Text

Proposed Rev to TS 3/4.6 to Remove List of Containment Isolation Valves,Revising Allowed Outage Time for CCW Motor Operated Containment Isolation Valves & Allowing Use of Containment Penetration Check Valves as Isolation Devices
	ML20086B756
Person / Time
Site:	Callaway
Issue date:	06/26/1995
From:	; UNION ELECTRIC CO.
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20086B744	List: ML20086B741; ML20086B756;
References
	NUDOCS 9507060087
	Download: ML20086B756 (40)
	v • d • e

r i ATTACHMENT 1 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES (MARKED UP) f 9507060087 950626 PDR ADOCK 05000483 P PDR

p INDEX R "' TN 'l

) .

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 9

PAGE SECTION EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (Continued) 3/4 5-10 3/4.5.5 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK.............................

3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT !

C o n ta i nment I n cegri ty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-1 ,

3/4 6-2 Containment Leakage......................................

3/4 6-4 ,

Containment Air Locks....................................

3/4 6-6 Internal Pressure........................................

i 3/4 6-7 Air Temperature..........................................

Integrity.................. 3/4 6-8 Containment Vessel Structural System........................... 3/4 6-11 !

Containment Ventilation f

3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS .

Containment Spray System................................. 3/4 6-13 f 3/4 6-14 f Spray Additive System.................................... I Containment Cooling System............................... 3/4 6-15 l N VALV 3/4 6-16 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMEN .

TABLE 3. 6 CONT AI;%NT I;0LATION VALV 5. . .Q.g l4-fMd. . . . . . . . . . .3/4 . . .6-18 s s 3 r s 3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL l Analyzers.......................................

3/4 6-31 Hydrogen 3/4 6-32 Hydrogen Cor. trol Systems.................................

1 3/4./ PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE 3/4 7-1 Safety valves............... ............................

TABLE 3.7-1 MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE POWER RANGE NEUTRON FLUX HIGH SETPOINT WITH INOPERABLE STEAM LINE SAFETY 3/4 7-2 VALVES OURING FOUR LOOP OPERATION................... ,

~

CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 D .

f'%.

/

~ ! \

(.

/ '

DEFINITIONS CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY 1.7 CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall exist when;

a. All penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions .

are either:

1) Capable of being closed by an OPERABLE containment automatic ,

isolatio s m, or

2) Closed by manual valves, blind flanges, or deactivate automatic valves secured in their closed positions, except ;; pr;. ucd i,7 Teic :. i ;f Occification 0.0.0. f r g f y g "*

ot**^ under admirachut'ive cabs / a..r pdgy

b. All equipment hatches are c osed and sealed, gptdgcagtrn s 3

c. Each air lock is in compliance with the requireme of Specification 3.6.1.3.

d. The containment leakage rates are within the limits of Specification 3.6.1.2, ano

e. The sealing mechanism associated with each penetration (e.g., welds, bellows, or 0-rings) is OPERABLE.

CONTROLLED LEAKAGE 1.8 CONTROLLED LEAKAGE shall be that seal water flow from the reactor coolant pump seals.

CORE ALTERATION 1.9 CORE ALTEPATION shall be the movement or manipulation of any component within the reactor vessel with the vessel head removed and fuel in the vessel.

Suspension of CORE ALTEPATION shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe cons' e rvative position.

CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT ,

1.10 The CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT (COLR) is the unit specific document that provides core operating limits for the current operating reload cycle.

The cycle specific core operating limits shall be determined for each reload cycle in accordance with Specification 6.9.1.9. Plant operation :

within these operating limits is addressed in individual specifications. j DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 l l

1.11 DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 shall be that concentration of I-131 (microcurie / l gram) which alone would produce the same thyroid dose as the Quantity and isotopic mixture of I-131, I-132, I-133, 1-134, and I-135 actually present.

3 The thyroid dose conversion factors used for this calculation shall be those ,

listed in Table III of TID-14844, " Calculation of Distance Factors for Power i and Test Reactor Sites."

CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 1-2 Amendment No. H.M . 58

3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

) 3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION ,

3.6.1.1 Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be maintained.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

Without primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, restore CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY within

- 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.1.1 Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall-be,y

(.emonstrated:

s a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that all penetrations

not

) capable of being closed by OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valves and required to be closed during accident conditions are closed by manual valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in tneir closed positions, except es U c.ided m Tei c 3. C i be ys/res that s'^ Specification 3.6.3; dre elvs uader AtNdrdM Cort hI P&N N-

b. By verifying that each containment air lock is in compliance with the requirements of Specificat2cn 3.6.1.3; and A A r, n 2

c. After each closing of eNh penetration subject to Type B testing, except the containment air locks, if opened following a Type A or B test, by leak rate teRing the seal with gas at a pressure not less i j

than P , 43.1 psig, and verifying that when the measured leakage rate forth$sesealsisaddedtotheleakageratesdeterminedpursuantto j Specification 4.6.1.2d. for all other Type B and C penetrations, the ;

combined leakage rate is less than 0.60 L,. l 1

n Except valves, blind flanges, and deactivated automatic valves which are l located inside the containment and are locked, sealed or otherwise secured l in the closed position. These' penetrations shall be verified closed during each COLD SHUTDOWN except that such verification need not be performed more ;

often than once per 92 days.

CAlt.AWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 6-1 Amendment No. D. 62 i

l I

REVISlay 3-.-- l 7 ,

) CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION V V ' v y gN 3.6.3 BeAcontainment isolation valve)(;p;;ifi;d in Teth 2.0-1 shall be OPERABLE sith i;;htha ti;;.;; .; ;;.a.- S Teth . 0-1.-N-A APPLICABILITY: H0 DES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With one or more of the containment isolation valve (s) ep;;ified k T.t k 2.;~1 ;

inoperable, maintain at least one isolation valve OPERABLE in each affected i penetration that is open and:

a. Restore the inoperable valve (s) to OPERABLE status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ,

or

b. Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months by use of at leas r one deactivated automatic valve secured in the isolation position,

c. Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months by use of at least one closed manual valve or blind flangey or cAsck., va.lve wi4A floa> ,

ffroyk +he va/ve seeMih ar-Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the T next

-).

d.

SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

)

e. . 1"Ae f v' ovis'iens off S~ oci0cdien

^

3 0.

A

[ are-A s,o/ op y* Nea Sle.

/

SU LANCE ITE00 M ga v- v -

4.6.3.1 %e/\ containment isolation valveK ;p;;if f;d h Teth 0.0-1 shall be demonstrated OPERABLE prior to returning the valve to service after maintenance, repair or replacement work is performed on the valve ter its associated actuator, control or power circuit by performance of a cycling test, and verification of isolation j _

On /agi,mmt ico /s&cn Vo lVer n'of b of#^*A w an i nlernit& f ba fif uhder asdmiosirkslfYC GD M & l.

'W it A Ner- Sa /ir kiy ./ is$ sc hes S/a 7e'n<ek t', yhe sno/or cper d / VolV

atroei&d a.v4 reae4- co*/an+ pm ces/ eeby ,EGN M ,s9,%

fr I, (,2 j / 37, /3 o s i3/, /22, /33 may be eneryige) e d qcl*W br 407

'Io /3 hoM*f b d2'11c{ec-f ay debectfcv cfagsto tr'rc GV* l4 AW N k S m Af be t-c$toftt*/ /* tvr/wt: Me Ve/re fr? on 0/'O'ASW l CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 6

.9 e me

L

, I h' %

, - l

- CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

- SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) 4.6.3.2 Each containment isolation valve -- " ' ' * ' ' shall be i demonstrated OPERABLE during the COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING MODE at least ;

once per 18 months by ,

a.# Verifying that on a Phase "A" Isolation test signal, each 'l Phase "A" isolation valve actuates to its isolation position, b.# Verifying that on a Phase,"B" Isolation test signal, each l Phase "B" isolation valve actuates to its isolation position, and ; ,

c. Verifying that on a Containment Purge Isolation test signal,-

each puqe supply and exhaust isolation valve actuates to its

'" 6,i ,,,,.s ,w /,4w -- '

4.6.3.3 The isolation time of each power operated or automatirhalve et

?dh ?.F1 shall be detemined to be within its limit when tested. pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.. A

The specified 18 month frequency may be waived for Cycle I provided the surveillance is. performed prior to restart following the first refueling i outage or June 1, 1986, whichever occurs first. The provisions of '

Specification 4.0.2 are reset from perfomance of this surveillance. :

4

~

l l

l

?

N CALUb!AY = UNIT 1 3/4 6-17 k:endment No. 8 K

@/ 1

n. _ _ - . _. _

CoKTAffeemt sYSTEf*3 ,

aass 3/4.s.t.2 arefacuLAT10N FLUID nH cokTp.DL (RFPc) [YSTEM The operability of the RFPC Systes ensures that there exists adequate TSP-C I in the containment such that a post-LOCA ~ equilibrium sump pH of greater than or i equal to 7.1 is maintained duri the recirculation phase. The miniaun depth of 30" er,st:res that 9000 lbs'ef T5P C is available for dissolution to yield a i minimum equilibrium sump pH of.7.1. This pH 1evel minimizas the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components. .The upper limit of 34.8' corresponds to the 1 basket design capacity.

114.6.2.3 CONTAIMENT COOLING $YSTEM ,

The OPERABILITY of the Containment Cooling System ensures that: (1) the ,

containment air temperature will be maintained within limits during normal operation, and (2) adequate heat removal capacity is available when' operated in conjunction with the Containment Spray System during post-LOCA conditions.

The Containment Cooling System and the Containment Spray system are redundant to each othrr in providing post-accident cooling of the Containment atmosphere. As a rer. ult of this redundancy in cooling capability, the allowable out-of-service time requirements for the Containment Cooling System have been appropriately adjusted. However, the allowable out-of-service time requirements for tie Containment Spray System have been maintained consistent with that assioned other inoperable E5F equipment since the Containment Spray System k1so provides a mechanism for removing iodine from the containment atmosphere.

3/4.5.1 c0KTA1 H ENT fSOLATIO( VALVES

)*

The OPERABIL!iY of the containment isolation valves ensures that the containment atmesphere will be isolated from the outside environment in the .

event of a release of radioactive material to the containment atmosphere or i pressurization of the containment and is consistent with the requirements of GDC 54 thru 57 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50. Containment isolation within the time limits specified for those isolation valves designed to close automatically ensures that the release of radioactive material to the environment will be consistent with the assumptions used.in the analyses for a LOCAi-1~MT6AT,Har-+

3 /4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTRDL The OtutABILI1Y of the equipment and rystees required for. the detection and control of hydrogen gas ensures that this equipment will be available to maintain the hydrogen concentration withire containment below its .flaminable limit during post-LOCA conditions. Either recombiner unit (or the Purge system) is capable of controlling the expected drogen generation associated with: (1) zirconiure-water reactions, (2) radioly ic decomposition of water, and (3) corrosion of metals within containment. The Hydrogen Purge subsystem discharges directly to the Emergency Exhaust system. . Operation of the Emergency Exhaust System with the heaters operating.for at least 10 continuous hours in a 31-day period is sufficient to. reduce the buildup of moisture on the adsorbers and HEPA ,

filters. These hydrogen control systems are consistent with the recoamiendations of' Regulatory Guide 1.7, " Control' of Combustible Gas. Concentrations in Containment Following a Loss-of-Coolant Accident," Revision 2, November 1978.

CALLAWAY - UNIT I B 3/4 6-4 Amendment No. 96 l l

l l

ptm 11 .

l

., i e i

.~b

+

^

j l INSERT-FOR BASES SECTION 3/4.6.3 ;

i The opening of locked _or sealed-closed containment isolation valves on an intermittent basis under l administrative control includes the following .

considerations: (1) stationing a dedicated individual, who- i is in constant communication with the control room, at the valve controls, (2) instructing this individual to close these valves in an accident situation, and (3) assuring that ,

environmental conditions will not preclude access to close 'l the valves and that this action will prevent the. release of j radioactivity outside the containment. !

i

,6 2

I i

U I

i l

?

I

..__. _ _ . ~ . . - _-. ,

^

REvisgoy 3

.s f . TABLE 3.6-1 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES 'l l

[

TYPE L{AK MAXIMUM ISOLATI0t TIME "

j PENETRATIONS ALVE.NUM8ER FUNCTION TEST REQUIRED (Seconds)

1. Phase "A" Is ation (active)

~P-62 BB HV- 026** PRT Nitrogen C 10 Iso Valve P-62 BB HV-8027 PRT Nitrogen' C 10 Iso Valve +

i i

P-74 BG HV-8100 Seal Water Return C 10 l

TMT Iso Valve .i P-24 BG HV-8112 Sea Water Return C 10 CTMT so Valve P-23 BG HV-8152 Letdown stem CTMT C 10 Iso Valve 7g P-23 BG HV-8160 Letdown Syst CTMT C 10 1

, Iso Valve s e 25 BL HV-8047 Reactor Makeup Wa er C 10 CTMT Iso Valve P-21 EJ HCV-8825** RHR to SI Test Line A 10 Iso Valve P-82 EJ HCV-8890A** RHR A to SI Pumps Test 13 Line Iso Valve ,

P-27 EJ HCV-8890B** RHR B to SI Pumps Test A 13 Line Iso Valve P-49 EM HV-8823** SI/ Accumulator Injection A 10 Test Line Iso Valve

P-411 EM HV-8824** Safety Injection Pump B A 10 Test Line Iso Valve

- 1he provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 6-18

REVIStoy 3

__)

TABLE 3.6-1 (Continued)

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES MAXIMUM TYPE LEAK ISOLATION TIME FUNCTION TEST REQUIRED (Seconds)

PENETRATIONS VALVE NUMBER

1. Phase "A" I lation (active) - (Continued)

Baron Injection Up- A 10 P-88 EM -8843**

stream Test Line Iso

- SI Test Line to RWST C 10 P-92 EM HV-88 Iso Valve Safety Injection Pump A 10 P-87 EM HV-8881**

Test Line Iso Valve Test Line System C 10 P-92 EM HV-8964**

O side CTMT Iso ..

Hydr en Analyzer B' A,C 5 P-99 GS HV-3 Inlet so P-99 GS HV-4 Hydrogen nalyzer B AC 5 g

y Inlet Iso 7g P-99 GS HV-5 Hydrogen Anal er B AC 5 Inlet Iso Hydrogen Analyzer A,C 5 :

P-56 GS HV-B :

Disch Iso .

A,C b l P-56 GS HV-9 Hydrogen Analyzer B '

Disch Iso Hydrogen Analyzer A ,C 5 P-101 GS HV-12 Inlet Iso Hydrogen Analyzer A A,C 5

-P-101 GS HV-13 Inlet Iso ,

l GS HV-14 Hydrogen Analyzer A A,C 5 P-101 Inlet Iso Hydrogen Analyzer A A,C 5 P-91 GS HV-17 Disch Iso GS HV-18 Hydrogen Analyzer A A,C P-97 Disch Iso

- The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 6-19 l

^

REVISlon 1 ;

l TABLE 3.6-1 (Continued) ,

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES , _

MAXIMUM TYPE LEAK ISOLATION TIME PENETRATIONS VA VE NUMBER FUfCTION TEST REQUIRED (Seconds) l

1. Phase "A" Isola ion (active) - (Continued) i GS HV-31 Sample Line to CTMT A,C 5 ,

P- 101 !

Atmos Monitor ,

GS HV-32 Sample Line to CTMT A,C 5 P-101 .

Atmos Monitor GS HV-33 drogen Sample Return A,C 5 P-97 F m PASS i

GS HV-34 Hydr en Sample Return A,C 5 P-97 From SS Sample Li e to CTMT A,C 5 P-99 GS HV-36 Atmos Moni r !

P-99 GS HV-37 Sample Line t CTMT A,C 5 i vg Atmos Monitor GS HV-38 Sample Return CTM A,C 5 3

- ~56 Atmos Monitor ,/ i P-56 GS HV-39 Sample Return CTMT A,C 5 Atmos Monitor HB HV-7126 RCDT Vent Inside CTMT 10 P-44 HB HV-7136 RCDT Pumps Disch Hdr C 10 P-26 Outside CTMT Iso HB HV-7150 RCDT Vent Outside C 10 ,

P-44 '

CTMT RCDT Pumps Disch Hrd C 10 P-26 HB HV-/1/6 Inside CTMT Iso .

P-30 KA FV-29 Reactor Bldg Instr Air C l Supply outside CTMT Iso l CTMT Normal Sumps to C 30 i P-32 LF FV-95 Floor Drain Tank Inside CTMT Iso CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 6-20

l TABLE 3.6-1 (Continued)

REVISlay 2

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

)

^

MAXIMUM TYPE LEAK ISOLATION TIME

o. TEST REQUIRED (Seconds)

PENETkTIONS VALVE NUMGER FUNCTION

1. Phase "A" Isolation (hetive) - (Continued)

CTMT Normal Sumps to C 4 P-32 LF FV-96 Floor Drain Tank Outside CTMT Iso PZR/RCS Liquid Sample 5 P-93 SJ -5** C ,

Inner CTMT Iso PZR/RCS Liquid Sample C 5 P-93 SJ HV-6 Outer CTMT Iso PZR Vapor Sample Outer C 5 P-69 SJ HV-12**

CTMT Iso P-69 SJ HV-13** R Vapor Sample Inner C 5 _'

C Iso ..

Acc lator Sample C 5 P-95 SJ HV-18**

Inner TMT Is Accumulat r Sample EMD C 5 P-95 SJ HV-19""

Outer CTMT so PZR/RCS Liqui Sample C 5 P-93 SJ HV-127""

Outer CTMT Iso !

P-64 SJ HV-128** PZR/RCS Liquid A,C 5 Sample Inner CTMT I P-64 SJ HV-129"* PZR/RCS Liquid A,C 5 Sample Outer CTMT Iso PZR/RCS Liquid C 5 P-64 SJ HV-130** .

Sample Outer CTMT Iso Valve ,

PASS Discharge to A,C 5 P-57 SJ HV-131**

RCDT ,

SJ HV-132** PASS Discharge to A,C 5 ,

P-b/

RCDT ,

+w heeem*w m

- lhe provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 6-21 !

l i

i REVISiCN 2

- TABLE 3.6-1 (Continued) l CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES 1 MAXIMUM TYPE LEAK ISULATION TIME !

VALVE NUMBER FUNCTION TEST REQUIRED (Seconds) l PENETRATIO I

2. Phase "A" olation (passive)*

Accumulator Tank Fill C 5 ;

P-58 EM V-8888** '

Line Iso Valve

- CTMT Recire Sump to CTMT A 30 P- 16 EN HV-Spray Pump A Iso (

CTMT Recire Sump to CTMT A 30 P-13 EN HV-07** I Spray Pump B Iso i

CTMT Nitrogen Supply C 10 P-45 EP HV-8880**

so Valve Hy ogen Purge Inner C 5 P-65 GS HV-20**

CTMT so g --

Hydroge Purge Outer C 5 P-65 GS HV-21**

CTMT Iso Fire Protec on System C 30 :

P-67 KC HV-253** '

=g Hdr Outer CT Iso s

'I 3. Phase "B" Isolation (active)

i-l).. ,

CCW to RCS Iso C 30 l P-74 EG HV-58 ,

CCW Return From C 30 P-75 EG HV-59 .

i RCS Iso i 30 l P-75 EG HV-60 CCW Return From )

RCS Iso EG HV-61 CCW Return From C 30 l P-76 !

RCS Iso CCW Return From

C 30 l P-76 EG HV-62 l

RCS Iso l f

"May be opened on an intermittent basis under administrative control.

- The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable. l I

I CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 6-22 l 1

TABLE 3.6-1 (Continued)

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES MAXIMUM TYPE LEAK ISOLATION TIME IONS VALVE NUMBER FUNCTION TEST REOUIRED (Seconds)

PENET

4. Conta nt Purge Isolation (active)

CTMT Mini-Purge C 5 l V-161 GT HZ-4***

Supply Outside CTMT Iso CTMT Mini-Purge 5 V-161 GT -5*** C l Supply Inside CTMT Iso GT HZ-11 CTMT Mint-Purge C 5 .1 V-160 -

Exh Inside

CTMT Iso GT HZ-12**" CTMT Mini-Purge C 5 i V-160

' h Outside MT Iso

5. Containment Purge Isolation (pas ve) D6L6 M Purge C 10 V-161 GT HZ-6*** CTMT S Supply 0 side CTMT Iso CTMT S/D Pu . C 10 V-161 GT HZ-7***

Supply Inside CTMT Iso GT HZ-8*** CTMT S/D Purge C 10 V-160 Exh Inside CTMT Iso GT HZ-9*** CTMT S/D Purge 10 V-160 Exh Outside CTMT Iso

6. Remote Manual P-41 BB HV-8351A RCP A Seal Water C N.A.

Supply I

- - The provisions of Specifi.:ation 3.0.4 are not applicable provided the (

penetration is isolated oy two passive devices.

l CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 6-23 Amendment No. 33 1

l

f

) REVISION 1 TABLE 3.6-1 (Continued)

' CONTAINMENT ISOLA 110N VALVES

'55) 1./

TYPE LEAK ISOLATION TIME NUMBER FUNCTION TEST REQUIRED (Seconds)

PENETRATIONS VAL

6. Remote Manual - ontinued)

RCP B Seal Water C N.A.

P-22 BB HV-835 Supply RCP C Seal Water - C N.A.

P-39 BB HV-8351C Supply CP 0 Seal Water C N.A.

P-40 BB HV-8351D 5 ply RCS t Leg 1 to RHR A N.A.

P-79 BB PV-8702A Pump Suction RCS Hot g 4 to RHR A N.A.

P-52 BB PV-87028 Pump B Suc ion g PASS Sump S le CTMT C 5 P-15 EJ HV-23**

Iso PASS Sump Sample TMT C 5 P-15 EJ HV-25** '*s Iso \

PASS Sump Sample CTMT C 5 .>/

P-14 EJ HV-24**

Iso PASS Sump Sample CTHT 5 P-j4 EJ HV-26**

Iso .

ESW Supply To C N.A. '

P-71 EF HV-31 Containment ;

Coolers ESW Supply To C N.A. [

P-28 EF HV-32 l Containment Coolers ESW Supply To C .A. t P-71 EF HV-33 ,

Containment Coolers -

i l

"the provisiuns of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

J l

CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 6-24 _

l I

i

~~~ - - - ~ _

~ .

) REVIS ON y TABLE 3.6-1 (Continued)

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

~~~ ~ MAXIMUM TYPE LEAK ISOLATION TIME PENETRATIOh6 VALVE NUMBER FUNCTION TEST REQUIRED (Seconds)

6. Remote Ma al - (Continued)

EF V-34 ESW Supply To C N.A.

P-28 Containment Coolers EF HV-45 ESW Return From C N.A.

P-73 Containment Coolers ,

EF HV-46 ESW Return From C N.A.

P-29 Containment oolers _

EF HV-47 ES Return From C N.A.

P-73 Cont inment Coole

)Q6Mb N.A.

P-29 EF HV-48 ESW Retu From C 3 Containmen

. Coolers ESW Return Fro C N.A.

P-/3 EF HV-49 Containment Coolers ESW Return From C N.A.

P-29 EF HV-50 Containment Coolers EG HV-127* CCW Supply to RCP N.A.

P-74 CCW Return from RCP C N.A.

P-75 EG HV-130*

CCW Return From RCP C N.A.

P-/5 EG HV-131*

CCW Return From RCP C N.A.

P- /fi IG HV-132*

Thermal Barriers CCW from RCP Thermal C N.A.

l'- /h i G llV- 1.i l^

Barrier

lhese valves were assumed to be clused during the accident analysis, and ar nurmally closed but may be opened on an intermittent basis under adminstrati control.

CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 6-25

\

REvis;oy 3 TABLE 3.6-1 (Continued)

) CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES MAXIMUM l TYPE LEAK ISOLATION TIME i FUNCTION TEST REQUIRED (Seconds)

PENETRATIONS VALVE NUMBER

6. Remote Man - (Continued)

RCS Hot Leg 1 to RHR A N.A.

P-79 EJ H 8701A Pump A Suction RCS Hot Leg 4 to RHR A N.A.

P-52 EJ HV-87 B Pump B Suction RHR Pump A Cold Leg A N.A.

P-82 EJ HV-8809A Injection Iso Valve EJ HV-88098 R Pump B Cold Leg A N.A.

P-27 In'ection Iso Valve EJ HV-8811A CTMT ecirc Sump to A N.A. -

P-15 -

RHR Pu A Suction EJ HV-8811B CTMT Reci Sump to A N.A.

P-14 RitR Pump B uction gg EJ HV-8840 RHR Hot Leg Re irc A N.A. "'

.f-21 J Iso Valve EM HV-8802A" SI Pump A Disch Ho A N.A.

P-87 Leg Iso Valve P-48 EM HV-8802B" SI Pump B Disch Hot A N.A.

Leg Iso Valve P-49 EM HV-8835 SI' Pumps Disch to A N.A.

Cold Leg Iso Valve P-89 EN HV-6 CTMT Spray Pump A A N.A.

Discharge Iso Valve EN HV-12 CTMT Spray Pump B A N. A.

P-66 Discharge Iso Valve

/. Active for SIS CVCS Charging Line C 1 P-80 BG llV-8105 "These valves were assumed to be closed during the accident analysis and are no . 11y closed but msy be opened on an intermittent basis under administrative control. .

CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 6-26

~

REVIStoy ,

TABLE 3.6-1 (Continued)

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES MAXIMUM TYPE LEAK ISOLATION TIME PENETRATIO VALVE NUMBER FUNCTION TEST REQUIRED (Seconds)

7. Active fo SIS - (Continued)

P-88 EM V-8801A Boron Injection to A N.A.

RCS Cold Legs P-88 EM HV-8 1B Boron Injection to A N.A.

RCS Cold Legs

8. Hand-0perated and Chec Valves P-41 BB V-118 RCP A Seal C N.A. ~-

ater Supply ,

P-22 BB V-148 RC B Seal C N.A.

Wate Supply P-39 BB V-178 RCP C 5 1 C N.A.

Water Su ly P-40 BB V-208 RCP 0 Seal N.A.

C Water Supply f - 24 BG V-135 RCP Seal Water R urn C N.A.

P-8U BG 8381 CVCS Charging Line C N.A.

P-25 BL 8046 Reactor Makeup Water C N. A.

Supply P-78 BM V-045 Steam Generator Drain N.A.

Line Iso Valve P-78 BM V-046 Steam Generator Drain C N.A.

Line Iso Valve P-53 EC V-083 Refueling Pool Supply C N.A.

From Fuel Pool Cleanup P-53 EC V-084 Refueling Pool Supply C N.A.

From Fuel Pool Cleanup P-54 EC V-087 Refueling Pool C N.A Return to Fuel Pool Cooling CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 6-27

i REVIS!Oi; 1--

TABLE 3.6-1 (Continued)

[ .

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES 1

MAXIMUM l TYPE LEAK ISOLATION TIME FUNCTION TEST REQUIRED (Seconds) . :

' PENETRATIONS VALVE NUMBER i

8. Hand-Operate and Check Valves - (Continued) * ,

N. A. l P-54 EC V 88 Refueling Pool C Return to Fuel '

Pool Cooling Refueling Pool C N.A.

P-55 EC V-095 ;

Skimmers To Fuel Pool Cooling Loop l efueling Pool C N.A. ?

P-55 EC V-096 ,

temers To Fuel Po Cooling Loop _

CCW S ply to RCP C N.A. i P-74 EG V-204 RHR Pump to Cold A N.A.

P-82 EJ 8818A ;

Leg 1 Inj tion EJ 88188 RHR Pump to 1d A N.A.

-) P-82 Leg 2 Injectio ,

i RHR Pump to Cold A N.A. l P-27 EJ 8818C

. Leg 3 Injection RHR Pump to Cold A N.A.

P-27 EJ 88180 Leg 4 Injection ,

EJ 8841A RHR Pump Disch to N.A. [

P-21 RCS Hot Leg 2 l

RHR Pump Disch to A N.A.

P-71 EJ 8841R RCS Hot Leg 3 SI Pump Hot Leg 1 A N.A.

P-8/ EM V-001 1 Injection i SI Pump Hot. Leg 2 A N.A. l P-RI EM V-002 '

Injection SI Pump Hot Leg 3 A N. . f P-48 EM V-003 Injection 51 Pump Hot Leg 4 A N.A.

P-43 EM V-004 Injection l

,~

j CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 6-28 i

t

l$l ~.

TABLE 3.6-1 (continued)

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES TYPE LEAK MAXIMUM ISOLATION TIME .

PENETRA NS VALVE NUMBER FUNCTION TEST REQUIRED (Seconds)

8. Hand-Op ated and Check Valves - (Continued) ;

Accumulator Fill Line P-58 V-006 C N.A.

From SI Pumps P-49 EM V- 0 SI Pump Disch to Cold A N.A.

Leg 1 ;

P-49 EM V-020 51 Pump Disch to Cold A N.A. '

Leg 2 P-49 EM V-030 SI Pump Disch to Cold A N. A.

Leg 3 7 P-49 EM V 040 S Pump Disch to Cold A N. A.

Leg

}

P-88 EM 8815 BIT to CS Cold Leg A N. A. 7 Injectio g

s P-89 EN V-013 CTMT Spray mp A A N.A.

to CTMT Spra Nozzles !

P-66 EN V-017 CTMT Spray Pump A N.A.

to CTMT Spray Noz les P-45 EP V-046 Accumulator Nitrogen C N.A. ;

Supply;Line j P-43 ND V-016 Auxiliary Steam to C N.A. ,

Decon System P-43 ND V-017 Auxiliary Steam to C N.A. )

Decon System P-63 KA V-039 Rx Bldg Service Air C N.A. .i Supply P-63 KA V-118 Rx Bldg Service Air C N.A. l Supply P-30 KA V-204 Rx Bldg Instrument C N. .

{

Air Supply. !

i P-98 KB V-001 Breathing Air Supply C N. A.

l to Rx Bldg. j CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 6-29

. s.

TABLE 3.6-1 (Continued)

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES MAXIMUM TYPE LEAK ISOLATION TIME i PENETRATION VALVE NUMBER FUNCTION TEST REQUIRED (Seconds) l

8. Hand-Operat and Check Valves - (Continued)

P-98 KB 02 Breathing Air Supply C N.A. l to Rx Bldg. ;

P-67 KC V-478 Fire Protection C N.A.

Supply to RX Bldg P-57 SJ V-111 Liquid Sample from A,C N.A. .

PASS to RCDT i

9. Other Automatic Valves D glg'T BD _'

P-1 AB-HV-11*** Mn. ts. Isol. A N.A P-2 AB-HV-14*** Mn. Sta. Isol. A N.A P-3 AB-HV-17*** Mn. Stm. I 1. A N.A.

P-4 AB-HV-20*** Mn. Stm. Isol. A N.A.

P-5 AE-FV-42*** Mn. FW Isol. A N.A.

P-6 AE-FV-39*** Mn. FW Isol. A N.A.

P-7 AE-FV-40*** Mn. FW Isol. A N.A.

P-8 AE-FV-41*** Mn. FW Isol. N.A. ,

P-9 BM-HV-4** SG Blowdn. Isol. A 10 P-10 BM-HV-1** SG Blowdn. Isol. A 10 l

P-11 BM-HV-2** SG Blowdn. Isol. A 10 f

P-12 BM-HV-3** SG Blowdn. Isol. A 10 i

- The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

- - These valves are included only for table completeness. The requirements of Specification 3.6.3 do not apply; instead, the requirements of Specifica-tions 3.7.1.5 and 3.7.1.6. apply to the Main Steam Isolation Valves and Main Feedwater Isolation Valves, respectively.

CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 6-30 Amendment No. 18

i I

1 l

l l

NITACHMENT 2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES (RE-TYPED)

INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION PAGEi EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (Continued) 3/4.5.5 R EFU ELIN G WATER STO R AG E TANK........................... ............ 3/4 5-10 3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT Containm e nt Int e g rity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 /4 6- 1 l

Containm e nt Le a ka g e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-2 i

Co ntainm e nt Air Loc ks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 /4 6-4 ;

1 I nt e r n a l Pre s s u r e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 /4 6 6 Ai r Te m pe ra t u r e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 /4 6-7 Containment Vessel Structural Integrity.................................... 3/4 6-8 Containment Ventilation System ................ ..... ............ ......... .... 3 /4 6-1 1 3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS Conta inm e nt S pra y S yst e m . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. .. . . . . . . . 3 /4 6- 13 S pray Ad d itive S yst e m . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 /4 6- 14 Cont a inm e nt C o oling S yste m. .. . . . . .. .. . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . 3 /4 6- 15 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES....................................... 3/4 6-16 TABLE 3.6-1 D E L ET E D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 /4 6 - 1 8 3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL H yd rog e n Ana!yz e rs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 /4 6- 31 H yd rog e n C ont r ol Syst e m s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 /4 6-3 2 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE S a f e t y Valv e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 /4 7 - 1 TABLE 3.7-1 MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE POWER RANGE NEUTRON FLUX HIGH SETPOINT WITH INOPERABLE STEAM LINE SAFETY VALVES DURING FOUR LOOP OPERATION. ................... 3/4 7-2 CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 IX

i l

DEFINITIONS r

lJ

.{

CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY 1.7 CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall exist when: !

a. All penetrations required'to be closed during accident conditions are either: ;

1) Capable of being closed by an OPERABLE containment automatic - !

1 isolation valve system, or

2) Closed by manual valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic {

valves secured in their closed positions, except for valves that are l open under administrative control as permitted by Specification 3.6.3. l l

b. All equipment hatches are closed and sealed, l

c. Each air lock is in compliance with the requirements of Specification f

3.6.1.3.

l

d. The containment leakage rates are within the limits of Specification l 3.6.1.2, and l

e. The sealing mechanism associated with each penetration (e.g., welds, j bellows, or O-rings) is OPERABLE. i I

CONTROLLED LEAKAGE I 1.8 CONTROLLED LEAKAGE shall be that seal water flow from the reactor coolant pump seals.

l CORE ALTERATION !

1.9 CORE ALTERATION shall be the movement or manipulation of any component ;

within the reactor vessel with the vessel head removed and fuel in the vessel.

Suspension of CORE ALTERATION shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe conservative position. ;

CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT l

1.10 The CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT (COLR) is the unit specific document that provides core operating limits for the current operating reload cycle. The cycle specific core operating limits shall be determined for each reload cycle in accordance with Specification 6.9.1.9. Plant operation within these operating limits is addressed in individual specifications.

J DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 l

, I 1.11 DOSE EQUlVALENT I-131 shall be that concentration of I-131 (microcurie / gram) !

which alone would produce the same thyroid dose as the quantity and isotopic mixture j of I 131, I-132, I-133, I-134, and I-135 actually present . The thyroid dose conversion !

factors used for this calculation shall be those listed in Table lil of TID-14844,

" Calculation of Distance Factors for Power and Test Reactor Sites."

CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 1-2 Amendment No. A B 35,58 i

3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY !

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.1.1 Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be maintained.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1,2,3 and 4.

ACTION: :

Without primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, restore CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY within '

1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.1.1 Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be demonstrated:

a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that all penetrations

not capable of being closed by OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valves and required to be closed during accident conditions are closed by manual valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in their closed positions, except for valves that are open under administrative control as permitted by ?

Specification 3.6.3; ;

b. By verifying that each containment air lock is in compliance with the requirements of Specification 3.6.1.3; and

c. After each closing of each penetration subject to Type B testing, except the containment air locks, if opened following a Type A or B test, by leak rate ;

testing the seal with gas at a pressure not less than P,,48.1 psig, and i verifying that when the measured leakage rate for these seals is added to the -

leakage rates determined pursuant to Specification 4.6.1.2d for all other Type B-and C penetrations, the combined leakage rate is less than O.60 L, .

)

Except valves, blind flanges, and deactivated automatic valves which are located inside the containment and are locked, sealed or otherwise secured in the closed position.

These penetrations shall be verified closed during each COLD SHUTDOWN except that

)

such verification need not be performed more often than once per 92 days.

J l

CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 6-1 Amendment No. I3,62

l I

I l

l CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS i j

3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES 1 1

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 1

3.6.3 Each containment isolation valve shall be OPERABLE *.

I APPLICABILLTX: MODES 1, 2,3, and 4.

ACTION:

i With one or more of the containment isolation valve (s) inoperable, maintain at least one isolation valve OPERABLE in each affected penetration that is open and:

a. Restore the inoperable valve (s) to OPERABLE status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months , or ' ,

b. Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months by use of at least one i deactivated automatic valve secured in the isolation position, or ;

c. Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months by use of at least one closed manual valve or blind flange or check valve with flow through the valve :

secured, or {

d. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD ,

SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

i

e. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable. .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS ;

i 4.6.3.1 Each containment isolation valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE prior to :

returning the valve to service after maintenance, repair or replacement work is !

performed on the valve or its associated actuator, control or power circuit by ,

performance of a cycling test, and verification of isolation time.

Containment isolation valves may be opened on an intermittent basis under ;

administrative control. ,

After satisfying this action statement, the motor operated valves associated with reactor coolant pump seal cooling, EGHV58,59, 60,61,62,127,130,131,132, !

133 may be energized and cycled for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months to conduct any actuator l diagnostic evaluations which may be required to restore the valve to an OPERABLE ,

condition. ,

I CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 6-16 ,

l CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) 4.6.3.2 Each containment isolation valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE during the i COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING MODE at least once per 18 months by:

a.# Verifying that on a Phase "A" Isolation test signal, each Phase "A" isolation valve actuates to its isolation position, b.# Verifying that on a Phase "B" Isolation test signal, each Phase "B" isolation valve actuates to its isoletion position, and

c. Verifying that on a Containment Purge isolation test signal, each purge supply and exhaust isolation valve actuates to its isolation position.

4.6.3.3 The isolation time of each power operated or automatic containment isolation valve shall be determined to be within its limit when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

The specified 18 month frequency may be waived for Cycle I provided the surveillance is performed prior to restart following the first refueling outage or June 1,1986, whichever occurs first. The provisions of Specification 4.0.2 are reset from performance of this surveillance.

i l

l I

l l

CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 6-17 Amendment No. 8 I

1 l

I CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.6.2.2 RECIRCULATION FLUID oH CONTROL (RFPC) SYSTElj The operability of the RFPC System ensures that there exists adequate TSP-C in the containment such that a post-LOCA equilibrium sump pH of greater than or equal to 7.1 is maintained during the recirculation phase. The minimum depth of 30" ensures that 9000 lbm of TSP-C is available for dissolution to yield a minimum equilibrium sump pH of 7.1. This pH level minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components. The upper limit of 36.8" corresponds to the basket design capacity.

3/4.6.2.3 CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the Containment Cooling System ensures that: (1) the containment air temperature will be maintained within limits during normal operation, and (2) adequate heat removal capacity is available when operated in conjunction with the Containment Spray System during post-LOCA conditions.

The Containment Cooling System and the Containment Spray System are redundant to each other in providing post-accident cooling of the Containment atmnsphere. As a result of this redundancy in cooling capability, the allowable out-of-service time requirements for the Containment Cooling System have been appropriately adjusted. However, the allowable out-of-service time requirements for the Containment Spray System have been maintained consistent with that assigned other inoperable ESF equipment since the Containment Spray System also provides a mechanism for removing iodine from the containment atmosphere.

3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES The OPERABILITY of the containment isolation valves ensures that the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in the event of a release of radioactive material to the containment atmosphere or pressurization of the containment and is consistent with the requirements of GDC 54 thru 57 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part ]

50. Containment isolation within the time limits specified for those isolation valves '

designed to close automatically ensures that the release of radioactive material to the environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for a LOCA.

l The opening of locked or sealed-closed containment isolation valves on an intermittent basis under administrative control includes the following considerations: (1) stationing a dedicated individual, who is in constant communication with the control room, at the valve controls, (2) instructing this individual to close these valves in an accident situation, and (3) assuring that environmental conditions will not preclude access to close the valves and that this action will prevent the release of radioactivity outside the containment. '

l j

CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 6 - 4 Amendment No. 96

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES (Continued) I i

3/4.6.4 COMBUSTlBLE GAS CONTROL The OPERABILITY of the equipment and systems required for the detection and I control of hydrogen gas ensures that this equipment will be available to maintain the hydrogen concentration within containment below its flammable limit during post-LOCA l conditions. Either recombiner unit (or the Purge System)is capable of controlling the expected hydrogen generation associated with: (1) zirconium-water reactions, (2) radiolytic decomposition of water, and (3) corrosion of metals within containment. The l Hydrogen Purge Subsystem discharges directly to the Emergency Exhaust System.

Operation of the Emergency Exhaust System with the heaters operating for at least 10 l continuous hours in a 31-day period is sufficient to reduce the buildup of moisture on the.

adsorbers and HEPA filters. These hydrogen control systems are consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.7, " Control of Combustible Gas Concentrations in Containment Following a Loss-of-Coolant Accident," Revision 2, November 1978.

I CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 6 - 5 Amendment No. 96

i 1

i ATTACHMENT 3 SAFETY EVALUATION f

f C

I b

t i

Attcchm:nt 3 P:ga 1 of 7 ULNRC-3227 BAFETY EVALUATION f proposed change This. amendment request revises Technical Specification (TS) 3/4.6 by 1) removing the list of containment isolation valves,

2) revising the allowed outage time for containment isolation component cooling water (CCW) motor operated valves, and

3) allowing the use of containment penetration check valves as isolation ~ devices.

'The list of containment isolation valves, TS Table 3.6-1, is removed in accordance with the guidance of NRC_ Generic Letter 91-08, ' Removal of Component Lists from Technical Specifications".

This change is consistent with the provisions of the containment systems section of NUREG-1431, ' Standard Technical Specifications for Westinghouse Plants" and consists of:

1

1. the deletion of references to Table 3.6-1 from TS'1.7, 3/4.6.1 and 3/4.6.3;

2. the addition of. wording to Surveillance Requirement 4.6.1.1.a to exempt valves opened under administrative control as permitted by TS 3/4.6.4;

3. the addition of a note to LCO 3.6.3 to indicate that TS 3.0.4 does not apply, and that containment isolation valves may be opened under administrative control, and;.

4. the revision of BASES Section 3/4.6.3 in accordance with the GL 91-08 guidance.

TS 3.6.3 is revised by the addition of a footnote to ACTION Statement (b). After satisfying this ACTION Statement the footnote would allow the CCW motor operated valves (MOVs) to be energized and cycled for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months to conduct any actuator diagnostic evaluations which may be required to restore the valves to an OPERABLE condition. The current TS ACTION allowed outage time of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months does not provide sufficient time to troubleshoot and perform corrective maintenance and do any required diagnostic evaluations.

TS LCO 3.6.3.c is revised to allow the use of penetration check valves as isolation devices. This change is also consistent with the provisions of the containment systems section of NUREG-1431.

Background

Containment integrity is provided by the containment structure and by isolating the various penetrations that pass through the .i containment structure walls. Maintaining containment integrity R prevents excessive radioactivity from passing from the centainment' to the atmosphere in the event of a release of radioactive material to the containment. The containment isolation valves are an integral part of the containment isolation design.

n l

Attcchm:nt 3 Paga 2 of 7 {

ULNRC-3227 i The function of containment isolation valves is to be closed or to automatically close to limit the release of radioactive fission products to the environment. TS 3/4.6.3 establishes requirements for containment isolation valves and TS Table 3.6-1 identifies those valves required to be OPERABLE to satisfy TS requirements.

Containment Isolation Valve Table Romnval This proposed change removes TS Table 3.6-1, Containment Isolation Valves, in accordance with GL 91-08. Specifications which refer to Table 3.6-1 are revised to reference the applicable valves by function. The proposed change allows Table 3.6-1 to be removed from the TS without altering existing TS requirements or those components to which they apply.

Generic Letter 91-08 provides guidance in removing component lists from the technical specifications. In accordance with the guidance, component lists removed from the TS must be relocated in plant documents subject to the change control provisions in the Administrative Controls Section of the TS. These changes then would allow the component lists to be updated outside of the license amendment process.

Union Electric will relocate the list of containment isolation valves to FSAR Chapter 16, which contains other relocated TS sections. Changes to the FSAR are subject to the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59. This process provides proper levels of review and approval of changes and for the identification of any unreviewed safety question. Records of the changes are maintained and an annual report submitted to NRC that describes the changes and provides a summary of the safety evaluation of each change. The FSAR is also updated every 18 months with any changes. Therefore, ndequate controls exist to ensure that these components satisfy the applicable TS requirements. Relocation of Table 3.6-1 to Chapter 16 of the FSAR does not affect the purpose or information provided in FSAR Figure 6.2.4-1, Listing of Containment Piping Penetrations.

TS Table 3.6-1 identifies valves which may be opened during plant operation under administrative control. These valves are required to be opened for testing, maintenance, or other activities.

Administrative control of these valves when opened in Modes 1 through 4 is required since rapid closure would be necessary to ,

isolate the containment during accident conditions. TS 3/4.6.3 is ;

revised to retain the exception of the requirements to those i valves under administrative control. This change is provided by appropriate plant procedures, which are maintained under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59.

Several Table 3.6-1 valves are exempt from the requirements of TS 3.0.4, as currently indicated by a table footnote. This change relocates the TS 3.0.4 exception to LCO 3.6.3, which causes this exception to apply to all containment isolation valves. TS 3.0.4 precludes entry into an operational mode or condition when an LCO would not be met without reliance on the provisions of the action requirements. GL 91-08 states that the action requirements for

Attachm:nt 3 Paga 3 of 7 ULNRC-3227 containment isolation valves permit continued operation with an inoperable valve when the associated penetration is isolated, therefore an exception to the limitation of TS 3.0.4 on changes in operational modes or conditions is acceptable for this specification. In addition, this increase in the scope of TS 3.0.4 is acceptable because it is also consistent with the guidance provided in Generic Letter 87-09.

The valve closure time requirements listed in Table 3.6-1 are maintained in appropriate plant procedures, the FSAR and the Callaway Pump and Valve Program. These documents are all controlled under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59. Therefore, removing the Table 3.6-1 valve stroke times will not alter these requirements.

The proposed change does not alter the current TS requirements for containment isolation valve operability. The LCO and surveillance requirements will be retained in the TS. Therefore, the proposed changes will not affect the meaning, application, or function of the TS requirements for the containment isolation valves.

Allowed Outage time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months TS 3.6.3 is revised by the addition of a footnote to ACTION Statement 03) allowing up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months to energize and cycle component cooling water MOVs in order to perform diagnostic testing.

Table 1 provides a listing of the penetrations and their !

associated MOVs that would be applicable to the proposed footnote to ACTION Statement (b). These penetrations are associated with '

the component cooling water supply and return lines supplying the reactor coolant pump motors and thermal barrier heat exchangers.

A situation could exist which requires these MOVs to have -

maintenance performed on-line. If the allowed outage time of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months is exceeded, the MOV must be closed to satisfy TS 3.6.3 ACTICN 03) . The addition of the footnote to this TS would allow sufficient time for the completion of diagnostic testing so the MOV could be returned to OPERABLE status.

The MOV predictive performance program describes the MOV diagnostic test program at Callaway Plant. Callaway is presently using the MOVATS 3000 series developed by ITI-MOVATS, Inc. for diagnostic testing. This program satisfies requirements of <

Generic Letter 89-10, " Safety Related Motor Operated Valve Testing and Surveillance" and commitments to Bulletin 85-03, " Motor Operated Valve Common Mode Failures During Plant Transients Due to Improper Switch Settings" as well as predictive performance. Some forms of MOV maintenance require diagnostic testing be performed prior to declaring the MOV OPERABLE. This testing can routinely take up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months to complete. The current Action Statement to TS 3.6.3 does not account for the time required to perform diagnostic testing.

The MOVs listed in Table 1 meet acceptable alternatives to the explicit requirements of GDC 56 since they utilize automatic

Attachment 3 Page 4 of 7 ULNRC-3227 isolation valves that fail "as is" versus failing closed upon loss of power to the valve cperators. These penetrations are in service during normal operation and are required to be open following an accident. A check valve is provided inside containment for the supply line and independently powered automatic isolation valves are provided inside. containment for the return lines. These valves serve as the second barrier between the containment atmosphere and the outside atmosphere so that the failure of the other barrier, i.e. the automatic isolation valve outside containment, does not prevent isolation of the penetrations. This arrangement is provided so a single active or passive failure will not result in the loss of both containment isolation barriers.

The proposed change to use check valves as isolation devices is not applicable to the RCP seal uater penetrations because the outside containment supply line consists of two parallel automatic isolation valves. This design ensures that there is a supply of water to the reactor coolant pump seals, but results in a situation whereby two valves must be closed to satisfy the TS action statement. Allowing 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months to restore the inoperable f valves is acceptable because the system is closed (isolated from l the RCS with flow through the penetration) and the penetration can still be isolated by the in containment isolation device.

Based on this, the administrative controls in place while

! performing valve maintenance and and the fact that the Callway PRA I

in unaffected by this change, the additional allowance of up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months to energize and cycle the inoperable valve to conduct any required diagnostic testing to restore the valve to OPERABLE status will not result in containment leakage that would exceed limits assumed in the safety analyses for a LOCA.

l Use of Check Valves as Tsolation Device TS LCO 3.6.3.c is revised to allow the use of penetration check valves to satisfy the requirements for penetration isolation.

The use of containment isolation check valves as isolation devices is acceptable because the callaway containment design assumes that check valves will act as isolation devices. This is discussed in the NRC Safety Evaluation Report for Union Electric (NUREG-0830, ,

dated October 1981) in section 6.2.3, containment Isolation System.

The penetration check valves are subjected to Type C integrated leak rate and full flow testing, which makes these valves highly reliable devices. These testing requirements are contained in the Callaway Inservice Testing Program. In addition, NUREG-1431 allows the use of check valves as isolation devices.

l Miscellaneous. Change Table 3.6-1 includes the main steam and main feedwater isolation valves for table completeness only. These eight automatic valves will not be relocated to the FSAR since the requirements of 1

Attachment 3 page 5 of 7 ULNRC-3227 <

i specification 3.6.3 are not applicable to them and these valves are contained in Specifications 3,7.1.5 and 3.7.1.6.

Evaluation The proposed revision to TS 3/4.6 to remove the listing of containment isolation valves, revise the ACTION Statement for the CCW MOVs, and credit penetration check valves as isolation devices does not involve an unreviewed safety question because operation of Callaway Plant with this changs would not:

a) Increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of ,

an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report.

The proposed changes simplify the TS, meet the regulatory >

requirements for control of containment isolation and are consistent with the guidelines of GL 91-08. The information contained in Table 3.6-1 has not been changed, but only relocated to a different controlling document. This is an administrative change which should result in improved plant practices and have no impact on plant operations. Addition of the footnote to allow up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months for valve testing does not affect the severity of any accident previously evaluated. The proposed revision to the TS will not adversely impact plant safety since the second barrier of the two required is still available to provide isolation between the containment atmosphere or the reactor coolant system and the outside atmosphere.

b) Create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report.

There are no design changes being made that would create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of equipment.

These changes do not result in any physical change to the ,

plant or to the manner of plant operation. Addition of the footnote to allow up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months for valve testing does not affect the severity of any accident previously evaluated.

The additional time provides assurance that the inoperable valve is in proper working order prior to returning it to OPERABLE condition.

c) Reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification.

The proposed revision to the TS does not reduce the margin of safety assumed in any accident analysis. Contain*.nent )

isolation will still be maintained as provided by the second l isolation valve to ensure that the release of radioactive i material to the environment will be consistent with the I assumptions used in the analyses for a LOCA.

l

1 Attcchment 3 Page 6 of 7 l ULNRC-3227 Conclusion Given the above discussions as well as those presented in the Significant Hazards Consideration, the proposed change does not ;

adversely affect or endanger the health or safety of the general public or. involve a significant safety hazard.

n 5

Attachm:nt 3 <

Pc.gs 7 of 7 ULNRC-3227 TABLE 1 Type Leak Eenetration i Valve (s) Test GDC P-74 EGHV0058. -0127 C 56 ,

P-75 EGHV0059, -0060,-0130,-0131 C 56 P-76 EGHV0061, -0062,-0132,-0133 C 56

ATTACHMENT 4 SIGNIFICANT IIAZARDS EVALUATION l

1 1

l Attechment 4 Paga 1 of 2 ULNRC-3227 SIGNIEICANT HAZARDS _ CONSIDERATION Proposed changa This amendment request revises Technical Specification (TS) 3/4.6 by 1) removing the list of containment isolation valves,

2) revising the allowed outage time for containment isolation component cooling water (CCW) motor operated valves, and

3) allowing the use of containment penetration check valves as isolation devices.

The list of containment isolation valves, TS Table 3.6-1, is removed in accordance with the guidance of NRC Generic Letter 91-08, " Removal of Component Lists from Technical Specifications".

This change is consistent with the provisions of the containment systems section of NUREG-1431, " Standard Technical Specifications for Westinghouse Plants". This portion of the proposed change:

1. deletes references to Table 3.6-1 from TS 1.7, 3/4.6.1 and 3/4.6.3,

2. adds wording to Surveillance Requirement 4.6.1.1.a to exempt valves opened under administrative control as permitted by TS 3/4.6.4,

3. adds a note to LCO 3.6.3 to indicate that TS 3.0.4 does not apply, and that containment isolation valves may be opened under administrative control, and

4. revises BASES Section 3/4.6.3 in accordance with the GL 91-08 guidance.

TS 3.6.3 is revised by the addition of a footnote to ACTION Statement (b). After satisfying this ACTION Statement the footnote would allow the CCW motor operated valves to be energized and cycled for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months to conduct any actuator diagnostic evaluations which may be required to restore the valve to an OPERABLE condition. The current TS ACTION allowed outage time of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months does not provide sufficient time to troubleshoot and perform corrective maintenance and do any required diagnostic evaluations.

TS LCO 3.6.3.c is revised to allow the use of penetration check valves as isolation devices. This change is also consistent with the provisions of the containment systems section of NUREG-1431.

Evaluation The proposed revision to TS 3/4.6 to remove the listing of containment isolation valves, revise the ACTION Statement for the CCW MOVs, and credit penetration check valves as isolation devices does not involve a significant hazards consideration because operation of Callaway Plant with this change would not:

a) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

l Attachment 4 ]

Pcgm 2 of 2 l ULNRC-3227 l i

l The proposed changes simplify the TS, meet the regulatory requirements for control of containment isolation and are consistent with the guidelines of GL 91-08. The information contained in Table 3.6-1 has not been changed, but only relocw,-d to a different controlling document. This is an administrative change which should result in improved plant practices and have no impact on plant operations. Addition of the footnote to allow up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months for valve testing ;

does not affect the severity of any accident previously evaluated. The proposed revision to the TS will not adversely impact plant safety since the second barrier of the two required is still available to provide isolation between the containment atmosphere or the reactor coolant system and the outside atmosphere.

b) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

There are no design changes being made that would create a new type of accident or malfunction and the method and manner of plant operation remain unchanged. Addition of the footnote to allow up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months for valve testing does not affect the severity of any accident previously evaluated.

The additional time provides assurance that the inoperable valve is in proper working order prior to returning it to OPERABLE condition.

c) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

There are no changes being made to the safety limits or safety system settings that would adversely impact plant safety. Containment isolation will still be maintained as provided by the second isolation valve to ensure that the release of radioactive material to the environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for a LOCA. This will assure that containment integrity is maintained.

Based on the above discussions, it has been determined that the requested Technical Specification change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident or create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident or condition over previous evaluations; or involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. Therefore, the requested license amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

.l l

1 l

\

1 I

ATTACHMENT 5 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION ,

4 4

L T

F I-I

(

i

Attachment 5 Page 1 of.1 ULNRC-3227 ENYlRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION This amendment request revises Technical Specification 3/4.6 by 1) removing the list of containment isolation valves, 2) revising the allowed outage time for containment isolation component cooling water motor operated valves, and 3) allowing the use of containment penetration check valves as isolation devices.

The proposed amendment involves changes with respect to the use of facility components located within.the restricted area, as defined in 10 CFR 20, and changes surveillance requirements. Union Electric has determined that the proposed mmendment does not involve:

(1) A significant hazard consideration, as discussed in i I

Attachment 4 of this mnendment application; (2) A significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite; l (3) A significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.

Accordingly, the proposed mmendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22 (c) (9) . Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or enviromental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

I I

l

-_

ML20086B756

Text

Background

Navigation menu

Search