ML20072K053

Response to First Set of Interrogatories & Request for Production of Documents,Per ASLB 830224 Oral Order. Certificate of Svc Encl.Related Correspondence

ML20072K053
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	03/21/1983
From:	Eddleman W EDDLEMAN, W.
To:	CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
Shared Package
ML20072K057	List: ML20072K053 ML20072K061
References
ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8303300347
Download: ML20072K053 (57)

Text

'

acuno conacsronzscs O}{td R. (

00'.;KETED

, USMC UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION kb.h' h.04 .

BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD Glenn O. Bright Dr. James H. Carpenter James L. Kelley, Chairman In the Matter of

) Dockets 50 400 OL CAROLINA POWER AND LIGHT CO. et al. ) 50 401 OL (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, )

Units 1 ani 2) )

)

Wells Eddleman's Response to Applicants 8 -

First Set of Interrogatories and Request For Production of Documents Pursuant to an oral order of 2 - 214- 8 3 fron dudge Kelley, I now file this response to Applicants' above referenced quest' ions.

If I may so note here, I still believe that informal discovery is far nore efficient and less burdensome than this sort of formal interrogatory proceeding'. NRC rules encourage informal discovery but it appears the Applicants are unwilling to consider it. I would think it far less burdensone to answer questions directly than to file over a dozen copies6\ 'o qv 3'\H3 o% pcud6 blQ all questions and responses. It also 4

might make things move faster and more efficiently in thi.s nrocee di:ng.

Apclicants8 attornev Jones is looking into this again at my request.

, ,,8$ This response is organized as follows:

Eo' gg ,First appear the general interrogatories with an explanation en .

0 of how they will be dealt with in these responses.

3:

es So Then the answers to the specific interrogatories appear. -

OS

g Objections are noted under the general or specific interroEatory mE

"'",to which each objection applies. -

Documents I possess will be made available to Applic' ants on D SO 3 agreeable terms, as" discussed with them d.I the NCUC load forseast heatirg.

-2 RESPONSES TO GENERAL INTERROGATORIES 1(a). State the name, present or last known address, and present or last knoQn employer of each person known to you to have first-hand knowledge of the facts alleged, and upon which yet relied in formulating allegations, in each of your contentions which are the subject of this set c:

interrogatories. .

(b). Identify those facts concerning which each such person has first-hand knowledge.

(c). State the specific allegation in each contention

. which you contend such facts support.

requested L(a) The/information known to me about persons with first-hand knowledge of facts alleged and upon uhich I relied in femuMing allegations in a contention will be stated in response to that.

contention, to the extent it is not in the original contention.

1(b) Facts concerning which each such person has first-hand

~

knowledge will be likewise identified, and 1(c) the allegation these facts support will be identified. i i I l

and l 2(a).

State the name, present or last known address,  !

other than affiant, present or last employer of each person, l l

who provided information upon which you relied in answering each. interrogatory herein.

(b). Identify all such information which was provided by each such person and the spe'cific interrogatory responseI in which such information is contained.

n--

_3 2(n). Objcetion (aeplies to all raquasts to' enswar any intarroga-tory requesting identity of any persons providing information used in responding to interrogatories):

My understandisg of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which govern NRC discovery, is that Rune 26(b)(k)(B) thereof prohibits discovery of facts known or oninions held by an expert not ernected to be called as a witness, essentially only if "it is inuracticable for the earty seeking discovery to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other means". Anplicants have made no such showing.

Indeed, with their resources, it is doubtful if there is any subject related to my contentions on which daey could not obtain their own

. experts, facts and opinions completely indeoendently of ne, or of any persons (if any) whom I may have consulted.

I further understand that the above Rule has been interpreted to unconditionally protect the identity of nonwitness experts who have been informally consulted. Ager v. Jane C. Stormont Hosnital,

~

622 P 2d 496 (10th Circuit 1980); see also In re sinking of Barre Raneer I, 92 F.R.D. 486 (S.D. Texas 1981) and Perry v. W.S. Darley&Ro.

54 P.R.D. 278 (E.D. Wisc. 1971). Since the Anplicants have made no showing of any inability to obtain information on tonics on whi.ch I may have consulted experts, I maintain that I don't have to reveal even whether I have consulted formally with experts retained for the nurpose of answering interrogatories.

Since I an disclosing in resnonse to snecific and general i int'errogatories all the facts on which my contentions are based, l

I naintain that Applicants will be able to find their own exoerts to consult on the natters en.comnassed by my contentions, since

. I certainly haven't cornered the narket on experts, and c ouldn't.

l Only if they can't find experts or get information on the subjects and facts in/ underlying my contentions would they have any valid reason to attempt to show the Board special circumstances that night

=.

-h- -

support discovery of the identity, ooiniens, or information of any non-witness experts I might have retained. 10 CFR 2 740(b)(2) provides that discovery of me or a consmultant may be had "only uoon a showing '

that the party seeking discovery has s'ubstantial need of the inforna-tion and that he(sic) is cnable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means." Federal evidence Rule 26(b)(4) provides likewise, and has been held in Ager v.

Stornont Hosoital, sunra, to anply to both the identity of non-witness cons'ul,tants and the content of their advice. Aggt also holds, at 503, that the case underlying LBP-78-33, 8 NRC 461 (see 465-66), where a licensing board required identification of an intervenor's exnerts under 2.7h0(b), was improperly decided.

No "conpelling need" under the Federal Rule above (and 2.7h0@ )

exists when the facts of a party's position are known, other exnerts are available, and the supplier of the information is not exoected

'to testify. hoover v. US Dept of Interior, 611 F 2d.1132,1142 (5th Circuit, 1980).

In Ager, the Court also addressed the chilling effect that revealing the nanes of nonwitness experts consulted would have on the ability of persons such as intervenors to have access to inforned ouinions. "... disclosure of the identities of ... consultative exuerts would inevitably lessen t he number of candid ouinions available as well as the number of consultants even willing to discuss a medical maltractice clain with counsel." (p.503).

The identity'of the exoert needs to be kept secret to urevent such effects. The Court said, "once the identities of retained or soecially encloyed experts are disclosed, the protective provisions of the rule concerning facts known or opinions held by such exnerts are subterted. "

The Court agreed with plaintiffs in Aggr that

.' i

-5 In nedical malpractice actions (nerhaus) nore than any other type of litigation, the linited availab'ility of consultative exnerts and. the widespread aversion of nany health care providers to assist 71ahtiff's counsel require that, absent special circumstances, '

discovery of the identity of. evaluative consultants be denied.

If one assumes that access to informed oninions is desirable in ooth prosecuting valide claims and eliminating groundless ones, a discovery practice that would do harm to these objectives should not be condened. (This quote & those above, p.503)

The circumstances of nuclear intervenors like nyself are strikingly sinilar to that of plaintiffs in Ager. The nuclear industry contains many people hostile to intervenors, and many more unwilling to consult with them onenly because of the effect on their employment. In this case, Hawkeye Security was forced to withdraw from consultancy with me, re security plans, due to industry pressure. Judge Kelley commented on this withdrawal in a conference call, "Maybe that's just the way the world works.

People who work for one side dcn't work for the other."

Given the massive resources of Applicants and the nuclear indust #y, and their tendency to react against whistleblowers (e.g.

case of Willian Smart, cited in transcrint of NRC remand hearing on CP&L management capability in 1979, Dockets 50-400 et al),

it is clear that the industry controls the employment of virtually all the available expertise. An industry insider providing informa-ti.on is unlikely to be willing to exnose hersh1f or hinself to nossible firing, demotion, harassment, or even the time and exnense

. of being deposed or called as a witness or having.to answer interrog-atories. Similar problems arply to peorle outside the industry, with the possible exception of job loss. I say possible because pressure could be brought by the nuclear industry or Applicants to fire a person fron a non-industry job. Other fears range higher:

a news reporter interviewing a person-who had knowledge of problens with the South Texas nuclear uroject was wounded and her killed, by assailant (s) unknokn,within the last few years. source

To sumnarize, industry expert's (nuclear) may lose jobs or contracts I

by even being identified with intervenors at all (e.g. Hawkeye Security within the last 6 months in this case). This exerts a clear chilling -

effect on the willingness of such persons to provide information to any intervenor.

l Non-industry exoerts are also subject to harassment and difficulties l which may be innosed on them if their identities are known or discovery, deoosition or subpoenaing of them is allowed. This exerts a chilling effect on them. I have heard this said by such persons.

However, both such experts (in a linited pool of experts working for a type of party shunned by nost in their field) and nonernerts

who are not expected to be called as witnesses are nrotected from l

having either their identities or anything else disclosed in connection with them, provided that the facts of a case are available to the

\ -

l i

other party (e.g. Applicants) along with other experts. Eger, s unra ,

and the rules and cases cited above.

This is clearly the case here, and Applicants have nade no showing as required by 2.7kO(b) that they can't get the info or 1

! expertise by other means. The information underlying my contentions is being disdbsed (a lot of it cones fron Apolicants and NRC), and l the idea that Auplicants have to have access to exnerts (if any) I have consulted in resconding to their interrogatories, or else they

can't obtain information and expertise on the subject of my contentions, l

l 1s. laughable. If in fact Anplicants have no expertise on any of ny contentions available, they ought to concede it.

The above summarizes my objection to General Interrogatory 2(a) l for every case, every person, every contention, to which it may apply, if any. These arguments and cases also anply to my objection to General Interrogatory 2(b), given below, and are incornorated therein by reference as if ful,1y set out in that objection.

2(b). Objection, incoroorating the above objection's facts and cases, to all such revelation of who provided information used in response to interrogatories, upon which I relied in making such answers.'

The information upon which I rely is being revealed in resnonses to snecific interrogatories. However, to identify the source of such information when orovided by nonwitnesses, expert or not, is objected to because it would reveal the identity of the provider, against the protection of Federal Rule 26(b)(4) (Federal Rules of Evidence govern NRC prpeeedings) and the argunents cited above.

I further object because this interrogatory may be inter [eted to encompass revelation of materials or information prepared in anticipation of the hearing in this case, without showing by Applicants that they have a substantial need of such infornation and cannot obtain it by other means.

Ma7 I believe that the identity of nonwitness nonexnerte I/have consulted is absolutely privileged, and the identity of nonwitness experts I may have consulted is privileged under the above rules and because of the chilling effect identification of such nerson(s)

(if any) Ext by connecting them with any information they may have nrovided, will have on availability of information and expertise to me in oressing my case. I would enter both this and the above l

l objection even if the answer to 2(a) and 2(b) of Anolicants '

general interrogatories were "none", because of the chilling effect it would have on obtaining advice, infornation and exnertise for my case later. I have snoken with exnerts and nonexnerts who are absolutely tnwilling to be identified in connection with this case or intervenors in any nuclear li' censing nroceeding, due to fear of losing jobs (etc), which is that very chilling effect, However, the

, individuals I have identified in the last sentence did not urovide

) anything used in any contention, except for persons whose nanes I l do not know and could not identify.

- _ - = ..

I should not be required to provide.the identity of any expert known to me who is not exnected or intended to be a witness, without ,

the showing of compelling need and ne alternative way to get info on the . subject of a snecific contention, which Applicants have not made. And even if they were to clain such a showinF, the chilling effect of identification of exnerts, which has been shown with respect to one of my exnerts already in this proceeding (Hawkeye), should be weigh 6d against thist consideration.

3(a). State the name, adciress, title, employer and educational and professional qualifications of each person you intend to call as an expert witness or a witness relating to any contention which is the subject of this set of interroga-tories.

(b). Identify the. contention (s) regarding which each such person is expected to testify.

(c). State the subject matter to which each such person is expected to testify. ,

m q b di eb w ek. e d 'd (p N &

3(a) I have not yet retained experts except in Security, whe=e the 4 security intervenors' exnerts and qualifications will be identified on March 18th to the extent not nreviously shown, uer the' Board's schedule set 2-24-83, to all parties.

kmWO 3(b) There are no/ security contentions yet. When I have any experts, I will provide such information, k - NMdd bb 3(c) See above answers to3 (a) and 3(b)

_s_ A-4(a). Identify all documents in your possession, custody or control, including all relevant page citations, pertaining to the subject matter of, and upon which you relied in formulating allegations in each contention which is the subject of this set of interrogatories.

to which each such (b). Identify the contention (s) document relates.

(c). State the specific allegation in each contention which you contend each document supports.

R"350NSE:

4(a) This information will be revealed in responses for each contention, to the extent such information is in my possession custody or control and has not been revealed in the contention as

' filed or amended earlier, except: I have a folder full;r of handwritte notes I used in ureparing contentions. Since I have noved right af ter first filing the contentions, I am not sure all such notes I possess are in that folder, but I object that all such are Drivileged, as are any notes I may have made in the margin or otherwise on documents I may have used or did use in prenaring contentions, since all these documents reflect or include my " mental irmressions, conclusions, ouinions or legal theories of (a) repre'sentative of a narty concerning the proceeding" (namely, me, representing nyself), which the Board t

is required to urotect under 10 CFR 2.7h0(b). Rather than identify each such note or writing fully (I'll be glad to if asked), since they are miscellaneous, I simoly ask the Board to provide a protective order covering all such notes and writings, tane recordinFs, etc.

which are work product I used in urecaring contentions. All facts underlying the contentions have been and will be disclosed.

9 5(a). Identify all documents in your possession, custody or control, including all relevant page citations, upon which you relied in answering each interrogatory herein.

(b). Identify the specific interrogatory response (s) to which each such document relates.

I RESPONSE: The documents in my possession, custody or control I upon which I rely in answering each interrogatory will be identified (including page or chapter or section citations) in response to each specific interrogatory response to which each document relates, directly or by reference (e.g. "The documents referenced re IX(c) f above are also used in this answer, except for CPEL's salary recort").

l 6(a). Identify any other source of information, not previously identified in respon'se to Interrogatory 2 or 5,

~

which was used in answering the interrogatories set forth herein.

(b). Identify the specific interrogatory response (s) to which each such source of information relates.

RRSDONSE: With respect to information requested under general interrogatory 2, or any additional information that would identify a nonwitness consulted or providing information to answer interrogatorie s c the objections to 2(a) and 2(b) as stated above apply and are incorporated here by reference as if fully set out.

l With respect to other information, I will identify the source in the specific response (r) in which it was used.

l

7(a). Identify all documents which you intend to offer as exhibits during this' proceeding to support the contentions which are the subject of this set of interrogatories or which you intend to use during cross-examination of witnesses presented by Applicants and/or the NRC Staff on each contention which is the subject of this set of interrogatories.

(b). Identify the contention (s) to which each document related and the particular page citations applicable to each contention.

. RESPONSE: I have not yet formed intent to offer any narticular documents as exhibits or cross-examination exhibits or basis of cross-examination in this troceeding. It is safe to assume that documents referred to in the original, anended and accented conte ntion s I have made herein, or that was incornorated by reference into a con-tention superseded or ruled redundant to an admitted Eddlenan contention, may be offered as exhibits or used in cross-examination. Anplicants already possess this information. In addition, it is safe to assume that infornation obtained by me upon discovery could be used to cross-examine witnesses, or could be nade exhibits. I will only tell Applicants my cross documents for their witnesses, not for Staff's or other parties'.

When I plan exhibits and cross-exanination, I will then inform Applicants of this information as.. soon as practicable, including which contention and which nages of a docunent. In so doing I will object to revealing any nart of any such document which would identify or tend to identify a nontitness nonexnert, or a nonwitness expert with respect to whom Applicants have not shown a conne111ng need to identify because they cannot get information or exnertise on the subject involved elsewhere.

i In stating the above, I note that if I see something to use on t cross and e.g.,,be o anogger o use it Anp ie informed. But it nay,.

ide pne on a dage }pngp.ts will ha_ cants have just used.

RESPOESES TO OTHER Ih"ITRROGATORIES IN THIS SET (FIRST) '

Eddleman 9 and 11: Response time is suspended until after the close of the environmental hearings. I think 19 days thereafter is avoropriate.

lq 22A-1. ER Table 8.2.1-1 sets forth components in the l fuel cycle costs for the Harris Plant. The four components are -

cs follows: .

) (1) Enriched uranium costs (which, in turn, includes

, uranium costs, conversion costs and enrichment  ;

costs); ,'

(2) Fabrication costs; ,

(3) Spent fuel storage and disposal costs; and J (4) Carrying charges. H Do you centend that there are other components of the Harris -

fuel costs which are not included s

in ER Table 8.2.1-17 If so, s

st~ ate what other components you believe should be included, the '-

f.

cost associated with each, and explain in detail the basis'for your belief. -

RESPONoE 22-A-1: Yes. (1) Trans-ortation of the urarium, I

UF 6 , and fabricated fuel are not stated in this table. I hcve' l

not connuted these costs. (2) Transportation of spent fuel to 1

either an AFR site or another reactor site is not included in these Costs.

(3): carrying c sts of nuclear fuel, at the Company's fixed charge rate, which costs are passed on to ratepayers under, e.g. ,- the NC Utilities Commission's rulings in the last 3 CP&L general rate cases, do not appear to have been included on any realistic basis. The i Company's fixed charge rate is around 20% (e.g. Docket E-2 sub E16) 1

( and may be~ computed as follows: Using the capital structure (% common

, equity, % preferred stock, % debt, and 'the embedded costs of debt a and preferred stock allowed in a general rate case, along with

the allowed rate of return on common equity, nultiply each con 7onent of the capital structure by its allowed rate of return. Then multiply the debt commonont so obtained by a tax factor of 1.06383 (NC Gross Receipts Tax), and nulticly the equity and nreferred co

ponents so obtained by the conposite federal-state tax factor of 2.0958. Suma the components so obtained with tax factors, and you have the fixed charge rate. I thought I had a cony of the E-2 sub hhh Order, but if so I cannot locate it; Applicants possess this docunent, however.

I believe it includes net nuclear fuel (NC retail, .611k of total) of $42,h47,000. (I think gross nuclear fuel, including that burned, nay be more apuronriate for costing purnoses). Using the F-2 sub hhh capital structure, we derive the fixed charge rate as:

Debt .k95 x 9.97% x 1.06383 = 5.;,:25

~? referred .125 x 8.96% x 2.0958 = 2.3h Equity 36 x Ik,5% x 2.0958 = 11.55 sum of right col 19.1h5 Apolying 19.14% to ($ g gi glh)gives$13million.

ggd 'this over CP&L's 1981 nuclear generation (

%billionk.wH exoec n6ciee earluelSEnb426.urhEives15 FaRC F t 401 mills,withkmillfuel.

to cost nore than h nills.

(k)2In naking this resnonse I an not saying that the costs listed for 1 the h areas identified in ER Andt 5, Table 8.2.1-1, are accurate; nor do I endorse the use of Applicants' capacity factor estinates in connuting these costs in nills /kWh, narticularly for carrying charges.

, (3A) To continue the exolanation, if future nuclear fuel costs

'nore than the h nills or so C?&L had in 1981 (see PFRC Forn 1 for the olants, afiunswick and Robinson, p. 403-C and h03-A resnectively) taen tne cost of nuclect fuel in progress will also be proportionately higher, as will the carrying charges on it, even if CP&L's allowed profit does not increase. CP&L Drojects lh.5 nills levelized for which on fuel iabrication the sane and uranium pronortions (w/cenversion, given carrying enrichnent),5 charges of .35 x lft. or 5 mills /kWh.

~

-13 .

~

22A-2(a). ER Table 8.2.1-1 set's forth the estimated -

I l'ifetime levelized costs in mill per kilowatt hour for each -

component of the fuel cycle cost. State in detail which costs,~

as set forth in Table ER 8.2.1-1, you contend are erroneously low.

• 7 (b). For each cost identified in response to (b) 4 above, state what you believe the estimated cost should be and mqplain in detail the basis.for your allegation that the methodology utilized by Applicants for determining the cost'of enriched uranium is flawed.. ,

RESPONSE: Assuming part (b) above refers to nart (a), Apelicants do not anpear to have set forth their methodology in sufficient detail in the ER to determine its' flaws in their entirety. I will pursue discovery of Applicants to get more information on their methodology.

A-2(a): There may be other errors biasing Table 8.2.1-1 low

('ee s above) (see also resnonse to 2P-A-1, above, re carrying charges),

but I can now state that almost every cost in Teble 8.2.1-1 is erroneously low. I will conduct discovery of CP&L to find the rates on which the Table 6.2.1-1 numbers are levelized, and the underlying data With respect to nuclear fuel coste, I an sunplying Applicants i

with a cony of Table 2 from the CP&L Public Staff data rec.urest in NCUC Docket E-100 sub 40 (1981). The costs for conversion, enrichment, fabrication (excluding Harris initial core, which I bel' eve is higner),

and spent fuel disnosal I continue to rely unen. The yellowcake numbers i

may well be too high after 1987 (left column); note, however, that even recent prices of $17-25/lb U 03 g (obtained from rate cases) are above the 11.08 used for 1985, 86'and 87. These numbers cover the ueriod 1955-2004 They cover everything in Table 8.2.1-2

-1k-under Fuel Cycle costs, except carrying charges, which I treat under 22A-1(b) above.

~

The nuclear liability insurance costs are also low.

CP&L resnonje 16(a) and (b) to Kudzu Alliance discovery in NCUC Docket no. E-100 sub h0 (1981) gives the out of pocket liability insurance nremiumns. These anount to nearly 8 1 nillion per year in 1981, for 3 reactors ($300,000t/ reactor-year).

However, as noted below under (b), the cost of risk associated with the non-pu~ chased share of the trice Anderson insurance should also be included, which would quadruple tnose figures, raising the level to about 0 3 mills ner kWh curwently. Insurance costs may also escalate by 1965 (they had, see 18(a) of CP&L response above),

and will escalate nore if there is another serious nuclear accident.

I belierekk the O&M costs are low also. CP&L's estimate has not been set forth in sufficient detail to specify in what ways it is low, particularly since the interest rate (discount rate) on which these figures were le velized, is not known.

The decommissioning costs are likewise likely low, since decom-riseianirg of a unit the sira of Har*i s 1 or P has not been done yet, and the costs of cleanuo and waste discosal nay rise, narticularly if DOE or other authority (e.g. EPA, NRC) insists on immediate dismantlement. Note that ER Table 5.8.2-1 gives these costs in constant 1978 dollars. Constant 1986 dollars would be more anuropriate for conoarison. The 25% contingency included is low, due to higher waste disposal costs and need for additional orotection of radiation-exposed personnel in dismantlement of a Harris unit.

Inmediate dismantlement in Table 5.8.2-1 is shown with the lag" est f,f.%sibMd $ lad SW 11a (' cost, though for sene reason that cost isn't added up.') The assunctions , including (d) and (e) of that table are overoptimistic and subject to large errors. It is totall'y unclear that entombed radicabtive materdal

can be released unrestrictedly within .100 years. Many isotopes in the enbombed reactor, e.g. Cs-137, Ni-59, Nb-9h have half lives long enough to pose a major risk long bey 6nd 100 years. So do I-129, Sr-90, etc.

                                         ~~

To return to C&M briefly,' Amp [ican't s bave no t assessed t'he 'imoaci cf stricter standards for radiation exnosure on C&M costs. It is well kncun that nuclear CEM costs are higher because of the need to reduce radiation exoosure, and the industry has clained that s tricter standards for r6diatten exnosure would greatly increase costs (though I am not abla right now to lay hands on documents sayirg tnat ). On Carrying costs, the Public Staff 1979 recort (no 204-205) which CP&L cossesses, says that the carrying charge for nuclear fuel was taken at 20% by them. This agrees with my stater.ent above that the

  'ixed charge rate for CP&L saould be used ( it is about 20%)

Using the conversion as stated on p. 20h and Table III.B.12 of that renort (also on p.204, NCUC Docket No. E-100 s ub 35,1979), we have the following equivalencies : 325/lb U 033 is 1.60 to 1.S9 nills /kWh; Conversion at #5/ka U (52.27/lb) is 0.12-0.1h mills. Enrichment at

 $80/kg SNU is 1.02-1.53 n111s. Fabrication at $110/kg U is 0.k1 -0.5 nills. St orage, at $6/kg EM (Heavy Metal) (not included in sub h0 estinates -- it should be.       $6 is a 1978 price,1986 orice will be higher):

0.22-0.27 nills /kWh; Disposal at $220/kg EM is 0.82-0.99 mills /kWh. Now, if we use for exanole the 1990 and 2000x value s in Table 2 CP&L PS data requesta, NCUC Docket E-100 sub 40, we get (assuming $25/lb 33 in each of those years) 1.6 to 1.9 mills for yellowcake; U0

 ) 0 36-0.h2 nills (1990) to 0.9-1.05 mills (2000) for conversion; Enrichnent (1990) is 3 7 to 5.71 mills ; (2000) 7.15 to 10.72 nills ;

yabrication (1990) 1 72 to 2.1 mills j (2000) 5.13 to 6.25 mills; Storage (a'asuning 5%/yr inflation from 1978) (1990) o.h8-0 48 mills ;

      '~

(2000) 0.66-0.61 mills; Discosal (1990) (using KgU figure for KgEM) 1.01 to 1.2k nills; (2000) 1.81 to 2.2 nills (these last look low, buti it .is the reasonableness of the total that is critical here). Now, a rate levelized 1986 - 2011 will cone out between the 1990 and 2000 values, probably c&oser to the 2000 nunbers. Those 2000 numbers sun out at 17.25 to 21.93 mills /kWh ner the above referenced data.

              ..dd carrying chari;es at 20% of this (per 'S '79 nethodology) and you get 20.7 to 26.31 n'11s in the year 2000. I have not comuted a conclete levelization on the data, but you get the idea: Applicants underestinate.

yuclear liability *.nsurance: $120 million/olant costs CP&L about c300,000/yr fren ovivate insurers (Kudzu data recuest E-100 sub h0 itens

              & ind b); The full $560 million should be conputed at the s ane ecst rate to figure what the ultinate cost of this insurance is, i.e. the cost of providing the 3560 nillion (or mere) of nuclear liability insurance for each Harris unit under the " rice-Anderson act. Taking the insurance at 9.\6 x 10 dollars in 1981 (per 18 b of data recuest),
             ~and using C?&L actual nuclear production in 1981 of about 9 x 109 kWh, we get o.102 mill /kWh for actual production for the first $120 nilion of insurance.      Conservatively, this should be nultiolied by h to refalect the realistic cost of the entire $560 nillich of insurance (h:120 is h80, less than 560, so this is censervative). That gives

over 4 nills /kWh in 1981$. I think some escalation of nuclear insurance i

is also appropriate, and if there is are ther nuclear accident for which l

               ? rice-Anderson is invoked, prices for such insurance w"11 rise further.
             "he nultin11 cation of insurance coverage costs up to what insurance would cost for the whole $560 nillion limit (which cannot be obtained from private insurers for nu'elear liability) is a proxy for the realistic cost to society of that insurance.       Indeed, the fact that private

{ insurers will not risk even S560 711111on of their own noney on nuclear safety indicates that the insurers, as a group, Go not believe Applicants ' and NRC 's assurances of nuclear safety. If serious nuclear

                                                                   -6 accidents really had billion-to-one odds against them., the value of the risk of $560 million/yr of insurance for each reactor would be 56 cents per reactor. Yet the insurance companies charge CP&L anproximately 500,000 times that anount, for only $120 nillion of nuclear liability insurance per reactor.       That is a 2-million-to-one offset (500000 times the cost for 1/h the insurance or less).

That 's pretty good evidence CP&L underestimates nuclear liability costs. (c) N/A 22A-3: (a) Yes. I also do not agree that Arrlicants analysis is " based on established indices" since the ER does not identify any such index or indices. I will pursue discovery on this matter. (b) First, if the indices are wrong, or do not eroject

     ' accurately (or have not, if used for parojection in the past), the results will be wrong. I need discovery of Apolicants to answer this point in detail.

Seccnd, the Harris initial core cones from CP&L's low-cost uranium contracts, which I understand from the F-100 sub'h0 data reoues t referred to under 22-A-1 and -2 above, is about $11/lb yellowcake. The me rket price is now higher. Thus , CP&L's estirates aupear to escalate from an unrealistically low cost, by their own statement. i This sunply contract appears to run out in 1986 or 87, decending on whether CP&L's disclosure to Kudzu Alliance (E-100 sub h0, 1061, copy supp1ted to Applicants and all parties with wnE 3-18-83 Resnonse 're Eddlenan 15) or the CP&L PS disenlosure referenced above, is believed. On either basis, this is very early in Harris ' onerating life of 25 years stabting in 1986, as projected now by Applicants. The fabricat? on costs set forth in the CP&L "S data reauest are nuch higher, and should be used instead of Applicants ' cost estinates. l (c) N/a ,

_18-22A-4 (a) Yes. (b) In addition 'to d2e higher estinates of waste disoosal costs, e.'g. that by DOE $1977) cited by Konanoff in Power Propaganda (Eddleman EWhibit N-1 or N-2 or N-3 in E-100 sub h0, - which Applicantspossess ) 13 mills in 1978 dollars, the main reason I think this esti ate is low is that what it describes hasn't been done yet. If Congress has been unan successful in freezing trices (1972, e.g. ) and in regulating the price of gasoline (pre-19$1) there is no reason to believe Congress can legislate what it will really, cost to discose of nuclear waste any more than to suceose that Congress can nodify the law of gravity. Cos t-recovery reouirements for uraniun enrichnent have led to great increases in the cost /kgSWU i (cost to enrich one kilogram of Uranium to light -water reactor grade). There is no reason to think that nuclear waste disnosal will be other-wise. I continue to review documents en this, but cite here the DEIS for 40 CFR 191 at~ p.4 states that"The disposal standards (subpart 3) nust deal with a yet uncroven technology and with the need to extend nublic health urotecticn far into the future" . (Decenber 1982). Reagan's EPA is not exactly a hotbed of concern to protect the environnent, yet it s tates that the technology of nuclear waste disposal is as yet unoroven. Now how can anyone tell the cost of sonetning that's no t even proven? I also rely on the statenents and references in original cententinn 22-A here, as in all my answers to interrogatories, which sinply add to the basis stated In ny original contentions. (c) N/A 22-A-5(a) Yes. I don't acknowledge the indices are established, and DRI he.s a horrible record of forecast inaccuracy (see testimony of Dr. E.R. Weintraub, Prof. Economics, Duke University, E-100 sub EO before NCUC,1981, which Applicants pos sess. (b) See resnonse to 22-A-1 (b) and 22-A-2(b) a bove, and (a) preceding. (c) N/h. i

M . FESPONSE TO INTERROGATORr3 ON 223: Inrornulatinq this contentionx, Answer to ceneral interroge. tories: I relied solely on the ER and connon sense, which indicates that CP&L sinnly conied the sane nunber 'for ,;ayroll at 2 plants as they had had for k plants into the " analysis".Thims is obviously sloucy , if not inconnetent, figuring. I have no other infernation concerning payroll excent CP&L's changes to the ER, which Auplicants possess. It will require discovery of Applicants to find addit 6cnal infornat'on. 223-1. The question includes a statenent of trobable nisleading intenb, nanely that the se salaries are based on Aeplicants ' estinates of all conpany personnel, both onsite and offsite,' and contract labor required for operation of the Harris plant . .. but it doesn't say HHEN that estinate was made, or whether it was for 4 units or not. I believe C?&L sinnly adotted the s ane number for 2 unit s as f or 4 units. Otherwise the use of the identical number is an unbelievable enincidence. Additional arrors are likely; I an conducting discovery ASAP and will file requests to adnit such. 22-3-2 (a) No, and I an conducting discovery on this noint. (b) not applicable (c) discovery of Anplicants is required to s,ee i if this results in an underestinate, overestinate, or what. I need more infornation to answer to what extent additional NRC requirenents have inpacted staffing needs and costs for Harris. Atelicants

 ,   anpear to not have nade any new estinate, and an outdated est$nate is very likely inadequate and inaccurate due to changing requirenents l     cnd changing rates of inflation, wage '.nc rea se s, salary increases, 1

and changed benefits to ennloyees. l l

QQ RESPONSEtoEjdleman41 interrogatories GENERAL 1(a) George Maxwell, Senior Resident Inspector for NP.C, Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Auex NC, 362-0601; and others whose (b) the facts identified in this renorts thereon, which CP&L has, identification I am filing discovery of A,plicants to obtain ik%(c) Eddlenan contention bl, the"OK" tagging of defective nipe hanger welds, 69 4 and failures of Amplicants QA/QC trogran in this regard. Please note that I can't locate the I&E recorts this contention was based on, and may ,have lost them in the orocess of neving. They are on file with NDC and CI&L r,ets conies. However, CP&L's own reuort of 6-11-81 which Aeolicants orovide, has olenty of evidence of their QA failures. P k, iten 4 in the too half of the page (another k is in the bottom half) renorts 95% defects in 400 pipe hangers reinspected. Yet, all these isi pipe hangers had been cassed by CP&L previously. Exnibit no. 2 thereof shows 617 of 1766 hanger drawings re-reviewed had problens : unclear symbols, nissing synbols and incorrect symbols. Some of the 617 nroblem renorts covered more than one drawing. Clearly, the defect rate on the drawings is above 3k%, yet CP&L had not caught these problems previously. Deinspection (ditto source) yields worse results: of the.1786 ipice hangers issued for OA insnection, 701 were not installed. pdW Of the other 1065, 598, or 55% were rejected, ror a total of 15 3 reasons (a through o) which are a virtual dictionary of weld defects. Iten 5 of Exhibit 2 thereof says that unstarmed welds were accented bas ~ed on CP&L's lack of a requirement to stamp such welds and their "confiden(ce) of our welder qualification progran's ability to provide us with qualified nipe hanger welders" even though 95% of the welds in a samnle of 400 were rejected, and over 55% of a larger group reinspected were rejected for a huge number of types of errors. This assertion of confidence is baloney, as the above failures on reinspection show.-

5 General Interrogatory 3: I'll call Maxwell if Staff doesn' t. I don't know his q2 alifications, but he's evidently better at catching defective welds than C?&L is.' Subject matter: C?&L's records and QA/QC failures with regard to pipe hanger welds; CP&L's corrections or fixes thereof; CP&L's attitudes and responses to his findings. 5 6-11-S1 GI 4: I relied nrincipally unon Applicants ' own renort, though there is other infornation upon this. Anplicants sent ne a copy of that renort, so I don't need to give you one. GI 6- none now; GI 7 none now; GI 2 and h objections as stated under General interrogato ries. (b) 41-1(a) Yes. First, Applicants fa11ed to discover the problem. the NRC fouhd it. Applicants have not taken all effective corrective action reasonably required, nor have they shown that their corrective action is effective; there are defects in their corrective act~ ion beyond the one stated above in x response to a general interrogatory. Exhibit h to the 6-11-31 renort shows that of 85 duct hangers insnected,100% were defective, 61 rejected, 2 with engineering nroblems, and 2 which were tacked (I cresune this neans tack welded to hold l then cronerly). Of the 81 rejected, about half were OK'd without c1' ear j basis according to the information CP&L sunnlies. Exhibit 5 shows that of 298 Edlectrical cable tray and conduit 1 (955) han,e.es insnected, 285 (92%) had nroblens , 268 being rejected and 13 with engineering nroblens. Only 17 out of 296 were OK. The resolution of the engineering nroblems is not detailed. However, 239 of these were reaccented af ter either a permanent waiver (?W) which means they weren't fixed, or weren't fixed right in rework, but were still oMd , or by a Field Change R, quest (FCR) which basically l , anpears to be changing the requirements to fit what 's there or a' partial fix. Only 19 were reworked in the field and accepted by rework.

s - ~ ~ These rework, permanent waiver and field change requests are not specified in enough detail to see if they were adequate. NRC has not 100% reinspected then, according to their report attached to your 6-11-81 renort, so there is no assurance CP&L did things right here. I will shortly file discovery on these matters. It should be noted that the main focus of this contention is that CP&L, by bungling the inspection of oipe hanger design, weld specifications, welding and installation so badly, shows a deficient CA/QC grogran. In the words of NDC's counsel, if they're not competent to design and build a plant properly, they're not conpetent to run it. CP&L itself, to return to deficiencies in their response, states (p.2 of 6-11 report Rev. 1) that the nroblem was three-fold:" design drawing (s) with incorrect or unclear weld details were provided by the vender, and passing through all checking stages, were issued to the fie' d unco"rected.l (my emchasis) (neither Applicants nor their contractors or subcontractors caught these design / specification errors, even though they anpear to have affected 30 to 50 to even 95% of welds in various nipe hangers). Page 2 centinues " Field persennelfailed to weld the cipe hangers in accordance with the design drawings and/or made welds when deta!1s were missing or unclear." Why didn't they weld correctly? Why, if the drawings were missing or unclear in details, di dn ' t they a sk for clarified or corrected drawings? Anparently, this is still a oroblem for,3 of 37 drawings since 1-1-81 still had nroblems after getting (p.2) a second level of review by Bergen-Patterson. Who knows how many other bad drawings are still getting by 3-P, Ebasco and CP&L? The failure rate for welds on eine hangers in one sample af ter CP&L's welding school was taken by the welders, is shown on Exhibit 1 of the 6-11 letter to be 12.7%.

hi-1(b) continued < "}7 "}> - Page E. of CP&L's 6-11-61 letter. to NRC chows at the botton, item 4, that introper weld locatiens ar.d lengths, $= proper hanger fit-upf welds over holes and gaps, and other uroblems were "dispositioned" by permanent waivers or field change requests. Yet, it is not clear if any of these problens were fixed. As I understand such engineering evaluations, their nurpose is to anprove deviating materials and work if at all poss'_ble; no ex lanatien of the criteria for such, espegcially feldb over holes and gaps, i .proe,er weld locations, and introper hanger fit-up, are given. Wnile the FCRs and PWs are listed, CP&L's letter and its attachnents give no indicatien of the adequacy of the FWs and FCRs. (c) N/1 41-2(a) Yes . (b) That it has been is shown by Exhibit 1 to CP&L's 6-11-61 letter to r".C which was sent wi th Arplicant s ' interrogatories. It shows a 12.7% f ailure rate. I an nursuing discovery concerning other defects and deficiencies in the results of this training. (c) r/1. El-3(a) Yes.(%See resnonse to h1-1(b) cbove. I an also pursuing discovery further on this natter. (c ) N/A hl-h(a) Yes, by cernanent waivers (?W) or bf Field Correct'on Re que s ts (FBRs ) or other m.eans,(b) see resronse to El-1(b) above. (c) N/1. Note I an nursuing discovery on this also, k1-5 (a) Yes. (b) see resnonses to Ei h1-1(b) and hl-2(b) above; I also need to pursue discovery of UnC staff on this . I further und.erstand that additional nipe hanger, EVAC hinger, and cable hanger at Harris defects {have been- found since nid-1981, but I have not located those reports if I have copt es of them. (c) N/1

                                       -] k -

Update re k1-1 (b) and 41-2(b): I aise have the fc11owing documents re . pipe hanger defects at plants Daniel (CP&L's prime contractor for Harris) is building: 12-27-82 article fron St Louis Globe-Demberat by Allen Ievy entitled Pipe Support Problems Hold Up Eucicar Plant re Callaway (contributing to 10 month delay and 3750 millien cost increase, according to a vice president of Union Electric Co, probably Don Schnell, V?/ nuclear of UE. This, article states that the Wo11f Creek nlant in Kansas is "An identical nuclear plant under construction in Kansas (that) is having problems with its pipe hangers. Both niants are being built . . . using the same general contractor, Daneil International Corp."

                                " Wolf and continues that at"Xafi Creek, the braces that hold the cites suspended from the ceiling were not put up correctly or comoletely the first time around, "said Tom Taylor, suckesman for the        .

Kansas Corporation Commission." One from Kansas City Times 4/23/82 by Mitchell Benson, Energy / Enviromnental writer, entitled " parts made from scrap for clant: Eanger could have posed risk at Wolf Creek" stating that an NRC investigaticn uncovered 10 hangers for nices "made from scrap naterials at the construction site and rot with aeproved steel" and tha t 10 of these parts were " called counterfeit in an agency (NRC) recort and were discovered before they were installed." W.C. Seidle of NRC in Arlington Texas is cuoted as saying (though 9 of the hangers were not safety related) "Durirg this investigation, it was found that certain of your utiitti activities were not conducted in full co pliance with FRC requirements. This violation was documented ... no further resronse to this notice of violation is necessary." and states further that a snokesman for the utility said Daniel Construction fired a construction foreman last April (19817). A futsk further article K. City times h-20-82 Forged Paperwork Confirmed at Wolf Creek. I am supolying cocies of all these to Anolicantsq

Eddleman h5 - water hanner (la) RESPONSES to General Interrogatories: I consulted no one in fornulating this contention. lb and Ic U/A. 2. Objection. See general interrogatories above before specific answers ton questions Ka on each interrogatory. 3 None so far, k. I relied on EUREG 0606, volune E, task A-1, and the FSAR. (b) Eddlenan h5 (c) FrPFG-Of82; EGG-CAAP-5133 July 1900; DE-E 79-009 and 79-013; RE-A-78-229;

   *E-A-78-261 (all fron EG&G Inc and used as NRC task h.h renorts on Wmfer Hanner); RE-A-70-Okk State of the Art Literature Peview of Water Hanner, CAAP-TR-Ok2; UUREG/CR 1606; CAAP TR-053 Rev       1,.
 . July 1960. I have not been able to locate infernation as to which parts of these studies I relied on, since I noved after naking the contentions and have not found the original backun info for Eddlenan h5     However-   ~SFG/CR 2781 of July 1982 is one of the CR recorts I andicipatec       iw being prepared by UFC5 in Tddlenan 45 NUR3G/CR 2059 is one com?,leted in May 1982 which was also anticinated.

I believe Applicants haven't shown compliance with or ability to avoida the conditions in any of these renorts, as evidenced by their one-paragraoh cavalier response to Staff question hh0.h9: Aoplicants nerely assert that the ECCS systens will be full; they do not address the stean generators at all (Task h.3 recort, EU".EG/CR 1606,9/80); they do not reference any analysis of notential water hanner events, what lir.es or sections of lines or other cla'ces (e.g. steam generators) such water hanner events can occur in; they do not refer to ecllapsed stean voids at all, or the formation of slugs which can becone water hanners on systen restart af ter an outage; they give no direct nethod to assure that any systens, whebher pipes, non-pressurized systens interfacing the ECCS, or other systems, remain full of water; they assune operators will see all leaks; they assune onerators will know which leaks could lead

                                       /)          '

to water hammers though they orovide no check 12st of such systens, or means to separate leaks from such rystens from other leaks' so that operators will know exactly which leaks could relate to possible . water hammers, they Drovide no indication of how the operator, looking at the outside of a ncn-leaking nipe, will know if it contains steam, collansed stean voids, a water slug, or anything else; they de not ernlain how testing will check for nossible water hanners, of how it could nrevent water hanners from conditions occurring between tests; they do not explain in any way how the plant leak reduction insnection urogran will seek to detect water hanner events or conditions that can lead to then; they do not explain how sump level alarms relate to water hanner, or what alarns or what water levels in what tanks would be used by plant operators or nersonneal as an alert to possible water hanner conditions. In sun, the greatest support of Eddleman h5 at this point is the Applicants' own resconse, which is not at all resnons&ve to the N90's above-referenced renorts and does not provide a progran to assure that water hanne r events cannot oc cur, and that nrecursors to such events (e.g. formation of voids or slugs, leaks, and sudden valve onenings or closings, e.g. as occurred at Duke's

        ~4cGuire plant in Decenber 1981) will not either damage the trimary or ECCES or RhR systens, or dmmage control systems tied into water suno11es affected by the water hanner shock wave.

I will review these above-referenced documents anew and resnand to Auplicants further; and also when I locate the original Eddlenan 45 backun, I will so inforn Applicants. General Interrog 5: see above. cP&L's resnonse to Staff quest $ on kh0 49 shows that CP&L has not taken the concerns of

  ,      Eddleman h5 into account.

6 Not Applicable; objection to 2 annlies here. 7 Exhibits not planned or, finalized yet.

RESPONSE to 45 continued: h5-1(a) FSAR 10.h.7.1 describes Harris feedwater systens; in the original FSAR, water hanmer is 'not addressed in this section. Thus, the PSAR discussion was obviously inadequate then. FSAR Amendnent 2 does not change thit, section. Therefore ny answer is Yes, 10.h.7.1 does not describe any uay in tinich this systen is adecuate against water hanner. (b) The fact is that the analysis required to show g.dequacy against water hanner isn't in 10.h.7.1 of the FSAR. (C) Analysis not connlete. (d) Not Auplicable (N/A) h5-2 (a) Yes, particularly the draf t NUREG referred to a cage 11 of DJREG-0606, vol k #4,11-19-82, but since that docunent has net to my knowledged been issued yet, I cannot nake further response on it. Other documents still being analyzed or to be analy::ed. (b) see (a) ( c ) N/A . a - 45-3: Yeax. b: See under General Interrogatory 4(c) above. CPL:L's response to Staff question hh0.49 is clearly inadequate for Further analysis may be done on other natters re (b). the reasons stated there. (c ) N/A 45-4 (a) Yes. e only reference to water hammer in the FSAR 10.4.9 annears to be at page 10.h.9.6 (original FSAR'and anen6nent 2 thereto which adds cne sentence); However, nossible water han ier j initiating events are the automatic isolat!on of a ruptured suuply line (10.h.9.2.2 at nage 10-h,9,3, and the niping failures described in section 10.k.9 3 at page 10 4 9-5). "here is also a uroblem here in.that, if a stean generator failure initiates the reactor / turbine l trin of that latter section, offsite nower is assuned unava'lable i per 3 ranch Technical Position APCSB 3-1 (p. 10.h.9-5) and the stean i fron that S.G. night be one of the two innuts to the steam driven AFW punning. Low pressure or overpressure on that innut night l also lead.to valve closure cr formation of steam voids that could initiate a water hanner. l

                                                  ,           n                     .

The only analysis of the alleged adequacy of the AFW system against water hamner is on p.19.h.9-6 as anended (Andt x 2) which states that the systen is designed to renain full of water. The possibility of stean being pulled into' the AFW due to failure of condensation, or the nossibility of a void due to a line leak, are not analyzed. The third sentence states, the rest of the discharge piping is nressurized to steam generator nressure. If this cressure cones fromIstean generators themselve s , then an SG failure could lead to fornation of voids (by raising pressure) or collapse of vo'ds or stean to forn a slug or slugs of water (by lowering pressure). The fourth sentence says that void formation in the area of the stean generator auxiliary feedwater nozzle is nrevented by the tennering flow from the feeduater systen. But the AFS is diesigned to operate nostly when the feedwater systen is NOT working.

                 'This uroblen is not analyzed.

The fifth sentence states that the AFS will be nonitored for water hanner during initial testing per FSAR section 3 9.2.1; howe #er, l that section both in the original FSAR and in anendnent 2, does not address water hanner and does not nention the AFS directly. It seens to be nore about vibrations, and the snumbber inseection, etc nake no reference to water hanner events. At page RI 3 9.2.2 there is a reference to observing piping ete durirg transients for excessive no tion, based on the judgnent of the testers. All this acuears to say is that if a water hamner occuras in testing, naybe they'll notice it; but water hanner is not'directly nentioned here at all. The sixth and final sentence (all 6 take un 12 lines on FFAR oage 10.h.9,6 in total) e water hanner says that the nain stean suoply to the AF punn turbine is sloped to avoid collection of condensate.

                                             ~

This should reduce the nossibility of slug formation by condensate piling up in .the line, but where does the condensate fall to? This . sentence does not address that, nor the nossibility of fornation of a Aug in the line due to SG failure or condensation during shutdown. That is the only mention of water slugging effects harmin in that part of the FSAR. Clearly, this " analysis" of 12 lines is inadequate. What CP&L needs to do is first identify all nossible conditions of slug formation, based on both experience in the NRC reports / contractor renorts listed above under general interrogatory 4, and identify means of as.suring that if such slu'se form or water builds un in any place, it will be pronptly detected. A full analysis of the inpace of sudden valve closures and openings due to transients is also required. CP&L hasn8t done this, so I naintain their water hanner protection for the

                                                                     ~

AFS is inadequate. They don't even specify how the AF steam sunply line is sloped, how this is adequate to renove condensate from the line, where the condensate goes, whether this was a design change or sonething they forgot to re ntien before (which, if they did, indicates they're not really aware of water hanner risks), and if it is a change, what other effects it has. And that's jus t for the stean line, not the values and stean generators xxd tied in. The contradiction of assuming FW systen will prevent foidasri at A?W injection, when AFW injection will o6 cur with the fehdwater system out of service, is not addressed. Apolicants ' analysis is inadequate for at least these reasons. h5-4(c) see above (d) N/A 45-5 Yes (b) will need to re-review documents cited above to snecity. (c ) N/A. h5-6 (a) Yes (b) this procedure does not address water hammer at all. See above answer to h5-h b and c, and general interrog #4 re Rddleman E5

D ,e 45-6(C) n/a but I will supply further information when found. 45-6 (d)Yes N/(A b) 45-7(a) see resconse to h5,5(b) above, also to h5-h b and e and ' general interrogatory 4 re Eddleman 45. (c ) N/A h5-6(appplicants have not given a design of the FCCS pining which shows adequacy to nrevent the effects of water hanner in their response to Question S 0.h9 (Yes) (b) see 45-8(a) response and response to General Interrogatory 4 re Eddleman 115. (c) additional inadequacies will be identified. ( d) N/A . 45-9 (a) Yes, with reference to resuonse by Applicants to Question

           $ 0.49 by staff.     (b) in addition to the facts stated above re G.I. E on Eddleman 45, and 45-4 b and e and 45-1 a and b, 45-2 above the main steam systen does not appear to have been analyzed for water hanmer effects resulting fron formation of slugs due to steam condensation during shutdown, in isolated lines whether the plant is shut down or not, and the formation of. slugs er the initiation of water hanner due to stean generator failure.        *hese are clear inadequacies. 'An adequate analysis would identify all causes of slug formation or trips that can initiate water hamner due to valve openin; s or closings (e.g. isolation of S.g. on crimary or secondary side, including the case where one isolation valve works, but the one on the l

other side does not, or the one on the other leg on the same side does not), stean void formation in pipes, and would then specify direct detection of such slugs or voids, analyze all such trips and l valve closures or openin;;s, and show a neans to assure that slugs l or voids had not forned, which would be continuously avadlable to clant operators. Applicants assertions about systens being designed to stay full of water do not annear to anply to stean generators; indeed, it aopears Auplicantshave not addressed stean generators l AT ALL in their response to staff oue stion $0 49 (they do not. ). l

f - 45-9(c) N/A Yes (b): - k5-10(a)4the testing of the nain systen with respect to water hanner* events is not described in Applicants response to Staff question (lbbdEnis kk0.h9.h)From the rest of the FSAR, it anpears that only a visual, judgnental insnection will be performed with resnect to seeing if a water hanner actually oc curs during s tartup testing. After that, it is not clear if any water hamner tests will be run. If this question neans, has the Harris nain stean systen been testep and found adequate to withstand nossible water hanner events, definitely not. - With respect to inspection, what would be required is a means to identify leaks originating in lines, nunnb, or nortiens of lines, stean generators or oghter nain stean systenz conponents which snecificall) have the possibility of water hanner associated with then. These include leaks fron isolated lines, sudden ruptures, and other leaks as well as the injection of stean or stean nixed with water into lines under accident conditions (e.g. when the reactor coolant nay boil), and water hanner events that can inpact air or water-onerated controls. There is no such analysis in Applicants response to c,uestion hh0.h9 or any reference to such. Isolating which section is leaking can be done by an anprocriate systen of valves and draing for each section in which a water hanner can occur. Otherwise, inspection visually

      .ay not detect leaks. Autonatic indicators of water leaks from eneh section are required since coerators will net be visually
    'nsnecting all such lines, particularly those inside containnent, at all tines the nlant is running. For these reasons, Applicants' resnonse is wholly inadequate and so is their inspection and testing re water hanner. (c) N/A.

q-45-11 See resnonse to General Interrogatory 4 re Eddlenan h5 Some additional renorts are referenced in the task analysis of A-1, Water Hammer, in NUREG-0606 Volune k (earlier number used to prepare contention 45; later one, #4,' used in resnonse here) but I do not have nunbers on then. See p. 11 of NUPEG-0606, Vol 4 #4, 11-19-82 frcm NRC . EESPOUSE re contenti en 65 (Eddle .an) GENE"AL $ nterrogatories 1. I co nsulted no one but ny memory. 2 and,5, objections as stated above under general interrogatories.

3. see above re general intevrogatories 4. Will be detailed below.

6 and 7 Mone yet.

                     "ES"0NSE TO 65-1(a) I don't know yet and will nesue discovery on this, but note that I do not linit contention 65 to deficiencies or noncenformances as defined by Annlicants in their questiers.

b and c, see a above. 65-2 (a),b and c. See 65-1 above resconses. 65-3 (a ) Ye s . (b) Just look at the 0.A/QC failures re nine hingers (see response to Eddleman 41-1(b)) where 95% of a group of 400 were defective and got by initial inspection and weren t caught by Applicants until the URC resident inspector found sehe of the nroblems l on or about 9/3/1980. Consider also the terrible record of Daniel International with respect to concrete and base nats, as described see also Update rebelow. Eddlenan y D hl,/a.e 's record in nine hangers. further in resnonses (c)'h 65-4 In additien to renorts I had read of such defects, and the testinony of S. Miner (I believe) on this natter and the firing of general forenan Willian Snart at Callawyy (Harris managew nt caparbility remand hearings' 1979, transcrint) I have the following documents relating to these problems: l

                                     -} )                           .

65-h racnonso centinuod

                                          .                        Wolf 1, The Imronworker, 9/79, pp 26-28 re " huge voids" in Xati Creek containment structure       and a base mat poured 12-77 which tests out far below strength due to a substandard nour by mannit Den 6el          -

recortedly consisting of concrete rejected for highway use. It says U90 gave daneil the go-ahead even though "about 50 cercent" of the concrete test containers for the base nat failed to meet specified strength of 5,000 p.s.i. and in spite of the fact that NRC h.s never nade an on-site strength test of the base mat. Joint Intervenors' Exhibit Q (I believe that's the narking) from Callaway re a crack in concrete at Callaway. Letter fron J.G. K opler, director NRC region III to Mrs. L. A. Deey, 4-4-80, which states that voids forn (ref. NRC regulatory guide p.2 1.55, June 1973), to which Keppler replies that they are caused by rebar being present in large amounts and numbers, but he says the rebar is generally close to the surface. This is not so obviuosly so for basemats and is f alse for containment walls in which the rebar i goes very deen 5 Joi nt Intervenors ' Exhibit E - Callaway - Daniel Internat?.onal Concrete Placing Report which shows at secend rade that" concrete rlace-r.ent crews lacked adequate experienced superrvision" and references l QCP-109, which I don't hafe but nresume is a quality control orocedure. Conment abovs is by Red Johnson, a sueerintendent of concrete placing. pp 89-98 of Joint Invergenors prop;ced findings, section Y, honeyconbing in the feactor building basenat, Callaway, STN-50-h83-OL I 3-1-82; and np 1-lh of Joint Intervenors' 3-2-83 brief in suoport of exceptions in the same case, re basemat; Applicant's Exhibit No1 1 in the sane docket, Non-Conformance l Rgnert NCR 2-0856-CGA; and Joint Intervenovs' Exhibit 8 in the sane i l STN-50-h83-OL proceeding, Final recort on concrete voids 6n reactor building base mat callaway plant which refers. to the soniscone insoec-tion joint intervenors coint out went through stehl, not concrete. I i

4q ._ 65-k continued. I continue to investigate and collect documents lf on this, e.g. with respect to WoII Creek and Farley. n 65-5 No, CP&L is a, thoroughly incompetent utility as f.own by its - 3runswick plant, and that as well as Danniel's poor record is a basis for my concern re the base mat at Harris. In understand that the foundation of one of the Brunswick units has a crack in it and that the resident liRC inspector there believes this crack could continue to widen to such an extent that it might force that unit to shut down by anp,roximately 1985 I have not examined the experience of other contractors in any detail, but am aware of proble ms with concrete at LaSalle, Midland, and some plants constructed by Bechtel, to the best of ny recollection. I an also concerned re numerous recorts of bad concrete which have come from persons who say they are working ow heve worked at the Earris olant. pp 2-3 65-6. See letter from Keopler to Drey, cited under 65-h above. The fluidity of the conrete mix as poured, the care with which it is poured, and the number and placement of rebar in the. area of the cour obviously influence the formation of voids and honeycombing. If the concrete itself is not sufficiently fine and fluid to flow into every crack or grap between rebard, the pour will obviously have voids. If the pour is done too fast, or with too viscous a mix, rebar near the surface may trap it, leaving holes or large vo! ds undeurneath. If the nour is not adequately s coervised and insnected during couring, the. existence of vo' ds may not even be noticed. Where structural steel or enbeds or trumplates obstruct the parth of the coured cone crete, eg. by being criss-crossed in layers offest under the cour, of by having a main d?.mension or plate at right angles to the nnvnal to the surface of the eventual mat or wall (i.e. in the olane of the mat or wall being poured), special care and injection of

                                 -3 65-6 continu;d concrete will be required to prevent voids. Honeyconbing and missing concrete along the structural steel, especially rebar, is          another problem that can and does occur, especially if the concrete is too viscous, noured too f ast, or includes atr from mixing. The honey-conb is gaps and non-adhesicn of concrete around the rebar, and good vibration practice combined with careful attention to concrete nix consistency and viscosity is required to prevent formation of large anounts of honeyconbing in places, such as the base mat, where rebar is especially thick and multilayered. Another such place is the iel base of walls, e.g. of the containment and of buildings.                  Dane '

once built a whole wall without rebar at Earris, which is another problem I am concerned about. This interrogatory sounds like an exam cue stion, so if more information is requ' red, niease ask, informally

                                                                          ~

first. 65-7 I have not personally examined either the structural steel design or the conrete piecenent reports for Harris; I have seen the concrete placement renorts for Callaway. Otherwise, I have not. CP&L has not in the past provided ne access to the Harris rebar en-site so that I might inspect it, and I haven't yet askea theE to. l l 65-8(a) If by intended function you mean having integrity in the ir face of a design basis earthquake, ariliner crash, or tornado nissile, i I believe Yes. (b) the description of the huge voids and weak concrete I. In the structure indicate that it is weaker than design basis and thus, emb'e ds , trunplates and other structures which may be strongly stressed durirg an earthquake, airliner crash into the containment, or tornado l l missile, one or nore may fail, leadirg to greater stress on the others, additional f ailures, still f urther stress on the remaining sunports of walls, floors and equipment, and quite possibly equipment, numns, walls, ob other part,s of the plant vital to safety or containment

6F-8(b) enrtinuad - integri,ty could collapse or rupture or break down, inpairing or negating the saf ety of the clant. This is about as detailed as I can get, except to note daat the lower strenth and reserve margins (safety nargins) you have in strength of convete, steel, or both, the closer you cor.e to a cascade of f ailures if one ra*t is ove-loaded for its actual strength and fails. Voids in concrete also allow more noti.cn and even oos sible slinpage of rebari and embedded suonorts and tr'unplates, potentis. ting collapses by getting Caen going. (c) U/1 65-9(a) It is my understanding NRC did not recuire uma daem to modify the structure to . correct the deficiencies, but I need to conduct sor.e discovery on this myself. I don ' t know in any detail. (b), (c) see a above. 65-10(a) Yes. See Joint Intervenors brief excepts 89-98, cited above under 65-h. I am not sure what"oroperly nerforming its intended f unction" means in Applicants' t erminology , it seems vague and quite possibly misleading as to the meaning of a resnnnse. Therefore I object and request clarification of the meaning of this l l phrase throughout Applicants' interregatories on Eddleman 65. - (b)(c ) see above. 65-11( a ) no t known , b , c , s e e (a); see also 65G9 resnonse above l 65-12 (a) I have not comnleted checking into die Parley plant l* concernint- this. I am filing discovery on it. (b) (c) (d) see a. 1:ot'e re (c) I would not be surorised if NuC had issued a license to operate Farley despite serious flaws in its structure or design. Look at Diablo Canyon, which was well on the way to a full ouerating license and had a fuel load / low power test license when the horrifying defects (over 100 found so far) in its seismic design were found

                     ~

l $nadvertentiv. l 65-13(a) not known, see resnonse to 65-12 (a) above. 3,c, see a.

~ He Eddlenan 75: I consulted no orie. No exeerts, yet. Info given below re what supports the contention. p-fe 3, ],1 - h 75-1(a) Yes, they may be b t NRadauxiliarycoolng %(C) systems are blocked (e.g. by hydrilla, clans corbicula sp. or other corrosion, scale) or rendered inoperable by leaks or equinment failure, then the condenser would be required (and thus the cooling towers) unless CF&L was willing to vent radioactive stea . to atnxosthere, which in ny view is not a safet shutdown. (c ) N /A 75-2. This is another quiz type question ("your answer should include"), which I cannot answer in all the detail asked (each biocide and every type of

• to which each and every type of narine growth will possibly orove resistant). I believe corbicula so is one such. Corbibula larvae can pass through the screens and enter the riarris cooling sys tem. As to the mechanisns of acquiring io genetic resistance to baicides, I cannot specify such. Generally, genetic mutations and interchange of genetic m.aterial which itself has considerable variability, would be means of acquiring resistance to.baiocides. Another possibility is marine algae, though it anpears to be dark enough under the cooling towers that such woulc have diffi-culty establishing themselves except on the ton side of the soray slats and on the piping above it; nonetheless, dead algae could nove into the spray or fall into it or be knocked off by it, and could then be transnorted to the condenser and fcul or corrode it, esne cially as the dead algae decor. pose 75-3(a) Yes. (b) the ER addresses use of chlorine to kill algae only. No nention is nade of corbicula sp. or other foms of marine growth, nany of which may be resistant to chlorination because they live in ~a water or have the ability to live in even saltier water.

 ,    Whether the condenser is properly grounded is a matter I have not been able to find yet in the FSAR. Grounding is needed to prevent chenical corrosion, and imoroper grounding will accelerate chenical corrosion

around the attachnent points of any organisms (e.g. corbicula sn or barnacles or mollusks) growing in the condenser or circulating water piping. These organisms can live on al Eae which the chlorination systen - has killed, or live algae resistant tn chinvire which the systen is circulating. It is clear that Apolicants have failed to take such appropriate measures at their Brunswick olant (condenser and RH9) as shown by the failures and ruptured heat exchangers found in Anr'1 and May ,1981. These are referred to in FOIA-82-261 (I believe thatts the nunber) from J.M. Felton NRC to R. Udell, Critical Mass; I believe there is nore detail in the LERs on these events to N"C, which Apolicants It is also vossess, unclearand whichApolicants whether I think I have takeconf due es of,dbut negar hs ve not of exygen in yet located. g (c ) N/A the CWS (spraying oxygenates water) and light which can nullify the biocide ability of C12 75-h(a) The measures are insufficient to nrevent entry of naterial that could nourish marine growth, e.g. algae living or dead, decayi g bits of organic natter, etc., so I think the ar.swer is Yes. (b) ER section 3.k.2.7.2 states (p. 3.h.2-5) that dredging of the nond (holding pond for cooling tower blowdown) may be required to renove these s oliis that 60 a c cumul ata there. Thus, solids accunulate in the ecoling tower blowdown; they nust have been in the c'rculating water systen te get into the blowdown, and since Aunlicants clain they are nininizing corrosion, nost of these solf ds nust have co .e fron intake. According te ER 2 3.b.2.8.3 the travel' rg screens are full of 3/8 inch square holes (al Ene erd debris of s f'ne sort tha t clans, etc, can 11v'e on can easily get through that). The fine screens, used only when traveling screens are down for naintenance, have the sane size onenings (1/8" wire on 1/2 inch centeris gives 3/8" gaps ) . There is no indication the -intake wate" is f?ltered way which would nrevent algae and o"ganic or processed. debris in any/S" finer than 3 in diameter (and sone larger, if flexible)

                                                                                   . t Chlorine fron entering the CWS.        Chtorin2e in 30, minute bursts w'11 'not i

necessarily kill clams, but nay kill g food for them. Corbicula have lived in condensers at other nuclear riants, but I cannot read'17 1' (I8ve been looking) locate the information used in oreparing this contention, o* cther docueerts including this f act. (c) N/A. 75 - 5 (a) I an not fa-ilier with Annit eents nlans, if any, to monitor the Harris reservoir for introduction of Asiatic clans. (b) (c) see (a); I an nursuing discovery on these natters. I note that detecting corbicula, etc, is not the same as preventing then. The spread of corbicula appears inexorable in climates like ours around the Barris site. 75-6(a) Yes, as f ar as grounding and builduo of narine growth such as corbicula are concerned, I don't believe Applicants ' neasures can prevent it or hold it within acceptable limits. All the FSAR ' says is that a cathodic protection sy stem and a coal tar coating are pr.ovided. Nothing is said re the grounding of the aluninum bronze in the condenser, the ground? nE of the other metals and nining of the condenser, whether these metals and oiping contact aluminum bronze directly, what aluminum bronze alloy is in the condenser, . who conditions it corrodes under and so on. All there is 'n the FSAR (the ER anpears to be identich.) s one statement that the main ccndenser has "a cathodic protection s w' which "is pro vided". The nature of this system, its capabilities, etc , th e exn ected. corros ion rates, monitoring of corrosion in the condenser, and so on, de not an near to be discussed in the FSAR mad its first 3 amendr.Ents, which I have. (FSAR 10.h; ER 3.h) (sentence noted above re cathodic nrotection is identical in original FSAR and 3 amendments: p. 10,b.1-3 under section 10.4.1-2 (last sentence, in original TSAR). There is also a claim in the FSAR, naked, section 10.h.5-2 at page 10.h.5-2, tha t" materials in the cooling water ___systen will__Maig% e@Freg%%" _ ___ __ _ _ i

                                                                -d N
                    . l.                         ' h0-l                 ibat's all it says.

No figures are i referenced, no f urther info s is'provided. No types 'of corresf on are analyzed, no nothing. The amendments don't change .this part, as far as I've seen. I am' frankly surprised tnat Anplicants have not urovided more information on this point. There is no wa7 to tell if their

           \i ;neasures are appropriate when they are not described, but I think it is reasonable to assune they are insufficient when they are not describ,ad or analyzed.        (c) N/A 75-7(a)Apulicants' provision for pressure changes in the main condenser does not seen to be specified in the FSAR or ER, excent as to limiting back pressure during steam dumps into the condenser, which, according to the FSAR andndments, can handle up to 40d of the full steam outnut before stean wculd have to be vexnted to atmosphere (actually, the table, FSAR 10.h.h-1, shows that 6 of 1h dump valves each allowing 705,000 lb/hr, feed the condenser, and 8 feed to atnposphere.         Thus, the percentage is about hP.857% to the condenser if all 6 of these valves are fully onened.           This nercen-tage which the condenser can allegedly handle has risen from 35% to h0% in FSAR anendm.ents since the original FSA", with little or no I

explanation. I see no indication that Acolicants take pressure chanFes into account other than having instruments to block the steam dumn l l' valves, and considering flooding of the condenser. (b) see (a): ! Anplicants don't appear to have taken this into account as stated l in the FSAR. (c) N/A. Please note, this cuestf on is confusing because Applicants have not provided sufficient info in the USAR to clearly answer it. I an conducting discovery on these matters ASAP. l

RES?Ol*SE RE EDDLEMAN 80 beyond infc given 4 n original contention General Interrogatories: I consulted no oneg I relied on studies which show inconglete mixing is normal, rather than the nearly con 51ete. mixing assumed by models such as the ER5s. However, I cannot as yet locate the materials used to prepare Eddlenan 80; I have neved since preparing the contentions (imnediately thereafter, within the next 2 weeks and 3 days) and nay have 1ce t these naterials. At any rate, I have not yet located then, though I have searched ny S* E?Po files and the boxes containing materials used in preparing co nt enticns .

                  /

I have as yet no exnert witnesses, and will identify documents when located. My objections to G.I. #2 and #$ are as stated above under General Interrogatories nrior to the answers to specific interrogatories. 80-1(a) Yes. These models, according to FR 5.2.2, are actually desc=ibed in ER 611 3 I presume that section is what you neant. (b In sectien 6.13 2 reference is made to a regulatory guide 1.xix, which I presume actually has a number, and is dated 9/30/77, re Atmospheric Dispersion nodels for potential Accident Cons equenc e As'sessments' at Nuclear Power Plants". This section Eoes en to say that one of three equatf ons was used, but under nonstable wind conditions it does net specify which of equations (2) and (3) were used. The long-term nodel (6.13 2.2) is even more unclear, saying noth'ng about how the probabilities f and factors DECi(x), DE*Lijk(x) and 9Fk (*) are connuted for each distance x. lielther of the se models take rainout or non-gaussian dispersbn, into a ccount. Fur ther, I understand that daere are recent studies of disnersal in the wake of towers and buildings which show that the se m.odels do not give actual dispersion as observed in reality. I hage not yet identified or obtained such documents. (c) N/A 80.2(a) Yes. See response to 80-1(b) above. (b) the models do not mention rainout at all. It does not enter into the equations 7 given, which are generally Gaussian dispersion _equat'ons. (c) N/A. l

                                     -h2-80-3l a). I am not sure what the nos t lim' ting scenario is.

I think it would be a radioactive release which is either directly into a rainstorm or snowstorn which carries the particulates released directly to earth in a small area, conbined with wind patterns which deliver nost or all of the radioactive gases from the release to the same snall area, carticularly tho se decaying into non-gaseous forms. l l Another case which ni Eht be the most 1$ n' ting scenaricx is a thunder-storm which suddenly creates a downdraf t and driving rain into a plune (nore fike an " invisible balloon") of radioactive gases and narticulates released, dtiving then down onto a small area. The most limiting esse for dbc area would be one $ n which it contained a la ce numbe" of persons outside unpro6ected, e.g. a park full of picnickers, etc, including rany small children and infants (for the thunderstorm), or onto a heavily populated area where nuclides will be taken up by foot traffic, air intake of cars or homes or buildings, etc, for example, a drive-in mcvie parking lot in winter, the storn l l having arrived after the novie began. I am not confident I can specify TH E nost liniting scenario Applicants should have considered; farm, for exanple, this direct delivery of radionuclides could be to a anzm, Dr. Wilson's orchard, a garden or community gardening area, a day care l center, a happital, a prison, a school and so on. I have not connuted which of these gives the greatest risk. I think I an not obligated to do Applicants' work for then or carry th eir burden of proof, thcugh I will assist then in identifying seenarios such a s the above. l (b) Obviously. (c ) the nodel of the long-run doe sn't look at any 1 such scenarios. The nodel for the s: ort-run shows no adaptation to s'1ch, and does not include rainout. The inadequacy is basically r that the model does not treat the situat$ en s describe d above. l (d) N/A. ,

1

                                         -k3-        .

80-h(a) I don't know what these Peg Guides state. Comnliance with a regulatory guide, in and of itself, would not urove anythinE concern-ing this content $or, since it $ s not' e. bout the Dag. Guidae, but ahnut the adequacy of Applicants ' nc deling te det1 with rainout and non-uniforn (non-Gaussian) dispersbn. (b) N/A, see (a) above (c) ditto to (b7. 80-5(a) I do not recall if Reg. Guides 1.109 or 1.113 or both were referred to in fornulating my original contention 80. They are not referrdd to in the centention. I believe I may have had a co y of ReE Guide 1.109 at the time I fornulated this contention, but cannot now locate such. In any case, I do not believe these guf des were approved by the Commission itself, but by NRC Staff, and I do not know how deficient they may be. If they do not take into secount non-dispersed, nonuniform dispersion, and rainout transnort of. radio-nuclides, then they are inadecuate under this contention. (b) See response tc (a) above and to above interrogatories, narticula rly 00-1(b), 80-2(a), and 80-3(a)(b) ard (c) and 89-h(a). (c) N/A REFONSE ?.E EDDLHiM' 132. General Interrcestories: I consultee no one. I used only the contentions of CESG and Palmetto Allience in the Crtawba case, and my knowledge that NU"EG-0737 and othe- rTI renorts point out that their are not unambiguous water level indicators in PWRs and that this was a ma jcr caus e of the TMI accident since onerators didn't know directly what the le vel of water ' n the reactor vessel was. No excetts yet, not witnesses, I have net got cooles of these docunents, they're in the "aney Library (L:D' 7aleich) and include the Keneny Commission 9enort, 90govin Senort, and NU"EG-0737. I did not note pages on which I identifie d this informaticn, and don't know what paEes it is on, though it is common knowledge tnat uater level indicators ar~e not in PWos and Apnlicants stipulated to this part of Edh

                               -kh-132-1. No. I have not yet reviewed the design of the "VIIS.

However, I understand that it involves only about 3 rressure tubes, which are not nrotected against corrosf on, blockage, crushing durirE an accident, and which has an arror of several feet and carnot detect water pressure at noints away fron where it reaches (e.6. , water level or pressure in rarts of the cere where beids or on-tf al netiting or flow bicekage may have occurred). This seens clearly inadecuate. I have ordered FU'EG/CR -2626 but it has not yet arrived, so I will

              /

have to analyse this furdber to provide more details. A system unable to tell if the core is covered one foot or uncovered one foot, which cannot tell if rart of the core is a void, and which cannot Be fully protected fron blockaEe, 's clearly inadecuate. . 132-2. No. I don't trust Applic ants or 'destinghouse as far as nuclear safety goes. I want to fully review this PVLIS system before making any such decision, as I believe it has at least the inadequacies sttted above in response to 132-1. I think a direct readin6 of watev levels in at least 9 parts of the core (spaced out like a tic tac toe g-id) would be required to really know the water level inside the reactor vessel and the core well enouch to nrevent partial or whclesenle I neltdowns. I don t even know for a fact that Staff has cceented this dei' ice. REstorSE TO 83/8h. I consu'ted ne one. I relied on the E', basic chenistry, and ny mencry of or art! cle concerninF the interaction of chlorine and urea in suinning neols, leading to formation of TEC1 3, NH2 C1 and NC1 . Sin e the chlorinstion level in pools is sinilar to 3 that specified for Harris discharge (o.5 to 1 pyn) and Harris will use up to 3 to 5 ppm chlorine in its cooling water systen, 'n which hydrazine is expected to be present as well as ammonia, I reasonad that the same or similar react

• ons could occur when these chemicals

                                       -h5-I also relied on the fact that chlorine interacts with organic connounds such as phenols, dioxins, biphenyls, and many others which are present in nature (dioxins nonchlorinated) or discharged into rivers like the Haw and Cape Fear.        I have a renort of Haw river monimmitoring from the Corps of Engineers, e nd I believe another fron UNC-CH, but cannot locate either now, though I have searched; these reports ident'fy many heavy metals in the water, as set forth in ny cententions 83 and 8h.       The organic chemickls ha ve not been fully etalyzed yet, to my knowledge, in Haw River water or Jordan Dam water. Ammonia and chlorine are known to forn complexes with metal ions, which could induce toxic effects in the more soluble for.n of these complexes; many of these metals are known carcinogens, e.g. Cr, Pb, Cd.      To answer (1) on page 39 of Annlicants ' irterroga-tories, it appears that Table 3.6.2-1 has been deleted fron the 7" in Anendnent 5       If so, I have no informaticn on wha t chenicals Apnlicants will discharge into the Harris cooling lake, and will have to conduct discovery on this matter.      However, the abcVe-naned table in earlier vers?ons of the ER identified chlorine, hydra 71ne, ammonia, sulfates, and oil / grease. Chlorinated hydrocarbons (chlorine + oil, grease) are ca cinogens.       Metals such as those listed abcVe and set out in original contentiens 83 and 8k and the r evised vers

• nn presented at the prehearing conference are carcinogens, and can be noved to or into living beings by interact'on with chlorine which increases the solubility of such metals in many cases, and can ionize such metals and nake then nore reactive. (2) See resnonse to (1) cbove. The forns-tion of carcinogenic conpounds may precede discharge, narticularly for interaction of chlorine with ammonia and hydrazine forning NH 201, NHC1 , r NC1 . I have not analyzed all react'on nroducts of such 2 3 chemicals and I t hink it would be silly to list every nossible chlorina-tion of ev,ery hydrocarbon cha$ n found in diese1 ~ fuel, grease, and oils.

                                 -h6-These hydrocarbons are known, and their, chlorine connounds are known, ch&orine replacir.g one or more lkydrogens on a hvdrocarben. I also believe that Harris sewage will release urea into the lake, forming NelEp (3)' the chemical nrocesses in dbe Harris nlant which nroduce each NHC1g2
                                                                             ??C1 3

such chenical are: (a) chlorination (b) use o# annonia and hydrazine to maintain pH or oxygen scabenge, operstf on of the turbine building (which I an not sure is prouerly a chen' cal rrocess, but which will discharge 1 nillion Eallons a year with .05 opn hydrazine and 0 to 1 ppn annonia; the sanitary syeten chlorination, releasing 4.5 nillion gallond a year, with chlorine up to 0.5 ppm; the secondarr system chemicc1 clearing Ky.xte solutions ' use, which is said to discharge 7 20 million gallons per year after(each)nlant startuu, with 50-90 unn hydrazine del! vered f or treatment and an "imnossible to predic t' concentration of hydrazine the reafter (all fron Table 3.6.2-1 of FR); the ecoling water blowdown anount car be calculated varfously fron the IR. Page 3.h.2-1 seems to innly blowdown of 106 cubic feet ner second (c13). whiuh is about 49000 gallons per n'.nute per unit. Table 3.h.2-3 xi on nage 3 4 2-13 says maixnum coolinE tower blowdown wfl1 be 9600 gen per unit. If the blowdown averaged 6000 gpn and Harris operated at a 60 to 80 percent availabil'ty factor, this would be about P to .2.7 billion gallons per year, at chlorine concentrations said to average 0.2 ppn. That is in decent agreement with the 5000 gallons of chlor'ne ( that the ER says elsewhere will be discharged yearly.

 .      Another dhenical process, which the warmth in .the Harris ulant CWS.would encourage , that nroduc es carcinogens, i s the breakdown of organic natter releasing me thane wh'ch can then i_ react wi th chlorine to form chloroforms ( chloronmethanes ),dich are known ca -

cinogens. (4) Any concentration above 1 ppm chlorine can do th4.s; below 1 ppn, I don't knew; I have not deternined concentrati.oris of the other chenicals necessary for such reactions to nroceed- chlo='ne will reach 3 to 5 ppn in the cws twice a day, and to reach that

                                             -h7-concentration, it must be injecte? in a, higher concentvat'en, possibly as high as 100%.

83/8h -2(a) I have not . analyzed the magnitude of this risk, so far, as asked in (1-) or (2) hereunder. (b) mone, since I haven,t analyzed it. 83/8h-3 (1) I have not connuted this anount, and am not into and from - able to without actual testinE of dispersiongfeem the Barris lake - The risk is greater tc a swinner who swallotN water f re n the lake or hss (2)down the Cape Fear River, which I do not believe I can afford to onen cuts. undertake. I have not established concentrations of each such chemical in food chains (a) in the river or (b) off the NC coast. c The concentration factors can be substantial, howev'er, e.g. 10' chlorinated from water to organism fat for most dioxins, and annroximately a f actor of 10 for each additional step in a food chain or web above the first. This f actor of about 10 concentration is co non for many chemicals, although I have not analyzed Cape Fear r$ver organisns_ or shellfish or other organisn off the North Carolina coast for such or established mysef1f what the conc ent rations are. 63/8h-4 In addition to the above-referenced analys's, the chromatography conducted f or Haw River Assenb17 is believed to show a large number of neaks (annroximately 100) showing orEanic chenicals. The Haw feeds into the Cane Fear. While it is not tractical or possible for me to provide a list of every chenical (orgedic , dye, phenol-based) in the Cape Fear that becomes more cared negenic afte- ,. reactions with chlorine, ammonia, and hydrazine, obvious such are non-chlorinated dioxins, chlorinated dioxins with a few excentions (e.g. 2,3,7,8 TCDD, which is about as carcinogenic e s it can Fet); almost any phenol-based chenical become s e. ore carcinogenic when chlorinated as chlorination 'ncreases its solubility and its ability to interact ionically -- thus,-its ability to be carried into living cells and nucliei, and to interact chenically with genetic naterials, is increased. I do not know the exact means

of such carcinogenesis. Hydrazine and acmonia can =eact with ohenol-based materials (and many dyes) to form azo connounds, a number of which are carcinoge'ns. (2) Most of these reactions would troceed independently of the joint concentration of chlorine, ammonia, and hydrazine. For exanple, chlorination deoends on the concentration of chlorine. I have net analyzed the cross-effects of the joint concentrations of chlorine, annonia, and hydrazine on any of the above reactions. (3) I ' m not sure how specific one needs to be. Chlorination and annoniation and reactions with hydrazine such as I an concerned with involve usually the renlacement of hydrogen

                                                 ~

with either C1, NHp or NH. These reactions can also involve oxygen ato r.s in the ring structures of phenol-based and othen organica chemicals. I haven't got a chemirstry text in ny nossession which l gives the step by sten, radical-by-radical descrintion of these reactions, but they do proceed, which is dhe key fact. As noted above, it is not practical to list every carcinogen which will result;

      -indeed, some chemicals will likely resultz which are car'cinogens l       but which have not yet been established to be such; however, in addition t

l to NC1 3, NH2 01, and NHC12, the dioxins noted above, and all other chenicals noted above in resnonses te this interrogatory, would become more carcinogenic after at least sone reactions with C1 or ammonia or hydrazine, with the exdettion of 2,3,7,8 TCDD which is about as carcinogenic as you can get. Obviously , th en , e.g. , 2,3,7 tri chloro DD (and 2,3,8 - and 2, 7,8, and 3,7,8- ditto) are such chemicals. A list of all of them just isn?.t pract1 cal to produce, as there are over 70 dio71ns alone involved. I will attempt to suuplement this resnonse with listings of chenicals when I identify such as connounds that can or will becor.e r. ore carcinogenic af ter reaction with chlorine, anmpnia, or hydrazine.

      @ coy eJ) QVJSMic eve #tr+Clz de O w cos y teld cavcwgerde chtc&M

                                         -h9-83/8h-5. The basic nethod that wou? d be adequate would be a frequent sanoling of water and sediment (sedianent will be washed          .
                                 ~

out fron the Jordan Dan into dae Cane Fear to orevent siltatf or buildup) af ter which all such samules would be subjected to both gas and liquid chromatography of sufficient accuracy to identify all ruch chenicals at concentrations of 10 ppb or up. Fo r dioxir s , the testing nethods at state of the art are said to be able to detect concentrations in the Darts ner trillion range, which is

                   /

aoprouriate given their extrene toxicity / carcinogenicity. Hewever, I do nct know these nethods for test 4rc for d5 0xins in any detail. Obviously the resolution and sensitivity of the chronatorranhy are critical. ~ihere chronatograuhy is not sufficiently s ensitive, other techniques, such as inf rared absonrtion aralysis, NMR spectroscopy, etc, may be required to achieve identificatier of each chenical down to the 10 unb level. 83/8h-6. The EP doesn't nention this natter. Nor do Arnlicants' water quality renorts to EIA (Forn 767). The State doesn't nonitor nost of then, ner does the Ce ps of Engineers. I an not sure what ESA has done about this. I have inquired of EPA by telenhone in July 1962 re what analysis of this natter EFA might have done, with resnect to the Earris nlant, and received several resnonses (also oral) which stated, Ucne. 83/Sh-7 (1) By "nobilize" I near to ionize, change the ionization state of, or free from a conolex in such a way as to nake the metal nore biologically or biochemically active (via increased solub!1fty, increased reactivity, increased chen$ cal activity etc) so that the I metal can react with living organisns. (2) chlorine; nossibly annonia and hydrazine; other chenical dischanges not aralysed yet for this ability. (3) In addition to the netals listed in Eddlenan 83/Sh I l

and the original Eddlenan 83 and Eddlen,an Bh (nossible excentien of nercury), we have silver, germanium, galliun, antinony, osniun,-

                                                                                 ~

and'the others listed in the nonitorinE renorts referenced above (I think one version Eddleman 83.84 lists firtually 61 of daeg,) but I can't locate it new)'(4) cannot list c 1 such chenical reactions, basically 01 2 r C1 ion ulus netal or netal conrlex yields netal chloride, netal ion, or metal ion in higher charge 22 +A+ state (e.g. Cr

• C1 yields Cr plus C1"). I an not aware of a minimum concentration for these reactions, although the reaction rate depends on concentration. In dedinents, the c'encentrat' on will be higher for netals. Another poss' ble nobili zat*.cn route is via chloranine which could form connlexes with metals. These reactions generally lead to a (metal)(NE3 )x comnlex vith x from 2 to 6, which can exist as a chloride or as an ion.

(5) This interrogatory is perhaps overly broad, but actually, each and every living creatxure that uses water in its netabolism (esnecially those that filter water in feeding, o" drink water) will nore reedily absorb such chenicals (metals ) once they are nobilized. That means all of ther though I don 't have a list. Humans, fish, clans, oysters, algae, riankton, are all included in this. I think it unduly

burdensene to require ne to list every such species, sir.ce th ese l are available fron references and research, and there is only one o"

 . me , and the informat$ on anpears to be available to. l.n"licant s f ro-sources other than nyself.      I have specified that every wcter-using organism would absorb such chenicals more readily; also, anythirg that eats such organism or ogramisns which have eaten other such organisms will concentrate the netals better because of (1) the larger uptake into the first organism that ingested the nobilized netal and (2) the greate" ched cal reactivity of the metal as mobilized.

                                              -8 51-To the extent I an being asked to l'st infornction Acolicants have available elsewhere on the identity of all species int the cane Fear and the ocean off the coast near the Cane Fear, I object sinnly because (1) Aunlicant s can get this informat'.on elsewhere (2) it's unduly burdensone -- I can't spend the tire to f *.nd all such snecies and tyre then out (3) I've ansvered the substance of their que stion. I wrote this resro se about 8 pn 3/21 and therefore will.nct be able to Incate Aurlicants' attorneys to negotiate it before filing, bat I'll aska then about it 3/22.

63/64-6. Apnlicants don't mention metals in dhe TR othe- than those discharged from Harris, to my knowl edge. y an oursuing discoverv

                                                                      ,r' or to 51L-62, as   to any such analysis An-licant s hrve done either urior to 7-15-S2, or to date.

U?DATE re 83/6h-h: T^ble A-2, p.29 of EPA-600/2-77 023k, Charter 11, gives the following a66181ves used in fiber nroduct'cr: Stiblene; phenyl counarin derivatives, c1kylated phenols, u-cresols , long-chain alkyl derivatives of hydroxy benzo thenenes, 2-nethrb 5-vinyl tyridine, 2-vinyl pyridine , p-vinyl-ben ene sulfonic aci d , i sulphocinanic acid, nolyoxyethyhner attached te aliphatic hyd"oc,a* bon chains. These are "T nical Additives used 4n (synthetic) fibe" troduction. I borrowed this docunent but will sunnly An"1* cent s a cory of this table. Te.ble A-1, Fiber raw materials , list s other phenyl chemicals relevant. I will suntly An l' cants this table also

            . Allied Chenical, Moncure NC, Du c ont at Care Fear and Kinston UC, Falk Fibers & F,brics at Yancerville and Fucuay "rrina FC, Kryszt Kayser Roth at Creednoor, NC, Texfi Industries as Asheboro, NC, and Wellington synthetic fibers, Pilot Mtn, NC, as well as Rchn and Haas at Fayetteville UC and The Osterneck Co. er Lumberton NC are listed as producers of fibers uhich use these additives Kr (Table C-1 ibid)

I believe the Govecoor's Waste Management Board, of which CP&L VD Grahan is a member, has data on hazardous waste product

• on in FC

           ?.3141 of EPA-600/2-77-0238 Vol 7, organic Dyes and Tigments Industry, identifies Ciba-Geigy Corn Greensboro NC as a maker of dyes. The descriptien of its products (p.272) is very general.

Table A-1 lists the raw materials of dyes, pp 163-68. I a ,treviding Applicants docies of these. The entire document is available from IPA, but since I borrowed the copy I an using, I cannot make it availa'ble to Apnlicants. It describes in some detail the reactions used in naking dyes, and lists thousands of them '(it apr: ears) in Ampendix 3. The discharges of d7 es into the Haw River are ec.:on knowledge. L?DATE 9e Eddleman 65: I have now looked at FSA9 3.8 and figure It is not clear 1 3.3.1-2 thereof, describing basemat rebar layout. from this layout where in the height of the 12 foot thick nat the rndial rehars are. The fit at the ha.9e of the walls is not on this diagran in any detail. I have not co nared this design with callaway, l. Wolf Creek, or Parley. l 4

     . . .                                  -7
 .                                          ,~>

UPDATE Re Eddlenan 22-A resnonse: 22-A-k(b) specifically. In preparing this resconse I did not notice a note I had made dentailing a con,utet' on cf nuclear waste disnosel costs bas.6 nr +ha figures given in the Court of Anneals' (DC Circuit ) ouinion in NRDC v NRC (1982) at page 67 of the ouinion of Judge Bazelon. These figures are (for no plutoniun or uraniun recycle ) per 1000 MNe reactor, $71 million canital cost plus enerating co st of 0.E to 1.L nills per KWH for hi hE level waste (snent fuel) discosal. Converting. tnis for Harris at 900 MWe, we have a canital cost of $63 9 million which at 20% fixed charge rate is about 12.78 million dollars a year to pay for the c arital investnent in waste d$ snosal. Dividing this 9 by C?&L's estimate of h.6 x 10 kWh ner year for harris 1 (6-30 82 PURPA filing, 292 302(b) itens 1-2h)(with NCUC) which Aunlicants filed and thus nossess, we get right at 3 x 10 dollars ner kWh, o- 3.o nills. Adding in the 0.h to 1.h nills operating cost g!ves 3.h to 4.4 mills /kWh. To this we must allow for uncertainties, for exanole, the car $ +al cart or venrocessing nients are cuite hich, and Dr. K.Z. Morgan has stated, if ny nemory serves me correctly, that the 3srnwell plant (AGUS) for renroceesing could renuire $250 to .

           $500 nillion in additional ec,uipment te prevent unacceptable releases of radioactive gases to the environnent during rervocessing of snent nuclear fuel. Thur, K_ recycle options can be expected to cost nore than the option costed out by Judge Bazelon above fron the evidence in NRDC v. KRC. The cost of nuclear waste discosal I believe goes te i

22-A(h)(b). I believe Anulicants have the decision; if they don t I will make available a cocy of o.67 of it. I

STATE OF NODTH CAROLINA COUNTY OF ORANGE Today Wells Eddlenan aupeared before ce and affirned that the responses he is filing to-day to Crrolina "owem & Light interrogatories s.re true to the best of his nresent knowle6ge except as to matters therein stated uoon info mation and belief, and he telieves those to be true.  ! This ay of March, 1983

                                              /

yu pqw /Y,C > 7 7 d d 14; O2mmt:s.cn L;,!.e //- / 3.8( b i

STATE OF NCETH CAROLD:A

                      -           COUNTY OF ORANGE                                  .

< Today Wells Eddlenan aupeared before ne and affirmed that the responses he is filing to-day to Crrolina Power & Light interrcgatories c.re trt:e tc the best cf hic rresent knowledge except as to matters therein stated upon infomation and belief, and he believes those to be true.

                    -                                       A!            ~

This ay of March, 1983

                                                     /

tea,v yw / ~YC~7 > 7 7 d d ti.; 0;mmi:: ton Eg.:.e; / /- / 3.8( O 6

                                           .                                          1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATOFY COMMISSION In the natter of CAROLIKA POWER k LIGHT CO. Et al. )) Dockets 50-h00 Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 and 50M01 0.L. CERTIFICATE 0F SQ VICE I hezeby certify that copies of W f vh24fod5t2-

                                                 ...         . _   m,t .     -_ccutsi OhD
         = nWO9&es CFM sed 43LLy 22,y 41,4g,Lc,25,go + cc3/g f HAVE been served this g ' day of March              _

1981 , by deposit in the US h il, first-class posta5e prepaid, upon all parties whose names are listed below, except those whose names are marked with

              /

an asterisk, for whom service was acconplished by Judge James Kelley , Atomic Safety and Licensing Board US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington DC 20555 GeorSe F. Trowbrid 6 e (attorney for Aeplicants) Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge , _, 1800 M St. NW .- Washin6 ton, DC 20036 , , Office of the Executive Legal Director Phyllis Lotchin, Ph.D. Attn Docke ts 50-400/E010.L. 108 3ridle Run USNRC Chanel Hill NC 2751h Washington DC 20555 Dan Fead Docketing and Service Section CEAILT/ELP Attn Docke ts 50-k00/h010.L. Box 52h Office of the Secretary Chapel Hill NC 2751h USNRC Wasnington DC 20555 Pat & Slater Newnan CANP John Runkle 2309 Weynouth Court CCNC Raleigh NC 27612 307 Granville Rd - Chapel Hill Ne 2751E .

         ' Travi.a Payne                                                            -

Edelstein & Payne . Box 126h3 Ralei 5h NC 27605 Richard Wilson, M.D. Certified by  % 729 Hunter St. Apex NC 27502

                                                                                      - _ - , - -}}