ML20102C362
| ML20102C362 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 03/01/1985 |
| From: | Eddleman W EDDLEMAN, W. |
| To: | Bright G, Carpenter J, Kelley J Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| CON-#185-881 82-468-01-OL, 82-468-1-OL, OL, NUDOCS 8503050562 | |
| Download: ML20102C362 (12) | |
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i ogATED CORRESPONO@f%
Q UNITED STATES OF AMERICA C0drE uux NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION U M -5 81 :12 BEFORE THE ATOMIC Glenn O.SAFETY Eright AND LICENSINGnBOARD cc.
- V , ,Lh:
Dr. James H. Carpenter " '
James L. Kelley, Chairman In the Matter of CAROLINA POWER AND LIGHT CO. et al. )
(Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, )
Unit 1) ) ASLBP No. 82-h68-01
) OL Wells Eddleman's Resnonse to Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents on 41-G Response to request for production of documents: I have no control over Chan Van Vo, but I understand that documents in his possession (or copies thereof) have already been made available to Applicants; I believe all other docunents referred to in these responses are already in po, session of Applicants.
Answers to Interrogatories G-1(a) Robert Guild, c/o 2135i Devine St., Columbia SC 29205; documents were provided by Carolina Power & Light Co. and I&E reports by NRC Staff. (b) see specific responses (c),(d) N/A it appears.
8g G-2(a) see specific responses (b) see (a). .,
wra So' G-3(a) There is no interrogatory 14 in the general set; see response 88 Lo to general interrogatory 1(a) above; see also specific responses.
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$a oo (b) see (a),
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om 1(a) Yes. (b) I have not yet completed my review of the voluminous gg documentation produced by CP&L on discovery -- it's about a 10-ream paper box full. However, even thus far along_J can draw the following conclusions:
1 Extension of time to file today OK'd by Auplicants atty O'Neill
a ,, 4 : e . . . ;tp (At Chan Van Vo received very positive evaluations, includaing skipping a grade in promotion, and uronotion to Engineer af ter minimum time in grade, before about early .1983 For Van Vo's promotion to Engineer, a note on the speed letter or similar form concerning this (from Alex Fuller to (?name) Lucas) states that (the addressee) had checked with Ed Willet and he has "no reserv."
which I would read to mean "no reservations". Fuller evidently recommended the promotion. Previous evaluations noint out Van Vo's doing work "at the engineer level" before he was in the Engineer job classification; praise his accuracy, thorhughness, ability to get along with others, and point out that he handled a large volume of work and continued to improve his abilities. They also mention that in addition to his regular duties he had been invaluable in training new employees concerning codes, prodcedures and the like, including which ones to use. Few (none that I observed) reservations are expressed on any of these evaluations, which annear to be the personnel only documents in hisafile from the time period between his hiring and early 1983, except for transfers and assignment records. (There may be other items; review is not connlete). (I don't have the documents at hand right now, but they can be as easily located and read to find these references by CP&L as by me.)
Van Vo was also evidently considered to be quite well. qualified (perhaps a bit overqualified) in experience and education (etc) for the job at which he began work for CP&L.
However, all this changes in the spring of 1983 as far as documentation in his personnel file is concernad. Menos are written after the fact on alleged past problems Van Vo had had on the job (problems nowhere noted in contemporaneous job performance evaluations of Van Vo, and evidently not documented contnooraneously with their alleged occurrence). Records of counseling sessions and meetings,
mostly prepared by the person Van Vo says was an incompetent boss, Alex Fuller, proliferate. Although Fuller states in some of these documents that he, Ed Willett, et al.were only trying to heln Van Vo, these statements are clearly their interpretation of sessions which by their own statement did not go well and were tense. Since they are writing the memos to the files, common sense tells me they would not blame themselves for any of the problems. Rather, these nenos are consistent with both an af ter-the-fact and a continuing effort to fabricate or produce some excuse for getting rid of Chan Van Vo.
Likewise, the numerous notes and short memos to file concerning times of coming to work and leaving (aside from some annarent inconsistencies like Van Vo being warned for enning in at 6:50 a.m.
instead of 6:45 with a warning that he should be on the job by 7:00 a.m.
indicate that for the most part, even an intensive effort to document problems (obviously something that would put an employee under pressure) mostly only turned up minor ones. Likewise, the documentation that troliferates after early 1983 concerning Van Vo's " errors" in work, first do not take seriously Van Vo's comnlaints that he was overworked (recall dhat he had been uraised in nast evaluations for doing a lot of work, working overtime as necessary to avoid backlogs), and secondly find mistakes of the tyne that evidently were rampant in the hanger orogram at the Harris plant, e.g.
not having all the details right in an evaluation, misreading i
a blueprint or specification, etc; further, there are not a large number of these errors and Van Vo's error rate compared to other engineer & is not a factor so far as my veview has yet revealed.
Thesedocumentsandtheiranneadcepattern(intime)are quite consistent with a concerted effort to harass, intinidate and fire Chan Van Vo. Fuller evidently scent a large amount of time i
putting together notes and menos to file on Van Vo af ter early 1983
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Moreover, although CP&L documsnts naintain Van Vo had sono problems (not alleged to be his fault) in his ne sonal life,
& job supevvisors other than Fuller the" counseling"(so called) by Fulleramixai disulays little if any evidence of symoathy or help. Rather, it appears that Fuller and others out Van Vo's actions under the kind of nicroscone that would turn up something wrong with virtually any human being (all of us being inoerfect). With the hanger program in serious difficulty, and Fuller and Willett having nanagement jobs in that program, their extreme attention to the nost petty matters concerning Van Vo stands out as unusual. While they try to cast it as cart of an effort to help a troubled enployee, and clain Van Vo could not handle the extra responsibility of being an Engineer, the record of contennoraneous evaluations of Van Vo's eawlter nerformance shows he was doing work at the engineer level, and doing it well, to a high standard, well before he was named an Engineer. The excess of observation, coupled with sooradic " counseling" (not nonthly as it "should have" been) in tense conditions, is nerfectly consistent with a cannaign to get rid of Van Vo. Since it is very unusual for a sunervisor to sinoly state in a newson's file "I decided I don't like this guy raising safety concerns, so I fired hin", a pattern of excessive attention as is displayed in Van Vo's personnel file is a logical way for a person having an illegal motive (firing or harassing for safety concerns) to proceed to carry out that objective (getting rid of the person who raises safety concerns).
4 It is obvious also, from connon sense, that " counseling" or "we're only trying to help yout strategies can be effective in harassment, intimidation, and making a case to get rid of an emoloyee.
It puts the employee in a double bind. If she or he does not reveal personal weaknesses and fully discuss problens, the " counselor" can say "you're not being coonerative" and put menos about the employee's
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" bad attitude" or" unwillingness to try to innrove" or the like, into the person's personnel file. But if the person coonerates with those who are trying to cause him or her oroblens, that 's helping to dig the emnloyee 's own grave on the record. So the employee can't win and can't escape excent by quitting the job (which accomplishes the harasser's goal). It appears that Van Vo's " counseling" may well have been of this type. Certainly the" ..anselors" display no sensitivity to the influence of Vietnamese culture on Van Vo's attitudes or ways of relating to peonle or ways of doing his job. While there is some other documentation, re talks with Van Vo by persons other than his supervisors, who attenpt to understand him more, there is no evidence this information was used to good effect. The effect of probation and sunervisory ,
" counseling" of this tyne is obviously to increase the pressure on Van Vo, but the supervisors appear to disply no sensitivity to this pressure or itas effect. Since that uressure compounds Van Vo's difficulties, a comnetent and truly synnathetic sunervisor would either seek to reduce the pressure, or seek advice on how to reduce that pressure. All this can be readily deduced from the Van Vo personnel file and connon sense about how organizations attemnt to build a case against anyone they have decided to get rid of (by firing, resignation, etc).
Please note this investigation is continuing and also that answers below may provide meditional information responsive to interrogatory 1(b)(this interrogatory being resnonded to now).
2(a) No. (b) N/A; however I have received information from Van Vo through his counsel, Robert Guild. So far as I an aware, this information is reflected in the affidavits by Van Vo already produced in this case, and in the deposition of Van Vo by CP&L to some extent (I am not sure of that extent).
I (b)I believe 3(a) They certainly have been. See, for exannle, the FOIA document appended to the February h reconsideration motion I filed on 41-G etc. Van Vo also has stated, I understand, that Alex Fuller told him (Van Vo) not to go to the NRC without Fuller's approval.
(Van Vo evidently obeyed this instruction during his employment with CP&L) (To the extent this info re Van Vo is not in his affidavit, it was provided by Robert Guild. ) Also there is the matter of getting a message across without an obvious instruction. For example, the treatment of Van Vo for raising his concerns about safety w! thin CP&L could and very likely would deter others from raising such concerns even within CP&L, much less to the NRC. Also, a document produced by CP&L on discovery, Parks Cobb's 10-22-8h letter to CP&L, refers to allegations of harassment made by quality insnectors at Harris, and it appears that in fall 198k or thereabouts, a n
" Inspector Review Panel" was set up to deal with this. Cobb 's attachments to this letter, specifically his clant for investigating Van Vo's concerns, annears to predetermine his conclusions on this i
issue. CP&L's internal investigation olan leaves many issues to the legal department only (no technical evaluation). Cobb's plan uses words to the effect that investigation of some issues should support the results of other investigations. That sounds like he's planning to find" facts" or conclusions in sunport of other conclusions already made. Because Cobb destroyed his notes and interview documents (see CP&L answer to my interrogatory 41-G-1(c)) it is reasonable to infer he wanted no one looking into the process by which he got to his conclusions. This is at least susnicious.
(c) It is not necessary to have CP&L crdering neoole not to talk to the NRC (or issuing written instructions to that effect) for there to be harassment, intimidation, or an obvious atmosphere of discouraging employees from communicating with the NRC. The example of what
happens when the NRC maMes even casual contact with CP&L enployees (CP&L has a high-level memorandum which is intended to insure that higher management is notified whenever any such contact occurs and especially on sensitive matters, dbe " sensitivity" of things being a repeated consideration in the brief meno signed by numerous senior CP&L officials and approved by E.E. Utley) indicates that CP&L definitely wants to know when the NRC makes any contact with anyone in their organization. This high degree of sensitivity could well lead employees to infer that if they want to contact the NRC, they would be expected to let management know, or that if they did not informa management of CP&L of the contact, they had best nake the contact in secret because otherwise the enntact night well be reported to management by someone else.
And of course what happened to the alleger in the FOIA document attached to my Feb h 1m985 motion for reconsideration, what happened to Chan Van Vo, and what appears to have haupened to other neonle at the Harris niant sends a powerful message through the olant
- " grapevine". Actions speak louder than words, and it it common knowledge on many jobs that an official comnitment to safety, etc.
may be just for external consumpion, not to be taken literally by employees. Actions which are takean against employees who express safety concerns, either within CP&L or to NRC, obviously have the l effect of " educating" observant employees not to talk to the NRC or raise safety concerns, regardless of " instructions" about safety.
The employee who has a concern for safety and is not fully satisfied l
with what CP&L or its contractors do about that, is in a serious i
bind given that anyone has been instructed (e.g. an the allegations i
un the FOIA document referred to Feb 4; Applicants ' response gives i
a sumnary of actions on these allegations that anpears to include nothing about making it easier to speak to thca fiRW
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be free of harassment if one does; nor to keen CP&L from stonning people from going freely to NRC).
ki 4(a) The question does not make sense. Evidently, there are missing or destroyed quality control documents at Harris.
Van Vo mentions seeing a large number of then discarded in a warehouse.
Page 3 of NRC investigation report (I&E) 8h-h3 states k that CP&L (" licensee") noted that it considered "the missing records to be in-process records". However, I note that 10 CFR $0 Appendix B item XVII says " Sufficient records shall be maintained to furnish evidence of activities affecting ouality. The redcords shall include at least the following ... The records shall also include closely-related data . . . Records shall be identified and retrievable . ...
" (emphasis added). None of this allows any exception for nissing records. A missing record is not being " maintained", is not "retriev-able" and cannot " furnish evidence".
CP&L goes on to say (page 3 of I&E renort 8h-h3) that "The missing records may have been stolen". Dubing the insnection (it ran from November 27-30,198h), CP&L "ehanged the nrocess for handling pipe support quality documentation" Clearly Van Vo's concern had a basis if there wre documents missing, and the basis must have been valida for CP&L to change its procedure. There may be missing documents in many other areas besides pipe supports, and these may include QA documents under criterionXVII or 10 CFR 50 Appendix B noted above.
(b) see above "not limited to the substance of any such indtruction" -- it is the documents being missing that is the problem. Instruction to destroy or get rid of documents would just compound the problem.
(c)(see (b) above also) the contention does not require that CP&L instructed someone to destroy documents. CP&L is resnonsible for maintaining the documents, so if they are missing
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or destroyed, CP&L is failing its safety responsibilities under 10 CFR $0 Appendix B criterionXVII. Please note that there may be other criteria etc which CP&L is failitg to connly with when they have missing or destroyed quality documentation. I have not completed my inquiries into this matter or ny checking of the applicable rules and regulations and reauirements.
5(a) I am not aware that CP&L has any such policy. But see responses t's parts of (i) above: a person intending to harass or intinidate gor fire or pressure (e.g.,to resign) an emoloyee could well use " counseling" as a vehicle; any employee may have r
come problems (none 6f us are perfect) so documenting a real or fabricated rroblen could then be a convenient excuse forharassment.
To the extent "CP&L's practice" refers to what was actually done to Chan Van Vo as " counseling" by his sunervisors, I believe it did constitute harassment; I have set forth my reasoning and information 33 so far detailed and available to ut into this response, above (see, e.g., pp h,5 above).
(b) see (a)
(c) ThE question appears to misstate the contention unless l CP&L's " practice" means what CP&L did to V9n Vo. Certainly it is consicient with harassing and firing' Van Vo to use "counselingW to
, help build up some record against him -- esnecially since he was evidently such a good employee before CP&L evidently decided to get rid of him in early 1983 To overcome the past record, his supervisors ' would- nee'd to resort to 'every means available, and "counselingM in the nannger they did it annears to be one of those means of harassment, pressuring Van Vo and putting him in a bind.
See, e.g., pp h-5 above re how " counseling" can be harassment.
6(a) Van Vo had a concern for safety regarding this niino.
This concern is logical because the cump sunplied feedwate= to the stean generator. A failure of a "non-safety" comeonent can still cause an accident, esoeciallysince the nuclear industry and ?MC classify so much equiement non-safety. Van Vo evidently believed this systen was classified as safety -- a basis for such a beliezuf is shown at pp 3-h of I&E inspection report 84-h3, all other piping
, being said to be Seismic Class I. While Van Vo may not have had this in mind, his concern was for safety. The pioing was classified Seinsic I until at least 6-30-78 according to CP&L document #000896, l drawing CAR-2165-G-071 Rev 5 (6-30-78) footnote k. Evidently the hangens had also been classified seismic I and were reclassified later as Van Vo discusses in his affidavit (s) (hangers for this pipe).
Seisnic I is clearly a nuclear safety classification (classed as safety-related, I believe), but downgrades from it may also be safety-concerns. Van Vo evidently was concerned with the ability of the pumn to perform its function, which could be innontant to safety (in the event of other equipment failures, it might be the necessary backup to avoid a serious accident).
(b,c) see (a ) resconse above. I repeat that a concern for safety does not have to relate to an iten classified " safety" especially when reclassification of items (e.g. piping and hangers) and safety-related functions (e.g. supplying feedwater) are involved. The steam-driven feedwater system is there as a backup against electrical failures (where the electrically-driven feedwater punps night not work) for exam >1e. I would also note you don't have to be right 100% to have a nuclear safety concern. Exposing anyone to harassment or firing because they raise a concern that it not right or not 100% right obviously would and does have a chilling effect on the w3111ngness of others to raise safety concerns. Since no one is enffect, it would be detrimental to safety to only allow nerfect safety concerns.
k . O 7(a) I'm not sure. Cobb destroyed all his notes and I'm not sure I've seen all the documents on this.
(b,c) Answer is neighther affirmative nor negative. Guild inforns rms that Van Vo told Alex Fuller that if he YVan Vo) didn't need to do anything about his observations re this inproper installation, to just say so. Fuller, according to Van Vo, told him instead to write the speed letter concerning the installation. From Van Vo 's affidavit, it appears that Applicants failed to properly identify the non-conforming setup for this installation when Van Vo and perhaps others cuestioned it. They evidently went ahead and put it in. Further,-
improper or insufficient action by Applicants is evident in CP&L's failure to correct the imoroper installation until over 2 years after the problen occurred. CP&L evidently, according to discovery documents, did not commit to changing the installation (cutting it out and reolacing it, anparently) until aoproximat&ly 18 October 1984; the uroblen was said to have been found in 1982.
84a) see response to 7(a) above. (b,c) I'm also not sure. If CP&L knew it and Fuller knew they knew, why did he tell Van Vo to write the speed letter about it? If he found out later and discarded i
the speed letter for that reason, why didn't he advise Van Vo by note j or meno that the problem had been found before and was being taken care of? If Van Vo is right in his affidavit about being told to write the speed letter, and about it being visible to him on top i
of trash from Fuller's office (info supplied by R. Guild, beyond affidavit)), these cuestions are not satisfactorily answered by CP&L.
- 9(a). If you mean "does the FSAR require it", the answer annears i
l to be no, although the FSAR is ambiguous as noted re Table 3.P.1-1 l p.3 2.1-h0, in paragraph 5(b) of I&E report 8h-h3. If you nean, i
should it be required to be safety-related or seisnic 1, I'n not sure.
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, q kf 9(b) sso (a).
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y 10.(a,b) Yes, and there may be plenty of unidentified ones too.
y hbe unidentified ones are more trouble, since the p*oblen is not known.
4 n .sg E" E 3Much careful checking for these should be recuired, since DD" 1775 T
ggc e" ec* (I&E inspection recort 84-143, pp 5-6) identified " numerous uroblems o
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with material substitution and control". Evidently, 200 of 1000
$v$ finally-reviewed hanSer material verifications had material N*c
,[* that could not be gtraced and which was sent to a "sasquamoling program" ooE
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using permanent waivers allowing the use of unidentified material, eed g g.g4 Although the NRC says "no deviations or violations were ident?*ied" w .c w d
ny m-(p.6) this aupears to ne to be an obvious violation of 10 CF9 50 Anp B E$'m item VII which requires that "nurchased raterial skal.k . . . conform oSI.3 o yg { to the nurchase specifications" and that evidence that this is so eo Mm,E "shall be retained at the nuclear powerolant ... and shall be nme
$ e c 9 sufficient to identify the specific requirenents ... met by the smc4 gg purchased material"... When tbs naterial documentation does not n .o 8"*
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., show where and to what snecifications naterial used in the plant
$ $ '0 D was purchased, then that information has obviously not been retained.
jY jN&* To try to synthesize documentation af te= the fact does not excuse oC the violation of the requirement to retain the information that ex-En1 "shall be available at the nuclear powerplant . . . nrior to installation".
o .c .tl C,g It appears to met that the NRC is being very lax about this, as an j do the words of criterion VII for cuality assurance are clear. (c ) N/A ca goc 11(a,b) Yes. It was falsification to put a P.O. number on the aww
$%# Q/ documents other than the P.O. number for the material. Since Cobb "ea
- s. n a- . destroyed his suoporting documentation, I can't trace his basis; CP&L
$ $c a gg g has not identified separately any documents used by Cobb; indeed they A.
- Eh& do not separate any of the documents nroduced ( a box full) by the 5m g g parts of the interrogatory they are resnonsive to. (c ) N/A .
e3e 12(a,b) Yes. The insnector dhecked only one hanger (CCoH*105 that
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hasbeeninspectederobablymorethananyotherhangerintheniant).
See also responses to 10 and 11 above.
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