ML20077H996

Response to Util Objections & NRC Response to Intervenor 830726 Revised Emergency Planning Contentions.Adequate Basis Given for All Contentions.Contentions Which Could Have Been Raised in Phase I Not Waived.Certificate of Svc Encl

ML20077H996
Person / Time
Site:	Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png
Issue date:	08/08/1983
From:	Jay Dougherty AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED, SHOREHAM OPPONENTS COALITION
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
References
ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8308120153
Download: ML20077H996 (26)

Text

'

l 00CKETED

, USNRC 8/08/83

'85 AUG 11 NO:39 UNITED STATES .OF AMERifbCE OF SEClitit -

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM3DB6Kpite G & SERVI:.'

BRANC61 3 Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board

)

)

In the Matter of )

) Docket No. 50-322 (OL)

LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY )

)

(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )

Unit 1) )

)

)

SHOREHAM OPPONENTS COALITION'S RESPONSE TO LILCO'S OBJECTIONS TO INTERVENORS " REVISED EMERGENCY PLANNING CONTENTIONS" AND NRC STAFF RESPONSE TO

~

REVISED EMERGENCY PLANNING CONTENTIONS shoreham opponents Coalition (" SOC") submits this response to the objections filed by LILCO and the NRC Staff to the revised contentions filed jointly by the Intervenors on July 26, 1983.

Counsel regrets that a lack of time precluded the consolidation of this responsc with a similar response or responses to be~ filed by other intervenors.

An effort has been made to avoid needless duplication of argument with respect to the generic issues that 8308120153 830008 PDR ADOCK 05000322

, O PDR

f j =

are extant. For the most part this response focuses specifically on the objections that have been raised with respect to those contentions for which SOC has been designated the lead inter-venor.

The " Lack of Basis" Objections LILCO and the Staff have asserted that in many specific respects the Intervenors' cont'entions lack a " basis." But they have done little to explain what they mean by this, and their brief explanations do not jibe with the objections.they have raised. LILCO interprets the " basis" requirement to mean that

~

the proponent of a contention must provide "a reason to believe j the contention may be -true."- LILCO's uJ' ly 8 Objections at 4. Yet even where the reasoning underlying . given contentions .is plain, LILCs has raised " basis" objections. The Staf f has. stated that

it interprets the " basis" requirement to require only that .the contention "be sufficient to assure that the parties are on i

notice as to the precise issues that will be litigated." S taf f Objections at 2. Yet several unexceptionally specific l

{ contentions have been branded by the Staff with a " lack of basis" objection.

Suffolk County's July 12 response to both LILCO's July 8 Objections and the Staf f's July 7 Objection to earlier draft

contentions lays out the guiding principles surrounding the

" basis" requirement. In a nutshell, an intervenor need not demonstrate that a given contention is supported by evidence, nor even that it is well-taken. Houston Power & Light Co. ( Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Sta., Unit 1), ALAB-590, 11 NRC 542 (1980); Mississippi Power &_ Light Co. (Grand Gulf Nuclear S ta.,

Units 1 and 2), ALAB-130, 6 AEC 423 (1973). Even where a conten-tion is demonstrably " dead wrong," it may nevertheless be per-fectly admissible. Grand Gulf, supra. NRC rules of practice provide that such contentions are to be eliminated not at the threshold, i.e., the prehearing conference stage, but by means of summary disposition pursuant to 10 C.F.R. S 2.749.

In Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), LBP-81-24,16 NRC 175 (1980), one interven-or, the Sunflower Coalition, had submitted a single contention alleging generally the inadequacy of the Applicant's emergency plan. It supported this contention with oral statements at the prehearing conference to the effect that the local road network would prevent a successful evacuation, that there were too few buses and tow trucks to support an evacuation, and that local firefighters would be unable to carry out their assigned respon-sibilities. The Applicant and the Staf f both opposed the admis-sion of the contention on the ground that it was supported merely with " broad" and "conclusory" allegations and thus lacked the

1.

3 t

j l

l l

required basis. Id. at 187-188. The Licensing Board, h o w e v'e r ,

rejected this argument squarely, stating that notwithstanding the intervenor's complete failure to present factual or documentary l

support for its claims;- it had nevertheless satisfied the " basis" f requirement simply by.specifying the particular ' defects in t.he

^ .

j emergency pl_an _with which it was concerned:

- ~-

i

[The basis requirement] has been satisfied because int- -

ervenors' specification of .'a nuinber of e~msrgency plan' . ~

l

. particulars provided a reasoned basis for their overall challenge. to: .the wo 2 r k a b i'l.i tyuoi. th e ~ pla n. - It is;not- i necessary at this . point for us to inquire into. the truthfulness of :each ~of rthe particulars. Indeed such an j

inquiry would place us in the position of disregarding

}

j Grand Gulf and Allens Creek.1 Whil~e? providing' a~ " reasoned basis" f or a technical contention may at times require -~

j citation to..a plausible. authority, a reasoned basis does not always require a citation. The workability of an

'i i emergency plan is the kind of an issue on which knowledg- -

4 able local citizens can  ;

form a reason _ed opinion. .

, I d. a t 191. See also Id. at 182-83 (" great care should be taken '

i

)

before rejecting a. contention that is poorly framed.")

t In this case the Intervenors have jointly filed not a single contention asserting the overall unwnrkability of the LILCO plan, j but scores of contentions breaking down our concerns with the j utmost precision. In more than 150 pages of material we have articulated and explained why the LILCO plan will not work. Yet, as we add more detail with multiple contentions, subcontentions, and preambles, the Applicant and the Staf f seem to see this as an opportunity to raise an even greater number of " lack of basis"

objections. In so doing they grossly misinterpret the " basis" requirement. When we are forced to defend against a " lack of basis" objection to our claim that LILCO's written materials will not be read by the Blind, we enter an Alice-In-Wonderland en-vironment in which established NRC pleading rules are distorted unrecognizably. We urge the Board to follow NRC precedent and admit those contentions which are reasonably clear, reasonably specific, not frivolous, and not a challenge to NRC regulations.

The " Phase I" Objection LILCO and the Staf f' have raised " Phase I" objections to i number of the contentions or subcontentions. The essential basis for this argument is a statement in an opinion by Judge Brenner's Licensing Board (LBP-82-22) in which the Intervenors were in-structed not to raise issues within the scope of the now defunct Phase I of this emergency planning litigation. SOC endorses Suffolk County's July 12 ref utation of the " Phase I" challenges to the contentions, and adds the following additional observa-tions.

The Phase I emergency planning issues were isolated by the Brenner Board when it became clear that many issues relating to onsite emergency preparedness were ripe for litigation, while most of the of fsite issues would remain unripe for some time.

i l l

The Phase I/ Phase II division was seen as a procedural shortcut which would (1) expedite the resolution of the entire OL proce-eding and, perhaps more importantly, (2) lay the necessary foun-dation for the Board's consideration of a low-power. license application by LILCO. SOC has no difficulty with the. proposition that it may not_ now rai,s_e Phas_e I issues t. hat were either settled by stipulation or were resolved unfavorably with the termination of Phase I of this proceeding. We ask for only one bite at any given apple,(this does not mean, of course, that there is any bar to the County's assertion of onsite contentions that have arisen af ter the termination of-Phase I).

However, it'is? sombthing'else again for LILCO to assert that the Intervenors may not now ra-ise any issue that was arguably 1

within the scope of Phase .I, regardless of whether the issue was actually raised at that-time.

To begin with, such an argument is inconsistent with the language of'LBP-82-22, which directed the parties not to advance issues which were '" clearly" within the scope of Phase I. I d. at 64 (emphasis added). The use of the j term " clearly" means that doubts should be resolved in the Inter-venors' favor.

Secondly, there are substantial due process problems with 1

the argument that, by f ailing to raise issues that conceivably might have been raised in Phase I, the Intervenors forfeited,

i , .

r without notice or consent, their rights to raise such issues in Phase II. To our knowledge there is nothing in the Phase I i

record suggesting that Intervenors were told to raise-it-or-lose-it, and neither LILCO nor the Staf f have pointed to anything of l

this kind. Assuming for the sake of argument that LBP-82-22 was intended to place such an arbitrary, retroactive limitation on the scope of th'e Phase II issues, the enforcement of that limita-tion by this Board would be fundamentally unf air and a violation of the Intervenors' rights to a full and f air hearing.

I The "No Legal Requirement" Objection i

In many cases LILCO or the Staf f has challenged a particular j contention on the ground that there is no associated legal re-quirement. These objections apparently rest on the implicit assumption that LILCO's emergency planning responsibilities re-quire it to do nothing that is not spelled out explicitly in 10

. C .F. R. S 50.47. This reflects a basic misunderstanding of the nature of this proceeding.

The 16 standards set forth in S 50.47(b) are obviously not intended to serve as a complete and exclusive list of of those features that are essential to an acceptable emergency plan. If this were the case, it would be unnecessary for emergency plans to provide for evacuation under any circumstances, since 50.47(b) l l

l

, , ~ - - - - - - - - , ..- -- . . - - , , , - . - , , - - - - - - . - - . , , , ,- -

does not explicitly require it. Rather (and as we all know),

these standards constitute goals that emergency plans must achieve through a wide variety of means. The brevity of the 16 standards suggests that an Applicant enjoys wide discretion in choosing methods, f acilities, :and equipment, so long as it can persuade. a licensing board that they -satisfy the NRC's - standards, including the overall requirement that each plan be shown to be adequately protective of - the public healch and. safety, 10 C.F.R.

S 50.47(a). Accordingly, licensing boards must exercise their consideyed judgment .in. pa_ssing upon_ the adequacy of any. plan.

The "no legal requirement" argument implies that no judgment

' ~

is needed in reviewing an emergency plan - a requirement is either spelled out in the rules or it isn't, and a given plan either satisfies that requirement or it doesn't. This line of reasoning is, of course, simplistic and wrong. The NRC's s tan-dards are designed to be interpreted, both by Applicants when designing emergency plans, by Intervenors when contesting their suf ficiency, and by licensing boards when reviewing them. The question whether a particular feature of a plan is " required" is a question of interpretation which is ultimately lef t exclusively to the Board. Therefore, at this stage of the proceeding, no party can claim that any feature (or missing feature) of the LILCO plan is "not required." This objection has no merit, and l

l l

has no supporting precedent.

At other points LILCO has taken its "no legal requirement" one step further, by proposing a solution to the defect raised by a contention and then claiming that there is no legal requirement that the particular solution be adopted. For example, LILCO's response to the loss-of-offsite-power - streetlights contention

( # 96.C ) is that there is no legal requirement to provide street-lights with a backup power supply.

We emphasize that it is not the role of the Intervenors in this proceeding to devise solutions to the defects in the LILCO plan. The company enjoys wide discretion to develop its ' plan, and we would feel uncomfortable choosing from several available ap-proaches to a given problem. For example, the streetlight black-out problem might be solved in a variety of ways, e.g., backup power systems, batteries, solar panels, etc. Our preferred method of solving this problem is not to operate Shoreham in the first place. But just as it would be inappropriate for us to suggest a particular solution, it is inappropriate, at best, for LILCO to point at a particular solution and then claim (1) that the solution is "not legally required" and (2) that our conten-j tion is therefore inadmissible.

What we have done is to identify specific legal requirements and then to show how the LILCO plan, as it now stands, will f ail

to satisfy those standards. We submit that this is the extent of our obligation in this respect, and that the "no legal require-ment" objection is without legal basis.

The " County's Own 'Doing" ' Objectihn~

~ ~

~ ~

LILCO has objected to several contentions on the grounds that the par ticular ;p_roblem .re.f e renced . is. the "Coun ty's own doing." To the extent that. we understand this unprecedented and rather extraordinary-object. ion,; it ; flows from the reasoning that since the County ;is. -gullty .of . culpable malf e.asance for acts-committed outside of this proceeding, it has no right to assert that it will not perform. the emergency. planning functions that the LILCO plan says it will. Once;again, we will merely add our perspective to the County's July 12 response to this argument.

We presume that in LILCO's view neither SOC, the North Shore Coalition, nor the Town of Southampton share in Suffolk County's culpability. There thus can be no reason why the Intervenors other than the County are precluded from advancing the challenged contentions, and LILCO has not claimed otherwise. The conten-I tions have, of course, been submitted jointly. If it were to become necessary, we might simply ask the County to rescind its

support of the contentions to which LILCO has raised this objec-tion, and thereby renove the ' alleged. taint. But there is no need to come up transparent solutions to silly objections -

the

" County's own doing" argument clearly does not hold water, i

f Remarke With Respect to Soecific Contentions Contention 21 Contention 21 asserts that LILCO's proposed brochure and other educational materials will not be read or understood by:

A. Schoolchildren; B. The blind, vision-impaired, and illiterate; C. Hispanic persons who speak English poorly or not at all.

This contention also asserts that this group will not understand emergency broadcast messages.

With respect to subcontention A, LILCO contends that there e

is no legal requirement that it prepare educational materials that are understandable to schoolchildren. The Staf f contends that the subcontention lacks a basis.

' With respect to subcontention B, LILCO contends that there is no legal requirement that it prepare educational materials l

that are Braille-encrypted. The Staff contends that the subcon-tention lacks a basis.

With respect to subcontention C, LILCO contends that because non-English speaking Hispanics will be advised to send in a card requesting a brochure written in Spanish, this portion of the subcontention lacks a basis.

LILCO has.no objection to the portion of 21.C referring to EBS messages, and the Staf f has no

, obj ection to 21.C at all.

10 C.h.R. SS 5 0.4 7 ( b)( 5 ) and (7), and NUREG-0654 SS

~ ~

II.E.5 & 7, II.G.1 & 2, and' II.J.10'( c)- impose upon LILCO the' legal requirement that its emergency plan contain printed and' broadcast

~

messages which provide the public with educational information in advance of an accident and during the course of an accident. To the extent that any segment of the public cannot understand this information, the regulatory requirement will'not be satisfied.

We have not asserted that LILCO's educational materials must be understandable to schoolchildren, the vision-impaired, or non-English speaking people. LILCO is free.to develop such materials or to employ any other method of remedying this defect that M sees fit, such as radio messages, classroom training, etc. As it i

now stands, however, LILCO's plan is defective in this regard, I

l Contention 69.B

- -- - - ~ = - - - - - - - = ~

This contention asserts that the LILCO Plan is defective for not incorporating or setting forth the essential details of the early dismissal plans of the schools or school districts within the emergency planning zone.

LILCO has no objection this contention, and the Staff has raised " lack of basis" and "no legal requirement" objections.

10 C.F.R. SS 50.47(a)(1) & (b)(10), and NUREG-0654 II.J.9 &

10 impose upon LILCO the legal requirement that its emergency plan provide for the safe and prompt evacuation of the people within the EPZ. Since the LILCO plan calls for the institution of early school dismissals in the event that an evacuation is ordered, the efficacy of early school dismissals and their coor-dination with.the other aspects of the evacuation process is crucial. Because it neither incorporates nor summarizes the early dismissal plans of the schools or school districts within the EPZ, there is no way of verifying that such plans actually exist. More im por tantly, it is impossible to ascertain whether these plans are compatible with the other elements of LILCO's evacuation plan.

We note that a similar contention was litigated in Susquehanna.

See Pennsylvania Power and Light C_o2 (Susquehanna Steam Electric Sta., Units 1 & 2), LBP-82-30, 15 NRC 771 (1982).

. _ _ _ _ i

~^ ^~ - - ~'

. Contentions 93 Loss of fsite Power l

These four contentions allege various ways in which the l LILCO plan is deficient for its failure to accomodate a possible loss of of fsite power ('i.e., regional blackout) during an emer-gency.

The Staf f opposes the admission of any of ' tliese contentions on the grounds that the chances of such of an occurrence are too

~

remote, because the contention lacks a basis in that' it implies that the loss of offsite power' may' be a result of'an accident at thus sho'u'ld Eiave b'een raised eablier as an equip-

~

the plant, and ment safety contention, 'an'd 'on " Phase' I" grounds.

Even if the simultaneous occurrence of an accident at Shore-ham and a loss of of f site power were very unlikely, LILCO would

~

nevertheless be required to plan for it. As noted in the text of the contention, NUREG-0654 requires " planning for the worst pos-sible accident, regardless of its extremely low likelihood." I d.

at 7. The S taf f's reliance on Southern California Edison Co.

(San Onof re Nuclear Generating Sta., Units 1 & 2), CLI-82-83,14 NRC 1091 (1981), is misplaced. In that decision the Commission held only that emergency plans need not take account of incredi-bly unlikely scenarios, in that case (1) a simultaneous earthquake in excess of the "saf e shutdown ear thquake" on the i

. basis of which the plant was designed, or (2) an earthquake of lesser magnitude which (by definition) could not cause an acci- l l

dent and the simultaneity of which was therefore pure coinci-

. dence.

Here, however, a loss of offsite power would not be unlikely at all in the event of an accident at Shoreham. The probabi-listic risk assessment completed last month indicates that a loss '

of of fsite power is associated with roughly 11% of the severe accident scenarios. See SAI, Inc., Final Summary Report, Probabi-listic Risk Assessment, Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, July, 1983, at 4-2, Table 4.1-1 (indicating that loss of offs'ite power scenarios represent a risk of 6.5 x 10-6 out of a total risk of 5.5 x 10-5 ). This does not imply, the Staf f's assertion notwith-standing, that the loss of of fsite power would be caused by an accident; the PRA includes scenarios in which the contrary is true.

In addition, NUREG-0654, Appendix 1, identifies loss of of fsite power as an " initiating event" that must be planned for.

Id. a t 1-5, 1-9, 1-13.

As to the Staf f's argument that "much of this material was I

covered" in Phase I, we respond that this statement suffers from a lack of specificity as well as basis. More detailed responses follow.

Contention 93 - Adequate Facilities This contention asserts that the LILCO plan is deficient under 10 C.F.R. S 50.47 ( b)( 8 ) and NUREG-0654 II.H. because it does not indicate that crucial emergency facilities, e.g., the emergency operations center,: staging areas, bus transfer-points, receiving hospitals, and relocation centers, will function in the event of a loss-of offsite power. -

- To this contention LILC0 has raised a "no. legal- requirement" objection. Once again, however, LILCO ha's created-straw man

~

solutions'to this -def'iciency 1 ( e.g., backup power supplies'and alternative -sites) - and then :c'la'imed that such alternative solu-tions are not legally mandated. We have not advanced any of these solutions */ Our ' claim is simply that if some solution is not devised, the plan will not work.

1

• f See generally, however, Proceedings on, Meteorological Aspects of Emergency Response Plans for Nuclear Power Plants, NUREG-0032 i1982) at 18-19 (suggesting that weather modeling systems should be equipped with backup power supplies).

l

Contention 94 This contention asserts that the LILCO plan is inadequate because it f ails to demonstrate that, in the event of a loss of offsite power, LERO will be able to maintain communications with emergency personnel as required by 10 C.F.R. S 5 0.47 ( b)( 5 ) , ,

i NUREG-0654 II.E. 2, and other applicable requirements. LILCO has raised a "no legal requirement" objection to 94.A, which concerns the ef fects of a blackout on the LILCO Customer Service Office, which serves a key role in initiating LERO communications with its emergency personnel. Our position is not that LILCO must install a backup power system in the Customer Service Office, but that unless some means of protecting against a blackout is devel-oped, communications with emergency workers will be cut off.

We do not oppose LILCO's suggestion that subcontention 94.B be consolidated with 93.A.

Contention 95.A This contention asserts that in the event of a loss of offsite power LILCO's siren system would not function, and that the LILCO plan therefore violates 10 C.F.R. S 5 0.4 7 ( b)( 5) .

i LILCO's objection is that this could have been a Phase I issue l

l l

and therefore cannot be litigated now.

We disagree. Yhe scope of Phase I was limited to the ad-equacy of LILCO's onsite plan. To the limited extent that the issues admitted in Phase I concerned of fsite matters, they in-volved the initial contacts between the plant operators and the public - the interf ace between onsite and of f site authorities.

Contention 95.A, on the other hand, is far broader than this, since it focuses on siren notification as the first step in the offsite' emergency response process. Thic contention ~is concerned with the offsite implications of a blackout-induced siren system

' ' ~

failure. - - -

Contention 95.B This contention asserts that because radio station WALK will cease transmissions in the event of a loss of offsite power, it will be able to transmit emergency messages within the EPZ. LILCO objects to this contention on " basis" grounds, saying, in effect, that because this contention is wrong it is inadmissible.

As noted in the introduction to this pleading, " factual" objections to contentions are not cognizable at this stage of the proceeding. Even if they were, we would question LILCO's state-ment that " WALK has backup power." The document offerred to support this claim suggests only that WALK intends to acquire l

l I

(

some sort of backup power system in the future.

Contention 95.C This contention asserts that a loss of offsite power would prevent radio station WALK from activating the tone alert radios within the EPZ. LILCO's objection, aside from a " lack of basis" claim similar to that discussed above, is that this was a Phase I issue.

This is incorrect. E P 1, the Phase 1 contention at issue, was addressed specifically at "LILCO's system, known as the prompt notification system." Station WALK, which is not a part of LILCO's onsite emergenc'y response organization, was not a part of the prompt notification system. Thus, the possible loss of power to the station was not within the scope of EP 1.

Contention 95.D This contention asserts that the tone alert radios to be distributed to selected f acilities within the EPZ will not func-tion in the event of a regional blackcut. LILCO asserts that this contention could have been litigated in Phase 1.

We contest this objection on the same grounds raised in the discussion of 95.A, above.

E .

Contention 9 5.E This contention asserts that, in the event of a regional blackout, the LILCO plan will not provide continuing information to the public via the news media, as required by the authorities cited, because the Emergency ~ News Center will become inoperable.

LILCO's response ~ l's that - it -is not legally: required t'o-install a 2

backup power supply for the Center.

Again, we do not disagree that this particular solution to the problem is "not legally required." However,'some solution is legally required, and the absence of such a solution rendera the plan deficient.

Contention 96 -- -

This contention asserts that a loss of offsite power would seriously hamper or completely disable a number of offsite facil-ities and systems that are important to the viability of the LILCO plan, such as private ambulance services, hospitals, ser-vice stations, streetlights, residential lighting, etc. LILCO's objection is that there is "no legal requirement" that it provide these f acilities and systems with backup power or backup power supplies.

We once again challenge the legal validity of this

l

. objection. See page 7, above. LILCO may approach this problem in i l

a number of ways, all of which are permissible under NRC regulations.

Contention 97 .

This contention asserts that the LILCO plan is inadequate because is fails to provide for the possibility that an emergency response may be necessary during extremely bad weather. Subcon-tention A addresses the problem of assuring public notification during or af ter a heavy snowfall or other severe weather event.

9 7.B asserts that an effective evacuation will be impossible during very bad weather.

LILCO and the Staff oppose the admission of 97.A on the ground that a Phase I contention, EP 1, addressed the issue. As to 97.B, the Staff has no objections, while LILCO has raised

" lack of basis" and "no legal requirement" objections.

The claim that the subject matter of this contention was covered by contention F,P 1.A is misleading. The scope of EP 1.A is clear from its le..;guage:

LILCO has f ailed to. demonstrate that the siren coverage will not be constricted significantly during weather conditions such as rain, snow and fog, which have a tendency to muf fle sound, as well as during high winds l and thunderstorms, which may adversely affect the ability l to hear the sirens.

l This contention dealt with acoustical and auditory issues rela-I

\

l

tive to siren performance.

It proceeded on the premise that the sirens would at least operate.

See the settlement of this con-tention, which is attached to LILCO's objections, and which demonstrates that contention EP 1 was concerned with matters suc as sound attenuation under differing levels of humidity.

Contention 97.A, on

~ the other hand, alleges that because of bad weather the sirens may~ fail to ope' rate - because the neces ,

sary persons will be unable to push the necessary buttons. For the purpose of this contention we are willing to assume that the sirens, once activated,' function perfectly under any weather conditions.

There is thus no overlap between this contention and EP 1.

Moreover, 97.A alleges that in tr. o event of weather-related siten f ailure, bad weather will materially impede the execution of " route alerting."

This is further evidence that the scope of this contention is broader than and different from EP 1.

With respect to 97.B, it may be crucial that an evacuation be ordered in the event that an accident at Shoreham were to occur during rain or snow conditions, since precipitation is "an efficient scavenger" of airborne radioactive  ;

matter and tends to  :

magnify doses in the vicinity of a release. Planning Basis for n the Development of State Local Governmental Radiological Emer-gency Response Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear Power  !

Plants, NUREG-0396 (1978) at I-25.

Sheltering under such condi- E r

i O

e

tions would likely present greater risks to the public health and safety than even an extended evacuation, particularly in light of that non-protective nature of most residential buildings.

NRC rules have long required that emergency plans make i

provision for " severe natural phenomena" such as bad weather, See Reg. Guide 1.101 ( rev. 1)(1977) at 4, and NUREG-0654 continues this requirement. See Id. at App. 1, discussing the extent to which weather conditions may affect emergency action levels, and App. 4 at 4-6, 7, where it states explicitly that evacuation time estimates for power plants in northern climates must consider snow.

If serious adverse weather were a once-in-a-lifetime event there would be no need to plan for it. However, the Safety Evaluation Report for Shoreham indicates that the site can be expected to receive as much as 56 inches of snow per year, and that ice storms producing a glaze on surfaces may be expected on an average of 2-4 days per year. The preamble to the Commission's emergency planning rules requires applicants to show that "ade-quate protective actions in response to actual or anticipated conditions can and will be taken." 45 Fed. Reg. 55403 (August 19, 1980). We contend that serious adverse weather is or should be an

" anticipated condition" that is addressed in the LILCO plan. See Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating l

l l

l

- y

24 -

Sta., Units 2 & 3), CLI-81-33, 14 NRC 1091, 1093 (concurring views of Commissioner Ahearne)(suggesting that emergency plans

. must assume operations under the worst annual weather conditions).

Respectfully submitted, -

JahresB. Douglief ty 3045 Porter St., NW Washington DC 20008 (202)362-7158 Counsel for SOC 6

. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA US C NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licens_ing Board 5 AW 11 20:40 0FFICE OF SE(,Rua 00CX5 TING & SEj:v[cf

) BRANCH

)

In the Matter of )

) Docket No. 50-322 (OL)

LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) (Emergency planning)

)

(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )

Unit 1) )

)

)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that copies of the foregoing SOC's Responses to LILCO and NRC Staff Objections to Intervenors' Contentions were served upon the following, either by hand on August 8, 1983 (where indicated by a single asterisk), by hand on August 9, 1983 (where indicated by two asterisks), or by deposit in the United States Mail on August 8:

• James S. Laurenson, Chairman Samuel J. Chilk, Secretary Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, DC 20555 ATTN: Docketing and Service Section

• Dr. Jerry A. Kline Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n Atomic Safety and Licensing Washington, DC 20555 Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n

• Dr. M. Stanley Livingston Washington, D.C. 20555 1005 Calle Largo Santa Fe, NM 87501

• W. Taylor Reveley, III, Esq.

Hunton & Williams Edward M. Barrett, Esq. 707 E. Main Street Long Island Lighting Co. P.O. Box 1535 l 250 Old Country Road Richmond, VA 23212 l Mineola, NY 11501 l Atomic Safety and Licensing l ** Bernard M. Bordenick, Esq. Appeal Board Panel Office of Exec. Legal Director U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555

Energy Research Group, Inc. ** Ralph Shapiro, Esq.

400-1 Totten Pond Road Cammer & Shapiro, P.C.

Waltham, MA 12154 9 East 40th Street New York, NY 10016

• Herbert H. Brown, Esq. Howard Blau, Esq.

Kirkpatrick, Lockhart, Hill, 217 Newbridge Road Christopher & Phillips Hicksville, NY 11787 19 0 0 M S tree t, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036 Cherif Sedky, Esq.

Brian McCaffrey- - -

Kirkpatrick, Lockhart, Charles Daverro Johnson & Hutchison Long Island Lighting Co. 1500 Oliver Building 175 E. Old Country Road _ Pittsburgh, PA 25222 Hicksville, NY 11801

. . . _____ MHB.Te_chnical Associates David J. Gilmartin, Esq. 1723 Hamilton Ave.

Attn: Patricia Dempsey, Esq. Suite K County Attorney San Jose, CA 95125 Suffolk Co. Dep't of Law Veterans Memorial Highway Nora Bredes, Exec. Coordinator Happauge, NY 11787 Shoreham Opponents Coalition 195 East-Main Street

• • Steven B. Latham, Esq. Smithtown, NY 11787 Twomey, Latham & Shea 33 West 2d Street Eleanor L. Frucci, Esq.

Riverhead, NY 11901 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Mr. Stuart Diamond U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n Environment / energy writer Washington, D.C. 20555 NEWSDAY Long Island, NY 11747 Jeffrey Cohen, Esq.

- Deputy Commissioner & Counsel Jonathan D. Peinberg, Esq. New York State Energy Office New York State Agency Building 2 Department of Public Service Empire State Plaza Three Empire State Plaza Albany, NY 12223 Albany NY 12223

\

es B. Dougherty

,