supply - Refer to design documents listed on page C.1-3
- Disconnecting means X
- Feedback protection in case of X loss of ac power to chargers Distribution system -
- Independence of circuits to X redundant equipment
- Auxiliary devices X
- Feeder between Class lE power X system and system located in non-safety class structure C.1-4 (10990)
APPENDIX C-1 (Cont)
Electrical (Cont)
Acceptability F_SAR/ Licensing Commitment Covered By Design Document / Requirement Yes No IEEE 485-1978 General considerations to determine Refer to design documents listed on page C.1-3 X battery size Momentary loads consideration to deter- X eine battery duty cycle Duty cycle diagram -
- Steady-state loads X
- Random loads X Considerations of limiting factors X to determine battery size Additfoaal considerations to X determine battery size FSAR Table 8.1-1; Appendix A IEEE 484-1975; NRC RG 1.128, Rev.1 Installation design criteria
- Ventilation X C.1-5 (10990)
APPENDIX C-1 (Cont)
Electrical (Cont)
Acceptability l Covered By Design Document / Requirement Yes No l FSAR/ Licensing Commitment FSAR Appendix A Refer to design documents listed on page C.1-3 SER 8.1 10CFR50, GDC 17; NRC RG 1.6, Rev. O X
Independence between redundant standby (onsite) power sources and between their distribution systems FSAR 8.1-1; Appendix A 10CFR50, GDC 5; NRC RG 1.81, Rev.1 IEEE 379-1972; NRC RG 1.53, Rev. 0 ,
X Application of single failure criterion to protection systems FSAR 8.1-1; Appendix A IEEE 384-1974; NRC RG 1.75, Rev. 2 X
Isolation devices C.1-6 (10990)
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APPENDIX C-2 (Cont)-
Electrical i
Acceptability Areas Reviewed For Adequacy Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comments Yes No IEEE 308-1974; NRC RG l-32, Rev. 2; 10CFR50 GDC 5,17,18 Redundant loads The electric loads shall be (a) Design criteria DC-DC-01-BB, Rev. 4 X separated into two or more (b) Single line diagram 6E-1-4001 A, Rev. D redundant load groups. (c) Key diagrams:
6E-1-4010A, Rev. E 6E-1-40108, Rev. E (d) S&L Standard ESC-291 dated 1/30/79 SR 125 Y de loads are separated into two redundant groups.
Safety actions The safety actions by each Review documents same as (a), (b) and (c) above X load group shall be redun-dant and independent of the safety actions provided by its redundant counter- l j
parts.
Power supplies Each of the redundant load Review documents same as (a), (b) and (c) above. X groups shall have access SR 125 Y system consists of two redundant to a power supply that subsystems per unit. Each subsystem consists of consists of a battery and a battery, a battery charger and distribution one or more battery bus.
chargers.
C.2-2 (10990)
APPENDIX C-2 (Cont)
Electrical (Cont)
Acceptabili ty Areas Reviewed Yes No For Adequacy Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comments X
Common power Two or more load groups may Review documents same as (b) and (c) above.
supply have a common power supply There is no common power supply to the two if the consequences of the redundant load groups.
loss of the common power supply to the load groups under design basis conditions are acceptable.
X Common failure The batteries shall not Review document same as (a) above. Each mode have a common failure SR 125 V dc equipment room is served by its mode for any design basis dedicated ventilation system. SR 125 V dc equip-event (DBE). ment is located in Seismic Category I struc-ture to protect against earthquake, missile and wind. Fire detection and protection equipment provided for fire protection. This ensures preventing common failure mode for any DBE.
Protective Protective devices shall (a) Design criteria DC-DC-01-BB, Rev. 4 X devices be provided to limit the (b) Logic diagrams degradation of the Class 1E 6E-1-4029 DC01, Rev. C power systems. Sufficient 6E-1-4029 DC02, Rev. C indication shall be (c) Key diagrams provided to identify the 6E-1-4010A, Rev. E actuation of a protective 6E-1-40108, Rev. E device. (d) Schematic diagrams 6E-1-4030 DC01, Rev. G 6E-1-4010 DC02, Rev. G 6E-1-4010 DC05, Rev. K 6E-1-4010 DC06, Rev. H 6E-1-4010 DC09, Rev. H C.2-3 (10990)
APPENDIX C-2 (Cont)
Electrical (Cont)
Areas Reviewed Acceptability For Adequacy Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comments Yes No Protective Automatic circuit breakers have been provided devices (Cont) for battery feed, battery charger feed, inter-unit tie feed, and for each of the feeders to NSR bus and other loads.
, For indication in case of actuation of protective device, see Battery supply, Battery charger supply, and Distribution system.
Battery supply
- Availability Each battery supply shall (a) Single line diagram 6E-1-4001 A, Rev. D X be immediately available (b) Key Diagram 6E-1-4010A, Rev. E during normal operations During normal operation both battery and bat-and following the loss of power from the ac system. tery charger supply power to SR bus. Following
, loss of ac power, battery continues to supply power to SR bus without interruption. Battery charger is designed such that it does not be-come load on the battery in case of ac power failure or charger malfunction.
- Independence Each battery supply shall Single line diagram 6E-1-4001A, Rev. D X be independent of other battery supplies.
I C.2-4 (10990)
APPENDIX C-2 (Cont)
Electrical (Cont)
Areas Reviewed Acceptability For Adequacy Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comments Yes No
- Surveillance Indicators shall be pro- Following instruments, indicating lights and X vided to maintain the annunciators are provided status of the battery Instrument Ind Lts Ann supply. Vol tage X0 Amperes O Brk r-Pos 0 X X - In Control Room 0 - Local on distr. center Design criteria DC-DC-01-BC, R4 Equip spec F/L-2822, Amend 2 Logic diag 6E-1-4029DC01&O2-C Key diag 6E-1-4010A&B-E Schematic diag. 6E-1-4030DC01-G Schematic diag. 6E-1-4030DC05-K Schematic diag. 6E-1-4030DC06-H Battery charger supply
- Surveillance .ndicators shall be pro- Following instruments, indicating lights and X vided to monitor the annunciators are provided status of the battery Instrument Ind Lts Ann charger supply. The instru- Vol tage 0 LO X mentation shall include HI X indication of: Amperes 0
- Output voltage Brkr Position 0 AC X
- Output current DC X --
- Circuit breaker Loss of Power AC X "
position DC X X - In Control Room 0 - Local on distr. center C.2-5 (10990)
APPENDIX C-2 (Cont)
Electrical (Cont)
Areas P.eviewed Acceptability For Adequacy Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comments Yes No
- Surveillance (Cont)
High dc output voltage signal trips the 480 V ac input circuit breaker Documents: (a) 6E-1-40290C01-C (b) 6E-1-4029DC02-C '
tc) 6E-1-4030DC01-G (d) 6E-1-4029DC05-G (e) 6E-1-4029DC06-H (f) 6E-1-4010A-E (g) 6E-1-40108-E (h) Equip spec F/L-2820, Amend. 2 <
(i) Design criteria DC-DC-01-BB, Rev. 4
- Disconnecting Each battery charger power (a) Single line diagram 6E-1-4001 A, Rev. D X means supply shall have a discon- (b) Key diagram 6E-1-4010A, Rev. E necting device in its ac (c) Schematic diagrams power incoming feeder and 6E-1-4030DC01, Rev. G its dc power output circuit 6E-1-4030DC02, Rev. G for isolating the charger. (d) Equipment specification F/L-2820, Amend. 2
- Feedback Each battery charger power Schematic diagrams X protection supply shall be designed 6E-1-4030DC01, Rev. G to prevent the ac power 6E-1-4030DC02, Rev. G supply from becoming a load on the battery due to a power feedback as die result of the loss of ac power to the chargers.
C.2-6 (10990)
APPENDIX C-2 (Cont)
Electrical (Cont)
Areas Reviewed Acceptability For Adequacy Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comments Yes No Distribution system
- Independence Distribution circuits to (a) Single line diagram 6E-1-4001 A, Rev. D X redundant equipment shall (b) Key diagram 6E-1-4010A&B, Rev. E be electrically independent (c) Schematic diagrams of each other. 6E-1-4030DC 05-K 6E-1-40300C 06-H 6E-1-4030DC 07-F 6E-1-4030DC 08-K 6E-1-4030DC 09-H 6E-1-4030DC 10-F
- Surveillance The distribution system Following instruments, indicating lights, X shall be monitored to the annunciators are provided extent that it is shown Bus Instrument Ind Lts Ann.
to be ready to perfonn its Vol tage 0 0 LO X intended function. Ground 0 X NSR bus Feed brkr OPEN X Inter-unit OPEN X Tie breakers CLOSE X X - In Control Room 0 - Local on distr. center w
.g C.2-7 (10990)
1 APPENDIX C-2;(Cont)
Electrical (Cont)
Areas Reviewed Acceptability For Adequacy Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comments Yes No i
- Surveillance (Cont)
(a) Design criteria DC-DC-01-BB, R4 (b) Equip spec F/L-2822, Amend. 2 l (c) Logic diagrams i GE-1-4029DC01-C GE-1-4029DC02-C l (d) Key diagram GE-1-4010A&B-E I (e) Schematic diagrams GE-1-4030DC01-G l GE-1-4030DC05-K '
GE-1-4030DC06-H
- Auxiliary Auxiliary devices that (a) Single line diagram GE-1-4001 A, Rev D X l devices are required to operate (b) Key diagrams GE-1-4010A&B-E '
dependent equipment shall (c) Schematic diagrams .
be supplied from a related GE-1-4030DC05-K I bus section to prevent the GE-1-4030DC06-H ,
loss of electric power in GE-1-40300C07-F- I one load group from causing GE-1-4030DC08-K the loss of equipment in GE-1-4030DC09-H l another load group. GE-1-4030DC10-F !
i
- Feeders Feeders between the Class lE Documents- same as for Auxiliary devices X l power systems located in I safety class structure and systems located in non-safety :
class structures shall be provided with automatic cir-cuit interrupting devices located in the safety class structures.
C.2-8 (10990) i I
APPENDIX C-2 (Cont)
Electrical (Cont)
Areas Reviewed Acceptability For Adequacy Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comments Yes No-IEEE 485-1978 General The most severe of the (a) Design criteria DC-DC-01-BB, Rev. 4 X considerations following conditions should (b) Single line diagram GE-1-4001 A, Rev. D be used to determine the (c) Battery sizing cales 4391/19-D-5, Rev. O battery size.
- Load on de system exceeds Note:
the maximum output of the Auxiliary ac power is assumed to return within 10 battery charger seconds of a loss of operating power.
- Output of the battery charger is interrupted
- Auxiliary ac power is lost Momentary loads Although momentary loads (a) Design criteria DC-DC-01-BB, Rev. 4 X may exist only for a frac- (b) Battery sizing calc. 43911 19-D-5, Rev. O tion of a second, each is considered to last for a full minute because the instantaneous battery vol-tage drop for a given momen-tary load is essentially the same as voltage drop after 1 minute.
C.2-9 (10990)
-- ~
APPENDIX C-2 (Cont)
Electrical (Cont) l Acceptability Areas Reviewed Yes No For Adequacy Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comments Duty cycle Loads with inception and Documents same as in Momentary loads X diagram shutdown times known are plotted on the diagram Note:
Only 1 minute rating is assumed critical due to l as they would occur. If inception time is known auxiliary ac power return to battery chargers within l but the shutdown time is 10 seconds. ,'
indefinite it shall be l
assumed that the load will continue through the remain-l der of the duty cycle.
X Loads which occur at random No random loads identified e s!!al.1 be shown at the most critical time of the duty cycle in order to simulate the worst case load on the battery.
Battery size - Maximum system voltage as Battery consists of 58 cells and is sized X limiting factor based on minimum bus voltage of 105V (cell dis-
- Minimum system voltage as charge voltage of 1.81V per cell) and maximum limiting factor bus (equalizing charge) voltage of 138V
- Float voltage as limiting (2.38V per cell).
factor Documents same as in Additional considerations (below).
- Charging rate as limiting factor C.2-10 (10990)
APPENDIX C-2 (Cont)
Electrical (Cont)
Areas Reviewed Acceptability <
For Adequacy Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comments Yes No Additional - Temperature correction Battery sizing calc. 4391/19-D-5, Rev. 0 X considerations factor Temp. correction factor 1.05 for 69'F
- Design margin - A method Design margin 15% X of providing this design Aging factor 125%
margin is to add 10-15 percent to the cell size determined by calculations.
- Compensating for age, the X battery rated capacity should be at least 125%
of the load expected at the end of the service life.
J C.2-11 (10990)
APPENDIX C-2 (Cont)
Electrical (Cont)
Areas Reviewed Acceptability For Adequacy Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comments Yes No IEEE 484-1975 X NRC RG 1.128, Rev.1 Installation l design criteria
- Ventilation The battery area shall be (a) Elect. equip install location dwg. 6E-1-33718, ventilated, either by a Rev. P natural or induced venti- (b) Hydrogen evolution calc. 4391/19-AI-10, Rev. 2 lation system, to prevent (c) Heat dissipation calc. 4391/19 AI-15, Rev. 2 accumulation of hydrogen (d) Equip. spec. F/L-2819, Amend 2 and to maintain design F/L-2820, Amend 2 temperature. The ventilation (e) S&L IOM from HVAC Dept,1/24/78 system shall limit hydrogen
- accumulation to less than Battery areas are ventilated to prevent accum-2 percent of the total ulation of gases produced during charging opera-volume of the battery area. tions. Each battery area is provided with in-Maximum hydrogen evolution dependent SR ventilation system. A separate rate is 0.000269 cubic feet SR exhaust fan and duct is provided for each per minute per charging Class lE battery area. Environment in battery ampere per cell at 77 F, area per S&L IOM from HVAC dept. is from 69'F to one atm. The worst 108"F. Environment specified in equipment specs expected condition is F/L-2819 and 2820 is 77*F for battery and 65*F to forcing maximum current ll2*F for chargers. Battery area temp. is higher than into fully charged battery. specified. Battery qualified life is reduced because 1
of higher temperature.
1 i
C. 2-12 (10990)
APPENDIX C-2 (Cont)
Electrical (Cont)
Acceptabili ty Areas Reviewed Yes No For Adequacy Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comments NRC RG 1.6 10CFR50 GDC 17 Independence be- The electrically powered SR (a) Design criteria DC-DC-01-BB, Rev. 4 X tween redundant dc loads should be separated into (b) Single line diag. GE-1-4001 A, Rev. D standby (onsite) redundant load groups such (c) Key diagram GE-1-4010A&B, Rev. E power sources and that loss of any one group will (d) Schematic diagrams between their dis- not prevent the minimum safety GE-1-4030DC 05-K tribution systems function from being performed. GE-1-4030DC 06-H GE-1-4030DC 07-F GE-1-4030DC 08-K X Each de load group should be energized by a battery and bat- GE-1-4030DC 09-H tery charger. The battery char- GE-1-4030DC 10-F ger combination should have no l automatic connection.to any other redundant de load group.
No provision should exist There are no bus ties or sharing of power sup- X for automatically connecting one plies between redundant load groups in each load group to another load group. unit.
X No provision should exist for automatically transferring loads between redundant power sources.
C. 2-13 (10990)
APPENDIX C-2 (Cont)
Electrical (Cont)
Acceptability.
Areas Reviewed Yes No For Adequacy Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comments X
Independence. . . If means exist for manually (Cont) connecting redundant load groups together, at least one interlock should be provided to prevent an operator error that would parallel their standby power sources.
X The standby source of any load group should not be automatically paralleled with the standby source of another load group under ac-cident conditions.
NRC RG 1.81, Rev.1 IEEE 379-1972 NRC RG 1.53, Rev. 0 10CFR50 GDC 5 Refer to documents in a, b, c & d above Redundancy and independence of components X Application of In case of multiunit nuclear single failure power plants, each unit should preclude the loss of both redundant subsystems criterion to pro- have separate and independent as a result of a single failure tection systems onsite emergency and shutdown dc system capable of supplying mini-mum ESF loads and the loads re-quired for attaining a safe and orderly cold shutdown of the unit, assuming a single failure and loss of offsite power.
C.2-14 (10990)
APPENDIX C-2 (Cont)
Electrical (Cont)
Areas Reviewed Acceptabili ty For Adequacy Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comments. Yes No c IEEE 384-1974 NRC RG 1.75, Rev. 2 Isolation devices Provide two interrupting devices Schematic diagrams X in series actuated only by 6E-1-4030DC05-K fault current to isolate non- 6E-1-4030DC06-K Class 1E circuit connected to Class 1E circuit. Al ter- SR 125 V de control center has two NSR devices:
natively, provide an inter- undervoltage relay and ground detector record-rupting device, which shall ing voltmeter. These devices are isolated from be tripped from Class 1E bus. SR bus by an interrupting device actuated by with a safety injection fault current. FSAR commitment is to provide coincident with loss of offsite two interrupting devices (actuated by fault power signal. current) in series when nonsafety-related cir-cuit is connected to safety-related circuit.
C. 2-15 (10990)
, ~ . _
APPENDIX C-2 (Cont)
Equipment Qualification (Seismic)
Areas Reviewed Acceptability For Adequacy Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comments Yes No Qualification report IEEE-344-1975 CQD File,005567, Rev. 0 X storage batteries Purch. Spec. F/L 2819 Supplier - Gould (Tag #'s 1820C01E, 182DC02E).
Qualification report IEEE-344-1975 CQD File 005567, Rev. 0 X storage battery racks Purch. Spec. F/L 2819 Supplier - Gould (Tag #'s 182DCOIEA, EB
& 182DC0ZEA, EB).
Qualification report IEEE-344-1975 CQD File 005960, Rev. 01 X ;
de distribution center Purch. Spec. F/L 2822 Supplier - G.E.
(Tag #'s 1&2DC05E, 6E, SE A, SEB , 6E A, 6EB ).
Qualification report IEEE-344-1975 CQD File 012527 Rev. 0 X battery chargers Purch.
Spec. F/L 2820 Supplier - Power Conversion Products (Tag #'s 182DC03E, 182DC04E).
Qualification report IEEE-344-1975 EMD Files 022749, 023119, 024103 X fuse panel Purch. Spec. F/L 2788 (Note - Operability of internal Supplier - Systems components will be verified in a Control separate report.)
(Tag #'s 182DC10J, 182DCllJ).
C.2-16 (10990)
s APPENDIX C-3 ADEQUACY OF DESIGN PROCESS Civil / Structural (Seismic)
Acceptability Design Yes No Process Reviewed Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comments Seismic responca Refer to Appendix A-3 (Seismic) X spectra for C4tegory I structures and components C.3-1 (10990)
' APPENDIX C-3 (Cent) i 4
Electrical i
Design Acceptability Process Reviewed Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comments Yes No Verification of the Verify that the actual loads The design process does not document verification X actual loads connected connected to the battery are of actual loads connected to the battery to to the battery within those used in duty verify the duty cycle used in the battery sizing
! cycle based on which bat- design calculation.
! tery is sized i
Battery area Verify that the actual In the conceptual design of the battery room, X i ventilation temperature in battery area this room had walls on all sides and the environ-is same as one at which ment in the room was controlled at 770F + 20F.
battery life was decided, The design was subsequently finalized with wire since higher temperature fence on north side of battery and walls on other
- ' reduces battery life three sides. As a result, the environment in the battery room changed from 770F to 690F/1080F. Actual
< higher temp. of 1080F resulted in reduced qualified life. This has no safety impact.
Overall there was good interdiscipline interface X
, with HVAC. Electrical group provided heat load
] infonnation to HVAC to design ventilation system.
i HVAC in turn provided year round temperature in
! the battery area to Electrical group for their
, use for battery qualified life evaluation.
, Control power cin:uits Verify that the minimum In order to ensure the capability of various X
- voltage drop voltage for various control SR 125 V dc power voltage drop feeds for controls i components is higher than to various switchgear, S&L did detailed voltage 4
the minimum voltage for drop calculations with actual pulled length and which they are designed in size of cables and either used auxiliary relay order for them to do their or parallelled the conductor so that the control safety function devices will have adequate voltage level at their j tenainals for them to function properly.
' Minimum - maxiraum voltage range information was coordinated with the switchgear vendor.
C.3-2 (10990)
I APPENDIX C-3 (Cont)
Electrical (Cont)
Acceptability Design Yes No Process Reviewed Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comments S&L coordinated the information on maximum X Maximum battery short Verify breakers rating and circuit current trip setting for proper battery short circuit current with Gould to l selection so that they do select breaker ratings and the trip setpoint l their safety function as designed Design documents Design documents shall be Some inconsistencies were found in the design X consistent in respect of documents:
same design information shown on more than one o Design criteria do not list all IEEE design document in order standards and NRC RGs connitted to in the FSAR.
to avoid confusion and possible error o The battery rating in the battery charger specification was not revised when battery rating changed from 900 AH to 1200 AH.
o The vendor data information attached to the battery and the battery charger confonned specification are proposal data and are out of date.
The above inconsistencies have no impact on actual installation or procurement.
The above design process was covered by review of the following documents:
- 1. (a) Design calculation 4391/19-D-5, Rev. 0 (b) Single line diagram 6E-1-4001 A, Rev. D C.3-3 (10990)
APPENDIX C-3 (Cont)
Electrical (Cont)
Acceptabil1ty g39 Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comments Yes No Process Reviewed
?, -Equipment specification F/1-2819, Amend. 2
-HVAC memo 1-24-78
- 3. -Design calculation 4391/19-AO-16, Rev.1
- 4. -S&L telecon memo, 3/24/80.
S. -Design criteria DC-DC-01-BB, Rev. 4
-Equipment specification F/L-2920, Amend. 2
-Equipment specification F/L-2819, Amend. 2
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APPENDIX C-4 S&L INTERFACE WITH WESTINGHOUSE AND NUCLEAR POWER SYSTEMS Electrical Acceptability Yes No Company Interface Reviewed Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comments Equip. Specif. No. G676573 dated 9-13-67, Rev. 3. X Westinghouse Westinghouse equipment specification for static S&L reviewed this equip. spec., and used it as a inverter power supply sys- basis for the inverter load in the battery duty tem for critical single cycl e.
phase loads.
C.4-1 (10990)
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APPENDIX C-6 REVIEW OF S&L DESIGN REVIEW Electrical Acceptability S&L Review Report Review Yes No S&L Design Review X
S&L Design Review Team reviewed the following EDRR No. C2-004-BY dated 6-30-82 electrical design aspects of SR 125 V dc Cl-005-BY dated 6-30-82 system:
- Independence from the ac offsite power S&L has an established engineering practice system of having a formalized design review at system
- Failure of redundant dc onsite power level by an independent group. This review is circuits from the effects of missile, a done with the help of a checklist which addresses pipe whipping, a charging fluid or a considerations relevant to design requirements and fire licensing commitments. The review group findings
- Redundancy summary is sent to Elect. Dept. Manager, who either
- Independence of redundant dc power agrees or disagrees with the findings and provides circuits resolution in case of disagreement. We concur with
- Battery capacity the review considerations and comments presented in
- Battery charger capacity the above reports, and find the procedure and its
- Isolation of NSR loads from Class IE dc implementation acceptable.
power system per NRC RG 1.75
- Surveillance
- Sharing of dc onsite power system between two units C.6-1 (10990)
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APPENDIX D-1 IDENTIFICATION /IMPLEENTATION OF COMMITMENTS AND CRITERIA Electrical Layout Acceptability Covered By Design Document / Requirement Yes No FSAR/ Licensing Commitment i
Appendix A; R.G.1.75, Rev. 2 (Sect. 8.3.2.1)/IEEE 384-1974:
The physical separation of the circuits and equip- For the Interim Report, the following documents ment comprising or associated with the Class 1E which address portions of separation licensing ;
power systems, protection systems had equipment commitments, were reviewed to determine whether shall meet the criteria set forth by IEEE 384-74 the Byron design meets the licensing commitment as amended by R.G.1.75 and exceptions stated in concerning separation. For details of the areas FSAR Appendix A. The major areas of licensing within separation reviewed, refer to Appendices A-2 commitment include the following: through D-2.
- Compatibility with mechanical systems 1. Design criteria - cable sepration (EL-1) X
- Associated circuit separation DC-EE-01-BB, Rev.11
- Separation analysis requirements
- Non-Class lE circuit separation 2. Class 1 cable termination & splicing - X
- Cable & raceway design basis Proc.11, Rev.19 (EL-3)
- Cable spreading area separation
- General plant area separation 3. Documentation of cable sep. criteria violations X
- Identification Proc. BSP-6, Rev. 0 (EL-4)
- 4. Project instruction - electrical separation walkdown X Instruction PI-BB-42, Rev. 1 (EL-5)
- 5. Project instruction - Walkdown - 1 inch separation X of conduit Instruction - PI-BB-53, Rev. 0 (EL-6)
D.1-1 (11080)
. n . - , .
APPENDIX D-1 (Cont)
Electrical Layout (Cont)
Acceptability Covered By Design Document / Requirement Yes No FSAR/ Licensing Commitment Appendix A; R.G.1.75, Rev. 2 (Sect. 8.3.2.1 )/IEEE 384-1974:
(Cont)
- 6. Project instruction-safety-related/NSR X Interface Review Report PI-BB-54, Rev. 0 (EL-13)
- 7. Cable separation criteria composite table X l Dwg 6E-0-40278 Rev. A (EL-15) j
- 8. Elect notes & sym. X 6E-0-3390 Sh.1 Rev. AP (EL-17) 6E-0-3390 Sh. 2 Rev. AG (EL-17) 6E-0-3390 Sh. 3 Rev. G (EL-17)
- 10. Cable pan install. /etails X 6E-0-3237 Rev. Z (EL-19) 6E-0-3237A Rev. L (EL-19) 6E-0-3237B Rev. L (EL-19)
D.1-2 (11080)
4 I
APPENDIX D-1 (Cont)
Electrical Layout (Cont)
Acceptability Covered By Design Document / Requirement Yes No FSAR/ Licensing Commitment Appendix A; R.G.1.75, Rev. 2 (Sect. 8.3.2.1)/IEEE 384-1974:
(Cont)
- 11. CECO Ltr. to S&L - Sept. 7,1982 X
Subject:
Splicing of Cables in Aux. FWR Tunnel (EL-22)
- 12. Cable separation conflict reports (CSCR)
- a. CSCR #2 3/11/83 (EL-29A) X
- b. CSCR #3 3/17/83 (EL-298) X
- c. CSCR #5 4/14/83 (EL-29C) X
- d. CSCR #6 5/3/83 (EL-290) X
- e. CSCR #7 9/8/83 (EL-29E) X
- f. CSCR #810/24/83 (EL- 29F) X
- g. CSCR #16 3/8/84 (EL-29G) X
- h. CSCR #19 4/23/84 (EL-29H) X Cable Rating Design Basis (Derating)
(FSAR 8.3.1.4.1.2)
The ampacity for each cable size shall be deter- For the Interim Report, the following documents, which cined by the appropriate derating factors address only portions of the licensing commitment, were reviewed to determine whether the Byron design meets the licensing commitment concerning cable derating. For details, refer to Appendix A-2.
D.1-3 (11080)
APPENDIX D-1 (Cont)
Electrical Layout (Cont)
Acceptab111ty No Covered By Design Document / Requirement Yes FSAR/ Licensing Commitment
- 1. Cable tray X Cable Rating Design Basis (Derating):
(FSAR 8.3.1.4.1.2) (Cont) power cable ampacity AMPAC 3/27/84 (EL-16)
- 2. Fire barrier cable ampacity X evaluation & Std ESI-151 (EL-25)
- 3. Removing / deleting previously X installed caales Instruction PI-BB-51 Rev. 0 (EL-8)
D .1 -4 (11080)
_ -_ .- n -- . . -
APPENDIX D-1 (Cont)
Equipment Qualification - Seismic Acceptability Covered By Design Document / Requirement .Yes No FSAR/ Licensing Comunftment Seismic qualification of Seismic Standard spec. for seismic qualification - Fonn X Category I instrumentation and 350-8 references project purchase spec, which electrical equipment (BOP) reference references IEEE-344 current revision. Component IEEE-344-75 and IEEE 344-71 "IEEE Qualification Division seismic checklist Recommended Practices for Seismic indicates if the qualification report meets the Qualification of Class lE Equipment requirements of IEEE-344-1975.
for Nuclear Power Generating Stations" (IEEE 344-71 for existing test reports)
(FSAR 3.10.2.2)
References Reg. Guide 1.89 For seismic qualification, Reg. Guide 1.89 X
" Qualification of Class lE Equipment references IEEE-344. (See above, FSAR 3.10.2.2) for Nuclear Power Plants" (FSAR 3.10.5)
Reg. Guide 1.100 references IEEE-344-1975. X Reg. Guide 1.100," Seismic Qualifica-tion of Electric Equipment for Nuclear (See above, FSAR 3.10.2.2)
Power Plants". Applicant complies with the objectives of this reg. guide (FSAR Al.100-1) 0.1 -5 (11080)
APPENDIX D-1 (Cont)
Mechanical - Stress i
Acceptability Covered By Design Document / Requirement Yes No FSAR/ Licensing Comunitment 1
" Moderate-Energy Fluid System Inside and Out- EMD-045602, Rev. 00, dated 10/18/83 Moderate energy X side Containment" for postulating through wall piping, Units 1 & 2, for essential service water and leakage cracks (FSAR 3.6.2.1.2.2) component cooling water piping systems D.1-6 (11080)
~. .
APPENDIX D-2 DESIGN ADEQUACY Electrical Layout Acceptability Areas Reviewed For Adequacy Acceptance Criteria Procedure / Documents Reviewed and Comments Yes No Reg. Guide 1.75, Rev 2 Associated circuits Associated circuits S&L design precludes associated circuits. X shall be identified, Cir1:uits are either Class lE or non-Class 1E.
separated and Documents supporting this position are as follows:
analyzed / tested 1. Design criteria - cable separation per IEEE 383-1975. DC-EE-01-BB Rev.11 (EL-1)
- 2. Cable separation criteria composite table Dwg 6E-0-40278 Cable & raceway The design basis In determining the cable tray loading, a S&L X design basis shall be that the design restraint is that cables are below the cable trays will top level the side rails. This is shown in not be filled above Project Instruction PI-BB-17, Rev. 3 (EL-10).
the side rails.
Splices shall be Splices are generally prohibited in S&L design. X documented on design If required, splices are performed per S&L Std.
documents. EA-208, Section 6, Method 1. Splices are also identified as shown in Dwg 6E-0-3587 Rev. AA.
Splices which are required but not documented on drawings are documentad on FCRs per Hatfield Electric Co. 's Procedure #11.
D.2-1 (11080)
APPENDIX D-2 (Cont)
Electrical Layout (Cont)
Acceptability Areas Reviewed Yes No For Adequacy Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comments Reg. Guide 1.75, Rev 2 (cont)
Specific equipment Redundant Class 1E The Class 1E batteries, battery chargers and X separation: batteries shall be associated distribution centers are located in l placed in separate separate rooms within a Category I structure. l safety class struc- This is shown on Dwg 6E-1-3371B, Rev P.
tures.
Battery chargers Refer to discussion above. X for redundant Class 1E batteries shall be physically separated in accor-dance with the requirements of IEEE 384, Section 4.
Redundant Class 1E Refer to discussion above. X distribution centers shall be physically separated in accor-dance with the re-quirements of IEEE 384, Section 4.
D.2-2 (11080)
APPENDIX D-2 (Cont)
Electrical Layout (Cont)
Acceptability Areas Reviewed .
For Adequacy Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Consnents Yes No Reg. Guide 1.75, Rev 2 (cont)
Identification Exposed Class 1E Cable trays in safety-related areas are identified X raceways shall be with segregation labels on both sides every 15 ft marked in a and on both sides of wall and floor penetrations.
pennanent manner All exposed conduits in safety-related areas are at intervals not identified at ends of conduit, every 15 ft and to exceed 15 ft on both sides of floors and walls. Embedded and at points of conduits are identified where conduit extends entry to and to reach cable trays. This is shown on exiting from Dwg. 6E-0-3390 Rev. AP.
enclosed areas.
Cable Rating Design Basis (Derating)
(FSAR 8.3.1.4.1.2)
Ambient derating Ampacity of each Appropriate ambient derating was applied to power X cable size shall be cables and shown on a computer program -
derated for proper Cable tray power ampacity (AMPAC) 3/27/84 (EL-16) ambient.
Tray cover derating Ampacity for each Five percent derating for tray covers was applied X cable size shall be on all power cables. This is shown on a computer derated for tray program -- Cable tray power ampacity (AMPAC) covers. 3/27/84 (EL-16)
Penetration (fire stop) Ampacity for each Derating for cables penetrating a 3-hour fire X cable size shall wall, floor, or ceiling was covered by the Fire be derated for Barrier Cable Ampacity Evaluation (EL-25). S&L fire stops. Std. ESI-151 (EL-25) provides guidance for perfonaing this evaluation. Derating for each penetration and cable was considered.
D.2-3
) (11080) l _ _
APPENDIX D-2 (Cont)
Mechanical - Stress Acceptabfifty Areas Reviewed Yes No For Adequacy Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comments X
Moderate energy piping Mo through-wall leakage Piping analysis calculation ISX-16, cracks are postulated if Rev. 04F0, ESW piping system: the highest (FSAR 3.6.2.1.2.2) stress at node 200A is 12449 psi which is less the maximum stress range as calculated by the sum than 0.4(1.2 Sh+S A ) = 16,200 psi. As a result, of Eq (9) and (10) of moderate energy leakage cracks are not required.
Para NC-3652 does not exceed 0.4(1.2 Sh+SA I- ,
0.2-4 (11080)
~ . _ - -- -
APPENDIX D-3 ADEQUACY OF DESIGN PROCESS Control Systems Acceptability Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comments Yes no Design Process Reviewed Design calculations for Statement of objective Procedure / calculation EMD 015140, Rev. 4 X instrument tube spans is clear and complete Calc. EMD 015139, Rev. O Calc. Em 030898, Rev. O Sources of equations Calc. Em 030653, Rev. 0 X used have been docu- Calc. EMD 019583, Rev. O mented Calc. EMD 042097, Rev. O Procedure GQ-3.08 Rev. 4 X
Sources of constants and input data have been documented X
Computer programs used are identified X
Computer programs used have been vali-dated and documented X
Code requirements have been identified and documented X
Calculations have been reviewed (checked) in accordance with S&L pro-cedures X
Calculations have been approved in accordance with S&L procedures D.3-1 (11080)
APPENDIX D-3 (Cont)
Electrical Layout Acceptability Yes No Design Process Reviewed Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comments Implementation of separation The process of en- S&L electrical separation program is comprehensive, requirements suring separation com- methodical and detailed. The process is governed by pliance shall be com- the design criteria for cable separation (DC-EE-01-BB).
prehensive and shall result in compliance To ensure cable separation, the cable routing computer with the criteria set program will not allow improper cable routing in wrong forth in IEEE 384-1974 raceways. All SR & NSR interfaces are listed in the as amended by RG 1.75 Internal Review Report (IRR) Index. These interfaces and exceptions stated are detailed and analyzed for compliance with separa-in FSAR, Appendix A. tion requirements in the IRR.
To ensure raceway separation, S&L Stds. ES0-292 and ES0-295 require review of cable tray and electrical installation drawings to verify separation compliance.
Any apparent exceptions is required to be identified, documented, justified and approved by Procedure BBP-6.
Furthermore, the electrical contractor is required to report any apparent exceptions by Hatfield Elect. Co.
Procedure 11.
i Document reviewed are as follows:
- 1. Design Criteria - Cable Separation (EL-1) X j
DC-EE-01-BB Rev. 11 l
- 2. Class 1 Cable Termination & Splicing - Proc.11, X Rev.19 (EL-3)
- 3. Documentation of Cable Sep. Criteria Violations- X Proc. BBP-6 (EL-4)
D.3-2 (11080)
APPENDIX D-3 (Cont)
Electrical Layout (Cont)
Acceptability Yes No Design Process Reviewed Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Cunents
- 4. Project Instruction-Electrical Separation Walkdown X Instruction PI-BB-42 Rev.1 (EL-5)
- 5. Project Instruction-Walkdown-1" Separation of X Conduit Instruction PI-BB-53 (EL-6)
- 6. Project Instruction-Safety-Related/NSR Interface Re- X view Report PI-BB-54 (EL-13)
- 7. Cable Separation Criteria Composite Table X Dwg 6E-0-4027B; Rev. A (EL-15)
- 8. Elect. Notes & Syn. X 6E-0-3390 Sh.1 Rev. AP (EL-17) 6E-0-3390 Sh. 2 Rev. AG (EL-17) 6E-0-3390 Sh. 3 Rev. G (EL-17)
X
X
- 10. Cable Pan Install. Details
~
6E-0-3237 Rev. Z (EL-19) 6E-0-3237A Rev. L (EL-19)
SE-0-32378 Rev. L (EL-19)
- 11. Cable Separation Conflict Reports (CSCR)
X
- a. CSCR #2 3/11/83 (EL-29A)
X
- b. CSCR #3 3/17/83 (EL-298)
X
- c. CSCR #5 4/14/83 (EL-29C)
X
- d. CSCR #6 5/3/83 (EL-290)
X
- e. CSCR #7 9/8/83 (EL-29E)
X
- f. CSCR #8 10/24/83 (EL-29F) X
- g. CSCR #16 3/8/84 (EL-29G)
X
- h. CSCR #19 4/23/84 (EL-29H)
D.3-3 (11080)
APPENDIX D-3 (Cont)
Equipment Qualification-Seismic Acceptabili ty Yes No Design Process Reviewed Acceptance Criteria Procedures / Documents Reviewed and Comments Dynamic qualification review IEEE-344-1975 MSS-6.2-D, " Dynamic Qualification Criteria". This X procedure document summarizes qualification requirements sanc-tioned by IEEE-344-1975. Additionally, the Byron Sta-tion qualification commitments are identified.
Form MAS-0HD-2.A Rev. A, " Checklist for Dynamic X Qualification of Mechanical and Electrical Equipment."
Sargent and Lundy qualification review is performed against this checklist to ensure complete evaluation of applicable requirements.
Report CQD-4391-DQSR, " Status Report for Dynamic X Qualification". This report contains current quali-fication for any given piece of equipment. Tracking of all qualification documents and required actions enable efficient qualification management.
D.3-4 (11030)
APPENDIX D-5 DESIGN CHANGE CONTROL Quality Engineering Acceptability Area of Change Yes No Control Reviewed Documents / Procedures Reviewed and Comments Quality Assurance The following QA procedures were reviewed for compliance procedures with 10CFR50 Appendix B X
GQ-2.04 Rev. 5 Indoctrination and Training X
GQ-3.04 Rev. 6 Design Criteria l X
GQ-3.07 Rev. 6 S&L Drawings X
GQ-3.08 Rev. 4 Design Calculations X
GQ-3.09 Rev. 5 Foreign Design Documents X
GQ-3.13 Rev. 6 E .gineering Change Notice X
GQ-4.01 Rev.15 Procurement Specifications X GQ-16.01 Rev. 6 Corrective Action Reports X
GQ-16.03 Rev.1 Design Errors & Deficiencies X
GQ-5.01 Rev. 2 Project Instructions D.5-1 (11030)
APPENDIX D-5 (Cont)
Quality Engineering (Cont)
Acceptability Area of Change Yes No Documents / Procedures Reviewed and Comments Control Reviewed Project instructions The following project instructions were reviewed for compliance with S&L QA Procedure GQ 5.01 Rev. 2 X
PI-BB-05 Rev. 9 Mech. Dept. Dwg. Review & Comment Requirements X
PI-BB-06 Rev. 0 Elect. Dwg. Preparation Review & Approval X
PI-BB-08 Rev. 5 Processing Non-Conformance Reports and S&L Engineering Change Notices X
PI-BB-10 Rev.1 Mech. & Stuctured Drawing Prep., Review & Approval X
PI-BB-12 Rev. 2 Processing Offsite Vendor Non-Conformance Reports X
PI-BB-13 Rev. 9 Processing Field Change Requests (FCRs)
PI-3B-14 Rev. 2 Interface Flow Requirements Piping and Analysis and X Component Support Design X
PI-BB-15 Rev. 2 Formal Piping Analysis and Component Support Design X
PI-BB-16 Rev. 2 Procedure for Handling As-Built Information PI-BB-24 Rev. 3 Processing and Ibnitoring of Contractor Technical Data X Documents X
PI-BB-27 Rev. 2 As-Built Piping Reconciliation X
PI-BB-30 Rev.1 HVAC Ductwork Seismic Support Design Verification X
PI-BB-44 Rev.1 Superseded Pipe Support Drawings D.5-2 (11080)
APPEM)IX D-5 (Cont)
Quality Engineering (Cont)
Acceptability Area of Change Yes No Control Reviewed Documents / Procedures Reviewed and Comments Design criteria S&L Procedure GQ 3.04 Rev. 6 Design Criteria The following design criteria documents were reviewed for their compliance to the noted QA procedure for:
- a. Project identification
- b. Safety-related identification
- c. Revision control sheet signed off by reviewer / approver
- d. Latest revision noted on revised pages
- e. Are regulatory guides /PSAR/FSAR/ standards / codes noted?
- f. Is latest revision noted in design criteria status report?
X DC-AN-01-BB Rev. 4 Annunciator System X
DC-DC-01-BB Rev. 4 Battery a dc Distribution DC-EE-01-BB Rev.11 Cable Separation Electrical Install. X X
DC-EE-02-BB Rev. 3 Relay Protection for Elect. System X
DC-PR-01-BB Rev.1 Radiation Monitoring System X
DC-IP-01-BB Rev. 3 Instrument and Control Power X DC-ST-03-BB Rev.11 Structural Design Criteria X
DC-ST-04-BB Rev. 1 Seismic Subsystems & Equip. Response Spectra X
DC-SX-01-BB Rev. 3 Essential Service Water System D.5-3 (11080) 1
k APPENDIX E PROGRN4 PLAN (1097o)
Rev. 0 PROGRAM PL AN INDEPENDENT DE3IGN REVIEW 0F BYRON GENERATING STATION, UNITS 1 & 2 Prepared for Comonwealth Edison Company Chicago, Illinois Approved by [ Datesf9/f4 Proje dianager '
Concurrence by -
Manager of Engine
!80 ate [
ng, BPC /
Bechtel Power Corporation San Francisco, California April, 1984
Rev. 0 i
TABLE OF CONTENTS BYRON STATION INDEPENDENT DESIGN REVIEW PLAN Title Page Number Sections I. Introduction and Summary 2 Task Descriptions 5 II.
Task - 1 Design Requirements 6 Task - 2 Design Adequacy 8 Task - 3 Design Process 10
( 13 l Task - 4 General Assessments Processing of Observations 14 III.
Reports and Documentation 16 IV.
Organization 17 V.
21 VI. Schedule VII. Appendix A - Quality Assurance Program B - Bechtel Qualifications C - Resumes
Rev. 0
- Program Description Byron Independent Design Review r
L I. - Introduction and Summary This document describes the proposed program for the independent review of the design for Units 1 and 2 of the Byron Station of Commonwealth Edison Company, covering work by Sargent & Lundy Engineers. It is intended to be fully responsive to the requirements set forth in the 1etter of April 12, 1984 from Messrs. B. R. Shelton and R. E. Van Derway
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of Commonwealth Edison Company to Mr. Peter Karpa of Bechtel Power Corp.
The purpose of this design review will be to provide an additional level of confidence in the design of the Byron Station through a review of the technical adequacy of several selected systems and the design process
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employed by Sargent & Lundy (S & L). Three systems have been selected for this review: the Component Cooling Water System, the Essential Service Water System, and the DC Distribution System. From this review, an assessment will be made both of the adequacy of the systems reviewed, and of areas of the plant design which were not specifically reviewed, including positive aspects of the design work.
The review will be performed by a dedicated project team, comprised of qualified personnel from Bechtel Power Corp. (Bechtel). The work will be performed under the direct surveillance of the Manager of
Rev. 0 Engineering, Bechtel Power Corporation (BPC) to whom the Project Manager I of the review team will report for project direction. The majority of the review team will be comprised of personnel from Bechtel's San Francisco Power Division and the Corporate group, but there will be some individuals drawn from other Bechtel entities when beneficial to the effort. Activities of the team will be physically divided between the Chicago offices of S & L and Bechtel offices in San Francisco, so as to achieve objectives of the review, expeditiously.
The program for the review of each system is divided into the tasks listed below. However, these divisions are mainly for convenience and clarity of reporting, and do not imply different personnel will necessarily perform each task.
Task - 1 Design Requirements Task - 2 Design Adequacy Task - 3 Design Process Task - 4 General Assessment Each of these tasks is described in more detail in the respective sections and is intended to incorporate all of the work requested in the April 12 letter and its Attachment - A.
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Rev. 0 The Bechtel work will be performed under the requirements of its
' corporate quality assurance program (BQ-TOP-1, Rev. 3A), which has been approved by the NRC. Implementing procedures will comply with applicable requirements of the quality assurance program, and some will be based upon the standard Bechtel Engineering Department Procedures (EDP's). The quality assurance program for the review is described in Appendix A, and will be implemented in accordance with approved procedures. Procedures will also be issued, as required, to provide additional detail for performing activities of the Review.
There are no known conflicts of interest by Bechtel F3wer Corporation, or by individuals on the review teams, which should prevent this review team from arriving at objective conclusions from the review, or which would otherwise compromise purposes of the review.
Work will be scheduled for an interim report to be submitted by May 31, 1984, and a final report by approximately July 31, 1984.
Rev. 0 II. - Task Descriptions s
The tasks described here have been organized to allow a thorough review of the specified systems listed below, and at the conclusion of review,
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to draw conclusions appropriate to the objectives and connensurate with the review work performed.
l The systems reviewed will be as follows:
Component cooling water (CCW) system.
Essential service water (ESW) system.
( DC distribution system (Class lE portions, only)
System boundaries will be as generally described in the FSAR. However, the review will be extended, as necessary, to cover areas related to f
CECO responses to specific NRC questions. The review will cover mechanical, electrical, environmental, and structural aspects of the design of each system. It will also include instrumentation and control design, plant arrangements, and relevant nuclear engineering.
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Task - 1 L
Design Requirements
(' General Task - I will determine the extent to which design criteria or other design objectives, match licensing comitments. These will be used to implement Tasks 2 and 3, and to assess how design inputs are specified.
Source of the comitments will be the FSAR, responses to NRC questions on the FSAR, and such other documents as Commonwealth Edison (CECO) specifically
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Sub-Tasks 1A Establish checklists to perform Task - 1.
IB Review FSAR and other documents specified by CECO to identify
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safety-related design criteria or other safety-related commitments and design requirements. This includes Ceco responses to NRC questions.
1C Review Ceco and S & L procedures for specifying design requirements.
Compare design requirements to the inputs used by S & L in developing designs or other documents, such as specifications. In doing this, due
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recognition will be given that there are many ways design requirements 1 may be specified. Also, where interpretations of requirements are made, the justifications for apparent differences will be sought.
Rev. O s s Effective dates for codes and standards will be confirmed.
t ID Review output documents as appropriate, to determine if requirements are suitably reflected. These include procurement specifications, construction drawings, and design chan3es.
1E Identify and process Ob',ervations and incorporate results in the reports issued.
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Task - 2 Design Adequacy General Task - 2 will review each of the selected systems for adequacy in meeting the licensing commitments and safety-related design requirements. These commitments and requirements will be those determined from Task - 1.
To assess design adequacy, primary reliance will be placed on the results as described in output documents. It will be recognized there are many ways to arrive at an adequate design which T.eets requirements. No attempt will be made to re-verify each step in designing the specified systems. Instead, the designs will be reviewed for accurate inputs and reasonableness of outputs, and adequacy of the design techniques based on a review and sampling of the work. Independent calculations will be performed only to the extent necessary, and not as a general rule.
In judging accuracy and completeness of design documents, due recognition will be given to established professional engineering practices and other precedents established in the nuclear industry. This will consider the level of detail needed to link design requirements with the output documents, and the process employed. It will also consider needs to justify design decisions and assumptions.
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Sub-Tasks 2A Establish checklists to perform Task - 2.
[ 2B Assemble design reanirements for the specified systems.
2C Review selected design documents for the following:
- 1. Safety classifications, to determine if the structures systems, and components have been properly classified as to safety significance as defined in 10CFR50.
- 2. Accuracy and completeness of the design criteria and other inputs, including assumptions and codes or standards.
- 3. Applicability of standard design methods.
- 4. Method of analysis, to determine if an appropriate method was used, including mathematical models, and use of standards.
- 5. Engineering judgments and assumptions and the basis on which they were exercised and utilized.
- 6. Accuracy of implementing the analysis, including use of properly validated computer codes.
- 7. Adequacy of means by which designs were verified.
- 8. Translation of design into output documents, for completeness, clarity, and proper control.
- 9. Reasonableness of the output, in relation to similar designs.
In performing the above reviews, each system will be reviewed from the standpoint of an integrated design, properly coordinated between disciplines. It will include mechanical, electrical, nuclear, and civil / structural aspects of the design.
The last design revision will be considered for basis of the review This may be a field change request or other change notice. Al so ,
in-process work will be included, where appropriate.
2D Forward potential Observations resulting from the above to the Internal Review Committee, for review and processing.
Rev. O Task - 3 Design Process General
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Task - 3 will provide an assessment of the effectiveness of the S & L design process, for the specified systems. In performing this task, reviews will be made to evaluate the extent to which the design process is sufficiently controlled so that safety-related design requirements are met, and that relevant comitments in the FSAR are complied with. In the event there are activities for which procedures were not followed (e.g., not available, deviation from procedures, or no commitment) the actual practices used will be evaluated.
In making this assessment, due consideration will be given to the extent to which engineering judgement is appropriate, in lieu of written procedures.
Recognition will be made of the complexity of the work, how unique it is, qualifications of personnel performing it, and other relevant factors.
Care will be taken to establish the time-frame of the design, to assurt correct applicability of changing requirements.
Sub-Tasks 3A Establish checklists to perform Task - 3.
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3B Review FSAR, S & L procedures (including its QA program), and referenced documents to identify requirements for the design process.
Rev. 0 3C Interview selected, key S & L personnel so that reviewers correctly s
understand how requirements are interpreted and how they should be implemented.
) 3D Develop flow charts for design of the specified systems.
3E Review selected documents in the specified systems for adequacy and completeness of procedural requirements. Where procedural requirements are not available, the actual process will be evaluated to determine the extent to which the design is adequately controlled.
Documents reviewed will include those related to design criteria, calculations (both by hand and computer), drawings, specifications, and
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design change authorizations.
The documents will be reviewed for elements which include the following:
- 1. Adequacy of documentation of the design calculations,
- 2. Interface design control between S & L and Westinghouse, and
' between S & L and Nuclear Power Services,
- 3. Design change controls including use of Field Change Requests (FCR's), Non-Conformance Reports (NCR's) and Engineering Change Notices (ECN's).
- 4. Design reviews performed by S & L covering the specified systems, for technical adequacy.
- 5. Such other elements related to design control which are embodied in the FSAR and its referenced documents.
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'l Rev. 0 3F Forward potential Observations resulting from the above to the Internal Review Committee for review and processing.
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Task - 4 General Assessment L
General In Task - 4, the results of Tasks 2 and 3 will be assembled and analyzed to determine what conclusions can be drawn regarding systems, structures and components which were not reviewed.
This analysis will be performed near the end of the review, using all available information, recognizing that conclusions must be commensurate with the ' nature of what was reviewed.
A balanced assessment will be sought, and one which emphasizes the likely impact on safety from observations made. As such, both positive and negative results will be considered, and the significance of all of them will be I
weighed.
Sub-Tasks 4A Consolidate all observations into a summary list.
4B Analyze the list in 4A for trends and root causes, and possible implications for unreviewed, safety-related areas.
4C Report those broader conclusions commensurate with what was actually reviewed and provide an analysis of results.
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III. Processing of Observations In the event the review of the specified systems reveals certain design
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activities which cannot be accepted by the reviewer, such as potential discrepancies, they will be termed Observations and processed in accordance with an established procedure.
The program for processing will seek to assure that Observations made as a result of the review are fully understood, validated, evaluated as to safety-significance, and closed-out through appropriate corrective action. Accordingly, provisio'n is made for complete investigation and examination by Bechtel (the Reviewer). To this end, two internal review committees will be established within the Reviewer's organization.
It is also intended that results of the processing will not be compromised by any lack of independer e by the Reviewer. Accordingly, the functions of CECO (the Owner) and of S & L (The Engineer) are essentially restricted to providing information and otherwise clarifying the basis of design, while Observations are being considered.
Subsequently, corrective action will be mutually agreed to by the Owner, Engineer, and Reviewer. Then, it will be implemented by the Engineer.
Key steps in processing of potential Observations, all the way to close-out by reviewer, are shown in Table - 1. At any point, however, the processing may be terminated and closed-out, if Reviewer determines no reporting or other action is appropriate.
Rev. O TABLE - 1 Processing of Observations Responsibility
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- 1. Potential Observation developed during R review and forwarded to Level - 1 Internal Review Cmunittee.
- 2. Item discussed in detail with cogni-zant personnel. E, R
- 3. Level - 1 Internal Review Committee R confirms Observation and determines if it is of potential safety significance.
- 4. Notification to CECO, for potential R safety significant items.
- 5. For other accurate but non-safety sig- E, R nificant items, process as in Steps 9,10 and 11. For invalid items, pro-cess as in Step 9.
- 6. For potential safety significant items R Level - 2 Internal Review Committee confirms Observation. Confirms if safety significant.
- 7. Prompt notification to CECO for safety R significant items.
- 8. For safety-significant and for other E, R accurate but non-safety significant items, process as in Steps 9,10 and 11.
For invalid items, process as in Step 9.
- 9. Report issued. R
- 10. Response made, incl ding proposed corrective action, if appropriate. E
- 11. Corrective action proposal accepted. R
- 12. Monitoring of above activities 0 KEY E - Engineer 0 - Owner R - Reviewer
Rev. O IV. Reports and Documentation One Interim Report is planned, describing overall results of the work to date, and including a description of the review program. Also, a Final Report will be issued covering results of all work performed and including whatever broader conclusions can be drawn on areas not reviewed.
Reports on individual Observations will be issued when they are confirmed by the Level-1 or Level-2 Internal Review Committee in accordance with Section III. This will be done promptly to permit responses to be imediately initiated and corrective action begun. A standard form will be used for these reports.
All reports will be issued to CECO with copies to S & L and others specified by CECO.
A copy of all calculations and other documentation which support the individual, interim, and final reports will be provided to CECO.
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V. Organization The review will be performed by a Review Team, mostly comprised of
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senior engineering and project management personnel from Bechtel Power Corp.
The work of the Review Team will be under the overall direction of the Manager of Engineering, Bechtel Power Corp. The cay-to-day activities, however, will be managed by its Project Manager, who reports to the Manager of Engineering. The Project Manager also receives direction from the Projects Engineering Manager, Commonwealth Edison Co., under terms of the contract and to the extent permitted by this review program.
Organization of the Review Team is shown on Figure - 1.
The team is organized around the systems to be reviewed. Each of these will be reviewed by an identified System Group, led by an experienced member of engineering management. These groups will be responsible for performance of all the identified tasks for each system. Their leaders will also develop the broader conclusions, described in Task - 4 for un-reviewed areas.
Members of the groups have been carefully selected to assure qualified, objective, and balanced assessments of what is reviewed. In some cases,
Rev. 0 individuals may serve on two or more System Groups, where the workload permits. In all cases, their review work will be carefully monitored by management of the Review Team.
The necessary discipline and other technical expertise will be represented within the Review Team, and usually on each System Group.
It is not expected that additional entities will be involved, apart from the Review Team and the Review Comittee; although this does not f
preclude occasional assistance from elsewhere in Bechtel where some special expertise is available. Current membership of the Review Team and Review Comittees is shown in the Byron Review Roster, on Table - 2, however needed changes may be made from time-to-time.
Quality Assurance surveillance will be from an assigned Quality Assurance Engineer, who will report directly to the Manager of Quality Assurance, Bechtel Power Corp.
Team-wide support will be provided in the areas of licensing ccmitments and administration by individuals reporting to the Project Manager.
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Qualifications of Bechtel Power Corporation for design review work are summarized in Appendix - B. Resumes of key members of the Review Team and of the Review Committees are included in Appendix - C.
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FIGURE - 1 BYRON REVIEW PROJECT ORGANIZATION CECO BPM BPM-QA S&L Off-Team Review Team Project Manage nt Project
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____ _ _ _. Management QA Internal Review Committees Admin.
Licensing-Commitments
- 1 I a Elect. Power System CCW System ESW System b_______ n_ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ u, _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Project Engrg.-
Elect. System Process Engrg. Process Engrg.
Layout Stress Stress I&C Pipe Support Pipe Support QE Piping Engrg. Piping Engrg.
Seismic Qual. Layout Layout Env. Qual. Structural Structural Direction -----------Communication Note: Each System Group provides services to others, as required
'N N Rev. O TABLE - 2 Byron Review Roster Corporate Management P. Karpa Management Sponsor L
J. M. Amaral Quality Assurance Management Review Team Staff C. W. Dick Project Manager G. L. Parkinson Deputy Project Manager R. S. Cahn Licensing - Commitments D. W. Wol fe Quality Assurance Engineer K. G. Purcell Administrator D. B. Hardie Quality Engineering System Groups A. M. Appleford Structural Engineering A. W. Davis I & C Engineering C. M. Hazari Electrical System Engineer E. M. Hughes CCW Systems Group Leader A. T. Jocson Process Design C. W. Jordan Electrical Systems Group Leader R. J. Lodwick Process Design W. D. Lowe Plant Design M. H. Malkani Stress Engineering A. S. Meyers Piping Engineering M. G. Michail Structural Engineering R. S. Powell ESW Systems Group Leader E. Salinas Structural Engineering H. Shah Pipe Support Design B. S. Shicker Structural Engineering J. A. Shoulders Process Design L. S. Spensko Quality Engineering J. M. Strohm Environmental Qualification A. Valahovic, Jr. Fire Protection C. R. Whitehurst Seismic Qualification G. K. Young Electrical Systems Engineering Level -1 Internal Review Committee C. W. Dick Project Manager
'l G. L. Parkinson Deputy Project Manager R. S. Powell ESW System Group Leader E. M. Hughes CCW System Group Leader C. W. Jordan Electrical System Group Leader R. S. Cahn Licensing - Commitments Level -2 Internal Review Committee A. L. Cahn Bechtel Power Management Consultant R. P. Schmitz Chief Nuclear Engineer, BPC S. A. Bernsen Project Manager, BPC Rev. O s
VI. Schedule Review work will be keyed to the target milestone dates shown below:
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May 31,1984 Issue Interim Report July 31,1984 Issue Final Report ,
More detailed schedules will be developed after initial reviews have taken place. However, it is not expected that the nature of the work will permit the detail of scheduling that is normally performed on a f design - construction project.
The date for the Interim Report will be considered firm, in which the results of work performed to that time will be reported.
The date for the Final Report will be considered as a target date, which may be adjusted several weeks earlier or later, depending on progress and results of the review. In the event ongoing work justifies completion and limited additional time is needed, the completion date may be delayed. Likewise, every reasonable effort will be made to complete the review in the shortest possible time, consistent with achieving objectives of the Review.
The overall guidelines to be employed will be to complete sufficient review work by July 31, 1984, to produce a Final Report, which will not require further review work by the Reviewer or others.
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APPENDIX F LIST OF GENERAL MEETINGS (1097o)
APPENDIX F LIST OF GENERAL MEETINGS April 5 San Francisco Bechtel kickoff meeting to discuss scope of work and mode of operation.
April 10 San Francisco Bechtel meeting to establish review team assignments.
April 17 Chicago CECO /S&L/Bechtel combined IDR kickoff meeting.
April 23 Chicago CECO /S&L/Bechtel meeting. S&L presentation on HELB/MELB design.
April 24 0' Hare Airport CECO /Bechtel joint presentation to NRC personnel, describing plans for the
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April 25 Byron Bechtel visit to Byron Generating Station. Meeting with S&L jobsite personnel to discuss IDR program, review selected work.
April 26 Chicago Bechtel design review team status presentation of IDR to S&L personnel.
May 10 Chicago Bechtel design review team status presentation of IDR to S&L personnel.
IJote: Meetings listed do not include meetings held by individual reviewers.
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