ML20079K549
| ML20079K549 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Braidwood  |
| Issue date: | 06/18/1991 |
| From: | COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20079K545 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9110230128 | |
| Download: ML20079K549 (39) | |
Text
Braidwood. Nuclear Power Station 10CFR50.59 Annual Repon 1990 - 1991 NRC Docket Nos. 50-456 and 50-457 License Nos. NPF-72 and NPF-77 l
l
! 9110230128 911017 PDR ADOCK 00000456 R PDR l.
BJEL_ RELOAD -NUCLEAR _ WORK __REQUIST 1._ Unit 1 Cycle 3 Reload 1. A47454 M]HQR CIIANGES SPECIAL PAQCEDURES
- 3. MCR 20-1-90-055 IEMERRARY_ALTERAIlOHS l MODJf.1 CAT 10ES._
- 1. 91-0-010
- 1. M20-0-87-022- 2. 91-0-011
- 2. M20-0-87-030 3. 91-0-021
- 3. -M20-1-87-053- 4, 91-1 001
- 4. M20-1-87-067 5. 91-1-002
- 5. M20-1-87-0"3 6. 91-1-009
- 6. M20-1-88-014
- 7. M20-1-88-030
- 8. M20-1-88-032
- 9. M20-1-88-033
- 10. M20-1-88-045
- 11. M20-1-88-055-12.-M20-1-88-060
- 13. M20-1-88-092
- 14. M20-2-88-033.
- 15. M20-2-88-063A
- 16. M20-1-89-014
- 17. M20-1-89-026
- 18. M20-1-89-029
- 19. H20-1-89-032
- 20. M20-1-89-033
- 21. M20-1-90-008
A UNIT _LEYCLE_LRELOAD DESCRIEIlON Draidwood 1 Cycle 3 core redesign due to normal reload fuel requirements.
SAFETE_EYAURAT10ti_SUMMAR1
- 1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or-malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Saft.ty Analysis Report is not increased because as evaluated'in r>ction 3.1 of.the Braidwood 1 Cycle 3 reload safety evaluation, the reload cote does not impact LOCA limits. The revised Draldwood 1 Cycle 3 reload design has been verlfled to satisfy LOCA accident analysis limits and assumptions.
The Braidwood 1! Cycle 3-reload parameters have been verified to be less limiting than the bounding valuss assumed in the LOCA analysis of record, and the reload core does not adversely impact the design or operation of any other plant equipment.
- 2. The possibilityLfor an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because the method and manner of plant operation 18-unchanged, and the reload cere's structural, thermal-hydraulle and nuclear characteristics are not significantly different from l
-.. Lpreviously installed' equipment. '
- 3. The margin of safety,'as defined in the bacia, for any Technical j -l Specification, 1s not reduced because'the Draldwood'l Cycle 3 reload l . safety evaluation / safety parameter. interaction list process as documented in the' reload safety evaluation / safety-parameter L interaction list master checklists and minutes demonstrate the new l key-parameters of. interest-do not exceed their associated limits.
L l
i I
279(100891)
ZD79G
. . . -. . ~-- - ..- . -
MlHRR_.CliANGE_tiCR2921 2D__01d DESCRICIl0H This minor change. replaces the Kerotest' accumulator fill line valves (ISIB934A-D) with valves supplied by Anchor Darling Valve (AIDV). It has been determined that past cracking of fill lines ISI69EA thru ED 1" was due to vibration caused by back flow operation through the Kerotest valve. The AIDV's are not diaphragm operated and therefore no vibration will be created by back flow through these volves.
. SATITX_IVALUAIlotLSUttiARY
- 1. 'The probability of an occurr'nce or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis-Report is not increased because replacement of valves will continue to allow the operation of the accumulators per UFSAR Section 6.3. Valves are qualified for use in the' system, therefore no added probabilities or consequences of an accident are created.
- 2. .The possibilityLfor-an accident or malfunction of a dlfferent type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is notl created because' replacement of existing valves does not change original design conditions. Since new valves have been qualified for use, no added accidents or malfunctions are created.
- 3. I
_The margin of sefety, as defined in the basis, for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because Tech Spec Section 3/4.5.1 requires all accumulators operable in modes 1, 2, & 3. Replacement of valves will' preclude possible cracking of' fill'line which might result:in loss of coolant. As a result, margin of safety will be maintained by. valve replacement.
2 279(100891)
'ZD79G
, ~_. - - ~ . - . - . . . . - . . . . ~ . - - . . . . _ - . . - - . . _ . - , _ . - _ . - - . . .-
141140R_CilARGLHCR20:1dQ:0M DESCRIET10ti -
Change _setpoint of relief valve ICV 8119 from 300 prig to 230 psig by changing
. out spring / washer-assembly. The reduction in setpoint will provide additional overpressure protection to components located on lower elevations.
SAFETLEVALUAT10tL
SUMMARY
- 1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, i or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Heport is not increased
- because the small break LOCA analysis and the failurn mode and effects analysis bound the failure modes of ICVB119.
- 2. The possibility-for an accident or_ malfunction of a different type
-than any previously evaluated in the Final-Safety Analysis Report is not created because the setpoint change is accomplished by the change .
out of the relief setting spring with all other-parameters remaining the-same.
- 3. The margin of safety, an defined in the basis, for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because this valve is not discussed or defined in any basis for any Technical Specification and the new setpoint reduces the probability of failure of lower elevation components.
3 279(100891)
ZD79G
'v-.
-. -., ..w.,.' v.,4J rm,- <-.,,,,,,.m ,.m,, , , _ , , , ,
._......wrm-*
M1H0!LCilANGEliCERQ:1 90f.055 DESCR1ET10H.
Install. flow control valves in the IA lines on the operators for valves IAF004A, D. The IAF004A, B valves are normally'open, llowever, during survelliance testing of the pumps, the valve on the running pump is closed.
~
Presently, if an EST actuation. signal opens the valve, the pump will trip due to suction pressure translent. By using the new flow control valve to slow the opening time of the valve, the auction paessure transient will be ruduced and the probability of a pump' trip should-be reduced. ,
SAEETI_EYALUATIDM_SUMMAKI' .
- 1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because during normal operation, the AF004 valves are open and this change has no effect on valve operation. During surveillance testing, this. change will allow the-valve on the inoperable but r running pump to respond to an EST actuation, thereby increasing
- safety by making two pumps available (with only one pump available,-
the AP system is in a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> hCOAR) instead of one. Also, Section 10.4.9.3.1 of the UFSAR requires.160 gpm to be delivered within one minute to each of three unfaulted steam generators. The testing of this change will ensure that this requirement is still' met.
- 2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type.
than any previously evaluated In the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because installation of the Flow Control volve does not change the function of the AF004 valves. .The only effect of this change is to slow the operation of the AF004 valves. When the requirements of Section 10.4.9.3.1 (160 gpm dellvered within one minute to each of three unfaulted steam generators) are met by testing, no possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated can be cret;ted. The testing requirements for this minor plant change have been revised to prevent
~
inadvertent switchovet to SX suction. The possibility of a switchover to SK without pump trip has been eliminated.
- 3. The margin of safety, as defined 11n the basis, for. any-Tochnical Specification, is not reduced because the margin of safety for the basis 3/4.7.2 will not be' reduced or changed. The testing for-Section 10.4.9.3.1 of the UFSAR will also ensure that the total flow from each AF pump will meet the basis of 740 gpm. Nrne that.this-change will-have no affect on the pump flow rates. .This change is not intended to circumvent or modify 3.7.3.2 or 4.7.1.2.1. During surveillance-testing when the AF004 valve la closed, the pump associated with the closed AF004 valve will still be declared inoperable and the seventy two (72) hour LCOAR will be entered.
4 279(100891)
ZD79G
. _ _ _ . _ _ . ~ . _ _ _ ._.-._ .- - _ _- _ . - . _ _ - _ . .
MODIE1 CAT 10tLM20.-1 01-D22 .
.DESCRIP.IICH.
Add:a 14" fire protection gate valve OPP 898_in series with valve UFP579 to improve maintenance capability-of the fire protection system.
EAEETX.IVALUATILW_
SUMMARY
1.- The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as provlously evaluated in the-Final Safety Analysis Report in not increased '
because the system availability is increased by tnis change. This change.is non-safety related.
The possibility for an_ accident or malfunction of a dif ferent, type
~
2.-
than any previously evaluated in the final Safety Analysis Report. is not created because the function of the system is not changed by the addition of valve OFPB98 for maintenance.
- 3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis, for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because.the system availability is increased by this change.
1 l
t -
5 l
279(100891)
ZD79G i
.:.. - . - . , , - . . _ . ~ . - - .
.: .S ,
?
i MQDIEEAT10tLM20 61-030 DIS.CRIETION
' Add isolation valves OrP901 and OrP902 to replace the function of valves OTP515A and OPP 515D.
i SAEETY 1:YALUAT10tL
SUMMARY
- 1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously -
evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because the function of the system has not been changed.
- 2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because the func'.lon of the system is not changed.
- 3. The margin of safety, as deflued in the basis, for any Technical.
Specification, is not reduced because this modification only involves isolatlon valve addition.
t I
6 279(100891)
ZD79G l
. _ ~ . . . . - . . - . . - . - - - - . - . ~ _ . - - . .,. . ~..- -. . .. . - ..
3- .
MQP1Y1 CAT 10M..M20:120h053 '
^
DESCR11' TION provide level indiention for reactor cavity local level during refueling by painting a scale on the refuelang cavity wall.
SAEE'IT_EVALUAT10tL
SUMMARY
- 1. ~The-probability'of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction- of equipment, important to safety as previously -
ovaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased
'because;the scale allows local verification of refueling cavity level. Iti has no af fect on system operation as described in the FSAR Chapter 15.
- 2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type' than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis l<eport la-not created because thin scale does not offect plant operation in any way. It han no affect on any chapter 15 FSAR Safety Analysis.
- 3. The margin of safety,-as defined in the basis, for any Technical Specificetion, is not reduced becauce this scale Indication will aid in compliance of TS 3.9.10 which states that at least 23 feet of water will be maintained above the reactor vessel flange.
7 279(100891)
-ZD79G
.. .. . - - . . . ~ - . - ~ ~ - . .-- ~- . . - . - . - . . . - . . . .
,. E.
I J
MOH1f1CA1101LM20-1-01-011 DESCRIPllOli Install logic panel and system to initiate auxiliary feedwater and trip the turbine if 3/4 steam generator levels reach 3% of narrow range span below the low-low reactor protection system setpoint and power is at or above 30% ac measured by turbine impulse pressure ins t rtunentation.
SAFETY EVAWATION.
SUMMARY
- 1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Sefety Analysis Report is not increased because the ATWS Mitigation System (AMS) is isolated from existing safety systems-on input and output such that a fault on the AMS will not degrade any existing system. The system provides an additional.
diverse system to mitigate the consequences of an A*IMS event.-
- 2. The possibility for-an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is
-not created because design isolates AMS from other safety systems-such that failure of AMS will not degrade interfacing safety systems. . Anticipated transients without trip is addressed in TSAR Chapter 15,
- 3. 'The margin of safety, as defined in the baals, for any Technical
.Sperification, 1s.not reduced because AMS is isolated from existing afety systems to preclude a failure of AMS degrading a-safety system. --The_AMS provides an additional system to mitigate an A"WS event-and does not affect the margin of safety as' defined in the bases for Technical Specifications.
l l
l l
l-8 279(100891)
ZD79G
-- _ - ~, - - - -
l l
1 l
i MQElflCATiDilJ120-1-87 -011
-l DESCRIETION ,
1 This modification will provide a permanent, accurate 3eactor Vessel and l Refueling Cavity level monitoring system through the installation of three i level instrument' loops for monitoring purposes. This installation will replace the existing Refueling Cavity level instrument loop and will provide level indications, Reactor Vessel low level alarm and Refuells; Cavity high and low level alarms at Main Control Board IPM06J. It will also provide a computer input for level trending purposes. and a graphics display on Main Control Boeid 1pM06J, identifying critical elevations during refueling operations.
Additionally, a handswitch on main Control Doard IPM06J for manual actuation of the containment evacuation alarm, and control switche- on cabinet IPA 20JC for disabling Reactor Vessel and Refueling Cavity level alarms during nonnal plant operations with level instruments isolated will be provided. This modification also improves the reliability of the Residual Heat Removal system for operation by providing additional indications to ensure pump NPSil requirements are met.
SMITLJVALUATlDtLSUMMARX
- 1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because the existing FSAR Chapter 15 Accident Analysis is not affected, since the non-safety related portion of the level monitoring system installed by this modification is isolated from the safety-related portior, of the subject system during normal plant operations by ASME B&PV Code, Section IJ1, manual valves and failure
-of the safety-related piping is bounded by the small break LOCA analysis.- Also the reliability of the Residual Heat Removal System for operation.as described in FSAR Section 5.4.7 is enhanced by the .
installation of this modification, through a reduced probability of a related malfunction of equipment important to safety 1.e. RHR system pump operation.
- 2. The possibility for;an accident or malfunction of a different type
.than any previously evaluated'in the Final Safety Analysis Report-is not created because-this modification enhances the function of the Reactor Vessel'and' Refueling Cavity level monitoring system, through provision of additional indications and associated alarms for
-refueling operations. Also, the function of the Residual Heat Removal system, as described in FSAR Section 5.4.7, is not affected by this modification. Further, modification failure modes and effects do'not impact the ability of the subject level monitoring and Residual Heat Removal or associated systems to perform their intended
-functions. -This innta11ation is utilized only during refueling operations and othet methods for verify 1ng Reactor Vesse] and-Refueling Cavity levels, and RHR system pwnp operation, are available.
9 279(100391)
ZD79G
MODILICATI0tLMZD-3-01-DILconk'1
- 3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification, is not reduced because the existing bases for Technical Specification 3/4.9.10 for Refueling Operations restrictions on minimum Reactor Vessel water level, to ensure that sufficient water depth la available to remove 99% of the assumed 10%
iodine gap activity released from the rupture of an irradiated fuel assembly, are enhanced by the installation of this modification to provide a permanent, accurate kenetor Vessel and Refueling Cavity le"el monitoring system. Likewise, the existing bases for Technical Specification 3/4.9.8 f or required Residual llent Removal cystem pump operation, based on Reactor Vessel wat er level, are also enhanced by this moditication through impr oved Rilk system reliability f or refueling operations. Therefore, the margin of safet.y is improved.
10 279(100891)
ZD79G
g f
M001EICKilotLH2.0 1:6.Br014 ;
PlS.CAIPI1Oli
-Install cueck valve 1T0095 in the main turbine oil flater 2-luch bypass line, ,
to prevent back flow from the oil reservoir to the oil purifier when the oil filter pump dlscharge valve is in the bypass mode and t.be pump is off.
' ShEETLEVALUATIDH_SUMMAEY
, 1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident,
-or.malfu.ictlon of equipment important to safety.as previously evaluated in_the final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because system reliability is not impacted and system function is improved by installation of this modification.
- 2. 'The possibility for-an accident or malfunction of a different type .
than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Hoport is not created because no new failure modes are introduced by this modification to affect the ability of existing systemn to potform their intended functions.
3' , The: margin of safety, as defined in the basis, for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because this modification is non-safety related and system operation is improved by its installation.
L V
11 279(100891)
ZD79G
, - , 2..m. .,-v.__,.. - ~ r,.
.- 7 MODIEICATIDN_M20:1100-010 DESCEIETION Install a flow meter-(totalizer)-on the main generator stator water tank vent
, line so that hydrogen Icakage into the stator cooling water can be monitored.
The meter will be installed in series with an existing meter ( I F QllIYO 20 ) . - The new meter is more sensitive.
SMETLIVALUATIDM_SUltiARY
- 1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of'an accident, or malf unction of equipment _in., rtant to safety as previously evalunted in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased bscause the FSAR/UPSAR does not evaluate any accidents that might cecur due to this type of equipment. This modification does not change any accident analysis as evaluated in UFSAR/FSAR.
2.- The possibility for an_ accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because the added equipment is passive, redundant,-
non-safety related and is located in an non-safety related, non-seismic area. The new equipment is similar to equipment which la already installed and so no new operation modes are created.
- 3. The margin of safety, as-defined in the basis, for any Technical Specification,'2s not reduced because the system being modified does notfinvolve or impact any Technical Specifications.
i a
~-
12 279(100891)
ZD79G-
~ ~ - - - . - _ _ -- - , - - . - . ~. . . . . - -.- .
'l J
l l
l HOPJ f3CATIOJLM2D-l:811012 1 DESCRIPTIDH Provide narrow and wide rango computer inputs from the Post Accident Neutron l Monitoring instrumentation,-to satisfy the Regulatory Guide 1;97, Revision 3, requirement for printed output of the associate indications. This design change is required to meet the UFSAR, Appendix A commitment to provide
. computer" input s for _ printed output of narrow and wide range post-accident ,
neutron indication.
-t SAEITLEVAWAT10tLSUffiARY 1.. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased.' This modification affects safety related display instrumentation through provision of non-safety related computer inputs for printed output 9f rarrow and wide range post-accident neutron indication (as required.
by Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 3) only. The reliability of the Post: Accident Monitoring System for required operation is not affected by the implementation of this design change.
- 2. ^ The possibility for an accident or malfunction o r a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is
-not created because as defined in UrSAR Section 7.5.3.3.9, the transmission of required signals from Post Accident Monitoring System (PAMS). equipment for control and monitoring purposes is through isolation devices. Since no credible failure at the output will prevent the associated channel'from meeting minimum performance requirements considered in the design bases, the ability of the PAMS to perform its_ intended functions is not impacted by the installation of this modification.
' 3 .~ The margin of safety, as defined in the basis, for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because the Post Accident Monitoring System is not specifically addressed in the Technical Specifications o and this modification does not affect any safety related function of associated equipment. Th ;efore, the margin of safety is unchanged.
l-l'
.279(100891)
ZD79G L
-4 l
t l
r i MODHlCAT101U42.0-1 &0.13 !
DESCRIPTJOtf This modification replaced the reslating product of combustion (P.O.C.-lonirat.lon) smoke detectors above the reactor coolant ptunp areas with l 22$'t heat _(thermal) detectors.
SAtCTLEVALVATIDtLSUM4ARY
- 1. The probability.of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipmeint_lmportent to safety as prev 2ously evaluated in the final Safety Analysis-Report is not increased ;
because this portion of the system is non-safety rehted, provides an alarm only function and is not utiliz3d in any accident scenarlo.
2._ The possibility for-an accident or malfenction of a different type l than any preolously evaluated in the final Safety Analysis Report, is not created because this system dotes not have any function during an accident ovaluated in the TSAR and will not change or -af foct any previously evaluated accidents.
- 3. The snargin of safety, as defined in the basis, for any Technical ;
Specification, la not reduced because the systems involved are not governed by Technical Specifications-and have no impact on the margin of safety.
l
?
7 14 279(100891)
ZD790
t fiOD1D CATIOttJIR:1 d 0:0 0 DESCEit1LOM Provide an audible type alarm for the station operator, in addition to each of the division low low level status lamps, f or the level of NA0li solution in the spray additive tank for the_CS system by connecting a common window alarm to-both of the. low low level switches. Hove the window alstens for high low levels in the spray additive tank and high percentage of hydrogen in containment down one tile each to provide proper top to bottom sequence for the new tile.
SATITLEVALVAT10tLSUlttAW
- 1. The probability of an necurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment impostant to safety as-previously evaluated _in the Final Safety Analysla Report la not increased because the'new alarm circuit is only a source of-low energy, annunciator voltage out to a normally open-level switch contact, and does not have the potential for creating or alleviating the mittgation.of.a LOCA.
- 2. The possibility for an accident or analfunctlon of a different type than any previously evaluated in.the Final Safety Analysis Heport is not created because the analysis of failure modes and effects proved that this modification was not subject to nor created any single f ailure event that could disable the indicat.lon for low low level or operatior, of the CS system a:ad that it was not possible to create a dit(crent type of accident or malfunction of equipment.
- 3. The margin of cafety, as defined in the basis, for any Technical
,_ Specification, is not reduced because- there never were any auto iunctions or operator actions for low low Jevel status lights or a corresponding level meter reading and this modification only provides a common redundant annunciator alarm to'further assure operating that
- the tank is being depleted during CS system design use.
i 15 279(100891)
-ZD79G E
MODirlCAT1GLH20-hB B-0D DESCR1tIl0H "Two-pen" recorders on panel IPM05J for the hot and cold leg temperature recorders of the reactor coolant system (RCS) are_ required to allow for a direct comparison per loop for more efficient operation.
SATITLEVALUATIGL
SUMMARY
- 1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Repor t la not - Ancreased through a review of UrSAR section 7.2.1.1.4. -Modification testing-will verity proper installation and operation. No present or new occurrence or consequence.was_ determined.
2 . -- The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously eval,ated in the Fisa3 Safety Analy11s Report is not, created because the equipment has _no public health or safety implication and the seismic qualitication of thq Instruments and panel have been unchanged.
- 3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis, for any Technical Specification, la not reduced because these secorders are not involved in or affect the margin of safety for Tech Spec 3.4.9 which describes the excesalve cooldown rate of the RCS. Tavg is used in the basis of this Tech Spec not the hot and cold leg temperatures.
16 279(100891)
ZD790/ZNLD/1277/16 1
_ _ . _ . _ . _ _ . . . . . . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ . - __ __._ - - _ _ _ - - - - _ . m._._____m____-
i
. i r
11RDltICAT10!Ui10:1:&D00 DESCRIEI1Gi Replace containment isolation valves on the post accident. hydrogen monitoring j system.
SATITLEVAWAT10!LSUMtMY
- 1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the final Safety Analysis Report la not increased because none of the single failure events or design basis accidents could be affected by this modification. Chapter 15.0.1.2, 15.0.1.3, and 15.0.1.4 were revlowed.
- 2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type '
than any previously avaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because there are not any new falluro modes created by this rnodificallon.
- 3. The margin of safet.y, as defined in the basis, for any Technical Specification, la not reduced because this modification does not change any Technical Specification and none of the baslo are chat.ged.
t b
s f
17 279(100891)
ZD790
-yy , ---- y i,.,,,.,., .,q ...w, ,.. -# 7,, c., .c.,-,....,. .y. , y , ,,- ,,,wy, ,, w-.,,,,m.,,_.-w,,ye,,w.-ey,,,w.ww w ey, v.r,-ix,,,e-,w,
l' MOR1f1 CAT 10tLM20 B U-092 DEScitlPTION ThlJ modification reroutes the condensate drain piping f rom each steam jet air ejector aftercondenser through a liquid drainer to the Intercondenser sump,
-which drainn back to the main condenser. This will conserve treated condensate, telleve overloading of the turbine building floor drain system, and alleviate the problem of ammonin vapors collecting in the Turbine Ballding.
SAttTL.IVALUAT10!LEUltiARY
- 1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equlpment important to safety as previously '
evaluated in.the Final Safety Analysis Report 16 not Increased because this modification does not impact any safety related' systems or safety related structures, and As located-in a non-seismic area.
Fallure of the stemn jet alt ejector drain piping is not considered in the UFSAR.
- 2. The possibility for an accident or malfunJtion of a different type than_any previously evaluated in tte
_ 3 Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because this modification does not impact any safety-related systems or safety related structures, and is located in a non-seismic area. No new failure effects have been determined to exist as a result of this modification.
3.- The margin of safety, as defined in the basis,' for any Technical Specification,-la not reduced becausa this modification does not impact any safety related-systems-or safety-related-structures,--and is located in a non-seismic aten. No new failure mode is created by ,
this modification. There are no interactions created by this modification that prevent any safety systems from performing their intended functions.
r la 279(100891)
ZD790
+
4 HC'D101CATIWLH20:Z:O 0:03 3 DESCAltTIGl This inodification provides nartow and wide range computer inputs f rom the post accident neutron monitoring instrwnentation, to satisfy the regulatory guide 1.97, Revision 3, requirement lor printed output of the associated indications. This design change is requited to sneet the UFSAR, Appendix A commitment to_ provide computer inputs for printed output of narrow and wide range post accident ind'. cation.
SafITY_IYAINA2101 E HHARY
- 1. _ The probab)11ty of_an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, ,
or malf unction of ; equipment lmpor tant to saf ety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis kepott is not incteased 1 because the post accident neutron anonitoring system la not specifically discussed within tirSAR Chapter 7.0 and therefore no tirSAR changes are required. The probebility was evaluated and because no change is requir9d, no present or new occurronce or consequence was determined. Modification testing will verify proper operation.
- 2. The possibility for en accident or malfunction of a different type than-any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Peport is not created because the unchanged operation of the systems involved eliminates this possibility. The tirSAR Appendix A discussion of regulatory Guide 1.97 will be amended to document compliance.
- 3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis, for any Technical -
Speelfication, la not' reduced because the post accident neutron monitoring system la not addressed in the sections reviewed, 3.3 and 3.6 In addition, this modification will not reduce any margin of safety already established. Proper installation of computer inputs to non-safety outputs will encure the margin in maintained.
19 279(100891)
ZD790
- - i I
MODir1CATIL4LH20:2200-903h DESCR11'Iloti 1
- I Installation of teps in Steam Generator Dlowdown Sample lines and !
, Hon-Essential Service Watet lines to allow fot fut.ute Installation of sample pumps and coolers to f eel 11 tate sampling during depressurlsation modes.
SAEEIX_EVALUAT10tl_GVHHARY ,
)
- 1. 1he probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment linportant to saf ety as previously evaluat ed in the Final Safety Analysla Report la not increased because the installation of the modification will eventually allow luct eased capability to sample the steam gener ator in all niodes of I operation at.the sample panel.
- 2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because no new f ailure snodes are introduced by the '
installation of this modification. The Steam _ Generator sampling system la enhanced by the installation of this modification. ;
- 3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis of any Technical Speeltication, is not reduced because this modification is not safety ,
related and enhances the Steam Generator sampling system. Tech Spec. t 3.7.1.4 surveillance requirements will be adhered to more easily when entire modification is completed.
I s
20
, 279(100891)
ZD790 u ,_ _ , ..u._,_._,_._..._a__. ___ _ __._._____.._,.,_._,a._,___,_,_
.,
- 1 HDD1UCAT10tlHML-h89M14 f DESCR1tIl06 The suljact modification provides a redundant, independent nieans of verifying Reactor Vessel Level Indication during refueling or redu'ed inventory conditions as requited by HRC Ceneric Letter 88-17, " Loss of Decay lleet
' Itemov a l " . Inadequate determination of liCS level has been the root cause of rnany potentially significant loss of decay heat removal events. The modification provides Indication in the control room, annunclation on low level, and a computer point.
5ArLTLCVAll)ATION BUMMARY
- 1. The probabl11ty of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, ,
or malfunction of equipment linportant to safety as previously evaluated in the Tinal Safety Analysis Iteport is not increased because this modification does not affect any of the Single railure ,
Events or Design Danis Accidents analyzed in the TSAR. The level ,
Indicating system la used only when the plant is shutdown. The ,
safety related piping la isolated from the non-safety reinted piping during normal plant operations using ASME Section 111 valves and the ,
piping and components are seismically supported, in the unlikely }
event that the safety related piping:falled during power operation, the failure would be bounded by the small break LOCA analysis (less i than one square foot).
- 2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type ,
thun any previously evaluated in the final Safety Analysis Report is not created because the non-safety related level indicating system is used during refueling or whenever the RCS level la required to be lowered. 1,oss of the icvel indicatling system would not prevent the systems from performing their intended _ function since other methods are-aval)able for verifying level and proper RilR pump operation.
- 3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis, for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because Technical Fpecification 3/4.9.6 requires that at least one RHR loop be In operation to ensure thit sufficient cooling capacity is available.to remove decay heat and maintain-the RCS below 140 degrees F and ensures that sufficient coolant circulation la provided to minimize the effect of boron dilution-lucident and boron stratification. .-In as much as this mod!f1 cation provides.a means of verifylng-adequate RilR pump NPSH thereby, improving RilR pump rollebility/ availability,.the margin of safety as defined in Technical Specificatlon is increased..
7 i
i 21 279(100891)
L ZD790 L
L _ , _, - - . - - . ,._._ _._, _ ___ . . _ _ . . _ , , _ _
)
i 5
110DIrlCAT10!Oi20 kO9:01L i
DEhCRIP110H i This modification upgrades the existlny RllR heat exchanger outlet temperature ;
instrtunent loop to safety related and adds Indlcation in the MC11 BATETLEVALUATIDL
SUMMARY
1.. The probability of an occutrence or the consequence of an accident, or malf unction. of equipment _ linportant to safety as previously ,
i evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not inctensed because appropriate isolators will be inst.alled to segregate safety ,
f rorn non-safety components and -en analysla has been performed to i Insure the sensing integrit.y of the equipment. No new accident or -
-fallure modes have been Identitled or existing ones altered.
- 2. . The possibility for an accident. or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is ,
not created because the appropriate luolators will be installed and an analysis has_been performed to insure system and component +
integrity. No now accident or failure modes have been identiflod that.have not been previously analyzed.
- 3. The margin of safety, as de_ fined in the banis, for any Technical 4 Sp'acification, is not reduced because the new indication added to the ?
MCB will let the operator monitor the RHR system temperature from the .
control room.- This will allow the operator to take.the= appropriate ,
action upon recognition of a teinperature-deviation, which in ef fect increases the margin of safety due to early detect.lon of the j deviation. ;
i e
I f
{.
u 22 279(100891)
ZD79G- l
- , _ _ _ _ . . . ~ _ . . . _ . _ . _ _ , _ _ . . _ . _ _ . _ , _ . _ , . . , _ .._ _. ._ _ . . . _
l
)
HODir.1 CAT 1GLM20-l- 09:029 DESCRH'T10!I- !
Install drain valves in each crossover loop to improve analutenance ,
accessibility to the RCS system, and reduce exposure to radiation. As a ?
result of reanalyzing subsystesns for addition of valves, implement snubber ;
deletion thereby reducing scope of surveillance and testing program. i SAEETtlVAINAT10!L!iUMMARY
- 1. .The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malf unction of equipment impot tant. to safety as previously ;
evaluated in the Tlnni Saf ety Analysis Report, is not luct eased because addition of dr ain valves is bounded' by RC I,0CA an analysed in tirSAR.15.6.5 _ Reduction of snubbers has been analymod such that all ,
load combinations identitled in-UTSAR section 3.9 are bounded.
- 2. The possibility for an accident or malfunct.lon of a different type than any previouslyl evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because this mod has been analyzed to assure all bounding design criterla have been met. No added failure types have been .
determined to be created. '
- 3. The. margin of safety, as defined in the basis, for any Technical Specification, le not reduced because addition) of drain valves will i not impact TS 3/4.4 for operation of the RC system. For snubbers, l Code case N-411 allows for alternate yhlves for response spectrum, i resulting in fewer snubbers seguired without.teducing the margin of saf ety .of piping components wit h respect to design and operation.-
4 f
I d'
I-F If 23 279(100091)
' zu?90
. - ,,,_._ - u . u ._ . n , _ _ _ -. . _,- _ ~__...__ _ ._ _._ - __ _ _.a .~.-._ _ .
1 i
. 1 I
1 l
1 NODifJCAT10!LMZU-1:09:032 i DESCRIP.IIDti Deletion of the autoclosure interlock (AC1) function on the RilR suction luolation valves 1(2)FH8701A/B and 1(2)RitB702A/D. In place of the AC1 function, an alarm will be provided on the main control board. Inputs for the alarm will be. valve not fully closed (spare contacts in the limitorquo i operator) and RCS wide range pressure lucreasing (PT403/PT405).
SATETLIYALVAT10liEMMARY
- 1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to saf ety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysla Repost is not increased because the RilR suction relief valves are used as a means of cold overpressure protection. The cold overpressure protection system is designed to ensure the limits of Appnadla G to 10 CTR part $0 are not exceeded when one or more of the RCS cold legs are less than or equal to 350 deg r. Transient analysis were performed to determine the worst case mass input and heat input events (refer to UFSAR, Section 5.2.2.11.2). Removal of the ACI does not impact the transient analysis. flowever, removal of the ACI helps ensure that the RllR suction tellet valves are available to mitigate' potential >
overpressure transients. Additionally, temoving the ACI reduces the potentiel for inadvertent 1sointion of the RHR system which can cause a Low Temperature Overpressure (LTOP) transient (reduced letdown '
combined with a loss of decay heat removal) while also isolating an overpressure mitigation path. Therefore, removal of the ACI does not ,
involve an increase in the probability of an occurrence or the conseguence of an accident preulously evaluated in the TSAR. In fact, removal of the ACI has a positive impact on LTOP mitigation, thereby, reducing the probability of an occurrence of an accident.
Analyses was-also performed to confirm that one RHR rellet valve has the capability of maintaining the Rl(R system masimum pressure within1 code limits (refer to UFSAR, Section 5.4.7.2.3). Removal of the ACI does not aflect this analysis.- Should a peak pressure occur while the RHR system suction isolation valvec are open, the pressure offect on the low pressure RHR system would be mitigated by the RilR suction rollet valves. The deletion of the ACI feature has no effect on the ability of the RilR system to survive pressure transients when the RilR system la connected to the RCS, since the RilR suction isolation valves are slow acting and-no caedit la taken for their actuation.
Therefore, removal of'the ACI will not involve an increase in the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR.
t :
24 279(100891) 20790-
, - . _ - . ~ . . - . _ . . . . , . . , _ . . - - , - _ _ _ _ _ . _ . . . - - _ _ _ _ , - - -
. - ~ - -
MOMI1 CAT 10!LH20:1.81-all. cont'd ;
I i
The impact of removal of the ACI to Event V,-hDCA outside containment, frequency was also considered. Analysis demonstrates that the probability of the occurrence or consequences of an accident are not increased. The dominant failure mode is tupture of the valve disc in each of the two series motor-operated valves (MOVs) in the RHR suction line when closed during normal power operation. This failure modo is Ar' ,endent of the AC'. Another 2ess influential contributor to Event V frequency was fo.'.d to be rupture of one valve
+4h!1e the other valve has failed open. The tesults demonstrate that, ,
in this case, removal of the ACI is beneficial when compared _to retaining it. .
Analyses was performed to determine the impact of removal of the ACI on RilR system unavailability. The analysis Indicates that the ,
tellability of the RilR cyctem is unchanged during RilR initiation and that it is improved during short and long term cooling. The ACI becomes more of a detrimental factor as the length of time in which Ri!R la required to operate increases. Therefore, the probability of malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR is not malfunction of equipment importent to safety.
- 2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a diffegent type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report-la not created because the ef fect of an overpressure translent will not change due to the removal of the ACI. Thc RilR suction relief valves were designed to maintain the RilR system pressure within design limits. Although. the ACI isolates the RCS- f om the EllR suction ,
rellet. valves on high RCS propriare,. overpressure protection of the RllR system la provided by the RilR suction relief valves not by t.he slow acting suctio- . solation valves. The purpose of the interlocks is to assure double isolation between the RHR system and the RCS when the plant is at normal operating conditions. .The Interlock prevents '
the. possibility of an Event V due to operator error.
25 279(100891) 1
~ZD790 t
4
- ?
i liOD A EI CAT 10tui20d:01:03 Leont ' d i Analyses were performed t o demonst rate the impact of removal of the ACI on Event V frequency, RilR system reliability and overpressure transients. The analysis perfotmed compared the results with and without the AC1. Iloweve r , the tenults wete contingent upon providing an alarm to alert the operator that a RCS-RilR series suction isolation valve (s) la not. fully closed and that double isolation la not being maintained. The modification will not impact the opening circult:y, nor will it effect the HOV position Indication in the control room.- The setpoint for the alarm will be within the range of the open pe missive setpoint pressure and the RHR system design pressure minun the HilR pump setpoint pressure and the R!lR system design pressure minus_the RIIR pwnp head pressure. Operating ;
procedures will be revised to direct the operator to-take tbn i necessary actions to close the open valve (if it la not closed ), or if this la not possibic, to return to the safe shutdown mode of operation. The analysis performed indicates an overall increase in safety due to the. removal of the ACI, implementation of the modification, and procedural changes. Therefore, the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated is not created.
- 3. The margin of safety, an defined'In the basis, for any Technical Specification is not reduced because deletion of the ACI has no ef feet on the ability of the HilR system to survive pressure transients when the RilR system is connected-to the RCS, since the RilR suction' isolation valves are slow ecting and no credit is taken for their actuation, flowever, removal of the ACI helps ensure that the
~
RilR suction relief valves are~availabla to mitigate potential overpressure transients. Additionally, removal of the ACI improves
-RilR system reliability. Therefore, the margin of safety la not reduced. In fact, the margin of safety is increasea.
+
t 26 279(100891)
Z0790-
H001E1CA110R_M2hl:8h033 DESCRItT10H Revise the solid state protection system to provide automatic isolation of SG Blowdown isolation valves ISD002A-II-On low-low SG 1evel. Revise safeguards test cabinet circuits to allota on line testing of the new isolation f unction.
SAfrDLIMUAT101L
SUMMARY
- 1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an acc4 dent, or malfunction of egalpment important to safety as previous $y evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report la not increased because the probability of a decrease in secondary cooling events is unchanged and consequences of such events are reduced since automatic closure of the SG blowdown valves will preserve 50 inventory._ The probability or conbequences of failure of the reactor protection system due to selsmic effects is unchanged.
- 2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because redundant trains of the reactor protection system will be utilized to actuate redundant solenoids on the isolstion valves. The ef fects of a.SG sample line f ailure without isolation of the corresponding 1 solation valve and the effects of continuous sampling f rom all SG's during AF events has been evaluated.
, 3. The margin-of safety, as defined in the basis, for any Technical Specification, ls not reduced because automatic isolation of SG blowdown will ensure that AF can provide sufficient heat sink to cool down the RCS as discussed in the basis for TS 3/4.7.1.2. . Containment isolation function (TS B3/4.6.3) of blowdown valves is unchanged.-
Mitigation of accident and transient conditions (TS D3/#.3.2) is enhanced by preservation of SG inventory during AF events.
27 279(100891)
.ZD79G/ZNLD/1277/27.
MVDif1CATIUllil20-1-90:000 DESCRIETIDH Revise condensate piping supplying suction to the Auxillary reedwater Pumps in Unit 1. The significant portions of the piping revision-consist of adding a loop sent to the suction header piping and adding pipe supports to seismically support the suction piping. The purpose of the modification'is to return the setpoints for the AP pump alarm (Iow suction), trip and switchover to SX from
-their present conservative limits back to-the Technical Specification limits.
SAff;TLLYALVAT10lLSUMMARI
- 1. -The probability of an occurrencu or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously-evaluated in the final Safety Analysis Report is not incrensad
'because the back-up essential service water system will supply suction to the AF-pumps lf a failure of t.he condensate suction occurred.
- 2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because the revision of the condensate piping as stipulated in the modification will perform the same system function and will not introduce any new accidents or malfunctions than those-already evaluated in the FSAR.
- 3. The margin of unfety, as-defined in the basis, for any Technical brecification, is not reduced, llowever,~ presently the setpoints for the AF pumps alarm, trip and switchover are-conservatively set to prevent air induction into the suction piping. By performing this ,
modification, the setpoint for the SK Switchover in Table 3.3-4 will be changed from its conservative limit back to the Technical
~
Specification limit. The margin of safety (200,000 gallons of. ;
available water) as defined in the basis of Technical Specification 3.4,7.1.3 will be maintained upon completion of this-modification.
s 20
-279(100891)
ZD79G l
x ._._m._ .- - _ . , , . _ . . . . _ , . . , _ _ . . _ . _ _ _ _ _ . . . . , _ . _ . .
. ~ . .._,_,a __ _ _ _._. _. . .,_.,._m
HUCLE AILF0PILhr0 VEST _ A41454 DE.SCRitTION Remove the close lutetceptot valve and load drop anticipation reference due to station desire to inhibit these function so as to eliminate the possibility of the same event as described in DVR 6-2-90 055 from occutring.
SAEETLEYALVATIO!LSUtV4AM
- 1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because the close Inter ceptor valve and load dr op ant.icipation are not referenced in the accident sect.lon of the UFSAR and t her efore will not have an affect.
- 2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safet.y Analysis Report is not created because the reliability of systems required for nafe shutdowns descr ibed le t he rSAR at e not affected as no functional changes are required to these systems.
- 3. The margin of safety, as detlued in the basis, for any Technical Speelfication, is not reduced because these are no Tech Specs af fected by thlo 11uclear Wor k Requent.
29 279(100891)
ZD79G
_.___._..__.__._.._..~_.._--.__._____._..m__.._._m__. - _ _ _ _
t SEECI ALEROCEDURILSPP_9.1:012 DESCRIPUQ!i This flush procedure will clean all high pressure nitrogen piping in the Aux building in order to remove all traces of oil. This oil was injected into the line when the ll.P. nitrogen compressor failed.
SArITLEVAWAnotL
SUMMARY
l t
- 1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, 1 or analfunction of equipment important to safety as previously i ovaluated in the l'inal Saf ety Analysis l<eport is not. Increased i because the only equipment important to safety as evaluated in the :
tirSAlt la the 01 accumulators and certain portions of the low pressure i nitrogen system. The SPP provides for temporary nitrogen to the S1 !
acewnulators during execution of this flush. The low pressure nitrogen system will remalu. f ully operable during t ho flunh. s
- 2. The possibility for art accident or analf unction et a different type :
t.han any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis lleport is
- not, created becauan although the S1 accumulators will be pressurised !
through a temporary nitrogen supply, the function will not. be changed.
- 3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis, for any Technical Specification,-!s not reduced becnuse f ull function of the HI !
accumulators 'and low pressure . nitrogen system will be maint.alned and "
monitored during the flunh procedure.
i l
t l
30-279(100091)
I ZD790'
. .m. .. -
._-._.m._ m._,_._ . _ - . _ , _ . . ; ._ , _ , _ . _ . _ _ .
l; i
t SPICIAk_NDCEDURC_GPL&D21 --
i DESCRIEI1GI t
The auto swapover of the Turbine Driven TW PP to its standby oli pump on ?ow oil pressure does not work. SSCR 91-002 raised the setpoint in order to allow the swapover to occur f ast enough to prevent a TW PP trip. This test defeats the automatic electrical swapover (which has been proven to work) in order tn test only the low oil pressure swap. The Turbine Driven TW PP will be latched .
and idling during this test. The running lube oil PP C/S la placed in pull !
out. A satisf actory test results in the standby pump start without TW PP trip, otherwise the TW Pp trips wlth no effect on the plant. }
l SALEILEVALUATIGL
SUMMARY
i t
- 1. The probability of an occurlence on the consequence of an accident, ;
or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously ;
evtAunted in the final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because an Adling TW Pp will be tested. The test has no effect on ,
- t'ae speed control circuit of the TW PP. The test only affects the ebility of the idling pump to remain latched. The test affects only r one Turbine-Driven FW PP at a time, during a period when it is not supplying water to the S/G's. The test has no direct effect on any ,
of the protective sneasures used to mitigate the consequences of this accident. . The test defeats the electrical auto start of the standby PW PP lube oil PP, in order to test its low oil pressure auto start.
The electrical auto start is reconnected per the test before its i completion. The failure mode would be unchanged because the loss of a lube oli pump will trip the Turbine Driven TW PP if the standby lube oil pump l f alls to start in time. This test only deals with an idling pump which will have no direct effect on the unit operation.
- 2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because the test will prove that a design back up feature to prevent a Turbine Driven TW PP trip ls now working as designed, or requires rework. This will reduce the possibility of a TW PP trip.
- 3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis of any Technical Speelfication, is not reduced because in this test, no Tect.. Spec was affected.
t i f t
31
! 279(100891)
- zD790 l
e--6yAGww efmy,- -ym-_g...gm...y g y, ypg y ..,,w p.i.ga _y pg ,=.pgryy.w-.9 ,p .,#97y-w-,yyy-ny p w,
- - . . - - . ~ - -
TEMPORAltLALTERAT10lL91:0:010 DESCRIPIl0M Install a tempornty hose betwecu N2 tank 011T01T and a connection in line ONTOC) 1/2 lunido the Turbine llullding. Temporary alteration will supply N2 until failed underground piping to flued.
SAtETLEYALU ATION.SVielAIM
- 1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, !
or malfunction of equi t eent impottant,t.o safety as pieviously l evaluated in tha final Saf ety Analysin Iteport la not increened j because the !!2 system does not impact any accident evaluated in the
'UFSAR.'- l 2, The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the final Saf ety Analyulo iteport 10 i not created becaune the temporary hose will funct,lon the same as the j origloal pipina. The N2 system is non aately related and the low nressute supply la not discussed in any'detall. l t
.3. The trargin of saf ety, an defined in the bania, for any Technical I 6pecification, le not reduced because it is not impacted by the low i pressure N2 system. ;
u j r
i t
t t
3 ll i
32 ,
279(100891)
ZD790 b -,--._ - . - . . - . . - - - . - . . - , , , . - , - , - - . , _ . - - .
I l
l i
I TEMtQRARLAETERAT10tLS1 0-011 l DE3CRIP110H i Install a temporary Lose between a high pressure H2 Tanker and a connection. In line OHTOC1 U2 Inside the Turbine Dullding. This temporary alteration will 1 supply high pressure H2 to ptessurite the Unit 1 S1 accumulators to return ;
Unit 1 to service. Mod!fication M20-0-91-001 la incompleted due to underground piping which failed its pneumatic test.
- EhrETL_UVALUATION_
SUMMARY
l
- 1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, e or malf unction. of equipment inipor tant to saf oty as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because accumulators will be fully pressurized and operable during modes li 2, 3. This Temporary Alteration will supply H2 the same as the original system.
- 2. The.possibillty for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is ,
not created because the nitrogen system performs no safety function ,
and 1s non-safety related. However, nitrogen is used to prosaurire the SI acewnulators and the back-up bottle rack. The acetunulators must be available.in mode 3. Presently, Unit 1 is in mode 5. i Therefore, they must be pressurised to their Tech Spec limits before the Unit can becomo operable. Sluce the S1 neewnulators are a passive system, once they are precaurised, the nitrogen la no longer-regulred except for minor adjustmenta which can be accomplished by '
the bottle rack. It accumulator pressure;is lost, the Unit enters a bCO. Theref ore, once the accumulators are pressurized, no accident or malfunction different that. cho. previously evaluated can occur.
The margin of safety, an defined in the' basis of any Technical
~
3.
Specification, is not reduced because the Si accumulator pressure is '
as outlined in the Tech Spec. The pressure limits of i.he 51 accumulators are not changed or affected by this temp alt. The ,
accumulators will be preocurized as normal and the bottle rack system
.wlli still act as back-up.
33 279(100891)
ZD790
t I
t s
TElitDRAELALTERAT10tL91:0:011
)
DESCHIPTION j This alteration will jumper the open limit switch on OSX063A to allow operation of the OA VC chl]Ier in iemote.
t SMITYEAWAT10tLSutMARX ,
1, The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, i or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously ,
evalusted in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not incroaced because the jumper is backed up with Internal cniller safety features which will protect the machine. The jumper does not affect any system t. hat controls of f-site dosage. Even !! this chiller trips on t' high condenser preneure, the redundant chiller in elsed large enough_
to carry the load.
- 2. The. possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Finni Safety Analysis Report la not created because the jumper is allowing the system to functlon in ;
a normal manner with the lateinal safety features of the chiller _,
being utilized.
- 3. The margin of safety, an defined in the basis of any Technical
-Specification, is not reduced because even after the jumper is ,
installed, the chiller will be operable and operatlng in its normal ,
configuaation.
r 34 279(100891)
ZD790-
. m m ,. - ;. . _ . . .__.__.,_..-._.._....,_._.____,.____.._,_.w._..u._a,_,.._.m . ,
r
[
I TERT 0RARLALTERAIl0lL&lz.001 1
DESCR11T10!i l l
. Temporary Alterat l on to allow the use of hose station 19 to be used as a water i source for temporary outage structures sprinkler systems, in addition to performing its design function of hand fire protection. [
EATITLIVALVAT10tL
SUMMARY
- 1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident,-
i
.or malfunction of equipment _linportant to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because fire protection has no safe. shutdown function as set forth in the fire protection report referenced by section 9.5.1-of t.he UrSAR. .
- 2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the final Safety Analysis Report is not created because fire protection has no affect on safe shutdown ,
systems but. serves to mitigate the consequences of a fire. ;
I
- 3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis, for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because fire protection is not governed by the Technical Specifications. The level of fire protect.lon is not ,
lowered.
t
?
l 1
+
P-Y 35 279(100891)
ZD79G
.. ~m. .
2 ._,._..m.,...m._.._.___m__._ _ _ _ . , _ .
c..
TCl4P01tABLALTClaT10lL91:L-002 DISCHirI1011 Tumpotaty Alteration to allow the use of hose station to be used as a water source for temporary outage structure sprinkler system in addition to performing its design function of hand fire protection.
$AEETLEVALUAT10LSUMt4ABY
- 1. The probability of an occurrence or the-consequenco of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important.to safety as previously evaluated in the final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because fire protection has no safe shutdown function as set forth in the fire-protection report, an referenced by section-9.5.1 of the tirSAR.
- 2. The possibility.for an accident on. malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is-not created because fire protection has no affect on safe shutdown systems, but serves-to mitigate the consequences of a flie.
3.- The margin of safety, as defined in t.he basis of any Technical Specification, in not reduced because fire protection is not governed by the Techulcal Specifications. The level of fire protection is not lowered.
i 1
36 279(100891).
ZD790
_ . _ . , - . . _..-_-,,--_c_2.___.,_ . ..-...__,.,__._.#.:_,.__ _ . . _ _ _ . . . - _ _ _ _ _ . . , __._x . . _ . . _ _ _ . - .
i e*>
- l TDitREARLALIClaTIGL91_1:DDP DESCRIPIIDif Disconnect the front. connector from data A 1P102JA and detector / encoder A411.CilD-8 K02 tod. The data A coll A3 is supplying etratic informat.lon to the detector / encoder catd which is then decoding thic intermittent erratic data as an Indicat.lon of 6 steps. When this 6 step code is combined with the correct data D information an urgent alarm is generated causing the display to indicate. rod bottom. This problem only happens about once per day and lasts for about $ minutes. -Disconnecting the detector from the card will cause the data A f allut e on the K02 r od which then goes to 1/2 accut acy on the data B information.
SArtTLINALUAT10tLSUMMA!W ;
- 1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, ,
or malfunction of equipment linportant to safety as previously ;
evaluated in the final Safety Analynis Report la not increased :
because the. initiating events will not be changed f rom t. hose in the r analysis ~since 'Se-DRP! Indication will still be capable of tod ,
position determu. lon within 3 12 steps. The consequences are not increased since the change is within the bounds of the analysis.. The-disconnection does not effect. the reactor trip signal generation or analysis of the accident consequences.
- 2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously. evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report la not, created because no plant equipment is being operated in a manner different from its normal operat.lon as designed. The DRPI system was
- designed with 2 data c.abinets to allow for a f ailure of one data
- train. The DRPI syste'n then goes to 1/2 accuracy on the remaining data cabinet train data. This change la bounded by the analysis.
The DRPI system is a passive system and has no act.1ve role lu moving rods.
- 3. The margin of safety, as defined in the baals, for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because normal-DRPI accaracy with both data A.and D la i 4 stepn. With data D only, the accuracy is 410, ,
-4 steps. This is within the .t 12 steps of the Lh0. The K02 fuel assembly is also an incore detector instrumented location.
37 279(100891)
- ZD79G gt< .- y'y--a-e3=--c-----%- 9 m.ev-p9'i,.,p,---w -'s>-iy-y'+g-s-97ytg-.e 7w., --9,y,9ygyw---- c-i ec- ywq e- -
,m,,y9 .y .w , myw y y-e gymym-1 y,v-yysvyy ,r-yww.-u-g-ww-e g-' iv a ,a 6 sa---,s u,*r.e ---e-wew-y+-em