ML20078D073

Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants,Vc Summer Nuclear Station,Unit 1 (Phase I), Technical Evaluation Rept

ML20078D073
Person / Time
Site:	Summer
Issue date:	08/31/1983
From:	Friederichs S EG&G, INC.
To:	NRC
Shared Package
ML20078D065	List: ML20078D073
References
CON-FIN-A-6457, RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612 EGG-HS-6371, NUDOCS 8310040123
Download: ML20078D073 (49)

Text

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e e ENCLOSURE 1

. EGG-HS-6371 4 ..

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CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 1 (PHASE I)

Docket No. 50/395 Author S. L. Friederichs Principal Technical Investigator T. H. Stickley Published August 1983 i=

EG&G Idaho, Inc.

Idaho Falls, Idaho 83415 l

Prepared for the

' U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Under DOE Contract No. DE-AC07-76ID01570 1

- FIN No. A6457 a

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i 8310040123 830916 i PDR ADOCK 05000395

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9 ABSTRACT

'l The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has requested that all nuclear '

plants, either operating or under construction, submit a response of compliancy with NUREG-0612. " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power .

Plants." EG&G Idano, Inc., has contracted with the NRC to evaluate the

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responses of those plants presently under construction. This report contains EG&G's evaluation and recommendations for Virgil C. Summer Nuclear

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Station, Unit 1.

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EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1 is not totally consistent with the guidelines of NUREG-0612. In general, inconsistencies exist in the following areas:

e Special lifting devices e Lifting devices (not specially designed) (slings)

The main report contains recommendations which will aid in making the above items consistent with the appropriate guidelines.

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CONTENTS ', -

ABSTRACT

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EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

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1. INTRODUCTION .................................................... Is

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1.1 Purpose of Review ......................................... -1

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1.2 Generic Background ........................................ I 1.3 Plant-Specific Background ................................. 3

2. EVALUATION AND BECOMM ENDATIONS . . . . . '.'. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1 Overview ........................ ......................... 4 2.2 Heavy Load Overhead Handl ing Systemi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.3 General Guidelines ........................................ 11 2.4 Interim Protection Measures ....................'.... .. . . 23 i' s , ss

3. C O N C LU D I NG S UMMA RY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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3.1 Applicable Load-Handling Systems .......................... 27 '

3.2 Gui del i n e Recomme ndati o n s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 . .

3.3 Interim Protection ........................................ 31- ~

3.4 S u mm a ry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

4. REFERENCES ...................................................... 32 TABLES 2.1 Nonexempt Heavy Load-Handling Systems ........................... 6 .

2.2 Exempt Heavy Load-Handling Systems .............................. 8 3.1 NUREG-0612 Compliance Matrix ................... ................ 29

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CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 1 PHASE I

1. INTRCDUCTION 1.1 Puroese of Review This technical evaluation report documents the EG&G Idaho, Inc.,

review of general load-handling policy and procedures at Virgil C.

Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1. This evaluation was performed with the objective of assessing conformance to the general load-handling guidelines of NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power

. Plants" [1], Section 5.1.1.

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1.2 Generic Backgrouiid  ! N. ., +

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2 Generic Technical Activity Task A-36 wa: established by the U.S.

s Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff to systematically examine

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• staff licensing criteria and the adequacy of measures in effect at g s operating nuclear pcwer plants to assure the safe handling of heavy loads and to recommend'necessary changes to these measures. This

' activity was initiatied by a letter issued by the NRC staff on May 17, 1978 [2], to all, p'ower reactor applicants, requesting infortnation

• concerning the pontrol of heavy loads near spent fuel.

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The results of Task A-36 were reported in NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants." The staff's conclusion from this evaluation was that existing measures to control the handling of heavy loads at operating plants, although providing protection from certain potential problems, do not adequately cover the major causes of load-handling accidents and should be upgraded.

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l In order to upgrade measures for the cont'rol of heavy loads,'the staff l

developed a series of guidelines dest' stied to achieve a two phase objective using an accepted approacn or protection philosophy. The first portion of the objective, achieve'd<tnrough a set of general guidelines identified in NUREG-0612,# A rticle 5.1.1, is to ensure that all load-handling systems at nuclear power plants are designed and operated such that their probability of failure is uniformly small and appropriate for the critical tasks in which they are employed. The

,sacond portion of the staff's objective, achieved through guidelines identified,in NUREG-0612, Articles 5.1.2 through 5.1.5, is to ensure that, for load-handling systems in areas where their failure might result in signif,1 cant consequences, either (a) features are provided, in addition to those required for all load-handling systems, to ensure that the potential for a load drop is extremely small (e.g., a single-failure proof crane) or (b) conservative evaluation's of load-handling accidents indicate that the potential consequences of any load drop are acceptably small. Acceptability of accident

. consequences is quantified in NUREG-0612 into four accident analysis evaluation criteria.

The approach used to develop the staff guidelines for minimizing the potential for a load ' drop was based on defense in cepth and is summarized as followsi e Provide sufficient operator training, handling system design, load-handling instructions, and equipment insoection

" to assure reliable operation of the handling system O

e, Define safe load travel paths through procedures and

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, , operator -training softhat, to the extent practical, heavy

/ loads are not carried over or near irradiated fuel or safe .

shutdown equipment m _

e - r Provide mechanical stops or electrical interlocks to prevent

" movement of heavy loads over irradiated fuel or in proximity

'to equipment associated with redundant snutdown paths.

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. Staff guidelines resulting from the foregoing are tabulated in Section 5 of NUREG-0612.

1.3 Plant-Seecific Backcround

. On December 22, 1980, the NRC issued a letter [3] to South Carolina Electric and Gas Company, the applicant for Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit I requesting that the applicant review provisions for handling and control of heavy loads at Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1; evaluate these provisions with respect to the guidelines of NUREG-0612; and provide certain additional information to be used for an independent determination of conformance to these guidelines. On June 26, 1981, Sou'th Carolina Electric and Gas Company provided the initial response [4] to this request.

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2. EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 2.1 Overview The following sections summarize South Carolina Electric and Gas Company's review of heavy load handling at Virgil C. Summer Nuclear -

Station, Unit I accompanied by EG&G's evaluation, conclusions, and recommendations to the applicant for making the facilities more consistent with the intent of NUREG-0612. The applicant has indicated the weight of a heavy load for this facility (as defined in NUREG-0612, Article 1.2) as 2500 pounds.

2.2 Heavy Load Overhead Handlino Systems This section reviews the applicant's list of overhead handling systems which are subject to the criteria of NUREG-0612 and a review of the justification for excluding overhead handling systems frem the above mentioned list.

2.2.1 Scoce

" Report the results of your review of plant arrangements to identify all overhead handling systems from which a load drop may result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal (taking no credit for any interlocks, technical specifications, operating procedures, or detailed

, structural analysis) and justify the exclusion of any overhead handling system- from your list by verifying that there is sufficient physical separation from any load-impact point and any safety-related component to permit a determination by inspection that no heavy load drop can result in damage to any system or component required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal."

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A. Summary of Aeolicant's Statements The applicant's review of overhead handling systems

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identified the cranes and hoists shown in Table 2.1 as those which handle heavy loads in the vicinity of irradiated fuel

~ or safe shutdown equipment.

The applicant has also identified numerous other cranes that

~"_ have been excluded from satisfying the criteria of the general guidelines of NUREG-0612. These are indicated in Table 2.2. These various overhead handling devices were reviewed by the applicant to criteria of NUREG 0612 and were excluded based on sufficient physical separation from any impact-load point that could damage any system or component required for plant shutdowr or decay heat removal. Some of the devices have been excluded because the applicant has indicated the " heavy load" of 2500 pounds for this facility would not be exceeded.

B. EG&G Evaluation The applicant's response indicates that each overhead handling device at the Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1 is listed in Tables 2.1 and 2.2. Figures 1 through 11 of Reference 5 shows the locations of all overhead handling systems in the plant and their proximity to safety-related components. EG&G concludes that the applicant's list of cranes and hoists in the aforementioned tables is complete and satisfies the requirements of j

NUREG-0612. The applicant performed a review of the various overhead handling devices to the criteria of NUREG-0612 by a physical inspection of the plant and by studying up-to-date layout drawings. For those devices which were excluded, the

- applicant has provided justification that indicates sufficient physical separation exists between components 5

TABLE 2.1 NON EXEMPT HEAVY LOAD-HANDLING SYSTEM VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 1 Heavy Loads Handled Load -

Crane I.D. Crane Type and Lifting Device Weicht XCR-1 Reactor Cavity Spent- and New-Fuel 2,500 lbs Manipulator Crane Assembly and Handling Tool XCR-2 Spent-Fuel Pit Spent-Fuel Assembly 2,500 lbs

&XCR-16 Bridge Crane and Handling Tool XCR-49 Fuel-Handling Fuel Transfer Canal 4,500 lbs Building, Fuel Gates and Two-Part Transfer Canal Sling Gate Hoist XCR-4 Reactor Building a) CRDM Missile 54,000 lbs Polar Crane Shields b) Upper Internals 92,000 lbs and Internals Lifting Rig c) Lower Internals 268,000 lbs and Internals Lifting Rig d) Internals Lifting 19,000 lbs Rig e) ISI Tool and 20,000 lbs Vendor-Supplied Lifting Device f) RCP Internals 48,000 lbs g) RCP Casing and 52,000 lbs Lifting Beam h) RCP Motor 77,140 lbs

1) RV Studs, Nuts, 8,500 lbs a-d Washer Stand j) Equipment Bridge 4,000 lbs k) Reactor Vessel 143,500 lbs Head Assembly, Lifting Rig, and Sling

1) Reactor Vessel 21,000 lbs Head Lifting Rig ,

XCR-23A 2-ton Manual Chain a) RB Sprague Sump 3,000 lbs

&XCR-23B Hoise and Trolley Isolation Valve .

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Haavy Loads Handled Load Crane I.D. Crane Tyoe and Lifting Device Weicht XCR-23A b) SI Recirculation Top 3,000 lbs

&XCR-23B Sumps Isolation (continued) Valves Pro-tective Chambers i XCR-36 20-ton Electric Radwaste Facility Less than or Cable Hoist and Equipment equal to maximum Trolley capacity XCR-40A, 10-ton Hand Main Steam Isolation Less than maximum XCR-408, Chain Hofsts Valves capacity XCR-40C and Trolleys XCR-46 3-ton Bridge a) Concrete Plugs 1770 lbs Crane b) Filters and Negligible Cartridges c) Storage Casks 2590 lbs XCR-47 10-ton Bridge Hot Machine Shop less than maximum Crane and Low Level capacity Waste Storage XCR-50 10-ton Bridge a) Service Water Less than maximum

& XCR-51 Crane and Hoist Traveling capacity Screen b) Service Water 14,000 lbs Pump c) Service Water 15,650 lbs Pump Motor XRW-13 3-ton Jib Crane a) Concrete Plugs 1,770 lbs b) Spent Filters Negligible and Cartridges c) Storage Casks 2,590 lbs d) Lifting Beam 1,350 lbs b

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l TABLE 2.2 EXEMPT HEAVY LOAD-HANDLING SYSTEMS VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 1 Heavy Loads Handled Load Crine I.D. Crane Tyoe and lifting Device Weight XCR-3 Fuel-Handling a) New Fuel Shipping 6,600 lbs -

Building Crane Container and Vendor-Supplied Lifting Device b) Spent-Fuel (late)

Shipping Cask and Vendor-Supplied Lifting Device c) Irradiated- (later)

Specimen Shipping Cask and Vendor-Supplied Lifting Device XCR-45 Fuel-Handling NA NA Building, (Not overhead New-Fuel Elevator handling device)

Winch XCR-17 Turbine Building General Electric Less than or equal Crane Turbine Generator to maximum and Associated capacity Power Plant Equipment XCR-18 10-ton Cable Power Plant Less than or equal Hoist and Trolley Equipment to maximum XCR-19 7.5-ton Electric Power Plant Less than or equal Cable Equipment to maximum Hoist and Trolley capacity XCR-20A 5-ton Hand Chain a) RHR Pumps 4,400 lbs

&'XCR-208 ~ Hoist and Trolley b) RHR Pump Motor 3,200 lbs XCR-21A 5-ton Manual Chain a) RB Spray Pumps 5,400 lbs Hoist and Trolley b) RB Spray Pump 5,800 lbs Motors XCR-54A, 5-ton Manual Chain SI Charging Pumps XCR-548, Hoist and Trolley a) Pump 7,500 lbs

& XCR-54C b) Base 6,000 lbs -

c) Gear 2,100 lbs d) Motor 6,700 lbs 8

, TABLE 2.2 (continued)

Heavy Loads Handled Load Crane I.D. Crane Tyoe and Liftin; Device Weight XCR-24 8-ton Hand Chain Main Steam Stop less than or equal Hoist and Trolley Valves to maximum capacity XCR-25A, 10-ton Hand Hoist Main Condenser 26,500 lbs XCR-25B, and Trolley Water Boxes XCR-25C, (2 Cranes per

& XCR-250 Water Box)

XCR-26 4-ten Hand Chain Feedwater Booster Holst and Trolley Pumps a) Pump 7,000 lbs b) Driver 8,500 lbs c) Bedplate 5,900 lbs XCR-27 5-ton Electric Power Plant Less than or equal Cable Hoist and Equipment to maximum Trolley capacity XCR-28 2-ton Electric Chemical Storage Less than or equal Cable Hoist and Containers to maximum Trolley capacity XCR-29A, 2-ton Hand- Generator Parts Less than or equal XCR-29B Operated Hoist to maximum and Trolley XCR-31 1/2-ton Hand Chain Under Heavy load NA Host and Trolley limit XCR-33 2-ton Hand Chain Turbine-Driven Hoist and Trolley Emergency Feed-water Pump a) Pump 3,000 lbs b) Base 2,400 lbs c) Driver 3,260 lbs XCR-34 1-ton Electric Under heavy load NA Cable Hoist and limit Trolley

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XCR-42 10-ton Bridge Hot Machine Shop less than or equal Crane Applications to maximum capacity i

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Heavy Loads Handled Load '

Crane I.O. Crane Tyoe and Lifting Device Weight XCR-43 10-ton Bridge Service Building Less than or equal Crane Applications to maximum -

capacity XCR-48 1-1/2-ton Hand Instrument and Less than or equal Chain Hoist and Service Air to maximum 1 Trolley Compressors cacacity XCR-53A, 2-ton Twin Hook CRDM Cable Support NA XCR-538, Extension Hoists Structures XCR-53C XRW-11 1-ton Jib Crane Under heavy load NA limit Reactor Building Equipment Hatch NA Equipment Access Hatch Door m

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- necessary for safe shutdown or decay heat removal and load-impact points. EG&G concludes that the applicant has met the requirements of NUREG-0612 concerning exclusion of

.- overhead handling systems.

.. C. EG&G Conclusions and Recommendations Since there is no information to the contrary, EG&G concludes that the applicant has included all applicable hoists and cranes in their list of handling systems which must comply with the requirements of the general guidelines of NUREG-0612. The Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1 is, therefore, consistent with the criteria of Heavy Load Overhead Handling Systems.

2.3 General Guidelines This section addresses the extent to which the applicable handling systems comply with the general guidelines of NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.1. EG&G's conclusions and recommendations are provided in summaries for each guideline.

The NRC has established seven general guidelines which must be met in order to provide the defense-in-depth approach for the handling of heavy loads. These guidelines consist of the following criteria from Section 5.1.1 of NUREG-0612:

e Guideline 1--Safe Load Paths e Guideline 2--Lead-Handling Procedures e Guideline 3--Crane Operator Training

. e Guideline 4--Special Lifting Devices e Guideline 5--Lifting Devices (not specially designed) 11

O D e Guideline 6--Cranes (Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance) e Guideline 7--Crane Design.

These seven guidelines should be satisfied for all overhead handling systems and programs in order to handle heavy loads in the vicinity of ~

c _ the reactor vessel, near spent fuel in the spent-fuel pool, or in other areas where a load drop may damage safe shutdown systems. The succeeding paragraphs address the guidelines individually.

2.3.1 Safe Load Paths [ Guideline 1, NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.1(1)]

" Safe load paths should be defined for the movement of heavy loads to minimize the potential for heavy loads, if dropped, to impact irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel and in the spent-fuel pool, or to impact safe shutdown equipment. The path should follow, to the extent practical, structural floor members, beams, etc., such that if the load is dropped, the structure is more likely to withstand the impact. These load paths should be defined in procedures, shown on equipment layout drawings, and clearly marked on the floor in the area where the load is to be handled. Deviations from defined load paths should require written alternative procedures approved by the plant safety review committee."

A. Summary of Acolicant's Statements Inside the Reactor Building, the applicant has identified areas where cranes XCR-4, XCR-53A, XCR-538, XCR-53C, and the Reactor Building equipment access hatch crane can be operated safely without damaging vital plant components or releasing radioactive material to the environment. In other

! areas, cranes XCR-1 and XCR-34 must operate where a safe load path cannot be defined. For these two cases, the applicant is developing procedures to protect vital components or mitigate radioactive releases due to an -

inadvertent load drop. Figures 4, 5, and 6 of Reference 5 describe the safe load path areas for the Reactor Building .

Cranes.

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l In the Fuel Handling Building area, cranes XCR-2 and XCR-16 operate over the spent-fuel pit where a safe load path

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canr.ot be defined. The operation of these cranes are governed by the Westinghouse Refueling Procedures which are currently being reviewed and placed into a standard format.

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. Cranes XCR-3, XCR-45, and XCRl-49 do have safe load paths defined and are shown on Figures 5 and 7 of Reference 5.

The Turbine Building cranes XCR-17, XCR-24, XCR-25A, XCR-258, XCR-25C, XCR-25D, XCR-26, and XCR-48 have safe load paths defined in the various figures of Reference 5. All have been excluded from further study or concern by the applicant.

The applicant has defined safe load paths for the Auxiliary Building cranes in the figures of Reference 5 and have excluded them from further study or concern with the exception-of XCR-23A, XCR-238, and XCR-46. These three cranes could affect safe shutdown equipment or radioactive releases. In this instance, precedures are being developed to preclude an inadvertent heavy load drop.

In the Intermediate Building, the cranes have safe load paths depicted in the figures of Reference 5 and are excluded from further study or concern with the exception of chain hoists XCR-40A, XCR-408, XCR-40C. These chain hoists service the main steam isolation valves and preliminary study has shown that a dropped valve could deform the floor l at point of impact. Consequently, the applicant is writing l

procedures to minimize the effects of an inadvertent valve l

i drop.

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Cable hoist XCR-23, in the Water Treatment Building, has a safe load path defined in Figure 1 of Reference 5 and is excluded from further study or concern as there are no components necessary for safe shutdown or for decay heat removal in the area.

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For the Diesel Generator Building, hoists XCR-29A and XCR-298 have safe load paths shown in Figure 4 of Reference 5. The applicant has chosen to exclude these .

cranes from further study or concern because of the redundancy of the diesel generator system.

The cranes located in the Drumming Station have safe load paths cefined in Figure 4 of Reference 5. Heist XCR-36 is used to handle low- and high-level radiation shipping casks and, even though an inadvertent drop could result, no damage would occur to the floor or the spent-fuel pit cooling pumps

.below. However, the applicant is preparing procedures to prevent dropping of a radwaste cask and minimize potential hazards. Crane XCR-47 is used to handle shielded and unshielded low-level waste storage containers and the applicant is preparing procedures to ensure safe handling of the containers. Jib crane XRW-11 is excluded from further study as its rated capacity is under the heavy load limit.

Jib crane XRW-13, in the same area as hoist XCR-36, is used to handie spent filters and their storage casks. The applicant is developing procedur.s to ensure proper handling of these filters to minimize possiF'lity of an inadvertent load drop.

Hot Machine Shoo crane XCR-42 has a safe load path depicted in Figure 4 of Reference 5. The applicant has excluded this crane as no components necessary for safe shutdown or decay heat removal is located in the area.

l Crane XCR-43 in the Service Building has a safe load path shown in Figure 1 of Reference 5. This crane is excluded .

from further study or concern because the Service Building does not contain equipment necessary for safe shutdown or .

dacay heat remova'.

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3 In the Service Water Intake Screen and Pumo House, cranes XCR-50 and XCR-51 are used for the service water pumps and have a safe lead path shown in Figure ~ 8 of Reference 5. The applicant is developing procedures to ensure that the cranes do not travel over an operating service water pump.

B. EG&G Evaluation For those overhead handling devices which have safe load paths, the applicant has prepared equipment layout drawings identifying the safe load paths. When no safe load can be defined, the applicant is preparing procedures to govern the operation and use of the devices. The applicant also indicated that safe load paths will be permanently marked on the walls or floor of the plant.

EG&G concludes that the applicant is consistent with the requirements of Guideline 1, Safe Load Paths, NUREG-0612.

C. EG&G Conclusions and Recommendations (1) The Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 is consistent with the criteria of Guideline 1, " Safe Load Paths," NUREG-0612, by defining safe load paths in procedures; providing equipment layout drawings sh.owing w

safe load paths; and marking load paths on floors or walls in the area where the loads are to be handled.

(2) Special procedures should be completed prior to fuel load.

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9 2.3.2 Load-Handlino Procedures [ Guideline 2, NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.1(2)1

" Procedures should be developed to cover load-handling operations

• for heavy loads that are or could be handled over or in proximity to irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment. At a minimum, procedures should cover handling of those loads listed in

• Table 3-1 of NUREG-0612. These procedures should include:

identification of required equipment; inspections and acceptance criteria required before movement of load; the steps and proper sequence to be followed in handling the load; defining the safe path; and other special precautions."

A. Summary of Applicant's Statements The applicant is developing procedures for handling heavy loads with overhead handling devices. Presently, the applicant is developing maintenance procedures to encompass overhead handling systems with respect to the safe load paths. Where safe load paths could not be defined, special lifting procedures are being developed and, where possible, special lifting instructions are incorporated inte specific component maintenance procedures.

B. EG&G Evaluation With the preparation of the necessary load-handling i

i procedures, EG&G considers the applicant to be consistent l with Guideline 2. Presently, the applicant is developing maintenance procedures to encompass overhead handling systems' with respect to the safe load paths. Where safe load paths could not be defined, special lifting procedures

are ceing developed and, where possible, special lifting instructions are incorporated into specific component ,

maintenance procedures.

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t C. EG&G Conclusions and Recommendations When the necessary load-handling procedures are prepared, the applicant will be consistent with Guideline 2, NUREG-0612. Those items delineated in the guideline concerning identification of the requireo equipment, inspections, and acceptance criteria required before movement of Icad, steps and proper sequence in handling the

__ load, defining the safe load path and other special precautions should be specifically addressed in the applicant's procedures where applicable.

2.3.3 Crane Ooerator Training [ Guideline 3, NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.1(3)1

" Crane operators should be trained, qualified, and conduct themselves in accordance with Chapter 2-3 of ANSI B30.2-1976,

' Overhead and Gantry Cranes' [6]."

A. Summary of Aeolicant's Statements The applicant conducts an extensive training program for its crane operators and riggers which meets or exceeds all the requirements of Chapter 2-3 of ANSI B30.2. The maintenance group conducts a program for the crane operators and riggers entitled, " Basic Operator and Rigger Training Program." The l crane operator and rigger training programs include in-class written examinations and in plant examinations for practical application. After a crane operator or rigger becomes qualified by the training program, an annual physical examination and a biannual retaining and requalification of the crane operators and riggers are required.

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8. EG&G Evaluation The applicant has met the criteria of' this guideline for training, qualification, and contact as specified by Chapter 2-3 of ANSI B30.2-1976. EG&G recommends the applicant review the procedures from Guideline 2 and provide '

training to permit complete familiarization with the procedures prior to their use, especially those infrequently used.

C. EG&G Conclusions and Recommendations The applicant is consistent with the criteria of '

Guideline 3, NURIG-0612, in which crane operators are trained and qualified in accordance with Chapter 2-3 of ANSI B30.2-1976 " Overhead and Gantry Cranes."

2.3.4 Soecial Lifting Devices [ Guideline 4, NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.1(4)1 "Special lifting devices should satisfy the guidelines of ANSI N14.6-1978, ' Standard for Special Lifting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000 Pounds (4500 kg) or More for Nuclear Materials' [7]. This standard should apply to all soecial lifting devices which carry heavy loads in areas as defined above. For operating plants, certain inspections and load tests may be accepted in lieu of certain material requirements in the standard. In addition, the stress design factor stated in Section 3.2.1.1 of ANSI N14.6 should be based on the combined maximum static and dynamic loads that could be imparted on the handling device based on characteristics of the crane which will be used. This is in lieu of the guideline in Section 3.2.1.1 of ANSI N14.6 which bases the stress design factor on only tne weight (static load) or the load and of the intervening components of the special handling device."

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A. Summary of Acolicant's Statements  !

The applicant's lifting devices are not consistent with ANSI l N14.6-1978. It is proposed that alternate methods for demonstration of equivalency will be provided by a detailed inspection and testing program. The applicant is developing maintenance procedures to perform frequent and periodic

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inspection which includes visual and nondestructivt examination of critical surfaces. Periodic load tests will be performed, as necessary, to verify structural adequacy of the special lifting devices. All rigging and lifting davices are controlled and maintained using the plant's computerized preventive maintenance program. The applicant's existing inspection and maintenance procedures are outlined in the plant's Mechanical and Maintenance Procedure MMP-165.8, "Use and Control of Rigging Equipment."

B. EG&G Evaluation The proposed inspection and testing program for special lifting devices partially fulfills the requirements of this guideline. The applicant should provide a design analysis including static and dynamic loads for all special handling devices, particularly those used for critical loads. The stress design factors should be addressed in the analysis.

All other aspects of ANSI N14.6 should be addressed by the applicant in their report.

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l C. EG&G Conclusions and Recommendations l

In order to be consistent with the criteria of Guideline 4,

- the applicant should:

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(1) Perform a design analysis of the special lift'ngi devices using the stress design factors for dynamic and static loads showing that these devices meet ANSI N14.6.

(2) Provide analysis for those special handling devices that are considered for critical loads.

(3) Retrieve and examine fabrication records for ANSI N14.6 compliance.

(4) Examine acceptance testing of the special handling devices, per ANSI H14.6 criteria.

(5) Load test all special handling devices, per ANSI N14.6 2.3.5 Lifting Devices (Not Soecially Designed) [ Guideline 5, NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.1(5)]

" Lifting devices that are not specially designed should be installed and used in accorcance with the guidelines of ANSI B30.9-1971, ' Slings' [8]. However, in selecting the proper sling, the load used should be the sum of the static and maximum dynamic load. The rating identified on the sling should be in terms of the ' static load' which produces the maximum static and dynamic. load. Where this restricts slings to use on only certain cranes, the slings should be clearly marked as to the cranes with which they may be used." .

A. Summary of Acclicant's Statements The applicant's lifting devices are not consistent with ANSI B30.9-1971. It is indicated that inspection and testing will provide the reliability needed for slings.

20

B. EG&G Evaluation EG&G finds that the use of slings that' are not consistent

. . with ANSI B30.9 as unacceptable. The applicant should be consistent with this guideline and ANSI B30.9. If the slings in the applicant's possession can be proof-tested to the load rating based on static and dynamic load in

~

accordance with ANSI B30.9, then by using appropriate markings, those slings can be designated for a particular service.

All the lifting devices for the plant should be installed and used in accordance with ANSI B30.9. The ratings identified on the sling should be in terms of the " static lead" which produces the maximum static and dynamic load.

Where slings are restricted to use on certain cranes, then the slings should be clearly marked to indicate which cranes they may be used with.

EG&G suggests that the applicant should select slings for lifts based on the next higher sling rating. This would preclude the applicant from accumulating slings for specific lifts and would also simplify consistency with ANSI B30.9-1971.

l l

C. EG&G Conclusions and Recommendations In order to be consistent with the requirements of this guiceline, the applicant should perform the following prior f to fuel loading.

l l

- (a) Assure that slings for the plant are installed and used f in accordance with ANSI B30.9 l -

t .

(b) Proof test the load rating. The load rating should be based on static and dynamic load.

21

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(c) Mark the slings in terms of the static load, which produces the maximum static and dynamic load.

(d) When slings are restricted to certain cranes, mark them accordingly.

2.3.6 Cranes (Insoection, Testing, and Maintenance) [ Guideline 6, NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.1(6)]

"The crane should be inspected, tested, and maintained in accordance with Chapter 2-2 of ANSI B30.2-1976, ' Overhead and Gantry Cranes,' with the exception that tests and inspections should be performed prior. to use where it is not practical to meet the frequencies of ANSI B30.2 for periodic inspection and test, or where frequency of crane use is less than the specified inspection and test frequency (e.g., the polar crane inside a PWR containment may only be used every 12 to 18 months during refueling operations, and is generally not accessible during power operation. ANSI B30.2, however, calls for certain inspections to be performed daily or monthly. For such cranes having limited usage, the inspections, test, and maintenance should be performed prior to their use)."

A. Summary of Acolicant's Statements The applicant's cranes and rigging equipment are maintained, tested, and inspected to the requirements of ANSI B30.2, Chapter 2-2, by the Plant's Computered history and maintenance program.

B. EG&G Evaluation i

EG&G considers that the applicant is consistent with the criteria of NUREG-0612 for inspection, testing, and maintenance of theft cranes and rigging equipment.

22

C. EG&G Conclusions and Recommendations The applicant is consistent with the criteria of

- Guideline 6, NUREG-0612, in which their cranes and rigging equipment are inspected, tested, and maintained in accordance with Chapter 2-2 of ANSI B30.2-1976.

2.3.7 ' Crane Desion [ Guideline 7, NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.1(7)]

"The crane should be designed to meet the applicable criteria and guidelines of Chapter 2-1 of ANSI B30.2-1976, ' Overhead and Gantry Cranes,' and of CMAA-70, ' Specifications for Electric Overhead Traveling Cranes' [9]. An alternative to a specification in ANSI B30.2 or CMAA-70 may be accepted in lieu of specific compliance if the intent of the specification is sati sfi ed."

A. Summary of Aeolicant's Statements All the applicant's cranes and hoists have been designed in accordance with CMAA Specification 70 and ANSI B30.2 Chapter 2-1.

B. EG&G Evaluation EG&G considers the applicant to have all its cranes designed in accordance with CMAA-70 or ANSI S30.2.

C. EG&G Conclusions and Recommendations (1) The Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 is l

consistent with the criteria of NUREG-0612, Guideline 7 on Crane design.

2.4 Interim Protection Measures The NRC staff has established (NUREG-0612, Article 5.3) that six measures should be initiated to provide reasonable assurance that 23

1

. . I

. handling of heavy loads will be performed in a safe manner until final implementation of the general guidelines of NUREG-0612, Article 5.1, '

is complete. Four of these six interim measures consist of general Guideline 1, Safe Load Paths; Guideline 2, Load-Handling Procedures; Guideline 3, Crane Operator Training; and Guideline 6, Cranes (Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance). The two remaining interim

^

_ measures cover the following criteria:

o Heavy load technical specifications o Special review for heavy loads handled over the core.

Applicant implementation and evaluation of these interim protection measures is contained in the succeeding paragraphs of this section.

2.4.1 Interim Protection Measure 1--Technical Soecifications

" Licenses for all operating reactors not having a single-failure proof overhead crane in the fuel storage pool area should be revised to include a specification comparable to Standard Technical Specification 3.9.7, ' Crane Travel - Spent Fuel Storage Pool Building,' for PWRs and Standard Technical Specification 3.9.6.2, ' Crane Travel,' fo'r EWRs, to prohibit handling of heavy loads over fuel in the storage pool until implementation of measures which satisfy the guidelines of Section 5.1."

A. Summary of Acolicant's Statements Not applicable. Plant is not operational.

B. EG&G Evaluations, Conclusions and Recemmendations Not applicable. Plant is not operational.

O 24

2.4.2 Interim Protection Measures 2, 3, 4. and 5 - Administrative Controls

.- " Procedural or administrative measures [ including safe load paths, load-handling procedures, crane operator training, and crane inspection]... can be accomplished in a short time period .

and need not be delayed for completion of evaluations and modifications to satisfy the guidelines of Section 5.1 of

[NUREG-0612]."

A. Summary of Acclicant's Statements Summaries of applicant's statements are contained in discussions of the respective general guidelines in Sections 2.3.1, 2.3.2, 2.3.3, and 2.3.6, respectively.

B. EG&G Evaluations, Conclusions, and Recommendations EG&G evaluations, conclusions, and recommendations are contained in discussions of the respective general guidelines in Sections 2.3.1, 2.3.2, 2.3.3, and 2.3.6.

2.4.3 Interim Protection Measure 6--Soecial Review for Heavy Loads Over the Core "Special attention should be given to procedures, equipment, and personnel for the handling-of heavy loads over the core, such as vessel internals or vessel inspection tools. This special review should include the following for these loads: (a) review of procedures for installation of rigging or lifting devices and

movement of the load to assure that sufficient detail is provided l and that instructions are clear.and concise; (b)-visual I inspections of load-bearing components of cranes, slings, and special lifting devices to identify flaw < or deficiencies that could lead to failure of the component; (c) appropriate repair and replacement of defective components; and (d) verify that the

. crane operators nave been properly trained and are familiar with specific procedures used in handling these loads, e.g., hand

[, signals, conduct of operations, and content of procedures."

25

. A. Summary of Acolicant's Statements No applicable. Plant is not operational.

B. EG&G Evaluation Not applicable. Plant is not operational.

C. EG&G Cenclusion Not applicable. Plant is not operational.

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26

9

3. CCNCLUDING

SUMMARY

3.1 Acolicable Load-Handling Systems

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The list of cranes and hoists supplied by the applicant as being subject to the provisions of NUREG-0612 is apparently ccmplete (see Section 2.2.1).

3.2 Guideline Recommendations Consistency with the seven NRC guidelines for heavy load handling (Section 2.3) are not satisfied at Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1. This conclusion is represented in tabular form as Table 3.1.

Specific recommendations to aid in consistency with the intent of these guidelines are provided as follows:

Guideline Recommendation

1. Section 2.3.1 a. Consistent with guideline.

2. Section 2.3.2 a. Consistent with guideline.

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3. Section 2.3.3 a. Consistent with guideline.

4. Section 2.3.4 a. Partially consistent with guideline. See Table 3.1 Compliance Matrix 27

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, Guideline Recommendation ,

5. Section 2.3.5 a. Not consistent with guideline. .

6. Section 2.3.6 a. Consistent with guideline.

7. Section 2.3.7 a. Consistent with guideline.

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. t' TABLE 3.1. -'

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/ Weight Guideline I Guideline 4 Guideline 6

, . or Guideline I Crane ' Special Crane-Test

'- , Heavy Capacity Safe Load Guideline 2 Operator Lifting Guideline 5 and Guideline 7 Equipment Designattoo Loads (tons) Paths Procedures . Training Devices Slings . Inspection Design t r Reactor Cavity Manipulator .

C

.C 2 C . C C NC NC C Crane--XCR-1 i C NC NC C Spent Fuel Pit Bridge Crane--XCR-2 .C e / 2 C C C Spent Fuel Pit Brtilge Crane C .-- C, C, C NC NC C C Protex Cable Reel--XCR-16 -; '

/-- x--

Fue!: Transfer Canal Gate NC C C 3 C / C C --

lloist--XCH-49 -

C C C NC NC C C Heactor Building Polar Crane--XCH-4 C 360/25 C C C C NC C C Iurbine Building Crane--XCR-16 C 220/30 C

1. C C C NC C C Holst--XLR-20B C 5 C

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e Auxillary Building Elevation .

C C --

f C ' 2 C C C C ,

412 Holst-XCR-23A '

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• Auxilfary Building Elevatica C 2 C C C C NC C /C < '~_

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412 Holst--XCR-238 '

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fL lisist--ICR-258 ,

!!o ist--XCH-25C - , ,

Holst--XCH-25D  ;, ,,

,,- , ,y Drumming Station Holst--XCR-36 C 20 C C C C NC . C- C Intermediate Building C 10 C C C C NC C Elevation 536 Holsts--XCR-40A C Intermediate Building Elevation 536 Holsts--XCR-408 Intermediate Building E levation 536 Holsts--XCR-40C 3 C C C NC NC C C Elevation 463 Crane--XCR-46 C

TABLE 3.1. (continued)

N' Weight Guideline 3 Guideline 4 Guideline 6 or Guideline I Crane Special Crane-Test Heavy Capacity Safe Lead Guideline 2 Operator Lifting Guideline 5 and Guideline 1 Lautpment Designation Loads (tons) Paths Procedures Training Devices Slings Inspection Design Drumming Station Crane--XCR-47 C 10 C C C C NC C C Traveling Screens Holst--XLR-50 C 10 C C C C NC C *C Service Water Pumps Crane--XCR-51 C 10 C C C C NC C C CHUM Cable Support N-Drumming Station Jib Crane--XRW-13 C 3 C C C C NC C C

• C = Applicant action is consistent with NUREG-0612 Guideline.

NC

• Appilcant action is nct consistent with NUREG-0612 Guideline

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3.3 Interim Protectier EG&G's evaluation of information provided by the applicant indicates that the following actions are necessary to ensure that the six NRC staff measures for interim protection at the Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit I are met:

Interim Measure . Recommendaticn

1. If consistency with all seven guidelines of NUREG-0612 Section 5.1 cannot be achiesed by plant operational startuo, interim protective measures, as indicated in NUREG-0612 Article 5.3, must be completed prior to operation and refueling.

3.4 Summary The applicant's action is consistent with four of the NRC guidelines for heavy load handling at the Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1. These are Safe Load Paths, Load-Handling Procedures, Crane Operator Training, and Crane Design, and Cranes (Inspection, Testing and Maintenance). Partial consistency is met with Guideline 4, Special Lifting Devices, and there is no consistency with Guideline 5, Lifting Devices (Not Specially Designed).

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. 31

- 4 REFERENCES

1. NUREG-0612, Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants, NRC.

2. V. Stello, Jr. (NRC), Letter to all acplicants.

Subject:

Recuest for '.

Additional Information on Control of Heavy Loads Near Spent Fuel, NRC, 17 May 1978.

3. 'JSNRC, Letter to South Carolina Electric and Gas Company.

Subject:

NRC Request for Additional Information en Control of Heavy Loads Near Spent Fuel, NRC, 22 December 1980.

4 T. C. Nichols, Jr., South Carolina Electric and Gas Company, Letter to H. R. Denton (NRC)

Subject:

Response to Staff Position, Interim Actions for Control of Heavy Loads, dated June 25, 1981.

5. Gilbert Associates, Inc., GAI Report No. 2289, " Control of Heavy Loacs of Nuclear Power Plants--Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station Unit 1."

6. ANSI B30.2-1976, " Overhead and Gantry Cranes."

7. ANSI N14.6-1978, " Standard for Lifting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000 Pounds (4500 kg) or more for Nuclear Materials."

8. ANSI B30.9-1971, " Slings."

9. CMAA-70, " Specifications for Electric Overhead Traveling Cranes."

32

NRC somu 335 U.s. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BISLIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET EGG-HS-6371 4 TITLE AND SV87tTLE 2. (Leave erasef Control of Heavy 1. cads at Nuclear Power Plants 3. aEcPIENT s ACCEsSicN NO.

Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1 (Phase I)

Docket No 50/395

7. AUTMOR tS3 5. DATE REPORT COMPLETED

• uoNTH lveAm S. L. Friederichs, T. H. Stickley August 1983

9. PER50RMING QRGANt2ATION NAME AND MAILING ACORESS Ilaeiver l<a Coors DATE t'tPORT ISSUED

• woNTM lYEAp October 1983 EG&G Idaho, Inc. , ,c,,,, ,,,,,,

Idaho Falls, ID 83415

8. (Leave Oranti

12. SPON$0 RING ORGANIZATION NAME AND MAILING ACORESS (tacevoe 1,o Cooe8 , y Division of Systems Integration

, , . ,,y yo .

Office of auciear neactor xeguiation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission A6457 Washington, DC 20555 et mICO CQvg mE O sinetus,ve oansJ 13 TYPE OF REPORT 14 iLeave m esaJ

15. SUPPLEVENTA Av NOTES

16. ABSTR ACT (200 woros or sesst The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has requested that all nuclear plants, either operating or under construction, submit a response of consistency with NUREG-0612,

" Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants." EG&G Idaho, Inc. has contracted with the NRC to evaluate the responses of those plants presently under construction.

This repcrt contains EG&G's evaluation and recom.endations for Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1.

17s CESCRIPYORS 17 (EY .'v0RCS AND DOCUMENT AN ALYSIS e

175 ICENTIFtERS.CPEN ENCEO TE AMS 19 SECUR,TV OLASS ITa s resorti 29 NO 058 AGES 18 Av ATLA 8tLITY ST ATEVENT Make available only as specifically approved Unclassified

by program office. 20yQjyssIlNE'#'~' l -

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ENCt.05UPI 2 SYNOPSIS OF ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH NUREG 0612 The fo!!owing Information is provided to identify exceptions or interpretations related to verbatim compliance with NUREG 0612 Guidelines that have occurred during the course of this review. For each of the major Guidelines specific exceptions are ident!fied, a discession concerning the underlying objective of that Guiceline is provided, and approaches felt to be consistent and inconsistent with that guideline are identified. While each such exception has been handled on a case by case basis, and has been considered in light of overall compliance with NUREG 0612 at a particular plant, the topics are of a nature general enough to be of interest to other plants.

S 1

1 GUIDEi.!NE I SAFE LOAD PATHS Exception 1 In the opinien of the licensee, development of individual load paths is impractical since there are a significant number of loads for which the pickup and

!aydown areas vary from outage to outage. Further, in some cases the location of 4

safety relate (equipment combined with the design of the floor over which heavy Joads are carried indicates that for a number of lifts there is no preferred load path.

Discussion The purpose of this portion of Guideline 1 is to ensure that the i

paths over which heavy loads are carried have been developed and approved in advance of the lif t and are based on consid? rations of safety. In particular it is provided to avoid the ad hoc selection of load paths by maintenance personnel since such a situation I

. could resu:t in the use of a load path which has been established by a process wherein considerations other than safety have taken precedence.

It is recognized that there are a class of loads which, although in excess of the weight specified for classification as a heavy load, are actually miscellan-eous or maintenance related loads for which it is impractical to ldentify a specific '

laydown area which can be fixed from outage to outage. Conversely there are a number of loads for which specific laydown areas have been allocated in the original plant design and which should reasonably be expected to be carried over the same load paths during every outage. A tabulation of loads in this latter category, generally applicable to PWR's and BWR's, was provided in NUREG 0612 as Table 3-1.

' A fundamental principal of NUREG 0612 is protection through defense in depth. Specifically, the first line of protection from an accident which could result in caman to spent fuel or equipment required for safe shutdown or decay heat removal

!s te avc d or minimize the expcsure of such equipment to crane borne loads overhead.

Where such exposure is minimized, rather than avoided, a second line of defense can then be provided by 16tervening barriers such as floors or the provision of additional lifting device redundancy or safety factors. Considering the foregoing, the use of exclusion areas, rather than safe load paths, is consistent with this gdideline only under circumstances where there is no safety related equipment located beneath the area accessible to the crane hook but outside of the exclusion area. This situation has been found in buildings such as the turbine hall or screen house where safety related equipment is concentrated in a specific area within the crane path. It is unlikely l to occur within containment due to the numerous safety related piping and electrical ,

systems provided to support decay heat removal.

Approaches Consistent With This Guideline Specific safe load paths are prepared and approved for major components for which hazardous areas are well estab!!shed. For miscellaneous lifts load corridors are established such that any movement within that corridor cannot result in carrying a heavy load over spent fuel or systems required for safe shutdown or decay heat removal (regardless of Intervening floors). Movement within these corridors is at the discretion of the load handling party.

Specific safe load paths are prepared and approved for major components for which hazardous areas are well established. For miscellaneous lif ts detailed direct-ions are prepared and approved for developing safe load paths which include floor plans showing the location of safety related equipment and instructions to avoid such equipment. Specific safe load paths are then prepared each time a miscellaneous lift qualifying as a heavy load is made. These individual load paths are temporary and may change from outage to outage. -

1 2

Acoroachrs Inconsistent With this Guideline, Use of limited exclusion areas in containment which merely prohibited the carrying of heavy loads directly over the core or specific components and allow full load handling party discretion in other areas.

Exception 2 In the opinion of the licensee marking of load. paths on the floor is impractical. This may be caused by the general use of temporary floor coverings which would cover the load path markings, or, due to the number of loads involved, a requirement for multiple markings which could confuse the crane operator.

Discussion The purpose of this feature of Guideline i is to provide visual aids to assist the operator and supervisor in ensuring that designated safe load paths are actua!]y followed. In the case of the operator it has the additional function of avoiding undesirable distractions while handling suspended loads (e.g., trying to read procedural steps or drawings while controlling the crane). This feature should also be seen as a provision necessary to complete a plan for the implementation of safe load paths.

Specifically it provides some additional assurance that, having spent the time and effort to develop se.fe load paths, those paths will be followed.

Approaches Consistent With this Guideline Rather than mark load paths a second member of the load handling party (that is, other than the crane operator)is made responsible for assuring that t'e designated safe load path is fe!! awed. This second persen, a sig a!n an is typica!!y med on cab c;erated cranes, checks out the safe load path prior to the lif t to ensure that it is clear, refers to the safe load path guidance during the lift and prevides direct-is- to the operator and that the load path is followed. To support this approach the duces and responsib!!! ties of each member of the load handling party should be clearly defined.

Prior to a lif t the appropriate load path is temporarily marked (repe, pylons, etc.) to provide a visual reference for the crane operator. In cases where the load path cannot be marked (e.g., transfer of the upper internals in a PTR) temporary or permanent match marks can be employed to assist in positioning the bridge and/or trolley during the lif t.

In either case reasonable engineering judgement would indicate that in certain specific lif ts marking of safe load paths is unnecessary due to physical constraints on the load handling operation (e.g., simple hoists, monorails, or very short lif ts where movement is limited to one coordinate axis in addition to the vertical).

Approaches Inconsistent With this Guideline Positions which in effect do not recognize the need for realistically providing visual aids to the crane operator and imply that, for all lif ts, the operator will remember the load path from review of procedures or by reference to a drawing.

Exception 3 Obtaining written alternative procedures approved by the plant safety review committee for any deviations from a safe load path is considered too cumbersome to accommodate the handling of maintenance loads where laydown areas may have to change or load paths altered as a result of unanticipated maintenance requirements.

4 3

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• Discussion Th2 purpose of this portion of this guidaline is to ensure that deviaticris from established safe load paths receive a level of review appropriate to their safety significance. In general it is highly desirable that once safe load paths are established

~

they are retained and kept clear of interference rather than routinely deviated from.

lt is recognized, however, that issues associated with plant safety are the responsibility of an individual licensee plant safc7 review committee (or equivalent) and the details of their excercizing this responsibility should be within their jurisdiction.

Accroach Consistent With this Guideline A plant safety review committee (or equivalenti delegates the respon-sibility for approving temporary changes to safe load paths to a person, who may or may not be a member of that committee, with appropriate training ud education in the area of plant safety. Such changes are reviewed by the safety review committee in the normal course of events. Any permanent alteration to a safe load path is approved by the p! ant safety review committee.

Accroach Inconsistent With this Guideline Activities which in effect allow decisions as to deviations from safe load paths to be made by persons not specifically designated by the plant safety review committee.

d 6

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GUIDELINE 2 LOAD HANDLING PROCEDURES No significant exceptions to this guideline have been encountered.

Occasionally a question arises concerning the need for individual procedures for each lif t, in general, it was not the purpose of this guideline to require separate procedures for each lif t. A reasonable approach is to provide separate procedures for each major lif t (e.g., RV head, core internals, fuel cask) and use a general procedure for handling other heavy loads as long as load specific details (e.g., load paths, equipment requirements) are provided in an attachmenu or encjosures.

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GUIDELINE 3 CRANE OPERATOR TRAINING Excention The only exception occassionally encountered with respect to this Guideline other than fairly minor, site unique, exceptions has been a desire to deviate from the requirement of ANSI B30.2-3.1.7.o for testing of all controls before beginning a new shift. In some cases a licensee has qualified a commitment in this area by noting that only crane controls "necessary for crane operation" wl!! be tested at the start of a shif t.

j Discussion This requirement (ie. not a recommendation) of ANSI B30.2 is important since crane control system failures are relatively significant contributors to load hancling incidents. The only reason that can be seen for an exception in this area

, is a general aversion to the word "all". Specifically,it appears that some licensees fear that a commitment to this requirement will force them to test all control type devices (eg. motor overloads, load cells, emergency brakes) rather than just those features generally known as controls (ie. hoist, bridge, and trolley motion controllers).

Approaches Consistent With this Guideline Exceptions that clearly indicate that all normal controls (hoist, bridge, and trolley motion controllers) will be tested at the start of each shift and that the pJrpose of not Committing to "all" Controls is to avoid a misunderstending concerning other control devices.

Accroaches Inconsistent With This Guideline

. A response that implies that a decis:en to test or not test a normal contre! will be made by the crane operator on the basis of what type of lif t or direction of motion he expects for the forthcoming shif t.

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6

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GUIDELINE 4 SPECIAL LIFTING DEVICES

. Exception 1 Some licensees have indicated that their special lif ting devices were designed and procured prior to the publication of ANSI N14.6 and therefore are not designed in accordance with that standard. This fact is sometimes combined with a reference to the title of that standard to reach a conclusion that the standard is not applicable.

Discussion The purpose of this section is to ensure that speciallif ting devices were designed and constructed under controlled conditions and that sufficient document-ation is available to establish existing design stress margins and support future mainten-ance and repair requirements. ANSI N14.6 is an existing standard that provides require-ments supporting this goal for lif ting device applications where the consequence of a failure could be similar to that which could be expected in the event of the failure of a speciallifting device carrying a load within the jurisdiction of NUREG 0612.

Consequently it seems appropriate that for special lifting devices subject to NUREG

< 0612 it should be able to be demonstrated that, from a design standpoint, they are as reliable as a device for which ANSI N14.6 was developed.

Approaches Consistent With This Guideline Although not originally specified to be designed in accordance with ANSI N14.6 the special lif ting device in question was provided by a reactor vendor, ie. a:::rdance with appropriate quality assurance and quality control procedures, for a r .:!!i: app lication associated with power plant compor.ents provided by that vendor.

Eased en either the review of the original stress report or, if such a stress report is unava!!able, the preparation of a new stress report, the licensee has determined that margins to material yield and ultimate strength are comparable to those specified in ANSI N14.6. Although not required of the lif ting device vendor, the licensee has

. reviewed the design of the lifting device and prepared a list of critical components whose repair or replacement should be performed under controlled conditions.

Approaches Inconsistent With This Guideline No information is available concerning the original design but it is probably allright because the device has been used for ten years and never failed.

The device was built before the publication of ANSI N14.6, does not carry shipping containers of nuclear material weighing more than 10,000 pounds, and thus need not comply with ANSI N14.6.

Exception 2 No 150% overload test has been performed and,in the opinion of the licensee, such a test is impractical.

Discussion The performance of a load test in excess of the load subject to NUREG 0612 is an important contributor to the ability to assess the overall reliability of a device. Such a test supplements design reliability by demonstrating that the device was properly tabricated or assembled and that a portion of the design safety margin has been demonstrated. Such proof of workmanship is particularly important for a fairly complicated device. It is recognized, however, that the specification of a 150% overload test is somewhat arbitrary and that, in some cases, the nature of the device is such that the likiihood of workmanship shortcomings is remote.

7

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Aporoechts Consistent With This Guideline The licensee has evaluated the lif ting device in question and has

- determined that design stress margins are substantial. Further it has been established

, that the device itself is uncomplicated and principally put together with mechanical joints such that an assembly error is highly unlikely. The use of welded joints is severly limited and where employed were performed in accordance with substantial quality 1

controls (eg AWS DI.1) including NDE. The device has been tested to 100% of rated lead.

Although a 150% overload test has not been performed the lifting device has been subjected to a manufacturer recommended overload to demonstrate proof of workmanship (typically 120-125 %).

Aporoaches Inconsistent With This Guideline See this topic for Exception I above.

Exception 3 The requirement of ANSI N14.6 for an annual 150% load test or ful! NDE is excessive. Both the load test (due to the inability to make the test lift within containment) and the NDE (due to the need to remove protective coatings) are impractical and not justified by the infrequent use of these devices.

Discussion A continuing inspection program to assure the continued maintenance ef safety margins incorporated in the original design of the device is important to cemonstrate the reliability of speciallif ting devices. It is recognized, however, that some devices employed in a nuclear power plant, particularly those associated with refueling, are used under conditions of control and at frequencies of use that are substant-la:Iy less severe than that possible for the type of lif ting device for which ANSI N14.6 was originally prepared. Consequently a reasonable relaxation of the inspection interval seems appropriate.

Approaches Consistent With This Guideline Overload tests will be conducted but at a longer interval,5 years, between tests to be consistent with the number of operational lif ts required.

NDE of load bearing welds will be conducted at 5 year intervals or, alternatively, load bearing welds will be examined through a program that ensures i

that all welds will be examined over a normal inservice inspection interval of 10 years

• i in a manner similar to that specified in the B&PV Code for Class 2 Component Supports.

Approach inconsistent With This Guideline Continuing inspection will be limited to an annual visual examination of the device.

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- GUIDELINE 5 LIFUNG ' DEVICES NOT SPECIALLY DESIGNED Exce: tion Licensees have taken exception to the requirement to select slings in accordance with the maximum working load tables of ANSI B30.9 considering the sum of static and dynamic loads. Most commonly it is the licensees position that the approximate factor of safety of five on rope breaking strength inherent in these tables adequately accomodates dynamic loading.

Discussion The intent of this portion of this Guideline, which also applies to special lif ting devices under Guideline 4,is to reserve the ANSI B30.9 safety factors for accomodating sling wear and unanticipated overloads and avoid a reduction of this safety factor as a result of the routine dynamic loads inherent in book / load accel-eration and deceleration. While it is acknowledged that, for operating characteristics typical of cranes employed at nuclear power plants, these dynamic loads are unlikely to be substantial, such a determination cannot be made generically. Typically the actual dynamic load due to hook / load acceleration or deceleration is a function of design book speeds and the type of hoist control system employed. It should also be recalled that ANSI B30.9 is a general industrial standard which applies to al! load

. handling devices and does not in itself provide for any additional conservatism in consid-eration of the potential consequences of a load handling accident at a nuclear power plant. Based on this, it is considered reasonable that individual licensees evaluate the potential contribution of dynamic loading in their operations and if such dynamic loading is indeed significant accomodate it in their procedures for sling selection.

A:o oach Consistent Tith This Guideline The licensee has evaluated the potential routine dynamic loading for lif t! -; devices not specia!!y desig .ed and found them to be a re:atively small fraction byp:ca;;y 5-159s) ef static load. This estimate has been made on the basis of either calculated acceleration and deceleration rates or through use of the industrial standard for impact loading of cranes specified in CMAA-70. In either case having verified that routine dynamic loading of a specific hoist is indeed small the licensee has drawn the conclusion that revised selection criteria to accomodate such minor additional loads will not have a substantial effect on overall load handling reliability.

Approach Inconsistent With This Guideline Statement to the effect that dynamic loads are accomodated in the tables of ANSI B30.9 with no indication that the licensee has assessed the actual dynamic loading imposed on cranes subject to NUREG 0612.

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l *. GUIDE!.!NE 6 CRANE INSPECTION TESTING AND MAINTENANCE, l

Exceotion The only exception occasionally encountered with respect to this Guideline other than fairly minor and site-unique exceptions has been a desire to deviate from the requirement of ANSI B30.2-1.1.2.a.2 and 3.2.4 for testing of hoist limit devices before beginning a new shift. In some cases a licensee has qualified a commitment in this area bf noting that this limit switch will be tested only if operations in the

. vicinity of the limit switch are anticipated.

{ Discussion While this issue is treated somewhat ambigously in ANSI B30.2 (it is a recommendation in article 1.1.2 and a requirement in article 3.2.4)it is important since two-blocking incidents are relatively significant contributors to load handling incidents. Further it should be noted that this test has been incorporated.as a require-

, ment of OSHA in 29 CFR 1910.179.(n).(4).(i). It is recognized, however, that there may be circumstances where such a test is not prudent. First, such a test clearly should not be made with the hook under load. Consequently if a shif t char.ge is made with the hook loaded (this, by the way, is not a desireable practice and could be preclud-ed through strict compliance with ANSI B30.2-3.2.3.]) a hoist limit switch test should not be performed. Second, there may be circumstances where the nature of forthcoming load handling operations indicates that the time (and minor risk) associated with this test is not justified. In particular if it is known that a hoist will not be used or used only in an area substantially removed from the upper travel limit, it would seem reason-a::le to defer the limit switch test until the start of the next shif t. If such an approach is uken, h: wever,it should be approached with care. Requirements for deferring an upper limit switch test should accomodate the uncertainty associated with maintenance p!ans and establish unambiguous criteria concerning what operations can be determined to be remete from upper travel limits. Such criteria should recognize that the need for upper travel limit switch protection may be preceeded by a control system f ailure and consequently should conservatively allow for operater response time and potential delays associated with emergency shutdown of the crane.

Aporoach Consistent With This Guideline General compliance with this requirement. Certain specific provisions made for deferring upper limit switch testing under conditions that are not subject to operater interpretation.

Aporoaches Inconsistent With This Guideline An approach that implies that a decision to test or not is left to the discretion of the operator or implies that such a test will be required only if operat-ions are planned in close proximity to the hook upper travel limit.

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• GUIDELINE 7 CRANE DESIGN

' Exception

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• Occasionally a licensee has indicated that the overhead electric travelling cranes employed at a site were purchased prior to the publication of CMAA-70 or ANSI B30.2-1976 and thus these standards should not be applied.

Discussion Tne purpose of this Guideline is to ensure that all cranes carrying heavy loads in nuclear power plants meet certain minimum criteria in their design and, consequently, can be assumed to provide an acceptable standard of mechanical, electrical, and structural reliability. It is also recognized, however, that cranes in operating plants may have been designed and procured prior to the publication of current standards and, thus, not strictly comply with some details of these standards.

In general, though, current standards have evolved from predecesor standards in existence at the time of crane procurement (EOCI 61, ANSI B30.2-1967) and, since the later standards are not revolutionary, it is likely that cranes at nuclear power plants will provide a degree of reliability equivalent to that provided by the current standards.

Such a general determination canot be made, however, by the staff since nuclear power plant cranes are usually unique and provided with site specific design features.

It is up to the licensee then to make a systematic comparison of their crane design with the requirements of current standards and determine if additional design features are appropriate.

Aceroach Cens! stent With This Guideline Tne licensee has compared original crane procurement specifications or existing crane designs with the requirements of the referenced stancards in areas effecting load handling reliability. In instances where the current standard provides additicnal protection against the consequences of operater error or component failure the licensee has proposed modifications which will result in a degree of load handling reliability similar to that provided in the current standard.

Approach Inconsistent With This Guideline Positions to the effect that the cranes satisfied standards in existence at the time of procurement and what was good enough then is good enough now.

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F-a s Document Name:

CONTROL HVY LOADS EVELYN Requestor's ID:

EVELYN Author's Name:

J. Hopkins -

Document Coments:

Control of Heavy Loads (NUREG-0612) Virgil C. Sumer .

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