ML20071B470

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search

Proposed Revs to Tech Spec Re Anticipatory Reactor Trip Sys,Boration Sys Temp & Corrections to Typographical Errors in Administrative Section
ML20071B470
Person / Time
Site: Davis Besse Cleveland Electric icon.png
Issue date: 02/22/1983
From:
TOLEDO EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20071B469 List:
References
GL-82-16, GL-82-17, GL-82-23, TAC-49481, TAC-49482, TAC-49730, TAC-51388, TAC-52419, NUDOCS 8302280337
Download: ML20071B470 (19)
v • d • e


Text

. _ _

Docket No. 50-346' License No. NPF-3 Serial No. 913 February _22, 1983

~ Attachment I

.I.

Changes to Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Unit 1, Appendix A Technical Specifications 3.3.2.3, 4.3.2.3, Tables 3.3-15, 4.3-15 and Bases.

A.

Time required to Implement. This change is to be effective upon.

.NRC approval.

B.

. Reason for Change (Facility Change Request 79-283, Rev. B, Supp.

3). This amendment request supercedes Toledo Edison submittal of November 15, 1982 (Serial No. 873) and responds to Generic Letter 82-16.

C.

Safety Evaluation (See Attached) 4 8302280337 830222 PDR ADOCK 05000346 P

PDR

[

~

1

- 7 LSAFETY EVALUATION \\

i

).

. This License Amendment Request (LAR) provides new Technical Specifications I for " Limiting Condition for Operation" and surveillance requirements for

' the safety grade Anticipatory Reactor Trip System (ARTS).

' Without the installation of ARTS in the facility,-when the main' turbine trips at reactor power greater than 25% of full' power,.the ICS will-initiate a' reactor power runback and the unit should stablilize when the reactor power' reaches.a level less than 25% full power. However, if the

-ICS.is not properly tuned, high RCS pressure may occur causing a RPS reactor trip. The initiation of ARTS, in this case, is to prevent _the-

.ICS from-challenging'the RPS. In the event that both of the main feed pump; turbines are lost, the ARTS _will anticipate the problem and trip the

. reactor before the RCS reaches the RPS high pressureLtrip setpoint. ARTS

.is.not required.for.the' case when the main turbine ~ trips at reactor power less than 25% full power since the turbine bypass valves are designed to

-fully. handle this condition without challenging the RPS.to trip the reactor or without-changing the reactor power or. turbine header pressure.

.The new Technical Specifications are-considered to be-adequate to demonstrate and ensurei he' continued operability.of ARTS. The t

surveillance requirement'specified for this system ensures that the overall system functional capability is maintained and the periodic surveillance tests performed at'the minimum frequencies are sufficient to demonstrate

-this' capability.

~ Pursuant ~to the above, it is concluded that the proposed Technical Specification changes do not involve.an unreviewed safety question.

?

+

r I'

L l

t

{

r i.

,,,n.

n.,r.,,-.-,,,

-,.?,.,

,.----,..-,,.,n-

,n~,,-,.,+--,.,-,

..m--

.-a.--,._s-.-,-

.,,--,,-,n

i

,~

INSTRUMENTATION ANTICIPATORY REACTOR TRIP SY5 TEM INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.2.3 The Anticipatory Reactor Trip System instrumentation channels of Table 3.3-15 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY As shown in Table 3.3-15 ACTION: As shown in Table 3.3-15 e

b SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS-i 4.3.2.3 The Anticipatory Reactor Trip System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the' performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION l

and CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST for the modes and at the frequencies shewn in Table 4.3-15.

l i

l l

DAVIS-BESSE UNIT I

TABIS 3.3-15 ANTICIPATORY REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TOTAL NO.

CHANNELS MINIMUM APPLIC-FUNCTIONAL OF TO CHANNELS ABLE UNIT CHANNELS TRIP OPERABTI MODES ACTION 1( )

16 1.

Turbine Trip 4

2(*)

3 2.

Trip of Both i

Main Feed Pump i

Turbines 4

2 3

1 17 3.

Output Logic 4

2 3

1 18 Trip automatically bypassed below 25 percent of RATED THERMAL POWER

^

Applicable only above 25 percent of RATED THERMAL POWER e

6 d

i 1

l l

TABLE 3.3-15 (CONTINUED)

ACTION STATEMENTS' ACTION 16 -

With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirements, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or reduce reactor power to less than 25 percent

.of RATED THERMAL PU4ER within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

ACTION 17 -

With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than required by.the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirements,

, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

ACTION 18 -

With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and POWER OPERATION may proceed provided both of the following conditions are satisfied:

a)

The control rod drive trip breaker associated with the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within one hour, b)

The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, one additional control rod drive trip breaker associated with another channel may be tripped for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.3, after reclosing the control rod drive trip breaker opened in a) above.

DAVIS-BESSE UNIT 1

..n

TABLE 4.3-15 ANTICIPATORY REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS CHANNEL MODES IN WHICll CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE IS FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION TEST REQUIRED 1(

Turbine Trip (*)

S

'Not Applicable M

1.

2.

Main Feed Pump Turbine Trip S

Not Applicable M

1 3.

Output Logic Not Applicable Not Applicable M

1 Trip automatically bypassed below 25 percent of RATED THERMAL POWER Applicable only above 25 percent of RATED THERMAL POWER I

t

BASES ANTICIPATORY REACTOR TRIP i

Safety grade anticipatory reactor trip is initiated by a turbine trip (above 25 percent of RATED THERMAL POWER) or trip of both main feedwater pump turbines.

This anticipatory trip will operate in advance of the reactor coolant system high pressure reactor trip to reduce the peak reactor coolant system pressure and thus reduce challenges to the power operated relief valve. This anticipatory reactor trip system was installed to satisfy Item II.K.2.10 of NUREG-0737.

ks a/2 e

e e

e G.

DAVIS-BESSE UNIT 1

~

Docket No. 50-346 License No. NPF-3 Serial No.'913 February 22, 1983 Attachment II

'I.

Changes to Davis-Besse Nuclear. Power Station Unit 1, Appendix A Technical Specifications 3.1.2.8, 3.1.2.9, 4.1.2.1 and 4.1.2.2.

A.

Time required to Implenent. This change is to be effective upon NRC approval.

B.

Reason'for Change (Facility Change Request 82-111, Rev. B).

A section of the heat traced piping from the Boric Acid Addition Tank (BAAT) to the "T" connections to the letdown return line is used not only for Boric Acid addition from the BAAT but also is used for the transport of demineralized water and low boron concentration liquid (<5000 ppm) from the clean radwaste receiver tank. When this section of the piping is used for concentration of liquids of less than 5000 ppm boron, the maintainance of piping temperature greater than 105*F is not necessary.

C.

Safety Evaluation (See attached).

I i

(

~,

.~,

- - ~ -, -,,,,..

c,.

~

4 E

SAFETYEVALUATIdN 1

4 1This amendment request is-to revise the. Technical Specifications. Sections 14'.1.2.1, 4.1.2.2 (Surveillance Requirements) and 3.1.2.8, 3.1.2.9 (Limiting Condition for Operation).

[

.The' purpose of the affected Technical Specification is to' provide assurance against boron crystallization in Lthe concentrated boric acid -

addition : system and the boron injection flow path from this system..The

~

safety function'of the boric acid addition system is to provide a boration capability sufficient to ensure adequate shutdown margin from all-

. operating conditions to 1.0% AK/K after Xenon decay;and cooldown to 200'F.

. Technical Specifications sections 4.1.2.1, 4.1.2.2,.3.1.2.8, and 3.1.2.9 require that two flow paths.be operable by verifying that the pipe

temperature of the heat. traced portion of the flow path from the-concentrated boric acid storage system is greater than 105*F when the boric acid' addition system and associated heat tracing has between 7,875 and 13,125 ppm of boron with a solution temperature greater than 105'F. The 105'F. minimum boric acid solution temperature for the boric acid flow path is intended to avoid crystallization of the boric acid solution by maintaining the heat traced portion ~ of the flow path from the concentrated boric acid system above 105'F.

However,.the same function can also be achieved by changing the. Technical Specification as attached.

Technical Specifications 4.1.2.la and 4.1.2.2a should be revised because a section of the heat traced piping from-the Boric Acid Addition Tank (BAAT) to the "T" connection to the letdown return.line is used not only.for boric acid addition from BAAT but also for.the transport of demineralized water and other low boron concentration liquid ((5000 ppm) e.g. the clean

]

radwaste receiver tank (see attached Figure.1). The'only time that this temperature should be monitored above 105*F is determined by the attached

+

~

decision tree. The decision tree demonstrates that.the only time the need

'for temperature verification exists is during and after the flow path has

-been used for transporting fluid with a source concentration of >5000

}

ppmB.

If'at any time the line is used for transporting the fluid of source concentration (5000 ppmB the. temperature need not be maintained

_above 105'F.

During times when the line is used for transporting a boric i

. acid solution more than 5000 ppmB and after that, the temperature needs to be verified to be more than 105*F.

If the fluid source concentration is less than 5000 ppmB, the temperature need not be maintained above 105*F since per the attached graph (Figure 2) the crystallization will occur.

only below the freezing point of approximately 32'F.

Thus, there is no

-safety concern for boric acid crystallization under those circumstances.

Only when the flow path contains high (>5000 ppmB) boric acid l

concentration does the need for avoiding crystallization exist. Liquid samples are taken from the source for verification of boron concentration i

(not from_the flow path) and this is so reflected in the revised Technical Specifications.

i

1 Technical Specifications 3.1.2.8a.3 and 3.1.2.9a.3 require.that the boric e

~ acid ~ addition system and associated heat tracing have a minimum solution

~

-temperature of'105'F..However, revised Technical Specifications 4.1.2.la and 4.1.2.2a will ensure that the associated heat traced portion of the flow path from the concentrated boric acid storage system is > 105'F when this flow path is used to transport boric acid solutions with a fluid source concentration. more than 5000 ppmB until' the time ?that. this flow.

path is used for any. other purpose. Therefore, Technical' Specifications 3.1.2.8a.3 and.3.1.2.9a.3 should-not include the associated heat traced portion since the Surveillance Requirements for its operability are already included ia revised Technical Specifications 4.1.2.la and 4.1.2.2a.

The proposed changes to the Technical Specifications will ensure that adequate protection is available when required. At the-same time it will eliminate an undue restriction on temperature during the times'when this restriction does not serve any safety function. The proposed changes' adequately provide the assurance that the intent of the Technical Specifications is being met. Therefore, making this change in the Technical Specifications will preserve the safety function of. the boron injection system and the protection provided by the existing Technical Specification will remain unaltered.

Ptrsuant to the above, this is not an unreviewed safety question.

i i

-....-__m,,-.

.-,.._.;,_,-.....a.-

..4

~

DECISION TREE-EAT TRACED PORTION OF.

TE BORIC ACID FLOW PATH HAS FLOW HAS NO FLOW FLUID FLOW SOURCE FLUID FLOW SOURCE FLUID FLOW SOURCE FLUID FLOW SOURCE CONCENTRATION CONCENTRATION (WHEN LINE WAS LAST (WHEN LINE WAS LAST

>5000 PPMB.

(5000 PPMB USED) >5000 PPMB USED) (5000PPMB SHOULD MAINTAIN TEMPERATURE NEED SHOULD MAINTAIN TEMPERATUPI NEED TEMPERATURE NOT BE MAIN-TEMPERATURE-NOT BE MAIN-MORE.THAN 105*F TAINED > IOS*F, MORE THAN 105 F TAINED > 105*F,

-TO ENSURE BORON SINCE THE TO ENSURE BORON SINCE TE CRYSTALLIZATION CRYSTALLIZATION CRYSTALLIZATION CRYSTALLIZATION IS PRECLUDED.

TEMPERATURE IS IS PRECLUDED.

TEMPERATURE IS a

.NEAR FREEZING NEAR FREEZING (SEE FIG. 2).

(SEE FIG. 2).

g SECTION OF HEAT TRACED PIPING BAAT MU TAN K A

B p /TCE) l D W.S T N

CLEAN R.ADWASTE RECCIVGR. TANK l

FIGURE - 1 l

l i-l

o, d

200 150 O

J h

^

^

100

/

OPERATION

/

y

./

f5

/

H

/

/

3 ACCEPTABLE 50 8

OPERATION

/

0 0

5000 10000 15000 20000 l

l BORON CONCENTRATION IN THE SOLUTION, ppm B l

Minimum Solution Temperature in the Boric Acid Addition Syster}

l FIG URE- ?

?,

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.2 B0 RATION SYSTEMS FLOW PATHS - SHUTDOWN LIMITINdCONDITIONFOROPERATION 3.1.2.1 At least one of the following boron injection flow paths shall be OPERABLE.

A flow path from' the concentrated boric acid storage system a.

via a bori'c acid pump and'a makeup or decay heat removal (DHR) pump to the Reactor Coolant System, if only the boric acid storage system in Specification 3.1.2.8a is OPERABLE, or

' b.

A flow path from the borated water storage tank via a makeup or DHR pump to the Reactor Coolant System if only the borated water storage tank in Specification 3.1.2.8b is OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

With none of the above flow paths OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes until at least one injection path is restored to OPERABLE status.

I t

-SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

'4.1.2.1 At least one of the above required flow paths shall be demon-strated OPERABLE:

~

At least once per 7 days by verifying that the pipe tempera-a.

ture of the heat traced portion of the flor path is > 105'F.nas tramiceau murie wher, a flow ;;;th frc; th: consentrated bcri: acid :t?r:ge -

-SyStCm i5 USCd, and AFTER TNtf FLewPATH Is USEb To YRANsratr Betic Acib SaLuYleM3 worse A FLUlO SeVtcK CONC [NTAATood Mett TMAM.5" con PFMO UMTil. YooE YtME TotAT Yuss flow P b.

At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual,auar ornaE Paucuc power operated or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed or otherwise secured in position is in its correct position.

o DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 1-6 e

^

e

..,.-,,,-----.-e

~

REACTIVITY CONTROLS SYSTEMS FLOW PATHS - OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.2 Each of the following boron injection flow paths shtll be OPERABLE:

a.

A flow path from the concentrated boric acid storage system via a boric acid pump and makeup or decay heat removal (DHR) pump to the Reactor Coolant System, and b.

A flow path from the borated water storage tank via makeup or DHR pump to the Reactor Coolant System.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

a.

With the flow path from the concentrated boric acid storage system inoperable, restore the inoperable flow path to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to 1% ak/k at 200*F within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />; restore the flow paph to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTOOWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

b.

With the flow path from the borated water storage tank in-operable, restore the flow path to OPERABLE status within one L

hour or be in at least H0T STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

i i

SURVIELLANCE REQUIREMENTS l

l 4.1.2.2 Each of the above required flow paths shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

c a.

At least once per 7 days by verifying that the pipe tempera-l ture of the heat traced portion of the flow path frgg the concentrated boric acid storage system is > 105'F ArPdc ABLE PURING AHO AFTER THl3 fl OW PATH IS USCO TO TRANSPORT BoRoc, Act a 5'o l.U TION.5 WsTtt A CLusD SovRct CONcEIJ7AATlaN MoRE titan 5000 PPan B unTn. THE TIME THA r THIS flow PATH is 0.1ED foR AHy OYME A PURPOSK.

DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 1-7 m

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BORATED WATER SOURCES - OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.9 Each of the following borated water sources shall be OPERABLE:

The boric acid addition system and 2;;::izted h::t tr;;i.;g a.

with:

1.

A minimum contained borated water volume in accordance with Figure 3.1-1, 2.

Between 7875 and 13,125 ppm of boron, and 3.

A minimum solution temperature of 105'F.

b.

The borated water storage tank (BWST) with:

1.

A contained borated water volume of between 482,778 and l

550.000 gallons, 2.

Between 1800 and 2200 ppm of boron, and 3.

A minimum solution temperature of 35*F.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

a.

With the boric acid addition system inoperable, restore the I

storage system to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to 1% ak/k at 200 F within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />; restore the boric t

acid addition system to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

b.

With the borated water storage tank inoperable, restore the tank to OPERABLE status within one hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUT 00WN within j

the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

O DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 1-17 Amendment No. 36

1 4

REACTIVITY CONTROL' SYSTEMS BORATED WATER SOURCES - SHUT 00WN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.8 As a minimum, one of the following borated water sources shall be OPERABLE:

a.

A boric acid addition system ::.d.::::i ted ':e:t tr;;i :3 with:

1.

A minimum contained borated water volume in accordance with Figure 3.1-1, 2.

Between 7875 and 13,125 ppm of boron, and 3.

A minimum solution temperature of 105'F.

b.

The borated water storage tank-(BWST) with:

1.

A minimum contained borated water volume of 70,700

gallons, 2.

A minimum' boron concentration of 1800 ppm, and 3.

A minimum solution temperature of 35'F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

With no bbrated water sources OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATION or positive reactivity changes until at least one borated water source is restored to OPERABLE status.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.2.8 The above required borated water source shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

At least once per 7 days by:

1.

Verifying the boron concentration of the water, 2.

Verifying the contained borated water volume of the source, and DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 1-14

+

m

h-

l'

- Docket No.-50-346

' License.No..NPF-3'

- Serial No. 913.

' February ;22, - 1983

- Attachment III I.

-Changes to Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Unit 1, Appendix A Technical Specifications 6.9.1.4.

'A.

Time required to Implement. This change is to be effective upon NRC approval.

B.~

-Reason for Change (Facility Change Request 81-007).

Correcting these typographical errors does not create an unreviewed safety question.

C.

Safety Evaluation The purpose of Technical Specification 6.9.1.5.b is to outline reporting requirements (to the NRC) of the steam generator tube inservice inspection results. This Technical Specification (6.9.1.5.b) does not perform a safety function. The existing Technical Specification requires that reports required on an annual basis shall include the complete results of steam generator tube-inservice inspections'(Specification 4.5.5.b).

The reference to-Specification 4.5.5.b is a typographical error because there-is no Specification 4.5.5.b.

The correct Specification.to be referenced is 4.4.5.5.b.

Also, the intent-

.ofLthe. Technical Specification relates to the steam " generator"

~

rather'than steam " generation".

L sc6 b/1 i

I

't i-;.

I L

A ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS l.

power operation), supplementary reports shall be submitted at le'ast J

every three months until all three events have been completed.

ANNUAL OPERATING REPORTM

6. 9.1.4 Annual reports covering the activities of the unit during the previous calendar year shall be submitted prior to March 31 of each year, ji The initial report--shall be submitted-prior _to.Karrh_Lof the year 1

1 following initial criticality.

l 6.9.1.5 Reports required on an annual basis shall include:

a.

. A tabulation on an annual basis of the number of station, utility and other personnel- (including contractors) receiving.

exposures greater than 100 mrem /yr and their asso remexposureaccordingtoworkandjobfunctions,patedman e.g.,

reactor operations a'nd surveillance, inservice inspection, routine maintenance, special ma'intenance (describe maintenance), '

i waste processing, and refueling.

The dose assignment to various duty functions may be estimates based on pocket dosimeter, TLD, or film badge measurements.

Small exposures totalling less than 20% of the individual total dose need not be accounted for.

In the aggregate, at least 80% of the total whole body dose received from external sources shall a

be assigned to spec,ific major work functions.

generator

"~

b.

The complete results of steam generatica tube inservice- ~ ~

inspections (Specification 4.5.5.b)..

f

4. 4. 5'. 5. b MONTHLY OPERATING' REPORT 6.9.1.6 Routine reports of operating statistics and shutdown experience shall be submitted on a monthly basis to the Director, Office of Management and Program Anal.ysis., U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C.
20555, l

with a. copy to the Regional Office,.to arrive no later than the 15th of each

' month following the calendar month covered by the report lj A single submittal may be made for a multiple unit station.

The submittal should combine those sections that! are comon to all

~

units at'the station.

-2/

This tabulation supplements the requirements of 520.407 of 10 CFR part 20.

Ainendment 1.1o. Sy41 DAVIS-EESSE,ONIT1.-

6-15

-w..,,,,,

, --

Retrieved from "https://kanterella.com/w/index.php?title=ML20071B470&oldid=4418689"