ML20085D883

Memorandum Re Revised Emergency Planning Contentions. Contentions Sequentially Numbered,Redrafted to Eliminate Repetition & Redundancies & Reorganized Per New Subj Matter Categories.Certificate of Svc Encl

ML20085D883
Person / Time
Site:	Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png
Issue date:	07/26/1983
From:	Jay Dougherty, Latham S, Letsche K, Shapiro R KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART, NORTH SHORE COMMITTEE AGAINST NUCLEAR & THERMAL POLLU, SHOREHAM OPPONENTS COALITION, SOUTHAMPTON, NY, SUFFOLK COUNTY, NY
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
Shared Package
ML20085D872	List: ML20085D869 ML20085D883
References
NUDOCS 8307290159
Download: ML20085D883 (200)

Text

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g,,g p w.F.C Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board ~7

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LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY Docket No. 50-322

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MEMORANDUM REGARDING REVISED EMERGENCY PLANNING CONTENTIONS Pursuant to the Board's request made at the July 13, 1983 prehearing conference and confirmed in the First Prehearing Conference Order and Notice of Second Prehearing Conference, dated July 20, 1983 (hereinafter, " Order"), Intervenors Suffolk County, the Shoreham Opponents Coalition, the North Shore Com-l mittee Against Nuclear and Thermal Pollution, and the Town of Southampton (collectively, "Intervenors") hereby submit their Revised Emergency Planning Contentions. As the Board re-quested, the Revised Contentions are sequentially numbered from 1 to 97. They have been redrafted to eliminate repetition and redundancies and reorganized according to several new subject matter categories (including the ones suggested by the Board).

The reorganization of the contentions has resulted in broad changes in the presentation of the Revised Contentions When compared to those which originally were filed. To assist 8307290159 830726 PDR ADOCK 05000322 PDR g

I the Board and Parties, a cross reference table Which illustrates the reorganization and consolidation is attached as Appendix A. The table lists the Revised Contentions by subject heading and by number, and indicates the numbers of the original contentions Which have been consolidated under the re-vised subject headings. Appendix B contains a more detailed table which breaks down the Revised Contentions into subparts and again cross-references to the original contentions. Appen-dix B also identifies the original contentions which have been deleted rather than consolidated with other contentions.

The task of reorganizing and consolidating the contentions was undertaken to eliminate, Wherever possible, any repetition and redundancy. The reorganization under new subject headings necessitated the addition of some new introductory, transi-tional and explanatory language to provide the appropriate context for individual contentions, and to eliminate as much as possible the need for cross-references to other contentions (one of the objections made by LILCO to the original conten-tions).

There are still several instances Where a certain amount

, of repetition (beyond that necessary to provide context)

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remains. In each instance, however, the repetition is essential given the subject matter of the contentions Which are

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involved. For example, the primary discussion of the evacuation shadow phenomenon is contained in the contention on that subject (Contention 23), as contemplated by the Board.

However, the existence of the evacuation shadow phenomenon is also one of the bases for the contention that LILCO's 10 mile EPZ is inadequate. Therefore it was necessary to include an abbreviated discussion of the phenomenon in the EPZ Contention (Contention 22), in order to avoid triggering a " lack of basis" objection to that contention.

Pursuant to the agreement of the parties, a preliminary draft of the Revised Contentions was provided for enmment late on Friday afternoon, July 22, 1983, to counsel for LILCO, the Staff, and the Citizens for an Orderly Energy Policy. LILCO counsel advised counsel for Suffolk Cour t y on Monday, July 25, 1983, that it's preliminary reaction to tra Revised Contentions was thatt they were still too long becatl' they contained ap-proximately 180 pages; that individual contentions contained

" extraneous information," cross references to other conten-tions, and covere6 more than one subject; and, in sum, that LILCO's objections as to the style and form of the original contentions would probably be reasserted with respect to the Revised Content 1ons.1/ No comments were received from counsel

~1/ LILCO's counsel indicated that these comments were prelim-inary because the Revised Contentions had not yet been (Footnote cont'd next page)

e y for the Staff or for the Citizens for an Orderly Energy Policy.

Intervenors will respond to objections ultimately filed by LILCO and the other parties at the appropriate time. In advance, however, Intervenors do have a brief comment on LILCO's preliminary objection on the basis of length. The LILCO Plan is a lengthy, complex document which encompasses all aspects of offsite emergency planning. Intervenors have reviewed the Plan in its entirety, and have identified a large number of specific deficiencies which cover many aspects of the Plan's adequacy and implementability. Intervenors have then explained those deficiencies in detail so that the bases for the contentions (both legal and factual) are set forth as spe-cifically as possible. Intervenors would be happy to be able to present the contentions in fewer pages but experience with lack of basis / lack of specificity objections compels the inclu-sion of detail in the contentions. In our view, the fact that 180 pages are required to state the contentions is neither I

(Footnote cont'd from previous page) reviewed in the depth necessary to permit more detailed comments. Because only general comments were received, Intervenors were in no position to make specific changes in the contentions to attempt to obviate LILCO's apparent continued objection to the form and organization of the contentions.

surprising nor, more importantly, in any way inappropriate or improper. The Revised Contentions are organized in the fashion suggested by the Board, LILCO and the Staff, and their length is, indeed, irrelevant to the question of their admissibility.

All Intervenors join in all the Revised Contentions. The primary sponsors of Contention 22 are jointly Suffolk County and the Town of Southampton. The Shoreham Opponents Coalition is the primary sponsor of Contentions 21, 63.B, and 93-97.

Suffolk County is the primary sponsor of the remaining con-tentions.

Respectfully submitted, Dated: July 26, 1983 David J. Gilmartin Washington, D.C. Patricia A. Dempsey Suffolk County Department of Law Veterans Memorial Highway Hauppauge, New York 11788 Y Ah -

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Herbert H. Brow '

Lawrence Coe L npher Karla J. Letsc e Christopher M. McMurray Michael S. Mi'11er KIRKPATRICK, LOCKHART, HILL, CHRISTOPHER & PHILLIPS 1900 M Street, N.W., Suite 800 l

Washington, D.C. 20036 Attorneys for Suffolk County ,

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3 J s B. Dougherty ff //

3 5 Porter Street, W. W .

W hington, D.C. 20008 (202) 362-7158 Counsel for Shoreham Opponents Coalition a/>L Uwu Ralph. Sh$fpiro / p J

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8 1 Cammer & Shapiro 9 East 40th Street New York, New York 10016 Counsel for North Shore Committee Against Nuclear and Thermal Pollution TWOMEY, LATHAM & SHEA

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Jop F.[)B. Latham Stiepherr Attorneys for the Town of Southampton 333 West Second Street Post Office Box 398 Riverhead, New York 11901 l

i Contention Cross-Reference Table Revised Contentions (July 26)

Original Contentions (July 7)

• LILCO's Lack of Legal Authority _

Contentions 1-10 1.A-1.H, 29.C.1, 29.E, 29.F, 36.I, 61, 65, 66, 67, Southampton 3 70, 76.B, 125, 128, Command ano Control Contentions 11-14 2.A-C, 3.A, 3.c LILCO's Lack of Credibility Contention 15 -

3.D, 4, 97, 100.B,21.B, 101,29.D, 104 30.B, 40, 73, Public Education a;.' !aformation Contentions 16-21 21.C, 28, 98, 99, 100.A, 102, 103, 105, 106, SCC 5-SOC 8 Inadequacy of LILCO D;c'93ed 10-Mile Plume Exposure Path 5, 6, Southampton 1 Contention 22 y .sa-Aing Zone ("EPZ")

Evacuation Shadow Phenomenon Contention 23 5, 21.A-C, 22, 31, 54, 56, 57, 76, 103.G, 103.I, Southampton 4.B LILCO's Lack of Agreements with Organizations and Personnel Relied Upon in the Plan 3.A, 9, 29.B, 36.B, 37.A, 38, 40, 42, Contentien 24 42.B, 43.A, 43.B, 44, 45, 46, 48, 51.C, 52, 53, 55, 62, 74, 77.B, 90, Role Conflict of Emergency Workers 96.A, 109, 119, 128, Southampton 2 and 4 Contention 25 2.D, 2.E, 8, 77.B, Southampton9, 29.C.4, 4.C 42.B, 46, 56, Notification Contentionof26 Emergency Response Personnel 2.E, g

12, 29.C.2.a, 29.C.2.b, 29.C.2.d, 81, 82,43.B.1, 36.D, 95, SOC47,4 Sl.E.1, 78, 79, 80, a

o All Suffolk County contentions unless otherwise noted .

Mobilization of Emergency Response Personnel 2.E, 29.C, 36.C, 36.D, 38, 43.B.2, 45 Contention 27 46, 47, 51.E.2, 56, 82, 93 Communication Among Emergency Response Personnel 30.E, 36.E, 83, 85-91 Contentions 28-34 Training of Emergency Workers ,

3.B, 8, 11, 72, 84, 107-112, 114-118, Contentions 35-44 120-124 Accident and Dose Assessment and Projection 7, 10, 13-15, 17, 18 Contentions 45-51 Emergency Operations Center 69 Contention 52 Security During A Radiological Emergency 74, 75, Southampton 4 Contention 53 1

Medical and Public Health Support 77.C p Contention 54 w I

Notification to the Public 92, 93-95, 96.B, SOC 4 Contentions 55-59 Protective Actions Contentions 60-83 Sheltering - Contentions 60-62 19, 20, 21.D, 21.F-21.H, 23.A-23.D, 24 Evacuation - Contentions 63-77 25-27, 30, 32-35, 36.A, 36.F, 36.H, 36.J, 36.L, 36.M, 37.B, 38.5, 38.6, 39, 41, 42.A-42.D, 43.A, 43.B.2, 43.B.3, 43.C.3, 43.C.4, 43.B, 43.D, 47, 48.A, D-F, 50, Sl.A, B, C.1, E, 54, 57-59, SOC 1-SOC 2, SOC 3a-SOC 3c, SOC 9 Food, Milk, Water and Livestock Control - 61, 63-68, 74,~Southampton 3 Contentions 78-83 Recovery and Reentry 125-132 Contentions 84-91

_ _ _ . . _. _ _ _ _ . _ _ . . . _ _ . _ _.-..____.____...__..._..__.._.-.__.__..._.-_.,._._.__..._..---..___...___.__..._-_..m..

State Emergency Plan 133 Contention 92 Loss of Offsite Power '

SOC 10-SOC 13 Contentions 93-96 Bad Weather SOC 14 Contention 97 I

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Appendix B Detailed Contention Cross-Reference Table Revised Contentions (Ju'l y 26) Original Contentions (July 7)

Lack of Legal 1 1.A, 29.C.1

, Authority 2 1.B, l.C, 29.E, 76.B 3 1.D, 29.F 4 1.E 5 1.F 6 1.G 7 61, 65, 66, 67, Southampton 3 S 125, 128 9 1.I, 36.I 10 1.H, 70 Command and 11 .

2.C Control 12 2.A 13 3.A, 3.C 14 2.B Lack of Credibility 15.A 3.D, 4, 97 15.B 4, 21.B, 97 15.C 4, 40 15.D 4, 29.D, 73, 30.B 15.E 4, 97, 100.B 15.F 101 15.G 4, 104

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Public Education 16 21.C, 103 17 28, 98, 105 18 99, 106 19 100.A 20 102 21 SOC 5, SOC 6, SOC 7, SOC 8 Inadequacy of 22 5, 6, Southampton 1 EPZ Size Evacuation Shadow 23.A 21.A-C Phenomenon 23.B 22 23.C 60 23.D 31, Southampton 4.B 23.E 54 23.F 57 23.G 56 23.H 5 23.I 103.G, 103.I l

23.J 76 Lack of 24.A 3.A Agreements 24.B 9 24.C 29.B 24.D 36.B 24.E 40 24.F 37.A, 43.B, 45 l

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24.G 45, 46, 51.C, 77.B 24.H 48 24.1 38 24.J 44 24.K 46, 51.C, 77.B 24.L 90 24.M- 42.B 24.N 52, Southampton 2 24.0 43.A, 53 24.P 55, Southampton 4 24.0 74 24.R 62 24.S 109, 119 24.T 96.A 24.U 128 Role Conflict 25.A 2.D, 2.E, 29.C.4, 56 25.B 8, 9 25.C 42.B 25.D 42.B 25.E 46, Southampton 4C, 77.B 25.F 56 Notification of 26.A 78 Emergency Response Personnel 26.B 12, 29.C.2.a, 79, 80, 81, 95, SOC 4 26.C 80 l

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1 26.D 2.E, 81, 29.C.2.b, 29.C.2.d, 36.D, 43.B.1, 47, 51.E.1 1 26.E 12, 82 Mobilization of 27 2.E., 29.C, 36.C, 36.D, 38, Emergency Response 43.B.2, 45, 46, 47, 51.E.2, Personnel 56, 82, 93 Communications Among 28 83 Emergency Response Personnel 29 85 30 30.E, 86 31 36.E, 87, 91 32 88 33 89 34 90 Training of 35 107 Emergency Workers 36 108, 117 37 3.B, 8, 109, 118 38 110 39 111, 112 40 114, 72 41 84 42 115 43 116 44 120, 121, 122, 123, 124

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Accident and 45 7 Dose Assessment and Projection 46 10, 11 47 13 48 14 49 15 50 17 51 18 Emergency Opera- 52 69 tions Center Security 53.A 74, 75, Southampton 4 53.B 75 Medical and Public 54 77.C Health Support Notification to 55 92 the Public 56 93, SOC 4 57 94 58 95 59 96.B Sheltering 60 19, 20 61.A 21.D 61.B 21.D 61.C 21.F 61.D 21.G, 21.I 61.E 21.H ,

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61.F 23.A t

61.G 23.B 61.H 23.C 1.I 23.D 62 24 Evacuation 63 25 64 60 e

Evacuation 65.A 26, SOC 1, SOC 2 Time Estimates 65.B 27 65.C 30 65.D 32 65.E 33 65.F 34 65.G 33, 39, 43.D, 47, 51.F 65.H 35 Removal of 66.A 36.A obstacles 66.B 36.F 66.C 36.H 66.D 36.L 66.E 36.M 66.F 36.J People Without 67.A 37.B Access to Cars 67.B SOC 9

. . - B6 - l 67.C 38.5, 38.6 67.D 38.6 School Children 68 41 69.A 42.A 69.B SOC 3a 69.C 42.B, SOC 3b 69.D 42.C, SOC 3c 3

69.E 42.D 4

70 43.A 71.A 43.B.2, 43.B.3, 4

71.B 43.C.3, 43.C.4 Special Facilities 72.A 47 72.B 48.A, D, E, F Handicapped 73.A 50 People 73.B 51.A, B, C.1, E, SOC 9.A.3 Relocation 74 54 Centers 75 57 76 58 77 59 Food, Milk, Water 78 61 and Livestock 79 74

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I 80 63 81 64, 65, 66, Southampton 3 82 67 l l

83 68 Recovery and 84 125 Reentry 85 126 86 127 87 128 88 129 89 130 90 131 91 132 State Emergency 92 133 Plan Loss of Offsite 93 SOC 10 Power 94 SOC 11 95 SOC 12 96 SOC 13

,' Bad Weather 97 SOC 14 Original Contentions that have been deleted: 16 20 77.A

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113 118 SOC 9.A.2 SOC 9.C Southampton 4.C l

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Revised \O Emergency Planning Contentions July 26, 1983 Filed by: Suffolk County, the Shoreham Opponents Coalition, the North Shore Committee Against Thermal and Nuclear Pollution, and the Town of Southampton i

TABLE OF CONTENTS Page INTRODUCTION................................................. 2 Contentions 1-10: LILCO's Lack of Legal Authority........... 3 Contentions 11-14: Command and Control.................... 13 Contention 15: LILCO's Lack of Credibility.*................ 19 Contentions 16-21: Public Education and Information........ 26 Contention 22: Inadequacy of LILCO's Proposed 10-Mile Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zone ("EPZ")...... 36 Contention 23: The Evacuation Shadow Phenomenon............ 47 Contention 24: LILCO's Lack of Agreements With Organiza-tions and Personnel Relled Upon in the Plan................. 55 Contention 25: Role Conflict of Emergency Workers......... 70 Contention 26: Notification of Emergency Response Person-nel........................................................ 77 Contention 27: Mobilization of Emergency Response Person-nel......................................................... 84 Contentions 28-34: Communications Among Emergency Re-sponse Personnel........................................... 88 Contentions 35-44: Training of Emergency Workers........... 94 Contentions 45-51: Accident and Dose Assessment and Projection................................................. 105 Contention 52: Emergency Operations Center................ 111 Contention 53: Security During a Radiological Emergency... 113 1-l

Page Contention 54: Medical and Public Health Support.......... 114 Contentions 55-59: Notification to the Public............. 115 Contentions 60-83: Protective Actions..................... 119 Contentions 60-62: Sheltering........................ 120 Contentions 63-77: Evacuation........................ 125 Contention 65: Evacuation Time Estimates........ 127 Contention 66: Removal of Obstacles from the Roadway and Provisions for Fuel.................. 136 Contention 67: Evacuation of Persons Without Access to Automobiles............................ 138 Contentions 68-71: Evacuation of School Chil-dren............................................. 143 Contention 72: Evacuation of People in Special Facilities....................................... 149 Contention 73: Handicapped People at Home....... 151 Contentions 74-77: Relocation Centers........... 153 Contentions 78-83: Food, Milk, Water and Livestock Control............................................... 157 Contentions 84-91: Becovery and Reentry................... 162 Contention 92: State Emergency Plan....................... 168 Contentions 93-96: Loss of Offsite Power.................. 169 SOC Contention 97: Bad Weather............................ 175

Revised Emergency Planning Contentions INTRODUCTION These Revised Emergency Planning Contentions are filed by Intervenorn Suffolk County, Shoreham Opponents Coalition, North Shore Committee Against Nuclear and Thermal Pollution and the Town of Southampton (collectively, "Intervenors").

The "LILCO Plan" to which the contentions refer is the so-called "LILCO Transition Plan," consisting of the following documents:

-- "SNPS Offsite Radiological Emergency Response Plan,"

Revision O, with blue-colored inserts identified as "LILCO Transition" (herein referred to as the "LILCO Plan" or the

" Plan");

"SNPS Offsite Radiological Emergency Response Plan for Suffolk County, Appendix A Evacuation Plan," with gold-colored inserts (herein referred to as " Appendix A");

-- "SNPS Local Offsite Radiological Emergency Response Plan Implementing Procedures," Revision O, Volumes I and II, with blue-colored inserts identified as "LILCO Transition" (herein referred to as "OPIPs"); and

-- " Emergency Procedures -- Shoreham Nuclear Power Station (Revised)" (herein referred to as "Information Brochure").

Unless otherwise stated, the "EPZ" referenced in the con-tentions is the 10-mile plume exposure pathway EPZ assumed in the LILCO Plan.

CONTENTIONS Contentions 1-10: LILCO's Lack of Legal Authority Preamble to Contentions 1-10. The LILCO Transition Plan specifies that in an emergency, the actions described in Con-tentions 1 through 10 below may be ordered to be taken by LILCO personnel. Contentions 1 through 10 allege that LILCO person-nel do not have the authority to order or to perform those actions.1/ Accordingly, as alleged in these contentions LILCO cannot, as a matter of law, exercise the responsibilities iden-tified in Contentions 1-10, and therefore, contrary to 10 CFR Section 50.47(a)(1) its Plan could not and would not be imple-mented. LILCO's lack of legal authority to perform actions assigned to LILCO under the Transition Plan also results in noncompliance with 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(3) and NUREG 0654, Section A.2.6, in addition to other regulatory requirements as set forth in the contentions which follow.

1/ See also pages 2-3 of the June 23, 1983 FEMA review of the Transition Plan (" FEMA Report") which also questions LILCO's legal authority.

Contention 1. LILCO is prohibited by law from directing traffic. N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law SS1102, 1602 (McKinney); N.Y.

Penal Law SS190.25(3), 195.05, 240.20(5) (McKinney); N.Y.

Transp. Corp. Law S30 (McKinney). Under the LILCO Plan, LILCO employees designated " traffic guides" are expected to direct or

" guide" traffic to ensure that evacuees follow the evacuation routes identified and prescribed by LILCO in the Plan. (See OPIP 3.6.3, at 5-6 and Attachments 1 and 4 thereto; Appendix A

" Traffic Control," at IV-5 et seq.). These portions of the Plan, therefore, are incapable of implementation.

Further, LILCO's lack of authority to direct traffic ren-dets its evacuation time estimates, required under 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix E, Section IV, and NUREG 0654,Section II.J.8 and Appendix 4, inaccurate. LILCO's evacuation time estimates (Ap-pendix A at V-3; OPIP 3.6.1, Attachment 4) and the computer model from which they are derived, assume that all persons will use only the prescribed evacuation routes. See, for example, Appendix A, at IV-19 which states:

It is essential . . . that each motorist enter the evacuation network on the specified links, and on no other network link.

If the motorist errs in this respect, he may find it impossible to travel toward his assigned destination without disrupting the flow of evacuating automobiles, increasing his own delay and that of many other evacuees.

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(See also, Appendix A, at V-2). In fact, however, since LILCO's traffic guides are prohibited by law from directing traffic, LILCO will not be able to ensure that motorists will use only the prescribed routes, rendering the LILCO evacuation time estimates inaccurate. Thus, LILCO does not comply with 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(10), Part 50 Appendix E Section IV, and NUREG 0654 Sections II.J.8, J.9.5., J.10, and Appendix 4.

Without LILCO's assumption that evacuees will follow prescribed evacuation routes, the LILCO evacuation time estimates would increase substantially.

Contention 2. LILCO is prohibited by law from blocking roadways, setting up barriers in roadways, and channeling traf-fic. N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law Sill 4 (McKinney); N.Y. Penal Law SS190.25(3), 195.05, 240.20(5) (McKinney); N.Y. Transp. Corp.

530 (McKinney). Under the LILCO Plan, LILCO employees are ex-pected to implement various traffic control measures, including those listed above, to ensure that evacuees follow the evacua-tion routes prescribed by LILCO. (Appendix A at Section IV).

LILCO's evacuation time estimates assume that traffic control devices such as roadblocks, prescribed turn movements, chan-nelization treatment, one-way roads and blocking lanes on the Long Island Expressway will be implemented and ef fective in 5 directing and controlling evacuation traffic. (See Appendix A i

at.IV-82) Because LILCO and its " traffic guides" lack legal authority to implement such traffic controls (see also FEMA Report at 2-3, 10-11), LILCO cannot rely on the use of traffic control devices to ensure the use of prescribed evacuation routes. As a result, LILCO's evacuation time estimates are un-realistically low and the Plan fails to comply with 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(10), Part 50 Appendix E Section IV, and NUREG 0654 Sections II.J.8, J.9, J.10, and Appendix 4.

Contention 3. LILCO is prohibited by law from posting traffic signs on roadways. N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law Sill 4 (McKinney); N.Y. Penal Law $5190.25(3), 195.05, 240.20(5)

(McKinney). In addition to its proposed use of signs as traf-fic control or channelling devices (see Contention 2), the LILCO Plan also assumes that " trail blazer" signs will be installed as permanent roadway hardware to direct the public in the use of prescribed evacuation routes in the event of an evacuation. LILCO's evacuation time estimates assume that such signs are installed. (Appendix A, at IV-82). In fact, howev-er, such signs will not be installed by Sutfolk County and it is unlawful for LILCO to install such signs. Therefore, LILCO cannot rely on such signs to ensure the use of prescribed evac-uation routes, and its evacuation time estimates are, as a result, unrealistically low. Thus, LILCO fails to comply with

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10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(10), Part 50 Appendix E Section IV, and NUREG 0654 Sections II.J.8, J.9, J.10, and Appendix 4.

Contention 4. LILCO is prohibited by law from removing obstructions from public roadways, including the towing of private vehicles. N.Y. Penal Law S 165.05 (McKinney). The LILCO Plan provides that " road crews" made up of LILCO employ-ees will remove obstacles from roadways b,y using LILCO tow trucks and line trucks. (Plan, at 4.4-3; OPIP 3.6.3, at 1 and Attachment 2 thereto).2/ Because LILCO is prohibited by law from towing private vehicles and removing obstacles from public roadways, this aspect of LILCO's Plan cannot and will not be implemented. As a result, the Plan fails to comply with NUREG 0654,Section II.J.10.k. In addition, LILCO's evacuation time estimates do not include the effects upon evacuation of accidents, breakdowns and other road blockages, apparently based at least in part on an assumption that such obstacles will be removed immediately. (Appendix A at V-2). Since LILCO lacks authority to remove such obstacles from evacuation routes, its evacuation time estimates are thus unrealistically 2/ LILCO has informally advised Suffolk County that no private tow truck operators will be involved in removing obstacles from the roads,' contrary to the statements in the Plan at 4.4-3 and 4.4-4.

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low and the Plan fails to comply with 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(10), Part 50 Appendix E Section IV, and NUREG 0654 Sections II.J.8, J.9, J.10 and Appendix 4. ,

Contention 5. LILCO is prohibited by law from activating sirens and directing the broadcast and contents of emergency broadcast system ("EBS") messages to the public. N.Y. Penal Law SS190.25(3), 195.05 (McKinney); N.Y. Exec. Law 5 20 et seq.

(McKinney). Under the LILCO Plan, LILCO employees are expected to order that sirens be activated. They are also expected to determine the contents of EBS messages, to determine that an EBS broadcast should be made, and to direct that such broadcast occurs. (See OPIP 3.3.4) Because LILCO employees are prohib-ited by law from performing such actions, the LILCO Plan cannot and will not be implemented, and the Plan falls to comply with 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(5) and NUREG 0654 Section II.E.5 and E.6. Moreover, in assigning such functions to LILCO employees, the Plan fails to comply with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D.3.

Contention 6. LILCO is prohibited by law from making de-cisions and official recommendations to the public as to the appropriate actions necessary to protect the public health and safety, including deciding upon protective actions which will be communicated to the public. N.Y. Penal Law $5190.23(3),

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1 195.05 (McKinney); N.Y. Exec. Law S 20 et seg. (McKinney).

Under the LILCO Plan, LILCO employees are identified as being responsible for all command and control functions, as well as all management and coordination of the entire emergency re-sponse, are to be performed by various LILCO employees. (See Plan at 3.1-1; OPIPs 2.1.1, 3.1.1, 3.6.1). Thus, contrary to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A, LILCO employees rath-er than " State and/or local officials" are identified as re-sponsible for planning, ordering, controlling and implementing the offsite response including appropriate protective actions.

Because LILCO is prohibited by law from performing such functions, its Plan cannot and will not be implemented, and it fails to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(b)(5), 50.47(b)(6),

50.47(b)(10), and NUREG 0654 Sections II.E.5, E.6, E.7, G, J.9 and J.10.

Contention 7. LILCO is prohibited by law from making de-cisions and official recommendations to the public concerning protective actions for the ingestion exposure pathway. N.Y.

Exec. Law S20 et seg. (McKinney); N.Y. Penal Law S190.25(3),

195.05 (McKinney). The LILCO Plan provides that various LILCO employees will be responsible for determining, making to the public, and implementing protective action recommendations for the 50-mile ingestion exposure pathway EPZ. (See Plan Section

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3.6; OPIP 3.6.6) Because LILCO employees are prohibited by law from performing these actions, the proposed ingestion pathway EPZ protective actions cannot and will not be implemented.

Therefore, the Plan falls to comply with 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(10), 50.47(c)(2), Appendix E Section IV.A.8, and NUREG 0654,Section II.J.ll.

Contention 8. LILCO is prohibited by law from making de-cisions and official recommendations to the public concerning recovery and reentry. N.Y. Exec. Law S20 e$ seq. (McKinney);

N.Y. Penal Law S190.25(3), 195.05 (McKinney). The LILCO Plan proposes that short-term and long-term recovery and reentry operations will be performed by LILCO personnel following a radiological emergency at Shoreham (Plan, at 3.10-1 and 3.10-2; OPIP 3.10.1), and also states that "the initiation of Recovery and implementation of Reentry is a non-utility decision-making process" (OPIP 3.10.1, at 1). LILCO identifes no non-utility entity, with necessary authority, which has agreed to undertake the initiation of the recovery and reentry processes. Since, under the LILCO Plan, command and control functions are assumed by LILCO, and under New York law, LILCO does not have the au-thority to perform recovery and reentry functions, recovery and reentry cannot be initiated or implemented. The Plan thus falls to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(b)(1), 50.47(b)(13),

j and NUREG 0654 Section II.M.

l l

Contention 9. LILCO is prohibited by law from dispensing fuel from tank trucks to automobiles along roadsides. Suffolk County Sanitary Code, Article 12; Town Fire Prevention Codes.2/

Appendix A of the LILCO Plan (at IV-192), states that a gaso-line contingency plan is "under development," and the Plan (at 4.4-4) states that "[g]asoline, diesel fuel, motor oil, etc.,

will be provided ... by Private Gasoline and Diesel Fuel Companies." Appendix A further states that "(o]nce the method-ology for providing gasoline has been determined, an allocation system will have to be derived specifying the number of gallons allowed, etc." (Appendix A, at IV-192).4/ Because LILCO is prohibited by law from distributing gasoline to motorists on the roadsides, this aspect of the LILCO Plan cannot and will not be implemented. It is likely that many evacuees will not begin an evacuation with a full tank of gas. Many cars may run out of gas, both inside and outside the EPZ, as a result of ex-tended operation times due to congestion, stop-and-go 3/ Until LILCO indicates where it intends to station its fuel dispensing vehicles, the applicable Town Codes cannot be more specifically identified.

4/ LILCO has informed Suffolk County that the fuel will be obtained from private companies pursuant to agreements al-ready in place and that LILCO fuel trucks will actually distribute the fuel.

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l conditions and time spent sitting in queues. Cars running out of gas, and the probable abandonment of vehicles which will follow, will result in obstructions and blockages on roadways in use during the evacuation, LILCO's evacuation time estimates do not take cars running out of gas and the resulting road obstructions into account. If LILCO cannot effectively prevent or remove such obstacles, its evacuation time estimates will increase. The LILCO Plan thus fails to comply with 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(10), Part 50 Appendix E Section IV, NUREG 0654 Sections II.J.8, J.9, J.10, and Appendix 4.

Contention 10. LILCO is prohibited by law from performing law enforcement functions at the EOC, at relocation centers, and at the EPZ perimeter. N.Y. Penal Law SS190.25(3), 195.05, 240.20(5) (McKinney); N.Y. Transp. Corp. S30 (McKinney); N.Y.

Veh. & Traf. Law SS1102, 1602 (McKinney); N.Y. Exec. Law S 20 et seg. (McKinney). The LILCO Plan identifies LILCO employees as being responsible, during an emergency, for establishing and maintaining security and access control for the EOC, directing traffic into the relocation centers, establishing and maintaining security at the relocation centers, and establishing and maintaining perimeter / access control to evacu-ated areas. (OPIP 2.1.1, at 51, and Attachment 2, at 47; OPIP 3.6.3, Attachment 4). 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(1) requires

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LILCO to demonstrate that it "has staff to respond and to augment its initial response on a continuous basis." LILCO must also "specify the functions and responsibilities for major elements ... of emergency response," including law enforcement response. NUREG 0654,Section II.A.2.a. Without the ability to provide security at the EOC and relocation centers, and provide perimeter control, the LILCO Plan and the protective actions contemplated therein could not and would not be imple-mented. The Plan thus fails to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(b)(1) and 50.47(b)(10), and NUREG 0654, Sections II.A.2.a, J.9 and J.10.

Contentions 11-14: Command and Control Preamble to Contentions 11-14. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A requires emergency plans to describe the orga-nization for coping with radiological emergencies, including definition of authorities, responsibilities, and duties of individuals assigned to the licensee's emergency organization and identification of the State and/or local officials respon-sible for planning for, ordering, and controlling appropriate protective actions, including evacuations. In the LILCO Tran-sition Plan, in place of " State and/or local officials," LILCO employees are identified as being responsible for planning for, ordering, and controlling the entire offsite emergency

T response. Thus, all the command and control functions, as well cs all management and coordination of the entire emergency re-cponse, are to be performed by various LILCO employees. (Plan, at 3.1-1; OPIPs 2.1.1, 3.1.1, 3.6.1). Accordingly, the "offsite authorities responsible for coordinating and imple-menting offsite emergency measures," with whom the LILCO onsite cmergency coordinator must exchange information (see 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.2.c), are fellow LILCO em-playees.

In Contentions 11-14 below, the Intervenors contend that there cannot and will not be offsite emergency preparedness that provides reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at Shoreham because LILCO employees are not able to exercise effectively the command and control responsibilities necessary to plan for, order, manage, coordinate and control appropriate protective actions. Each of the deficiencies idan-tified in Contentions 11-14 results in noncompliance with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1), 50.47(b)(1), 50.47(b)(3), Part 50 Ap-pendix E,Section IV, and NUREG 0654 Section II.A.

Contention 11. The LILCO employees in command and control positions under the LILCO Plan may experience a conflict between LILCO's financial and institutional interests and the

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public's interest, which may substantially hamper their ability to perform the functions assigned to them in a manner that will result in adequate protection of the public. The Intervenors

< contend that LILCO employee; will have a strong incentive to

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minimize the public's perception of the potential or actual

[ danger involved in a radiological emergency in order to avoid

engendering public or LILCO shareholder disapproval of LILCO, or anti-Shoreham sentiment. Thus, for example, they may not recommend an appropriate protective action in a prompt manner because to do so would be contrary to LILCO's financial inter-est in maintaining a public perception that Shoreham is not a source of danger. LILCO has failed to institute appropriate measures (comparable to thoce required by 10 CFR Part 50, Ap-  ;

pendix B, Criterion 1 for QA/QC personnel) to ensure the inde-pendence of LERO personnel. Accordingly, there is no assurance that correct and appropriate command and control decisions will l be made by LILCO employees.

Contentien 12. The LILCO Transition Plan is premisGd on the belief that LILCO personnel will, in fact, be able to exer-cise the command and control functions which are specified in the Plan. The Intervenora contend that LILCO personnel will not be able to exercise proper or effective command and control of response to a Shoreham emergency because LILCO personnel l

l

will not be adequately familiar with the site-specific conditions in Suffolk County. The site-specific conditions as to which familiarity is essential are the County's geography, topography, road network, demography, and the locations, char-acteristics and capacities of schools and other institutions and volunteer organizations. It is further essential that LILCO personnel be familiar with the legal and jurisdictional limitations of their own authority and that of other entities who may assist or participate in response to a Shoreham emer-gency. Familiarity with, and complete understanding of, such facts and conditions are essential to the effective management and coordination of emergency response. Those in command and control positions must be able to make prompt and informed de-cisions dealing with circumstances and events that may not be contemplated or specifically provided for in a written emergen-cy plan.

LILCO personnel lack the necessary familiarity with local conditions. Many of the command and control personnel do not reside or work in the Shoreham vicinity and thus will not have the day-to-day familiarity with conditions in Suffolk County which is essential to effective command and control. The In-tervenors do not believe that such familiartty can be taught to LILCO personnel, because the essential knowledge of such facts 1

can only be obtained if classroom training is reinforced by day-to-day responsibilities and experience which require knowledge of the local conditions. LILCO personnel do not have such training or experience. Thus, LILCO command and control personnel will not be aware of how the various entities, institutions, organizations and the population operate or interact with each other on a day-to-day basis or in an emer-gency situation and will be unable to fulfill command and control responsibilities effectively during an emergency.

Contention 13. The LILCO Plan assigns to LILCO employees the responsibility of command and control over the personnel in the non-LILCO support organizations relied upon in the Plan for performing emergency response functions. Such organizations are the American Red Cross (" ARC"), Brookhaven National Labora-tory ("BNL"), local law enforcement agencies, ambulance, fire and rescue organizations, the Long Island Railroad ("LIRR"),

the Salvation Army, voluntary groups such as churches and industries, and an unnamed lumber company. (See OPIP 2.1.1; Plan at 2.2-2, 2.2-4, 4.2-1; Appendix A at IV-82, IV-186-7).

LILCO's attempt to exercis.e such authority conflicts with the normal chains of command, assignment of responsibilities, and internal operating procedures according to which these organi-zations function. For example, support organizations have j

their own plans and procedures which may differ significantly from the LILCO Plan and its implementing procedures. In addition, some local law enforcement officers and firefighters will decline to implement any Plan which is not the Plan of the

~

local government (i.e., Suffolk County). Therefore, there is no assurance that the procedures set forth in the Plan, or other procedures that may be ordered by LILCO personnel during an emergency, will be followed by non-LILCO employees, particu-larly in the event that the support organization supervisors or the individual emergency workers decide that a different proce-dure would be better or more appropriate in a given situation.

The Plan also falls to indicate that the emergency re-sponse personnel relied upon in the LILCO Plan (i.e., LILCO em-ployees, personnel from non-LILCO organizations, and other unaffiliated support personnel), will be indemnified by LILCO for injuries they incur or for liabilities to third parties which may be incurred during training drills or exercises, or in responding to an emergency under the command and control of LILCO personnel. As a result, emergency response personnel, particularly those not employed by LILCO, may refuse to obey the command and control directives of LILCO employees, and thus may not carry out tasks and responsibilities assigned to them under the LILCO Plan.

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Contention 14. The Plan fails to identify the title of the LILCO officer who will fill the role of Director of LERO (OPIP 2.1.1 at 5). This constitutes non-compliance with NURCG 0654, Section A.1.d. (See FEMA Report, at 2).

Contention 15: LILCO's Lack of Credibility Preamble to Contention 15. The LILCO Plan is dependent upon LILCO/LERO personnel providing essentially all necessary information and recommendations which are required during an cmergency. Contention 15 addresses the question whether LILCO/LERO recommendations for protective actions (and other information provided by LILCO/LERO) will be believed and followed or whether LILCO will be distrusted as a source of in-formation with the result that its protective action recommen-dations (and other information provided) will not be believed or followed by the public.

Contention 15. Intervenors contend that LILCO is not con-sidered by the public to be a credible source of information.

More than 60 percent of the people in Suffolk County would not trust LILCO afficials at all to tell the truth about an accident. See Social Data Analysts Survey. Persons are more likely to question, refuse to believe, disobey or ignore orders, recommendations, or information that come from persons whom they do not believe than that from authorities they trust and consider credible.

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Because the public does not perceive LILCO as a credible source of information, protective action recommendations and other information disseminated by LILCO in an emergency will not be followed or believed by the public. Furtner, LILCO may be viewed hostilely as the source of the problem in the first place, or skeptically because the public will perceive that it is not in LILCO's financial interest to disclose all pertinent information. (Members of the public will perceive that LILCO will not disclose the seriousness of an accident due to fears of lower ratings in the financial markets, NRC sanctions, or a lower public image than already exists.) Therefore, people will be likely to disregard or disobey protective action recom-mendations or other emergency instructions disseminated by LILCO during an emergency. Intervenors thus contend that the LILCO Plan cannot and will not be implemented, and accordingly, there can be no finding of compliance with 10 CFR Section 50.47. The paragraphs which follow set forth the particular aspects of, or operations contemplated by, the LILCO Plan which cannet be implemented as a result of LILCO's lack of credi-bility, and the resulting lack of regulatory compliance.

Contention 15.A. LILCO employees are assigned the re-oponsibility of command and control over (a) the personnel in the support organizations relied upon in the Plan for emergency h

response services (ARC, BNL, ambulance, fire, rescue organizations, local law enforcement agencies, the Salvation Army, the LIRR, an unnamed lumber company, and groups such as churches and industries), and (b) " medical personnel" whose af-filiation is not identified in the Plan, and select volunteers.

(OPIP 2.1.1; Plan at 2.2-2, 2.2-4, 4.2-1; Appendix A at IV-82, IV-186-7). Intervenors allege that such individuals will share the public perception that LILCO is not a credible source of information. Therefore, it is likely that orders from the LILCO employees in command and control will not be obeyed by the non-LILCO emergency workers relied upon in the Plan. Ac-cordingly, there is no assurance that the portions of the LILCO Plan involving participation of non-LILCO personnel can or will be implemented, and there can be no finding of compliance with 10 CFR Section 50.47(a)(1). The likelihood that non-LILCO workers will not obey LILCO command and control orders means that the following aspects of the LILCO-Plan cannot and will not be implemented:

(1) Offsite accident and dose assessment and projection, and recommendations to the LILCO Director of LERO as to what particular protective actions should be recommended to the public, resulting in noncompliance with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(b)(9), 50.47(b)(10), 50.47(c)(2) and NUREG 0654 Sections 3

II.I, J.9 and J.10.

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(2) The protective action of evacuation resulting in noncompliance with 10 CFR Sections 50.47 (b)(10) and NUREG 0654 Sections II.J.9 and J.10.

(3) Staffing of relocation centers, and the provision of necessary services for evacuees, resulting in noncompliance with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(b)(8), 50.47 (b)(10), and NUREG 0654 Sections II.J.10 and II.J.12.

Contention 15.B. A protective action recommendation of sheltering could not or would not be implemented. Based on a l

survey of Long Island residents, a substantial number of the people advised to shelter will choose to evacuate instead as a result of their lack of trust in LILCO's interest or ability to properly and objectively determine and recommend actions that 1

are in the best interests of the public. Thus, the protective action of sheltering could not and would not be implemented in violation of 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1), 50.47(b(10) and NUREG 0654 Sections II.J.9. and J.10.

l Contention 15.C. The LILCO Plan appears to assume that t

l Its recommendation that schools implement an early dismissal will result in children being protected in the event of an l evacuation order, because children could thereby evacuate with their parents. (See Appendix A, at II-20). However, under the

LILCO Plan, the decision to implement an early dismissal rests l

I e =

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with the schools. (See Appendix A, at IV-182). The recommendation to dismiss early will be made, by LILCO, over the EBS radio (Plan at 3.6-6; Appendix A at IV-182). The school authorities, being members of the public, are likely to share the perception that LILCO is not a credible source of in-formation. Therefore, they may not believe, or follow, the in-formation or recommendations provided to them by LILCO. As a result, there is no assurance that any protective actions for school children (including sheltering, evacuation, or early dismissal to permit sheltering or evacuation with parents) can or will be implemented, and there can be no finding of compli-ance with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1) or 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG 0654 Sections II.J.9 and J.lc.

Contention 15.D. Assuming that the traffic control measures specified in the LILCO Plan are not prohibited by law (see Contentions 1-4), LILCO's traffic guides will be disobeyed by motorists, as a result of LILCO's lack of credibility. Sim-11arly, LILCO personnel assigned to perform security functions under the LILCO plan (i.e., performing law enforcement functions at the EOC, relocation centers, and at the EPZ perim-eter), again assuming they are not prohibiteo from performing such functions, are unlikely to be trusted or obeyed by the public result of LILCO's lack of credibility. Such

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l disobedience and reaction to instructions from a non-credible source is especially likely in light of the heightened fear and anxiety caused by a radiological emergency, which is perceived to be different from other emergencies. In addition, since the emergency will emanate from an incident at LILCO's own facili-ty, the public will be likely to hold LILCO and its personnel responsible for the emergency, which will cause LILCO's employ-ces to be viewed with hostility and suspicion, and will in-crease the likelihood that orders from LILCO employees will be ignored or disobeyed. As a result, there can be no finding of compliance with 10 CFR Part 50c Appendix E Section IV.A. and NUREG 0654 Section II.J.8 and Appendix 4, because LILCO's evac-uation time estimates are unrealisticall'y low (being based on the assumption that all evacuees will follow the evacuation I routes and instructions prescribed by LILCO). The Plan also falls to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1) and l

l 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG 0654 Sections II.J.9 and J.10 because there is no assurance that the protective action of evacuation can or will be implemented or that there will be adequate secu-rity during an emergency. In addition, the lack of effective perimeter control will result in persons' entering the EPZ, and -

being exposed to radiation, and impeding evacuation from the EPZ.

Contention 15.E. The sample messages for EBS broadcasting which are contained in the Plan (Attachment 3.8.1) identify a LILCO employee (Director of LERO) as the source of the informa-tion and the protective action recommendation. Since the public does not consider LILCO to be a credible source of in-formation or advice, instructions from a LILCO employee will not obeyed. Therefore, these messages will not accomplish their intended purpose of providing clear instruction to the public and there is no compliance with 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(5) and NUREG 0654 Sections E.5, E.6 and E.7.

Contention 15.F. LILCO's proposed rumor control point is to be manned by LILCO employees. (Plan, at 3.8-5). This rumor control effort will'be ineffective and will fall to comply with NUREG 0654,Section II.G.4.c, because it relles on LILCO -- a non-credible source of information -- as the authoritative source for squelching, explaining or otherwise controlling rumors. Rumors cannot be effectively controlled if the source of control is itself not credible. Thus, the LILCO Plan does not comply with NUREG 0654,Section II.G.4.c and 10 CFR Sections 50.47(b)(5) and 50.47(b)(7).

Contention 15.G. LILCO proposes to conduct.all public education activities designed to inform the public about Shoreham and about actions to be taken in the event of a f

Shoreham emergency. (See Plan at 3.8-1 through 3.8-3) LILCO's lack of credibility renders LILCO incapable of effectively educating the public on these matters. The public will likely disbelieve, disregard or discount purported educational materials regarding preparations for a radiological emergency at Shoreham, if such materials are received from and/or prepared by LILCO. Thus, the LILCO Plan cannot and does not comply with 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(7) or NUREG 0654, Sections II.G.1 and 2.

Contentions 16-21: Public Education and Information.

Preamble to Contentions 16 - 21. The NRC's emergency planning regulations require that the public receive informa-tion on a periodic basis on the nature and effects of radia-tion, protective measures which should be taken in the event of a radiological emergency, methods of public notification and other such information. 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(7) and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D.2. Public education materials should include written material that is likely to be available in a residence during an emergency, and in addition, measures must be taken to inform transients of the proper action to be taken during a radiological emergency.. NUREG 0654, Sections II.G.1 and G.2. 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(5) requires that there be means to provide notification and clear k

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__ _ _ . _ __ _ _ _ , . _. _ .- . _ . . _ _ ___. _, ~_

instruction to the populace within the plume exposure pathway EPZ and that the content of effective messages to the public must be established. See also NUREG 0654, Sections II.E.5 and

7. It is crucial to any radiological emergency response effort that the public have accurate and truthful knowledge of the nature of the threat, the protective actions available and the effectiveness of such protective actions. Otherwise, public confusion and ignorance will hamper the emergency response and the public will be unable to take protective actions. If in-formation is not provided clearly or is not understood or believed, the public will fall to take appropriate protective actions, resulting in increased exposure, and noncompliance with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1), 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG 0654 Sections II.J.9 and J.10.

Contention 16. LILCO has drafted a public education bro-chure entitled " Emergency Procedures: Shoreham Nuclear Power Station." The content of LILCO's public information brochure is misleading and Incomplete and thus this aspect of the public information program fails to comply with 10 CFR Section l

l 50.47(b)(7), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D.2, and NUREG 0654, Sections II.G.1 and.2. In particular:

l A. The brochure erroneously states (at page 3) that j all leaks of radioactive material will be held inside the l

containment building. Such a statement ignores the fact that severe accidents can cause radioactive materials to be released into the environment.

B. The brochure erroneously states (at page 4) that all offsite workers will be in place to help the public when, in fact, LILCO cannot guarantee that this will be so. (See Contentions 1, 2, 24, 25, 26, and 27.)

C. With respect to the value of sheltering, the bro-chure states (at page 6) that:

In most cases, nearby residents would be advised to remain indoors. This provides safety because buildings block the outside radiation.

This statement is incomplete and misleading because it implies that sheltering will offer complete or adequate protection. In fact, sheltering will reduce doses by only a fraction and thus will not provide adequate protection. (See Contention 57) In-deed, according to LILCO, if one shelters in the typical Long Island home, one will still receive (on the average) 70 percent of the dose one would recieve if standing outside. (See OPIP l

3.6.1, at 21 (footnote)). Such a dose will result in severe health consequences in many accident scenarios. Thus, the bro-chure needs to be amended to make clear that sheltering will reduce exposure by only a small fraction and thus for many eccidents, sheltering will not provide adequate protection.

9

D. The brochure inaccurately implies (at page 7) that a bus or automobile will provide effective' protection from radiological exposures. In fact, a bus or automobile provides almost no protection from radiological exposure.

E. The LILCO brochure's discussion of radiation effects is limited to natural sources and very low levels of radiation. It does not adequately address the magnitude of doses that the public might receive during a severe accident, such as one requiring EPZ evacuation, nor the health-threatening consequences related to such releases. Such inade-quate disclosure of essential facts renders the brochure in-credible. Further, the brochure does not discuss adequately the health consequences of exposure to low-level radiation, particularly:

1. The detrimental physiological effects of various levels of exposure;

2. The increased risk of cancer both to the population as a whole and to individuals; and

3. The possibility of genetic defects in future generations.

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, such information is necessary so that the public will be aware l

of the seriousness of exposure to radiation and take all oppropriate protective actions to avoid such exposure.

F. The LILCO brochure does not inform the public that LILCO itself, in the form of LERO, will be issuing all in-formation and protective action recommendations, as well as performing almost all emergency response tasks. It is impor-tant that the public be aware of the source of all emergency information so that it may assess and evaluate the information it is receiving.

G. Although LILCO has informally advised the County that the brochure will be distributed to all households within 20 miles of the plant, the Plan does not reflect that informa-tion. In any event, the brochure fails to inform those outside the EPZ that they may be exposed to levels of radiation in excess of EPA's Protective Action Guides and that protective actions may be required outside the EPZ in some circumstances.

In addition, the brochure does not address the particular needs of persons on the eastern end of Long Island who m'ay seek to evacuate and thus will need routing instructions and directions to appropriate relocation centers. The East End population should be informed of the danger of traveling toward the pl nt and, potentially, toward the plume in the event of a release from the plant. Such information is essential so that people outside the EPZ will be able to take appropriate protective actions if so required.

l 1

H. The brochure (at page 5) states that the public will be notified long in advance of any actual danger. This is inaccurate and ignores the possiblity that in the case of a fast-moving eJent (see NUREG 0654, Appendix 1, at 1-16 and 1-17) there may be little time between notification and actual danger.

I. The brochure does not inform the reader that in the event of an evacuation or after sheltering, he or she should report to a relocation center to be monitored and, if necessary, decontaminated.

J. The brochure is missing much specific detail, particularly: what radio stations are participants in the EBS system other than WALK; detailed zone"and evacuation maps; and identification of relocation centers, schools and school dis-tricts. See FEMA Report at 6, citing non-compliance with NUREG-0654,Section II.G.2.

Contention 17. The LILCO public education program is de-fective for falling to use an effective array of media. For instance, its program ignores the use of radio and television which in many cases are more effective for educating large por-tions of the population. LILCO instead relies solely on writ-ten material such as its brochure, telephone book inserts and posters to educate the public. However:

i

A. A substantial segment of the population will not read the LILCO materials because they do not understand their significance, they are not interested or concerned, or they are skeptical of LILCO. Reasons that persons will not read the materials are:

1. Few people read utility brochures.

2. Few people read telephone books for educa-tional purposes.

3. With respect to apartment dwellers, LILCO l

has left the responsibility of distributing its brochure to individual building managers (Plan, at 3.8-2) who may not per-form that task.

4.. Direct mail information will be viewed as junk mail and thrown away.

5. Posters in motels, gas stations, etc. and signs on beaches will not be read by the transient population.

B. Others will read the information when they receive it, but will subsequently discard or misplace it and will not remember the contents when a radiological emergency occurs.

C. Still others will read the information but not understand it.

As a result, many people will not be able to take appropriate protective actions, even if they might otherwise want to, because they will not know, remember, or understand:

that they should tune to radio station WALK; the alphabetical designation of the zone they are in; the evacuation route they are supposed to take; or, the relocation center to which they or their children and relatives are assigned. Therefore, peo-ple will not know whether they should take shelter and, in the event of an evacuation order, they will not know whether they should evacuate. In addition, they will be unable to follow prescribed routes, thus increasing greatly their evacuation times. LILCO's inadequate information thus will render inef-fective the overall notification and protective action scheme contemplated in the LILCO Plan. This constitutes noncompliance with the 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1), 50.47(b)(5), 50.47(b)(7),

and 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG 0654 Sections II.E.5, E.6, E.7, G.,

and J.

Contention 18. The proposed LILCO posters, telephone book inserts, and EBS messages do not tell the reader what tone he is in nor do they describe the zones in which protective actions must be taken or the prescribed routes to take from those zones. (See FEMA Report at 5, citing non-compliance with NUREG 0654,Section II.E.7.) Therefore, someone who does not l

have access to a brochure in the event of an emergency will be unable to identify h.is or her zone or to follow the prescribed evacuation route out of the zone of danger. Thus, these items are not effective and do not comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(b)(5) and 50.47(b)(7) and NUREG 0654 Sections II.E.5, E.6, E.7, G.1 and G.2. Further, even if people know the pre-scribed evacuation routes for the zone in which they live, the LILCO plan does not assure that if such people are visiting other zones (such as to pick up their children at a schocl which is in another zone), they will be able to determine quickly and reliably the prescribed routes by which to evacuate from that zone. Thus, the Plan falls to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1) and 50.47(b)(10), and NUREG 0654 Sections II.J.9 and J.10, because protective actions cannot and will not be implemented.

Contention 19. The sample EBS broadcast messages in the Plan (Attachment 3.8.1) do not provide adequate or accurate in-formation because almost all the messages instruct the public that the release is not expected to pose a serious health I hazard, although LILCO cannot make such a determination in advance of an accident. These messages could cause members of the public to fall to take the emergency seriously when, in fact, the situation is serious. The messages should be revised

to make clear that a serious health hazard may in fact be likely but that uncertainties make precise prediction impossi-ble. Such an accurate message is required under 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(5) and NUREG 0654,Section II.E.7.

Contention 20. LILCO intends that EBS messages will be broadcast simultaneously by WALK AM and FM. (Plan at 3.3-6).

However, WALK AM does not operate at night. Therefore, those persons without FM radios (especially people in cars) will be unable to receive adequate information in the event a radiological accident occurs at night, contrary to the require-

, ments of 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(5).

Contention 21. The brochure and other printed educational materials which accompany the LILCO Plan will not be read and/or understood by several segments of the population, and I the Plan therefore fails to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(b)(5), 50.47(b)(7) and NUREG 0654,Section II.B.1, E.5 and II.J.10(c).

A. LILCO's materials will not be read or understood by schoolchildren.

B. LILCO's materials cannot be read by the illiterate, the blind, or the severely vision-impaired. The Plan.does not indicate that Braille-encrypted materials will be distributed, or that alternative media (such as radio) will be ,

{ omployed to educate the public.

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C. LILCO's materials are written exclusively in '

English. Similarly, the EBS messages to be transmitted by WALK in the event of an emergency will be delivered exclusively in English. However, data from the 1980 census show that there cre more than 1,300 Hispanic residents of the towns of Brookhaven and Riverhead who speak English either poorly or not at all. These people will not understand either LILCO's educa-tional materials or its EBS messages.

Contention 22: Inadequacy of LILCO's Proposed 10-M11e Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zone ("EPZ")

Preamble to Contention 22. 10 CFR Section 50.47(a)(1) prohibits the NRC from issuing an operating license absent a finding that emergency preparedness exists for the offsite area surrounding a nuclear power plant. The Commission must find that the state of emergency preparedness provides " reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency." Id.

A major source of radiation exposure in the event of a radiological emergency is that received as a result of direct contact with a radioactive plume and/or from inhalation of ra-dioactive gases and particles within the plume. Thus, the NRC requires the development of a plume exposure EPZ around each plant as the basis for planning for a radiological emergency.

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1 10 CFR Sections 50.47(b)(10), 50.47(c)(2) and Appendix E, '

Sections II.N.2 and IV.

EPZs are defined as the areas for which planning is needed- to assure that prompt and effective actions can be taken to protect the public in the event of an accident." NUREG 0654,Section I.D.2. The "overall objective" is to provide planning and a state of preparedness that will permit imple-mentation of protective actions if exposure to the public is projected to be above the EPA's Protective Action Guides

("PAGs"). 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(10) requires that planning for protective actions must be consistent with Federal guidance such as the PAGS. Under the PAGs, protective actions should be commenced in the event of potential exposure of members of the ,

public in the range of one to five rems. NUREG 0654,Section I.D.l.

Under the NRC's rules, plume exposure EPZs are generally

! 10 miles in radius. However, the 10-mile size is not an absolute: [t]he exact size and configuration of the EPZs sur-rounding a particular nuclear power reactor shall be determined in relation to local emergency response needs and capabilities 4

as they are affected by such conditions as demography, topogra-phy, land characteristics, access routes, and jurisdictional ,

, boundaries." 10 CFR Section 50.47(c)(2). See also NUREG 0654,Section I.D,2.

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Contention 22. LILCO proposes a plume exposure pathway EPZ of approximately 10 miles in radius. (See Plan Figure 3.5.1 and Appendix A, Figure 3.) Intervenors contend that LILCO's proposed 10-mile EPZ is inadequate in size. Under the cite specific circumstances existing on Long Island, an EPZ larger than 10 miles and perhaps as large as 20 miles is neces-sary. The bases for Intervenors' contention that a plume expo-cure pathway EPZ greater than 10 miles is required are: the cite specific consequences which would be experienced in a se-vere Shoreham accident; special topographic, geographic, gov-ornmental and social conditions existing on Long Island; the fact that LILCO's 10 mile EPZ does not provide a sufficient base for expanding emergency response to larger areas should the need arise; the evacuation shadow phenomenon; and the need to avoid having the EPZ divide population zones and governmen-tal entities. These bases are described in greater detail in paragraphs A-D below.

Contention 22.A. The radiological consequences of a se-l vere accident at Shoreham are likely to be experienced at eerious levels at distances greater than 10 miles from the l

plant. A Shoreham-specific consequence analysis (F.C.

Finlayson and Edward P. Radford, " Basis for Selection of Emer-gency Planning Zones for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant, i

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Suffolk County, New York," (Draft), October, 1982) has been conducted which takes into account, among other things, the me-teorological and topographic characteristics of the areas sur-rounding the Shoreham plant. This analysis based on local conditions demonstrates that in the event of a core-melt accident at Shoreham, there could be doses far in excess of PAG s

levels at the edge of the 10-mile EPZ proposed by LILCO.

In the event of an especially severe Shoreham accident, persons in areas beyond the LILCO 10-mile EPZ would have a 35 percent chance of receiving 200 rems and a 60 percent chance of j receiving 30 rems. (200 rems represents the threshold level for early deaths; 30 rems is the level at which detectable damage to the body occurs). Even in the event of a less severe accident, persons in areas beyond the LILCO 10-mile EPZ would have a 50 percent chance of receiving 10 rems, and a 20 percent i

l chance of receiving 30 rems. These projected doses are well above PAG levels. At 20 miles from the plant, there is less than a one percent chance of receiving a 30 rem dose (de-l tectable physical damage can result from such a dose) for the spectrum of representative core melt accidents. For more se-vere core melt accidents, at 20 miles there is less than a one percent chance of receiving 200 rems.

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I An EPZ larger than 10 miles is necessary in order to provide planning and preparedness for protective actions neces-sary to mitigate doses that could produce early injuries or death, and to ensure that persons will be prepared to take pro-tective actions in those areas most likely to experience radia-tion doses above the PAG levels. NUREG 0654,Section I.D.2.,

recognizes the need to be prepared to take protective actions at distances beyond 10 miles from the plant but appears to as-sume that for most situations a base planning area of 10 miles readily permits expansion of planning to the area beyond 10 miles. This is untrue on Long Island for the reasons described in parts B and C below and for the additional reason that emer-gency response is to be undertaken by LERO, a LILCO creation which lacks capability in an emergency to augment its response needed for the 10 mile area. Hence, detailed advance planning for a larger area is required. The Intervenors believe that given the site specific consequetices of a severe accident at Shoreham, an EPZ of approximately 20 miles is justified. In any event, in light of such consequences, the 10-mile EPZ pro-posed by LILCO is inadequate and should be enlarged.

Preparedness beyond the 10-mile EPZ proposed by LILCO is further required by 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(10), since

"[gluidelines for the choice of protective actions during an I

emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, [must be]

developed and in place." The Shoreham-specific consequence analysis demonstrates that under certain accident scenarios, exposures of five rems or more are likely out to 20 miles from the plant. The Federal PAGs require the commencement of pro-tective actions at a potential exposure of one to five rems.

In failing to provide for the commencement of protective actions anywhere beyond a 10 mile EPZ, the LILCO Plan is thus inconsistent with Federal PAGs and in violation of 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(10).

Contention 22.B. The NRC has recognized that in the event of certain serious accidents, protective actions would need to be taken beyond a 10-mile EPZ. See NUREG 0654,Section I.D.2 at 11 and 12. The site specific characterisitics and consequences of a severe accident at Shoreham would make such protective actions essential to comply with the Federal PAG guidance and 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(10).

The area of Long Island which surrounds Shoreham, particu-larly the area which lies east of the Shoreham nuclear plant and east of LILCO's proposed EPZ (including the towns of East Hampton, Southold, Shelter Island, most of Riverhead and virtu-clly all of Southampton), possesses a number of distinguishing characteristics, which taken together, contribute to the need

to plan beyond the 10-mile EPZ proposed by LILCO. Among these distinguishing characteristics are the following:

1. A significant seasonal increase in population, par-ticularly during the five months of May through September;

2. A highly transient, dispersed seasonal population, much of which depends upon limited public transportation;

3. A road network which is inadequate to accommodate this seasonal population and which is heavily congested during ordinary seasonal conditions;

4. Due to Long Island's configuration, the inadequate road network on the north and south forks connects to two principal east-west arteries, the Long Island Expressway and Sunrise Highway, both of which pass through or very close to LILCO's proposed EPZ;

5. The area east of the EPZ provides no means of exodus to the east, meaning that persons deciding to evacuate must travel toward and through LILCO's EPZ. Studies show that large numbers of people in this area will spontaneously evacuate to-ward the EPZ;

6. The governmental resources available to control, com-municate with, direct, shelter, provide security and otherwise accommodate this seasonal population are inadequate. Further, as noted in part A, no governmental resources will be available l

I and thus all response is a LILCO responsibility. LILCO's LERO lacks capability to expand response to an emergency from the 10 m.le EPZ to a larger area unless detailed advance planning is in place. (This might be different if governmental entities have greater resources and experience than LILCO were participating in the response);

7. One of the five towns east of the EPZ (Shelter Is-land) is itself an island, which further aggravates its traffic and transportation concerns; and,

8. In addition to the complications caused by seasonal population, transportation east of the EPZ is affected by flooding and snow storms at various times during the year.

Intervenors contend that these site specific characteris-tics which exist for Shoreham demonstrate that local emergency response needs and capabilities require planning and preparedness beyond LILCO's proposed 10 mile EPZ. Such plan-ning and preparedness are necessary to assure the existence of an adequate response base to support expanded response efforts which may be required in the event of a serious accident.

LILCO has failed to provide planning or preparedness for any area beyond 10 miles from the plant, despite the site specific consequences which could result from a severe accident at Shoreham. Thus, the LILCO Plan does not provide a substantial

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1 base for the expansion of response efforts which is likely to prove necessary and such efforts could not be developed during the course of an accident based on LILCO's Plan. This is con-trary to the guidance of NUREG 0654,Section II.D.2 and 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(10).

Contention 22.C. An EPZ larger than 10 miles is required for the additional reason that people from outside the 10 mile EPZ will attempt to evacuate, whether ordered to do so or not.

Without planning and preparedness for an area beyond 10 miles, which takes local conditions (see C above) and voluntary evacu-ation into account, the voluntary evacuation will impede the evacuation of persons within the 10 mile EPZ and will result in inadequate protection for persons both inside and outside the 10 mile EPZ. Thus, in light of local conditions and the volun-tary evacuation which will exacerbate the effects of such local conditions, an EPZ that is larger than 10 miles is required.

LILCO's plan essentially ignores any planning for voluntary evacuees and thus is inadequate. (For a detailed discussion of t

voluntary evacuation (the " evacuation shadow" phenomenon), see Contention 23).

I j An EPZ larger than 10 miles is further necessary to provide planning and preparedness for the education, notifica-l tion, and safe movement and relocation of the large number of l

people likely to be on the roads in the event of a Shoreham cmergency. A high proportion of the voluntary evacuees will be I

from the eastern end of Long Island. Due to their perception that they would be trapped if the wind blew to the east, many East End residents will choose to evacuate in the event of an emergency at Shoreham. In voluntarily evacuating, they will move to the west, in some cases entering the iO-mile EPZ. In order to protect these people, and to ensure that their volun-tary evacuation does not adversely affect people within 10 miles of the plant, the EPZ must be extended so that detailed planning encompasses the people to the east of the plant.

Further, large numbers of people to the west of the plant may also voluntarily evacuate, creating congestion for those

. attempting to leave the 10-mile EPZ proposed by LILCO and also affecting the safety of those people east of the plant who may also voluntarily evacuate. Extension of the EPZ to the west to encompass those persons who may be involved in protective actions is essential.

LILCO has not adequately provided for communications, se-i curity, blockades, relocation centers, medical facilities or any other protective actions for the area outside the proposed 10 mile EPZ in order to mitigate the impact of spontaneous evacuation on the adequacy or implementability of protective

( _ .

actions in LILCO's proposed 10 mile EPZ, or to preven' any such impact altogether. Failure to develop at this time emergency planning measures for the area outside the 10 mile EPZ will result in uncontrolled, chaotic evacuation should a serious accident occur at Shoreham, thereby affecting LILCO's efforts to manage the evacuation of persons within its EPZ and causing fear, panic, accidents, looting, possible violence and other phenomena beyond the control of the officials in the area east of the EPZ. Thus, an EPZ of larger than 10 miles is necessary to achieve compliance with 10 CFR Section 50.47(a)(1).

Contention 22.D. 10 CFR Section 50.47(c)(2) provides that two elements essential to defining the configuration of an EPZ are the location of local jurisdictional boundaries and demographic conditions. Thus, it is good emergency planning practice to include, if possible, the entire area of a local municipality within the boundaries of an EPZ. At a minimum, an EPZ should avoid dividing major population centers within a local municipality. See NUREG 0654,Section I.D.a.

LILCO's EPZ fails to meet the criteria of 10 CFR Section 50.47(c)(2) and NUREG 0654 because the proposed LILCO EPZ runs through and divides the villages of Port Jefferson and Terryville and the town of Riverhead. The EPZ chould be ex-tended to include all of Port Jefferson and Terryville and l

additional portions of Riverhead (those portions in the area 1-2 miles to the immediate east of the proposed EPZ which contain dense population and Riverhead's business district).

Contention 23: The Evacuation Shadow Phenomenon Contention 23. Intervenors contend that in the event of l

an accident at Shoreham, there would be large numbers of persons who would evacuate voluntarily (the " evacuation shadow" phenomenon), even if not ordered to do so. LILCO has failed to take into account adequately the evacuation shadow phenomenon, thus resulting in a failure to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1), 50.47(b)(10), 50.47(c)(2), and NUREG 0654,Section II.D. The specific deficiencies in the LILCO Plan which result from its failure to take into account the evacuation shadow phenomenon are set forth in detail in paragraphs A-J, below.

Contention 23.A. A protective action recommendation of sheltering under the LILCO Plan would not and could not be im-plemented because a substantial number of the people in the 10 mile EPZ who are advised to shelter will choose to evacuate in-I stead. Vehicles provide little if any protection from a pass-ing plume. Thus, even if a sheltering recommendation were made because plume passage were imminent, a substantial number of people would receive little if any protection from the plume.

Therefore, a protective action recommendation of sheltering

will not constitute an adequate protective measure and the Plan thus falls to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1) and 50.47(b)(10), and NUREG 0654 Sections J.9 and J.10.

Contention 23.B. Even if an initial announcement r'egarding a Shoreham emergency indicates that persons in certain portions of the EPZ need not take any protective action, a substantial portion of the population, upon learning of the existence of an emergency at Shoreham, will decide to evacuate. If the event then were to escalate and a sheltering recommendation were then to be made, the voluntary evacuees would be unable to shelter because they would be in transit in their vehicles and sheltering would not be an available protec-tive action. Thus, they would be subject to exposure to the passing radioactive plume. The LILCO Plan thus falls to provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken, in violation of 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1) and 50.47(b)(10), and NUPEG 0654 Sections J.9 and J.10.

Contention 23.C. The LILCO Plan proposes an EPZ consist-Ing of 19 separate zones. In a radiological emergency requiring evacuation of the EPZ, it is LILCO's strategy to conduct "a systematic area-by-area evacuation downwind of the reactor." (Plan, Appendix, A at I-5). The Plan is unrealistic

in expecting to evacuate only certain zones within LILCO's 10-mile EPZ without expecting residents of the bordering zone (s) and probably other zones as well, also to evacuate.

People not located in a zone recommended to be evacuated will not wait while their immediate neighbors evacuate in response to a protective action recommendation. This is particularly so for people who live close to the plant. Accordingly, LILCO's plan for staged evacuation of the inner EPZ zones is unworkable and thus not in com'pliance with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1) and 50.47(b)(10), and NUREG 0654 Sections II.J.9 and J.10.

Contention 23.D. Voluntary evacuation will result in a much larger number of people attempting to evacuate (and thus using the limited capacity of the existing road network) than is assumed by LILCO in its evacuation time estimates.5/ The additional vehicles will create congestion within the EPZ and in the regions just outside the EPZ, which will cause queuing and will impede traffic evacuating from the EPZ.

The addition- l al congestion caused by voluntary evacuation will cause adverse health consequences to the public because (a) evacuees from 5/ The numbers of people expected to evacuate voluntarily, the locations from which they will evacuate, and the circumstances under which they will evacuate are set forth in a survey and studies which the County has provided to all parties.

(See " Basis" section of this contention.)

\

beyond the 10 mile EPZ will impede the evacuation of those within the'10 mile EPZ who are ordered to evacuate, resulting in evacuees' receiving health-threatening radiation doses; and (b) those who choose to evacuate will be unable to do so safely and efficiently.

Moreover, while LILCO acknowleges that persons not specit-ically instructed to evacuate will, in fact, attempt to evacu-ate (Appendix A, at I-5), the LILCO evacuation time estimates ignore the number of vehicles which will be on the roads due to such voluntary evacuation.6/ The LILCO evacuation time estimates thus are inaccurate for failing to take into account the numbers and locations of people who will evacuate voluntar-11y contrary to instructions. If voluntary evacuation were properly taken into account, the LILCO estimates would increase substantially, rendering evacuation an inadequate protective action for many accident scenarios. Thus, the LILCO Plan fails I

to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1), 50.47(b)(10), Part 50 Appendix E Section IV, NUREG 0654 Sections J.8, J.9, J.10, and Appendix 4.

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i 6/. LILCO has recently provided the County with a new KLD study which attempts to take into account voluntary evacu-ations from outside the EPZ. The study is not part of the Plan and the County has not had sufficient time to evalu-l' ate it completely. As appropriate at a later time, this portion of this contention may be revised to include this KLD study if LILCO's Plan takes it into account.

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Contention 23.E. Two of the three primary relocation centers designated by LILCO are well within 20 miles from the Shoreham site. Both Suffolk County Community College and the State University of New York at Stony Brook are only three miles beyond the EPZ. Many evacuees who need relocation services will not use the relocation centers proposed by LILCO because they will observe a large number of voluntary evacuees from the area near the centers leaving the area. In addition, NUPEG 0654,Section II.J.10.h, provides that relocation centers must be "at least 5 miles and preferably 10 miles beyond the boundaries" of the EPZ. Accordingly, LILCO's designated relo-cation centers, in fact, will not provide the necessary services to evacuees and thus LILCO does not comply with NUREG 0654,Section II.J.10.g and h. Without adequate relocation centers, there is no assurance that the protective action of l

evacuation can and will be implemented, and therefore there is no compliance with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1), 50.47(b)(10),

and NUREG 0654 Sections J.9 and J.10.

Contention 23.F. The LILCO Plan provides no estimates of

! the number of evacuees who may require shelter in a relocation center, but the Plan falls to take into account the large number of voluntary evacuees who will increase substantially the demand for relocation services. Accordingly, there is no l

assurance that the relocation centers designated by LILCO will be able to accommodate or provide necessary services and facilities for the number of persons likely to require moni-toring, decontamination, sheltering, food and other such services. (See also Contention 75) Thus, LILCO fails to com-4 ply with NUREG 0654, Sections II.J.10.g and J.12, and there is no assurance that the protective action of evacuation can or will be implemented, in violation of 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1), 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG 0654 Sections II.J.9 and J.10.

Contention 23.G. The Plan designates LILCO personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, sanitation, security and traffic control services at the relocation centers, and person-nel from the American Red Cross, the Salvation Army, groups f such as churches and industries, and select volunteers to I

provide other services at relocation centers. (See Plan, at i

4.2-1 to 4.2-4). The relocation centers will not be adequately l staffed, however, because the personnel relied upon by LILCO to respond to a relocation center are likely to be among the vol-

untary evacuees who will leave the area around the relocation cente.rs. In addition, traffic congestion resulting from ordered and voluntary evacuation will prevent timely staffing i

of the centers. Although the relocation centers are not within t

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the EPZ, they are in areas where thete will be high percentages of voluntary evacuation. The road systems around the reloca-tion centers -- as well as others which emergency workers would have to use to reach the centers from their homes or other lo-cations -- will be highly congested, thus impeding access to the relocation centers by emergency staff. Accordingly, LILCO cannot demonstrate that the relocation centers will be avail-able and functioning when needed, as required by 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1), 50.47(b)(10), and NUREG 0654 Sections II.J.9 and J.10.

Contention 23.H. The LILCO plan fails to provide adequate measures at the EPZ perimeter to control access to evacuated areas, contrary to the requirement of NUREG 0654 Section II.J.10.j. As a result, voluntary evacuees from the East End whose chosen evacuation routes may cross the EPZ perimeter, may travel into contaminated areas and receive health-threatening radiation doses and add to congestion within the EPZ. Thus, the Plan fails to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1),

50.47(b)(10), and NUREG 0654 Sections II.J.9 and J.10.

l Basis for Contention 23.

i l There is demonstrated reason to be concerned about the evacuation shadow phenomenon, which is the propensity for peo-ple to evacuate from areas perceived to be dangerous, even l

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though such evacuation may not be ordered or recommended.

During the TMI accident, large numbers of people evacuated vol-untarily. Whereas the TMI evacuation order recommended that 2F00 pregnant women and preschool children within 5 miles of the plant leave as a precaution, in fact over 144,000 people left and traveled long distances. The TMI accident thus docu-mented the existence of the evacuation shadow phenomenon. The reasons for voluntary evacuation are several, including the public's fear of a radiological emergency, heightened by its perception that such emergencies are unlike other disasters.

A survey of Long Island residents conducted by Social Data Analysts and reviewed by Drs. James Johnson and Donald Zeigler, Suffolk County consultants, has indicated that in the event of a radiological emergency at Shoreham, the evacuation shadow would be quite large. In fact, voluntary evacuees will outnum-ber, by many times, the number of persons who will evacuate be-cause they are ordered to do so. For instance, 31,000 families live within 10 miles of the Shoreham plant. If there were a recommendation to evacuate only the 10-mile EPZ around Shoreham, approximately 432,000 families (about half the popu-lation of Long Island) would attempt to evacuate. Even if a sheltering recommendation were made only for the population within five miles of the plant, approximately 217,000 families would attempt to evacuate.

i Contention 24: LILCO's Lack of Agreements With Organizations and Personnel Relied Upon in the Plan Contention 24. The LILCO Plan relies on several organiza-tions, entities, and individuals for the performance of services required as part of the offsite response to an emer-gency. However, contrary to NUREG 0654, Sections II.A.3 and C.4, LILCO has failed to obtain agreements from the organiza-tions or individuals relied upon which indicate their commit-ment to and capability of either performing the functions assigned to them, or providing the facilities expected from them in the LILCO Plan. Intervenors contend that in the ab-sence of such agreements, the LILCO Plan does not and cannot comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(b)(1), 50.47(b)(3),

50.47(b)(8) and NUREG 0654 Sections A.3 and C.4. In addition, without agreements which ensure both the participation of the various organizations and individuals relied upon in the LILCO Plan, and their capabilities to perform the functions assigned to them by LILCO, there can be no finding that the Plan or the protective actions contemplated therein can or will be imple-mented as required by 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1),

50.47(b)(10), and NUREG Sections II.J.9 and J.10.

Subparts A-V below set forth the particular organizations or individuals relied upon by LILCO in its Plan, the bases for l

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the contention that agreements from such parties are necessary, the effect of the lack of agreements upon the implementability of LILCO's Plan, and additional regulatory requirements which are not met in the absence of agreements.1/

Contention 24.A. The LILCO Plan assigns to LILCO employees the responsibility of command and control over the personnel in the sopport organizations identified in the Plan (i.e., ARC, BNL, ambulance, fire, and rescue organizations, local law en-forcement agencies, the LIRR, and unnamed lumber company, the Salvation Army, voluntacy groups such as churches and industries) and medical personnel and select volunteers whose affiliation is not identified in the Plan. (See OPIP 2.1.1; Plan at 2.2-2, 2.2-4, 4.2-1; Appendix A at IV-82, and IV-186-7). However, LILCO has no agreements from these organi-zations or individuals to follow LILCO's command and control directive. (See also Contention 13). In the absence of agree-

[ ments from support organizations and individuals which indicate l

the willingness and ability of their members or of the 7/ If in the future LILCO were to obtain agreements with any of the entities identified in this contention, the conten-

! tion as applied to such entities would not necessarily be-come moot. If and when any such agreements are provided to the Intervenors, the relevant subparts of this conten-tion will be modified, if modification is appropriate in light of the contents of the agreement.

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l individuals to follow the LILCO Plan and command and control directives of LILCO employees, there can be no assurance that any aspect of the LILCO Plan can or will be implemented.

Contention 24.B. The Plan does not include any agreements with BNL, FRMAP, or BNL employees which identify the services i to be provided, the criteria for their implementation or the arrangements for exchange of information, or which obligate them to perform the functions for which they are relied upon by LILCO. In the absence of such agreements, there can be no as-surance that accident or dose assessment or projection 1

functions can or will be implemented, and there can be no com-

,o pliance with 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(9).

I Contention 24.C. The LILCO evacuation.. time estimates and the computer model from which.they are derived assnme that all persons will use only those evacuation routes prescribed by i

LILCO, at least in part because of rigid traffic controls which i allegedly will be imposed by LILCO employees. (See Appendix A, at Part IV). Although the Intervenors disagree with the rigid and complex traffic control strategy envisioned by Appendix A, it is nonetheless necessary for duly authorized officers to be available at important locations to facilitate traffic flow during an evacuation. LILCO has no agreement with Suffolk County or any other entity to provide such personnel. Thus, i

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since there are no authorized personnel available to facilitate traffic flow, LILCO's evacuation time estimates are unre-alistically low, and the Plan fails to comply with 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix E Section IV and NUREG 0654 Section II.J.8 and Ap-pendix 4. As a result, protective action recommendations made using such inaccurate estimates could be wrong and could lead to increased public exposure to harmful radiation.

Contention 24.D. LILCO has asserted that it has general agreements with private fuel companies for the provision of fuel to LILCO. However, there are no agreements to provide such fuel during a radiological emergency, and the agreements are not included in the Plan. Therefore, there is no basis for LILCO's assertion that it will be able to provide fuel for evacuees during an evacuation. In the absence of such agree-ments with fuel companies, LILCO has no means of dealing with the likelihood that substantial numbers of vehicles will run out of gas during an evacuation, resulting in evacuees' being stranded without transportation, and blockage of roadways which will impede travel by other evacuees.

Contention 24.E. Under the LILCO Plan, individual schools and school districts are relied upon for implementation of early dismissals, sheltering in schools, and evacuation of the Shoreham-Wading River District. (See Appendix A at 180-185).

However, LILCO has no agreements, with the schools or school districts, to implement any of these proposed protective measures for school children. In the absence of such agree-ments, there is no assurance that any protective actions for school children can or will be taken.

Contention 24.F. LILCO proposes that all people who do not have access to an automobile at the time of an evacuation order, all school children in the Shoreham-Wading River School District, and large numbers of the residents of nursing and adult homes, hospitals and other special facilities will be evacuated by buses. According to LILCO's estimates, approxi-mately 285 forty-passenger buses are required to transport those able-bodied persons without access to cars who would need transportation out of the EPZ (see Appendix A, at IV-87 to IV-178; OPIP 3.6.4). An additional 25 forty passenger buses will be necessary, according to LILCO, to evacuate a portion of the residents of nursing and adult homes (see Appendix A at IV-189 to 191), with an additional unspecified number of buses necessary to evacuate certain of the approximately 630 patients in hospitals (see Appendix A, at IV-185 to 188). An additional unspecified number of buses is necessary to evacuate the chil-dren in the Shoreham-Wading River School District. However, the necessary number of buses will not be available for use by LILCO because:

1. LILCO has no agreements under which such vehicles will be available (see Appendix A, at III-36). See FEMA Report at 9-10, noting this as a violation of NUREG 0654,Section II.J.10.g.

2. Most buses within a reasonable distance of the EPZ are under contract to school districts or other entitles and any agreements with LILCO would, presumably, reflect such pre-existing commitments. Therefore, most buses in the area could not be relied upon by LILCO for use in an evacuation.

3. The LILCO Plan assumes that all schools other than those in the Shoreham-Wading River District will implement an early dismissal in the event of any emergency. If such dis-missals were to occur, most buses in the vicinity of the EPZ would be required by schools to transport children to their houses.

4. Many buses within a reasonable distance of the EPZ have capacities substantially less than 40 passengers.

5. LILCO itself does not possess the number of j forty-passenger buses will be necessary to implement the LILCO Plan.

In the absence of such agreements, LILCO's proposed evacu-ation of persons without access to cars, children in the Shoreham-Wading River School District, and residents of nursing l

l I

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and adult homes and hospitals cannot and will not be implemented.

Contention 24.G. According to LILCO's estimates (see Ap-pendix A, at IV-189 to 191), it will require sufficient ambu-

)

lances to make approximately 348 ambulance trips in order to evacuate just the nursing and adult homes located in the EPZ.

An additional number of ambulances and airplanes will be required to evacuate the approximately 630 patients likely to be in the hospitals within (and just outside) the EPZ. (See ,

Appendix A, at IV-185 to 188). An additional number of ambu-lances or specially equipped vehicles will be necessary to evacuate handicapped people from their homes. (See OPIP

, 3.6.5). However, LILCO has no agreements with ambulance or rescue services, or airlines, to provide such equipment in such quantitles. (See FEMA Report at 10). In the absence of such 1

agreements, LILCO's proposed evacuation of persons in special facilities, hospitals, and the handicapped cannot and will not be implemented. In addition, there is no assurance ambulances will be available to transport contaminated injured persons, or ,

persons injured during an evacuation to hospitals for treat-ment, as is required by 10 C'FR Section 50.47(b)(12). In fact, there are only 40 ambulances located within approximately 12 miles of Shoreham, some of which, of course, would likely be 4

l

occupied by duties outside the EPZ at time an emergency arose.

The number of vehicles necessary to perform a timely evacuation of the special facilities and handicapped persons in the EPZ l

I thus will not be available to LILCO.

Contention 24.H. The LILCO Plan relies upon the LIRR and an unnamed lumber company to evacuate up to 845 patients of special facilities and hospitals, by converting passenger cars to accommodate patients on mattresses (Plan, Appendix A, at IV-186). However, LILCO has no agreement with (a) the LIRR to provide the necessary number of trains and to permit modifi-cations to its cars, or (b) a lumber company to provide, on a 24-hour basis, the materials necessary to accomplish the pro-posed modifications to the LIRR cars. In the absence of such agreements the proposed evacuation of special facilities and hospitals cannot and will not be implemented.

Contention 24.I. The LILCO Plan provides that in the many l cases where buses evacuating people without access to cars are required to make more than one run, the bus routes will termi-

nate at designated " transfer points." Of the 285 buses which LILCO estimates it will require, 109 are expected to perform two runs and 14 are expected to perform three runs. As buses finish the required number of runs, people who have been deposited at transfer points will be bused from the transfer

points to relocation centers. LILCO's estimated route times begin and end with the assumed transfer points. (See Appendix A, at IV-87 to IV-178; OPIP 3.6.4).

However, LILCO does not have agreements with schools or school districts permitting LILCO to use the schools relied upon in the Plan as transfer points. In fact, such transfer points are likely to be unavailable for use by LILCO if an emergency were to occur during school hours. Moreover, without such transfer points, each bus route would have to terminate at a relocation center rather than at a transfer point, resulting in a substantial increase in the estimated route times. In the absence of such agreements, LILCO's proposed evacuation of peo-ple without access to cars cannot and will not be implemented.

Contention 24.J. The LILCO Plan relies upon special facilities, nursery schools, and their employees to perform several functions necessary to a successful evacuation of such facilities according to the_LILCO Plan. (See Appendix A at IV-180 through 189. (The facilities involved are the nursery schools in the EPZ, Association for the Help of Retarded Chil-dren (AHRC) facilities, United Cerebral Palsy facilities, John T. Mather Memorial Hospital, St. Charles Hospital, Central Suffolk Hospital, Millcrest Rest Home, Lane Home, Grimes Home, Moore Home, Lincoln Rest Home.) However, the Plan does not include agreements with the special facilities in the EPZ to implement the evacuation procedures set forth in the Plan, and thus the proposed evacuation of such facilities cannot and will not be implemented.

Contention 24.K. The LILCO Plan relies upon volunteer non-LILCO personnel to drive ambulances and rescue vehicles, and to provide the necessary medical and paramedical support services in the buses, ambulances, railroad cars and airplanes to be used in evacuating special facilities and the handicapped. LILCO also appears to rely upon LIRR personnel, private airplane crews and employees of an unnamed lumber com-pany to perform substantial and essential roles in the proposed evacuation. (See Appendix A, at IV-185 to 192). The LILCO Plan includes no agreements from any such individuals or entities to perform such services, under LILCO's direction, in the event of an emergency at Shoreham. In the absence of such agreements, LILCO's proposed evacuation of special facilities and the handicapped cannot and will not be implemented. There is also no assurance that contaminated injured persons, or persons injured during the evacuation, will be transported to hospitals for treatment as required by 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(12).

i Contention 24.L. The LILCO Plan relies upon unidentified " dispatch locations" to relay communications between LILCO command and control personnel in the EOC, and those emergency response personnel who are affiliated with hospitals or expected to drive ambulance, fire and rescue vehi-cles during an emergency. (See Plan at 3.4-3). If by " dis-patch locations," LILCO refers to those operated by non-LILCO organizations or personnel, agreements with such organizations and personnel are necessary to ensure their availability to LILCO during an emergency. The Plan contains no such agree-ments. In their absence, there can be no finding of compliance with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(b)(5), 50.47(b)(6), and NUREG 0654 Section II.F.

Contention 24.M. The LILCO Plan relies upon school bus drivers for implementation of early school dismissals (which constitute the primary protective action to be recommended by LILCO for school children). However, LILCO has no agreements with school bus drivers to perform such a function in the event of a radiological emergency at Shoreham. In the absence of such agreements, the protective actions for school children outside the Shoreham-Wading River School District cannot and will not be implemented.

l

A - I Contention 24.N. The LILCO Plan relies on the availabili-ty of non-LILCO facilities and medical institutions as reloca-tion and reception centers for evacuees. (See Plan at 4.2-1; OPIP 4.2.1; Appendix A at IV-180 to 191). However, LILCO has no agreements with the owners of the proposed facilities which provide that the facilities will be available as relocation or reception centers in the event of a radiological emergency at Shoreham. See FEMA Report at 10 (noncompliance with NUREG 0654 Section II.J.10.h). In the absence of such agreements, the protective action of evacuation cannot and will not be imple-mented. .

Contention 24.0. The Plan designates Suffolk County Com-munity College as the relocation center to be used by evacuees from eight of the 19 zones in the EPZ (zones A-E, H-J) and for the children in the Shoreham-Wading River School District.

LILCO estimates the population of these zones to be 18,599 (26,574 in the summer). (See Plan, Appendix A, at IV-87 to 178). Suffolk County Community College is an entity of the j Suffolk County government. LILCO has no agreement with Suffolk l

l County to use Suffolk County Community College as a relocation center. Furthermore, pursuant to Suffolk County Resolution No.

456-1982 and Resolution No. 111-1983, the Suffolk County Commu-l nity College will not be available for use in implementing the

1 LILCO Plan. Therefore, there is no relocation center designated for a significant portion of the, anticipated ovacuees. Thus, the proposed evacuation of zones A-E, H-J, and the Shoreham-Wading River School District, cannot and will not be implemented.

Contention 24.P. LILCO relies upon the ARC, the Salvation Army, groups such as churches, industries, and select volun-teers to provide services, including medical and counselling services, at relocation centers. (Plan 2.2-1, 2.2-2, 3.6-7 and at 4.2-1). However, LILCO has no agreements with the ARC, the Salvation Army, any other volunteer groups, or individuals, to provide such services. Indeed, many " groups" are not even spe-cifically identified by LILCO. In the absence of such agree-ments, LILCO's proposed protective action of evacuation cannot and will not be implemented.

Contention 24.0 The LILCO Plan appears to rely upon local law enforcement agencies to provide security in evacuated areas. (Plan at 2.2-4; Appendix A at IV-82). However, LILCO has no agreements with police departments to provide such secu-

! rity in the event of a radiological emergency. Thus, despite l

LILCO's recognition of the necessity for " security patrols to prevent vandalism or theft," (Appendix A, at IV-82), the Plan fails to provide for such patrols. In the absence of such

1 agreements, there can be no assurance that the LILCO Plan or the protective actions contemplated in the Plan can or will be implemented.

Contention 24.R. The ingestion exposure pathway EPZ includes portions of the State of Connecticut. LILCO has no agreement with the State of Connecticut under which the State agrees to plan for, recommend or implement protective actions for the portions of the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ that are in Connecticut. In the absence of such an agreement, protec-tive actions for the entire ingestion exposure pathway EPZ can-not and will not be implemented. Thus, there can be no finding of compliance with 10 CFR Section 50.47(c)(2).

Contention 24.S. LILCO is required to provide site specific emergency response training and periodic retraining for those offsite emergency organizations who may be called upon to provide assistance in the event of an emergency, including personnel responsible for accident assessment, police, security and fire fighting personnel, first aid and rescue personnel, local support services personnel, and medical support personnel. 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(15); NUREG 0654, Sections II.O.l.a, 4.b, d, f, g and h. In addition, 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(14) and NUREG 0654 Section II.N. require that there be periodic drills and exercises of emergency response l l l

l l

capabilities. LILCO has no agreements with offsite response organizations, or individual workers, to attend LILCO training sessions or to participate in drills or exercises. Such agree-ments are necessary because unlike its own personnel, LILCO cannot require non-LILCO personnel to receive training, or to participate in drills or exercises. In the absence of such agreements, there is no assurance that an adequate number of properly trained emergency workers will be available to respond effectively to an emergency at Shoreham, in violation of 10 CFR Sections 50.47(b)(14) and 50.47(b)(15), Part 50, Appendix E,Section IV.F, and NUREG 0654, Sections II.O.1.a, 0.1.b. and N.

In the absence of trained non-LILCO emergency' workers, no as-pect of the LILCO Plan can or will be implemented.

Contention 24.T. Under the LILCO Plan, the U.S. Coast Guard is relied upon to provide public notification services for the general public on the waters within the 10-mile EPZ and to restrict access to the EPZ during a radiological emergency at Shoreham. (Plan, at 2.2-2). Since much of the EPZ covers l

l Long Island Sound, prompt notification of boaters and swimmers i

i is important, particularly since the wind often blows offshore.

However, LILCO has no agreement with the U.S. Coast Guard to perform the notification functions required under the Plan. In the absence of such an agreement, a portion of the population

i l

i in the EPZ will not receive notice of an emergency, and persons inside and outside the EPZ may receive substantial doses of harmful radiation. Thus, there can be no finding of compliance  ;

with 10 CPR Section 50.47(b)(5), 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG 0654 Sections II.E.5 and E.6.

Contention 24.U. The LILCO Plan's provisions for recovery and reentry rely upon the appointment of individuals from FEMA and DOE to the Recovery Action Corculttee. (See OPIP 3.10.1, at Section 3.0.) However, LILCO has no agreement with FEMA or DOE to provide such personnel. In the absence of such agree-l ments, there is no assurance that proposed recovery and reentry i provisions of the LILCO Plan can or will be implemented. Thus, i there can be no finding of compliance with NUREG 0654,Section II.M.

1 Contention 25: Role Conflict of Emergency Workers

! Preamble to Contention 25. Emergency workers relied upon by LILCO will have conflicting duties in the event of an emer-gency. On the one hand, they will be obligated or expected to i parform some emergency function under the LILCO Plan; on the other hand, they will be obligated by preexisting family or oc-cupational relationships, to attend to other matters such as the safety of their spouses, children, or other family members, Role conflict for emergency workers was a documented problem at f

l

l TMI, especially concerning medical personnel; behavior surveys conducted by Suffolk County demonstrate that this will be a problem in a Shoreham emergency as well. Role conflict thus creates the possibility that significant numbers of emergency personnel will look to the needs of their families or others for which they have responsibility (including themselves) before they report (if at all) to their designated emergency response positions or otherwise respond to a request by LILCO for assistance. This factor will be exacerbated by the fact that many emergency personnel will be asked to respond from a relatively safe area outside the EPZ to a more dangerous area within the EPZ.

Contention 25. Intervenors contend that the LILCO Plan fails to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1), 50.47 (b)(1) and 50.47(b)(3), because the Plan falls to address the problem of emergency worker role conflict. Intervenors contend that a cubstantial number of the emergency workers relied upon under the LILCO Plan will resolve such conflicts by attending to their other obligations prior to, or in lieu of performing the l

l cmergency functions assigned to them by LILCO. In the absenc.,

of such workers, the LILCO Plan cannot and will not be imple-mented, and there can be no finding of compliance with 10 CFR l Sections 50.47(a)(1), 50.47(b),and NUREG 0654 Section II. The l

l

emergency workers likely to experience role conflict, the type of conflict, and the effect of such conflict upon the imple-mentability of the LILCO Plan are set forth in paragraphs A-F below.

Contention 25.A. The LILCO Plan is premised on the belief that LILCO personnel in command and control positions, as well as those assigned to perform other emergency response functions, will be willing to report promptly for duty in the event of a radiological emergency. Intervenors contend that LILCO employees located outside the EPZ at the time of an emer-gency will be reluctant to leave a relatively safe area outside the EPZ to enter a more dangerous area within the EPZ to exer-cise command and control, supervisory, or other emergency responsibilities. Other LILCO employees, including those lo-cated in the EPZ, or whose families are located in the EPZ, will also be reluctant to report for emergency duty without first having attended to the safety of their own families. The

" Emergency Worker Tracker System," which LILCO asserts will

" ensure that LILCO-employed the immediate families of all emer-gency workers are provided for throughout the incident" (Plan, at 2.1-7 and 2.1-8), has not even been developed yet, and therefore cannot be relied upon by LILCO to eliminate role conflict of LILCO personnel. Thus, Intervenors contend that t

. _ - . _ . _ ___ - _= - _ .__ .- - _ _. - .

d LILCO has failed to ensure that LILCO-employed emergency workers will in fact report promptly to perform emergency

! responsibilities and thus the LILCO Plan is not capable of im-4 plementation.

4 Contention 25.B. The LILCO Plan fails to take into account the role conflict that is likely to be experienced by BNL personnel upon whom LILCO exclusively relles for all offsite accident and dose assessment and projection functions, and for all command, control and coordination functions related I

to offsite accident assessment and the decision to recommend particular protective actions to the LILCO Director of LERO.

Such BNL personnel are likely to have families located in or near the EPZ and therefore are likely to attend to the safety of their families prior to, or in lieu of, reporting for emer-l gency duty. Without BNL personnel, neither offsite accident and dose assessment and projection, nor recommendation of pro-tective actions will be performed.

Contention 25.C. The LILCO Plan fails to take into account the role conflict that will be experienced by school bus drivers. In fact, a substantial number of school bus driv-ers are likely to attend to the safety of their own families before they report (if they report at all) to perform the bus t driving duties which LILCO assumes will be performed. Role l .

conflict of school bus drivers will mean that neither school buses nor school bus drivers will be available to implement the LILCO Plan. Without an adequate number of buses or bus driv-ors, LILCO will be incapable of implementing the following pro-tective actions:

1. early dismissal of schools (necessary under the LILCO Plan to permit school children to be sheltered or to evacuate with their parents);

2. evacuation of schools;

3. evacuation of persons without access to cars; and,

4. evacuation of persons in special facilities.

Contention 25.D. The LILCO Plan falls to take into account the role conflict that is likely to be experienced by teachers, other school employees, and crossing guards. In fact, a substantial number of such personnel are likely to attend to the safety of their own families rather than re-maining at the schools or at their posts in the event of an emergency. Accordingly, there is no assurance that under the LILCO Plan adequate personnel will be available to supervise children, including those required to walk home, during the cerly dismissal process, during school evacuations, or in the ovent that children are sheltered in the schools. As a result, i

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the following protective actions could not and would not be implemented:

1. early dismissal of schools;

2. sheltering of school children in schools; and

3. evacuation of schools.

Contention 25.E. The LILCO Plan falls to take into account the role conflict that is likely to be experienced by (a) the non-LILCO personnel who, under the LILCO Plan, are ex-pected to drive ambulances or rescue vehicles and to provide the necessary medical and paramedical support services in the buses, ambulances, railroad cars and airplanes to be used in evacuating special facilities and handicapped persons at home; or (b) Long Island Railroad (LIRB) personnel, private airplane crews and employees of an unnamed lumber company who, under the LILCO Plan, are expected to perform substantial and essential roles in the proposed evacuation of special l'acilities and the handicapped. (See Appendix A, at IV-185 to 192). A

! cubstantial number of such individuals will attend to the safe-ty of their own families prior to, or in lieu of reporting to perform emergency services, Without such personnel, the fol-lowing actions could not and would not be implemented:

1. evacuation of special facilities;

2. evacuation of handicapped persons at home; and,

3. transport of contaminated injured persons, or persons injured during an evacuation, to hospitals for treat-ment.

Contention 25.F. The LILCO Plan fails to take into account the role conflict that is likely to be experienced by the non-LILCO volunteers who are expected, under the LILCO Plan, to staff the relocation centers. LILCO identifies *.he ARC as the lead agency responsible for the total operatior. of the relocation centers. (Plan, at 2.2-1, 3.6-7 and 4.2-1).

LILCO also relles on the AFC for other specific actions in the relocation centers, such as medical and counseling support.

(Plan, at 4.2-1). The Salvation Army also is designated as as-sisting the ARC. (Plan, at 2.2-1). The LILCO Plan also asserts that LILCO will rely on groups such as churches, .

industries, and select volunteers, to provide additional services. (Plan, at 4.2-1). The relocation centers will not be adequately staffed, however, because the ARC personnel and other volunteers relied upon by LILCO are likely to attend to the safety of their own families prior to or in lieu of re-porting to perform emergency duties. Without such personnel, I

( the relocation centers will not be available or functioning when needed.

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4 J

SC Contention 26: Notification of Emergency Response Personnel l

Preamble to Contention 26. 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(5)  !

requires that an offsite emergency plan include procedures for notification of State and local response organizations and of emergency personnel. See also 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E Section IV.C. Procedures must be established regarding the bases for notification of response organizations, including means for verification of messages, and for alerting, noti-1 fying, and mobilizing emergency response personnel. NUREG 0654,Section II.E.1. and E.2. Moreover, there must be the ca-pability of notifying these emergency personnel "within 15 minutes after declaring an emergency." 10 CFR Part 50, Appen-dix E,Section IV.D.3. LILCO is required to establish primary and backup means of communications with local response organi-zations, to ensure that these communication systems are compat-lble with one another, and to ensure that there will be 24-hour per day notification to, and activation of, the local emergency response network. NUREG 0654,Section II.F.1.

i Without prompt and reliable notification of emergency per-sonnel, there will be delays in mobilizing them and in imple-menting command and control decisions regarding protective actions for the public. See NUREG 0654,Section II.F.1.e.

Prompt and reliable notification of emergency personnel depends upon an adequate, dependable and workable communications system.

Contention 26. Intervenors contend that the LILCO commu-nications system and procedures for notifying emergency re-sponse personnel fall to provide assurance that there will be prompt and reliable notification to such personnel. As a result, the Plan fails to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(b)(5), 50.47(b)(6) and NUREG 0654 Sections II.E and F.

Without prompt and reliable notification of emergency response personnel, necessary workers cannot and will not be promptly mobilized, and no aspect of the LILCO Plan, or the protective actions contemplated thereunder can or will be implemented, in violation of 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1), 50.47(b)(8),

50.47(b)(9), and 50.47(b)(10), and NUREG 0654 Sections II.H.4, I., J.9 and J.10. The specific deficiencies in LILCO's system for notifying emergency workers are set forth in paragraphs A-E below.

Contention 26.A. The LILCO Plan designates the LILCO Cus-l I tomer Service Office (Hicksville) as the primary notification l

l point of the LERO, responsible for receiving initial and fol-lowup notifications of an emergency from the plant, verifying authenticity and content of information contained in the noti-l j fication messages, and notifying key emergency response l  !

l i

l personnel. The number of emergency personnel to be contacted increases with the severity of the emergency. (See Plan, at 3.3-1; Figures 3.3.2, 3.3.3 and 3.3.4). However, LILCO's Cus-tomer Service Office is not capable of serving as the primary notification point of the LERO for the following reasons:

1. Although the LILCO Plan does not indicate the number of personnel assigned to the Customer Service Office, or the training and equipment available to those personnel, LILCO has informally advised Suffolk County that there will only be two operators on duty during the eight-hour midnight shift. In addition, the Plan makes no provision for backup for the on-duty dispatcher (s) in the LILCO Customer Service Office. (See Plan, at 3.3-1). Thus, staffing of the Customer Service Office is insufficient to ensure that the necessary notifica-tion functions will be performed.

t

2. The Plan does not indicate that there will be adequate equipment available to Customer Service personnel to l

l permit the necessary notification in a timely manner, i.e.,

1 within 15 minutes after an emergency is declared. See 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D.3.

l As a result, LILCO's provisions for receiving initial no-tification of an emergency, verifying the information received, and notifying emergency response personnel are deficient and 1

I l

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provide no assurance that emergency personnel will be alerted, notified and/or mobilized.

Contention 26.B. Under the LILCO Plan, non-dedicated, commercial telephone lines, with no backup means of communica-tion, are relied upon for notifying essentially all categories of emergency response personnel. The notifica. tion procedures which are dependent upon commercial telephones are:

1. Notification by the plant and/or LILCO Customer Service of (a) Nassau County, (b) the State of Connecticut, (c) the U.S. Coast Guard, and (d) the Federal Aviation Administra-tion. (See Plan at 3.4-4; Figures 3.3.5 and 3.4.1).

2. Notification of BNL, which will provide all offsite dose and accident assessment and projection personnel.

I (Plan, Attachment 2.2.1, at 2; Figure 3.3.5).

3. Notification of " key" emergency response person-nel who are employed by LILCO, by means of pagers which must be I

accessed by commercial telephones. (Plan, at 3.4-4 and 3.4-5).

4. Notification of all other emergency response per-sonnel who are employed by LILCO, by m'eans of telephone calls from other emergency workers. (OPIP 3.3.2).

l

5. Notification of reception hospitals, ambulance l

and fire / rescue dispatch stations, bus companies, relocation centers, and, apparently, the American Red Cross and all other 1

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non-LILCO organizations and personnel relied upon in the LILCO Plan. (See OPIPs 3.6.4 and 3.6.5).

LILCO's reliance upon commercial telephones for most noti-fication of offsite response personnel is inappropriate.

Commercial telephones are subject to overload, or may be out of service in the event of an emergency. The possibility of over-load is particularly acute under the LILCO Plan because, in addition to the heavy telephone use by the public which is likely in the event of an emergency, LILCO employees will themselves be making extensive use of the telephone lines. In addition to using the lines for all the notification purposes listed above, the Plan also contemplates LILCO personnel con-tacting all schools, hospitals, nursing / adult homes, other special facilities, and handicapped persons in the EPZ, to ver-ify their awareness of an emergency, the need to evacuate, and -

to arrange for assistance. (See OPIPs 3.6.4 and 3.6.5). If commercial telephone lines were not available to LILCO, practi-cally none of the offsite response personnel could be notified, and no aspect of its Plan could be implemented. Given both the l

enhanced probability of commercial telephone line overload, and the impact of telephone unavailability on the implementation of the LILCO Plan, LILCO's reliance upon commercial telephones means there can be no assurance that the Plan can or will be ,

implemented.

Contention 26.C. The LILCO Plan provides for notification of " key" LILCO emergency response personnel by pager. (Plan, l at 3.4-4 and 3.4-5). There is no assurance, however, that these key personnel can reliably be contacted through the LILCO paging system due to distance limitations on transmission, the fact that batteries for the pagers must be charged or replaced and tested on a regular basis, and unavailability of the individuals equipped with pagers (for example, because of illness or travel out of the paging area). In addition, the LILCO Plan provides no means for determining whether emergency personnel in fact have received the paged message / notification, i nor is there any requirement in the Plan for confirmation of messages by contacted employees. As a result, there is no as-surance that key LILCO emergency personnel will be promptly alerted, notified and mobilized.

Contention 26.D. The LILCO Plan provides for key LILCO l

emergency personnel, after having been contacted through the LILCO paging system, to notify, in turn, other LILCO emergency response personnel by telephone. The number of personnel to be contacted increases with the severity of the emergency. (See OPIP 3.3.2). However, some emergency response personnel will not be near telephones (such as meter readers and other LILCO employees who may be in the process of performing their normal

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(

job functions, or persons who are not at home), will be using their telephones or, for other reasons, will not be able to be contacted. In addition, it will take a substantial amount of time to place the number of telephone calls necessary to reach the required number of LILCO emergency response personnel.

(See, e.g., OPIP 3.3.2 at 74-91). Thus, under the LILCO Plan there is no assurance that there will be prompt notification and mobilization of the LILCO emergency response personnel.

Contention 26.E. The LILCO Plan has no procedures that assure prompt notification of non-LILCO emergency support orga-nizations and personnel, namely, BNL, the ARC, Salvation Army, hospitals and reception centers, bus companies, ambulance and fire / rescue organizations, the LIRR, an unnamed lumber company churches, industries, and other select volunteers. If commercial telephones are to be used and are assumed to be available (see subpart B of this contention), there is no as-surance that the necessary personnel will be capable of being l

contacted by telephone since they may not be near telephones or may be using their telephones. Moreover, there is no provision for verification of messages to these support organizations, as required by NUREG 0654,Section II.E.1. Further, the LILCO ap-parently contemplates notification of support organizations only if a Site Area or General Emergency has been declared by l

l

LILCO. (See Plan, Figure 3.3.4.) Thus, there is no assurance that there will be timely notification to the support organiza-tions relied upon by LILCO (see Plan, at 2.2-4), and there can be no finding that the LILCO Plan can or will be implemented.

Contention 27: Mobilization of Emergency Response Personnel Preamble to Contention 27. Once offsite emergency re-sponse personnel are notified of an emergency and instructed as to their assigned functions,8/ necessary emergency actions can-not be taken by those workers, (and therefore many recommended protective actions cannot be taken by the public) until the re-sponse personnel report to their assigned locations, obtain the equipment or vehicles they will require to perform their assigned roles, ans report to their emergency posts or dispatch locations. The activities that take place between the determi-nation that particular offsite emergency response personnel should be notified and the reporting of such personnel, with necessary equipmettt, to the locations where emergency functions t-will be performed, tre referred to herein as " mobilization" activities.

8/ See Contention 26 which sets forth the reasons prompt no-tification will not occur under the LILCO Plan.

Contention 27. LILCO assumes that LILCO and non-LILCO em-playees will be available to implement command and control directives. However, the emergency response work force upon which the Plan relles will not be promptly available to perform the duties and emergency response functions assigned to them under the LILCO Plan due to extended mobilization times. Al-though the LILCO Plan falls to provide estimated notification or mobilization times for emergency response personnel (see e.g., NUREG 0654 Section II.C.l.), Intervenors contend, based on surveys of emergency mobilization of the Suffolk County Police Department, that LERO mobilization will take at least several hours. In some cases, detailed in paragraphs A through F below, mobilization will take even longer because after having been notified of an emergency, workers will have 'to travel substantial distances, in congested traffic, and will have to obtain necessary equipment, before they report to their assigned posts to perform emergency functions. As a result of the extended mobilization times, the LILCO Plan, and the pro-tective actions contemplated therein, cannot and will not be implemented in a timely manner necessary to provide adequate protection to the public. The Plan thus falls to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1), 50.47(b)(1), 50.47(b)(3),

50.47(b)(8), 50.47(b)(9), and 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG 0654 1

Sections II.E.2, F.1.e, H.4, and I. The reasons for extended mobilization times are stated in paragraphs A through F below.

A. Many emergency response personnel, particularly those employed by LILCO, live and/or work substantial distances from the EPZ or other emergency services locations.

B. Emergency response personnel will have to travel through congested traffic resulting from public mobilization and evacuation travel, in order to get from their locations upon notification to their initial reporting locations.

C. Many emergency response personnel must report first to a " staging area" or " dispatch location" and then to an assigned post (see OPIP 3.3.2), which will require additional travel through congested traffic.

D. Many emergency response personnel must travel from their notification locations to other locations to obtain equipment or vehicles before reporting to staging or dispatch locations. Thus, road crews must obtain tow trucks and other equipment from LILCO storage locations which are spread throughout Suffolk and Nassau Counties (OPIP 3.3.2); fuel truck drivers must obtain fuel trucks, go to storage tanks, and fill the trucks with fuel; route alert drivers must obtain vehicles and mount loudspeakers on them (Plan 3.3-4 and 3.3-6; OPIP 3.3.4); bus drivers must be transported from staging areas to 9

bus garages, gain access to the buses (e.g. by " utilizing tool kits to gain entrance into the Bus Company garages" (OPIP 3.6.4 at 6)), and prepare the buses for use (e.g., by obtaining gaso-line and checking oil (see OPIP 3.6.4, at 7)); Long Island Railroad trains must be emptied of other passengers and the trains and a sufficient number of engineers must be brought to the Port Jefferson and Main Line Stations (Appendix A at IV-186); lumber must be obtained, brought to the LIRR trains, and train seats must be removed and replaced with lumber (Ap-pendix A, at IV-186). In addition, procedures for locating necessary equipment, sucr as buses and trucks, will require time and will further delay the efforts of response personnel to obtain such equipment. (See OPIP 3.6.4).

E. Emergency response personnel must travel from staging or dispatch locations, through congested traf fic, to reach the poses where they are to begin to perform their emer-gency functions.

F. If emergency response personnel are not con-tacted until the Site or General Emergency Level, as suggested in the Plan (see Plan, Figure 3.3.4), mobilization times will be even more extended because the level of traffic congestion encountered by emergency workers will be substantially greater.

Contentions 28-34: Communications Among Emergency Response Personnel Preamble to Contentions 28-34. 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(6) requires that an offsite plan must provide for " prompt communi-cations among principal response organizations to emergency 1 personnel and to the public." Without prompt and reliable i means of communications among emergency personnel once they begin to respond to the emergency, there can be no assurance

! that necessary and appropriate emergency measures, including l

, those necessary to implement protective action recommendations, can and will be taken as required by 10 CFR Section 50.47(a)(1).

Intervenors contend that LILCO does not provide for

, adequate, dependable and workable communications among emergen-cy personnel following notification, and therefore there can be l

no finding of compliance with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1),

50.47(b)(6), 50.47(b)(8), and 50.47(b)(10), and NUREG 0654 Sections II.E.2, F., H.4, J.9 and J.10. The specific deficiencies, each of which leads to this conclusion, are set -

forth in contentions 28-34.

Contention 28. No radio or dedicated telephone links to any Federal agencies are described in the LILCO Plan. Thus, the Plan fails to provide adequate and reliable means of L

)

communications with Federal emergency response organizations, as required by NUREG 0654,Section II.F.1.c. (See FEMA Report, at 5.)

Contention 29. The LILCO Plan does not specify the number of emergency personnel that will be assigned responsibility for manning communications equipment at the EOC, transfer points, dispatch stations, or other communication posts. Further, the Plan does not provide for trained repair technicians capable of keeping communications equipment operational. As a result, there is no assurance that LILCO's communications system can or will be operated in the event of an emergency.

Contention 30. The LILCO Plan falls to demonstrate that there will be sufficient and adequate communications equipment to ensure effective communications among LILCO field emergency personnel, including those expected to perform security functions. The Plan is unclear as to whether portable or mo-

! bile radios are to be provided to emergency field personnel (see Plan, at 3.4-3).9/ If portable radios are provided, they i

l 9/ Although not stated in the Plan, LILCO has informally advised the County that each field survey team, traffic guide, road crew, and evacuation route spotter, and each bus staging location, bus transfer point and ambulance /

fire / rescue dispatch station, will be equipped with porta-ble or mobile radios.

9

will have a limited broadcast range, and will operate on battery power. Batteries are effective for only a short time, but the LILCO Plan makes no provision for recharging radio batteries. If, on the other hand, mobile radios are provided, communication will only be possible if the personnel are in their vehicles. Moreover, mobile radios operate on battery power and the Plan makes no provision for assuring that trans-mission and reception of radio messages will be possible. The LILCO Plan falls to take into account the fact that persons other than emergency response personnel (i.e., the public) will have access to the radio frequencies to be used by such person-nel. Further, the LILCO Plan relles upon a simplex radio system, which limits the range of the field radios. As a result, many emergency field personnel will be unable to hear other field personnel who attempt to communicate on the same frequency. It is essential that field workers be able to com-municate co-workers having similar or related functions. For example, LILCO's traffic guides must be able to communicate in-formation to other traffic guides in order to coordinate traf-fic control strategy and to be aware of what traffic conditions l

may be coming. LILCO's traffic guides, however, will not have that capability because they will not have adequate radio y

equipment or frequencies. The result of such attempted traffic

control without adequate means for coordination will result in increased rather than decreased traffic congestion, and extend-ed evacuation times. Other field workers who are unable to communicate information to co-workers performing similar or re-lated functions, will be similarly unable to perform their assigned roles effectively or properly.

Contention 31. There is no backup communications system for the five frequency Emergency Radio System which is intended to provide communications between emergency response coordinators at the EOC and field emergency response personnel, including field survey teams, traffic guides, road crew and evacuation route spotters, bus staging locations, bus transfer points, and ambulance and fire / rescue dispatch stations. (See Plan, at 3.4-3). The amount of radio traffic anticipated for en emergency at Shoreham could not be adequately handled by five frequencies. However, the Plan has no provision for any backup frequencies to those five which comprise the Emergency Radio System, in violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.9. and NUREG 0654,Section II.F.1. Moreover, each l category of LILCO's field workers will be able to use only one I

of the five frequencies. Accordingly, if problems develop on that one frequency, communications will be impossible for all workers in that category. In the absence of backup systems,

there is no assurance that recommended and appropriate emergency actions can or will be implemented, since command and control instructions may not be communicated to personnel in the field, and the status of the emergency response may not be communicated to those in command and control.

Contention 32. Under the LILCO Plan, communications between field personnel and the EOC response coordinators will, in some cases, be relayed through transfer points, meaning that some field personnel will be unable to communicate directly with their respective response coordinators. (Plan, at 3.4-3).

This lack of direct communications will result in the delay of $

implementation of emergency actions.

, Contention 33. The LILCO Plan fails to demonstrate that there will be adequate means of communication between the Shoreham facility and BNL field monitoring teams, as required by NUREG 0654,Section II.F.1.d. See FEMA Report, at 5. As a result, there is no assurance that necessary and appropriate offsite accident and dose assessment actions, including those necessary to determine the appropriate protective action recom-mendations, can or will be taken, as required by 10 CFR Sections 50.47(b)(9) and 50.47(b)(10).

Contention 34. The LILCO Plan relies on existing radios in hospitals and in ambulance and fire / rescue vehicles for

i communications between LILCO command and control personnel and other LILCO emergency workers and these response and organiza-tions and their personnel. (Plan, at 3.4-3.) This proposal falls to ensure adequate communications among response person-nel because:

A. The LILCO Emergency Radio System will not be com-patible with the radio communications equipment used in day-to-day operations by hospitals and by ambulance / fire / rescue vehicles.

B. The LILCO system will not have direct access to the radio frequencies used by hospitals and by ambu-lance / fire / rescue vehicles.

C. LILCO has advised Suffolk County that the EOC will not even be equipped with fire / rescue, Emergency Medical Services, or hospital frequencies. Therefore, LILCO proposes to relay communications between the EOC and the response orga-nizations through still unidentified dispatch locations. As-cuming dispatch locations are in fact available to LILCO, the LILCO proposal precludes direct communications between LILCO personnel and non-LILCO emergency response personnel in the field, which will delay the implementation of emergency actions. In addition, there is no assurance that "a coordi-y nated communication link for fixed and mobile medical support facilities exists," as required by NUREG 0654,Section II.F.2.

SC Contentions 35-44: Training of Emergency Workers Preamble to Contentions 35-44. 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(15) requires that radiological emergency response training be provided to those who may be called on to assist in an emergency. In addition, 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(14) requires that periodic exercises be conducted to evaluate major portions of emergency response capabilities, periodic drills be conducted to develop and maintain key skills, and that deficiencies identified as a result of exercises or drills be corrected. See also, 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.

Under the LILCO Plan, in order to provide training "to those who may be called on to assist in an emergency," LILCO must ensure that both its own personnel and the personnel of non-LILCO emergency response organizations are adequately trained, and that they participate in drills and exercises that meet the requirements of the regulations. See NUREG 0654, Sections II.N. and O. Intervenors allege in Contentions 35 -

44 that LILCO's Plan falls to demonstrate that adequate training can and will be provided to emergency response person-nel.10/

10/ LILCO has advised Suffolk County that training materials are still under development. When those materials are developed and produced for the County's review, the County may revise these contentions. More specific contentions (Footnote cont'd next page)

l Contention 35. In violation of 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(15), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F. and NUREG 0654,Section II.0, the LILCO Plan falls to demonstrate that adequate training will be provided with respect to:

A. An understanding of the LILCO emergency planning basis and emergency classification system; B. Basic principles of radiation and health effects / health physics; C. Dealing with problems unique to radiological emergencies, such as the high levels of anxiety and distrust a radiological emergency is likely to provoke, leading to both population overreaction (spontaneous evacuation) and underreaction (failure to evacuate); and D. The specific tasks and duties under the Plan and implementing procedures.

Contention 36. The LILCO Plan falls to demonstrate that proposed training can or will be effectively implemented. Spe-cifically:

(Footnote cont'd from previous page) cannot be formulated at this time, given the lack of the LILCO training materials.

f' i

I t

I

I A. There is no indication that training methods will encompass changing needs and circumstances.

B. There is no definition of acceptable standards of performance for each response role during initial and

, requalification training.

C. Instructor qualifications are not set forth in the Plan.

D. Lesson plans and specific training objectives are i

not set forth.

E. Despite references in the Plan to the contrary (see, e.g., OPIP 5.1.1, at 9), there is no training manual for emergency response personnel, nor does LILCO intend to develop such a training manual.

F. The only training courses described in the Plan

-- i.e., the FEMA training courses (Plan, at 5.1-1 and Table 5.1-1) and the training courses offered by the ARC (Plan, at 5.1-7 and Attachment 5.1.1) -- will not be used to train LERO l personnel.

Thus, there is no assurance that there will be adequate training of the personnel relied upon by LILCO, as required by 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(15) and NUREG 0654,Section II.0.1.

(See FEMA Report, at 15.)

A 96 -

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i I

Contention 37. LILCO is required to provide site specific emergency response training and periodic retraining for those offsite emergency organizations who may be called upon to provide assistance in the event of an emergency, including per-sonnel responsible for accident assessment, police, security and fire fighting personnel, first aid and rescue personnel, local support services personnel, and medical support person-nel. NUREG 0654, Sections II.O.l.a, 4.b, d, f, g and h. LILCO has apparently provided no training to the LILCO and non-LILCO emergency response personnel who will be relied upon under the LILCO Plan. The Plan states that LILCO intends to " offer" emergency response training "to all members of LERO-support or-ganizations, including fire and ambulance companies, police, i and private groups." (OPIP 5.1.1, at 3). However, the Plan does not include a list of non-LILCO organizations or personnel who have received or will receive emergency response training, nor does the Plan specify or describe the initial or periodic retraining that has been or will be provided to emergency re-sponse organizations and personnel. Thus, there can be no finding that an adequate number of trained emergency workers will be available to respond to an emergency at Shoreham and to implement the LILCO Plan, in violation of 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1) and 50.47(b)(15), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F, and NUREG 0654, Sections II.O.1.a and 0.1.b.

. . . _ _ - - - . -. - . _ . . ~ . _ - . - -

Contention 38. The training offered by LILCO to non-LILCO personnel may be in direct conflict with the previous training of such personnel. As a result, the ability of non-LILCO per-sonnel to perform as expected under the LILCO Plan, and coordination of the emergency response, will be significantly impaired, resulting in a failure to accomplish necessary training goals in violation of 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(15), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F, and NUREG 0654,Section II.O.l. There is thus no assurance that the LILCO Plan can or will be implemented, and there can be no finding of compliance with 10 CFR Section 50.47(a)(1).

Contention 39. LILCO's Plan falls to deal effectively with the problem of attrition. As a result, LILCO cannot dem-onstrate that adequate numbers of trained support organization personnel will be available to respond to an emergency at Shoreham and thus cannot demonstrate compliance with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1) and 50.47(b)(15), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F and NUREG 0654,Section II.O.l.

A. With respect to LILCO personnel, the Plan states that an initial qualification course "will be scheduled each quarter for newly assigned emergency response organization staff designees" . . . (OPIP 5.1.1, at 2). However, to ensure compliance with 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(15), 10 CFR Part 50, J

l Appendix E,Section IV.F and NUREG 0654,Section II.O.1, LILCO l must demonstrate that all personnel are trained in their desig-nated emergency response organization positions. Thus, LILCO should make satisfactory completion of its emergency response training program a prerequisite to the hiring of personnel who will be assigned emergency response duties.

B. With respect to non-LILCO personnel, the Plan ignores the issue of attrition. Morever, LILCO will not know l whether personnel in emergency response support organizations who might have been trained at one time by LILCO remain with their respective organizations, and thus remain available to respond to an emergency at Shoreham.

Contention 40. There is no assurance that LILCO personnel can adequately perform the emergency functions and duties they are assigned under the LILCO Plan. The Plan calls upon LILCO personnel to perform emergency functions which, in most in-I stances, are tinrelated to their LILCO job functions. For exam-ple, LILCO meter readers are to serve as Traffic Guides (OPIP l

2.1.1, at 28), Customer Relations personnel are to serve as Evacuation Route Spotters (id., at 32), LILCO maintenance foremen and mechanics are to serve as Radiological Monitoring Personnel (id., at 17), and various designers, planners and an-l alysts are to serve as Security Personnel (id., at 47-54).

l l

l l l

There is no assurance that LILCO training will compensate for this lack of job-related experience, especially when the tasks to be performed may be accompanied by high levels of stress and fatigue involving life-threatening situations. Training alone cannot prepare people for the actual stress and trauma that ac-company emergency conditions. Experience is also essential.ll/

Moreover, training that is not regularly applied or used will be ineffective. Thus, even if their initial training were l

l adequate, LILCO personnel will forget what was learned during that training. Following their training, LILCO personnel will be expected to perform their regular job functions, which have no relation to their emergency roles, rather than applying or using their emergency training. This will minimize any benefits gained through the emergency training, especially since that training is only repeated on an annual basis, and there are no incentives for LILCO personnel to learn or to retain the emergency training provided to them. Accordingly,

{ LILCO cannot demonstrate compliance with 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(15)', or that the emergency functions and duties assigned to LILCO personnel under the Plan can or will be implemented, as required by 10 CFR Section 50.47(a)(1).

11/ For example, doctors and police officers are required to intern as residents and to serve as rookie police officers before their training is completed.

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Contention 41. All necessary emergency personnel must be trained adequately in the proper use of the communications equipment relied upon in the LILCO Plan. Such training must include instruction in the proper use of radio frequencies, the

! range of coverage available for each frequency, and proper l

radio discipline. The LILCO Plan, however, only requires that there be " communication drills" and that exercises shall test, inter alla, emergency response capabilities, " including commu-i nications capabilities." (Plan, at 5.2-2 and 5.2-3). The Plan gives no indication of the scope or content of the proposed communication drills and exercises. Thus, there is no assur-ance that LILCO's Plan satisfies the requirements of 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(15) or that emergency response personnel will be prepared and adequately trained to initiate and receive com-munications, as required by 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(6) and NUREG 0654,Section II.F.

Contention 42. Many of the LILCO personnel relied upon to implement the LILCO Plan, including those in positions of command and control as well as those with coordination and field functions, are not residents of Suffolk County. There-fore, they lack a sense of the territorial imperative that is a l principal motivating factor for emergency response personnel.

l i

Without proper motivation, training will not be effective to i - 101 -

l l

1

s ensure adequate emergency response, particularly for persons asked to perform in a potentially life-threatening situation.

Thus, LILCO fails to demonstrate compliance with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1) and 50.47(b)(15), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F and NUREG 0654,Section II.O.l.

Contention 43. Because many LILCO personnel are not area residents, they will not be familiar with the geography, topog-raphy, road network, demography, school and other facility lo-cations, jurisdictional limits of emergency and volunteer orga-nizations and their capabilities, and other local conditions in and around the EPZ. Moreover, they will not be aware of the internal workings of the communities within the EPZ. As a result, emergency personnel may be unable to deal promptly with, and make correct decisions concerning, unexpected situa-tions or contingencies, as required by 10 CFR Section 50.47(a)(1), including: traffic accidents at key intersections; obstructions of evacuation routes; situations where persons re-fuse to evacuate because they fear that their homes / businesses will be unprotected; unavailability of relied upon emergency resources or personnel. Training alone cannot serve as a substitute for experience and is even less effective when those expected to manage and coordinate the emergency response or im-plement that response in the field are unfamiliar with, and may

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l not have a concerted interest in, the area of the emergency.

Thus, LILCO cannot demonstrate compliance with 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(15), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F, and NUREG 0654,Section II.O.l.

Contention 44. The LILCO Plan falls to demonstrate that drills and exercises will adequately test the training of emer-gency response personnel so as to ensure that personnel are familiar with, and capable of performing, their duties under the Plan as required by 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(14), 10 CFR s

Part 50, Appendix E,Section IV.F, and NUREG 0654,Section II.N. Specifically:

A. Scenarios for the drills and exercises required by the Plan have not yet been developed by LILCO.

B. Even assuming the proposed drills and exercises were to test adequately the training and performance level of emergency response personnel, the Plan provides no assurance that training or performance deficiencies will be corrected.

Exercises test, but do not train, emergency personnel, Thus, tetraining should immediately follow the critique of a drill or j exercise so as to take into account any identified training deficiencies.

C. The LILCO Plan does not adequately specify the type and the frequency of drills. See NUREG 0654,Section II.N.2.

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D. The Plan does not provide for quarterly testing of communications with Federal emergency response organizations or States within the ingestion pathway. NUREG 0654,Section II.N.2.a. Moreover, the Plan does not provide for testing whether the content of messages is understood by emergency re-sponse personnel. Id. (See FEMA Report, at 13.)

E. The Plan fails to describe how exercises and drills are to be carried out to allow " free play for deci-sionmaking." NUREG 0654,Section II.N.3. (See FEMA Report, at 14.)

F. The LILCO Plan falls to provide for official ob-servers from Federal, State or local governments to observe, evaluate, and critique training exercises. NUREG 0654,Section II.N.4. (See FEMA Report, at 14). Nor does the Plan provide adequate means for evaluating observer and participant comments. NUREG 0654,Section II.N.5. (See FEMA Report, at 14.) Instead, under the LILCO Plan, post-exercise / drill cri-tiques will be performed primarily by LILCO. (Plan, at 5.2-3; OPIP 5.1.1, at 8 and 9). LILCO, however, will not be able to critique adequately its own Plan, including the exercises conducted under the Plan, due to its lack of expertise and ob-jectivity. Thus, deficiencies in the LILCO Plan and imple-menting procedures may not be identified or corrected.

104 -

I i

Contentions 45-51: Accident and Dose Assessment and Projection Preamble to Contentions 45-51. 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(9) requires offsite plans to provide that:

Adequate methods, systems, and equip-ment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition are in use.

See also 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, at Section IV.B. Simi-larly, NUREG 0654,Section II.I.8 requires the identification of an appropriate organization which:

shall provide methods, equipment and expertise to make rapid assessments of the actual or potential meanitude and locations of any radiological hazards through liquid or gaseous release pathways. This shall include activation, notification means, field team composition, transportation, communication, monitoring equipment and es-timated deployment times.

Intervenors contend that the LILCO Plan fails to comply with these requirements for the reasons set forth in Conten-l tions 45-51.

l Contention 45. The LILCO Plan appears to rely exclusively on BNL personnel for offsite accident and dose assessment and projection, as well as for all command, control and coordination functions related to offsite accident assessment and the decision to recommend particular protective actions to the LILCO Director of LERO (i.e., the Radiation Health

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l

Coordinator, Environmental Assessment Coordinator, Dose Assessment Teams, Environmental Survey Coordinator, and Offsite Survey Teams). (Plan, Section 3.5.B; Figure 3.5.2; OPIPs 2.1.1, 3.5.1, 3.5.2, 3.5.3 and 3.5.6) The Plan does not iden-tify by name, title or qualification the BNL and/or FRMAP per-sonnel who are expected to perform offsite accident and dose assessment functions and thus fails to comply with NUREG 0654,Section II.A.2.a.

l Contention 46. The Plan does not identify an individual at BNL who will be responsible for assuring continuity of technical, administrative and material resources. In addition, there is no assurance that BNL is capable of providing prompt or continuous services (24-hour) for a protracted period. Thus the Plan fails to comply with NUREG 0654, Sections II.A.4, and C.l.b. Indeed, the Plan provides for: only one BNL represen-tative, respectively, to act as Radiation Health Coordinator, Environmental Assessment Coordinator, and Environmental Survey Coordinator; only two BNL representatives to comprise the Dose l

l Assessment Staff; and only four BNL representatives to comprise the two Survey Teams. (Plan, Figure 2.2.1 at 2) Thus, even if the initial staffing for offsite monitoring and dose assessment were assumed to be adequate, there is no provision for augmen-tation of initial staffing on a continuous basis as required

?

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1

l l

under 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(1) and NUREG 0654, Sections II.A.l.e and A.4.

Contention 47. The LILCO Plan indicates that the informa-tion on fission product releases to be used by BNL personnel in making offsite dose projections is limited to noble gases and lodines. (See Plan, Figure 3.3.3, at 2, and OPIPs 3.5.2 and 3.6.1). LILCO has failed to comply with NUREG 0654 Section II.E.4.f, which requires information to offsite dose assessment i

l and projection personnel to include the " chemical and physical form of released material, including estimates of the relative quantities and concentration of noble gases, lodines, and particulates." (Emphasis added).

Similarly, NUREG 0654 Section II.I.10 requires that means be established for relating the various measured parameters (e.g., contamination levels, water and air activity levels) to dose rates for key isotopes (i.e., those given

In Table 3, page 18) and gross l radioactivity measurements. Provisions i shall be made for estimating integrated l dose from the projected and actual dose l rates and for comparing these estimates with the protective action guides.

l The referenced Table 3 lists radionuclides with significant contribution to dominant exposure modes, and includes several radionuclides in addition to noble gases and lodines. Neither

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the release information to be provided by LILCO to BNL or LERO, nor the dose projections to be calculated by BNL personnel, include or take into account isotopes other than noble gases and lodines. (See OPIPs 3.5.2 and 3.6.1). Thus, LILCO has failed to comply with this requirement of NUREG 0654, and 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(9). See FEMA Report at 7. The result of LILCO's failure to take into account isotopes other than noble gases and lodines is that the dose projections to be used by the Director of LERO in making protective action recommenda-tions to the public will be too low (i.e., non-conservative).

An example of a release isotope which should be included ,

in dose projection calculations is Tellurium-132, which may have a life-threatening impact due to external exposure and/or Inhalation. It has been predicted that 80 percent of the Tellurium inventory would be released in a severe core melt accident; this release isotope is identified as one of the largest health risks. (See WASH 1400, Appendix VI, Figure 13.1 and Figure 13.2). The Plan's failure to measure key isotopes such as Tellurium-132 (e.g. OPIP 3.6.1) is thus a significant deficiency contrary to the guidance of NUREG 0654,Section II.I.10.

Contention 48. The most sensitive scale (0-50mR/hr) of the instrument to be used in offsite radiation surveys (RO-2A)

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-_ . _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ . . . - , _ _ _ _ _ ~ .

l l

l 1s not sensitive enough to provide accurate low level radiation measurements (i.e., one mR/hr) as required. (OPIP 3.5.1, at 4). Thus, LILCO has failed to comply with 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(9).

Contention 49. The dose projection worksheets, liquid release worksheets, ground deposition calculations and required computations used for dose assessment projections and downwind surveys (OPIPs 3.5.2 and 3.5.3), require unrealistically accurate communications of complex data from survey teams to assessment teams in order to obtain the required calculated results. There are no provisions in OPIPs 3.5.2 or 3.5.3 for dealing with missing data, communications failures, the neces-sity of converting measurements from one unit to another, or the need for conversion factors if alternate equipment is used.

Thus, there is no assurance that those procedures will provide reliable data for use in making protective action decisions and, accordingly, there is no compliance with the 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(9) requirement that an adequate method be pro-vided for assessing the potential consequences of an offsite release.

Contention 50. The Plan provides for integrated dose cal-culation updates once every hour or once every four hours. The Plan also provides for analyses of samples at laboratories in 109 -

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Maplewood, New Jersey; Rockville, Maryland; Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; and Westwood, New Jersey.

(See Plan, at 3.5-2 to 3.5-4). The wind speed on Long Island ranges from five to ten miles per hour 70 percent of the time and wind direction changes frequently; these factors could cause the plume to travel at a rate of speed and in directions that would make the proposed intervals between dose updates and the time necessary to obtain analyses results far too long.

Such delays in obtaining accurate dose assessments could lead to incorrect protective action recommendations since by the time a dose calculation is made for one area the plume could have already proceeded to other areas. Given the conditions on Long Island, the failure to provide for integrated dose calcu-lations every 15-30 minutes is a violation of 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(9) and NUREG 0654 Section II.I.8.

Contention 51. The LILCO Plan identifies preselected dose sampling locations for areas within 11 miles of the plant.

(Plan, at Table 3.5.1). The Plan thus fails to comply with NUREG 0654 Section II.J.10.a, which requires the identification of sampling and monitoring points for areas up to 50 miles from the plant. Sampling and monitoring beyond the 10-mile EPZ is required to ascertain whether doses beyond the EPZ exceed the PAGs, requiring the initiation of protective actions. See NUREG 0654 Section I.D.2.

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\

Contention 52: Emergency Operations Center 1 Preamble to Contention 52, 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(8) requires that "[a]dequate emergency facilities and equipment to support the emergency response are provided and maintained."

Furthermore, NUREG 0654,Section II.H.3, requires the

" establish [ ment of] an emergency operations center for use in directing and controlling response functions." Among other things, the direction and control of response functions I

requires: prompt communications among principal response orga-nizations, to emergency personnel, and to the public (10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(6)); the receipt and analysis of all field monitoring data and coordination of sample media (NUREG 0654,Section II.H.12); and early notification and clear instruction to the populace within the EPZ (10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(5)).

The LILCO Plan provides that the Shoreham Emergency Operations Center ("EOC") will be located at the LILCO l Brentwood Operations Facility. LILCO states that "[o]n a day l

l to day basis, the facility is operated 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> per day in-volved in LILCO business activities," but that during an emer-gency at Shoreham, "a portion" of that facility will be uti-lized as the EOC. (Plan, at 4.1-1). The EOC will not be acti-vated until " declaration of an Alert or higher classification" (id.), or until the Director of Local Response orders its activation. (OPIP 4.1.1, at 1).

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Contencion 52. Intervenors contend that the LILCO Plan does not comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(b)(5), 50.47(b)(6) and 50.47(b)(8), and NUREG 0654, Sections II.H.3 and II.H.12, in that an EOC for use in directing and controlling response functions has not been established.12/ Until such a facility has been satisfactorily established, equipped, and rendered op-erational, LILCO is unable to perform any of the following functions required by 10 CFR Section 50.47:

! A. Notification of local response organizations and no-tification of emergency personnel by organizations (10 CPR Section 50.47(b)(5)).

B. Early notification and clear instruction to the popu-lace in the EPZ (10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(5)).

C. Prompt communications among principal response orga-nizations to emergency personnel and to the public (10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(6)).

I D. Dissemination of coordinated information to the public (10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(7)).

i 12/ If LILCO ever establishes an EOC, the Intervenors may have specific contentions regarding its adequacy. Such conten-

tions cannot be formulated at this time, however, given the lack of this facility.

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E. Assessment and monitoring of actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency (10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(9)).

Contention 53: Security During a Radiological Emergency Contention 53. Intervenors contend that LILCO will be un-able to provide adequate security in evacuated areas or other areas where evacuees may congregate, and therefore the Plan fails to comply with 10 CFR Section 50.47(a)(1), 50.47(b)(1),

and 50.47(b)(3), and NUREG 0654 Sections II.A.2.a, J.9 and J.10. Specifically:

A. Despite LILCO's recognition of the necessity for

" security patrols to prevent vandalism or theft in vacated neighborhoods," (Appendix A, at IV-82), the Plan in fact fails to provide for such patrols.13/ Without security, there may be looting, vandalism, and theft in the evacuated areas. The Plan thus falls to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(b)(1) and 50.47(b)(3), NUREG 0654,Section II.J.10.j., and it cannot be 1

i implemented, in violation of 10 CFR Section 50.47(a)(1) and

(

NUREG 0654 Sections II.J.9 and J.10.

13/ While the Plan appears to assume that this task will be performed by local law enforcement agencies, (see Appendix A at IV-82) in fact, no such law enforcement agencies will i do so. See Contentions 10 and 24.P.

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B. The LILCO Plan falls to provide for security at certain key areas within the EPZ where security will be essential, including fuel allocation points, staging areas for emergency response personnel and transfer points for evacuees.

The Plan also falls to p. ovide for security at the ENC. With-out adequate security in these areas, adequate protective measures could not and would not be implemented, in violation of 10 CFR Section 50.47(a)(1) and NUREG 0654, Sections II.J.9 and J.10.

Contencion 54: Medical and Public Health Support Contention 54. 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(8) requires that there be adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support the emergency response, and Section 50.47(b)(12) requires that chere be arrangements for medical services for contaminated in-jured individuals. LILCO fails to meet these requirements be-cause ambulances will be unable to respond where needed due to:

A. traffic congestion which will exist during an evacua-tion, and B. LILCO's proposed use of ambulances for the evacuation' of special facilities and the handicapped. (See Contentions 23, 65, 72, 73) t

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Contentions 55-59: Notification to the Public Preamble to Contentions 55-59. 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(5) requires that means be established to provide early notifica-tion and clear instruction to the populace within the plume ex-posure pathway EPZ. The public notification system should be capable of essentially completing the initial notification of the public in the plume exposure pathway EPZ "within about 15 minutes." 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D.3. (See also NUREG 0654,Section II.E.6. and Appendix 3 thereto).

Intervenors contend that under LILCO's Plan, there is no assurance that the public will receive notification of an emer-gency within 15 minutes, and as a result, there is no assurance that adequate protective actions can or will be implemented, as required by 10 CFR Section 50.47(a)(1) and NUREG 0654 Sections II.J.9 and J.10. The specific deficiencies in the LILCO Plan are set forth in Contentions 55-59.

Contention 55. Under the LILCO Plan, a system of 89 fixed sirens will be used to alert the public to an emergency at the Shoreham plant. (Plan, at 3.4-5). However, as a result of the deficiencies noted in Contention 26, LILCO will be unable to contact its key command and control personnel in a timely manner, thus potentially delaying the decision to activate the siren system, in violation of 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(3), Part

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50 Appendix E Section IV.D.3, and NUREG 0654, Sections II.E.6 and Appendix 3.

Contention 56. The LILCO Plan does not provide adequate backup in the event of failure of the LILCO siren system.

LILCO relies upon public address systems or loudspeakers, mounted on LILCO vehicles driven by " Route Alert Drivers," to provide backup to the sirens. (Plan, at 3.3-4 and 3.4-6; OPIP 3.3.4, at 3). However, the proposal to drive vehicles equipped i with loudspeakers through the non-activated siren areas to alert the public is impractical, unworkable, and will not provide notification with 45 minutes as required by NUREG 0654 Appendix 3. (See Contention 27.) In addition, some persons will not hear the broadcast message (such as persons with impaired hearing, persons outside the EPZ), and other persons will not understand the broadcast message (such as children, cnd non-English speaking persons). Route alert drivers are also required to abandon a route if dosimetry readings exceed cpecified levels. (OPIP 3.3.4, at 5, Attachment 1). Accord-ingly, there is no assurance that persons in the EPZ will be i promptly notifed of an emergency, and entire segments of the population may never be alerted at all, in violation of 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1), 50.47(b)(5), Part 50 Appendix E Section IV.D.3, and NUREG 0654, Sections II.E.6 and Appendix 3.

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Contention 57. The LILCO Plan provides that those special facilities or organizations with a large number of personnel (such as schools, hospitals, nursing homes and major employers) will be equipped with a tone alert radio which, upon activation by the EBS signal from WALK radio, is to broadcast automat-ically the emergency message. (Plan, at 3.3-4, 3.3-5 and 3.4-6 and Table 3.4.1). The Plan asserts that these tone alert radios will provide special facilities with additional alerting I or preparation time. However, since notification would coincide with notification to the general public, in fact these special facilities would not have any additional alerting or preparation time (for evacuation, sheltering, or implementation of other protective actions). Moreover, these radios depend upon the EBS signal broadcasting from WALK radio station.

Should the EBS signal originate from other stations, the radios would not activate and there would not be automatic transmis-sion of the EBS message. Further, WALK radio does not broad-cast on its AM frequency 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> per day. Thus, there is no assurance that tone alert radios will provide adequate notifi-cation of an emergency to special facilities within the EPZ, in violation of 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1) and 50.47(b)(5), Part 50, Appendix E,Section IV.D and NUREG 0654, Sections II.E.5, E.6, and Appendix 3.

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Contention 58. Under the LILCO Plan, the proposed evacua-tion of special facilities and the handicapped requires the Special Facilities Evacuation Coordinator and the Home Coordinator to verify by telephone that the special facilities and individuals are aware of the need to evacuate and to deter-mine their specific needs for assistance. (OPIP 3.6.5). This does not provide an adequate, workable or dependable means of timely notification of or communication with these people, be-cause the process of contacting them will take too long, persons to be contacted may not be near telephones, and handicapped persons may be unable to communicate by telephone.

Thus, the Plan falls to comply with 10 CPR Sections 50.47(b)(5) and 50.47(b)(6), Part 50 Appendix E Section IV.D.3, and NUREG 0654, Sections II.E.1, E.2, E.5, E.6, and Appendix 3.

Contention 59. Under the LILCO Plan, the U.S. Coast Guard is relied upon to provide public notification to the general public on the waters within the 10-mile EPZ. (Plan at 2.2-2).

However, the Coast Guard does not have the capability of noti-I I fying the public within 15 minutes and thus the LILCO Plan I

fails to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(b)(5), 50.47(b)(6),

Part 50, Appendix E,Section IV.D. and NUREG 0654, Sections II.E.5, E.6 and Appendix 3.

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Contentions 60-83: Protective Actions Preamble to Contentions 60-83. 10 CFR Section 50.47(a)(1) requires a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate pro-tective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency. In addition, 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(10) requires the development of a range of protective actions for the public; guidelines for the choice of protective actions must be consistent with Federal guidance. Such guld-ance includes the Manual of Protective Action Guides ("PAGs")

(EPA-520/1-75-001), which sets forth the threshold projected dose levels at which protective actions are to be commenced.

The PAGs are embraced in NUREG 0654, Sections II.J.7 and J.9, and are referenced in the LILCO Plan, at Section 3.6, and OPIP 3.6.1. NUREG 0654, in Sections II.J.9 and J.10, requires that there be established "a capability for implementing protective measures based upon protective action guides and other criteria." (Emphasis added).

In Contentions 60-83, Intervenors contend that LILCO's Plan does not provide reasonable assurance that adequate pro-tective measures can and will be implemented to protect the population from the potential health hazards of an accident at Shoreham. Thus, (a) there is no reasonable assurance that the measures proposed in the LILCO Plan would, if taken, provide

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adequate protection from the potential consequences of an emergency at Shoreham; and (b) there is no reasonable assurance that the proposed measures could or would in fact be taken in the event of an emergency.

Contentions 60-62: Sheltering Further Preamble to Contentions 60-62. The LILCO Plan provides that the protective action of sheltering may be recom-mended (Plan, at 3.6-5), and that it is "the preferred protec-l tive action if sufficient protection is offered by sheltering, or if no additional benefit is gained by evacuation." (OPIP 3.6.1, Section 3.2). Intervenors contend that as to the pro-posed protective action of sheltering, the LILCO Plan falls to comply with 10 CFR Section 50.47(a)(1) and NUREG 0654,Section II.J.9, because there is no assurance that sheltering, as a protective action, could or would be effectively implemented in the event of an emergency in a manner which would protect the i

public. Indeed, the facts indicate that many people will re-l fuse to shelter and will, instead, choose to evacuate,ll/ and I

that many other persons, as a practical matter, will be unable to shelter. Thus, sheltering cannot be viewed as an adequate 14/ See Contention 23: The Evacuation Shadow Phenomenon, for further discussion of this matter.

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protective action, as LILCO appears to believe, for the reasons set forth in SC Contentions 60-62. ,

Contention 60. At page 3.6-5 of the LILCO Plan, LILCO states:

Th[e] protective action [of selective sheltering] may be ordered at projected doses below the accepted PAGs to minimize radioactive exposure, particularly to preg-nant women and children . . . . In addition, the Selective Sheltering option may be recommended as an effective option for individuals who could not be safely evacuated. This would include individuals who have been designated medically unable to withstand the physical stress of an evacuation, as well as those individuals who require constant, sophisticated medical attention.

The Plan falls to set forth guidelines to be used by command and control personnel: (a) in choosing to recommend the protec-tive action of selective sheltering; or (b) in determining the individuals who should or would be subject to such a recommen-dation. Rather, as quoted above, the Plan contains only gener-alized statements which, in fact, provide no guidance at all.

In addition, there are no procedures which indicate the means by which such a recommendation would or could be implemented.

The Plan thus fails to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1),

50.47(b)(10) and NUREG 0654, Sections II.J.9 and J.10.

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Contention 61. Intervenors contend that a protective action recommendation of sheltering would not or could not be implemented. Specifically, a substantial number of the people who might be advised to shelter, as a practical matter, will be unable to do so because:

A. A large number cf the homes and other structures in the EPZ are constructed of wood and have no basements.

According to LILCO's shielding factors (Plan, Table 3.6.5), the protection offered by such shelter is limited, at most, to a reduction in dose of only 10 percent from that received with no shelter. As a practical matter, persons with access to such structures have little " shelter" available, and thus sheltering should not be considered as a protective action for these persons.

B. Persons who are traveling in their cars or other vehicles at the time of a sheltering recommendation may not be able to reach shelter fast enough to obtain any protection from a release of radioactive fission products. Vehicles offer es-sentially no protection from radioactive doses.

! C. The Plan makes no provision for sheltering chil-l dren in schools. There are no procedures indicating how, or under what circumstances, a sheltering order for schools would be made; nor are there any procedures indicating how, if at I

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1 all, such an order could or would be implemented by the schools. In addition, if LILCO were to recommend that schools institute an early dismissal, and school authorities were to follow that recommendation, school children would not have access to shelter for hours. (See SC Contention 69).

D. Transients who are on beaches, in parks or in other outdoor recreation areas will have no access to shelter.

Contrary to the requirement of NUREG 0654 Section J.10.a, the Plan fails to identify public sheltering areas. (See FEMA Report, at 8).

E. Persons who are in boats in the EPZ will have no access to shelter.

Moreover, even if people were willing and able to follow a sheltering recommendation, there is no assurance that taking auch action would provide any significant dose savings and thus prevent persons in the EPZ from receiving health-threatening radiation doses for the following reasons:

F. Those who take shelter in wood frame buildings without basements will receive 90 percent of the dose they would receive from the plume if they were outside the shelter.

(See Plan, Table 3.6.5).

G. Many other homes in the EPZ, even if they provide 3 more shielding than a wood house, will only reduce doses about

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50 percent. In a severe accident, a 50-percent dose reduction will still result in health-threatening doses.

H. According to LILCO, the average shielding factor available in the EPZ is 0.7, which means that, on the average, those who follow a sheltering recommendation will nonetheless receive 70 percent of the dose they would receive from the

~

plume if they were outside the shelter; I. The cloud doses resulting from a release'of ra-l dioactive fission products from the Shoreham plant could bs sa substantial that even taking into account the 30 percent aver-age dose reduction provided'by shelter in the'EPZ,s persons who follow a sheltering recommendation could still rece!.ve doses that would cause adverse health effects.15/

Thus, sheltering is not an adequate. protective:-action in

. the event of an emergency at Shoreham, apd ._ tbe' Plan , therefore, f alls to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47'(a)(1) and 50.47(b)(10), and NUREG 0654 Section II.J.9.

Contention 62. The LILCO Plan-makes no provision for re-location, or for monitoring the radiological exposure, of s

persons who have taken shelter'.from a passing plume. -Pather, l .

l 15/ See Contention 22 discussion of the site specific consequences of an accident at Shoreham.

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k _ _ _ _

after a sheltering order, the LILCO plan is silent regarding what action (s) a person is supposed to take at a later time.

Relocation of sheltered persons and monitoring are likely to be necessary after plume passage to prevent people from receiving substantial doses, in addition to those received while in shel-ters, from ground contamination which will remain even after plume passage. Thus, the Plan falls to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1), 50.47(b)(10), and NUREG 0654 Sections II.J.9 and J.12.

Contentions 63-77: Evacuation Contention 63. The LILCO Plan states at pages 3.6-5 to 3.6-6:

Selective Evacuation may be implemented to evacuate from the affected area of the plume exposure EPZ members of the general public who might have a low tolerance to radiation exposure. Specifically, this would include pregnant women and children 12 years and under.

The Plan fails to set forth guidelines to be used by command and control personnel: (a) in choosing to recommend the protec-tive action of selective evacuation; or (b) in determining, l Identifying and locating the individuals who should be subject to such a recommendation. In addition, there are no procedures which indicate the means by which such a recommendation could or would be implemented. The Plan thus falls to comply with 10

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CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1), 50.47(b)(10), and NUREG 0654 Sections II.J.9 and J.10.

Contention 64. The LILCO Plan proposes an EPZ consisting of 19 separate zones. In the event of a radiological emergency at Shoreham requiring evacuation of the EPZ, it is LILCO's in-tended strategy to conduct "a systematic area-by-area evacua-tion downwind of the reactor." (Plan, Appendix, A at I-5).

LILCO's Plan, however, falls to account for the fact that the l

wind shifts quickly on Long Island, with average wind speeds of approximately 10 miles per hour. Under such conditions, a shift in wind direction could quickly direct the plume over an area that was not in the original plume pathway, and thus not included in the initial evacuation order, before that area could be evacuated.

Intervenors contend that given wind conditions on Long Is-land, in the event any evacuation due to a radiological emer-gency is required, LILCO must evacuate at least a radius of five to seven miles around the plant. Any partial evacuation l

of only certain zones within a five to seven mile radius would expose the population of the nearby unevacuated zones to the I

risk of a sudden wind shift and consequent health-threatening oxposure to radiation. Under these conditions, the LILCO plan l of staged evacuation falls to constitute an adequate protective 126 -

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1 action, as required by 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1) and 50.47(b)(10).

Contention 65: Evacuation Time Estimates Further Preamble to Contention 65. Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 requires that license applicants " provide an analysis of the time required to evacuate and for taking other protective actions for various sectors and distances within the plume exposure pathway EPZ for transient and permanent populations." (See also, NUREG 0654,Section II.J.8 and Appendix 4). Accurate estimates of the time necessary to evacuate the Shoreham EPZ (or portions thereof) are essential to evaluating the evacuation route system. In particular, such estimates must be accurate and reliable so that command and control personnel who are considering what protective actions might be ordered for particular persons can estimate whether, given projected release and dispersion of health-threatening fission products from the Shoreham plant, evacuation can be accomplished before such dispersion takes place. (See 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(10); NUREG 0654 Section II.J.10.m). A deci-sion to order evacuation, if based on inaccurate evacuation time estimates, could result in evacuees' being trapped in queues or slow moving traffic inside or outside the EPZ, thus exposing them to a release of fission products from the Shoreham plant.

127 -

LILCO has submitted evacuation time estimates for the 10-mile EPZ, which estimates are contained in Appendix A, at V-3, and OPIP 3.6.1, Attachment 4.16/ LILCO estimates that the time for evacuation will vary from about two to two-and-one-half hours for only the inner EPZ sectors, tc a maximum of approxi-mately six hours for evacuation of the entire EPZ under adverse weather conditions.

Contention 65: Intervenors contend that LILCO's evacua-tion time estimates are inaccurate, unreliable and, in fact, should be far longer. LILCO's evacuation time estimates are so underestimated that under the LILCO Plan an evacuation may be ordered which realistically cannot be completed prior to release and dispersion of fission products from the Shoreham plant. Evacuees will be caught in queues or delayed in heavily congested traffic within the EPZ. Under many accident conditions, there will be a dispersal of radioactive materials while such traffic conditions still exist, resulting in unacceptable health-threatening exposure to the evacuees. The outomobiles of the evacuees will offer essentially no protection from the plume.

16/ The FEMA Report at 11-12 notes that the time estimates are inadequate in part because the estimates in OPIP 3.6.1 are incomparable to those in Appendix A.

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The specific deficiencies in LILCO's estimates and further bases for this contention are set forth in paragraphs A-H below.

Contention 65.A. The LILCO evacuation time estimates ig-note or underestimate the time required for people to mobilize and ready themselves for evacuation. The LILCO estimates in Appendix A include only the time involved in the actual evacua-tion trip out of the EPZ. (Appendix A, Table XIV). LILCO l LILCO assumes in OPIP 3.6.1 that complete mobilization of the public will take about 20 minutes after receiving notification, which grossly underestimates the time it will take for mobili-zation, especially during working hours. In fact, it will likely take at least from one to more than three hours for peo-ple to mobilize before they can begin to evacuate. This mobi-lization time will be required because:

1. Following activation of the prompt notification

[

cystem, it will take time for people to become aware of the 1

l emergency, to become informed of the recommended protective actions a.id to determine their own course of action.

2. Where possible, most families will seek to evac-t uate as a unit. Specifically, working parents will leave work and drive to schools and/or home to pick up their children l prior to evacuating. There will also be travel to and from 129 -

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I various locations as family groups are assembled from work locations, relatives' homes, day care centers, and the like.

Mobilization time must include time for the travel necessary to assemble family groups. In addition, families v825 schoo children who do not pick up their children themselves, will delay the start of their evacuation until all their children have returned home. Given the length of time necessary to im-plement early dismissals (see Contention 69), mobilization times could be increased significantly by this fact.

3. It will take time for the evacuees to gather nec-essary provisions before evacuating. (See " Emergency Proce-dures: Shoreham Nuclear Power Station," at 8). In addition, some persons will seek to go to banks, stores and other such facilities for money and provisions.

4. Travel within the EPZ during the mobilization period (work /home, home/ school, to banks and stores, etc.)

prior to commencing evacuation will result in heavy traffic congestion which will lengthen the time necessary to complete mobilization travel.

i j _ Contention 65.B. Heavy traffic congestion from mobiliza-tion traffic, due to both high demand and conflicting traffic flow ( i .e. , some traffic flow in directions different than pre-scribed evacuation directions), will lengthen evacuation times.

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_ _ __ , , __ _u ,p. , ,,-r.- -c-m.- ..

l LILCO's evacuation time estimates do not appear to take this cause of congestion and resulting evacuation delay into consid-eration. Thus, the LILCO estimates are inaccurate for this ad-ditional reason.

Contention 65.C. The LILCO traffic control plan, as de-scribed in Appendix A, even if assumed to be lawful and capable of being implemented, will, in fact, constitute an additional source of congestion which has been ignored in LILCO's evacua-tion time estimates. If such congestion were taken into account, the LILCO estimates would increase substantially. The Plan will cause additional congestion for the following reasons:

1. LILCO's estimates assume that its traffic guides will screen all motorists moving in a direction contrary to its prescribed traffic flow to determine whether each person has

" good reason" for going in that direction. (Appendix A, at IV-83; see also, IV-8). Thus, a traffic guide presumably would stop or otherwise delay all such motorists, question them, and ottempt to persuade or order them not to go in their intended directions if their reasons for doing so were judged not to be cufficient. This screening process will impede traffic flow, resulting in congestion and further increasing the evacuation time estimates. It will also require more traffic guidea than LILCO has designated for each traffic post.

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2. LILCO's attempted use of traffic controls may cause aggressive behavior on the part of those attempting to take protective actions. This aggressive behavior will stem in part from fear of a radiological emergency (which is perceived by the population to be different from other emergencies) and in part from confrontations that will result when motorists wish to travel contrary to the directions of the LILCO traffic guide, or are stopped by guides for screening. Conflicts between motorists and traffic guides will result in traffic blockages, confusion, accidents and possibly injuries, all of which will increase congestion.

3. Because under the LILCO Plan neither LILCO's traffic guides nor any other LERO personnel will alter traffic signal lights, traffic guides may attempt to implement a control strategy counter to the direction given by the signals.

(See FEMA Report at 10 citing non-compliance with NUREG 0654, i

Section II.J.10.j). Such simultaneous and potentially contra-dictory instructions to motorists will cause confusion and con-l '

gestion, thus further delaying traffic movement. (Id.)

4. In some cases, LILCO's prescribed routes direct mutorists to travel contrary to their perceptions of the most expeditious way out of the EPZ. (See, e.g., Post #19 described t in Appendix A, at IV-56). This will cause confusion and

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r anxiety on the part of the motorists and confrontations with traffic guides.

Contention 65.D. The LILCO time estimates assume that

"[n]o major vehicle breakdown or other types of incidents

[will] occur which block major routes for an extended time."

(Appendix A, at V-2). This assumption is unrealistic and leads to an underestimation of the time required for evacuation. Ex-amples of factors which increase congestion and thus increase time estimates, and which should have been included in LILCO's estimates, include:

4

1. Anticipated traffic accidents and automobile breakdowns, including running out of gas (for example, the Suffolk County police responded in 1982 to 10,000 incidents such as accidents and breakdowns on the Suffolk County portion of the Long Island Expressway, thus indicating the potential 4

for this factor to influence severely evacuation times);

2. The absence of shoulders on some primary or sec-ondary routes which will be used during an evacuation; I

3. Road construction / repair work which can be as-l sumed to be ongoing at any time; and

4. Abandonment of vehicles under emergency l conditions.

I

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Contention 65.E The LILCO evacuation time estimates do not take into account the additional congestion to be encoun-tered by evacuating motorists that will result from the evacua-tion and early dismissals of schools and the evacuation of those in special facilities and the handicapped. Such evacua-tions and dismissals will involve the use of large numbers of buses, ambulances and trains which will be traveling in all di-rections through the EPZ, on prescribed evacuation routes and other roads, making frequent stops. If the impact of special evacuations were taken into account, the LILCO time estimates for evacuating motorists would increase substantially.

Contention 65.F. Behavior research demonstrates that stress and anxiety induced by a radiological emergency at Shoreham will diminish driving skills and awareness, and impede the processing of information necessary for a driver to make decisions and drive properly. The geography of Long Island, with its narrow, limited land area, may create a feeling of being " closed-in," which may increase the likelihood of poor driver behavior. Decreased driving skills and driver awareness will cause confusion, congestion and accidents and, if properly taken into account, would increase LILCO's evacuation times.

LILCO, however, has failed to take these factors into account in its evacuation time estimates.

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Contention 65.G. The LILCO Plan does not include evacu-ation time estimates for evacuation of those with special needs who cannot rely on private transportation, such as school chil-dren, persons without access to cars, persons in health care or other special facilities, and the handicapped. (See FEMA Report at 11, citing noncompliance with NUREG 0654,Section II.J.10.1 and Appendix 4, at 4-9 to 4-10). The individuals in charge of making protective action recommendations must know how long it will take to evacuate these portions of the popula-tion. The Plan thus falls to comply with 10 CFR Appendix E,Section IV, and NUREG 0654,Section II.J.8 and Appendix 4.

4 Contention 65.H. The LILCO Plan (OPIP 3.6.3) provides for l two evacuation route spotters to report information to the EOC regarding traffic congestion on evacuation routes. (Contrary to the requirement of NUREG 0654 Section II.A.2.a., the LILCO employees expected to fill these positions are not identified

by job title in the Plan. See OPIP 2.1.1, at 32.) Without the ability to spot congested areas effectively, LILCO will be un-able to implement appropriate measures for evacuees to ave'i

! such congestion, resulting in increased evacuation times, t

LILCO's route spotters will be ineffective because:

1. LILCO has not previded enough route spotters to i cover the evacuation routes. (Uee FEMA Report at 11).

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2. The LILCO route spotters will be unable to move expeditiously'through heavily congested traffic, especially since the evacuating motorists will not defer to LERO vehicles i operating without police sirens or flashers. (Id.)

Contention 66: Removal of Obstacles from the Roadway and l Provisions for Fuel Contention 66. NUREG 0654 Section II.J.10.k requires that l an offsite plan provide "[ijdentification of and means for dealing with potential impediments . . . to use of evacuation I

routes, and contingency measures."

In the event of a radiological emergency at Shoreham and subsequent evacuation (recommended and/or voluntary), it is likely that there will be many instances of automobile

- accidents and vehicle breakdowns caused by the large number of vehicles on the road, stop-and-go conditions, overheating while l Idling in queues, driver inattention, failure to obey the rules of the road and other such conditions. In addition, it is likely that many evacuees will not begin the evacuation with a full tank of gas. Many cars may run out of gas, both inside i Gnd outside the EPZ, as a result of extended operation times i

due to congestion, stop-and-go conditions and time spent sit-ting in queues. Such occurrences, along with abandonment of i vehicles and construction which may be in progress at the time

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an evacuation is ordered, will result in obstructions and blockages on roadways in use during the evacuation. Taking such occurrences into account would cause evacuation time estimates to increase. (See SC Contention 65). In addition, it is essential that such obstacles be removed in a timely manner so that evacuation times will not increase even more due to substantial periods of reduced roadway capacity. Under LILCO Plan, removal of obstacles will be performed by LILCO road crews using LILCO tow trucks and line trucks and a gaso-line contingency plan is "under development." (See Plan at 4.4-3 and 4.4-4; Appendix A at IV-192).

Intervenors contend that the LILCO Plan fails to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1), 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG 0654,Section II.J, because LILCO will be unable to provide for ob-stacles to be removed from the roads, or to provide adequate fuel supplies for evacuees for the following reasons:

A. LILCO does not have an adequate number of tow trucks to enable LILCO personnel to remove all potential road -

obstructions, nor does the Plan specify the number of such ve-hicles at its disposal. (See FEMA Report at 11, citing non-compliance with NUREG 0654,Section II.J.10.k). In addition, contrary to NUREG 0654 Section II.A.2.a., the LILCO employees expected to be part of the road crews have not been identified by job title. See OPIP 2.2.1, at 30.

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B. Once they have been dispatched to an obstruction loca-tion, the tow trucks and other LILCO equipment will only be able to move as fast as the traffic flow, which will be ex-tremely slow. Therefore, they will be unable to respond to the site of an obstruction in an expeditious manner.

C. LILCO's Plan makes no provision for the evacuation of persons whose cars break down or are in accidents.

D. The LILCO Plan does not provide for snow removal.

(See FEMA Report at 11, citing non-compliance with NUREG 0654,Section II.J.10.k).

E. LILCO's fuel trucks, which are designed for transporting _ fuel, are not equipped ta pump fuel in the manner necessary to refuel automobiles. Furthermore, LILCO's fuel trucks are not equipped with necessary fire prevention equip-ment, such as is found on gasoline pumps and trucks designed for refueling aircraft. Therefore, the public will be subjected to an unacceptable risk of fire and/or explosions.

F. No provisions have been made to handle queues at fuel allocation sites which may back up into evacuating traffic, thus causing further congestion and delays.

Contention 67: Evacuation of Persons Without Access to l

l Automobiles l Contention 67. LILCO assumes that in the event an I

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evacuation is ordered, most members of the population will attempt to leave using their personal vehicles. However, a substantial portion of the population in the EPZ does not own or have access to an automobile. LILCO proposes that people who do not have access to an automobile at the time of an evac-uation order will be evacuated by buses running special evacua-tion routes, with bus stops purportedly no more than one-half mile from each such person's home. (Plan at 3.6-6; Appendix A, at III-35 and III-36, IV-87 to IV-178; OPIP 3.6.4). However, LILCO's proposal cannot be implemented, and LILCO's proposed evacuation of people without access to cars would not provide adequate protection for such people, because the evacuation would take too long. As a result of the time necessary to complete the evacuation, persons may be exposed to health-threatening radiation doses. Thus, the LILCO Plan fails to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1), 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG 0654 Sections II.J.9 and J.10. Specifically:

Contention 67.A. According to LILCO's estimates, approxi-mately 285 forty-passenger buses are required to transport those able-bodied persons who would need transportation out of the EPZ (see Appendix A, at IV-87 to IV-178; OPIP 3.6.4). In fact, however, LILCO will either need more than 285 buses or those buses will have to make many more runs than anticipated

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by LILCO because LILCO has substantially underestimated the number of people who will need such transportation:

1. LILCO appears to base its estimates solely on the number of households without cars. (See Appendix A at III-35). Its estimates thus ignore the significant number of people who belong to households witn automobiles, but who may not have access to such vehicles because at the time of an evacuation order, the vehicles are in use by another member of the household. LILCO's proposal for evacuating persons without access to transportation must include adequate methods of evacuating the members of vehicle-owning households who may not have access to a car. LILCO's estimates of the number of buses required do not appear to take such people into account.

2. LILCO's estimates also fall to take into account those persons who rely on public transportation to get into the EPZ but who, in the event of an emergency, may not be able to i

rely on such means to evacuate.

l l Contention 67.B. The Plan fails to provide adequate l

staffing to accomplish the proposed evacuation, in violation of 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(1). Specifically, it provides for only a single Bus Coordinator, who must maintain contact with all bus drivers. OPIP 3.6.4, at 7 (item 9). In addition, the Bus Coordinator must stay in contact with staging area coordinators

( ,

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1 i

and bus company operators, among others. OPIP 3.6.4, at 2. In addition, in violation of NUREG 0654 Section II.A.2.a., the Plan falls to identify by job title the LILCO employees who will serve as bus drivers. (See OPIP 2.1.1, at 42).

Contention 67.C. The staggered departures and multiple bus runs necessary under LILCO's plan to evacuate the people in each zone (Appendix A, at IV-87 to IV-178; OPIP 3.6.4, at 11-32), even using LILCO's unrealistically low estimates of the I number of people likely to need such evacuation, will result in lengthy evacuation travel times. Specifically, the LILCO Plan provides that in the many cases where buses are required to make more than one run, the bus routes will terminate at desig-nated " transfer points." Of the 285 buses which LILCO estimates it will require, 109 are expected to perform two runs 1

and 14 are expected to perform three runs. Only as buses finish the required number of runs, will people who have been deposited at transfer points be bussed from the transfer points to relocation centers. LILCO's estimated route times begin and l

end with the assumed transfer points. (See Appendix A, at IV-87 to IV-178; OPIP 3.6.4). The time required for an evacuee l

to get from the bus stop near his home to a relocation center, taking into account the need for multiple bus runs and waiting at a transfer point, will be substantially greater than the

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estimated route times. LILCO's " estimated route times" for the evacuation buses to reach the transfer points are also unre-alistically low in that they fall to take into account the congested conditions that will exist due to the factors set forth in Contentions 65.

Contention 67.D. Although OPIP 3.6.4 instructs LILCO em-ployees to inform evacuees at transfer points "that they are

outside of the 10-mile EPZ," in fact, four of the twelve i

transfer points are inside the EPZ, and three are practically on the boundary of the EPZ. In addition, of the remaining five transfer points, three are located approximately one mile be-yond the EPZ boundary, and two are approximately two and a half miles beyond the boundary. Under the LILCO Plan, people are

~ 1 :ely to be kept waiting, for substantial time periods, before tney are transported from transfer points to relocation centers. Leaving people at the seven transfer points within the EPZ will not provide protection for them. Leaving them at l

l the other five transfer points, all less than five miles beyond the EPZ boundary, conflicts with the intent of NUREG 0654,Section II.J.10.h, and could result in these people also I

receiving health-threatening radiation doses.

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1 I

Contentions 68-71: Evacuation of School Children Further Preamble to Contentions 68-71. The LILCO Plan proposes two means of implementing a protective action of evac-uation with respect to children who are in schools at the time of an evacuation order: (1) by recommending that schools im-plement existing early dismissal policies co children may return to their homes and evacuate with their' parents (Plan, at 3.3-5, 3.6-6; Appendix A, at IV-182 to IV-185); and (2) by per-forming a bus evacuation of the children directly from the schools to relocation centers (Plan, at 2.1-5, 3.6-5 to 7; Ap-pendix A, at IV-182 to 185; OPIP 3.6.5). For the reasons set forth in Contentions 68-71, the LILCO Plan does not provide an adequate and implementable means of evacuating school children, and thus fails to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1),

50.47(b)(10), and NUREG 0654, Sections II.J.9 and J.10.

Contention 68. The LILCO Plan fails to specify the bases upon which a protective action recommendation of early dismiss-al (as opposed to sheltering or evacuation) would be made, and thus does not comply with 10 CFP Section 50.47(b)(10), and NUREG 0654,Section II.J.10.m. Although Appendix A states (at 1

IV-182) that schools "will probably be advised to institute an early dismissal "(emphasis added) when they receive a tone alert radio notificaton, via EBS, of the " declaration of'an 143 -

alert or above classification," the basis to be used by LILCO in deciding to issue such a " probable" advisory is not stated.

There is also no basis provided for the possible early dismiss-al of the South Country, Three Village, and Sachem School Dis-tricts. (See Appendix A at IV-183).

Contention 69. LILCO appears to assume that its recommen-dation that schools implement an early dismissal will result in children being protected in the event of an evacuation order, because children could thereby evacuate with their parents.

(See Appendix A, at II-20). In fact, there is no assurance that early dismissal will provide children with adequate protection from health-threatening radiation doses, and there-fore the Plan fails to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1),

50.47(b)(10), and NUREG 0654 Sections II.J.9 and J.10, for the following reasons:

Contention 69.A. Under the LILCO Plan, the decision to implement an early dismissal rests with the schools. (See Ap-l j pendix A, at IV-182). The recommendation to dismiss early will be made over the EBS radio (Plan at 3.6-6; Appendix A at IV-182). The Plan contains no provisions for the_ transmission of any detailed information to school authorities about the emergency, its anticipated or potential progress, or the possi-ble dangers involved in implementing an early dismissal.

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l

Therefore, under the LILCO Plan, the appropriate school authorities will have no means of obtaining the information necessary to permit an informed and timely decision. The Plan also falls to provide indemnification for the school authorities in the event that their decision with respect to an early dismissal results in injury to children. Because they will not have adequate information or protection from liability arising out of their decision, there is no assurance that the schools will be able to, or actually will, make the appropriate decision with respect to early dismissal.

Contention 69.B. The LILCO Plan does not incorporate or provide any essential details of the early dismissal plans for the schools or school districts in the EPZ. It is thus impos-sible to tell whether such plans actually exist and, if so, the extent to which they are compatible with the LILCO Plan.

Contention 69.C. Early dismissal will not result in the timely arrival of children at their homes so they can be protected by their parents because:

1. Even under non-emergency conditions it takes hours to implement early dismissals due to the time required to make the necessary dec'ision, to mobilize the necessary person-nel and vehicles, and to perform the necessary number of bus runs. Under emergency conditions, the time required to

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accomplish an early dismissal is likely to be substantially greater, due particularly to congested road conditons and role conflict experienced by bus drivers and other personnel in au-thority. In addition, early dismissal policies rely upon large numbers of children walking home, distances of up to two to three miles, which can take a substantial amount of time.

2. Under the LILCO Plan, schools will receive noti-fication of an emergency at the same time as the rest of the public (by means of tone alert radios activated by the EBS an-nouncement (see Plan, at 3.3-4 and 3.3-5)). Therefore early dismissal traffic, including those children expected to walk home, will encounter early evacuation and mobilization traffic.

Contention 69.D. The Plan does not provide for prior no-tification of parents if early dismissal is going to occur.

According to surveys, between 30 and 40 percent of the school children within the plume EPZ return from school to an empty home because both parents hold daytime jobs (or, in the case of slagle-parent families, the sole parent holds a daytime job).

As a result, many children will be sent home to empty houses, and may be uncas.ed for during the emergency.

Contention 69.E. The Plan falls to provide a means of dealing with an escalation of the emergency (and accompanying need to recommend protective actions of sheltering cr 4

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~

evacuation) that may occur during the lengthy process of early dismissal. In the event of such an escalation, children are likely to F Jtranded in schools, or en route to their homes (walking ( 'n buses), without available shelter, means of evacuation or other protection. Children would thus be exposed l

to health threatening radiation doses.

Contention 70. The LILCO Plan states that the Shoreham-Wading River School District "is the only district which has the option of relocating its students." (Appendix A at IV-183). Thus the Plan does not identify relocation centers for, or the means or procedures to evacuate, any schools other I

than those in the Shoreham-Wading River School District. In-tervenors contend that in falling to provide for evacuation of the school children in the 16 other school districts in the EPZ even in the event of a fast moving event, (see Appendix A at IV-183), the LILCO Plan falls to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1), 50.47(b)(10), and NUREG 0654 Sections II.J.9 and II.J.10.

Contention 71. Intervenors contend that the Plan's provisions for evacuation of school children (Appendix A at IV-183 to 186; OPIP 3.6.5) are deficient for the following reasons:

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Contention 71.A. Assuming the availability of relocation centers for evacuated school children, under the LILCO Plan, a timely evacuation of the schools in the EPZ could not be imple-mented because:

1. Even if LILCO had agreements with companies to provide buses for an evacuation, many of the buses in fact would not be accessible to LILCO employees because they would be in the custody of the normal school bus drivers, or the buses would be located substantial distances away.

2. The LILCO Plan has no provision for supervision of children at schools, on buses or at relocation centers, or for indemnlitcation of school authorivies in the event children are injured or contaminated in connection with an evacuation.

Contention 71.B. An evacuation of schools, using LILCO employees as bus drivers, would take too long and children would not be adequately protected from health threatening radi-otion doses because:

1. Evacuating buses would encounter congestion from other mobilization and evacuation traffic, and thus would be substantially delayed in traveling from schools to relocation centers (assuming such relocation centers existed).

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2. Normal school dismissals require substantial numbers of multiple bus runs as well as staggered dismissal times. In the event of an evacuation, a large number of multi-ple bus runs (requiring several hours) would be necessary to transport all children out of the EPZ.

Contention 72: Evacuation of People in Special Facilities Contention 72. The LILCO Plan proposes to evacuate all hospitals, nursing homes and other special health care facilities in the EPZ using buses, ambulances, the Long Island Railroad ("LIRR"), and airplanes. (Plan, Appendix A at II-28 to 30, III-37, IV-179 to 180, IV-185 to 192; OPIP 3.6.5). This aspect of the Plan cannot be implemented; accordingly, people in special facilities will not be adequately protected in the event of an emergency and the LILCO Plan fails to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1), 50.47(b)(3), 50.47(b)(8),

50.47(b)(10) and NUREG 0654, Sections II.A.3, C and J for the following reasons:

Contention 72.A. Assuming the necessary vehicles were available to LILCO and were mobilized, the time necessary, fol-lowing mobilization, to accomplish the proposed evacuation of special facilities will be too long to provide adequate protection from health-threatening radiation doses. Evacuation will take too long as a result of: the large number of trips

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necessary to transport persons individually to relocation centers or to LIRR stations; the other mobilization and evacua-i tion traffic congestion which the evacuation vehicles will en-counter; and the time necessary to load and unload passengers from ambulances and onto trains or planes. Thus, the Plan falls to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1) and

. 50.47(b)(10).

Contention 72.B. LILCO's plan to use the LIRR to evacuate up to 845 patients, by converting passenger cars to accommodate patients on mattresses (Plan, Appendix A, at IV-186), is unworkable and cannot be implemented in a timely manner be-cause:

1. There is no assurance that any LIRR trains and necessary engineers, much less a sufficient number of them (see Appendix A, at IV-186), will be available at the Port Jefferson and Main Line stations to participate in the proposed evacua-tion.

2. It will take a long time to perform the necessary modifications to the LIRR cars, and the Plan does not provide for personnel to perform such modifications.

3. Limited access and loading conditions at the Port Jefferson and Main Line stations make the proposed evacuation impractical.

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4. The Plan does not provide for health care person-nel to accompany the patients in the railroad cars, or to meet patients and provide necessary support and transportation services at points of disembarkation.

Contention 73: Handicapped People at Home Contention 73. The LILCO Plan proposes to use ambulances to evacuate handicapped people who are not in special facilities. (OPIP 3.6.5). Intervenors contend that this as-I pect of the LILCO Plan cannot be implemented in a timely manner and therefore will not provide adequate protection to handicapped persons in the EPZ. Thus, this aspect of the Plan fails to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1), 50.47(b)(1),

50.47(b)(3) and 50.47(b)(10), and NUREG 0654, Sections II.A.3, 1

C.4 and J, as specified in paragraphs A and B below.

1 Contention 73.A. All handicapped persons in need of special evacuation services will not be known to LILCO and therefore will not be evacuated in the event of an emergency.

The preregistration system proposed by LILCO (Plan, Appendix A, at II-18; see also Information Brochure), will not result in identification of a substantial number of persons who may need assistance in order to evacuate because:

1. Many people who will require assistance will not return the postcards to LILCO because they do not: (a)

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perceive themselves to be handicapped; (b) desire to be identified as handicapped; (c) understand the reason or need to return the cards; (d) remember to return the cards; and/or (e) desire to rely on LILCO assistance in the event of an emergen-cy.

2. There is no provision for verifying the com-pleteness of the LILCO listing to be compiled from the returned postcards.

3. There is no provision for regularly updating the listing.

Contention 73.B. The LILCO Plan does not provide for the assistance and equipment necessary to accomplish an evacuation of handicapped persons at home, and thus fails to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(b)(1), 50.47(b)(3), 50.47(b)(5) and 50.47(b)(8), and NUREG 0654, Sections II.A.3, C.4, E and J.

Specifically:

1. The only provision for notifying handicapped individuals of a pending evacuation is by means of a telephone call from the LILCO Home Coordinator. (OPIP 3.6.5). This is an inadegtiate and ineffective means of notifying many handicapped individuals such as those who are deaf, bedridden, unable to get to a telephone or unable to communicate on a telephone, and thus LILCO falls to comply with 10 CFR Section

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50.47(b)(5) and NUREG 0654, Sections II.E.5 and E.6. (See FEMA Report at 9).

2. There is no provision in the Plan for assisting handicapped individuals with the preparation necessary prior to evacuation (such as locating and packing clothing and medica-tion, notifying relatives or friends).

3. One LILCO employee -- the Home Coordinator -- is supposed to contact all the handicapped persons and identify and contact all reception centers (OPIP 3.6.5, Section 5.1.2).

One person will not be able to perform those functions promptly enough to permit timely evacuation.

4. The proposed evacuation would take far too long, and as a result, handicapped people would be likely to receive health-threatening doses of radiation because evacuating vehl-cles would encounter congestion from other mobilization and evacuation traffic, and thus would be substantially delayed in traveling to the homes of handicapped individuals, and to relo-cation centers.

Contentions 74-77: Relocation Centers Further Preamble to Contentions 74-77. An offsite emer-gency plan must include means of relocating evacuees and must provide for relocation centers located at least five miles and preferably 10 miles beyJnd the EPZ. NUREG 0654, Sections 153 -

l 1

II.J.10.g and h. Such relocation centers are essential to provide food and shelter to those evacuees who have no alterna-tive places to stay and also to provide radiological monitoring and decontamination for evacuees and their vehicles. The relo-cation centers must have sufficient personnel and equipment to monitor evacuees within a 12-hour period. NUREG 0654,Section II.J.12.

The LILCO Plan calls for the establishment of relocation centers outside the EPZ at the following facilities (Plan, at 4.2-1; OPIP 4.2.1):

Suffolk County Community College (primary)

BOCES Islip Occupational Center (primary)

State University of New York at Stony Brook (primary)

State University of New York at Farmingdale (backup) i St. Joseph's College, Patchoque (backup).

The Intervenors contend that LILCO will be unable to provide adequate relocation centers and services for evacuees, and thus the Plan falls to comply-with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1),

50.47(b)(8), 50.47(b)(10), and NUREG 0654 Section J. The specific deficiencies which lead to this conclusion are set forth in Contention 74-77.

Contention 74. Two of the three primary relocation centers designated by LILCO are well within 20 miles from the

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Shoreham site. Both Suffolk County Community College and the State University of New York at Stony Brook are only three miles beyond the EPZ. In addition, many evacuees who need re-location services will not use the relocation centers proposed by LILCO because they will perceive those centers as being too close to the plant (e.g., only 13 miles). Accordingly, LILCO's relocation centers will not provide the necessary services to evacuees and accordingly, the LILCO Plan does not comply with NUREG 0654,Section II.J.10.h.

Contention 75. The LILCO Plan provides no estimates of the number of evacuees who may require shelter in a relocation center, and the Plan falls to demonstrate that each such facil-ity has adequate space, toilet and shower facilities, food and food preparation areas, drinking water, sleeping accommodations and other necessary facilities. Accordingly, there is no as-surance that the relocation centers designated by LILCO will be sufficient in capacity to provide necessary services for the number of evacuees that will require them. Thus, LILCO falls to comply with NUREG 0654, Sections II.J.10 9 and J.12.

1 Contention 76. LILCO's Plan limits the facilities for radiological monitoring and decontamination of the evacuated public to only the five relocation centers designated in the Plan. (See Plan, at 3.6-7, 4.2-2 to 4.2-4). The Plan provides

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for monitoring and decontamination only of those evacuees who stop at the relocation centers. Thus, there is no provision for monitoring or decontamin? tion of evacuees and vehicles who leave the EPZ but choose not to go to relocation centers. How-ever, based on the TMI experience, it appears likely that many evacuees will bypass the centers in favor of a destination more distant from the radiation hazard. In order to provide adequate protection to the public as required by 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1) and 50.47(b)(10), LILCO must provide a.

means for monitoring and decontaminating all evacuees.

Contention 77. The equipment used by LILCO to measure thyroid contamination at relocation centers -- BM 14 with HP270 probe -- (see OPIP 3.9.2) will be incapable of differentiating the required signal from background readings. The instrument's most sensitive scale (0-500 cpm) is insufficiently sensitive for the accurate measurement of a 75 cpm reading (the threshold for requiring hospital care) or a "50 cpm above background" reading. (See Plan, at 3.9-4; OPIP 3.9.2). In addition, the instrument is not sufficiently sensitive to the energy spe'ctrum given off by radiolodine to insure accurate detection of radiciodine thyroid contamination in the presence of background readings which are likely to elevated above the 10-15 cpm as-sumed by LILCO. (OPIP 3.9.2 and Plan, at 3.9-4). Accordingly, the LILCO plan fails to comply with NUREG 0654 Section II.J.12.

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Contentions 78-83: Food, Milk, Water and Livestock Control Further Preamble to Contentions 78-83. 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(10) requires that protective actions for the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ " appropriate to the locale" be in place.

The ingestion exposure pathway generally covers an area approx-imately 50 miles in radius. 10 CFR Section 50.47(c)(2). Plans for the ingestion pathway are required to " focus on such actions as are appropriate to protect the food ingestion path-way." Id. The purpose of these requirements is to protect the public from consumption of contaminated foodstuffs. NUREG 0654,Section II.J.ll.

Contention 78. The LILCO Plan does not adequately identi-fy the LILCO or LERO personnel who will be responsible for mak-Ing or implementing protective action recommendations or deci-sions with respect to the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ. The Plan states that the Director of Local Response is responsible for the protective action function (Plan, Figure 3.6.1), while i

the Health Services Coordinator will provide " coordination for local resources involved in controlling food, milk, water and livestock feed supplies" (Plan, at 3.6-8), and the Coordinator of Public Information will " advise farmers on the recommended practices with respect to livestock and agricultural products" (Plan at 3.6-8). However, the responsibility for 157 -

l implementation of the Ingestion Pathway Protective Action Procedure is assigned to the Dose Assessment Staff under the guidance of the Environmental Assessment Coordinator. (OPIP 3.6.6, section 2.0). The Plan thus falls to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(b)(1), and 50.47(b)(3).

Contention 79. The Plan falls to provide for protective actions for the portion of the ingestion exposure pathway in

, the State of Connecticut. The Plan thus falls to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1), 50.47(b)(1), 50.47(b)(3),

50.47(b)(10), 50.47(c)(2), and NUREG 0654,Section II.J.ll.

Contention 80. OPIP 3.6.6 - " Ingestion Pathway Protec-tive Actions" -- requires dose projections to be made as a pre-requisite to implementing the procedure. The projections are to be made according to OPIP 3.5.2. Such projections are inad-equate for use in determining ingestion exposure pathway pro-tective actions, however, because those dose projections are limited to the area only 10 miles from the plant (OPIP 3.5.2 Section 5.2.7 and Attachment 3). Thus, they cannot be relied upon to provide the dose projections necessary for protective action recommendations for the 50 mile ingestion pathway EPZ.

The Plan thus falls to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1),

50.47(b)(9), 50.47(b)(10), 50.47(c)(2), and NUREG 0654,Section II.J.11.

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Contention 81. The Plan contains no procedures or other means of implementing the protective actions set forth in At-tachments 7 and 8 of OPIP 3.6.6. Thus, LILCO has not developed adequate plans for the 50-mile ingestion exposure pathway, and there is no compliance with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1),

50.47(b)(1), 50.47(b)(3), 50.47(b)(10), 50.47(c)(2) and NUREG 0654 Section II.J.ll. Specifically:

Contention 81.A. The Plan does not state: (1) how the removal of lactating dairy animals from contaminated pasturage and/or the provision of substitute, uncontaminated stored feed, will be achieved; (2) how uncontaminated water sources are to be obtained or provided for lactating dairy animals; (3) how and under what criteria meats, meat products and animal feeds are to be considered on a case-by-case basis; or (4) how all livestock can be isolated. In addition, the Plan has no proce-dures or guidance governing the disposition of contaminated lactating dairy animals, or the treatment of uncontaminated lactating dairy animals should uncontaminated stored feed not be available. Thus, there is no assurance that the milk or meat products of these animals will be kept from public con-sumption.

Contention 81.B. The Plan calls for withholding contami-nated milk from the market to allow radioactive decay of 159 -

J short-lived radionuclides but does not call for its disposal or continued withholding after the decay period. (OPIP 3.6.6, At-tachment 7, at 1). The Plan provides no standards for determining what constitutes an adequate " decay period" or for identifying short-lived radioisotopes, nor does it contain any provisions for dealing with long-lived isotopes which would

! pose a serious health consequence to the public. In a#,dition, the Plan does not state: (1) how the withholding of contami-nated milk would be achieved; (2) how the prolonged storage and

[ special pasteurization of milk would be achieved; (3) how the 4

diversion of the production of fluid milk would be achieved; or (4) how the introduction of milk supplies into commerce would be prevented.

Contention 81.C. The Plan calls for washing contaminated fruit and vegetables and milling and polishing contaminated grains (OPIP 3.6.6, Attachment 7, at 1). However, the Plan contains no procedures for disposing of the wash water or mill-ing residue, which could pose a serious potential for adverse health consequences. In addition, the Plan does not state: (1) how the removal of surface contamination from fruits and vege-tables by washing, milling, etc. would be achieved; (2) how the i

milling and polishing of contaminated grains would be achieved; or (3) how the many informal local farm stands can be found and controlled.

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_ . . _ _ . ~. _ . _ . _ _ _ _ . . . . _ , . . _ _ _ _ . _ . _ , , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ , _ , _ _ _ _ , _ . - _ _ _ . , _ . _ . .

The Plan contains no maps showing key Contention 81.D.

land use data, watersheds, water supply intakes and treatment (1) how and from plants and reservoirs. Nor does it state: i where alternative drinking water supplies would be made ava l-iso-able; or (2) how affected wells would be identified and lated and reservoirs secured. how the (1)

Contention 81.E. The Plan does not state: ~

(2) who diet of all residents and visitors is to be restricted; will pay for condemnation and under what procedures condemna-tion will be executed; or (3) how exports of agricultural products from Suffolk County to other parts of the country can be controlled vr prevented.

The Plan does not provide for personnel, Contention 81.F.

facilities, equipment or even a communications network to im-plement any of the actions listed in subparts A through E.

The Plan does not provide for the confis-Contention 82.

cation of fish or other sea life from the Long Island Sound the nec-which may be contaminated, and thus does not consider Since about one-half of the possi-essary range of foodstuffs.

ble plume trajectories are over the Long Island Sound where there is much commercial and recreational fishing, there must be procedures for monitoring and controlling this path to the '

food chain. Without incorporating these considerations in

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Section 3.6.6 and the related OPIPs, the Plan does not meet the requirements of 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1), 50.47(b)(10),

50.47(c)(2), and NUREG 0654,Section II.J.ll.

Contention 83. The Long Island duck industry must be in-cluded for special consideration in the Plan. There must be procedures for putting commercially grown ducks on special feed and for restraining the movement of contaminated ducks into the commercial market and the food chain. LILCO's mere listing of the duck growers in OPIP 3.6.6 does not constitute the proper consideration. The dietary factor from OPIP 3.6.6, Attachment 6, which should be applied to commercially grown ducks should also be defined. Without the further development of duck pro-cedures, the Plan does not comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1), 50.47(b)(10), 50.47(c)(2) and NUREG 0654,Section II.J.ll.

Contentions 84-91: Recovery and Reentry I

( Preamble to Contentions 84-91. The LILCO Plan proposes l

that short-term and long-term recovery and reentry operations will be performed by LILCO personnel following a radiological emergency at Shoreham (Plan, at 3.10-1 and 3.10-2; OPIP 3.10.1). For the reasons specified in Contentions 84-91, In-i tervenors contend that contrary to the emergency planning i

standards of 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(13) and NUREG 0654,

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l

Section II.M, the LILCO Plan falls to include general plans for recovery and reentry, including the development of necessary procedures and methods that are capable of being implemented.

Contention 84. LILCO states that "the initiation of Re-covery and implementation of Reentry is a non-utility decision-making process" (OPIP 3.10.1, at 1). Contrary to 10 CFR Sections 50.47(b)(1) and 50.47(b)(3), LILCO identifies no non-utility entity, with necessary authority, which has agreed to undertake the initiation of the recovery and reentry processes.

Accordingly, under the LILCO Plan recovery and reentry cannot be initiated or implemented, and there is no compliance with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1), 50.47(b)(13), and NUREG 0654 Section II.M.

Contention 85. The LILCO Plan states (at 3.10-1):

LERO personnel will continue to moni-tor the affected areas and when radiation levels are such that it is safe to enter the area, will inform the Director of Local Response [a LILCO employee]. The Director of Local Response will then appoint a Re-covery Action Committee to develop a recovery plan for the restoration of the area to its pre-emergency condition.

(Emphasis added). The LILCO Plan thus merely states that a plan for recovery and reentry will be developed; at this time no such plan exists. This is contrary to the requirement of 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(13) that "[g]eneral plans for recovery and 163 -

reentry are developed," (emphasis added), and NUREG 0654 Section II.M.

Contention 86. Although the Plan asserts several general types of " Recovery and Reentry operations" (Plan, at 3.10-1 and 3.10-2), the Plan falls to identify the persons or organiza-tions who will: determine when such operations are necessary or appropriate; determine if they are adequate; have the capabill-ty of performing the operations; provide the necessary equip-ment; or determine if they are performed properly. There is no provision in the Plan which identifies when, under what circumstances, how, or according to what criteria, the listed operations are to be performed. Indeed, the Plan does not state that any of the operations ever would or could actually be performed. The list of operations contained in the Plan does not constitute a " plan" at all; it is merely a compilation of hypothetical actions. The Plan thus falls to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1), 50.47(b)(1), 50.47(b)(3),

50.47(b)(13), and NUREG 0654, Sections II.M.1 and II.M.2.

Contention 87. The Plan fails to identify, by name, title or qualification, the individuals from FEMA and DOE who are to be appointed to the Recovery Action Committee by the LILCO Director of LERO. (See OPIP 3.10.1, at Section 3.0.) It thus falls to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(b)(1), 50.47(b)(3),

and NUREG 0654, Sections A.1, A.2, and C l. ,

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I l

)

i l

1 In addition, the LILCO and BNL employees who will be appointed to the Recovery Action Committee (see OPIP 3.10.1, at Section 5.1) are not qualified or capable of exercising the responsibilities which LILCO apparently expects them to ilfill (see OPIP 3.10.1, at Sections 5.2 and 5.3). Similarly, the LILCO employee who will serve as Health Services Coordinator (i.e., a Department or Division manager of LILCO's Environ-mental Engineering Department (OPIP 2.1.1 at 7)), is not quall-I fled or capable of " recommending . . ., modifying, relaxing and discontinuing protective actions" as ste;ed in the Plan.

(Plan, at 3.11-1). Accordingly, the purported recovery and re-entry activities could not and would not be implemented.

Finally, the Plan fails to assign specific recovery and reentry responsibilities to particular members of the proposed Recovery Action Committee. Further, the Plan fails to document that any of the personnel or equipment required for recovery and reentry activities, designated in Sections 5.3.2, 5.3.3, and 5.3.4 of OPIP 3.10.1, will be available to LILCO. The Plan  ;

thus falls to comply with NUREG 0654, Sections II.M.2, A, and C, as well as with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1), 50.47(b)(1),

l 50.47(b)(3), and 50.47(b)(13).

Contention 88. OPIP 3.10.1 sets forth " Acceptable Surface Contamination Levels" in disintegrations per minute. The Plan

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I does not include a method for converting such information into radiation doses to the public. The Plan also falls to state the dose criteria that will provide the basis for a determina-tion that it is safe for the public to reenter previously evac-uated areas, and thus falls to comply with 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(13) and NUREG 0654, Sections II.I.10, and II.M.l.

Contention 89. The Plan fails to include a radiological cleanup plan and procedures to provide for the physical removal i

of radionuclides, stabilization of the radionuclides in place, and environment management which covers the following factors:

A. The type of surface contaminated; B. The external environment to which the surface is exposed; C. The applicability of weapons fallout data (particles from weapons falle'it are typically 100 microns or more in diam-eter);

D. The possible radiological hazards to the decontamination operators; E. The level of decontamination required; F. The consequences of the decontamination operation; and, G. The costs involved.

=

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In addition, the Plan fails to identify the anticipated decontamination factors ("DF"), and fails to cite or develop a technical basis for a DF. (The DF is a measure of decontamination effectiveness and is defined as the amount of contaminant per unit surface area before contamination, divided by the amount of contamination after decontamination.) The Plan also fails to address the following external factors that affect the efficiency of decontamination operations: ,

H. Wet and dry deposition; I. Major weather changes after deposition; J. Aging physical and chemical actions; K. Particulate matter size (aerosols expected to be released from a reactor core meltdown would be less than 10 microns in diameter);

L. Contaminated surface characteristics; and M. Operator or team skill, training and incentive.

! Finally, the Plan fails to set forth the criteria or l

j methods for decontamination of the various types of surfaces, (structures, paved areas, vehicles and equipment, land areas and soll, water, vegetation, animals, and humans), which could become contaminated. The Plan thus fails to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1) and 50.47(b)(13).

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Contention 90. The Plan falls to address the means for handling and disposing of the volumes and forms of radioactive waste that may result from decontamination operations. The Plan thus fails to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1) and 50.47(b)(13).

Contention 91. The Plan falls to demonstrate that LILCO has the required financial tesources to provide for the direct costs associated with the necessary recovery and reentry activities, including decontamination during the period until restoration of community life has been completed. Intervenors contend that LILCO lacks such necessary financial resources and thus the Plan cannot be implemented. The Plan thus falls to comply with 10 CPR Sections 50.47(a)(1) and 50.47(b)(13).

Contention 92: State Emergency Plan Contention 92. There is no New York State emergency plan to deal with an emergency at the Shoreham plant before thi.s Board. (See Plan, at Attachment 1.4.2). In addition, the LILCO Plan falls to provide for coordination of LILCO's emer-gency response with that of the State of New York (assuming, arguendo, such a response would be forthcoming). (See FEMA Report at 1.) In the absence of a State emergency plan for Shoreham, there can be no finding of compliance with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(2), 50.47(b), or NUREG 0654,Section I.E, I.F, I.H or II.17/

12/ In LBP-83-22, at 60, the ASLB mentioned that contentions would be appropriate concerning lack of coordination (Footnote cont'd next page)

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Contentions 93-96: Loss of Offsite Power Preamble to Contentions 93-96. The LILCO Plan must provide an adequate response for even "the worst possible accident, regardless of its extremely low likelihood." NUREG 0654,Section I.D. at 7. This includes a loss of offsite power, which would not be unlikely in conjunction with a severe accident at Shoreham. The LILCO Plan, however, contains no measures for dealing with such a circumstance, and thus does not provide for the protection of the public health and safety, for the reasons set forth in contentions 93-96 below.

Contention 93. 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(8) requires the emergency response organization to establish " adequate facilities" to maintain the emergency response. See also NUREG 0654,Section II.H. The LILCO Plan fails to satisfy this re-quirement by falling to allow for the possibility of a loss of offsite power. Specifically:

(Footnote cont'd from previous page) between the LILCO plan and the State plan. As noted in this contention, however, there is no State Plan before the Board. Thus, there is in fact noncompliance with all the NUREG-0654 planning requirements which pertain to the State. The County has not alleged separate contentions as to each of these, it being considered sufficient to note merely the lack of any State plan.

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A. The LILCO Plan does not indicate that the EOC has a backup power supply nor does it provide for the management of the emergency response from another location. In the event of a loss of offsite power the EOC would become inoperable and LERO would become unable to implement an emergency response.

B. The LILCO Plan does not indicate that backup power supplies have been established for staging areas, bus transfer points, receiving hospitals, or relocation centers. In the event of a loss of offsite power, these facilities would become inoperable.

Contention 94. 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(5) and NUREG 0654,Section II.E.2 require that emergency plans provide for the prompt notification of response personnel. See also 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix E, Sections 4C and D. Notification channels must remain open on a 24-hour basis. NUREG 0654, Sections II.F.1.a. The LILCO Plan violates this requirement by not al-lowing for the possibility of a loss of offsite power. Specif-ically:

A. The LILCO Plan does not indicate that the LILCO Cus-tomer Service Office has a backup power supply. In the event of a loss of offsite power, the LILCO Customer Service Office will become inoperable. Thus, the SNPS Contol Room will be un-able to notify LERO and initiate the emergency response process. See LILCO Plan at Section 3.3.

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,-- - . - + + - - , e -. - w pg -

-p-a

B. The LILCO Plan does not indicate that the EOC has a backup power supply. In the event of a loss of offsite power, the EOC will become inoperable, and LERO will be unable to no-tify emergency personnel in the field.

Contention 95. 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(5) requires every emergency plan to provide for early notification and clear instruction to those within the plume EPZ. These requirements are distinct: the public must be given an early alert signal and a follow-up instructional message. See NUREG 0654, Appen-dix 3, Section B(2)(a). The LILCO Plan violates these require-ments by falling to take account of the possibility of a loss of offsite power. Specifically:

Contention 95.A. LILCO relies on a system of sirens for providing an immediate alert to the public. See LILCO Plan at 3.3-4; OPIP 3.3.4. However, the LILCO Plan does not indicate that the sirens have a backup. power supply. Therefore, in the event of a loss of offsite power, the sirens will not function.

Contention 95.B. LILCO relies on the transmission of emergency broadcast messages by radio station WALK as the "pri-mary direct communications link to the public after activation of the sirens." LILCO Plan at 3.3-6. But the LILCO Plan does not indicate that WALK has a backup power supply. Therefore, in the event of a loss of offsite power, WALK would cease

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transmissions. The LILCO Plan suggests that there is a

" backup" system involving CBS radio in New York City. See LILCO Plan at 3.3-7. But this system evidently depends on the transmission. capabilities of Long Island radio stations which, like WALK, will become inoperable in the event of a loss of offsite power.

Contention 95.C. The LILCO Plan does not indicate that radio station WALK has a backup power supply, or that any other i

broadcasting facility has the capability to transmit the emer-gency broadcast signal used to activate the tone alert radios which will allegedly be provided to hundreds of facilities within the plume EPZ. See LILCO Plan at 3.3 pp. 6-7. In the event of a loss of offsite power, WALK would cease transmis-sions and would be unable to activate the tone alert radios.

Contention 95.D. LILCO relles on tone alert radios to i

provide the extra evacuation time required by large facilities such as factories and schools. See LILCO Plan at 3.3-4,5. The f

tone alert radios will evidently operate on AC power rather i than on batteries. Therefore, in the event of a loss of offsite power, the tone alert radios would not function.

Contention 95.2. Emergency plans must provide formal means for dissemination of information to the public through i

1 the news media. See NUREG 0654,Section II.G.3 and 10 CFR .

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, - ,,,- ----,--.. _..- - _ -, ,..--r- . - - . - - - , _ - - - , . , _ . - - -

m . - , . _ , . . . , , _ _ . - , - - - , , , . _ _ _ - - , - .

Section 50.47(b)(7). LILCO relles on the establishment of an Emergency News Center to satisfy this requirement. See OPIP 3.8.1. However, the LILCO Plan does not indicate that the Emergency News Center has a backup power supply or that a back-up news facility has been established. Therefore, in the event of a loss of offsite power, the Emergency News Center will be-come inoperable and LILCO's public notification duties will not be satisfied.

Contention 96. 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(10) requires each emergency plan to provide for protective actions which protect the public health and safety in the event of an accident.

NUREG 0654,Section II.J.9 requires a demonstration that the protective actions within a plan are capable of being imple-mented. The LILCO Plan does not satisfy these requirements be-cause it falls to take account of the possibility of a loss of offsite power. Specifically:

Contention 96.A. Assuming that an evacuation of the plume EPZ were determined to be the appropriate protective action, the LILCO Plan relies heavily on the services of private firms such as ambulance services, LILCO Plan at 3.7-1, bus companies, OPIP 3.6.4 at 2, and lumber companies, Appendix A at IV-186.

However, in the event of a loss of offsite power these fl.ms and facilities would become inoperable and close. LERO would thus become unable to utilize those services.

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Contention 96.B. Assuming that an evacuation of the plume EPZ were determined to be the appropriate protective action, LERO would be responsible for evacuating scores of hospitals, nursing homes, and facilities for the handicapped. However, the LILCO Plan does not indicate that these facilities have backup power supplies. In the event of a loss of offsite power, evacuation of these facilities would be either impossi-ble or far more difficult and time-consuming than indicated in the LILCO Plan.

Without functioning elevators, non-ambulatory persons could be moved only with extreme difficulty, if at all. With-out lighting, nighttime evacuation of these facilities would be all but impossible. Without functioning medical equipment, management would attempt some form of limited evacuation on its own. In any case, this potential circumstance is not taken into account in the LILCO Plan.

Contention 96.C. Assuming that evacuation of the plume EPZ were determined to be the appropriate protective action, the successful implementation of sucn an action would' depend on the functioning of systems and facilities that would in fact be inoperable in the absence of offsite power. These include:

residential lighting, public streetlights, traffic signals, and service stations. The LILCO Plan does not indicate that any of

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these facilities and systems have backup power supplies.

Therefore, in the event of a loss of offsite power, the Plan would not provide for the protection of the public health and safety.

SOC Contention 97: Bad Weather SOC Contention 97. The LILCO Plan is inadequate because it falls to take account of the possibility that a severe accident at Shoreham might occur in tandem with severe adverse weather, i.e.,-heavy snow. This deficiency violates the app 11-cable standards in several respects.

Contention 97.A. Prompt notification of the public is mandated by 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(6) and NUREG 0654, Sections II.E.6 and II.J.10. Tiie means specified by the LILCO Plan for immediate public notification are the siren system and, as a backup, route alerting. In the event of a heavy snowfall, how-6 ever, neither of these means will work. Heavy snow may damage commercial telephone lines and prevent communications, via pagers, with those LERO personnel responsible for activating the siren and emergency broadcast systems. Even if these persons were contacted, they would be unable to travel to the ECC, and from there to initiate the siren and emergency broad-cast systems. Moreover, during a heavy snowfall, the route alerting system would not constitute a reliable backup to the

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siren system because route alert drivers would not receive notification of the emergency (due to the inoperability of the EOC), would not be able to reach the staging areas (because of impassable roads), or (for the same reason) would not be able i to travel from the staging areas along the designated alert routes.

Contention 97.B. Pursuant to 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(10) the LILCO Plan must designate a range of protective actions appropriate to a variety of circumstances. See also NUREG 0654,Section II.J.9. This includes unfavorable weather. Yet the LILCO Plan's procedures for evacuation completely disregard the possibility of the existence of deep snow. SOC contends that the evacuation procedures outlined in the LILCO Plan would not work during a heavy snowfall, for the following reasons:

1. Key LERO personnel would be unable to travel to the EOC, as required by the LILCO Dlan at 3.3;

2. Neither traffic guides, road crews, evacuation route spotters, ambulance drivers nor staging area coordinators would be able to travel to the staging areas, as required by OPIP 3.3.3 at 2 and 3.6.3 at 5, 6;

3. Even if the persons listed in (2) above were to reach the staging areas, they would be unable to travel to their assigned posts / routes, as required by OPIP 3.6.3; 176 -

- - - -- , - - - .,e., n , , - - , . - ~ . - - . ---

4. Bus drivers and shuttle operators would be un-able to travel to staging areas, as required by OPIP 3.6.4 at 4 and, in any. case, would be unable to complete their assigned trips;

5. Relocation center staff would be unable to travel to the relocation centers; and

6. Members of the public would be unable to evacu-i ate their homes or places of work.

l Dated: July 26, 1983 Washington, D.C.

I

)

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I

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Befoc9 the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board

)

In the Matter of )

)

LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322

) (Emergency Planning)

(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )

Unit 1) )

)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of MEMORANDUM REGARDING REVISED EMERGENCY PLANNING CONTENTIONS and REVISED EMERGENCY PLANNING CONTENTIONS, dated July 20, 1983, have been served to the following this 26th c e, of July, 1983, by U.S. mail, first class, except as otherwise noted.

(0) James A. Laurenson, Chairman (#) Ralph Shapiro, Esq.

Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Cammer and Shapiro U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 9 East 40th Street Washington, D.C. 20555 New York, New York 10016

( ) Dr. Jerry R. Kline Howard L. Blau, Esq.

Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 217 Newbridge Road U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Hicksville, New York 11801 Washington, D.C. 20555

(* * ) W. Taylor Reveley, III, Esq.

(#) Dr. M. Stanley Livingston Hunton & Williams 1005 Calle Largo P.O. Box 1535 Santa Fe, New Mexico 87501 707 East Main Street Richmond, Virginia 23212 Edward M. Barrett, Esq.

Mr. Jay Dunkleberger l General Counsel Long Island Lighting Company New York State Energy Office ;

250 Old Country Road Agency Building 2  !

Mineola, New York 11501 Empire State Plaza Albany, New York 12223 Mr. Brian McCaffrey Long Island Lighting Company (#) Stephen B. Latham, Esq.

175 East Old Country Road Twomey, Latham & Shea Hicksville, New York 11801 33 West Second Street Riverhead, New York 11901

(#)Nora Bredes Docketing and Service Section Executive Director Office of the Secretary Shoreham Opponents Coalition U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm.

195 East Main Street Washington, D.C. 20555 Smithtown, New York 11787 Hon. Peter Cohalan Marc W. Goldsmith Suffolk County Executive Energy Research Group, Inc. H. Lee Dennison Building 400-1 Totten Pond Road Veterans Memorial Highway Waltham, Massachusetts 02154 Hauppauge, New York 11788 MHB Technical Associates (*) Eleanor L. Frucci, Esq.

1723 Hamilton Avenue Atomic Safety and Licensing Suite K Board Panel San Jose, California 95125 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm.

Washington, D.C. 20555 Joel Blau, Esq.

New York Public Service Comm. Ezra I. Bialik, Esq.

The Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller Assistant Attorney General Building Environmental Protection Bur.

Empire State Plaza New York State Dept. of Law Albany, New York 12223 2 World Trade Center New York, New York 10047 David J. Gilmartin, Esq.

Suffolk County Attorney Atomic Safety and Licensing H. Lee Dennison Building Appeal Board Veterans Memorial Highway U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm.

Hauppauge, New York 11788 Washington, D.C. 20555 I

Atomic Safety and Licensing Jonathan D. Feinberg, Esq.

Board Panel Staff Counsel, New York State U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Public Service Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 3 Rockefeller Plaza Albany, New York 12223

(*) Bernard M. Bordenick, Esq.

David A. Repka, Esq. Stewart M. Glass, Esq.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regional Counsel Washington, D.C. 20555 Federal Emergency Management Agency Stuart Diamond 26 Federal Plaza, Room 1349 Environment / Energy Writer New York, New York 10278 NEWSDAY Long Island, New York 11747 (*) James B. Dougherty, Esq.

' 3045 Porter Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20008

/

Spence Perry, Esq.

Associate General Counsel Federal Emergency Management Agency Washington, D.C. 20472 Mr. Jeff Smith Shoreham Nuclear Power Station P.O. Box 618 North Country Road Wading River, New York 11792

(*) Lucinda Low Swartz, Esq.

Pacific Legal Foundation 1990 M Street, N.W.

Suite 550 Washington, D.C. 20036 KIRKPATRICK, OCKHART, HILL, CHRISTOPHER & PHILLIPS 1900 M Street, N.W., Suite 800 Washington, D.C. 20036 DATED: July 26, 1983

(*) By Hand

(**) By Computer

(#) By Federal Express I

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