ML20070G887
| ML20070G887 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05200003 |
| Issue date: | 06/27/1994 |
| From: | Schulz T, Vijuk R WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY, DIV OF CBS CORP. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20070G881 | List: |
| References | |
| WCAP-13793, WCAP-13793-R, WCAP-13793-R00, NUDOCS 9407200338 | |
| Download: ML20070G887 (86) | |
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l WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 l l WCAP-13793, REV.' 0 l i l i AP600 SYSTEM / EVENT MATRIX i I i i l l Westinghouse Electric Corporation Energy Systems P.O. Box 355 Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania - 15230 01994 Westinghouse Electric Corporation All Rights Resenred
AP600 DOCUMENT COVER SHEET Form 58202F(9/93) (WP xxxx] AP600 CENTRAL FILE USE ONLY: RFS #: RFS ITEM #: 0058.FRM AP600 DOCUMENT No. REVISION NO. PAGES ATTACHED ASSIGNED To GW-G SY-001 1 79 ALTERNATE DOCUMENT NUMBER: WCAP-13793 ATTACHMENTS DESIGN AGENT ORGANIZATION: Westinghouse PROJECT: AP600 , WORK BREAKDOWN #: 3.3.1.4.4 TITLE: AP600 SYSTEM / EVENT MATRIX CALCULATION / ANALYSIS
REFERENCE:
DCP #/REV, INCORPORATED: ELECTRONIC FILENAME: APPLICATION: 94-116/0 l GW-GEE-130/0 ; i ! WESTINGHOUSE PROPRIETARY CLASS 2 This document contains information proprietary to Westinghouse Electric Corporation; it is submitted in confidence and is to be used solely for the purpose for which it is furnished and returned upon request. This document and such information is not to be reproduced, transmitted, disclosed or used otherwise in whole or in part without prior written authorization of Westinghouse Electric Corporation, Enetgy Systems Business Unit, subject to the legends contained hereof. m WESTINGHOUSE CLASS 3 (NON PROPRIETARY) l g DOE DESIGN CERTIFICATION PROGRAM GOVERNMENT LIMITED RIGHTS STATEMENT [See reverse side of this form) l (C) WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION 1994 l A license is reserved to the U.S. Government under contract DE ACO3-90SF18495. 1 l O DOE CONTRACT DELIVERABLES (DELIVERED DATA) Subject to specified exceptions, disclosure of this data is restricted until September 30,1995 or Design Certification under DOE contract DE-ACO3 90SF18495, whichever is later. EPRI CONFIDENTIAL / OBLIGATION NOTICES: NOTICE: 1 2 3 4 5 CATEGORY: A BD C D E F ARC FOAKE PROGRAM ARC LIMITED RIGHTS STATEMENT ISee reverse side of this form) 0 (C) WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION 19 A license is reserved to the U.S Government under contract DE.FCO2-NE34267 and subcontract ARC 93-3 SC-001. ARC CONTRACT DELIVERABLES (DELIVERED DATA) Subject to specified exceptions, disclosure of this data is restricted under ARC Subcontract ARC-93-3 SC-001. ORIGINATOR SIGNATU /D TE T. L. Schulz AP600 RESPONSIBLE MANAGER SIGNATUR tl APPROVAL DATE R. P. Vi luk , , g f L.) /
Form 58202F(9193) LIMITED RIGHTS STA TEMENTS 1 DOE GOVERNMENT UMITED RIGHTS STATEMENT (A) These data are submitted with limited nghts under government contract No. DE- ACO3-90SF18495. These data may be reproduced and used by the government with the express limitation that they will not, without wntten permission of the contractor, be used for purposes of manuf acturer nor disclosed outside the government; except that the government may disclose these data outside the government for the following purposes, if any, provided that the government makes such disclosure subject to prohibition against further use and disclosure: (1) This "Propnetary Data" may be disclosed for evaluation purposes under the restrictions above. (H) The " Proprietary Data" may be disclosed to the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), electne utility representatives and their direct consultants, excluding direct commercial competitors, and the DOE National Laboratories under the prohibitions and restrictions above. (B) This notice shall be marked on any reproduction of these data, in whole or in part. ARC LIMITED RIGHTS STATEMENT: This propnetary data, furnished under Subcontract Number ARC 93-3 SC-OO1 with ARC may be duplicated and used by the government and ARC, subject to the limitations of Article H-17.F. of that subcontract, with the express limitations that the proprietary data may not be disclosed outside the government or ARC, or ARC's Class 1 & 3 members or EPRI or be used for purposes of manuf acture without prior permission of the Subcontractor, except that further disclosure or use may be made solely for the foHowing purposes: This proprietary data may be disclosed to other than commercial competitors of Subcontractor for evaluation purposes of this subcontract under the restnction that the propnetary data be retained in confidence and not be further disclosed, and subject to the terms of a nord disclosure agreement between the Subcontractor and that organization, excluding DOE and its contractors. DEFINITIONS l DELIVERED DATA - Consists Of doCurnents (e.g. specifications, drawings, reports) which are generated under the DOE or ARC Contracts. EPRI CONFIDENTIALITY / OBLIGATION NOTICES I NOTICE 1: The data in this document is subject to no confidentiality obligations. NOTICE 2: The data in this document is proprietary and confidential to Westinghouse Electric Corporation and/or its Contractors. It is forwarded to recipient under an obligation of Confidence and Trust for limited purposes only. Any use, disclosure to unauthonzed persons, or copying of this document or parts thereof is prohibited except as agreed to in advance by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) and Westinghouse Electric Corporation. Recipient of this data has a duty to inquire of EPRI and/or Westinghouse as to the uses of the information contained herein that are permitted. NOTICE 3: The data in this document is propnetary and confidential to Westinghouse Electric Corporation and/or its Contractors, it is forwarded to recipieat under an obligation of Confidence and Trust for use only in evaluation tasks specifically authorized by the Electnc Power Research Institute (EPRI). Any use, disclosure to unauthonzed persons, or copying this document or parts thereof is prohibited except as agreed to in advance by EPRI and Westinghouse Electric Corporation. Recipient of this data has a duty to inquire of EPRI and/or Westinghouse as to the uses of the information contained herein that are permitted. This document and any copies or excerpts thereof that may have been generated are to be returned to Westinghouse, directly or through EPRI, when requested to do so. NOTICE 4: The data in this document is proprietary and confidential to Westinghouse Electric Corporation and/or its Contractors. it is being revealed in confidence and trust only to Employees of EPRI and to certain contractors of EPRI for limited evaluation tasks authonzed by EPRI. Any use, disclosure to unauthonred persons, or copying of this document or parts thereof is prohibited. This Document and any copies or excerpts thereof that may have been generated are to be returned to Westinghouse, directly or through EPRI, when requested to do so. NOTICE 5: The data in this document is propnetary and confident'ai to Westinghouse Electnc Corporation and/or its Contractors. Access to this data is given in Confidence and Trust only at Westinghouse f acilities for limited evaluation tasks assigned by EPRI. Any use, ! disclosure to unauthonzed persons, or copying of this document or parts thereof is prohibited. Neither this document nor any excerpts therefrorn are to be removed from Westinghouse facilities. EPRI CONFIDENTIALITY / OBLIGATION CATEGORIES CATEGORY "A" - (See Delivered Data) Consists of CONTRACTOR Foreground Data that is contained in an issued reported. CATEGORY "B" - (See Delivered Da's) Consists of CONTRACTOR Foreground Data that is not contained in an issued report, except for computer programs. l l CATEGORY "C" - Consists of CONTRACTOR Background Data except for computer programs. I CATEGORY *D" - Consists of computer programs developed in the course of performing the Work. , j CATEGORY "E" - Consists of computer programs developed pnot to the Effective Date or after the Effective Data but outside the scope of the Work. CATEGORY *F" - Consists of administrative plans and administrative reports. i i
! l l l l AP600 RECORD OF CHANGES . Form 58204 (191) AP600 DOCUMENT NO. GW-GSY-001 REVISION 1 ALTERNATE DOC. NO. WCAP-13793 DESIGN AGENT ORGANIZATION Westinghouse j l TITLE AP600 SYSTEM / EVENT MATRIX I CHANGE PARAGRAPH CHANGE DESCRIPTION AND REASON ENGINEER NUMBER NUMBER APPROVAUDATE 1 All Extensive revisions made to clarify and incorporate DCPs l (94-116/0, GW-GEE-130/0) , l 2 3.1.3.2 New sections added to provide discussion of each event. 3 3.0 Added two shutdown events (loss RNS and RCS drain during mid-loop) l l X 0012.FRM
TABLE OF CONTENTS i Section Title Page j
1.0 INTRODUCTION
1
2.0 DESCRIPTION
OF FUNCTIONS AND SYSTEMS 2 2.1 Reactor Shutdown 2 2.2 RCS Inventory Control 3 i. 2.3 Core Decay Heat Removal 4 , 2.4 Containment Cooling 6 ; I -
3.0 DESCRIPTION
S OF EVENTS 12 3.1 At Power Events 15 3.2 Shutdown Events 34 i 4.0 DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS 76 ! 1 GW-GSY4X)1 i Revision 1 j April 12,1994 l
. = . . , . . . - . - -
l l ! LIST OF TABLFE l ! Table Title Page i 2-1 Reactor Trip Signals 7 l 2-2 Engineered Safety Features Actuation Signals 8 2-3 Safety Grade Isolation of non-Safety Systems 9 2-4 Diverse Actuation Signals 10 2-5 Non-Safety System Actuation Signals 11 3-1 List of Events 14 3.1-1 Loss of Main Feedwater From Full Power 43 j 3.1-2 Loss of Offsite Power From Full Power 45 3.1-3 Loss of All AC Power From Full Power 47 ! 3.1-4 Small Steam Line Break From Full Power 49 3.1-5 Large Steam Line Break From Full Power 51 3.1-6 Steam Generator Tube Rupture From Full Power 53 l 3.1-7 RCS Leak (0 to 3/8") From Full Power 55 3.1-8 RCS Leak (3/8" to 1") From Full Power 57 3.1-9 Small LOCA (l" to 10") From Full Power 59 3.1-10 Large LOCA (> 10") From Full Power 61 3.1-11 Earthquake (SSE) From Full Power 63 3.2-1 Loss of Offsite Power From Hot Shutdown 65 3.2-2 Loss of Offsite Power From Cold Shutdown 67 l 3.2-3 Loss of Offsite Power From Mid Loop 69 3.2-4 Inadvertent RCS Drain From Mid Loop 71 3.2-5 Loss RNS From Mid Loop 73 3.2-6 Loss of Offsite Power From Refueling 75 GW-GSY-001 ii Revision 1 April IL 1994 l l l
__ ._. . _ _ . . ._ . _ , . . _ . . . _. ._ __. _ _ _ _ _ -_ ~ l LIST OF FIGURFE Figure Title .Page 3.1-1 Loss of Main Feedwater From Full Power 42 3.1-2 Loss of Offsite Power From Full Power 44-3.1-3 ' Loss of All' AC Power From Full Power 46 3.1-4 Small Steam Line Break From Full Power 48 3.1-5 Large Steam Line Break From Full Power 50 3.1-6 Steam Generator Tube Rupture From Full Power 52 3.1-7 - RCS Leak (0 to 3/8") From Full Power : 54 3.1-8 RCS Leak (3/8" to 1") From Full Power- .56 3.1-9 Small LOCA (l" to 10") From Full Power ' 58 3.1-10 > Large LOCA (> 10") From Full Power ~ 60 ' 3.1-11 Earthquake (SSE) From Full Power 62' 3.2-1 Loss of Offsite Power From Hot Shutdown ' 64~ 3.2-2 Loss of Offsite Power From Cold Shutdown 66 3.2-3 Loss of Offsite Power From Mid Loop 68 3.2-4 Inadvertent RCS Drain From Mid Loop 70 3.2-5 Loss RNS From Mid Loop 72 3.2-6 Loss of Offsite Power From Refueling 74 l \ l l- l l l ? l l' GW-GSY-001 iii Revision 1
- April 12,1994
, . _ . _ . . . ,, . ~ . . _,
l l 1
1.0 INTRODUCTION
l l This document describes how the AP600 systems are used to protect the reactor core during different l events. The following sections contain evaluations for a wide range of events. The initial conditions include full power and several shutdown conditions. For each event, different safety and nonsafety- ; related systems that can protect the core are listed. Systems that pmvide reactor shutdown, RCS makeup, core decay heat removal, and containment cooling are identified. In addition, the type of actuation and electrical power requirements for each system are also shown. The purpose of this document is to demonstrate that there are multiple levels of defense for each type of event. For more probable events there should generally be more levels of defense to provide the additional protection required. The systems that are nuclear safety-related are identified. I l l l l l GW-GSY-001 1 Revision 1 Apnl 12.1994
2.0 DESCRIPTION
OF FUNCTIONS AND SYSTEMS The functions addressed in this document are those necessary to protect the reactor core during an accident:
- Reactor Shutdown (Trip)
- Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Inventory Control
- Core Decay Heat Removal
- Containment Cooling 2.1 Reactor Shutdown Reactor shutdown includes the equipment necessary to mduce the power generation to zero in a timely fashion and to pmvide and maintain an adequate shutdown margin. The control mds usually provide this shutdown functior. E' hey are automatically inserted by the Protection and Safety Monitoring System (PMS) in response to one of the signals listed in Table 2-1. The PMS opens bmakers that de-energize magnets that hold the rods out of the core. The PMS, control rods, and trip breakers are.
safety-related. j The control rods can also be automatically inserted by a nonsafety-related Diverse Actuation System (DAS) in response to one of die signals listed in Table 2-5. The DAS is similar to the AMSAC provided in conventional Westinghouse PWR plants, except that DAS has several additional functions. l DAS is designed to be diverse from die PMS to reduce the chance of common mode failures in the signal processing equipment. DAS inserts the control rods by de-energizing the control rod motor-generator (MG) set field so that the power to the trip breakers is interrupted. This causes the control rod drive magnets to de-energize and allows the rods to enter the core. Control rod insenion may be slower under DAS control than by PMS because of the limited number of sensors, setpoints, and the chameteristics of the MG sets. However, it is fast enough to prevent the RCS from exceeding its upset pressure limit using best estimate analysis. The rods can also be inserted by operator manual control action. There are dedicated safety-related switches mounted on the main control board that are hard-wired directly to the trip breakers. There are also dedicated nonsafety-related switches associated with the DAS that can insert the control rods by de-energizing the MG sets in the same manner described above for DAS. GW-GSY-001 2 Revision 1 Apnl 12.1994
l l l
2.0 DESCRIPTION
OF FUNCTIONS AND SYSTEMS The functions addressed in this document are those necessary to protect the reactor core during an
-i accident: !
- Reactor Shutdown (Trip)
- Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Inventory Control ;
- Core Decay Heat Removal ,
- Contaitunent Cooling 4
2.1 Reactor Shutdown Reactor shutdown includes the equipment necessary to reduce the power generation to zero in a timely fashion and to provide and maintain an adequate sh'utdown margin. The contml rods usually provide l' this shutdown function. They are automatically inserted by the Protection and Safety Monitoring System (PMS) in response to one of the signals listed in Table 2-1. The PMS opens breakers that de-energize magnets that hold the rods out of the core. The PMS, control rods, and trip breakers are safety-related. The control rods can also be automatically insened by a ncasafety-related Diverse Actuation System , (DAS) in response to one of the signals listed in Table 2-3. The DAS is similar to the AMSAC pmvided in conventional Westinghouse PWR plants, except that DAS has several additional functions. DAS is designed to be diverse from the PMS to reduce the chance of common mode failures in the -1 signal processing equipment. DAS inserts the control rods by de-energizing the control rod motor-generator (MG) set field so that the power to the trip breakers is interrupted. This causes the control rod drive magnets to de-energize and allows the rods to cater the core. Control rod insertion may be slower under DAS control than by PMS because of the limited number of sensors, setpoints, and the' characteristics of the MG sets. However, it is fast enough to prevent the RCS from exceeding its upset pressure limit using best estimate analysis. j The rods can also be inserted by operator manual control action. There are dedicated safety-related - -! switches mounted on the main control board that are hard-wired directly to the trip breakers. There. are also dedicated nonsafety-related switches associated with the DAS that can insen the control rods - by de-energizing the MG sets in the same manner described above for DAS.
. GW GSY-(Kil 2 Revision 1 Apnl 12.1994
I i l l l l Another means of shutting down the reactor is to " ride out" the transi:nt. The negative moderator temperature coefficient of the primary coolant causes the mactor to reduce the power as the coolant temperature increases and density decreases. Pmtective actions which occur while " riding out" a transient are; the turbine is tripped, the Pressurizer safety valves open, and the Passive Residual lleat Removal Heat Exchanger (PRHR HX) is aligned automatically by die DAS. In addition, the operator borates the RCS to bring it down fmm about 5% power to 0%. The Chemical and Volume Control System (CVS) or the Core Makeup Tanks (CMTs) can be used to provide this function. In a large Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA), it is assumed that the control rods do not enter the core because of possible defonnations in the reactor intemals. In this case, the n actor is initially shutdown by the formation of voids in the coolant. Later, boron added via the CMT. and accumulator safety injection water reduces reactivity and provides the necessary shutdown margin. 2.2 RCS Inventory Control RCS inventory can be maintained by a number of different systems. In many situations the nonnal RCS makeup is by the Chemical and Volume Control System (CVS). The CVS has two nonsafety-related high pressure pumps; one is started and stopped automatically by the Plant Control System (PLS) in response to the signals listed in Table 2-5. The pumps are automatically loaded onto the nonsafety-related diesel generators if offsite power is lost. For RCS leaks greater than 3/8", the CVS typically cannot pmvide sufficient RCS makeup and the Passive Core Cooling System (PXS) will be actuated. The PXS provides the safety-related method of making up water to the RCS. For non-LOCA events, the CMTs will be actuated by the PMS by one of the signals listed in Table 2-2. The CMTs pmvide sufficient makeup to accommodate RCS leakage and cooldown shrink during non_LOCA events without ADS actuation. The CMTs use gravity to provide RCS injection. To make gravity effective a pressure balance line is connected fmm the CL to the top of the CMT. This line allows for two different modes of CMT operation. One mode is water recirculation which is used for non-LOCA eventa and the early stages of LOCAs. In this mode, hot water from the CL circulates to the CMT and cold CMT water is injected into the reactor by natural circulation. The other mode of operation is l steam displacement which is used to provide greater injection rates during LOCAs. For events where there is significant RCS leakage, additional PXS injection sources are utilized. These sources inject at lower pressures after the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS)is actuated. GW-GSY-001 3 Revision 1 Apnl 12,1994
The ADS is automatically actuated when the CMT level reaches a volume setpoint of 67%. This serpoint actuates the first stage of ADS. The second and third stages are actuated by timers in about 4 minutes following the first stage. Following ADS actuation, the operational procedure is to stan the Normal Residual Heat Removal System (RNS). The RNS provides injection into the RCS fmm the IRWST at about 100 psig. This injection stops the CMT injection and prevents the fourth stage ADS valves from being actuated. This feature prevents contManent pressurization and flooding. This also reduces risk to the public in case multiple failures occur in the ADS valves or the check valves from the In-Containment Refueling Water Storage Tank (?RWST). If there is a RNS equipment or operator failure, the fourth stage ADS valves open and allow gravity injection to the reactor from the IRWST. When the IRWST empties, water recirculates from the containment through the containment sump recirculation lines into the reactor vessel under gravitational force. The water is heated to steam in the reactor. It vents into the containment through the ADS. The passive contairunent cooling system condenses the steam making it available for injection into the reactor. In case there are multiple failures in the PMS, the DAS provides automatic actuation of some of the PXS functions. To reduce the chance of inadvenent actuation, the ADS has to be manually actuated if the PMS fails. The PXS also can provide RCS makeup for small LOCAs if the CMTs fail. In this case, the operators marmally actuate the ADS and the accumulators provide the necessary high pressure RCS makeup. These manual actuations are available through dedicated switches on the main control board. During plant shutdown these systems are capable of providing RCS makeup. Automatic CMT actuation and subsequent ADS is provided on low pressurizer level during hot and cold shutdowns. During mid loop, the ADS is required to be open and the only safety-related action required is to open the IRWST MOV isolation valves. This opening is automatic via DAS based on low HL level and manual via PMS. 2.3 Reactor Core Decay lleat Removal Core decay heat removal is provided by a number of different systems. In many situations the nonsafety-related Startup Feedwater System (SFW) is able to provide sufficient feedwater to the steam generator (SG) to pennit core decay heat removal. The SFW has two high pressure pumps that are staned automatically by the PLS in response to one of the signals listed in Table 2-5. These pumps are automatically loaded onto nonsafety-related diesels if offsite electrical power is lost. Initially, the SFW ilow to each SG is controlled to a pre-detemlined flow rate. After the normal SG level is GW-GSY401 4 Revision 1 Apnl 12.1994
I I 1 attained, the controller switches to SG level control. This control sequence minimizes the chance of 1 overcooling the RCS and overfilling the SG. If the SFW fails, the PRHR HX is automatically actuated by one of the PMS signals listed in Table 2-2. Manual PMS actuation is also provided. Automatic actuation by the DAS is provided (Table 2-4) as well as manual DAS actuation. The PRHR HX removes heat fmm the reactor by natural circulation. The heat is transferred to the IRWST. If the PRHR HX operation continues for more than 3 hours the IRWST starts to boil. In the longer term steam is vented to the contailunent where it is condensed. Most of the condensate drains down the containment wall and back into the IRWST. If the PRHR HX fails, the SG inventory boils down in about an hour. As SG heat removal becomes ineffective, the RCS heats up. The RCS begins to boil off through the Pzr safety valves to the contauunent. The CMTs are automatically actuated by the PMS on a low SG level plus high RCS HL temperature signal. The CMTs provide RCS makeup. If this cooling mode continues long enough, the CMT level drops to the ADS setpoint (67%) and ADS is automatically initiated. As described in Section 2.2, after ADS is initiated, there are several variations in how the ADS /RNS/accumulatois can work together to provide core cooling, depending on the types of failures. During plant shuidown conditions, these same systems are capable of cooling the core. The following discusses the plant response to a loss of core cooling at hot shutdown. During hot and cold shutdown conditions, the RNS is initially operating. Automatic re-stan of the RNS is the first level of defense. The CMTs and the PRHR HX are automatically actuated on low pn ssurizer level as the RCS inventory is discharged through the RNS relief valve. If the passive RHR heat exchangers fail, the RCS and CMT inventory are used to provide core cooling. When the CMT level drops sufficiently, it actuates ADS to reduce the pressure to allow IRWST gravity injection. Accumulator injection is not required because of the lower initial pressures and temperatures. During mid-loop operation, the RNS functions as in hot or cold shutdown. Mid-loop conditions do not pennit the PRHR HX to function since the RCS cannot be pressurized. Prior to entering into mid-loop condition, the ADS Stages 1,2 & 3 valves are opened. In this case, the only action required is to align the IRWST to provide core cooling. This is accomplished by opening the MOV isolation valves manually or automatically via DAS. GW-GSY-001 5 Revision 1 Apru 12.1994
J l l I 2.4 Containment Cooling j Normal containment cooling is provided by non-safety related fan coolers. These redundant fans are powered by the non-safety diesel generators. The fan coolers are able to cool the containment as long as there is not a significant heat input of decay heat from the PRHR HX or from a RCS leak (>l"). If-the heat input is too great, then the Passive Containment Cooling System (PCS) operation is required. The PCS provides safety grade containment cooling. It is actuated by the PMS (Table 2-2) and by the . , DAS (Table 2-4). Manual actuation via PMS and DAS is also available. PCS actuation allows the gravity drain of water onto the outside of the steel containment vessel. Heat transfer through the containment wall evaporates water. Natural circulation air flow continually removes the water vapor. Two other sources of cooling water are also available. One source is the fire water system and the other is the demineralized water system. Fire water or demineralized water may be sprayed onto the outside of the containment. When fire water is used, natural circulation of air over the containment is not needed to keep the containment below its design pressure. As a final level of defense, natural convection air cooling alone has been detennined to be sufficient to prevent containment failure. l Although the containment design pressure is exceeded, sufficient pressure is not produced to cause failure. l i ' Containment integrity and the PCS are required during at power modes and hot shutdown. They are not required during cold shutdown conditions when the RCS is not drained or during refueling conditions. In mid-loop conditions containment closure is required as well as PCS. i GW-GSY4K)1 6 Revision 1 April 12.1994
1 Table 2-1: Reactor Trip Signals ; 1 1 Description Sicnal Nuclear Startup - Source range high neutron flux or
- Intermediate range high neutron flux or
- Power range high neutron flux (low setpoint)
Overpower - Power range high neutron flux (high setpoint) or
- Power range high positive flux Core Cooling - Over Temperature AT or
- Overpower AT or
- Low pressurizer pressure or
- Low reactor coolant cold leg flow or
- Low reactor coolant pump speed or
- Reactor coolant pump bearing water high temp.
Reactor Overpressurization - High pressurizer pressure or
- High pressurizer water level Loss of Heat Sink - Low SG level (narrow range)
Feedwater Isolation - High-2 SG level ADS Actuation - ADS actuation signal Safety injection - Safety injection actuation (S) signal Turbine Trip - various signals, (e.g. high vibration, high lube oil temp., low lube oil flow) GW-GSY-001 7 Revision 1 April 12.1994
Table 2-2: Enginered Safety Feat' es Actuation Signals Action Signal S Signal - I aw-l pressurizer pressure or
- Hi-1 Containment pressure or
- Low compensated steam line pressure or
- Low-3 Cold Leg Temp. or j
- Manual actuation j Containment isolation - S signal j
- Manual actuauon 1
- Manual actuation of containment coohng PRHR HX Initiation - Low'SG level (Narrow Range) in any SG
+ low SFW flow after time delay or
- Low SG level (Wide Range) in any SG or
- CMT actuation or
- ADS actuation or
- Manual actuation CMT Initiation - S signal or
- Low-2 pressurizer level or
- High Hot Leg temperature + Low SG Level (Wide' Range) or I
- Manual actuation ADS - First Stage - Low-l CMT level in either CMT + CMT actuation signal or i - Manual actuation
! - Second Stage - 1st stage ADS signal + time delay )
- Third Stage
- 2nd stage ADS signal + time delay '
- Fourth Stage - Low-2 CMT level in either CMT + 3rd stage ADS signal
+ time delay or l - Manual actuation RCP Trip - CMT actuation signal or (Note 1) - ADS stage 1 initiation or
- High pump bearing temperature Passive Contaisunent - Hi-2 Containment pressure Cooling - Manual actuation l
Nete (1) Reactor coolant pump trip is delayed 15 see to allow reactor trip to occur first GW-GSY-001 8 Revision 1 April 12,1994 l L e r . . . . . - , . - , . . . . ., .n-
Table 2-3: Safety Related Isolation of non-Safety Systems Action Signals i Main Feedwater Isolation, - Low-l RCS Tc or Close MFW control &~ - Hi-1 SG na: Tow range level or Isolation valves &. - S signal or l Trip MFW pump - Manual actuation , Startup Feedwater Isol. - Low-2 RCS Tc or. ,
.Hi-2 SG narrow range level Steam Line Isolation - Low steam line pressure or
- Low-2 RCS Tc or
- Hi-1 containment pressure or
- Low-2 SG narrow range level
- Manual actuation ,
SG Blowdown Isolation - PRHR HX actuation signal CVS Suction Aligned - Reactor Trip or to BAT & demin. water isol. - CMT actuation or 4
- Source range high neutron flux or
- Loss of offsite power LI CVS Flow Isolation - Hi-2 SG level (narrow range) or
- High pressurizer level Pzr Heater Trip - CMT actuation (1)
Note (1) Automatic trip is nonsafety-related. Manual local breaker trip is safety-related. GW-GSY-001 9 Revision 1 April 12.' I994 - l
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l 1 L J
Table 2-4: Diverse Actuation Signals Action Signal Reactor Trip - Low SG wide range level or (Note 1) ' - Low pressurizer level or
- k. - Manual initiation Turbine Trip - Low SG wide rarige level or
- Manual initiation PRHR HX Actuation - 1,ow SG wide range level or
- High Hot Leg temperature or
- Manual initiation CMT Actuation - Low pmssurizer level or
- Manual initiation Passive Containment - High containment temperature Cooling - Manual initiation Critical Contaimnent - High containment temperature Isolation Valves - Manual initiation (Note 2)
RCP Trip - Low pressurizer level Initiate IRWST Injection - Low hot leg level
. (Mid-loop operation)
ADS Valves - Manual initiation Containment Hydrogen - Manual initiation Ignitors SG overfill protection - Manual initiation Notes: (1) De-energization of control rod MG set field causes the control rods to enter the reactor core. (2) Those containment penetration lines normally open and connected directly to the RCS or the containment. GW-GSY-001 10 Revision 1 April 12.1994
Table 2 5: Nonsafety Related System Actuation Signals Action Signal Start /Stop CVS Makeup Pumps -
- 1 pump (Notes 1 & 2) - Low pressurizer level (relative to programmed level)
Start SFW Pumps - Low SG level (narrow range) in any SG'or -
- Low feedwater flow to either SG ~
Auto SFW Flow Control - SG level above low SG level (nartow range)'setpoint Containment Fan Cooler - Containment temperature Control Notes: ,
- 1. Flow controlled to a pre-set flowrate, less than 100 GPM The pump is stopped on a high-relative level.
' 2. On CMT actuation signal, one CVS pump injects at its maximum flow. Start /stop Pzr level setpoints are less than zem power setpoints.
GW-GSY-001 11 Revision 1 April 12.1994
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l l 1 l 3 0 DESCRIPTIONS OF EVENTS l Table 3-1 lists the events that are evaluated in this document. The list includes 1I full power events and 6 shutdown events. This list of events is not intended to be comprehensive. There are other postulated events widch would require protective actions to prevent damage to the reactor core. The events which are evaluated in this document are expected to envelope these other events. Events that primarily challenge the reactor shutdown are considered to be similar to the Loss of Main Feedwater, Large Steam Line Break or the Loss of Coolant Accident events and are not separately dercribed. l l l For each event, a summary description, an operational flow chan and a systems contmls actions table are provided. The summary describes the safety-related and nonsafety-related systems which mitigate the consequences of the event. These systems are grouped into levels of defense that protect the reactor core. The flow chans depict the expected sequence of use of the different groups of systems. These flow chans show the levels of defense from an operational point of view. For example, ! following a loss of main feedwater, the startup feedwater pumps start automatically, if the SFW fails, the PRHR HX is aligned automatically. If that fails, the CMTs are aligned automatically, which leads to automatic ADS (passive feed and bleed). If that fails, the operators can manually stan ADS. The flow chans are organized to show system actuations in the same order that would occur considering automatic controls and emergency operating procedures (EOPs). Each group of systems is shown in a box which briefly lists the systems anc indicates how they are actuated (manually or automatically). If a group of systems operates properly, the arrow to the right shows the resulting plant state, e.g, " Success, no ADS" If they fail, then the arrow from the bottom of the box leads to the next level of defense. Each event has a table listing the supporting instmmentation and electrical systems widch suppon the operation of the mitigating systems. Each table shows the systems available that can provide reactor shutdown, RCS inventory control, core cooling, and containment cooling. For each system infonnation is shown indicating the source of the supporting I&C actuation and electrical power. Three different I&C systems are shown, the Plant Control System (PLS), the Protection and Safety Monitoring System (PMS), and the Diverse Actuation System (DAS). The PLS and the DAS are nonsafety-related systems and the PMS is a safety-related system. Automatic o aarmal actuation is identified under the I&C system as an "A" or "M" Note that automatic actuations may be perfomied manually through the same I&C system. For the PMS there are safety related main control board manual control through both component level soft controls and through dedicated system level GW-GSY-001 12 Revision 1 Apnl 12.1994
switches. For die DAS there are nonsafety-related dedicated system level switches. For the PLS there are nonsafety-related soft control switches. Tids evaluation does not identify the instruments used to actuate the various systems. If DC or AC power is also required for operation of equipment in that system, this is indicated by a "Yes" In many of the PMS actuations, no DC power is required for passive system operation; i.e. all that is required is to remove power and allow " fail safe" equipment to go to their prefened failure position. i l 1 l l l l l GW-GSY4K)1 13 Revision 1 I Apnl 12.1994
Table 3-1: List of Events Event Initial Condition 3.1.1 Loss of Main Feedwater Full Power 3.1.2 Loss of Offsite Power Full Power 3.1.3 Loss of All AC Power Full Power 3.1.4 Small Steam Line Break Full Power 3.1.5 Large Steam Line Break Full Power 3.1.6 Steam Generator Tube Rupture Full Power 3.1.7 RCS Leak (0 to 3/8") Full Power 3.1.8 RCS Leak (3/8" to 1") Full Power 3.1.9 Small LOCA (l" to 10") Full Power 3.1.10 Large LOCA (>10") Full Power 3.1.11 Earthquake (SSE) Full Power 3.2.1 Loss of Offsite Power Hot Standby 3.2.2 Loss of Offsite Power Hot / Cold Shutdown 3.2.3 Loss of Offsite Power Mid Loop 3.2.4 Inadvertent RCS Drain Mid Loop 3.2.5 Loss RNS Mid Loop 3.2.6 Loss of Offsite Power Refueling GW-GSY-001 14 Revision 1 Apnl 12.1994
- . .. .. . - -. -. . - . ~ - - . . ~ . . . . . _. - . l i 3.1 At Power Events 3.1.1 Loss Of Main Feedwater From Full Power First Line of Defense The loss of feedwater to the steam generator while the reactor is at full power is'a significant primary .
. system heat-up transient event. The loss of feedwater can be due to a pipe break in the turbine .
building or the failure or loss main feedwater pump function. At the time of loss of feedwater, low feedwater flow alann causes the startup feedwater (SFW) pumps to start. Despite SFW pump operation, the steam generator secondary side water boils down. The level decreases and the narrow ; range low level setpoint causes the reactor to trip. The reactor coolant pumps continue to operate. , When the steam generator level is re-established. the feedwater flow,is automatically contmlied to - maintain the level. The CVS provides RCS makeup as necessary for losses due to leaks and cooldown contraction. - Second Line of Defense (Safety Case) If the startup feedwater system does not provide feedwater, the steam generator wide range low level
~
setpoint is reached and the PRHR HX is aligned. This allows primary coolant from the hot leg to pass through the heat exchangers where heat is tmnsferred to the IRWST. The passive containment cooling ; system (PCS) provides containment cooling after the IRWST begins steaming. The CMTs provide RCS makeup as necessary to accommodate leakage and cooldown contraction. Third Line of Defense If the PRHR HXs are not aligned, the steam generators boil dry in about an hour. After the steam l generator secondary side no longer removes heat, the primary system pressure and temperature will rise until the pressurizer safety relief valves open. The venting of steam from the pressurizer causes a loss of inventory from the primary coolant system. The low wide range steam generator level with . coincident ingh reactor coolant system hot leg temperature aligns the CMTs and trips the' reactor coolant pumps. Initially the core make-up tanks provide RCS injection drain water recirculation. Later on as the RCS inventory depletes the CMTs will drain down and eventually the ADS actuation level will be reached. , Tids actuates ADS Stage 1. ADS Stages 2 and 3 actuate on timers within minutes. When the RCS pressure has fallen to 100 psi, the operational procedure is to align the RNS'to inject IRWST water. into the RCS. This injection stabilizes the CMT level and prevents actuation of ADS Stage 4. GW-GSY-001 15 Revision 1 April 12.1994
*' m
1 The nonnal residual heat removal system (RNS) also provides long term decay heat removal which makes operation of the PCS unnecessary. Fourth Line of Defense If the RNS fails or is not aligned to inject IRWST water, the CMT level continues to drop. When either CMT level drops to a low level, die 4th stage of ADS actuates and primary coolant is vented directly into containment. This final depressurization permits gravity drain of the IRWST into the reactor to provide core cooling. Steam released to the containment condenses on the inside of the coPtainment vessel as the passive containment Cooling system removes the heat. The condensed steam runs back down the inside wall and is collected in a gutter system and returned to the IRWST. In the long term, the IRWST drains down and the water level in the containment rises until water recirculates through the sump screen into the IRWST injection line. This mode of reactor cooling can continue indefinitely. The PCS provides long term cooling of the containment. Fifth Line of Defense if the CMTs fail to inject into the reactor vessel, the plant operators can manually actuate the ADS. The accumulators automatically inject cold, borated water into the reactor when the pressure drops to 7(X) psi. This injection provides adequate makeup until depressurization pennits gravity injection of the IRWST. The PCS provides long term cooling of the contailunent. GW-GSY-(X)1 16 Revision 1 April 12.1994
l 3.1.2 Loss Of Offsite Power From Full Power i l First Line of Defense The loss of offsite electrical power while the reactor is at full power is normally accommodated by a transfer to the turbine generator without a reactor trip, if this transfer is unsuccessful, the reactor trips l and the diesel generators are started. After stait of the diesel generators, the SFW pumps are automatically loaded and started. The feedwater supplied by the SFW system allows the Sgs to remove decay heat. The CVS provides RCS makeup as necessary for losses due to leaks and cooldown contraction. Second Line of Defense (Safety Case) In the event that the SFW pumps and CVS are not available, the steam generator will boil down. The SG wide range low level setpoint will be reached and the PRHR HX actuated. This allows primary coolant fmm the hot leg to pass through the heat exchangers where heat is tmnsferred to the IRWST. The passive containment cooling system (PCS) provides containment cooling after the IRWST begins steaming. The CMTs provide RCS makeup as necessary to accommodate leakage and cooldown contraction. Thir( Line of Defense If the PPHR Hxs are not aligned, the steam generators boil dry in about an hour. After the steam generator secondary side no longer removes heat, the primary system pressure and temperature will rise until the pressurizer safety relief valves open. The venting of steam from the pressurizer to the IRWST causes a loss of inventory from the primary coolant system. The low wide range steam generator level with coincident high reactor coolant system hot leg temperature aligns the CMTs. Initially the core make-up tanks provide RCS injection drain water recirculation. Later on as the RCS inventory depletes the CMTs will drain down and eventually the ADS actuation level will be reached. This actuates ADS Stage 1. ADS Stages 2 and 3 actuate on timers within minutes. When the RCS pressure has fallen to 100 psi, the operational procedure is to align the RNS to inject IRWST water into the RCS. This injection stabilizes the CMT level and prevents actuation of ADS Stage 4. The nonnal residual heat removal system (RNS) also provides long temi decay heat removal which makes operation of the PCS unnecessary. GW-GSY-001 17 Revision 1 Apnl 12.1994
)
Fourth Line of Defense If the RNS fails or is not aligned to inject IRWST water, the CMT level continues to drop. When . either CMT level drops to a low level, the 4th stage of ADS actuates and primary coolant is vented directly into containment. This final depressurization permits gravity drain of the IRWST into the reactor to pmvide core cooling. Steam released to the containment condenses on the inside of the - containment vessel as the passive containment cooling system removes the heat. The condensed steam runs back down the inside wall and is collected in a gutter system and returned to the IRWST. ' In the - long term, the IRWST drains down and the water level in the contairunent rises until the water recirculates through the sump screen into the IRWST injection line. .This mode of reactor cooling can continue indefinitely. The PCS provides long term containment cooll'ng. Fifth Line of Defense If the CMTs fail to inject into the reactor vessel, the plant operators can manually actuate the ADS. The accumulators automatically inject cold, borated water into the reactor when the pressure drops to 700 psi. This injection provides adequate makeup until depressurization permits gravity injection of ' the IRWST. The PCS provides long term contairunent cooling. 4 GW-GSY-001 18 Revision 1 April 12.1994 '
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l 3.1.3 Loss Of All AC Power From Full Power First Line of Defense (Safety Case) The loss of all AC electrical power while the reactor is at full power assumes unsuccessful transfer to the turbine generator and failure of the diesel generators. The reactor coolant pumps and feedwater pumps coast down. A low RCP speed signal trips the reactor, although in any case the rods will insert due to the loss of all AC power. Because there is no AC power, the SFW pumps and CVS are not available. Because the startup feedwater system does not provide feedwater, the steam generator wide range low level setpoint is reached and the PRHR HX is actuated. This allows primary coolant fmm the hot leg to pass through the heat exchangers where heat is transferred to the IRWST. The passive contaimnent cooling system (PCS) provides containment cooling after the IRWST begins steaming. The CMTs provide RCS makeup as necessary to accommodate leakage and cooldown contraction. Second Line of Defense If the PRHR HXs are not aligned, the steam generators boil dry in about an hour. After the steam generator secondary side no longer removes heat, the primary system pressure and temperature will rise until the pressurizer safety relief valves open. The venting of steam from the pressurizer to the IRWST causes a loss of inventory fmm the primary coolant system. The low wide range steam generator level with coincident high reactor coolant system hot leg temperature aligns the CMTs. Initially the core make-up tanks provide RCS injection drain water recirculation. Later on as the RCS inventory depletes the CMTs will drain down and eventually the ADS actuation level will be reached. This actuates ADS Stage 1. ADS Stages 2 and 3 actuate on timers within minutes. With the RNS unavailable to inject IRWST water, the CMT level continues to drop. When either CMT level drops to a low level, the 4th stage of ADS actuates and primary coolant is vented directly into contairunent. This final depressurization permits gravity drain of the IRWST into the reactor to provide core cooling. Steam released to the containment condenses on the inside of the containment vessel as the passive contaimnent cooling system removes the heat. The condensed steam runs back down the inside wall and is cd!rcted in a gater system and retumed to the IRWST. In the long term, the IRWST drains down and the water level in the containment rises until the water recirculates through the sump screen GW-GSY-001 19 Revision 1 April 12.1994 l .
into the IRWST injection line. This mode of reactor cooling can continue indefinitely. The PCS provides long term containment cooling. Third Line of Defense If the CMTs fail to inject into the reactor vessel, the plant operators can manually actuate the ADS. The accumulators automatically inject cold, borated water into the reactor when the pressure drops to - 700 psi. This injection provides adequate makeup until depressurization permits gravity injection of the IRWST. The PCS provides long term containment cooling. e GW-GSY-001 20 Revision 1 April 12.1994
l l 3.1.4 Small Steam Line fireak From Full Power A small steam line break results in a larger RCS cool down transient when the reactor is at hot zero power conditions. The small steam line break while at full power produces a slower cool down transient, but is more challenging to reactor core cooling due to the larger amount of decay heat. A small steam line break event which occurs at the end of fuel life can msult in temporary retum to power due to the RCS olant's large negative temperature coefficient of reactivity. This event is assumed to result in a reactor trip but to not initially actuate safety related systems. First Line of Defense For this case the safety-related systems are not actuated and the reactor is tripped or manually shutdown. The reactor coolant pumps and feedwater pumps continue to operate. The operators isolate the SG with the broken steam line from the feedwater supply. These actions limit the cooldown and avoid actuation fo the safety-related systems. The SFW pumps start if the MFW pumps are lost or are unable to properly control SG level. CVS makeup provides RCS boration to recover shutdown margins and to accommodate RCS leakage and cooldown contraction. Second Line of Defense (Safety Case) If the operator does not take effective actions to limit the RCS cooldown, a low RCS temperature signal trips the reactor and the reactor coolant pumps, isolates main and startup feedwater, aligns the CMTs and the PRHR HX. The RCS coolant shrinks as it cools which adds positive reactivity to the core. The reactor may regain critically for a shon time until the CMTs inject enough boron to shut the reactor down. The CMT operate in a water recirculation mode and do not drain down; ADS actuation is not approached. Cooling of the RCS occurs as the PRHR HXs transfer heat to the IRWST. After the IRWST begins steaming, the PCS provides the long tenn heat sink. Third Line of Defense If the PRHR HXs are not actuated, the steam generators boil dry in about an hour. Aftcr the steam generator secondary side no longer removes heat, the primary system pressure and temperature will rise until the pressurizer safety relief valves open. The venting of steam from the pressurizer to the IRWST causes a loss of inventory from the primary coolant system. The CMTs are automatically actuated on a low SG level co-incident with a high RCS temperature. Initially the core make-up tanks provide RCS injection drain water recirculation. Later on as the RCS inventory depletes the CMTs will drain down and eventually the ADS actuation level will be reached. GW-GSY-001 21 Revision 1 April 12.1994
This actuates ADS Stage 1. As the CMTs drain into the primary system, automatic depressurization of the system begins when either CMT level drops to the ADS actuation setpoint. ADS Stages 2 and 3 actuate on timers widdn minutes. When the RCS pressure has fallen to 100 psi, the operational pmcedure is to align the RNS to inject IRWST water into the RCS This injection stabilizes the CMT level and prevents actuation of ADS Stage 4. The normal residual heat removal system (RNS) also provides long temi decay heat removal which makes operation of the PCS unnecessary. Fourth Line of Defense If the RNS fails or is not aligned to inject IRWST water, the CMT level continues to drop. When either CMT level dmps to a low level, the 401 stage of ADS actuates and primary coolant is vented directly into contairunent. This final depressurization permits gravity drain of the IRWST into the reactor to provide core cooling. Steam released to the containment condenses on the inside of the , 1 contairunent vessel as the passive contairunent cooling system removes the heat. The condensed steam runs back down the inside wall and is collected in a gutter system and retumed to the IRWST. In the long tenu, the IRWST drains down and the water level in the containment rises until the water recirculates through the sump screen into the IRWST injection line. This mode of reactor cooling can continue indefinitely. The PCS provides long tenn containment cooling. I Fifth Line of Defense if the CMTs fail to inject into the reactor vessel, the plant operators can marmally actuate the ADS. The accumulators automatically inject cold, borated water into the reactor when the pressure drops to 700 psi. This injection provides adequate makeup until depressurization pennits gravity injection of ) the IRWST. The PCS provides long tenn containment cooling. 1 i i l l l l l GW-GSY-001 22 Revision 1 Apnl 12,1994
3.1.5 Large Steam Line Break From Full Power A large steam line break results in a larger RCS cool down transient when the reactor is at zem power, hot conditions. A large steam line break while at full power produces a slower cool down transient, but is more challenging to reactor core cooling due to the larger amount of decay heat. A large steam line break event which occurs at the end of fuel life can result in temporary rerum to power due. to the RCS coolant's large negative temperature coefficient of reactivity. This event results in a reactor trip and actuation of safety-related systems. First Line of Defense (Safety Case) The low steam line pressure causes a safeguards actuation (S) signal. This signal trips the reactor, trips the reactor coolant pumps and feedwater pumps, aligns the CMTs and the PRHR HX. The RCS coolant shrinks as it cools which adds positive reactivity to the core. The reactor regains critically for a time until the CMTs inject enough boron to shut the reactor down. The CMTs operate in the water recirculation mode and do not drain down; ADS actuation is not approached. A low RCS temperature isolates the main and the stanup feedwater lines which limits the cooldown. The PRHR HXs are automatically actuated to remove decay heat from the reactor and transfer that heat to the IRWST. The PCS provides long tenn cooling after the IRWST begins steaming. The CMTs also provide RCS makeup as necessary to accommodate leakage and cooldown contraction. Second Line of Defense If the PRHR HX is not actuated, the steam generators boil down in about an hour. After the steam generator secondary side no longer removes heat, the primary system pressure and temperature rise until the pressurizer safety relief valves open. The venting of steam from the pressurizer causes a loss of inventory from the primary coolant system. The CMTs are automatically actuated on a low SG level co-incident with a high RCS temperature. l Initially the core make-up tanks provide RCS injection drain water recirculation. Later on as the RCS ] inventory depletes the CMTs will drain down and eventually the ADS actuation level will be reached. This actuates ADS Stage 1. ADS Stages 2 and 3 actuate shortly afterwards on timers. When the RCS pressure has fallen to 100 psi, the operational procedure is to align the RNS to inject IRWST water into the RCS. This injection stabilizes the CMT level and prevents actuation of ADS Stage 4. GW-GSY-001 23 Revision 1 Apnl 12.1994
l The normal residual heat removal system (RNS) also provides long term decay heat removal which makes operation of the PCS unnecessary. l Third Line of Defense l If the RNS fails or is not aligned to inject IRWST water, the CMT level continues to drop. When i either CMT level drops to a low level, the 4th stage of ADS actuates and primary coolant is vented directly into containment. This final depressurization pemlits gravity drain of the IRWST into the reactor to provide core cooling. Steam released to the contairunent condenses on the inside of the containment vessel as the passive containment cooling system removes the heat. The condensed steam runs back down the inside wall and is collected in a gutter system and retumed to the IRWST. In the long term, the IRWST drains down and the water level in the containment rises until the water recirculates through the sump screen into the IRWST injection line. This mode of reactor cooling can continue indefinitely. The PCS provides long tenu conteitunent cooling. Fourth Line of Defense if the CMTs f:dl to inject into the reactor vessel, the plant operators can manually actuate the ADS. The accumulators automatically inject cold, borated water into the reactor when the pressure drops to 700 psi. This injection provides adequate makeup until depmssurization permits gravity injection of the IRWST. The PCS provides long term contailunent cooling. 1 l l l l GW-GSY-001 24 Revision 1 Apnl 12.1994
3.1.6 Steam Generator Tube Rupture From Full Power First Line of Defense The steam generator tube mpture while the reactor is at full power does not produce a severe themial hydraulic transient. The significant effects are loss of RCS inventory outside of the containment and the potential release of radioactivity through the secondary side of the steam generator to the atmosphere. As the primary coolant flows into the steam generator, the RCS pressure falls and the pressurizer level decreases. Reactor trip and safeguards actuation (S) signals are generated in response to low pressurizer pressure. The S signal trips the reactor coolant pumps, isolates MFW and aligns the CMTs and the PRHR HX. The SFW pumps are actuated in response to low feedwater flow, One CVS makeup pump is started / stopped to maintain pressurizer level between 10% and 20%. The operator takes action to cool the RCS using the intact SG and reduces pressure using the CVS auxiliary spmy into the pressurizer. As the RCS depressurizes to the SG pressure, flow of RCS coolant into the secondary side ceases. Second Line of Defense (Safety Case) If the startup feedwater system or the CVS makeup system malfunctions and provides excessive flow, the steam generator wide range high level setpoint is reached and the SFW pumps and CVS makeup pumps are isolated with safety related valves. After isolation of the SFW pumps and CVS makeup pumps, the CMTs provide RCS makeup and the PRHR HXs remove the core decay heat. When decay heat decreases to the level where the PRHR HX heat removal matches it, the RCS pressure drops to the SG pressure which terminates the tube leak. The CMTs do not drain to the level which actuates ADS. The PCS is available for containment cooling after the IRWST begins steaming. This level of defense also applies to a case where the non-safety SFW and CVS systems fail to actuate; the CMTs and PRHR HXs function in the same manor to provide RCS makeup and remove decay heat, respectively. l Third Line of Defense if the PRHR HXs are not aligned, the steam generators boil dry in about an hour. After the steam generator secondary side no longer removes heat, the primary system pressure and temperature will rise until the pressurizer safety relief valves open. The venting of steam from the pressurizer to the IRWST and the continued SG tube leak causes a loss of inventory from the primary coolant system. The CMTs are automatically actuated on a low SG level co-incident with a high RCS temperature. GW-GSY-001 25 Revision 1 Apnl 12.1994
Initially the core make-up tanks provide RCS injection drain water recirculation. Later on as die RCS inventory depletes the CMTs will drain down and eventually the ADS actuation level will be reached. This actuates ADS Stage 1. ADS Stages 2 and 3 actuate on timers within minutes. When die RCS pressure has fallen to 100 psi, the operational procedure is to align the RNS to inject IRWST water i into the RCS. This will stabilize the CMT level and prevent actuation of ADS Stage 4. The RNS also provides long tenu decay heat removal which makes operation of the PCS unnecessary, Fourth Line of Defense if the RNS fails or is not aligned to inject IRWST water, the CMT level continues to drop. When either CMT level drops to a low level, the 4th stage of ADS actuates and primary coolant is vented directly into containment. This final depressurization permits gravity drain of the IRWST into die reactor to provide core cooling. Steam released to the containment condenses on the inside of the containment vessel as the passive containment cooling system removes the heat. The condensed steam runs back down the inside wall and is collected in a gutter system and returned to the IRWST. In the long term, the IRWST drains down and the water level in the containment rises until the water recirculates through the sump screen into the IRWST injection line. This mode of reactor cooling can continue indefinitely. The PCS provides long term containment cooling. Fifth Line of Defense If the CMTs fail to inject into the reactor vessel, the plant operators can manually actuate the ADS. The accumulators automatically inject cold, borated water into the reactor when the pressure drops to 700 psi. This injection provides adequate makeup until depressurization permits gravity injection of the IRWST. The PCS provides long term containment cooling. : l { l GW-GSY-001 26 Revision 1 l Apnl 12, lW4 l
1I i 3.1.7 RCS Leak ( 0 to 3/8") From Full Power ; First Line of Defense The CVS system has the capability of injecting water into the RCS at a rate which matches the loss RC water through a 3/8" hole. The CVS can maintain RCS pmssure and permit the opemtor to perform a contmiled shutdown. The SFW pamps provide feedwater to the SG to initially remove sensible and decay heat. The RNS will be used later to continue the cooldown. Second Line of Defense if the CVS fails to provide makeup to the RCS the pressurizer low pressure signal will trip the reactor and generate a safety injection signal (S). This signal also trips the RCPs and actuates the CMTs and the PRHR HX. If the operators execute a manual reactor cooldown the CMTs will not drain down to the ADS actuation level. The RNS provides long tenn RCS cooling. Third Line of Defense If the CVS is unavailable and the manual reactor cooldown is not executed, the pressurizer low-low level alann will generate a safeguards actuation (S) signal. This signal trips the reactor coolant pumps, aligns the CMTs and the PRHR HX. The CMTs and PRHR HXs provide RCS makeup and remove decay heat, respectively. The PRHR HXs transfer heat from the primary coolant to the IRWST. The PCS provides long term cooling of the reactor after the IRWST begins steaming. Initially the core make-up tanks provide RCS injection while they operate in a water recirculation mode. Later in the event the RCS as the inventory depletes, the CLs void and the CMTs drain down. The drain down will continue until the CMT level drops to the ADS actuation level. This actuates ADS Stage 1. ADS Stages 2 and 3 actuate on timers within minutes. When the RCS pressure has fallen to 100 psi, the operators standard procedure is to align the RNS to inject IRWST water into the RCS. This will stabilize the CMT level and prevent actuation of ADS Stage 4. The nonnal residual heat removal system (RNS) also provides long tenn decay heat mmoval which makes operation of the PCS unnecessary. Founh Line of Defense (Safety Case) If the RNS fails or is not aligned to inject IRWST water, the CMT level continues to drop. When either CMT level drops to a low level, the 4th stage of ADS actuates and primary coolant is vented directly into contaimnent. This final depressurization permits gravity drain of the IRWST into the GW-GSY-(X11 27 Revision 1 Apnl 12.1994
reactor to provide core cooling. Steam released to the containment condenses on die inside of the-containment vessel as the passive containment cooling system removes the heat. The condensed steam runs back down the inside wall and is collected in a gutter system and returned to the IRWST. In the long term, the IRWST drains down and the water level in the containment rises until the water recirculates through the sump screen into die IRWST injection line. This mode of reactor cooling can continue indefinitely. The PCS pmvides long term containment cooling. Fifth Line of Defense if the CMTs fail to inject into the reactor vessel, the plant operators can manually actuate die ADS. The accumulators automatically inject cold, borated water into the reactor when the pressure drops to 700 psi. This injection provides adequate makeup until depressurization pennits gravity injection of the IRWST. The PCS provides long term containment cooling. I l 1 i l l 1 l l l l l l 1 I I < 1 1 GW-GSY-tK11 28 Revision 1 4 April 12.1994 l i
- . ..-. ..- - - .- - - - - - .- ~ 1 1 3.1.8 RCS Leak ( 3/8" to 1") From Full Power First Line of Defense Because the CVS has the capability of injecting water into the RCS at a rate which matches the RC - water loss thmugh a hole of 3/8", the CVS cannot match the RC water loss for a 1" leak. The pressurizer low pressure signal will trip the reactor and generate a safety injection signal (S). This signal also trips the RCPs and actuates the CMTs and the PRHR HX. If the operators execute a . manual reactor cooldown the CMTs will not drain down to the ADS actuation level. The RNS will
. provide long term RCS cooling. The RNS will perform its decay heat removal function.
Second Line of Defense , if the CVS fails or the operator fails to execute a manual cooldown, the CMTs will drain down to the ADS actuation level. This will actuate the ADS Stage i valves. ADS Stages 2 and 3 actuate on timers within minutes. When the RCS pressure has fallen to 100 psi, the operators standard procedure is to align the RNS to inject IRWST water into the RCS. This will stabilize the CMT level and prevent actuation of ADS Stage 4. The RNS also provides long term decay heat removal which makes operation of the PCS mmecessary. l Third Line of Defense (Safety Case) > If the RNS fails or is not aligned to inject IRWST water, the CMT level continues to drop. - When either CMT volume drops to a low level, the 4th stage of ADS actuates and primary coolant is vented directly into containment. This final depressurization pennits gravity dmin of the IRWST into the-reactor to provide core cooling. Steam released to the containment condenses on the inside of the l i containment vessel as the passive containment cooling system removes the heat. ' The condensed steam runs back down the inside wall and is collected in a gutter system and retumed to the IRWST. In die long tenn, the IRWST drains down and the water level in the contaimnent rises until the water recirculates through the sump screen into the IRWST injection line. This mode of reactor cooling can continue indefinitely. The PCS pmvides long tenn containment cooling.- 1
)
Founh Line of Defense If the CMTs fail to inject into the reactor vessel, the plant operators can manually actuate the ADS. The accumulators automatically inject cold, borated water into the reactor when the pressure drops to j 700 psi. This injection provides adequate makeup until depressurization pennits gravity injection of the IRWST. The PCS provides long term containment cooling. i GW-GSY-001 29 Revision 1 Apnl 12.1994
i l l l 3.1.9 Small LOCA ( 1" to 10") From Full Power l First Line of Defense RCS low pressure generates a safeguards actuation (S) signal. This signal trips the reactor, trips the reactor coolant pumps, aligns the CMTs and the PRHR HX. The CMTs and PRHR HXs provide RCS makeup and remove decay heat, respectively. The PRHR HXs transfer heat from the primary coolant to the IRWST. As the CMTs drain into the primary system, automatic depressurization of the system begins when either CMT volume falls to the ADS actuation setpoint. ADS Stages 2 and 3 actuate on timers within minutes. When the RCS pressure has fallen to 100 psi, the opemtors standard procedure is to align the j RNS to inject IRWST water into the RCS. This will stabilize the CMT level ano prevent actuation of ADS Stage 4. l l
- The RNS also provides long tenn decay heat removal which makes operation of the PCS unnecessary.
l Second Line of Defense (Safety Case) If the RNS fails or is not aligned to inject IRWST water, the CMT level continues to drop. When either CMT volume drops to a low level, the 4th stage of ADS actuates and piimary coolant is vented directly into containment. This final depressurization permits gravity drain of the IRWST into the reactor to provide core cooling. Steam released to the containment condenses on the inside of the containment vessel as the passive containment cooling system removes the heat. The condensed steam runs back down the inside wall and is collected in a gutter system and retumed to the IRWST. In the long tenn. the IRWST drains down and the water level in the containment rises until the water recirculates through the sump screen into the IRWST injection line. This mode of reactor cooling can continue indefinitely. The PCS provides long term containment cooling. Third Line of Defense if the CMTs fail to inject into the reactor vessel, the plant operators can manually actuate the ADS. The accumulators automatically inject cold, borated water into the reactor when the pressure dmps to 700 psi. This injection provides adequate makeup until depressurization permits gravity injection of the IRWST. The PCS provides long term containment cooling. GW-GSY-001 30 Revision 1 April 12.1994
3.1.10 Large LOCA ( > 10") From Full Power First Line of Defense RCS low pressure or containment high pressure will generate a safeguards actuation (S) signal. This signal trips the reactor, trips the reactor coolant pumps, aligns die CMTs and the PRHR HX. The RCS pressure drops rapidly and the resulting blowdown essentially empties the RCS. The rapid drop in RCS pressure allows the accumulators to inject. The accumulator injection refills the reactor vessel down comer and refloods the core. The CMTs function to continue safety injection until the RCS pressure drops to the point where IRWST injection begins. ADS operation is not necessary for this pressure reduction because of tiu large size of the break. The operators standard pmcedure is to align the RNS to inject IRWST water into the RCS. This will stabilize the CMT level and prevent actuation of 4th stage ADS. The PCS provides short term cooling of the containment. The RNS provides long term cooling after the PCS has reduced the peak contaimnent pressure. Second 1.ine of Defense (Safety Case) If the RNS fails or is not aligned to inject IRWST water, the CMT level continues to drop. When either CMT volume drops to a low level, the 4th stage of ADS actuates and primary coolant is vented directly into the contaimnent. Steam released to the containment condenses on the inside of the containment vessel as the passive containment cooling system removes the heat. The condensed steam runs back down the inside wall and is collected in a gutter system and returned to the IRWST. In the long tenn, the IRWST drains down and the water level in the containment rises until the water recirculates through the sump screen into the IRWST injection line. This mode of reactor cooling can continue indefinitely. The PCS provides long term containment cooling. GW-GSY-tX)1 31 Revision 1 Apnl 12.1994 l
i i i i 1 ) l 3.1.11 Earthquake (SSE) From Full Power l It is assumed that none of the non-safety related systems or equipment are available during or after a safe shutdown eanhquake (SSE). The main feedwater system, the stanup feedwater system and CVS j f makeup can not provide their injection functions. l First Line of Defense (Safety Case) Because the stanup feedwater system does not provide feedwater, the steam generator level will drop
- to a low level setpoint which trips the reactor, trips the reactor coolant pumps, aligns the CMTs and i
! the PRHR HX. The CMTs and PRHR HXs provide RCS makeup and remove decay heat, respectively. This allows primary coolant from the hot leg to pass through the heat exchangers where heat is transferred to the IRWST. The PCS provides containment cooling after the IRWST begins j steaming. The CMTs provide RCS makeup as necessary to accommodate leakage and cooldown ; contraction.
Second Line of Defense If the PRHR HX is not aligned to remove heat fmm the RCS, the RCS pmssure and temperature will rise unt] the pressurizer safety relief valves open. The RCS will lose inventory as the pressurizer steam vents into the IRWST. The CMTs are automatically actuated on a low SG level co-incident ! with a high RCS temperature. f hdtially the core make-up tanks provide RCS injection by water recirculation. Later on as the RCS inventory depletes the CMTs will drain down and eventually the ADS actuation level will be reached. This actuates ADS Stage 1. ADS Stages 2 and 3 actuate on timers within minutes. Because the RNS is not available the CMT level will continue to drop. When the level drops to a low level, the 4th stage of ADS actuates and primary coolant is vented directly into contairunent. This final , depressurization permits gravity drain of the IRWST. In the long tenn, the IRWST drains down and the water level in the containment rises untii die water recirculates through the sump screen into the IRWST injection line. This mode of reactor cooling can continue indefinitely. The PCS provides long temi containment cooling. GW-GSY4X)] 32 Re ision 1 Arn! 12,1994
Third Line of Defense if the CMTs fail to inject into the reactor vessel, the plant operators cu manually actuate Ox: ADS, l The accumulators automatically inject cold, borated water into the reactor'when the pressure dmps to ,
.i 700 psi. This injection provides adequate makeup until depressurization pennits gravity injection of (
the IRWST. The PCS provides long term containment cooling. i r P i
-f i
i i
' GW-OSY-001 33 Revision 1 - April 12,1994
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3.2 Shutdown Events 3.2.1 Loss Of Offsite Power From Hot Shutdown With the reactor at hot shutdown, the reactor is shutdown (rods inserted), the RCPs are operating and RCS cooling is provided by the RNS. , First Line of Defense The loss of offsite electrical power while the reactor is at cold shutdown results in the coast down of the reactor coolant pumps. After the diesels start, the RNS pumps are automatically loaded to provide heat removal. The CVS pumps am also automatically loaded to pmvide RCS makeup as required. Second Line of Defense If the RNS pumps are not available, then the operators can isolate the RNS and use the SFW pumps to remove decay heat from the SG. Third Line of Defense (Safety Case) In the event that the diesel generators do not start, the RNS is not available. As a result the RCS l temperatum will increase. This will result in the RCS pressure increasing and the lifting of the RNS relief valve. The loss of RCS coolant through the RNS relief valve causes the Pzr level to decrease which automatically actuates the CMTs and the PRHR HX. The PRHR HX are able to remove decay heat and transfer it to the IRWST. The PCS provides long term cooling after the IRWST begins steaming. The CMTs provide RCS makeup to compensate for the loss through the RNS relief valve and RCS leakage as required. Fourth Line of Defense If the PRHR HXs are not actuated, the RNS relief valve will continue to discharge water from the RCS. Initially the core make-up tanks provide RCS injection by water recimulation. Later on as the RCS inventory depletes the CMTs will drain down and eventually the ADS actuation level will be reached. This actuates ADS Stage 1. ADS Stages 2 and 3 actuate on timers within minutes. With the RNS unavailable to inject IRWST water, the CMT levels will continue to drop. When either CMT level drops to a low level, the 4th stage of ADS actuates and primary coolant is vented directly into containment. This final depressurization permits gravity drain of the IRWST. In the long term, the IRWST drains down and the water level in the containment rises until the water recirculates thmugh GW-GSY4101 34 Revision 1 Apnl 12.1994
I the sump screen into the IRWST injection line. This mode of reactor cooling can continue indefinitely. The PCS provides long tenu containment cooling. Fifth Line of Defense If the CMTs fail to inject into the reactor vessel, the plant operators can manually actuate the ADS. Because the RCS is at lower temperatures and pressures and decay heat is reduced the accumulators are not necessary. The ADS depressurization pennits gravity injection of the IRWST. The PCS provides long term containment cooling. GW-GSY4)01 35 Revision 1 Apnl 12,1994 f
3.2.2 Loss Of Offsite Power From Cold Shutdown 1 l l With the reactor at cold shutdown, the reactor is shutdown (rods inserted), the RCPs are operating and RCS cooling is provided by the RNS. In this case the RCS is assumed to be intact; reduced inventory conditions are addressed in cases 3.2.3 to 3.2.5. The containment is not required to be closed, however in most situations it is expected to be closed or capable of quick closing. 1 First Line of Defense The loss of offsite electrical power while the reactor is at cold shutdown results in the coast down of the reactor coolant pumps. After the diesels sta:1, the RNS pumps are automatically loaded to pmvide heat removal. The CVS pumps art also automatically loaded to provide RCS makeup as required. i Second Line of Defense if the RNS pumps are not available, then the operators can isolate the RNS and use the SFW pumps to remove decay heat from the SG. 1 I l Third Line of Defense (Safety Case) ) l in the event that the diesel generators do not start, the RNS is not available. As a result the RCS I temperature will increase. This will result in the RCS pressure increasing and the lifting of the RNS reliel valve. The loss of RCS coolant through the RNS relief valve causes the Pzr level to decrease which automatically actuates the CMTs and the PRHR HX. The PRHR HX are able to remove decay heat and transfer it to the IRWST. The PCS provides long term cooling after the IRWST begins steaming. The CMTs pmvide RCS makeup to compensate for the loss thmugh the RNS relief valve and RCS leakage as required. Fourth Line of Defense If the PRHR HXs are not actuated, the RNS relief valve will continue to discharge water from the RCS. Initially the core make-up tanks provide RCS injection by water recirculation. Later on as the RCS inventory depletes the CMTs will drain down and eventually the ADS actuation level will be reached. This actuates ADS Stage 1. ADS Stages 2 and 3 actuate on timers within minutes. With the RNS unavailable to inject IRWST water, the CMT levels will continue to drop. When either CMT level drops to a low level, the 4th stage of ADS actuates and primary coolant is vented directly into containment. This final depressurization pennits gravity drain of the IRWST. In the long term, the IRWST drains down and the water level in the containment rises until the water recirculates through GW GSY-001 36 Revision 1 Apnl 12.1994
i 4 1 the sump screen into the IRWST injection line. This mode of mactor cooling can continue - j indefinitely. The PCS provides long term containment cooling. l l Fifth Line of Defense 1 if the CMTs fail to inject into the reactor vessel, the pf ant operators can manually actuate the ADS, ) Because the RCS is at lower temperatures and pressums and decay heat is reduced the accumulators are not necessary. The ADS depressurization permits gravity injection of the IRWST.;The PCS provides long term containment cooling. , 1 1 0 f f i l GW-GSY-001 37 Revision 1 , l April 12,1994 !
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l 3.2.3 Loss Of Offsite Power From Mid-Loop With the reactor at cold shutdown mid-loop conditions, the reactor is shutdown (rods inserted), the l RCPs are stopped and RCS cooling is provided by the RNS. In this case the RCS is assumed to be in a reduced inventory condition with the water level in the HL. In mid-loop operation, the PRilR HXs are not available because the RCS is open to the containment. The containment is closed except for the personnel air locks which may be both open, but must be capable of being closed quickly. The technical specifications require the ADS Stage 1/2/3 to be open when in mid-loop conditions. First Line of Defense The loss of offsite electrical power while the reactor is at mid-loop condition causes a loss of AC power until the diesel generators stan. After the diesels stan, the RNS pumps are automatically loaded to provide heat removal. The CVS pumps are also automatically loaded to provide RCS makeup as required. Second L.ine of Defense (Safety Case) In the event that the diesel generators do not come on line, the RNS is not available. As a result the RCS temperature will increase and the RCS water starts to boil. When the HL level drops to a low level the IRWST MOV isolation valves opened manually through the PMS. In conjunction with the open ADS valves, this provides for effective RCS makeup and venting. The steam generated in the RCS will leave via the ADS valves into the IRWST where it is initially condensed. If there are other l openings in the RCS some of this steam may bypass the IRWST and enter the contairunent. In the l longer term the IRWST may drain down and recirculation from the containment sump will provide l l continued core cooling. The PCS with containment closure provides the long tenn heat siak. Third Line of Defense This case is identical to the second case except that the IRWST MOV elation valves are automatically opened via the DAS after a 30 minute delay. I l GW-GSY-001 38 Revision 1 April 12.1994
3.2.4 Inadvertent RCS Drain From Mid Loop First Line of Defense The CVS makeup pumps are available to makeup for an inadvertent drain from the RCS. The operators will have to manually actuate the CVS based on HL level. The RNS should continue to - ; operate and remove decay heat. Second Line of Defenst
- j. In the event that the CV S makeup pumps are not available, the RNS pumps can be re-aligned to inject l water from the IRWST to the RCS. The RNS HX would still be able to remove decay heat.
l { l Third Line of Defense (Safety Case)- In case the CVS and the RNS are not available, RCS temperature will increase and the RCS water will boil. When the HL tevel drops to a low level the IRWST MOV isolation valves are manually opened I through the PMS. In conjunction with the open ADS valves, this provides for effective RCS makeup i and venting. The steam generated in the RCS will leave via the ADS valves into the IRWST where it is initially condensed. If there are other openings in the RCS some of this steam may bypass the IRWST and enter the containment. In the longer term the IRWST may drain down and recirculation from the containment sump will provide continued core cooling. P The PCS with containment closure provides the long term heat sink. Fourth Line of Defense This case is identical to the third case except that the IRWST MOV isolation valves are automatically. opened via the DAS after a 30 minute delay.
-i i
i l I GW-GSY-001 39 Revision 1 Aptd 12,1994
i l 3.2.5 Loss RNS From Mid Loop l First Line of Defense (Safety Case) If both RNS pumps are lost, the RCS temperature will increase and the RCS water will stan to boil. When the HL level drops to a low level the IRWST MOV isolation valves am manually opened j through the PMS. In conjunction with the open ADS valves, this pmvides for effective RCS makeup and venting. The steam generated in the RCS will leave via the ADS valves into the IRWST where it is initially condensed. If there are other openings in the RCS some of this steam may bypass the IRWST and enter the containment. In the longer term the IRWST may drain down and recirculation from the containment sump will pmvide continued core cooling. The PCS with containment closure provides the long term heat sink. Second Line of Defense This case is identical to the first case except that the IRWST MOV isolation valves are automatically opened via the DAS after a 30 minute delay. l ! l 1 l l l l 1 l l GW-GSY-001 40 Revision 1 Apnl 12.1994 l
! i ! 1 l I 3.2.6 Loss Of Offsite Power From Refueling in refueling operation, the PRHR HXs are not available because the reactor vessel is opened to containment. The containment is not required to be closed, however it is expected that it can be quickly closed. t l First Line of Defense The loss of offsite electrical power while the reactor is at refueling conditions causes a loss of AC power until the diesel generators stan. After the diesels stan, the RNS pumps are automatically loaded to pmvide heat removal. The CVS pumps are also automatically loaded to provide RCS makeup as required. l Second Line of Defense in case the RNS is not available the Spent Fuel Cooling System can also be used to remove decay heat. One of the SFS pumps will be aligned to the refueling cavity to provide purification. Thini Line of Defense (Safety Case) In case neither the RNS or the SFS pumps are available, water in the refueling cavity can pmvide extended decay heat removal. It would take at least 6 hours to heatup to boiling and 72 hours to twil down to the top of the fuel. This capability provides time for the operators to recover RNS or SFP cooling. or to close the containment, or to secure onsite or offsite water makeup supplies. GW-GSY-001 41 Revision 1 Apnl 12.1994
- i. LMFW
\
l l T AUTO SFW, CVS
> SUCCESS NO ADS i
l Y AUTO PRHR HX, CMT, SAFETY CASE PCS > SUCCESS NO ADS i I i AUTO CMT, P ARTI AL ADS > SUCCESS MAN RNS INJECT ADS, NO FLOOD l i l l t i l AUTO CMT, FULL ADS,' IRWST,PCS > SUCCESS l ADS, FLOOD , 1 l l l i ; t MAN FULL ADS, AUTO ACCUM, IRWST, > SUCCESS PCS ADS, FLOOD l l i t CORE DAMAGE 7 - SUCCESS l , 4 FAILURE FIGURE 3.1-1: LOSS MAIN FEEDWATER AT FULL POWER FLOW CIIART GW-GSY-001 42 Revision 1 April 12,1994
Actuation / Electrical Systems Non-Safety Safety Diverse System Order of Use PLS DC AC PMS DC DAS l (1) (1) (1) o Reactor Shutdown
- 1. Control Rods - - -
A - - 1
- 2. Control Rods - - - - -
A i
- 3. Ride Out (2) M Yes Yes - -
A o RCS Inventory Control 1.CVS A Yes Yes - - - 2.CMT - - - A - - 3.CMT - - - - - A
- 4. CMT, RNS, part ADS M Yes Yes A Yes -
- 5. CMT, IRWST, full ADS - - -- A Yes -
- 6. CMT, IRWST, full ADS - - - -
Yes M
- 7. Accum, RNS, part ADS M Yes Yes M Yes -
- 8. Accum, IRWST, full ADS - - - -
Yes M o RCS Heat Removal 1.SFW A Yes Yes - - -
- 2. PRHR HX - - -
A - -
- 3. PRHR HX - - - - -
A
- 4. CMT, RNS, part ADS M Yes Yes A Yes -
- 5. CMT, IRWST, full ADS - - -
A Yes -
- 6. CMT,IRWST, full ADS - - - -
Yes M
- 7. Accum, RNS, part ADS M Yes Yes M Yes -
- 8. Accum, IRWST, full ADS - - - -
Yes M o Containment Cooling
- 1. Fan Coolers A Yes Yes - - -
- 2. CV external air, water drain - - -
A - -
- 3. CV external air, water drain - - - - -
A
- 4. CV external water fire sys only M Yes Yes - - -
- 5. CV external air only - - - - - -
Notes:
- 1) Manual controls are provided. The PLS has nonsafety-related MCB soft control switches. The PMS has safety-related MCB manual controls via both individual soft control switches and dedicated system level switches. The DAS has MCB manual controls via dedicated switches.
- 2) Reactor is shut down by negative moderator temperature coefficient as the coolant heats up. Requires automatic RCS pressure relief, turbine trip, and PRHR HX actuation. Also requires manual CMT or CVS boration.
I I TABLE 3.1-1: LOSS MAIN FEEDWATER AT FULL POWER ACTUATION GW-GSY-001 43 Revision 1 April 12,1994
I i 1 I I l l l l LOOP ; i l l l l t AUTO SFW, CVS
> SUCCESS :
NO ADS I l l i t' AUTO PRHR HX, CMT, SAFETY CASE PCS > SUCCESS NO ADS-j - l l , t : AUTO CMT, PARTIAL ADS > SUCCESS MAN RNS INJECT ADS, NO FLOOD l l 4 i l i T AUTO CMT, FULL ADS, l IRWST,PCS > SUCCESS i ADS, FLOOD l
- l I
t l MAN FULL ADS, [- AUTO ACCUM, IRWST, > SUCCESS l PCS ADS, FLOOD l !' l t ! CORE DAMAGE l l , 9 : SUCCESS i l 4 FAILURE ! FIGURE 3.1-2: LOSS OFFSITE POWER AT FULL POWER FLOW CHART
- GW-GSY-001 44 Revision 1 April 12,1994 I
1 l Actuation / Electrical Systems Non-Safety Safety Diverse i Function System Order of Use PLS DC AC PMS DC DAS (1) (1) (1) o Reactor Shutdown
- 1. Control Rods - - -
A - -
- 2. Control Rods - - - - -
A
- 3. Ride Out (2) M Yes -Yes - -
A o RCSInventory Control
~
1.CVS A Yes Yes - - - 2.CMT - - - A - - 3.CMT - - - - - A .
- 4. CMT, RNS pan ADS M Yes Yes A Yes -
- 5. CMT, IRWST, full ADS - - -
A Yes -
- 6. CMT, IRWST, full ADS - - - -
Yes M
- 7. Accum, RNS, part ADS M Yes Yes M Yes -
- 8. Accum, IRWST, full ADS - - - -
Yes M o RCS Heat Removal 1.SFW A Yes Yes - - -
- 2. PRHR HX - - -
A - -
- 3. PRHR HX - - - - -
A
- 4. CMT, RNS, pad ADS M Yes Yes A Yes - -
- 5. CMT, IRWST, full ADS - - -
A Yes -
- 6. CMT, IRWST, full ADS - - - -
Yes M
- 7. Accum, RNS, part ADS M Yes Yes M Yes -
- 8. Accum, IRWST, full ADS - - - -
Yes M o Containment Cooling
- 1. Fan Coolers A Yes Yes - - -
- 2. CV external air, water drain - - -
A - -
- 3. CV external air, water drain - - - - -
A
- 4. CV external water fire sys only M Yes Yes - - -
- 5. CV external air only - - - - - -
i Notes: 1
- 1) Manual controls are provided. The PLS has nonsafety-related MCB soft control switches. The PMS has !
safety-related MCB manual controls via both individual soft control switches and dedicated system level ! switches. The DAS has MCB manual controls via dedicated switches. !
- 2) Reactor is shut down by negative moderator temperature coefficient as the coolant heats up. Requires automatic RCS pressure relief, turbine trip and PRHR HX actuation. Also requires manual CMT or CVS boration.
TABLE 3.1-2: LOSS OFFSITE POWER AT FULL POWER ACTUATION GW-GSY@l 45 Revision 1 April 12.1994
LOSS AC i ! l ! , 1 9 l AUTO PRHR HX, CMT, SAFETY CASE PCS > SUCCESS l NO ADS l i l i 1 I t ! AUTO CMT, FULL ADS, IRWST,- PCS > SUCCESS
- ADS, FLOOD I
1 l t MAN FULL ADS AUTO ACCUM, IRWST, > SUCCESS ' > PCS ADS, FLOOD l s l ! i t CORE DAMAGE l l i 7 - SUCCESS i I I I ! 4 FAILURE l- FIGURE 3.1-3: LOSS ALL AC POWER AT FULL POWER FLOW CHART ! GW-GilY@l 46 Revision 1 April 12,1994 l l
i l l l Actuation / Electrical Systems Non Safety Safety Diverse i System Orderof Use PLS DC AC PMS DC DAS , o Reactor Shutdown .
- 1. Control Rods (2) - - - - - -
- 2. Ride Out (3) - - - - -
M , o RCS Inventory Control l
-1.CMT - - -
A - - 2.CMT - - - - - A
- 3. CMT,IRWST, full ADS - - -
A Yes -
- 4. CMT, IRWST, full ADS - - - -
Yes M
- 5. Accum, IRWST, full ADS - - - -
Yes M: o RCS Heat Removal
- 1. PRHR HX - - -
A - -
- 2. PRHR HX - - - - -
A
- 3. CMT, IRWST, full ADS - - -
A Yes. - ! 4. CMT,IRWST, full ADS - - - - Yes M
- 5. Accum, IRWST, full ADS - - - -
Yes M o Containment Cooling
- 1. CV external air, water drain - - -
A - -
- 2. CV external air, water drain - - - - -
A
- 3. CV external air only - - - - - -
Notes:
- 1) Manual controls are provided. The PLS has nonsafety-related MCB soft control switches. The PMS has '
safety related MCB manual controls via both individual soft control switches and dedicated system level j switches. The DAS has MCB manual controls via dedicated switches.
- 2) Control rod drive mechanisms are de-energized by loss of all AC power. .
t
- 3) Reactor is shut down by negative moderator temperature coefficient as the coolant heats up. Requires automatic l RCS pressure relief, turbine trip, and PRHR HX actuation. Also requires manual boration by CMTs.
1 I TABLE 3.1-3: LOSS ALL AC POWER FEEDWATER AT FULL POWER ACTUATION GW-GSY-001 47 Revision 1 April 12,1994
Sm SLB l l l t l AUTO CVS, SFW
> SUCCESS NO ADS l
l i
?
AUTO CMT, PRHR HX, SAFETY CASE SFW ISOL, PCS > SUCCESS NO ADS i t AUTO CMT, l 1 P ARTI AL ADS > SUCCESS ADS, NO FLOOD MAN RNS INJECT l l Y AUTO CMT, FULL ADS, IRWST, PCS > SUCCESS ADS, FLOOD l Y MAN FULL ADS AUTO ACCUM, IRWST, --> SUCCESS PCS ADS, FLOOD l l . I l Y CORE DAMAGE t : SUCCESS l 4 FAILURE FIGURE 3.1-4: SMALL STEAM LINE BREAK AT FULL POWER FLOW CIIART GW-GSY-001 4g Revision 1 i April 12,1994 l i l
Actuation / Electrical Systems Non-Safety Safety ' Diverse Function System Order of Use PLS DC AC PMS DC DAS o Reactor Shutdown
- 1. Control Rods - - -
A - -
- 2. Control Rods - - - - -
A
- 3. Ride Out (2) M Yes Yes - -
A ' o RCS Inventory Control 1.CVS A Yes Yes - - - i 2.CMT - - - A - - 3.CMT - - - - - A l 4 4. CMT, RNS, part ADS M Yes Yes A Yes -
- 5. CMT, IRWST, full ADS - - -
A Yes -
- 6. CMT, IRWST, full ADS' - - - -
Yes M
- 7. Accum, RNS, part ADS M Yes Yes M Yes -
- 8. Accum, IRWST, full ADS - - - -
Yes M o RCS Heat Removal 1.SFW A Yes Yes - - - l
- 2. PRHR HX - - -
A - - i
- 3. PhHR HX - - - - -
A
- 4. CMT, RNS, part ADS M Yes Yes A Yes -
- 5. CMT, IRWST, full ADS - - -
A Yes -
- 6. CMT, IRWST, full ADS - - - -
Yes M
- 7. Accum, RNS, part ADS M Yes Yes M Yes -
- 8. Accum, IRWST, full ADS - - - -
.Yes M o Containment Cooling
- 1. Fan Coolers A Yes Yes - - -
- 2. CV external air, water drain - - -
A - -
- 3. CV external air, water drain - - - - -
A
- 4. CV external water fire sys only M Yes Yes' - - -
- 5. CV external air only - - - - - -
Notes: l 1) Manual controls are provided. The PLS has nonsafety-related MCB soft control switches. The PMS has I saf ety-related MCB manual controls via both individual soft control switches and dedicated system level switches. The DAS has MCB manual controls via dedicated switches.
- 2) Reactor RCS pressure is shut relief, downturbine by negative trip, andmoderator PRHR HX ternperature actuation. Alsocoefficient as theCMT requires manual coolant or C heats uk')/S boration.. Requires a l
TABLE 3.1-4: SMALL STEAM LINE BREAK AT FULL POWER ACTUATION GW-GsY-001 49 Revision 1 April 12,1994
. _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ - _ - _ - _ _ _ _ - . . 0
Lg SLB i l l t AUTO CMT, PRHR HX, SAFETY CASE SFW ISOL, PCS > SUCCESS NO ADS i i t AUTO CMT, PARTI AL ADS > SUCCESS MAN RNS INJECT ADS, NO FLOOD I l 1 t AUTO CMT, FULL ADS, IRWST,PCS > SUCCESS ADS, FLOOD i i t MAN FULL ADS AUTO ACCUM, IRWST, >- SUCCESS PCS ADS, FLOOD l I T CORE DAMAGE 7 - SUCCESS l 4 FAILURE FIGURE 3.1-5: LARGE STEAM LINE BREAK AT FULL POWER FLOW CIIART GW-GSY-001 50 Revision 1 April 12,1994
Actuation / Electrical Systems Non-Safety Safety Diverse System Order of Use PLS DC AC PMS DC DAS o Reactor Shutdown
- 1. Control Rods - - -
A - -
- 2. Control Rods - - -- - - 'A M Yes Yes - -
A
- 3. Ride Out (2) j o RCSInventory Control 1.CMT - - -
A - - 2.CMT - - - - - A
- 3. CMT, RNS, pad ADS M Yes Yes A Yes -
- 4. CMT, IRWST, full ADS _ - - -
A Yes -
- 5. CMT, IRWST, full ADS - - -
Yes M
- 6. Accum, RNS, part ADS M Yes Yes M Yes -
- 7. Accum, IRWST, full ADS - - - -
Yes M o RCS Heat Removal
- 1. PRHR HX - - -
A - -
- 2. PRHR HX - - - - -
A
- 3. CMT, RNS, part ADS M Yes Yes A Yes -
- 4. CMT,IRWST, full ADS - - -
A Yes -
- 5. CMT, IRWST, full ADS - - - -
Yes M
- 6. Accum, RNS, part ADS M Yes Yes M Yes -
- 7. Accum, IRWST, full ADS - - - - Yes M o Containment Cooling
- 1. CV external air, water drain - - -
A - -
- 2. CV external air, water drain - - - - -
A
- 3. CV external water fire sys only M Yes Yes - - -
- 4. CV external air only - - - - - -
Notes:
- 1) Manual controls are provided. The PLS has nonsafe -related MCB soft control switches. The PMS has !
safety-related MCB manual controls via both indiv i soft control switches and dedicated system level .) switches. The DAS has MCB manual controls via dedicated switches.
- 2) Reactoris shut down by negative moderator temperature coefficient as the coolant heats up. Requires automatic RCS pressure relief, turbine trip, and PRHR HX actuation. Also requires manual CMT or CVS boration.
I l TABLE 3.1-5: LARGE STEAM LINE BREAK AT FULL POWER ACTUATION GW-GSY-001 51 Revision 1 April 12.1994
SGTR I l i Y AUTO CVS, SFW MANUAL SG ISOL, > SUCCESS RCS COOL /DEPRES NO ADS I l V AUTO CMT, PRHR HX, SAFETY CASE CVS / SFW ISOL, > SUCCESS PCS NO ADS i l 1 t AUTO CMT, PARTIAL ADS > SUCCESS M AN RNS INJECT ADS, NO FLOOD i l T AUTO CMT, FULL ADS, IRWST,PCS > SUCCESS ADS, FLOOD l l l t MAN FULL ADS AUTO ACCUM, IRWST, > SUCCESS PCS ADS, FLOOD I l Y CORE DAMAGE 1 - SUCCESS l 4 FAILURE FIGURE 3.1-6: STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE AT FULL POWER FLOW CHART GW-GSY-001 52 Revision 1 April 12,1994
Actuation / Electrical Systems Non-Safety Safety . Diverse Function System Order of Use PLS- DC AC PMS DC DAS o Reactor Shutdown
- 1. Control Rods - - -
A - -
- 2. Control Rods - - - .
A o RCS Inventory Control
- 1. CVS, SG isolation A '/as Yes M - -
- 2. CMT, CVS isolation A- Yes
- 3. CMT, CVS isolation M Yes - -
Yes M , 4. CMT, RNS, part ADS M Yes Yes A Yes -
- 5. CMT,IRWST, full ADS - - -
A Yes -
- 6. CMT, IRWST, full ADS - - - --
Yes M
- 7. Accum, RNS, part ADS M Yes Yes M Yes .-
- 8. Accum. IRWST, full ADS . - - - -
Yes M o RCS Heat Removal
- 1. SFW A Yes Yes - - -
- 2. PRHR HX, SFWisolation - - -
A Yes -
- 3. PRHR HX, SFW isolation M Yes - -
Yes- M ,
- 4. CMT, RNS, pan ADS M Yes Yes A Yes - '
- 5. CMT,IRWST, full ADS - -
A Yes -
- 6. CMT, IRWST, full ADS - - - -
Yes M
- 7. Accum, RNS, part ADS M Yes Yes M Yes - ,
- 8. Accum, IRWST, full ADS - - - .- Yes M o Containment Cooling :
- 1. Fan Coolers A Yes Yes - - -
- 2. CV external air, water drain - - -
A - -
- 3. CV external air, water drain - - - - -
A
- 4. CV external water fire sys only M Yes Yes - - -
i
- 5. CV external air only - - - - - -
?
Notes:
- 1) Manual controls are provided. The PLS has nonsafety-related MCB soft control switches. The PMS has ,
safety-related MCB manual controls via both individual soft control switches and dedicated system level switches. The DAS has MCB manual controls via dedicated switches. , TABLE 3.1-6: STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE AT FULL POWER ACTUATION l l GW-GSY-001 53 Revision 1 April 12.1994 5 t i
----g ,p.
.,- .e ,p- v-wa+ y----mm.s y , ,
RCS LEAK l l Y AUTO CVS, SFW NORMAL SHUTDOWN > SUCCESS NO ADS _ I T AUTO CMT, PRHR HX NORMAL SHUTDOWN > SUCCESS NO ADS . l l i Y ' AUTO CMT, PRHR HX, P ART ADS, IRWST > SUCCESS MAN RNS INJECT ADS, NO FLOOD l .._ i Y AUTO CMT, PRHR HX, SAFETY CASE FULL ADS, IRWST, > SUCCESS PCS ADS, FLOOD i l Y MAN FULL ADS AUTO ACCUM, IRWST, > SUCCESS PCS ADS, FLOOD l Y CORE DAMAGE t : success I 4 FAILURE FIGURE 3.1-7: RCS LEAK (0 TO 3/8") AT FULL POWER FLOW CHART GW-GSY-001 54 - April 12,1994
i i i Actuation / Electrical Systems Non-Safety Safety ' Diverse Function !
- System Order of Use PLS DC AC PMS DC DAS 1
- (1) (1) (1)
. o Reactor Shutdown
- 1, Control Rods - - -
A - -
- 2. Control Rods - - - - -
A i 3. Ride Out (2) M Yes Yes - - A i 1 o RCS Inventory Control ! 1.CVS A Yes Yes - - -
- 2. CMT, RNS, part ADS M Yes Yes A Yes -
- 3. CMT, IRWST, full ADS - - -
A Yes -
- 4. CMT, IRWST, full ADS -
Yes M
- 5. Accum, RNS, part ADS M Yes Yes M Yes -
- 6. Accum, IRWST, full ADS - - - -
Yes M o RCS Heat Removal 1.SFW A Yes Yes - - -
- 2. PRHR HX - - -
'A - -
- 3. CMT, RNS, part ADS M Yes Yes A Yes -
- 4. CMT, IRWST, full ADS - - -
A Yes -
- 5. CMT, IRWST, full ADS - - - -
Yes M
- 6. Accum, RNS, part ADS M Yes Yes M Yes -
- 7. Accum, IRWST, full ADS - - - -
Yes M o Containment Cooling
- 1. Fan Coolers A Yes Yes - - -
- 2. CV external air, water drain - - -
A - -
- 3. CV external air, water drain - - - - -
A
- 4. CV external water fire sys only M Yes Yes - - - -
- 5. CV external air only - - - - - -
Notes:
- 1) Manual controls are provided. The PLS has nonsafety-related MCB soft control switches. The PMS has safety-related MCB manual controls via both individual soft control switches and dedicated system level switches. The DAS has MCB manual controls via dedicated switches.
- 2) Reactor is shut down by negative moderator temperature coefficient as the coolant heats up. Requires automatic RCS pressure relief, turbine trip, and PRHR HX actuation. Also requires manual CMT or CVS boration.
TABLE 3.1-7: RCS LEAK (0 TO 3/8") AT FULL POWER ACTUATION GW-GSY-001 55 Revision 1 April 12.1994
RCS LEAK l l Y AUTO CVS, SFW, CMT, PRHR HX + SUCCESS NORM AL SHUTDOWN NO ADS i I I Y AUTO CMT, PRHR HX, PARTIAL ADS > SUCCESS MAN RNS INJECT ADS, NO FLOOD I I i t AUTO CMT, PRHR HX, SAFETY CASE FULL ADS, IRWST, > SUCCESS PCS ADS, FLOOD Y ACCUM, IRWST MAN ADS (FULL) > SUCCESS AUTO PCS ADS, FLOOD i l Y CORE DAMAGE i - SUCCESS i 4 FAILURE FIGURE 3.1-8: RCS LEAK (3/8" TO 1") AT FULL POWER FLOW CIIART GW-GSY-001 56 Rev ision 1 April 12,1944
Actuation / Electrical Systems Non-Safety Safety Diverse System Order of Use PLS DC AC PMS DC DAS _. (1) (1) (1) o Reactor Shutdown 1
- 1. Control Rods - - -
A - - '
- 2. Control Rods - - - - -
A o RCS Inventory Control
- 1. CVS, RNS M Yes Yes - - -
- 2. CMT, RNS, part ADS M Yes Yes A Yes -
- 3. CMT, IRWST, full ADS - - -
A Yes -
- 4. CMT, IRWST, full ADS - - - -
Yes M
- 5. Accum, RNS, part ADS M Yes Yes M Yes -
- 6. Accum, IRWST, full ADS - - - -
Yes M o RCS Heat Removal
- 1. SFW, PRHR HX A Yes Yes M - -
{_
- 2. PRHR HX - - -
A - -
- 3. CMT, RNS, part ADS M Yes Yes A Yes -
- 4. CMT, IRWST, full ADS - - -
A Yes -
- 5. CMT, IRWST, full ADS - - - -
Yes M
- 6. Accum, RNS, part ADS M Yes Yes M Yes -
- 7. Accum, IRWST, full ADS - - - -
Yes M o Containment Cooling
- 1. CV external air, water drain - - -
A - -
- 2. CV external air, water drain - - - - -
A
- 3. CV external water fire sys only M Yes Yes - - -
- 4. CV external air only - - - - - -
Notes:
- 1) Manual controls are provided. The PLS has nonsafety-related MCB soft control switches. The PMS has safety related MCB manual controls via both individual soft control switches and dedicated system level switches. The DAS has MCB manual controls via dedicated switches.
TABLE 3.1-8: RCS LEAK (3/8" TO 1") AT FULL POWER ACTUATION GW-GSY-001 57 Revision 1 April 12,1994
Sm LOCA I I i AUTO CMT, PRHR HX, PARTIAL ADS > SUCCESS MAN RNS INJECT ADS, NO FLOOD I l i Y AUTO CMT, PRHR HX, SAFETY CASE FULL ADS, IRWST,
- SUCCESS PCS ADS, FLOOD i
Y MAN PARTIAL ADS AUTO ACCUM, IRWST, > SUCCESS PCS ADS, FLOOD l l Y CORE DAMAGE T - SUCCESS l 4 FAILURE FIGURE 3.1-9: SMALL LOCA (1" TO 10") AT FULL POWER FLOW CIIART GW-GSY-001 58 Revision 1 April 12,1994
Actuation / Electrical Systems Non Safety Safety Diverse System Order of Use PLS DC AC PMS DC DAS o Reactor Shutdown
- 1. Control Rods - - -
A - -
- 2. Control Rods - - - - -
A ] o RCS Inventory Control
- 1. CMT, RNS, part ADS M Yes Yes A Yes -
- 2. CMT, IRWST, full ADS' - - -
A Yes -
- 3. CMT, IRWST, full ADS - - - -
Yes M
- 4. Accum, RNS, part ADS M Yes Yes M Yes -
- 5. Accum, IRWST, full ADS - - - -
Yes M-o RCS Heat Removal
- 1. CMT, RNS, part ADS M Yes Yes A Yes -
- 2. CMT,IRWST, full ADS - - -
A Yes -
- 3. CMT, IRWST, full ADS - - - -
Yes M
- 4. Accum, RNS, part ADS M Yes Yes M Yes -
- 5. Accum, IRWST, full ADS - - - -
Yes M o Containment Cooling
- 1. CV external air, water drain - - -
A - -
- 2. CV external air, water drain - - - - -
A
- 3. CV external water fire sys only M Yes Yes - - -
- 4. CV external air only - - - - - -
Notes:
- 1) Manual controls are provided. The PLS has nonsafety-related MCB soft control switches. The PMS has safety-related MCB manual controls via both individual soft control switches and dedicated system level switches. The DAS has MCB manual controls via dedicated switches.
l I l TABLE 3.1-9: SMALL LOCA (1" TO 10") AT FULL POWER ACTUATION GW-GSY-001 59 Revision 1 April 12.1994 1
t r Lg LOCA I I t AUTO ACCUM, CMT, PCS
> SUCCESS NO FLOOD MAN RNS INJECT i
1 T AUTO ACCUM, CMT, IRWST, PCS > SUCCESS SAFETY CASE FLOOD i l Y CORE DAM AGE I l i - SUCCESS l 4 FAILURE FIGURE 3.1-10: LARGE LOCA (>10") AT FULL POWER FLOW CHART I GW-GSY-001 g ,,
. Revision 1 April 12,1994 l
l
Actuation / Electrical Systems Non-Safety Safety Diverse Function - System Order of Use PLS DC AC PMS DC- DAS (1) (1) (1) l o Reactor Shutdown
- 1. Voids, Boron injection (2) - - - - - -
o RCS Inventory Control
- 1. Accum, CMT, RNS (no ADS) M Yes Yes A Yes -
- 2. Accum, CMT,IRWST no ADS - - -
A Yes -
- 3. Accum, CMT,IRWST no ADS - - - - -
A I o RCS Heat Removal
- 1. Accum, CMT, RNS (no ADS) M Yes Yes A Yes -
- 2. Accum, CMT, IRWST no ADS - - -
A Yes -
- 3. Accum, CMT, IRWST no ADS - - - - -
A o Containment Cooling
- 1. CV external air, water drain - - -
A - -
- 2. CV external air, water drain - - - - --
A
- 3. CV external water fire sys only M Yes Yes -- - -
- 4. CV external air only - - - - - -
Notes:
- 1) Manual controls are provided. The PLS has nonsafety-related MCB soft control switches. The PMS has safety-related MCB manual controls via both individual soft control switches and dedicated system level switches. The DAS has MCB manual controls via dedicated switches.
- 2) Voiding in core provides initial shutdown, boron from PXS provides long term shutdown.
TABLE 3.1-10: LARGE LOCA (>10") AT FULL POWER ACTUATION GW-GSY-001 61 Revision 1 April 12,1994
i i SSE l I v l AUTO PRHR HX, CMT, PCS
- SUCCESS
! SAFETY CASE NO ADS l i t AUTO CMT, FULL ADS, IRWST,PCS > SUCCESS ADS, FLOOD I i t __ M AN FULL ADS AUTO ACCUM, IRWST, a SUCCESS , PCS ADS, FLOOD I I I ' t CORE DAMAGE 1 l 9 - SUCCESS
- l l k FAILURE FIGURE 3.1-11: EARTHQUAKE (SSE) AT FULL POWER 110W CHART GW-GSY-001 62 Revision 1 April 12,1994 l '
1
Actuation / Electrical Systems Non-Safety- ' Safety Diverse Function i System Order of Use PLS .DC AC PMS DC DAS I (1) '(1) (1) ! o Reactor Shutdown 1
- 1. Control Rods - - -
A - - o RCS Inventory Control 1.CMT A
~
- 2. CMT, IRWST, full ADS - - -
A Yes - o RCS Heat Removal
- 1. PRHR HX - - -
A - -
- 2. CMT, IRWST, full ADS - - - -
A Yes - o Containment Cooling
- 1. CV external air, water drain - - - -
A - -
- 2. CV external air only - - - - - -
Notes:
- 1) Manual controls are provided. The PLS has nonsafety-related MCB soft control switches. The PMS has ,
safety-related MCB manual controls via both individual soft control switches and dedicated system level switches. The DAS has MCB manual controls via dedicated switches. l TABLE 3.1-11: EARTHQUAKE (SSE) AT FULL POWER ACTUATION GW-GSY-001 63 Revision 1 April 12.1994
LMFW -l i i l i V AUTO RNS COOL, , CVS > SUCCESS l NO ADS ! l , l l l t MAN ISOL RNS l AUTO SFW, CVS > SUCCESS l NO ADS i I l 1 9 AUTO PRHR HX, SAFETY CASE CMT,PCS > SUCCESS NO ADS i l 1 t i AUTO CMT, FULL ADS, IRWST,PCS > SUCCESS ADS, FLOOD I l I t MAN FULL ADS l AUTOIRWST,PCS > SUCCESS ADS, FLOOD l l l l ! l l CORE DAMAGE 1 1 i
)
; SUCCESS 4
FAILURE l FIGURE 3.2-1: LOSS OFFSITE POWER AT HOT SIIUTDOWN FLOW CHART GW-GSY-001 64 Revision 1 April 12,1994 f
\
1
Actuation / Electrical Systems Non-Safety Safety Diverse . Function i System Order of Use PLS DC AC PMS- - DC DAS- 1 (1) '(1) (1) o Reactor Shutdown
- 1. Control Rods (2) 1 o RCS Inventory Control 1.CVS A Yes Yes - - -
2.CMT - - - - A - - 3.CMT - - - - - A
- 4. CMT, RNS, pad ADS M Yes Yes A Yes - s
- 5. CMT, IRWST, full ADS - - -
A Yes -
- 6. CMT, IRWST, full ADS - - - -
Yes M o RCS Heat Removal
- 1. RNS closed loop cooling A -Yes Yes .- - -
- 2. SFW (isol RNS) M Yes Yes M Yes -
- 3. 'PRHR HX - - -
A - -
- 4. PRHR HX . - - - - -
M
- 5. CMT, RNS, part ADS M Yes Yes- A Yes -
- 6. CMT, IRWST, full ADS - - -
A -Yes -
- 7. CMT, IRWST, full ADS - - - -
Yes M o Containment Cooling
- 1. Fan Coolers .A Yes Yes - - -
- 2. CV external air, water drain - - -
A - -
- 3. CV external air, water drain - - - - -
A
- 4. CV external water fire sys only M Yes Yes - - -
- 5. CV external air only - - - - - - .
l Notes:
- 1) Manual controls are provided. The PLS has nonsafety-related MCB soft control switches. The PMS has safety-related MCB manual controls via both individual soft control switches and dedicated system level switches. The DAS has MCB manual controls via dedicated switches.
- 2) Control rods are inserted and the RCS borated prior to the event.
)
l TABLE 3.2-1: LOSS OFFSITE POWER AT HOT SHUTDOWN ACTUATION GW4SY-001 65 Revision 1 April 12.1994
LOOP l l t AUTO RNS COOL, CVS > SUCCESS NO ADS I l l t MAN ISOL RNS AUTO SFW, CVS > SUCCESS NO ADS I l T AUTO PRHR HX, SAFETY CASE CMT,PCS > SUCCESS NO ADS i i i AUTO CMT, FULL ADS, 1RWST,PCS > SUCCESS I ADS, FLOOD l l I I t MAN FULL ADS ( AUTO 1RWST, PCS
- SUCCESS i ADS, FLOOD l
l t CORE DAMAGE 7 - SUCCESS NOTE (1) RCS PRESSURE BOUNDARY IS INTACT IN THIS CASE l 4 FAILURE FIGURE 3.2-2: LOSS OFFSITE POWER AT COLD SHUTDOWN FLOW CHART j GW-GSY-001 66 Revision 1 April 12,1994 l
Actuation / Electrical Systems Non-Safety Safety Diverse Function System Order of Use PLS DC AC PMS DC DAS (1) (1) (1) o Reactor Shutdown - - - -
- 1. Control Rods (2) o RCS Inventory Control 1.CVS A Yes Yes - - -
2.CMT - - - A - - ! 3.CMT - - - - - A
- 4. CMT, RNS, part ADS M Yes Yes A Yes -
1 5. CMT,IRWST, full ADS - - - A Yes -
- 7. CMT, IRWST, full ADS - - - -
Yes M i 8. IRWST, full ADS - - - M Yes - l o RCS Heat Removal l 1. RNS closed loop cooling A Yes Yes - - -
- 2. SFW (isol RNS) M Yes Yes M Yes -
- 3. PRHR HX - - -
A - -
- 4. PRHR HX - - - - -
M l 5. CMT, RNS, part ADS M Yes Yes A Yes - l 6. CMT, IRWST, full ADS - - - A Yes -
- 7. CMT,IRWST, full ADS - - - -
Yes M l 8. IRWST, full ADS - - - M Yes - o Containment Cooling
- 1. Fan Coolers A Yes Yes - - -
- 2. CV external air, water drain - - -
A - -
- 3. CV external air, water drain - - - - -
A
- 4. CV external water fire sys only M Yes Yes - - -
- 5. CV external air only - - - - - -
l Notes:
- 1) Manual controls are provided. The PLS has nonsafety-related MCB soft control switches. The PMS has safety-related MCB manual controls via both individual soft control switches and dedicated system level switches. The DAS has MCB manual controls via dedicated switches.
- 2) Control rods are inserted and the RCS borated prior to the event.
f' 1 TABLE 3.2-2: LOSS OFFSITE POWER AT COLD SIIUTDOWN ACTUATION GW-GSY-001 67 Revision 1 ( April 12,1994 ,
1 i I LOOP I l l l I l AUTO RNS COOL l M ANUAL CVS > SUCCESS NO ADS I I t i MAN IRWST (1) AUTO PCS > SUCCESS SAFETY CASE ADS, FLOOD I l l T AUTO IRWST (1) AUTO PCS > SUCCESS ADS, FLOOD i i I CORE DAMAGE I
)
< l l l l NOTE (1) ADS STAGES 1,2,3 WILL BE OPEN DURING MID-LOOP l 7 - SUCCESS 4 FAILURE l FIGURE 3.2-3: LOSS OFFSITE POWER AT MID-LOOP FLOW CIIART l l GW-GSY-001 68 Revision 1 April 12,1994 l l .
Actuation / Electrical Systems l . i Non-Safety Safety Diverse Function - System Order of Use PLS DC AC PMSL DC DAS o Reactor Shutdown
- 1. Control Rods (2) - - -
o RCS Inventory Control 1.CVS M Yes Yes - - - 2.CMT - - - M - - 3.CMT - - - - - M
- 4. RNS injection (3) M Yes Yes - - -
- 5. IRWST (3) - - -
M Yes -
- 6. IRWST- (3)
Yes A - o RCS Heat Removal
- 1. RNS closed loop cooling A Yes Yes - - -
- 2. RNS injection (3) M Yes Yes - - -
- 3. IRWST (3) - - -
M Yes -
- 4. IRWST (3) - - - -
.Yes ,
o Containment Cooling-
- 1. Fan Coolers A Yes Yes - - -
- 2. CV external air, water drain - - .
A - -
- 3. CV external air, water drain - - - - -
A
- 4. CV external water fire sys only M Yes .Yes - - -
- 5. CV external air only Notes:
- 1) Manual controls are provided. The PLS has nonsafety-related MCB soft control switches. The PMS has safety-related MCB manual controls via both individual soft control switches and dedicated system level switches. The DAS has MCB manual controls via dedicated switches.
- 2) Control rods are inserted and the RCS borated prior to the event.
- 3) ADS stages 1,2,3 are required by tech spec to be open during mid-loop operation.
TABLE 3.2-3: LOSS OITSITE POWER AT MID-LOOP ACTUATION GW-GSY-001 69 Revision 1 April 12.1994
RCS DRAIN l l l t M AN CVS INJECT l AUTO RNS COOL > SUCCESS NO ADS I I i t i MAN RNS INJECT
& COOLING > SUCCESS '
NO ADS l l Y MAN IRWST (1) SAFETY CASE AUTO PCS > SUCCESS ADS, FLOOD i t AUTO 1RWST (1) AUTO PCS > SUCCESS ADS, FLOOD I l Y CORE DAMAGE NOTE (1) ADS STAGES 1,2,3 WILL BE OPEN DURING MID-LOOP l 7 : SUCCESS l 4 FAILURE ! FIGURE 3.2-4: INADVERTENT RCS DRAIN AT MID-LOOP FLOW CIIART GW-GSY-001 70 Revision 1 April 12,1994
l l Actuation / Electrical Systems l Non-Safety Safety Diverse l l Function System Order of Use PLS DC AC PMS- DC DAS (1) (1) (1). l 0 Reactor Shutdown
- 1. Control Rods (2) - - - -- - -
o RCS Inventory Control - 1.CVS M Yes Yes - - - 2.CMT *
-M - -
l 3.CMT - - - - - M
- 4. RNS injection (3) M Yes Yes - - -
l 5. IRWST (3) - - - M Yes -
- 6. IRWST (3) - - - -
Yes A i
- o RCS Heat Removal
- 1. RNS injection (3) M Yes Yes - - -
- 2. IRWST (3) - - -
M -Yes -
- 3. IRWST (3) - - - -
Yes A o Containment Cooling
- 1. Fan Coolers A Yes Yes -- -- -
l L 2. CV external air, water drain - - - - A - - l 3. CV external air, water drain - - - - - A l 4. CV external water fire sys only M Yes Yes - - -
- 5. CV. external air only - - - - - -
Notes: -
- 1) Manual controls are provided. The PLS has nonsafety-related MCB soft control switches. The PMS has safety-related MCB manual controls via both individual soft control switches and dedicated system level switches. The DAS has MCB manual controls via dedicated switches.
2 Control rods are inserted and the RCS borated prior to the event. 3 ADS stages 1.2,3 are required by tech spec to be open during mid-loop operation. h t TABLE 3.2-4: INADVERTENT RCS DRAIN AT MID-LOOP ACTUATION GW-GSY-001 71 Revision 1 April 12,1994
l l
)
LOSS RNS I i I t MAN IRWST (1)
. SAFETY CASE AUTO PCS > -SUCCESS ADS, FLOOD ,
i I t AUTO IRWST (1) , AUTO PCS > SUCCESS [ ADS, FLOOD Y
- CORE DAMAGE I
l I l I I l NOTE (1) ADS STAGES 1,2,3 WILL BE OPEN DURING MID-LOOP 7 - SUCCESS i I 4 FAILURE FIGURE 3.2-5: LOSS RNS AT MID-LOOP FLOW CHART i GW-GSY-001 72 Revision 1 April 12,1994 ;
l t 1 ! Actuation / Electrical Systems Non-Safety Safety Diverse ; , Function . i i System Order of Use PLS DC AC PMS DC DAS (1) (1) (1) o Reactor Shutdown - - - - - i' 1. Control Rods (2) ! o RCS Inventory Control M Yes Yes 1.CVS - - - 2.CMT - - - M - - 3.CMT - - - - - M
- 4. IRWST - - -
M Yes -
- 5. IRWST - - - -
Yes A-o RCS Heat Removal
- 1. IRWST 3 - - -
M Yes - l A
- 2. IRWST 3 - - - -
Yes o Containment Cooling i 1. Fan Coolers A Yes Yes - - - l 2. CV external air, water drain - - - A - -
- 3. CV external air, water drain - - - - - A M Yes
- 4. CV external water fire sys only Yes - - -
- 5. CV external air only - - - - - -
- Notes:
l 1) Manual controls are provided. The PLS has nonsafety-related MCB soft control switches. The PMS has l safety-related MCB manual controls via both individual soft control switches and dedicated system level switches. The DAS has MCB manual controls via dedicated switches.
- 2) Control rods are inserted and the RCS borated prior to the event.
- 3) ADS stages 1,2,3 are required by tech spec to be open during mid-loop operation.
l l TABLE 3.2-5: LOSS RNS AT MID-LOOP ACTUATION GW-GSY-001 73 Revision 1 April 12.1994 1
LOOP I l l t : AUTO RNS COOL
> SUCCESS NO ADS I
l t MAN SFS COOL
> SUCCESS NO ADS I
I i t REFUELING CAVITY SAFETY CASE (1) > SUCCESS NO ADS i l Y CORE DAMAGE NOTE (1) EITHER CLOSE CONTAINMENT OR PROVIDE ADDITIONAL MAKEUP AFTER 72 HR, 1 - SUCCESS l l 4 FAILURE I FIGURE 3.2-6: LOSS OFFSITE POWER AT REFUELING FLOW CHART i GW-GSY-001 74 Revision 1 April 12,1994
i l i l t j Actuation / Electrical Systems Non-Safety Safety Diverse Function System Order of Use PLS DC AC PMS DC DAS (1) (1) (1) o Reactor Shutdown
- 1. Control . Rods (2) - - - - - -
o RCS Inventory Control
- 1. CVS M Yes Yes - - -
L 2. SFS Injection M Yes Yes - - -
- 3. Refueling Cavity Inventory (3) - - - - - -
0 RCS Heat Removal l 1. RNS closed loop cooling A Yes Yes - - - l 2. SFS cooling (refueling cavity) M Yes Yes - -- - ! 3. Refueling Cavity inventory (3) - - - - - l o Containment Cooling
- 1. Containment open (3) - - - - - -
Notes:
- 1) Manual controls are provided. The PLS has nonsafety-related MCB soft control switches. The PMS has l
safety-related MCB manual controls via both individual soft control switches and dedicated system level switches. The DAS has MCB manual controls via dedicated switches. i
- 2) Control rods are inserted and the RCS borated prior to the event.
l 3) Containment can be closed or additional makeup provided after 72 hours.' l l ! l l TABLE 3.2-6: LOSS OFFSITE POWER AT REFUELING ACTUATION 1 GW-GSY-001 75 Revision i I April 12,1994 1
, I
l l f l 4.0 DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS A or Auto Automatic actuation AC Alternating Current electrical power Accum Accumulator (safety) ADS Automatic Depressurization Valves (safety) ADS (part) Sufficient ADS valves to allow RNS injection, Stage 1,2 & 3 (safety) ADS (full) Sufficient ADS valves to allow gravity drain from IRWST, Stage 4 (safety) . AMSAC ATWS Mitigation System Actuation Circuitry ATWS Anticipated Transient Without Scram BAT Boric Acid Tank (nonsafety) CCS Containment Cooling System (safety) CMT Core Makeup Tank (safety) CV _ Containment Vessel, used for passive cooling (safety) CVS Chemical and Volume Control System (nonsafety) DAS Diverse Actuation System (nonsafety) DC Direct Current electrical power EOP Emergency Operating Procedures IRWST In-containment Refueling Water Storage Tank (safety) M or Man Manual actuation MMI Man Machine Interface RNS - Normal Residual Heat Removal System (nonsafety) PCS Passive Containment Cooling System (safety) PLS Plant Control System (nonsafety)
- PRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment PRHR HX Passive Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger (safety)
PMS Protection and Safety Monitoring System (safety) Pzr Pressurizer RCP Reactor Coolant Pumps RCS Reactor Coolant System (safety) S signal Safeguards Actuation Signal SFW Startup Feedwater System (nonsafety) SG Steam Generator SSD System Specification Documents TS Technical Specifications
- i. GW-GSY4)01 76 Revision I April 12,1994 f
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