ML20071A467
| ML20071A467 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point, 05000000 |
| Issue date: | 04/17/1981 |
| From: | PLG, INC. (FORMERLY PICKARD, LOWE & GARRICK, INC.) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20071A408 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-82-626 PRA-810417-06, NUDOCS 8302240154 | |
| Download: ML20071A467 (37) | |
Text
o TIciar::, Lcwe and Garrick, Inc.
Acrii.17, 1931 It:DIAt P01:47 PRA .
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A. Sl'FFARY A.1 It:TRODL'CT IC.'i ine icw pressure' injection system (LPIS)'is evaluateo in the context of a larps or mecium loss of coolant accicent (LOCA). The purpose of the system is to inject water into the core replacing ccolant lost from tne primary system with water from the refueling water storage tank (RWST).
The acelyzec recirculation separately. phase, which utilizes pcrtions of the syster, is The analysis is carrieo out oncer the following conditions:
e RWST is available.
e Tr.e safeguares actuation signal (SIS) is present. -
e Success of the system is oefinec as injection of water into at least tno cold legs.
A.2 RE SULTS .
Tables lA ano 12 sumcarize the results for the four cases of electric pcaer unavailability consicerec (ccmoinations of buses 3A anc 6A) anc lists the k' ASH-1400 results. c Tne analysis nas revealec the follewine ccminant ccrtr m tcrs to LP!S unaveilability:
Mean With Electric Power Available (Bus 3A and 6A) 2.41 x 10-4 e Sincie Element Failures 2.37 x 10-4 (98.3%)
Check Valve 741 6.91 x 10-5 (pg,75)
Check Valve 881 6.91 x 10-5 (28.7%)
MOV 744 3.29 x 10-5 (13.6%).
MOV 882 3.29 x 10-5 (13.6%) ,
Manual Valve 846 3.29 x 10-5 (13.6fD e Double Failures 5.57 x 10-6 (2.3%)
Both RSR pumps 31 anc 32 3.29 x 10-6 (),ay; Pump meintenance anc 2.28 x 10-6 (o,g )
hareware failure
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a The overall LP!S syster uravas'atility is founc tc'be 2.al x IO d curing ncrmal Ocwer availability. Uncar cegracec per.er cercitiers less ,
of one bus), tr.e eserall LP S system unavailability is 2.36 x 10-3 a(nc tne ccminant centriLuters are snewn below:
Mean Dec acec Electric Power (Bus 3A or 6A Udavailable) 2.36 x 1.0-3 e Pump fails to start on cemand 1.36 x 10-3 (57.6%)
e- Maintenance- 7.36 x 10 4 (32.3%)
. e Single failures (harcaare) 2.37 x 10 4 (10.0%)
A.3 CONCLUSION The LPIS unavailability has been calculated assuming different states 'of electric power In all cases, single failures playec a cominant role. ,.
With human errt not found a f actor.'in this analysis, hareware failures anc-mainterance were found to be the-largest contributors to systems unavailability. Particularly, with one bus unavailable, har.cware failures cominatec.
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E. 51517 DE SCRIPTICN B.i Sv5 i? :UNCT!C.N Fcr replaces a large LOCA, the LPIS provides initial cooling of the core and ceclant lest from the primary, system with water from the refuelirg water storage tank (RWST). ,
B.2 SYS EM CONFIGURATION
- A bleci ciagram Figures 1 enc 2.and a simplifisc P610 for the system are shewn in Success of at least one of the two RHR pump trains will provice sufficient flow to keep the core covered after a large LOCA given that celiver flowtwo to of thethe three intact legs (excluding tne broken leg) core.
B.3 SYSTEM CPERATION a
The anc celiverpumps of this subsystem are activated by the safety injection signal 3,000 gpr eacn to the reactor coolant syster (RCS) by way of the resicual neat receval (RHR) heat exchangers when the primary system pressure is approxicately 150 psig.
safety injection system is to deliver,The function upon of this portion of rapid depressurization anothe lessCore. of coolant,_ large cuantities of water to aic in rapicly recovering the The RER pcmos craw water from the RW5T and discharge to the No. 31 anc 32 RHR beat excnangers' tube sice. The heat exchanger performs no heat trar.sfer function during active injection, but rather serves for ,
the rectrcciation phase. The heat exchangers' discharge is then cirects:
1,i r.e s . to tre fcur RCS colc legs by way of the accumulater cennection Wher.
occur. a safety injection signal is generated, the following events will start; If outsice power or three diesels are available, both pumps be startec. if only two diesels are functioning, a minimum of one p, ump will The pumps will draw water via normally open valve 882 from the RWST and discharge through normally open valve 744 (The control power for valves 744 and 882 is normally deenergized.) When either valve close's, the " Safeguards Valve Off Normal Position" and the DC monitor alarms annunciate. The flow is then to the RHR heat exchangers.
Component cooling is supplied to the RHR heat exchangers, but because of the relative low temperature of the coolant from the RWST, time. no actual cooling is perforced by the component cooling at this HCVs 638 and 640 are normally open and annunciate the " Safeguards
- Valve Off Normal Position" alarm if either moves off of the open position.
The heat ' exchanger outlets join into a heacer and then branch off to
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feec the accumulator cischarge lines which feec the four colo legs.
Flow incication is providea on the lines' feecing loops to give the operator indication of the system status.
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, , B.; SUPPCF.T SYSTEMS' .
The system is startec ey a signal from the safeguarcs actuation system (SAS), which starts the RHR pumps. Manual actuation frcm the control rocm is also possible. Electric pc er is necessary for. success of the system. Table 2 shews the power supplies to the various components of the LPIS. Pump cooling is not critical due to the relatively short time' irtoltec (about 30 minutes) and the low temperature of the water of the RWST. .
B.5 TEST REOUIREMENTS The RHR pumps are started manually from the control room monthly (test 3PT-M18). Table 3,shows the components of the system that are tested along with components tested quarterly (test 3PT-Q22) and during cold shutdcwn (test 3PT-V9).
The monthly _ test provides verification that 6 manual valves remain open, 15 motor-operated valves remain in normal positions, and 4 check valves cpen on-demanc. The heat exchangers are also shown to pass ficw. No valves are stroked during this test and the system remains in its permal configuration; therefore, system operation should not be degraded during the test. All locked open valves, and valves-749 and 882 are physically verified open weekly.
The quarterly test strokes eight MOVs and two air-operated valves while the system remains in normal configuration during the test.
During and at cold shutdown, S MOVs are tested to note holding required position, 12 check valves are tested to note opening'on demand and <
reseating correctly.
B.6 MAINTENAt:CE RE0VIREMENTS Maintenance is performed as required. If a pump is found failed, it is isolated from the system for a period up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> during which the pump is repaired. If repair is not complete during this period, the reactor is shut down. When one pump train is out,of service, the other train is tested daily.
A spare pump and associated spare parts are maintained in inventory to accommodate expeditious exchange or repair when an installed pump is found to be inoperable. .
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The LP!5 fault tree is developed for the event " Insufficient Flow from LP!S." 'Inis event appears in tne large and medium LOCA event trees ana mus: De prececed oy a successful accumulator system operatian wnich is rea; ired to initiate recovery of the core.
C.2 SYSTEM FAULT TREE Fault tree metnodology is used to analyze the.LPIS. Tne top structure.
of tne tree shoWs explicitly the parts of the system inat are disaoled during maintenance (or testing, if applicable). Figure 3 shows the first level of the tree. The INHIBIT gates specify the conoitions under which the tree is developed further. The fault trees for the transfers X, Y, and Z are shown in Figure 4. Special attention should De paid to tne naintenance trees because the configuration of the system changes and tne position of valves may cnange also. The X, Y, and Z are carries tnrough tne trees to the train gate level where the train is elimin'ated for tne'( and Z cases.
The fault tree contains only hardware failures. For eacn component we
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list the failure mode (e.g., fails open, closed, does not start, etc.) -
and failures to supply energy or the signals to. actuate. The failure causes are not listed. The fault tree is complete in the sense that the ,
minimal cutsets of the tree are equivalent to the top event.
C.3 FAU_T TREE CODING Taole 4 is a list of casic events, their failure modes, corresponaing codes, and mean values.
C.4 MINIMAL CUTSETS -
Ine minimal cutsets are identified using the blocks from Figure 1. The five valves in single flow lines that exist in the LPIS represent five single-event minimal cutsets. In addition, the SI signal to start can be considered a single-event cutset if operator action is not included. ,
e Check valve 741 fails to open, e .Mo;or-operated valve 744 fails closed.
e Check valve 881 fails to open.
e Motor-operated valve 882 fails closed.
e Manual valve 846 fails closed.
e Single pipe failure (see Taole 5). ,
The motor-operated valves are deenergized open sucn that the "' ailing Closed Mode" would be similar to a manual valve failing closed (i.e., the-gate drops into the flowpath). -
.- t ,. 'Taoles 6 and 7 show the additional single event cutsets for the cases wnere pump trains 31 or 32 are out of service for maintenance.
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, .- ine letter,icentifiec blecis fece Figure 1 represent "Llocks" that are
- grcues of lower.-level cocpenerts. Tne mer.bers of eacn letter bicck are listso telow for referer.ce ir,rfurther analysis.
Block Elements In The Block
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A Check valve 881, MOV 882, Manual valve 856 A' MOV-885A, MOV 885B. Tnis double failure would allcw water _to go into the sump which .would cause an-earlier start of recirculation, but the water would not'be lost.
-B Manual valves 7358,'7398. Check valveL7388, RHR pump 32. Tne' double failures involving excessive leakage back through check' valves 886A or 8868 and e MOV-1802A or-18028 transferring open were found to be of low probability and not incluced in the major contributors-(on the.orcer of 10-13). Likewise
, Check valves 738A or' 738S having excessive leakage ano the pump not starting on that path were founc tc be of low probability and not included in the major -
contributors'(on.the order of 10-8),
C Manual valves 735A, . 739A. Check valve 738A, RHR Pump 31. The double failures involving excessive leakage back tnrcugh check valves 88EA or 8865 and g MOV 1802A or'18028 transferring open were found to be cf low probability anc net inclycec in tne major contributors.(on the orcer of 10-13). Likenise check valves 73SA or 738B having excessive leakage and the pump,not starting on that path were found to be of low probability and not included in the major contributors (on the order of 10-8),
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D MOV 744, Check valve 741. Since the monthly testyof
- the RHR pumps does notiuse the line containing valves 883 and 1863, they are validated closed monthly and the probability-of both opening at the time of a safety injection was. considered.small.
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n Sicck Elements In The Eleck s
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_ Manual valve 742, H" eat exchanger 31, MOV 889B, POV 747, HCV 638, MOV 8999. Flow tnrougn MOVs EEBA and 88SE would not be lost as it woulo follow a cifferent patn into the core. Tnerefore, these valves were not incloced as failures. MOVs 889A anc 8892 are net cor.siderec sinole failures since the flow will split tetween the spray line- ar.c the injection headers on the path wnicn has the 889 valve cpen - The other-patn would run nearly normal beac if botn pucps were running. In.accition,_if the containment spray' pumps are running, they provice 300 psi head wnicn woule cause flow into the'LPIS~p'atn. ,
F E0V 7455, MOV.745A, Heat excnanger 32, MOV 889A, MCV 746 HCV 640, MOV 899A. F l ov. tnrough MOVs 88EA ar.c 88S3 wcule not be lost as it woulc fcilow a cifferent path into the core. Therefore, these valves ,
were not incluced as failures. NOVs 889A enc 889B are net considered single failures since the flow will ,
- split between the sprey line and the injection neacers en the path which has the 889 valve open. The other patn woulo run nearly normal heac if totn pucps are running. In accition, if the containment spray pumps
- are running, tney provide 300 osi heac whicn woulc cause flow inte the LPIS patn.
G Check valves 897A, 83SA H Check valves 8978, 8388 I Check valves 897C, 838C ~
J, . Check. valves 897D, 8380 Using these letter blocks, double failures can be determined by the following combinations: (B ano C), A', (E and F), anc cepending on wnicn colo leg nas had the large LOCA, ccmbinations of G, H, I, and J as follows:
, LOCA Leo Double Failures 1 'H1, IJ, JH 2 GI, IJ, JG 3 GH, HJ, JG 4 GH, HI, IG.
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Sir.ce tr.e pecLability cf tne LOCA occurrir:g in any one of the legs is ec:,al, eacr. cf these ceu:le f ailures is ecually likely. Tnere are nc
- ree-elecer. cr nigr.er creer f ailures in inis LP15.
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. . O. CUM.TI:lCATIC; .
D.I SCCG;Y CC C:T:C::, ELECTRIC PC'J F. AVL!' 2E' E Or: EUSES 3L A:D 6A D.I.1 harcware Centributien Each single-event minimal cutset is analyzec using plant-specific data:
o Check valve 741 fails-te open on demand. The trean and Cariance are:
Me ar.CVI:
6.91 x 10-5 Variance g ,j: 1.03 x 10-8 .
e Meter-operated valve 744 fails closed (deenergized open).
Fear F0V,Cl: 9.15 x 10-8/hr x 24 hr/ day x M-day est cycle
= 3.29 x 10 <-
VarianceMOV,CI: 1.01 x 10-I# x (24 x 15)2 = 1.31 x 10-9 .
e Check valve 881 fails to open on demand.
MeanCV2:
6.91 x 10-5 ,
VarianceCV2:
1.03 x 10 4 .
e Motor-operated valve 882 fails closed (deer.ergized open).
Mean MOV,C: 9.15 x 10-8/hr x 720-hr test cycle = 3.29 x 10-5.
2 1.01 x 10 = 1.31 x 10 VarianceMOV,C: x( .
e- Manual valve 846 fails closed (locked open).
Mean MV,C: 9.15 x 10-8/hr x 30-day test 2
cycle , 24 hrs aay
= 3.29 x 10-5 ,
Variance MV,C: 1.01 x 10#x 2
= 1.31 x 10 .
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. . e Pipe f ailure. Taole 5 snews the pipe sections that const'itute siegle f ailures of tr.e LP:5.
Tne total nardware contritutien for single f ailui as is the accition of the cc. ponents A and D using 0PD.
Mi30 singles = 2 meanCV '
- UMOV,C1 + meanMOV,C * *.eanMV,C
=
2 x'6.91 x 10-5 + 3 x 3.29 x 10- .
= 2.37 x 10'#
Variance singles = 4.02 x 10-8 ,
N 0.1.2 Test Anc Maintenance Contribution ,
Tne contnly test 3PT-M18 starts each pump for 15 to 30 minutes and recirculatesfficw through tne heat exchanger ene back to the pump suction. This test leaves all valves in their normal configuration anc assures ficw through MOVs 744, 745A, and 7a58. The nign pressure at the MOVs 7aa injection heads does not allow flow througn MOVs 899A, B, ,
MOVs 746, 747, or HCVs 638 and 640. The only time tnat flow is assured through these valves is during test.RPT-V9, during or at cold shutdown.
Therefore, if one of them fails between these tests, detection may not be notec during the Quarterly valve tests (3PT-022) with a failure such as.the gate crcpping off the stem. The valve cperator wcule still appear to be normal but the flowpath could be blockec.'
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,There is some chance that tne. valves stroked curing tne cuarterly test will be left in the wrong position, but none of the single failure valves are involved in this test so the affected valves will be treatec in tne next section on double failures.
Valve maintenance is not considered during_ normal operation ,on any valve that must change position on a safety injection.
D.I.3 Human Error Contribution The_ LPIS receives an automatic safety injection signal to the pumps with al1 valves being set in normal injection flowpath position. No operator
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interaction is normally recuired during this phase until the recirculation pnase begins.
D.1.4 Single Failure Contribution Table 8 presents the contribution of single. failures to system unavailability.
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0.2 ~ O'Ja ?. ! F C A T I CN OF OCUC'_ E F A !'.URE S D . 2 .' 1 Parev.are Centribuiten-All remaining hardware f ailure contributiens come from two-element
. cutsets as cescribec in Sectior. C. E ach block is examined here to ,
ceterrine the magnitude of the block's contribution to unavailability.
S1c:s E for C) Pume Train Secticn Unavailability Subscript Mean Variance a
RHR purp (fails to start) P 1.36 x 10-3 1.22 x 10-6 Cneck valve (fails to.open) CV 6.91 x 10-5 1.03 x 10-S Mar.ual valves (transfer closec) MV 3.29 x 10-5 1.31 x 10-9 The mean of 8 (or:C) .is then
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Mean B -** *^P * ***"CV + 2 me a r.gy = 1 i49 x 3 Variance,:
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1.25 x.10-0 .
Tr.e pumps alor,e centribute 1.36 x 10-3 so tney are the largest contributor in the train. The double failure BC is then,~using DPD:
MeanBC: (meang )B =
. 9 x 10' = 3.29 x 10-6 -
VarianceBC: - 2.68 x 10-II Evaluation of the heat exchanger blocks E and F used the following valves.
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Unavailability
\ Subscript Mean Variance Meter. valve 899A (B) (transfers MOVO 3.29 x 10 1.31 x 10-9 CloseC)
Motor valve 747 (746) (trans- LMOV1. 3.29 x 10-5 1.31 x 10-9 fers closec)
Motor valve 638 (640) (transfers ~MOV2 '3.29 x'10-5 1.31 x 10-9 closec) -
Moter. valve 889A(B[(transfers M0V3 0.72'x 10-5 3.52 x 10-8 open) (2.00 x 10-o x 720/2)
Heat exchanger 31.(32) (pluggec) HX e
. Manual valve 742 (train 3.1) MV 3.29 x 10-5 1.31 x 10-8 (transfers closec)
. 2 MC'.'s 745A, 7455 (train 32)- MOV4 3.29 x 10 1.31 x 10-E (trar.sfer cicsec) .
The above tabulation summarizes the contributors for both block E anc '
block F. Tne elements for block E include all the elements except the two MOVs-(745A, 7458). Block F includes all the elements except the single manual-valve (742). The unavailability of the blocks is computea belcw anc used to compute the system unavailability., -
Elec'ss E arc F are sligntly cifferent since cne has twc MC"s insteac of ene canual valve. .Using DPD arithmetic:
Meang : 4(3.27 x 10-5) . .72 x 10-5 = 1.39 x iO-4 Varianceg : 1.87 x 10 Mean : 5(3.29.x 10-5) + .72 x 10-5 , )'.72.x 10-4 F
Variancep : 2.82 x 10~0 .
Then Meargy: 1.39 x 10-# x 1.72 x 10'#
- 2.'37 x 10-8 Variance EF.
1.20 x 10 .
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n-Ine rimainirg tac-esent Cutsets of the Check valves in the CClc lecs are
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insigr.ificant, as shcton here:
Mean2: y 6.91 x 10-)
- 4.77 x 10-9 .
Ever nitn 100 such cutsets, the contribution to system hardware unasailasility is still domir,ated by the single-event cutsets and the twc-event cutset of both pumps failing to start.
D.2.2 Test Centribution Referring to SectiorrD.1.2, testing of the pumps monthly does not degrade the system. The cuarterly test of the MOVs in the heat excnanger blocks is performed by closing and then opening each valve before the next one is tested. Tnis procedure minimizes the contribution to unavailability due to a valve being left in the closed position.
D.2.3 f> air.ter ance Contribution ,
As discussed in Section 0.1.2, valve maintenance is not considered here,.
tut RhR purp maintenance is a contrioutor to system unavailability.
RHR pump 31 shcws one instance of being down for maintenance with the -
reactor not in cold shutdown. The total operating hours (1976 to 1980) corresponding to these instances yield a pump unavailability due to maintenance of
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Mean: 7.63 x 10 4 Variance: 5.10 x 10-8, Tne system fails when B is under maintenance and C also fails; tnus, we get:
Mean: 7.63 x 10-4 x.l.49 x 10-3 , 1,14 x 10-6 Variance: 7.36 x 10-12, l.ikewise, when C is under maintenance and 8 fails, we get the same result. Therefore, the total contribution is Mean: 2 x 1.14 x 10-6 = 2.28 x 10-6 Variance: 2.94 x 10-II.
D.2.4 Human Error Contribution From the discussion of the tests in Section D.I.2, the flow tests after maintenance at refueling or' cold shutdown assure that valves are aligned correctly. Tne monthly tests ao not cnange valve position. The
. ( ,- cuarterly tests do not contribute to valve misposi.tioning. After pump maintenance, tne pump isolation valves are verified open by a flow test of the repaired pump train. Therefore, no human error is included due to, these maintenance procedures.
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D.I.5 Other causes Mcs.t of the observec couplec Sailures in the industry involvec meter-cperatec cr air-cperatec velves tnat nac to enange position on' cemand. LThe frecuent partial tests and the full annual system test
'inciCateithat an unforeseen Common Cause, f ailure is of low frecuency.
D.2.6 Ocutle Failure Centribution .
Taole 9 summarizes the couole failure' contributions'. .
0.3 NO TRIPLE FAILURES D.4 SYSTEM UNAVAILAB." 'TY' Table 10 shoss the results that have been derived for the mean values of the dominar.t con'tributors to LPIS unavailability. These contributors are the basis for the uncertainty analysis. The mathematical expression for '
the unavailability.of the system in terms of the unavailabilities of the ccminant contrioutcrs is:
Otpg3 = 20CV + 30MOV1 + OBC + 0maint + BOBC + OEF = 2.41 x 10-# .
Using DPD arithmetic we find for O LPIS Mean: 2.41 x 10-4 Variance: 3.97 x 10-8 Str. Percentile: 5.92 x 10-5 Median: 1.82 x 10-4 95th Percentile: '6.14 x 10-4 14 0528A041481/1
r E. C'.% :CIFICATICre: BOXAM, CC:Q: TIC::, DEGRACED ELECTR!? Pct.1R Wnen either Bus 2A cr 6A is rot available, an RhR train beccres unavailable. This causes the elements in tne remaining path to becoce
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sirgle-eler.ent cutsets. The block B(C) is then'accec directly to the
- other sir.gie event cutsets to calculare the unavailability wjth one bus cut. Referring to Figure 2, the number of valves of each t,ype must be ceterr.inec sir.ce the data structure causes cepencence among valves that use tne same generic cata base.
Panual (F0Vs that oc not operate) = 9.or 10 Check valves =3 Pump =1 Tne calculaticr.:still shows that the pump and MOV-that must change position deninate the other single elements in the flowpath.
a If a bus is unavailable and maintenance is being perforced, the systee woule de unavailable. Both buses down make the system unavailable.
These results are shewn ir. Tatie 11.
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TABLE 1A LPIS UdAVAILASLE--ELECTRIC P0llEit AVAILABLE Bus Condition llean Variance 5th Percentile 11edian 95th Percentile D 3 and 6A g , e 2.41 x 10-4 3.97 x 10-0 5. 92 x 10-5 1.82x 10-4 6.14 x 10-4 1'
C r on n t 9fyen not 9 iven 3.10 x 10-4 4.70 x 10-3 7.40 x 10-3 E
TABLE la LPIS UllAVAILABLE--PARTIAL P0llER AVAILABLE flu ies ,Unwailabic '
Systen 3A 6A 3A36A '
Unavailibility -
(llean) 2.36 x 10-3 2.36 x 10-3 1.0 4
eh 9
g OP.N OOOOO. h$
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. TABLE 2 LPIS P01 EP. SUPPLIES Componert Power Supply PilP. Punp 31 But !!unber 3A P.HP. Punp 32 Bus !!unber 6A O g
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TABl.E 3 TESTIt!G PE0VIfEl:E!!?S .
Conponert . Testing / Inspection CHR Punp 31 -
Sterted and stopped contPly, i+en leaving cold shutdown, and at refueling.
RHP. Ponp'3? Started and stopped nonthly, iten leaving cold shutdown, and at refueling.
HCVf 38, HCVUD Strol.ed once; cuarterly.
I0V744;'882; Verify open; nonthly. .
74cA,B; 7<6; 7^7 .
f:0V745A,B; 889A,B Stroked once; quarterly.
110VSCEA,B; CPfA,B Verify open; nonthly.
4 l'anual Valves 735A,B; Verify open; nonthly
. 73fA,B; Pa6 Chech Valves 881, Open on denand; nonthly, refueling.
73PA,B; 741 Check Valves 887A-D; Seeted correctly; leaving cold shutdown.
P38A-D CFect Valves 887A-D; Open on demand; refueling.
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SYST.E.M .Ef f.EC.T.S. O. .F .P.I..P.E. .T.A.ll.URE Pips tectio's 3ia:ieter Systes Potential for Initiating Cornents flu-lear lleader . ( I n. ) Failure Other Syste:as inpa-t Event
- 1. Line Il ad>cr 155 - Sunply 12 Yes Yes loss of :t;lSI Ilo Can he isolateJ nins. illy 4 to 113 p' saps f rori R;lSI ivilve 016)
- 2. Line lla.,her SF - Supply 14 Yes Loss of pirip suction (and flo See iten 1 above 3;l:t p pips fro Contala- It'.lSI)
N
" nint Sirin (af ter fl0V 31D)
- 3. Ptsm S setton and 'lls- 14/8 Yes -Loss of Ril$f No^ In.llvidual p' alp can be charge Piping (2 penps) Isolate'l n.inually
- 4. Line li'aiber 9. P'rlp 's c .Yes Loss of 4'ASI flo Can he isolated Olscharge to plL't lleat Eachinjers
- 5. ,9'stlet' Rita lleet Exchangers 0 Yes loss of 2*.lSI Wo
- 6. Inilvitsal .oop Injection 6 ilo Yes, possible loss of 11 0 See accia.iutator piping Lines (af ter flow restrict- associate'l accuou14 tor table Ing orifice) DI) s OSI.M010101/1 ' ,
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TABLE 6 ADDITIOMAL sit'GLE-EVE!!T 11!!':! AL -
CUTSETS !!ITH Pul:P TP. Alt! 21 DISABLED DUE 10 flAIllTEt At!CE BPitPit3?S: CHP. Peop 3? liechanicr1 Bl10Pl1325: RHP. Puap 32 flotor BXV72rBC: 11anual Valve 73fB BXV73FBC: Tenual Valve 735B <
BCY7?fBC: Cieci. Valve 73EB TABLE 7 ADDITIONAL sit!GLE-EVEllT (11tlIl1AL CUTSETS 1'ITH PullP TRAIll 3? DI3AFLED DUE TO l%It!TEffAriCE S BPl1Fli31S: P.HP. Puap 21 lieclenical Bl10Pfl315: P.HP. Pump :31 Itotor BXV72fAC: lianual Valve 73fA .
BXV735AC: llanual Valve 735A BCY72 PAO: Checl Valve _73PA ,
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0513A040r81/1 22 .
L
a o TABl.E fl CAUSE TABLE FOR SINGl.E TAILURES - BilSES 3A AtlD 6A AVAILABLE Cause iffects
. iteam -
Unavallahllity Crymonents Systen other Systeiis initiiting twent Itardvare failure 6.9) x 10-3 Cvt41 falls to open not affected '
falls no ef fect Ha rth:1re failure G.9) x 10-5 CVWil f alls to open not affected N
fails no effect
..w Hardware failure 3.29 x 10-5 : yfp44 ciages (,geener- falls not affected no effe:t
)lze.1 open) k liardware failure 3.29 x 10-5 ;11Va'12 closes (deence- not affected falls no errec t gize.1 npen) liardeare failure 3.29 a 10-5 .31.inual valve a45 closes falls Safety injection no ef fec t (lockeit noen)
Total liar.1 tare 2.3f x 10-I Testing an<l flaintenay.e O nnne no ef fect no effect no e f fec t
!lu.un Error O none no effect no effect no effect Plitt. 2.3f x 10-1
- Oo:11nant Cnntributor
- llJrfluare f ailure 4
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TABLE 9 CAUSE TAlli.E FOR DOUBLE FAILURES Effects Cause fleam
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Caaponents Systm.: Pther Systems In,itiating
- e. vent Coincident hardware 3.29 x 10-6 stilnly R: lit pia.ips fails no effect fsilures no e f fec t m flaintenaxe and hardware 2.28 x .10-6 Ril.1 pis.ap maintenance - falls no effect
.* failures no e f fec t -
ilumen error and hardware O no ef fec t . no effect no effect f all'eres no e f fec t fofAL 5.57 x 10-6 00minant Contrib st9r y ile2rly Equivalent Contributions 4
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TABLE 10 D0!!ItJAllT C0l1TP.IPUTOP. CAUSE TAPLE FOP. LPIS BUSES 3A A!!D 6A AVAILABLE Doninant Cause Failure !! ode Uhevai 11'i ty SIllGLE FAILUCES Hardware Failures Valves stop flov 2.?7 x 10 #- -
DOUBLE FAILURES Coincident Hardware Failures -
- 3. P9 x 10-f . 9
!!rintenance 'Punp unavailaH e 2.T8 x 10-f TOTAL 2.41 x 10-4
. l e,
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0513A040981/1 25 ..
9 TABLE 11 D0!!IHAllT--CAUSE TABLE FOP. LPIS (Ore Bes Out)- ,
9 Doninent Cause '
Failure !! ode U.'evai ility Hardware Failure _ Puop fr.ils to start 1.36 -x 10-3 .
flaintenance On pump train 31 7.63 x 10 #-
or 32 Hardeare Failure Single nonoperating 2.37 x 10 ^ g vel ves TOTAL 2.36 x 10-3 e
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