Text

Rev 1 to Safeguards Actuation Sys (Safety Injection & Containment Spray Actuation), Draft Chapter to PRA
	ML20071A447
Person / Time
Site:	Indian Point, 05000000
Issue date:	04/17/1981
From:	; PLG, INC. (FORMERLY PICKARD, LOWE & GARRICK, INC.)
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20071A408	List: ML20071A429; ML20071A431; ML20071A433; ML20071A435; ML20071A438; ML20071A443; ML20071A447; ML20071A454; ML20071A461; ML20071A467; ML20071A484; ML20071A488;
References
	FOIA-82-626 PRA-810417-03, NUDOCS 8302240138
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{{#Wiki_filter:a i Pickard, Lo,.e and Garrick, Inc. INDIAN POINT PRA April 17,1981 REVISION 1 . f ~[ p'?' INDIAN POINT 3 )$8 ~ [ b.- t/ g SAFEGUARDS ACTUATION SYSTEM s. (Safety Injection and Containment Spray Actuation) A.

SUMMARY

A.1 INTRODUCTION The safeguards actuation system (SAS) is evaluated for its ability to respond to various plant conditions and to deliver proper actuation signals to the designatec engineered safeguards system (ESS) equipment during LOCA and other plant transient conditions. The function of the SAS is to detect breaks in the primary or secondary system and to initiate operation of the components associated with the engineered safeguards system. This analysis is carried out under the following assumptions: e The system is in its normal operating mode prior to the initiating event. e No operator action to manually initiate the system is ccnsidered in this analysis. However, action to manually initiate the essential safeguards system ecuipment is considered at the esent tree level. 4 The SAS is comorised cf two subsystems, safety injection actuation anc containment spray actuation. Eacn subsystem is analyzec separately in inis analysis. Failure of the safety injection actuation subsyster,is cefinec as failure of both channels of safety injection logic or failure in the safety injection instrumentation. Failure of a single cnannel of safety injection logic includes failure to actuate any single equipment actuation rclay. Failure of the containment spray actuation subsystem is defined as f ailure of both channels of containment spray logic or f ailure in the g containment spray instrumentation. u A.2 RESULTS The results of this analysis are summarized in Table I with the following dominant contributors to safeguards actuation system failure: Safety Injection Actuaticn Mean e Test of a single logic channel anc randem 5.0 x 10-6 failure in the other logic channel (80.5%). Random failures in both logic channels (19.5%). 1.2 x 10-6 e (.* 8302240138 830113 PDR FOIA BLUM82-626 PDR 1

e,. ~ Containment Spray Actuation Mean Test of a single logic channel and random e 5.0 x 10-6 failure in the other logic channel-(88%). Failure of the high-high containment e 3.8 x 10-7 pressure instrumentation (6.7%). Table 1 presents a comparison of the results of this~ analysis to the results obtained in.the WASH-1400 analysis for similar systems. A.3 CONCLUSIONS No single fai, lures which completely fail the safeguards actuation system were identified. Failures in two separete logic channels or instrumen-tation channels will result in failure of this system; however, operator action to start the required ESS equipment is independent of this system. 4 e i-I I l 2 0712A0a0281/1

e B. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION B.1 SYSTEM FUNCTION The safeguards actuation system receives signals f matrices, ahd sends actuation signals to enginee (ESS) equipment, based upon-plant conditionsa eguards system ogic limit damage in the event of breaks ~ in the reactorThe system serves or the secondary systems (main steam, feedwater, or steamcoolant s Two separate and distinct functions are performed b generators). these two distinct functions causes several othersa y this system: Each of the plant. This process sensors (analysis includes all associated equipment from the actuated by the system. instrumentation) through the various auxiliar Each function identified above is analyzed separately; however, the sections on system description and ays discuss both functions. operation B.2 _ SYSTEM OPERATION B.2.1 INITIATION SIGNALS Table 2 identifies the signals, logic arrangement which are used to initiate the safety injection o, and trip setpoints functions of this system. Fi r containment spray diagram for system operation.gures 1 and 2 present a simplified logic this system and the use of these signals are presThe generation of the s ented below. 1 Generator Pressure.High Steam Line Flow in Conjunction with Low T avg or Low Steam steam isolation valves (MSIV).This condition is l general location are: Indications of a-break in 'theream of the ~ m the four steam lines must indicate high shigh steam flow (to generate with: a)' low T two of fo twa of pressure (two of fou(r sensors)ur sensors), team flow) in conjun,ct av or b) low steam line aut'ematic safety injection. isolation (closure of all four MSIVs) l o initiating To generate the high steam line flow signal used to develop , a compariso'n circuit is stage pressure. a varying setpoint signal based on tu setpoint, and a trip signal is generateo when actual steam fl exceeds *the setpoint. spheric relief valve operation when turbine first stage pre ow not a true indication of actual steam flow signal must be in coinci.dence with either a low T, the high steam line flow ure is by a two of four sensing network, or a low stea avg signal c ors) generated signal generated by two of four pressure sensing networks rator pressure 9 C ~W b

= a 2. Steam Line Differential Pressure. This condition indicates a steam break upstream of the MSIVs or a large feedwater line break. A break in this location results in the closure of the nonreturn check valve (located in each steam line). Steam pressure upstream of the check valve now decreases as the associated steam generator feeds the break directly. A comparison network is used in which this steam pressure is compared to the pressure in two of the three remaining intact steam generators. When the pressure in the steam generator feeding the break decreases to the set,value below the other two steam pressures, an automatic safety injection signal is generated. 3. L a Pressurizer Pressure.. The pressurizer acts as a surge tank for the reactor coolant system. Pressurizer heaters cycle on and off to maintain RCS pressure within a certain band. Leakage fru.a the RCS in excess of the pressurizer heater and charging pump capt.bility for mak'eup results in a decrease in pressurizer-pressure, and consequently RCS pressure. This signal serves to initiate automatic safety injection to protect the core from damage for RCS breaks and excessive leaks. Three channels of pressurizer pressure are,monitorea and an auto-matic safety injection signal is generated if any two of the three cnannels indicate low pressure. This trip is manually blocked by operator action when RCS-pressure is below 1,900 psi curing a plant shutdown. This block is automatically removed when RCS press'ure e increases above 1,900 psi and operator action would be recuired to reinitiate the block if it is required. 4 High Containment Pressure. In the event of a break in the RCS, or a steam line break inside the ( containment building, pressure inside the containment building would increase. The rate of the increase is dependent upon the size of the break. Containment pressure is monitored by three pressure transmitters located outside of the containment building. When i containment pressure exceeds the setpoint value in two of the three l transmitter channels, an automatic safety injection signal is generated. t NOTE: all of the trip relays associated with'the instrumentation discussed above are "deenergize to trip." That is, loss of power to an instrument channel causes the relays associated with that channel to trip, which results in one of the trip signals required for safety injection actuation. 5. High-High Containment Pressure. A high-high containment pressure is indicative of a large loss of l coolant accident -(LOCA) or a major steam line break inside the A* containment building. Containment pressure is menitored by six pressure transmitters located outside the containment building in l 4

4 i w. i tne piping; penetration area. The output of these transmitters is diviceo into two groups of three. 'n' hen containment pressure exceeos. s. the high-high setpoint, a-signal is developed which energizes the .Two.out~of three channels in . relays associated with that channel. both groups are recuired to initiate automatic containment _ spray -actuation.- In addition to the automatic containment spray signal, a main steam line isolation signal is sent to close the MSIVs and an -automatic safety injection: signal is-developed. The tripping of~any of the input channels described ab' ave is indi-In addition, cated on supervisory panel "S0" in'the control room._ the following channel trips will result in alarms at'the locations i-i~ noted: Alarm location Tripped Channels r l. High Steam Line High Steam Line Flow Safeguards Panel Flow SI 2. Steam Line Dif-- Steam Line AP SI Safeguards Panel 4 ferential Pres-J3. Pressurizer Pres-Pressurizer Lo-Press RCS Supervisory Panel sure Channel Trip- =4 High Containment Hi Containment Pres-Safeguards Panel. sure ( .sure SI Channel Trip Pressure-5. High-High Con-High-High Containment No Alarm (High Indi- -tainment Pressur; eressure (Spray)-Chan-c a'tec) nel Trip I 6. Manual Initiation-Signals. In addition to the automatic signals described above, saf ety injec-tion or-containment spray may-be initiated by the operators in the-control room. Manual safety injection is accomplished using the red manual safety Depressing injection _pushbuttons on panel 582 in the control room. one of :theseLpushbuttons initiates the minimum recuired ESS eouip-Both pushbuttons must be depressed to' initiate all ESS ment. Manual spray actuation is ' accomplished by depressing equipment. both red manual spray actuation pushbuttons on safeguaros panel 581 -in the control room. Depressing one spray (actuation push button initiates ~ ene train of spray equipment. B.2.2 ESSENTIAL SAFEGUARDS EQUIPMENT ACTUATION Tall or portions of the following signals are actuated as a result of the L, ( '. generated' signals presented above: p 5 5 e

e e. Safety Injection e Unit Trip and 69 kV Ecs Transfer e Containment Spray Actuation e Containment Isolation Phase A e-Containment' Isolation Phase B' e -Containment Ventilation Isolation e Isolation Valve Seal Water System o Containment Cooling and Filtration e Steam Line Isolation e Feedwater Isolation e Reactor Trip-e ' Emergency Diesels e Service Water System e Auxiliary Feedwater ~- Figure 3 presents the functional relationships between the various initiation signals and the actuated-equipment. A discussion of the signals and the relationships is presented below. 1. Safety Injection Sicnal. Tha automatic safety injection signal is developed by the actuation of one of the five process input signals described previously. The automatic or manual safety injection signals cause the following actions to occur: a. Reactor Trip. The reactor is trippeo to reduce power production and aid in minimizing the consequences of_the accident. 9 b. Feedwater Isolation. The feed system is'isolatec to minimize the severity of steam break accidents. Unit Trip and 6.9 kV. Bus Transfer. The turbine is tripped to c. stop the demand for power. The 6.9 kV buses (1 through 4) are transferred to buses 5 and 6 to assure continued power to essential equipment. d. Containment Ventilation Isolation. This signaf causes _ isolation of the pressure relief.line, the purge supply line, and the purge ex.haust line to eliminate leakage from the containment through these lines. (The containment purge lines are only used during cold shutdown conditions.) e. Containment Isolation Phase A. This signal-isolates all fluid system containment penetrations which will not aid in minimizing' the consequences of an accident. In aadition, this signal causes operation of the isolation valve seal water system in order to provide a water seal against containment leakage and. actuates containment ventilation isolation. f. Control Room Ventilation Isolation. This signal changes the control room air conditioner to the incident condition. 9 8 4 6 MQ@BK@Mn

o e

g. ' Safeguards Sequence. This signal causes the '.ollowing actions:

(1) Commands all three diesel generators to start, provided controls are in automatic. ' (2) Sends a stripping signal to all loads on'the 480V buses which are not required for safety injection, and locks out all nonsafeguards loads except MCC36A, MCC368,-and MCC36C. (3) Provides a signal to trip bus tie breakers 2ATSA and 3AT6A. (4) Sends a starting signal tc the component cooling booster pumps and senos automatic signals to allow for injection path lineup. (5) In the absence of an undervoltage condition on the respec-tive 480V buses, sends sequence signals to start the safe-guards equipment on the four 480V buses. If outside power 'is lost, the sequence signal is delayed until voltage is restored to the affecteo 480V bus. If the SI signal is reset prior to restoring voltage to the bus, the SI equipment.will not automatically start. h. Illuminates the " Safety Injection Actuated" Lamp on Supervisory Panel 581. 2. Containment Soray. The containment spray actuation signal is 4 ceveicceo oy tne two-out-of-three-twice logic for high-hign containment pressure or by cepressing the two manual actuation pusnouttons. This signal causes actuation of the spray equipment and containment isolation phase B. Sodium hydroxide addition is delayed for two minutes after spray actuation to allow the operator time to cancel this addition if it is not needed. The cancel pushbutton only affects the sodium hydroxide addition system. B.2.3 SAFEGUARDS ACTUATION MANUAL RESETS The various actuation' signals pass through memory devices that preserve the signal to allow the functions to go to completion. Manual reset pushbuttons are provided to allow for operator flexibility during recovery. The action of these pushbuttons is described below: e Safety Injection Reset. Two manual pushbuttons are located at supervisory panel 5B2. These pushbuttons, one for each logic channel, allow resetting of the equipment actuating relays. Resetting of the relays does not remove equipment from operation. These reset pushbuttons are interlocked with a timing device that prevents resetting for two minutes after actuation. Once the signal is reset, it will not be reactuated by an automatic signal until after the reactor trip breakers are reset. Manual safety injection may be reinitiated at any *ime. C 7 umvw.mvo

e s Containment Isolation Phase A Reset. Two manual pushbuttons locateo at supervisory panel SN allow resetting of this actuation signal. Once reset, reactuation will be inhibited until after the automatic safety injection signal is cleared. Contair. ment Ventilation Isolation Reset.. Two manual pushbuttons e locatec at supervisory panel SN allow resetting of this actuation s i'gn al, e Cont'ainment Isolation Phase B Reset. Two manual pushbuttons locatec at supervisory panel SN allow resetting of this signal. Once reset, reactuation is inhibited until af ter the spray initiation signal has .g been reset. ---~-w e Soray Reset. Two manual pushbutton_s located at supervisory panel d~ ~j; 581 allow resetting of this signal. Once reset, automatic reactua- ~ tion is inhibited until after the spray initiation signal has cleared and the reactor trip has been reset. Manual spray injection may be reinstated at any time. B.2.4 SAFEGUARDS LOGIC CHANNELS There are two channels of actuation logic in the safeguards actuation system. These logic channels require DC power for proper operation. The power supplies for the logic channels are presented in Section B.3 of this. analysis. Table 3 identifies the logic relays and the ecuipment actuated by each relay. t Each logic channel contains seven master relay-slave relay sets. These relay sets are: g e SI Automatic Actuation e SI Manual Actuation e Containment Ventilation Actuation Containment Isolation Phase A (2) c e e Containment Isolation Phase B e Containment Spray Actuation The master relays are special relays which contain operating and reset coils. The master relay is normally deenergized. When the proper logic matrix is made up, the operating coil will be energized by auxiliary contacts and demand the various safeguards equipment to operate. The master relays, via a mechanical latching mechanism, and the slave relays will remain in the actuated position until the master relay is reset (reset coil is energized). The reset signal 15 applied through the manual reset pushbuttons described in Section B.2.3. The safeguards logic relays are located in relay racts behind the reactor trip ' logic relay panels. These relays are arranged in matrices which develop the necessary logic for safeguards initiaticn. A typical logic matrix and master relay-slave relay layout is shown in Figures 4 and S. Each logic relay is fed from a safeguards actuation bistable V

~

located at the analog racks. The signal frcm each analog bistable feecs a safeguards logic relay in each safety injection charnel. 8 0712A0a0281/1

With tne exception of the high-high containment pressure relays, the logic relays are deenergized wnen an unsafe condition is detected. During testing, contacts of a test relay in series with the auxiliary relays prevent the auxiliary relays from being energized. Should a safeguards actuation be called for during' testing, it will be initiated by either the other safeguards actuation logic network, or that portion of.the safeguards actuation logic network which is not undergoing testing. Figure 5 presents a typical test circuit arrangement for a safeguards actuation logic matrix and master relay. Note: manual SI removes the test signal that prevents the slave relays from being actuated thereby allowing the affected channel to respond to the actual SI condition. B.3 SUPPORT SYSTEMS . Successful operation o. the safeguards actuation system is dependent upon the electric power system, primarily the DC system. Each actuation channel receives DC power from a separate battery panel and battery.. Presented below are the ' sources of power for the safeguards actuation system. Also d are test power supplies for this system. DC power for e.. .aannel is monitored by two undervoltage relays which indicate un the front of the associated safeguards logic panel. q Subsystem Power Source Logic Channel 1 Battery 31 through Distribution (Panels 1-1 and 1-2). Panel 31 Logic Channel 2 Panel 32 Battery 32 through Distribution (Panels 2-1 and 2-2) Logic Channels 1.and 2 120 VAC Instrument Bus 33 Testing B.4 INTERFACING SYSTEMS The safeguards actuation system sends operation signals to the plant engineered safeguards system (ESS) equipment and then interfaces with all ESS systems. In addition to the ESS systems, the safeguards actuation system sends isolation signals to other plant systems which penetrate the containment building. 9 ~ 0712A040681/1

B.5 TECHNICAL SPECIFIC-ATIONS .The plant technical specifications icentify:- The maximum or minimum trip,setpoints. e The frequency of testing of the various SAS equipment. e The number of out-of-service instrumentation or logic channels. e e Limits on the number of channel tests that may be performed at the same time. 8.6 TEST AND MAINTENANCE ~- The various components in the safeguards actuation system undergo periodic testing and surveillance. Maintenance is performed as required. 1. The process instrumentation channels are periodically tested to satisfy plant technical specifications as indicated below; a. Channel checks are performed every shift (8 hours). A~ channel check is a qualitative determination of acceptable operability by observation of the instrument behavior during operation. b. Channel functional tests are performed monthly. A channel functional test involves the injection of a simulated sicnal into the channel to verify operability,. including alarm and/or 3 trip initiating action. c. Channel calibration for most instrumentation loops is performed during refueling' outages. Channel calibration is the adjustment of channel output, such that it responds, within acceptable range and accuracy, to k,nown values of the parameters which the channel measures. Calibrition encompasses the entire channel, including alarms or tript, and includes the cbanc.el functional test. 21 The safeguards actuation logic channels are periodically tested to satisfy plant technical specification requirements as indicated below: Logic Channel Functional Test. Logic channel functional tests are performed monthly. A logic channel functional test is the application of input signals, or the operation of relays or switch contacts, in all the combinations required to produce the required decision output, including the operation of all actua-tion devices. The coils for,the slave relays are checked for continuity rather than actuation. 10 0712A040281/1

= 3. During refueling cutages, a test safety injection signal is applied to check the operation of the engineered safety features. The breakers for the safety injection and residual heat removal pumps are made inoperable for this test, The test will be considered satisfactory if control board indication and visual observations indicate that all components heve received the. safety injection signal in the proper sequence; that is, the appropriate pump breakers shall have opened and closed, and the appropriate valves shall have completed their travel. 4. Testing Secuence. The general test procedure and test sequence for the logic matrices is presented below: i The safeguards initiation test panel is located.on the front a. doors of the safeguards initiation relay panels and consists of ~< three-position pushbuttons'(left, right, and push), white indicating lamps, and a red test lamp. A typical test circuit is shown in Figure 3. The white light will be illuminated whenever the proper coincident relay contacts are closed.. The lamp may be tested by depressing the lens. b. A master test push button is provided to block actuation of the slave relays allowing the master relays to be operated without energizing safeguards equipment. When the test switch is in the left, (normal position) or right c. position, contact la in series with the logic relay are closec. d. With the test ' switch in the push position, (either right or left), contact la.will be opened causing the logic relay to ceenergize. With the proper number of logic relays tripped, the white " matrix" light associated with that safeguards function will illuminate, indicating proper operation of the logic-circuit. A white master relay light is illuminated when the associated e.. master relay is actuated. Five lights are provided as follows: (1) SI_ Master (2) Containment Isolation Phase A Master (3) Containment Isolation Phase B Maste.' (4) Spray Initiation Master I (5) Containment ventilation Master. i' f. The operation of the individual logic relays is monitored by the I status lights on supervisory panel 50 and the channel trip alarms on the safeguards supervisory panel. The test reset push button removes the block signal to the slave relays, provided i f all master relays have been reset. I e 11 .fmsyygvwenw

~ B.7 OPERATOR INTERACTION Operator; action to manually initiate the safegLards actuation system is excluded from this analysis. - Operator errors during test or maintenance of this system are discussed in Section.0.6 of this analysis. B.8 COMMON CAUSE EFFECT The logic cabinets and instrumentation cabinets associated with this system are located in the control room behind the flight panels at Indian Point 3. ~ Common generic components'of this system are i.pplied by the same manu-facturers, are subject to common operation and test procedures, and have common susceptibility to secondary causes of failure (grit, moisture, vibration,etc.). Further discussion of the effects of common cause failure on system ~ failure is presented in Section 0.5 of this' analysis. C I s (.- d 12 0712A040281/1{

C. LOGIC MODEL-C.1 -EVENT TREE This system is. input to the event. trees developed for the LOCA, Jteam break, and loss of offsite power transients.. Failure of this system is defined as failure to send an' actuation signal to the actuated equipment. In the event tree, questions concerning the state of this system are asked following questions on electric power and before the actuated systems status. C.2 -SYSTEM FAULT TREE. Figure 4 presents the fault trees developed for the safeguards actuation system. Discussion.of the events and the quantification of the tree is-presented in Section D of this analysis. Manual actuation of this system is always possible; however, this analysis does not include the probability of manual actuation. The fault tree is developed for a LOCA condition in the plant. The fault tree logic for the steam.line break and the loss of offsite power

transients is similar.

C.3 FAULT TREE CODING Table 4 identifies the basi. events, their failure modes, and the failure rates associated with these modes. 5 k S 9 ke e O e* ~ 13 MlNudG15111/N

D. 00ANTIFICATION 0.1 SINGLE HARDWARE FAILURES No single hardware failures were identified in either the safety injection-actuation or containment spray actuation syst, ems. D.2 DOUBLE HARDWARE FAILURES The doubles contribution to system failure consist of random

hardware failures in one logic channel, coupled with random hardware failures in the other logic channel.

0.2.1 SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATION ,...g g, -.; .2 Channel 1 of safety. injection consists of the following basic components: D ": 'i e Actuation Relay A-1 e Manual Actuation Relay M-2 e Reset Relay and Pushbutton RS-1 e Normal Defeat Switch -1 e DC Power fuses 2-1 an'd 3-1 e Equipment Actuation Relays 10-15X e-Steam Line Isolation Relay S-1 e Containment High-High Pressure Relay AS1 The mean times to repair, MTTR, for the DC power fuse, the reset relay and the normal defeat switch are based upon the follcwing: 9 e. DC power fuse - Indication of a failed fuse is available on the front of the affected safeguards actuation panel. 'These panels are located in the control room and are uncer operator surveillance. Every shift (8 hours).the status of the' panels is. verified. The MTTR, 4 hours, is bas'ed upon one half.of the interval between visual t,_ inspections. o-Normal Defeat Switch'and Reset Relay - The failure mode of. interest is the shorting across of normally open contacts. Failures of this type are only detectable during the monthly logic channel testing or upon a system demand. The HTTR assigned, 360 hours, is based upon one half of the interval'between tests. Channel 2 contains similar components. The following equation defines the probability lof failure on demand for a single safety injection logic channel: Q

2(Y1 + V4) + V2 + 6V3 where

~V1 = probability of. occurrence of a single short around open. contacts. 14 0712A040281/1 t

o V2 = probability of failure of a single master relay. V3 = probability of failure of a single auxiliary relay. V4 = probability of failure of'a single fuse. channel unavailability on demand. Q = Using the failure data presented in Table 4 and the fault tree constructed for the event "No Safeguards Actuation Signal (SAS) from Channel 1," we obtain a distribution for the probability of failure on demand characterized by the following mean and variance: Mean 3.64 x 10-4 Variance 1.02 x 10-6, Using the fault tree and discrete probability distribution (DPD) arithmetic, we obtain for the probability of "No Safeguards Actuation Signal" (LOCA), a distribution represented by the following mean and variance: Mean 1.19 x.10-6 Variance 2.34 x 10-11 0.2.2 CONTAINMENT SPRAY ACTUATION q Contair. cent scray actuation channel l consists of the following components: o Containment Spray Master Relay 51-0 e Containment Spray Reset Relay Sl-R e-Containment Spray Auxiliary Relay SilX e DC Power Fuses 2-1 and 3-1 e Containment Spray Relay AS-1. The MTTR for the DC power fuses and the reset relay are based upon'the following: e DC pcwer fuse - 4 hours based upon the discussion in Section D.2.1. e Reset Relay - 360 hours based upon the discussion in Section 0.2.1. Channel 2 contains similar components. The following equation defines the probability of failure on demano for a single containment spray logic channel: Q = V1 + V2 + 2(V3 + V4) where V1 = probability of occurrence of a single short around open contacts. D 15 0712A0f0281/l

e V2.= probability of failure of a single master relay. V3 = probability of fatiure of a single auxiliary relay. V4 = probability of failure of a single. fuse. channel unavailability on demand. Q = For the event "No Spray Signal Generated Channel l" we obtain, using the failure data presented in Table ' and the fault tree constructed for this event, a distribution for the probability of failure characterized by the following mean and variance: Mean 1.85 x 10-4 Variance 2.54 x 10-7 For the event "No Containment Spray Actuation Signal," DPD arithmetic yields a probability distribution characterized with the following mean and variance: Mean 2.99 x 10-7 Variance 1.46 x 10-12, 0.3 INSTRUMENT LOOP FAILURES Two groups of instruments are considered; those whic,h initiate SI anc y those which initiate CS. 0.3.1 INSTRUMENT LOOP FAILURES, SI The instrumentation of interest for the LOCA transient is: pressurizer low pressure (3 channels, 2 of 3 required); and containment high and high-high pressure (high 2 of 3; high-high 2 of 3, twice). A basic instrumentation loop consists of a sensor, transmitter, test device, test-operate switches, bistable, power supply, and logic relays. Referring to the instrumentation fault trees, the sensor and transmitter are grouped in the transmitter block, and the bistable and logic relays are grouped in the bistable block. Note, upon a loss of power to the instrument loop, the logic relays associated with the loop change state to close their logic matrix contacts. This is true for all' 51 instru-mentation except high-high containment pressure where the relays must be energized to close the logic matrix contacts. The MTTR for the pressurizer and containment pressure transmitter networks are based upon the following: e Pressurizer pressure transmitters - Although these transmitters are only calibrated during plant refueling outages, the output of these transmitters is under continuous observation during plant V operation. Any deviation of a single channel will be detected t, ~ 16 0712A040281/1

during the normal channel checks performed every shift. For this reascn, four hours (one half of the normal shift cycle) is defined as the MTTR for these transmitters. e Containment pressure transmitters - These transmitters are also calibrated during refueling outages and routinely monitored in the control room; however, containment pressure does not vary signif_i-cantly over the course of a single shift. Drift or other malfunc-tions in a single transmitter network will be detected during plant operation due to the normal pressure buildup that occurs inside the containment over several days. Based upon engineering judgment, the MTTR for the transmitter network is defined to be sne half of a weekly cycle (84 hours). The following equation defines the probability of failure on demand for the safety injection instrumentation: 0 = (9V3 )(V1 + V2)2 2 where V1 = the probability of' failure of a single presurrizer transmitter network. V2 = the probability of failure of a single bistable / logic relay channel. V3 = the probability of failure of a single containment pressure transmitter network. safety injection instrumentation unavailability on_ demand.- Q = Based upon the above equation, we have the following distribution for the f ailure of instrumentation to provide automatic trip signals to SIS: Mean 1.56 x 10-16 Variance 2.59 x l'0-30, l 0.3.2 INSTRUMENT LOOP FAILURES, CS The in'strumentation which initiates containment spray consists of the containment high-high pressure transmitters and bistables. The six containment pressure transmitters are arranged in two groups of three with 2 of 3 high-high pressure signals required frcm each group for containment spray to be actuated. The instrumentation loops fail with no trip signal if pcuer is lost to the instrument icop. The MTTR for the high-high containment' pressure transmitters is defined as 84 hours for the reasons noted in Section D.3.1. ~ I O 17 t a m s w r. w a r t

F ine folicwing equation defines the probability of failure 6 the, containment spray instrumentation. 0 = 6 (V2 + V3)2 where e V2 = the probability of failure of a. single bistable channel. c V3 = the probability of failure of a single containe;- transmitter network. Q containment spray instrumentation unavailabilitg = r Based upon the above equation, the probability of failure fe "~~ containment high-high pressure signal is characterize,d by t2 mean and variance: Mean 4.24 x 10-3 Variance 1.55 x 10-4 D.4 SYSTEM FAILURE DUE TO TEST AND MAINTENANCE ^ D.4.1 TESTING Duringsystemlogicchannelfunctionaltesting,thema prevented from energizing by open contacts operated by the t( This testing is performed monthly and normally recuires four hours for completion. The master SI relay is not biccked for : duration of the tes ing; however, for the purposes of this aI is assumed that the channel under test cannot perform its fuI the entire duration of the test. hours with a variance of one hour.The mean test act d Using the test act durati data developed in Section 0.2.1 for a single SAS channel, we the contribution to system failure fer a single SAS channel u andrandomfailuresintheotherchannel,thefollowingmean) variance: S r nt Mean 3.58 x 10-4' = 2.53 x 10-6 o 2 h Variance 4.97 x 10'II. For the system total contribution to failure due to this testt must add the contribution to failure while testing of the oth-channel.-Thisresultsinthefollowingfailureprobabilityfh during test. Mean 5.05 x 10-6 i Variance 1.99 x 10-10, I t 18 0712A040281/1 L

9 D.4.2 MAINTENANCE Maintenance upon certain portions of this system is allowable under the plant technical specifications. This., maintenance is limited to the instrumentation which supplies the trip signais. Prior to performing the maintenance, the other channels of instrumentation which sense the same parameter are tested to ensure their operability. Upon completion of this testing, the failed instrument.is placed in the tripped position which, in effect, gives one part of the signal necessary for system actuation. Maintenance for the.se cases does not affect syste.m undvailablity. Maintenance.is not performed on other portions of the safeguards acutuation system during plant operation. D.5 OVA.L iflCATION OF COMMON CAUSE - INSTRUMENT CHANNEL MISCALIBRATION There is a potential for common miscalibration errors to be applied to all instruments of a particular set. During the periodic calibrations, a single technician or group of technicians perform the tests necessary to ensure instrument accuracy.. These tests are usually performed sequentially among identical channels. This leads to a close coupling between the acts. However, most calibration activities, even if performed in error do not result in an instrument that fails to provide-a trip. In addition, the diversity in the types of instruments that provice trip signals limits the effect of these potential cormon cause miscalibrations. If we take the value of a single instrument channel 9 failing (the sum of bistable, logic relays, and transmitter network f ailures) as the probability of common cause niscalibration of a' set of instruments, failure of two sets of instrumentation due to miscali-bration of this type would result in a mean and variance of: Mean 2.94 x 10-10 Variance 9.13 x 10-19 4 This value is used as the probability of common cause miscalibration of instrumentation. During the monthly logic channel testing, it can be seen from the fault tree that a single logic channel failure can cause failure of the safeguards actuation system. Both trains of logic are tested sequentially which in principle could introduce some common cause coupling between the' channels. However, the logic testing does not involve the changing of trip set points or logic arrangements. For this reaton, these testing failures are treated as independent events which j do not affect system unavailability. l D.6 0UANTIFICATION OF HUMAN ERROR The human error of f' ailing to actuate this system given an initiating l i event is outside of the boundary of this analysis, but is included in f the initiating event trees. 4 19 msww.w.wwo

Human errors during instrumentation calibraticn are discussed in the common cause section, Section 0.5. There are potential candidates for. human errors quantification during the monthly logic channel functional testing. These potential candi-dates are discussed below: 'l. Failure to r'eturn " Normal-Cefeat" switch to "No'rmal" after testing. This switch prevents the master SI relay from being energize'd. Failure to return this switch to normal defeats one entire channel of safety injection / containment spray actuation. This switch is annunciated in the control.roem and this error, if made, is immediately dettstable. For this reason, this potential human error is not quantified in this analysis. 2. Failure to return individual test switches to " Normal." These switches allow testing of the individual logic relays. All test switches are the push-turn type. All switches are-annunciated at the inditidual safeguards panel and each relay being tested is annunciated in the control room. Failure to return a switch-to ' normal results in that particular channel of instrumentation beirg unable to provide a trip signal. Because these switches have indication when they are in tne test position, and because the individual channels are annunciated when testing, no human error quantification is performed for this C condition.- D.7 SYSTEM OUANTIFICATION 0.7.1 SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATION Failure of the safety injection actuation subsystem is caused by failures in the individual logic channels, failures in the instrumen-tation, failure during test and maintenance, and common cause failures. The probability of safety injection actuation signal failure on demand is now: OSI * "SI logic + aInst + "TM + aCC = 6.24 x 10-6 g g = 2.20 x 10-10 2 b %~ e ~ 20 0712A040281/1

k. 0.7.2 CONTAititENT SPRAY ACTUATION Failure of the ocntainment spray actuation subsystem is caused by failures in the individual logic channels, failures in the instrumen-tation, failures during test and maintenance, and common cause. failures. The probability "of containment spray' actuation signal failure on demand is now: OCS * "CS logic + " Inst + "TM + "CC = 5.66-x 10-6 s[S*l49*IU U = 9 L -s-l e b

t..* -

l l ~ 21 f@NH402 8141 '

I i i D.7.2 C0fiTAltiMENT SPRAY ACTUATION Failure of the containment spray actuation subsystem is caused by failures in the. individual logic channels, failures jn the instrumen-tation, failures during test and maintenance, and common cause failures. The probability "of containment spray actuation sign'al failu're on demand is now, i 0C5 * "C5 bgic + % st + "TM + "CC = 5.66 x 10-6 pf5=1.49x10O. 4 1 / 4 o ~ (.* l. 21 -0712A040281/1

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t O m. m. e. m

m. e m e. h.

w o e e o e s wwmoN wN-oN m m wCOeQ NNQmo w H 7"TTT 7777-4 a a v C0000 00000 c y c em-mm memem M 2 mawww wwwaw H W L g g MWOmN mmOmm e o e o e e e e e e NNNmN -whm-O e O O wmend NNW-e e o e e e e e o e e OOOOO COOOO r em-mm e =wwww wwwww ~. o. m N. _ O. m. o m N. g e. e e m-mNW M M m fa m M I H v v C C C I z e o e S o 3 E o O g u O 4 g C 3 C l 3 g C u a C w C o C o X4 o CU pCe o -mo~ p oC b --C C ww-US g Sw= W 3 C o Cug e-L E g g em r g C gg3= h Cw%3= l = g C g g a eC ag U CGMU% &UMU% G U EC M U EC m seCE C sg C3 C m muk om e memEe C mub ou useo q od eu , o oCwo% = amhum mee m oC6 w w=wum g G u h C g e o e e e o e a e e e 9 m -NMgm u =NMwm e e M 4 O = N O O e e 22 m

TABLE 2 INDIAN POINT 3 - SAFEGUARDS ACTUATION SYSTEM SIGNALS AND LOGIC Parameter Logic Arrangement $ctpoint* Ac tuates Remarks 1 SAF[TT INJECil0H ACTUATION a. Manual Safety injection One out of two pushbuttons N/A . p* valent to Auto St. One pushbutton only starts minimus required equipment. Both must be depressed to ensure all necessary equip-ment receives a start signal. b. Illgh 5 team Line Flo.# in a. Two out of four liigh a. Prograimned based 1 Auto $1 a. Two flow transisitters per Steam Flow (one out of on turbine first a. Feedwater Isolallon steae line. One of two Conjunction with Low Ta y.j or Low Steam Line Pressure. two signals for two out stage pressure. b. Reactor Trip high generates high fluw of four loops) in con-c. Safeguards Sequence signal. Two of four sl - 3 Junction with: 1. Aua. Feedwater nals required. b. Two out of four Low .b. 2 5400F 2. Safety injection b. Any two of four. 3. Fan Cooling Tayg or c. Two out of four Low

c. 2600 psig 4.

Service Water c. Any two of four. U Steam Line Pressure. d. Containment Isolation Phase A. e. Cont.' nent Ventila-h tion isolation f. Isolation Valve Seal Water System g. Control Room Yentila-tion Isolation 2. Steam Line Isolation Ste'am Line Differential One out of four cha.inels of $150 psid Auto 51 (see Ib. alEvel c. Pressure two out of three pressure comparison networks. d. Low Pressuriser Pressure Two out of three channels 21700 psig Auto SI (see Ib. above) Blocked by operation action of pressurizer pressure. during shutdown. e e. tilgh Containment Pressure Two out of three channels 53.5 psig Auto SI (see Ib. above) of containment pressure. 2. CONTA.INHENT SPRAY ACTUATION a. Manual Spray Two out of tw pushbuttons. N/A a. Spray Actuation b. Containment Isolation Phase U (CIG) c. Containment Ventilation Isolation Tect.nical specification limit actual setpoints may vary. 'O n p

.q, TAlli.E 2 (continued)- INDIAN POINT 3 - SAFEGUARDS ACTUATION SYSTEM SIGNALS AND LOGIC Para <ter Logic Arrangement Setpoint* Ac tuates' Remarks b. tilgh-High Contatronent Two sets of two out of 523 psig Pecssure three pressure signals (two. a. Spray Actuation 1. The only automatic safe-out of three twice). 6. CID Containment Ventilation guards actuation signal c. Isolation which requires power at the d. Steam Line Isolation trip blstable to trip (through high glesa flow (i.e., energized to tripl. relay) 3. H15CELLANEOUS SAFEGUARDS CIRCulf5 Manus) Steam Line Isolation One rushbutton per loop N/A a. (four loops).' Hone Closes MSIVs only b. Hanual Contalrunent isolation One out of two pushbuttons N/A a. CIA b. Isolation Valve Seal Water Containment Ventilation c. Isolation High Containment Activity one of two (alr particulate Variable Setpoint Containment Ventilation Setpoint depends upon back-c. or radiogas) Isolation ground radiation. d. Safety injection Manual Manual pushbuttons and N/A. Reset timer Resets Automalle Safety Locked out by timer for two Injection Logic minutes. One reset for each train.

e..Contaltunent Vent'llation N/A isolation Reset -

N/A N/A Resets signal f. Containment Isolation N/A Phase A Reset N/A N/A. Resets signal is. Spray Actuation Reset N/A N/A N/A h. Contalriaent isolation N/A 1.csets signal Phase 8 Reset N/A N/A Resets signal Technical specification limit, actual setpoint any vary. e ~ ~ e n

e.-.:> l'AllLE 3 .m INDIAN POINT 3 SAFEGUARDS ACTUATION RELAYS / ACTUATED EQUIPMENT ~ 'ayCh*aa'3 8' ~ 3d, Egalpeent Actuate 4 Re arts, Logic Channel 1 1. 51 Autoiestic a.~~C-Al a.- Containment Isolation phase A Actuation b. 25101 b. Safeguards Sequencing. Relay SIA-l c. SI-10X c, Equipment Actuation Relays d. SI-ilX d. Eqalpment Actuation Relays e. 51-12X e. Equipment Actuation Relays f. 51-131 f. Equipment Actuation Helsys y g. SI-14X g. Equipment Actuation Relays un h. SI-15X h. Equipment Actuation Relays I. VI 1. Vent Isolation pelay. 2. 51 Hanual a. VI a. Vent isolation Relay . Actuation Relay b. 25101 b. Safeguards Sequencing - SlH-1 c. SI-IDX c. Equipeent Actuation Relays. (see below); d. SI-llX 4. Equipment Actuation Relays (see below)- e. SI-12X e. Equipacht Actuation Relays (see belowl

f. -SI-13X f.

Equipm!nt Actuation Relays -(see belowl g. SI-14X- ' g. Equipment Actuation Relays 1 (see below) h. SI-15X . h. Equipment Actuation Relays - (see below) 071M 4 e-m_

TABLE 3 (continued) INDIAN POINT 3 SAFEGUARDS ACTUATION RELAYS / ACTUATED EQUIPMENT Logic Channel , Device and Relay Actuated ' Equipment Actuated Remarks 3. E quf pment a. FIX Feedwater Isolation Relay Actuation b. F2X. a. Relay SI-10X c. F3X b. Feedwater Isolation Relay Feedwater Isolation Relay d. F4X c. d. Feedwater Isolation Relay e. 42/CCDP31 e. Aus. CC Booster Pump 28 f. 42/CCDP33 = f. Ava. CC Booster Pump 33 g g. Yelve 8518 g. liigh licad SIS Pump 32 h. Yalve 746 Stop Valve h. Riist Loop Discharge Stop Valve 1. Valve 822A. 1. CCW Outlet from Alla Ils J. Valve 856A

j. tilgh llead Granch Line Stop Valve g

k. Valve 856C k. Bligh llead Branch Line Stop Valve 1. Yalve 894A 1. m. Valve 894C Acconulator Discharge Stop 4 Equipment a. Valve 1835A Accenulator Oficharge Stop m. a. DIT Discharge Valve ActuJtion Relay b. Valve 1825A St.11X b. all! Irelet' Valve c. Yalve 50V-Illi c. leuclear lleader SW to Convea-tional P3 nt d. Valve 50V-Ill2 d. Conventional lleader SW to e. 52/2AT5A Conventional Plant e. Sus 2A-54 Ile areaker 5. Equipment a.. Reactor Trip Actuation itelay b. Yalve 50V-Il?0 51-12E h. Containment Cooling Water (SW)- c. valve 50V-1276 Diesel Generator Cooling c. Water 15W) 07134 N r ~ M. ~

4. TABLE 3-(continued) INDIAN POINT 3 SAFEGUARDS ACTUATION RELAYS / ACTUATED EQUIPMENT-d Re y A 1d Equipment Actuated Remarks 5. continued d. 12/CCidF d. Containment cooling water low flow alarms e. Diesel Start (3) e.

31. 33 Primary Auto Start.

N 32 8ackup Auto Start f. Contalnment Rectrcplation Air f. All FCVs N Units Flow Control Valves 6. Equipment a. 52/AFI a. Aust11ary Feedwater Pump 31 h Actuation Relay b. 52/AF3 b. Ausillary Feedwater Pump 33 51-1311 c. DFDP Relay c. ArW Pump Automatic Start Relay d. Reactor irlp e. 8 FPS 3 Relay 'e. Block Automatic. Start AFW Pump 32 7. trgulpinent a. Diesel Generator 31 Lockout ckt Actustion Relay b. Diesel Generator J2 lockout ckt 51-141 c. Diesel Generator JJ Lockout ckt. d. Air Conditioning. Control Room 8. Equipment ~. 51-15AX a a. Aunillary Relay 151 Pumps) Actuation Relay b. AllR Pumps (Bypass Trip Switch) i SI-15X 9. Steam Line a. SIA-1 a. 58 Actuation Relay isolation Relay b. HS1 b. IISIV J1 SLI c. H52 c. HSiv 32 d. MS3 d. H5IV 33 .e. H54 e. IISIV 34 I 07134 s } t .h-

O l 4 e.a TABLE-3 (continued) INDIAN POINT 3 SAFEGUARDS ACTUATION RELAYS / ACTUATED EQUIPMENT buipment4tuate[ Mks Ac y Ac u t d

10. 1812!* Contain-e.

SLI a. Steae Line Isolation Relay ment Pressure b. 51 b, Contalmeent Sprar Relay A51 II. Containment a. C-81 a. Containment isolation Phase Spray Relay Phase 8 Reisy 51 b. Vi b. Vent Isolation Relay c. SI-IX c. C5 Ausillary Relay

12. Contalemeent a.

52/C51 a. Conta'ineent Spray Pump 31 5prar b. Yalve 876A b. Additive Tank Outlet Aunillary c. Valve 866A c. C5 Pump 31 Sischarge Relay 51-lX

13. Contalement a.

C-8-ilX a. Containment lsolation Phase e Isolation Ausillpry Relay Phase B Relay C-El

14. Contairveent a.

Yalve 222. 4. RCS Pump i Seal Return Phase 8 b. Yalve PCV 1229 b. $JAE to Contalrument Aunillary c. Valve 797 c. CC to ACS Pumps Relay C-8-IlX d. Valve 184 d. CC From ACP N tar Searings

e..Yalve FCV625 e.

CC Free RCP Thermal Sarrier

15. Containment' a.

Contalrument Purge Valves a. To/From (All valvesl Ventilation b. Contalsmeent Pressure Relief Valves b. To/from (All valvesl Isolation Relay VI 0783A A g b

i. TABl.E 3 (continued) INDIAN POINT 3 SAFEGUARDS ACTUATION RELAYS / ACTUATED EQUIPMENT ' Logic Chamel Device E 31pment Actuated' and Relay Actuated 9 itemarks

16. Containment ~

C-AIII a. Phase A Equlpment Actuation isolation a. Phase A Relay b. C-Al2X Relays b. Phase A Equipment Actuation C-Al c. C-A13X Relays c. Phase A Equipment Actuation d. C-Al41 Relays to - d. Phase A Equipment Actuation. Relays

17. Phne A a.

Valve 200A E quipment a. Letdo'wn Flow control. 75 GPM oriface Actuation b. Valve 2008 b. Letdown Flow Control. 45 GPM Relay C AllX ortface a c. Valve 200C Letdown Flog Control. 75 GPM c. ortface d. Valve 201 d. Letdown From Regenerative lis e. H2 Recombiner System Italation Valve f. Yalve 519 f. Makeup

16 Pressurlier Relief Tank g.

Valve 548 g. Gas Analyzer - Pressurizer Relief Tank h. Yalve 791 h. CC to Escess Letdown Ha 1. Valve 793 J. PCV-1229 1. CC from facess Letdown als J. 5JAE Contalrasent Isolation

18. Phase A a.

Valve 4505 5eal Water for 5/G alowdown Eq,alpeent a. Sample Actuation b. Valve 956A b. Sample - Pressurtzer Steam Relay C-A12X c. Valve 956C $ ample - Pressurizer Liquid c. 01134

~ s a TABLE 3 (continued) INDIAN POINT 3 SAFEGUARDS ACTUATION RELAYS / ACTUATED EQUIPMF,NT Logic Channel Device ~ and Relay Actuated Egalpment Actuated Remark s

18. continued d.

Yalve 956E d. Sample - ACS e. Il2 Recombiner Systee Isolation Valve f. Valve 1410 (opent f. IV5W Isolation Yalve (opensi g. Valve 956G g. Accumulator Sample w h. Valve 1702 h. RC Drain Tank to WD5 Iloidup o Tank 1. Valve 1723 8. Containment Sump Pumps to HD5 iloidup Tank g i

19. Phase A a.

Yalve 17PS a. Vent Header From RC Drain Tank Equipment b. Valve 1780 b. Gas Analyaer - RC Drain Tank - Ac tuation c. 5/G Blowdown and Sa gle Isolation c. (17 Valves) Relay C-A13E Valves e d. Containment RAD Honitor Sol Valve d. 50V 1534 (C).1538 (01 1536 (C). 1540 (01 .e. Inst. Air Valve e. PCV-1228

20. Phase A a.

Valve 956J a. Gross'Falled Fuel Det. System - Equipment b. Pers Lock Valve i Actuation c. Espelpment Hatch Lock Valve Relay C-Ales Logic Channel 2 e 1. 51 Automatic - a. C-A2 a. Containment isolation Phase A Actuation Relay Relay b. 25102 b. Safeguards Sequencing 4. SIA -c. 51-201 c. Equipment Actuation Relays . d. 51-21X. d. Equipment Actuation Relays

7 07134 B

[ e 3

0 i. TABLE 3 (continued) INDIAN POINT '3 SAFEGUARDS ACTUATION RELAYS / ACTUATED EQUIPMENT E9 Peent Actuated Remads 1 a Rela ~ Actu teg 1. continued e. SI-22X e. Equipment Actuation Relays f. SI-23X

f. - Equipment Actuation Relays g.

SI-24X g. Equipment Actuation Relays h. SI-25X h. Equipment Actuation Relays 8. V2 1. Vent Isolation Relay N 2. 51 Manual a. Y2 a. Vent isolation Relay Ac tuation b. 25102

b.. Safeguards Sequencing -

SIM 2 c. SI-20X

c.. Equipment Actuation Relays d.

SI-21X d. Equipment Actuation Relays k e. SI-22X e. Equipment Actuation Relays f. SI-23X

f.. Equipment Actuation Relays g.

SI-24X g. Equipment Actuation Relays b. SI-25X h. Equipment Actuation Relays 3. Equipment a. FilX a. Feedwater Isolation Relay Ac tua tion ~* F12X b. Feedwater Isalation Relay Relay 51-208~ 4. Fl4X d. Feedwater Isolation Relay F13X c. Feede,ater Isolation Relay e. 42/CCSP32 e. Ausillary CC Booster Pump 32

f.. 42/CCsP34 f.

Aua. CC Booster Pump 34 g. Valve 851A g. liigh Head SIS Peep 32 Stop Valve h. Valve 747 h. AllR Loop bischarge Stop Valve f. valve 8220 1. CCW Outlet from RilR lta J.: Valve 8558

j. liigli llead dranch Line Stop Valve '

k. Valve 8560 k. iligte Ilead Branch Line Stop Valve 1. Valve 8946 1 Accumulator Olscharge Stop

m.. Valve 8940 m.

Accumulator Discharge Stop f 0113A S

o

e.- .9 i -TABLE 3 (continued) INDIAN POINT 3 SAFEGUARDS ACTUATION RELAYS / ACTUATED EQUIPMENT 3 Logic Channel Device Espalpment Actuated Remark s and Relay Actuated e 4. Equipment a. Yalve 18350 a. BlT Discharge Valve Actuation b. Valve 18520 h. Gli inlet Valve Relay SI-21M c. Valve 50V-Illi c. Nuclear lleader SW to Conven-tional Plant d. Valve 50V-1112 d. Conventional lleader SW to Conventional Plant e. Sus 3A-6A Tie Breaker e. 52/3AI6A to N 5. Erysipment a. Reactor Trip Actuation b. Valve SCV-Il71 b. Containment Cooling Water (SW) Relay SI-22it c. Valve 50V-12764 c. Diesel Generator Coollag Water (SW) d. 12/CCWF d. Contalment cooling water low flow alarm e. Diesel Start (3) e.

31. 33 Backup Auto Start.

32 Primary Auto Start f. Containment Recirculation Air Units f. All FCVs Flow Control Valves Auxillah Feedwater Pump 31 6. Equipment a. 52/AF1 a. Actuation b. 52/Af3 b. Aualliary Feedwater Pump 33 Relay SI-23M c. SFPD Relay c. AFW Pump Auto Start Relay d. Reactor Irlp e. 8FP83 Relay e. Block Auto Start AFW Pump 32 a. Diesel Generator 31 Lockout ckt 7. Equipment - b. Diesel Generator 32 Lockout ckt Actuation Relay SI-24a c. Diesel Generator 33 Lockout ckt d. Air Conditluning. Control Room 07134 D 9 e.,

r. TABLE 3 (contin 6cd) INDIAN POINT 3 SAFEGUARDS ACTUATION RELAYS / ACTUATED EQUIPMENT _ d y Ac ted EtPalpment Actuated' Remarks 8. Equipment a. 51-254 lulR Pumps (8ypass Trip Switch) a. Auxillery Aelay (51 Pumpsl Actuation b. Relay SI-25X 9. Steam Line a. 514-2 a. 51 Actuation Relay Isolation b.' H5il b. HIIV 31 Relay 5L2 c. Mill c. H5IV 32 U d. HST) - d. H51V 3) e. H514 e. MSIV 34

10. liigh Contain-a.

5L2 a. Steam Line Isolation Relay ment Pressure b. 52 b. Contalissent Spray Relay Relay A52

11. Containw nt

'a. C-82 a. Containment' Isolation Phase B-Spray Relay Relay 52 b. Y2 b. Vent Isolation Relay c. 52-lX c. C5 Ausillary Relay

12. Containment

a.

52/CS2 Contafssment Spray Pump 32 Spray b. Valve 8768 a. b. Additive Tank Outlet Ausillary c. Valve 8668 c. C5 Pump 32 Discharge Relay 52-1X

13. Containment a.

C-B-21X Contairseen't Isolation Phase 8 a. Isolation Phase B Aunillary Relay Relay C-82 s 0713A I y _-A

o TADl.E 3 (continued) e INDIAN POINT 3 SAFEGUARDS ACTUATION RELAYS / ACTUATED EQUIPMENT EqulPeent Actuated Remarks 4 R y Act td

14. Containment a.

Valve 222 a. RCS Pump 1 Seal Return isolation b. Valve PCV 1230 h. SJAE to Containment Phase B c. Valve 769 - c. CC to RCS Pumps Ausillary d. Valve 706 d. CC From RCP Hotor Bearings Relay C-8-21X e. Valve 709 e. CC from PCP Thermal Barrier

15. Containment a.

Containment Purge Valves a. To/Froe (All valves) Ventilation b. Containment Pressure Relief Valves b. To/ free (All valves) 7 solation Relay V2 g

16. Containment a.

C-A21X a. Phase A Equipment Actuation Isolation Relays Phase A b. C-A22X b. Phase A Equipment Actuation Relays Relay r.-A2 c. C-A23X c. Phase A Equipment Actuation Relays ' Equipment Actuation d. C-A24X d. Phase.A Relays

17. Phase A 4.

Yalve 202 a. Letdown From Regenerative lia E rpalpwnt b. H2 Recombiner System isolation Actuallon Yalve Relay C-A21X c. Valve 552 c. Hakeup to Pressurlier Relief 6 Tank d. Valve 549 d. Cas Analyzer - Pressurizer Relief lank e. Valve 796 e. CC From Excess Letdown lis f. Valve 798 f. CC to Excess Letdown Ha. 0713A 8 M

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= =

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m m em .mmmmm t e e f e e e f e e f e t C 3 W 9 9 9 e Q u C000000000 O C O O O O OO G C mmmmmmmmmm m m m m m m

== b 9 H 3 = WM M M M M M M M W. M M M N N W M W E C I m m m m m em m m m e ' a m a S O mN W e wwwwwwwwwN. N. N. N. N. N. . m. ww w NNNNNNNNNe e N Nm w u 000000000= = = = = = 0 00 Q Q" u e .t. = e c

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6 g C000000000 O O O 3 O O CO - e a p W mmmmmmm-mm = - m = mm m.m = o e

= = ww=w==

w w = a

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e..

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N. m. uo weeeeeeeem = m m m m a eM y g g C =O W w "M m m m m m e <H m a m. m m. m. m. m m m J a m wwwwwmNmNm e N 4 e e e e e e e m e 3 -uC MwwmmJwmem a m w-e e m e e H H 3 o-NmN-Nmm<<w w e-m. m a w e m. u a u = bm wwwwwwwww-m w m e wwd EEEEEEEEEE h.h I E 2 h w ~~-=~~~~-- m 3 C ~ x o w o m.e.o u. . < m. u = g 0000000&wm e h m 3 m W 4 D m--====mee e m. w w e k u c uvuuuuuoOw w w-e m e .a a w DOOOOOOuun n M M A d C U waamada b b b b w e OOO O O O O O b emewmmeda3 3 3 3 3 3 4 w --~~~~m a e a a o a T

=======ddU w e W W w 3 S O -94 99e9 mpm2 R E E 3 3 o 4 E wwwwwww== J e g g b b b b b b G .... e. .w w G G G G N G b =C G .emmmamawamam b ww nwwmN aea eaeammed ew 3 MewmmJJ. NmNmNme=N=C=C*C= C=C= C= d wmSME DEmEmEmEmb b = . h h< < e = e - e - e - e = # = 3 e hh CeCmCA CmEecme 4 eehhhee w e-- .e e e e 9 m g 7 ~~~~m W Uhhb Eb Eb Rbabab hu C WWeseggeg>=m*==>~m=== b C b b b b b bb 4 mzugg C CG G Ga Gu GaNa NaUa C CCCCCO DEMb b b 6 t G O C0 000== 3 9 3 e34 39 39 29 0 W a awaaaee% 4 + U*v+v+G+v+vs h = --~~=aahhd e e e e b = e O =n eeeg e-=b b t7 94 WUw7wvuT = a, 3 3 3 3 303 nab = be be k= b= h== b wwwwwd emmh >b >h>h>b >b>mOG& O O O OCmb=

3. b u

uvuvumm -O kababab mm D 6 ((((< aabb b w GGC C G 6U LG%C 6 ' L C %= w v 4 U C aaaaacC yyu o n y + =a w C C C C C==c--O=O=OgO O O .m* e a vvvvUJJC==&behaLw=.m =o =e AM O= b m C C e ys e 3 2 2 = son. G LLakLt?oe++++++e*4+e*bI O U m

===== S es-e-,-#- ---a=w u w 3 3 2 GG C C G=9=Um C*C= C= a C C gF77Fd e OOb eh eb eO9 0e3eOU O g wwwwwmmWwAw&w&wWbWhWh EE b -g O e M w O e ( ekCmOmNHwm e a O m m M NNNNMMMMMM 9 M M M e e e m N I O 37 D 6

e TABLE 4 (continued) SAFEGUARDS ACTUATION SYSTEM' BASIC EVENT DATA Fault Failura Data Event Description and Fallure tkale Tree consents Codin9 Miam-H/D Variance MTIR Heference*

42. No trip signal from Pressurlier Low Pressure H'C45605 6.67 x 10-6 0

2.50 x 10 mde up of logic Network, 4560 relay and bistable logic relay 6.20 x 10 D 2.49 x 10-11 46 - blstable 3.00 x 10-7 D 1.41 x 10-13 39

43. No trip signal from Pressurizer Low Pressure M'C45105 6.67 x 10-6 D

2.50 x 10-11 Made up of lo9 k Hetwork, 4510 relay and b stante M - logic relay 6.20 x 10-6 0 2.49 x 10-11 46 blstable 3.00 x 10-7 0 1,41 x 10-13

44. No trip signal from Contalmeent tilgh Pressure M'C94005 6.67 x 10-6 0

2.50 x 10-11 39 mde up of logic Network, 9400 rdlay and histable - logic relay 6.28 x 10-6 0 2.49 x 10-11 46 - histable '3.00 x 10-7 0 1.41 x 10-13 39

45. No trip signal from Contalmeent liigh Pressure H'C940E5 6.67 x 10-6 0

2.50 x 10-11 Made up of lugsc Network, 940E relay and blstable logic relay histable 6.28 x 10-6 0 2.g9 x 10-11 46 3.00 x 10-? 0 1.41 x 10-13 39

46. No trip signal from Containment liigh Pressure H'C94tf 5 6.61 x 10-6 0

2.50 x 10-11 m de up of logic Network. 940F relay and bistable - logic relay 6.20 x 10-6 0 2.49 x 10-31 46 - histable 3.80 x 10-1 0 1.41 x 10-13 39

47. No operator inillation of Containment Spray HMANC555 1.0 0

Quantified in test

40. Contalmnent Spray Relay, 51-0, f alls to close Hit si--S l.15 x 10-5 0

3.30 m 10 31

49. Containment Spray Relay, 52-0, f alls to close M(E 52--S l.15 x 10-5 0

3.;U x 10-9 37

50. Contalmnent Spray Ausillary Relay, 511X, falls HIE 511x5 6.28 x 10-6 0

2.49 x 10-4 46 to close

51. Containment Spray Auxillary Relay, 521X, f alls HtES21XS 6.20 x 10-6 0

2.49 x 10-4 46 to close

Reference refers to item numbers in the plant f ailure data section of this report.

0113A033001/1 6.s b.

e e 9 G = -U -U .G. =WA US =UD =UJ 1 -9 9 4 To Om QM Om C+ Om Oe Oe e-.=

= =

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3==

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3 -

g==* k 9 k

=====.o e o e - e e. e . tyg I .m. .m TTT T T Tm vm. gm gn E e4 e e4 ee - em bb b b b 3 3 3 3 3 T 000 O O naa .a a -x oo., m.

nm t 4 oo~. ~ ~ - --- -m- -m- -m o co..b v coo o o o ooo ooo ao n a C b 3 = W 4 M M E N M W M M M M 4 M N M M a = b ..... o o o . ~. m..= ~..o ~. e.,. ~ s

m. m. ~ ~. ~

m. z em ~ ~~~ ~~~ ~~~. ~- w>w as

=== = = o com com ooo ao = u ~ b m o e m ~~.....~..~. . ~.oob o.~. c b 2 m coo o o o ooo coo o c e Z 9 wxm K. w a www M ua wwa ww A d W E me. e ee~ 'e e ~ en S e s e. .~ ~ 8. ~. ~. o.. o x ~. ~... ~ o.. v 3 m. on m ~., =. O w M _O e z vum e a m e e m O mm< m 8 3 u. w w - e -~m =w w w w w a H -vC m e e. Qu .e 3.- m ebw uw-w u u u u o "~a EEk k i k i k k 4 n nu m z. b 4 = -~ m em.. 6 b b b = = o < = u. .= .= ..e hhw e e e w e p = =e e m a w w w e b b b b C GUM M M L L L 4 O amb b b w 1 i S : w .. - - T T T T eco e w = = = = a G GM M E M C C o we 24 e G L b L d C b hhWa W-9=C C C C 3 oom ouqu e b bm CM Cd C 3 4 = 3-p= m b g McE=E=E== W w deeded e =9 = =4 4 da C C C d o o - D C C 9 64 &9hC C C C C Wb=b=b= 0 O O C g

h b>b-6 u

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== = e e W 5 O eg b gb ek e O O e = ww 3 2 3 b b b b = M CC+9*Ge9% m h -a OOWTevet g -WD9u&$9<-WW g b & Db DbD 9< WW95 -g m g O gub-b- bo-o 'u O O OCmba

Ch

D ba cmb=

m eew bebM b me A PW D @e A ce a b OOC &C aC&=PU4=mu9-Pug =pue W Q bb W W =wW =d e -m e w . =p d uu O O GO

P*
m*
mm W

d @ @= d= M=C u GM Q*SM O=hA D* GA C= k C w =b-D=%=D=b=D=b~D t wweeg eg eb c b he b e s y b bw=w-w-w3 w w k w w u. COC=C=C= m 8 9 d 9 8 w e e w e e C S

== 0g 09 09 00 00 00 Cw e meuwu%u%EC ZE CZ EE bW m m o o Nme m ~ W m o a' n mee m m m e m e No 39

4 ~ TABLE 4 (continued) SAFEGUARDS ACTUATION SYSTEM BASIC EVENT DATA Fault Failure Data Event Description and failure hde Tree Consents ' -Coding hean il/0 Varlance NiiR Reference

4

61. No trip signal from Containment lil-lli Pressure WC94905 6.67.x 10-6 0

2.50 x 10-11 Made up of logic a Network, 9498 relay and blstable O - logic relay 6.23 x 10-6 ,D 2.49 a 10-11 46 - blstable 3.0d a 10-7 0 1.47 a 10-13

62. No trip signal from Containment lil-Hi Pressure WC949CS 6.61 x 10-6 0

2.50 x 10-11 39 g m de up of logic Network 949C relay and blstable logic relay 6.28 x'10-6 .0 2.49 x 10-11 46 blstable 3.08 x 10-7 D? 1.47 x 10-13 39

Reference ref ers to item nunbers in the plant f ailure data section of this report.

4 l 0113A033 dill /l

e

o e

o. -o o m o NN -M W e e e - o o ao o o o e e e e e e oo o y MM M M M S MM M M M bg

- m M

o em m-M m MW e. N.

v. o.

m. ' '.

g 0 e. 9 NN N -w - m W o ' o W-W NN w - e e # e e e e e e e co o o o~ oo o'o o -e ,e M M M M M J MM M M M E mW m e em W g w . m. o. K. N.

m. m.

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u. m. m

. m -w.- U C. mmOm G e Ge Du 9' u 4 O C b 6 -u 6 b- -C30 3 O e m 3 0 3 O w me-w _- M s CN-w C geg-g m-g-e M g g wMwe w .w g. wg.w g. w Co Co um Co C e u Owsmbs ob ODEmbs mb a % c-3u -3 o-zw -3 wwwe-w m-ewww-w m-d e e -m eem -n w OOwOg w og DowOg w g. w aCmx-m zu a-m=wm D s- M W -o o m NN o e d I -m m -- - - c e e e e e e e e e e e O. co o o o co o o q w y g l M MM M M 0 M M W M M

O C

g N -em m M e @m m M H o.

m. e.

m. m. w o. e. e NN N -9 - m H 4U e o o w -en W e NN e - M e e e e e e e e e 4 w o oc o o o oc o o g g M MW M M 4 W MM M M 'O T SW W W W mm W W H . m. o. a. e.

e. m.

o. m. w g M -- m N NM W N m O L E 2 o o e 9 8 9 ' g C G g C 2 W W b b g ( Mb g q o W-G E 3 -3 3 5 ( -3 A c" e e-9 .u e C-um-o O C- .u W - a C U Cg Ceg 4 Cg Ceg O 4 sb ebu C gw g by C Z C 3m O 59 A C3e O 2.U uC W-m C-ue c==d M om O e-Ebe E m O w=%b & Ce O b A O C= ce eb -O O. 3w =4We3 Md EM =40* 3 b WW y u > g g eC-W g g

C-W-

e w EW 3D-k- e w Ef3D-e ,o e C S ee g ze a C c an g o 2 C =90 99u 4 W C, U U 47u 6 - C 9 C C h C C C m 5 l 5m e g g cO s g m3 g g con -(y sw Cw-C >R Ob g O G R O b K k e Wu sw w e Cw-E W W

T
w C6O e35O*-

w e l m we ze eC = wu u w= - C <e m= - guwe-ou u- >guse-l m u Y NM W = NO W m m s I 4 o %o A* e 41 r -4

? t t*'..

4 CONTAINMENI' ISOLATION PilASE A CalANNE L I VdNTitATION

' ISOLATION CalANNELI CilANNI:1 I CalANNEL1 POWEn SUPPLY MASTER St AND LOGIC flE LAY SAFEGUAllDS i SEQ UE NCING. CilANNEL2 MANUALSI MASTEn HERAY CalANNELi ACTUATED EOUIPMENT CHANNEL.1 SAIEGUARDS MANUALSI ~ INSTilUMENI ATION 18 OF 21 ~

=

t to ACTUATED EQUIPMENT CilANNE L 2 MANUALSI MASTER nELAY CitANNE L 2 4 SAFEGUAHDS SEQUENCING CilANNE L 2 CilANNI 1. 2 CHANNEL. 2 POWin SUPPLY MASI En Si 1 AND 1.OGIC litLAY VENTI LATION l ISOI.ATION CilANNEL2 i CONrAINuEr:T ISOLATION PalASE A CalANNE L 2 1 i Figure 1. Indian P.sint 3 Safeguards Ac'tuation Safety Injection Subsystent e e ..p g

e i i i SIE AM LlHE ISOI AllON AND CONT ISOLATION SAf EGUAl10S PalASE D AClllATIOft CilAf4NE L ) CllANNEL t l Hiull lilG H PflE SSullE ~ HE RAY I OGIC CalANNEL l CONI AINMEf4 T CONTAINMENT l SP11 AY MASTER SPf1AY ACTUATION HELAY CilANNEl.1 CalANNELI 9 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION 3 CHANNELI LaJ HIGli IllGH MANUAL CONTAINMENT CONI AINMENT ^ ~ k NST U ENTAllON CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION CilANNEL 2 COfe t Alf4MEllT Col 4TAINMEf4T SI'll AY MAS T EM SPRAY ACTUATION liluit linGH HELAY CilANNEL 2 CHANNEL 2 Pf1ESSUFIF fit IAY 1.OGIC CilANNLI.4 S Il-AM l.lN E ISOlAIlON AND CONT ISOLATION SAT EGUADDS PalASE D ACI UA TIOff CalANN E l.2 CilANN El. 2 Fig ~ure 2. Indian Point 3 Safeguards Actuation Containment Spray Subsystem i. a

o 5h3,O N ey2 " ego W 2 ~ iO ** .O O I 4 i 4 4 4 q 4 4 L A N a N ' N N G s O a H DR. O L O MO E kD A 4 t p S l EN N N. G I T l L P4 F Os Y O I i Oi i N E Ln t NA W N S Nv O A ut AA I G h e yE N N C f Nr N E J A o tT O YI L r M t B O I E nE T T O A O C R S. E a i l t nt i s G L l AC R Al P A l U T IVE IO WE I A A e i N A M T s N O iu Mr W A n

v. L J

Y ll D ,T C N I NO C C I D sD A f I i 'N.. E t NL O W L T N I Ns Os A A i U GE A T D t o I gf4 E O. D E A A E L t EU N C L Ts A 0 ,V gA J SW F E C L A T s i AY TS O 0 C E t AN NN AI TA NA NA NA r. r E T F FQi A E AE H E F1 N 9 OA Nt OH Oe NN NN T. S

3. E E

I S A n 0 5 I 0 p5 SI SSS f Lf. CF ope CP CP Oi Oc a t J Cv Cv C$ le p m" p m-R n-a m d r g .4ig l =h z94a _ a i .t - [-,8 D l k l*"k c 1l l-I l ,9* o $ a l B { 1l lI l l L.*= l ) N E4r= a E n MI W t.== o T 2 i ( l iil l < "7r= t 'c t.wa n I I ls l' lI li 1 l l a<?*s ad u q1 F 4 + m e t g . h zg..e< s . Ez y S

r. A sE.<

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f 2

A o;r s n M VL T A n a O rt" EN I i T F G U AI < U 1oi d ASS n n i ?J I L 4, a rte d < UroI 3 .n e es r , d ,< ~ 5 r ni u g i &3N=g F r~g3NwE d gs .e'2=E {2zI 8 xoI

~ n T \\ y \\ A X a CI l \\ e R SP t M S e D U s R P e AD R UN / GA r ES e FE t AV s SL a OA M TV t neme GI g C na O r T L r E Y A S A ) E o L c n t E i A n g C Y o A) ll L OO C (n OM n E o M i t Y l a f u A I T. t IL S c E A X T U N s i A A I d n S r N a EP u O ge T f C G A a N I T S N T X \\ \\ \\ A) O 3 A l \\ TGT \\_ C (0 I C Cl UI i t \\_ YA n CO A i )0 S i ALM n 1 E o L E I T S O R P N TS n E a T i Y L dn r i I l r Cu T DS 1 1 4 e ru g i F

P e M OA ]l l!. j TL nI 55/[ UL ~ PI 3 g O o 3 Y[ 8 G/ IN / T Pt.M 5 A SiW 1 U H OT$ /r T G CI 8 AL t su \\ s nc ~ n C s 1 ~ \\^ S C WA R S1 T 3 l Sl T E CTY A SR T A O^ / 2 T N N M M A E CL OFE h V I E 4PYu G N COM T ON A h L yE C RPN LA gS t PI O O e / gEs S$CCs Ol a TC s 7DF R t T NO i f1 LI u 9 A T UA S c I / r gI) NT 8 i AI MIN C T t S O o H RW % P. e E s T T sI tOT$ T no g 0 i ta W c e u 8 WAl t g I i I i I I c L a E f n A t N E s R A T P S d E T T A r T L S M 2 S S a AL E T Ml n u i l l 8 u g c e g O A l s f i t l C a TY Sll S E EO R S 3 R V c e I g t E H )L l l i l wg n TEE Sg i SP AU 3 o o N SA MIP P g O C n A a 2 3 V i M d 0 E n l T A (Al I S I ) M O V I M S l e g I r 3 Y - T u RnnN g E H OA i \\ \\ MrM \\ E F T1 ENn g \\ hlj S0 MoAi A8 G C. r N S 2 M E 9 TC f aK Hin 8 I T 4 TsO AA i F n C.N f Oim. UT T s TN A CO M YWt80 N Os7 r AC Ar aA a 3 H W s $i nL E l ArO H C s C C.NIS t S a Yia TCi 4f E Y A A LmY OGl T O OOA O L EsAI TLM N E RANT n nsP A r*. e tYsL f I v 4rT 5' tnN A A E tE ts MnuV O i 1 s 2 3cn

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l 1 k s M M A A E E H S H TS A TS N S P W L U O A 2 A U L 2 C K D I N E M O A K A N L E A M N R E lA D R Oi M B L NC A M A e E A 5N e T E 0G r S T 1 I T fS S A U NM2 t I G O OL l I E TnE u l. 2 3 F AFN a t 8 I A U)N F S 5 S S S A T OC Al Sa m NAI C e ts ^ y 2 2 L S 2 u I E A n 41N o SA i Aal t gC au S t) D c9 R A1 A UNl sf O G OIM d o f)( r E A l. a1 A A U u S N gt T OCG I ee NAS f e ah SS( 3 l L l t 1 gL A N n a "gN i r ^ ggA o P I gI gC L n A a SN i DG d l I n l S A I U NM1 O I G I Ol I E TnE FArN 6 A U )SN S T A OCAl e S r i NA( C u S g A i S .s F L l A l UL M E NA NN M A Oa l NC (

i M M 4 l A A A E ) L 7 M l E I F H A A l 1 E i O E E S S D N O R N N LI 1 T Ti W W Al4 T N S S A P P O O MC W E S U U D D R T I M a K K K K OWE A A A A NSD E E E E n i n R 1 o D U B M M M M A A A A A A C C E E E E Y 0 O T T T T 6 L S S S S A L E H A S A 0 A 0 p O O O 0 O 0 t 7 E7 SL R AS L L S 5 S 5 I l E MI i S EN TN S AR I 2 1 ' 2 1 2 S 7 AHA MCF 7 S R F N O D 7 TE S 1 TS R US D ) T0 E P E li H M 9 SSP 1 EUE D CI HPD i T o cE f T T A A A 7 7 2 M MR L EL 0 O E NE t T 1) N EN U e U(s N GN A (S A A e + S Al h OA H O Ai - ( S NSC NSC N O I D T u7 7 6 7 Cu3 2 ^ U e I L MH E S r T OsN 8 u 4 iA g I DP i F S R L EAI WF u7 O F 3K E I P S M0 CU DF S R L E IA WF U 7. K I F 2 O E M0 P S CU DF A0 f i il i ff Ii~ l! 1*l Ii i: i!! . +

i. l l l. I t I i a I i 7 4 NO MANUAL I SAS CHANNEL 7 2 J M7 4 to ,em i NO DC POWER DCPOWEn Fn0M DC UCPOWER MANUAL MASTER NO OPERATOR ACTION TO FUSL t AtLS DistittuuT80N FUSE F AILS I SIUUTTON FW INailATE MANUAL RS 7 0 L PHE SSE D l PANEL 3Y SIin O F 2) T* MF U T MFu MnE 1 07-7 l 483--370 l 03 7 } K g l SIM7 l MNOOPAcT urdnSy.F i i 4 i Figure 6. (Sheet 3 of 19) 4 4 s i h 5 l

.t. IOCA al 7 NO AlliOMATIC SAS GENEH AT ED LOA } CilANtJEl,7 LOS 2 sa l' h NO AUTOMATIC STEAM I If4E ISOI.A T80N NO CONF AINMENI NO PHECSunt2E H 8'

^

I liiGli l'allSSullE 1 OW PRESStJRE Nt L SIGNAL Si CalANNE4 7 SIGNAL Si CilANNEL 7 St.7 II7 I p.y Figure 6. (Sh' et 4 Of 19) e o O 9 9 e g

e e i l 2 i STEAM UllE AK Ul".,IllE AM o 02 7 NO AUTOMAlIC SAS GENLilAI LD $8A 1 CilANNEL7 SBB 2 a2 1-NOlenESSuf11ZER S NO AUTOMATICSTEAM NO CONTAINMENT g pp, 7 LINE ISOLATION tilGil PflESSURE PilEssullE LOW PRESSuqE SIGN AL St m SIGN A L DEVE LOPED SIGNAL St SIGNAL $1 g CitANNEL7 CilANNEL7 CilANNEL 7 CilANNEL 7 ' MNOSLDP 7 1 1 i l figure 6. (Sheet 5of19) J i 4

s h 1 2 R E E 2 l ll l A 0 iu J S 7 O 0 l S S S S8L y l $, E SE p EfHPAl N s N PWN A ) OOIGla 9 NI SC 1 fo M A 6 E l ti t D e S CI E e x N T1 h A W A l Y S O Mi ( LL a O NE l T N K U[ A GN A t A 6 E S l e i O Aa B NSC r M u A E ( g i T F S 3 M a A E D T' E S P NO OlOL IlE A f A V '7 I MAE t L L S OO D. E T Sl N UI A N AEN A ONGt I I i NLSC a mN e r iIll l; l( l1 i

e l a NO EQUleMENT ACT UATION SIGNAL St. l SI 2 S13 NO EOulPMENT NO EOutrMENT ACTUATION SAS ACTUATION SAS CHANNELl CilANNE L 2 e% e% C00lrMENT ACTUATSON NG SAI CGU nDS NO SAFEGUAHOS EQUIPMENT ACTUATION HEIAY (ONE OF SIX) ACTUATION SIGNAL ACTUATION SIGNAL RE LAY (ONE OF SIXl CilANNEL I Fall.S ISA R ISA OOM CllANNE L 2 F AILS Mile Mn l 'y I a.1 a.2 { g l E4 7 6nFl.AYS E0 G i1E LAYS ClO 10X-SI-10 X NOTE: Sl F E20 20X-St-20x NOTE: SEE ^' Ett stX. St.11 X E24 21 X-SI-2 t X A On ACIUAir0 ACTUAT ED Et? 17X-SI-17X E QUIPME NT E22 22X-St.22X EQUIPMENT E13 l 't X-St.13X E23 23X-SI-23X E14 144-SI-8 4 X ElG ISX-SI lbX E24 24X-SI-24 X E25 2SX-S t-25 X r Figure 6. (Sheet 7 Of 19) . n

11

a e*.

4 4 i .u NO SArt' GUARDS SE QUE NCE SIGNAL 4' $31 GE NEllATE D j 58 2 SI 3 T f NO SAFEGUAtlDS NO SAFEGUARDS SEQUENCC SIGNAL. SEQUENCE SIGNAL j CllANN fI. I CllANNE L 2 i un i A 1 7% .rS i a l SAFEGUARDS NO SAf EGUAHDS NO SAFEGUARDS SAFEGUARDS $[OUfNCF HEIAY ACT UATION SIGNAL. ACTUATION SIGNAL 1 Ca lANN E L 1 l'All S LSASI T HOM (SAS) FROM SEQUEMCE DELAY CilANNE L 2 F AILS CilANN E I. I CHANNEL 2 MnE MHE i I $10 8 l a.1 a.2 S 510 2 I l S t Figure 6. '(Sheet 8 of 19) l t e 9 i .O.

e e

4 dJ W

M2 g w n. c C

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I 7 L L 2 A k Nll S O i G N I M 2 S O l OR R NF M i L L l A S l O N R G N I M l l S O a OH M JP F ) 9 1 1 f O A a. L TE N A NS E l 0 N 1 OI G Mli N EAN TI t A SD Nr A a e l N E a. I d I C e Ar I T OC iOI l T l h l AE Nl L Nl R N S EAEN OAA b CI 4 ( V8 NAl NrIS t O 0 E i O O. G 5 N1 GC I 6 ( e a r v ug i F l. AN) GI I E STY Sa u A S s A M H Y PMA S Ol ORE NFR ^ e ~ ^ '" a e g ^ "" ^" m i2 k il! ,4$1

a NO CONTAINMENT t.OCA ISOt.ATICN PHASE A STEAM BREAK UPSTR EAM ' ^ ^ STEAM BREAK DOWNSTREAM D I NO CONTAINMENT NO CONTAINMENT isot.ATION PHASE A ISOLATION PHASE A SIGNA L CHANNEL 1 SIGNAL CHANN FL 2 O / \\ n c' r% r% ~.n... C A2 MASTER C.A1 MASTER CA.1 R R E LAY CA.2R RE1.AY REMY CMNNEL 2 REL4Y CHANNEL 1 ENERGl2ED ENERGlZED F AILS FAILS O MRE MRE C.A1 l MR E CAI R E MRECA2RE C A2 I NO INPtJT SIGNAL NO INPUT SIGNAL PHASE A FROM PHASE A FROM CHANNEL 1 CHANNEL 2 l NO MANUAL NO MANUAL NO AUTOMATIC NO AUTOMATIC PHASE A PHASE A SASlal MS (al I WI CHANNEL 2 CHANNEL 1 SIGN A L SIG NA L Al MMANCIAS MMANCIAS A2 1 (.- Figure 6. (Sheet 11 of 19) 57

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ML20071A447

Contents

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SUMMARY

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ML20071A447

Text

SUMMARY

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