ML20094H152
| ML20094H152 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 07/25/1984 |
| From: | Rivenbark G Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co, Toledo Edison Co |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20094H155 | List: |
| References | |
| GL-82-016, GL-82-017, GL-82-023, NPF-03-A-073, TAC 49481, TAC 49482, TAC 49730 NUDOCS 8408130537 | |
| Download: ML20094H152 (11) | |
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UNITED STATES IG3 3 dt.h NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
\\;%..%'). E WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 THE TOLED0 EDISON COMPANY AND-THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY DOCKET N0. 50-346 DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 73 License No NPF-3 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Comission (the Comission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by the Toledo Edison Ccmpan The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company (the licensees dated November 25, 1981, as modified February 22, 1983, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; 8.
The facility will o'perate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Comission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities 6athorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Comission's regulations D.
The issuance.of this amendment will not be inimical to the comon defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Comission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2.
'Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-3 is hereby amended to read as follows:
8408130537 840725 PDR ADOCK 05000346
.P PDR
Technical Soecifications The_ Technical-Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, 'as revised through Amendment No. 73,ison are hereby incorporated in the license. Toledo Ed Company shall operate the facility-in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
3.
This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION hjg c W / Q ]. + / + /-
George'd Rivenbark, Acting Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 4 Division of Licensing
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: July 25, 1984
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ATTACHMENT T0 LICENSE AMENDMENT N0. 73 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE ?!0. NPF-3 DOCKET NO. 50-346
-Relace-and add the following~ pages to the Appendix "A" Technical
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-Specifications with the enclosed pages as-indicated.
The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical-lines indicating the areas of change.
The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.
3/4 3-30a (new) 3/4 3-30b-(new) 3/4 3-30c (new) 3/4 3-30d (new) a.
B 3/4 3-1 9
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INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS l
SECTION PAGE 3/4.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS 3/4.2.1 AXIAL POWER IMBALANCE................................
3/4 2-1 3/4.2.2 NUCLEAR HEAT FLUX HOT -
CHANNEL FACTOR - F................................
3/42 9
'3/4.2.3 NUCLEAR ENTHALPY RISE N
HOT CHANNEL FACTOR - F 3/42-7 AH...........................
3/4.2.4 QUADRANT POWER TILT................'..................
3/42-9 3/4.2.5 DNB PARAMETERS.......................................
3/4 2-13 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.1 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION............ 3/4 3-1 3/4.3.2 SAFETY SYSTEMS INSTRUMENTATION Safety Features Actuation System.....................
3/4 3-9 S team and Feed Rupture Control Sys tem................ 3/4 3-23 Anticipatory Reactor Trip System...................
3/4 3-30a 3/4.3.3 MONITORING INSTRUMENTAT:0N Radi ation Moni toring Ins trumentati on.................
3/4 3 Incore Detectors.....................................
3/4 3-35 Seismic Instrumentation.............................. 3/4 3-37 Meteorol ogi cal Instrumentati on....................'...
3/4 3-40 Remote Shutdown Instrumentation...................... 3/4 3-43 Pos t-Acci dent Instrumentation...................~.....
3/4 3-46 Chl ori ne Detection Systens............................ 3/4 3-51 Fi re Detection Instrumentation........................ 3/4 3-52 3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 3/4.4.1 COOLANT LOOPS AND COOLANT CIRCULATION l
l Startup and Power Operati on........................... 3/4 4-1 Sh utdown and Hot Standby...'........................... 3/4 4-2 3/4.4.2 SAFETY VALVES - SHUTD0WN.............................. 3/4 4-3 3/4.4.3 SAFETY VALVES AND ELECTROMATIC RELIEF VALVE - OPERATING 3/4 4-4
. DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 IV Amendment No. )lf,
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INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION PAGE 3 /4. 0 ' AP P L I CAB I L ITY........................................... 3/40-1 3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.1 BORATION CONTROL Shutdown Margin......................................
3/4 1-1 Boron Dilution......................................
3/4 1-3 Moderator Temperature Coef fi cient....................
3/4 1-4 Minimum Temperature for Criticality..................
3/4 1-5 3/4.1.2 BORATION SYSTEMS Fl ow Pa ths - Shutdown................................ 3/4 1-6 Fl ow Pa'ths - Opera ting...............................
3/4 1-7 Makeup Pump - Shutdown............................'..".
3/4 1-9 Ma keup Pumps - Opera ti ng............................. 3/4 1-10 Decay Heat Removal Pump - Shutdown................... 3/4 1-11 Boric Acid Pump - Shutdown...........................
3/4 1-12 Boric Acid Pumps - Operating.........................
3/4 1-13 Borated Water Sources - Shutdown.....................
3/4 1-14 Borated Water Sources - Operating....................
3/4 1-17 3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBL ES Group Height - Safety and Regulating Rod Groups......
3/4 1-19 Group Height - Axial Power Shaping Rod Group.........
3/41-2i Posi tion Indicator Channel s..........................
3/4 1-22 Rod Drop Time.............
3/4 1-24 Safety Rod Insertion Limit...........................
3/4 1-25 Regulating Rod Insertion Limi ts...................... 3/4 1-26 f Rod Program.........................................
3/4 1-30 Xenon, Reactivity.....................................
3/4 1-33
, Axial Power Shaping Rod Insertion Limits.............'.'
3/4 1-34 l
DAVIS-BESSE UNIT 1 III Amendment No. 38 yps 1 1931
INSTRUMENTATION ANTICIPATORY REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION I.TMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.2.3 The Anticipatory Reactor Trip System instrumentation channels of Table 3.3-15 shall be OPERABLE.-
APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3..l-15 ACTION:
As shown in Table 3.3-15 M CE REQUIREMENTS 4.3.2.3 The Anticipatory Reactor Trip System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION and CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST for the modes and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-15.
DAVIS-RESSE UNIT 1 3/4 3-30a Amendment No.
TABLE 3.3-15 ANTICIPATORY REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TOTAL NO.
CHANNELS HININUM APPLIC-FUNCTIONAL OF TO CHANNELS ABLE UNIT CHANNELS TRIP OPERABLE H0 DES ACTION Turbine Trip 4
2(*)
I) 1.
-3
-I 16 2.
Trip of Both Hain Feed Pump i
Turbines 4
2 3
1 17 3.
Output Logic 4
2 3
1 18 m1
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! b (b) Applicable only above 25 percent of RATED THERMAL POWER (c) Trip au l @
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TAB 2 3.3-15 (CONTINUED)
ACTION STATEMENTS' ACTION 16 With the number of channels OPERABE one less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABE requirements, i
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restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or reduce reactor power to less than 25 percent of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, i
i ACTION 17 --
With the number of channels OPERABIE one less than required by the Minimum t'hannals OPERABLE requirements, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
ACTION 18 -
With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and POWER OPERATION may proceed provided both of the following conditions are satisfied:
a)
The control rod drive trip breaker associated with j
the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within one hour.
b)
The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, one additional control rod drive trip breaker associated with another channel may be tripped for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.3, after reclosing the control rod drive trip breaker opened in a) above.
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l 3/4 3-30c Amendment No.
. DAVIS-BESSE UNIT 1 I.
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TABLE 4.3-15 ANTICIPATORY REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT CNANNEL HODES'IN WHICH CHANNEL CNANNEL FUNCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE IS FUNCTIONAL UNIT CNECK CALIBRATION TEST REQUIRED Turbine Trip (*)
i 1.
S Not Applicable H
1 2.
Main Feed Pump i
Not Applicable H
1
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3.
Output Logic Not Applicable Not Applicable H
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Trip automatically bypassed below 25 percent of RATED TNERHAL POWER i
Applicable only above 25 percent of RATED TNERNAL POWER 4
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3'/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION BASES 3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM AND l
5APElY 5YSTEM INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the RPS, SFAS and SFRCS instrumentation systems ensure that 1) the associated action and/or trip will be initiated when the parameter monitored by each channel or combination thereof exceeds
.its setpoint, 2) the specified coincidence logic is maintained, 3) sufficient redundancy is maintained to permit a channel to be out of seivice for testing or maintenance, and 4) sufficient system functional capability is available for RPS, SFAS and SFRCS purposes from diverse parameters.
The OPFRABILITY of these systems is required to provide the overall reliability, redundance' and diversity assumed available in the facility design for the protection and mitigation of accident and transient con-
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dit. ions. The integrated operation of each.of these systems is conststent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.
The surveillance requirements specified for these systems ensure that the overall system functional capability is maintained comparable to the original design standards. The periodic surveillance tests perfomed at the minimum frequencies are sufficient to demonstrate this capability.
The measurement of response time at the specified frequencies provides assurance that the RPS, SFAS, and SFRCS al. tion function associated with each channel is completed within the time limit assumed in the safety analyses. No credit was taken in the analyses for those channels with response times indicated as not applicable.
Response time may be demonstrated by any series of sequential, overlapping or total channel test measurements provided that such test demonstrate the total channel response time as defined.
Sensor response time verification may be demonstrated by either 1) in place, onsite or offsite test measurement: or 2) utilizing replacement sehsors with certified response times.
An SFRCS channel consists of 1) the sensing device (s), 2) associated logic and output relays (including Isolation of Main Feedwater Non Essential Valves and Turbine Trip), and 3) power sources.
Safety-grade anticipatory reactor trip is initiated by a turb.ine trip (above 25 percent of RATED THERMAL POWER) or trip of both main feedwater pump turbines. This anticipatory trip will operate in advance of the reactor coolant system high pressure reactor trip to reduce the peak' reactor coolant system pressure and thus reduce challenges to the power operated relief valve. This anticipatory reactor trip system was installed to satisfy Item II.K.2.10 of NUREG-0737.
DAVIS-BESSE Unit 1 B 3/4 3-1 Amendment No. 73 b
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3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION BASES
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3/4.3.3 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.3.1 RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the radiation monitoring channels ensures that
- 1) the radiation levels are continually measured in the areas served by the individual charinels and 2) the alann or automatic action is initiated when the radiation level trip setpoint is exceeded.
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3/4.3.3.2 INCORE DETECTORS i
The OPERABILITY of the incore detectors ensures that the measurements obtained from use of this system accurately represent the spatial neutron flux distribution of the reactor core. See Bases Figures 3-1 and 3-2 for examples of acceptable minimum incore detector arrangeme"ts.
i 3/4.3.3.3 SEISMIC INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the seismic instrumentation ensures that suffi-cient capability is available to promptly determine the magnitude of a seismic event so that the response of those features important to safety j
may be evaluated. This capability is required to permit comparison of the measured response to that used in the design basis for the facility.
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This instrumentation is consistent with the reconnendations of Regulatory Guide 1.12 " Instrumentation for Earthquakesdf April 1974.
3/4.3.3.4 METEOROLOGICAL INSTRUMENTATION The OPERA 8ILITY of the meteorological instrumentation ensures that sufficient meteorological data is available for estimating potential radiation doses to the public as a result of routine or accidental release of radioactive materials to the atmosphere.
This capability is required to evaluate the need for initiating protect the health and safety of the public. protective measures to This instrumentation is consistent,with the recossendations of Regulatory Guide 1.23 "0nsite Meteorological Programs," February 1972.
3/4.'3.3.5 REMOTE SHUTDOWN INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the rcnote shutdown instrumentation ensures that sufficient capability is.available to penntt shutdown and maintenance of DAVIS-BESSE. UNIT 1 B 3/4 3-2
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