ML20066B908

Proposed Tech Spec Changes Requiring Drywell Oxygen Concentrations to Be Maintained Below 4% Vol

ML20066B908
Person / Time
Site:	Quad Cities
Issue date:	11/01/1982
From:	COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20066B902	List: ML20066B900 ML20066B908
References
5364N, NUDOCS 8211090244
Download: ML20066B908 (8)

Text

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ATTACHMENT A

Commonwealth Edison Company I Quad Cites Station Units 1 and 2 Proposed Changes to DPR-29 and DPR-30 Technical Specifications Revised Pages

3.7/ 4. 7-6

3. 7 /4. 7-6a 3 . 7.=' 4. 7-13 5364N fIB21iO90244 '921101 ,

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i ATTACHMENT A 1

1 1 Commonwealth Edison Company

.i i Quad Cites Station Units 1 and 2 j

t Propose d Changes to DPR-29 and DPR-30 i

Technical Specifications 4

! Revised Pages : 3.7/ 4. 7-6 3.7/4.7-6a 3.7/4.7-13 I-

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QUAD-CITIES DPR-29

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points along the seal surface of the disk. 2) Vacuum breaker posidon in-dication and alarm systems

3) The position alarm system shall be calibrated and func.

will annunciate in the control tionally tested.

room if the valve opening

' exceeds the equivalent of 3) At least 25% of the vacuum l I/16 inch at all points along breakers shall be inspected l

the seal surface of the disk. such that all vacuum breakers shall have been inspected fol-

b. Any pressure-suppression cham- lowing every fourth refueling ber-drywell vacuum breaker may outage. If denciencies are be non-fully closed as indicated by found, all vacuum breakers the position indication and alarm shall be inspected and defi-systems provided that drywell to ciencies sorrected suppression chamber diferential Pressure decay rate is demon- 4) A drywell to suppression strated to be not greater than 25% chamber leak test shall dem-of the diferential pressure decay onstrate that wie hidal dir-rate for all vacuum breakers open ferential pressure of a kss the equivalent of 1/16 inch at all than 1.0 psi, the diferential points along the seal surface of the pressue dq rate hs a disk. exceed the rate which would

, occur through a 1 inch orifice

c. Reactor operation may continue without the addidon of air or

'IC provided that no more than one nitrogen.

quarter of the number of pressure suppression chamber drywell vac-uum breakers are determined to be inoperable provided th.t they are secured or known to be in the closed posidon.

d. If failure occurs in one of the two-position alarm systems for one or more vacuum breakers, reactor operation may continue provided that a diferential pressure decay rate test is initiated immediately and performed every 15 days thereafter until the failure is cor-rected. The test shall meet the re-quirements of Specincation 3.7.A.4 b.

5. Oxygen Concentration 5. Oxygen Concentration

a. After completion of the startup The primary containment oxygen con-test program and demonstration centration shall be measured and re-of plant electrical output, the pri- corded on a weekly basis.

mary containment atmosphere

,.,_ l shall be reduced to less 'than 4%

{

,W,; I twfjen by voltre with nitrogen gas during reactor power operaticn with reactor coolant 3rassure above 90 psig.

3.7/47 6

QUA D-CITIES t' DPR-29 lh3 eacept as specifwd h Specification 3.7.A.5.b.

l b Within the 48-hour period subse- i quent to placing the reactce in the '

Run mode following a shutdown, the contairrent atmosphere estygen con- l centration shall be reduced to less

. than di by volse, and maintained in this condition. Deinerting may cxrrence 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> prior to a '

shutdown.

c. For the period from 10 P.M. Janu-ary 14,1979 to midnight January 21,1979,the oxygen concentration li: nit in paragraph 3.7.A.5h shall not apply unless adequate supplies of nitrogen or system load condi.

tions sooner allow the inerting of the containment or shutdown of the reactor.

6. Containment Systems 6. Containment Systems DrywellSuppression Chamber Differential Pres. Drywell4uppression Chamber Differential Pres-sure sure

a. Differential pressure between the drywell s. The pressure differential between the drywell and suppression chamber shall be maintained and suppression chamber shall be recorded at at equal to or greater than 1.20 psid except least once each shift.

as specifwd in (1),(2), and (3) below:

(1) This differential shall be established within the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period subsequent to placing the eesctor mode switch into the RUN mode during a start.

up and may be relaxed 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> prior to reactor shutdown when the provisions of 3.7.A.5(b) apply.

i i{l 3.7/4.7-6s Amisedment No. 49

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QUAD-CITIES DPR 29 s

hydrogen, could resultif in it is present a loss in sufficientintegrity.

of containment quantities to result in excessively rapid reconcination, Tne at coolant loss-of oxygen accident.

concentration by volume minimizes the possibility of hydrogen combustion following a Sirificant quantities of hydrogen could be generated if the core cooling system did not sufficiently cool the core.

the fact that the oxygen analyzer indicated in 2 oxygen by volune.Providing an 1.CD by volume is consistent w The occurrence of primary system laskage following a major refueling outage or other scheduled shutdown is noch more probable than the occurrence of the loss-of-coolant accident upon which the specified oxygen concentration limit is based. Permitting access to the drywell for leak inspec-tions during a startup is judged gudent in terms of the added plant safety offered without sirl-ficantly reducing the margin of safety. Thus, to preclude the possibility of starting the reactor and operator and operating for extended periods of time with sipificant leaks in the primary system, leak inspections are scheduled during startup periods, when the primary system is at or near rated operating temperature and possure.

The amour period to provide inerting is judged to be sufficient to perform the leak inspection and establish the required oxygen concentration.

pressurized during periods of reactor operation. Le primary containment is normally sl1@tly containment but air could not leak in to increase oxygen concentration. Nitrogen used for inerting could leak out o Chee the contairment is filled with nitrogen to the required concentration, no monitoring of oxygen is necessary. tewever, at least once a week, the oxygen concentration will be determined as added assurance.

In conjunction with the Mark I Containment Short Term Program, a plant u'ilque analysis was performed (Reference 5) which demonstrated a factor of safety of at least two for the weakest element in the suppression chamber support system and attached piping. The maintenance of a drywell.mppression chamber differential pressure of 1.20 psid and a suppression chamber water level corresponding to a downcomer abmergence ranse of 3.21 to 3.54 feet will assure the integrity of the suppression chamber when objected to post 40CA sup.

pression pool hydrodynamic forces.

B. Standbl Gas Treatment System The standby gas treatment system is designed to filter and exhaust the reactor building atmosphere to the stack during secondary containment isolation conditions, with a minimum release of radioactive materials from the reactor buuding to the environs. One standby gas treatment system circuit is designed to automatically start upon containment isolation and to maintain the reactor building pressure at the design negative pressure so that all leakage should be inleakage. Should one circuit fa0 to start, the redundant alter.

nate standby gas treatment circuit is designed to start automatically. Each of the two circuits has 100%

capacity. Only one of the two standby gas treatment system circuits is needed to cleanup the reactor buUding atmosphere upon contair. ment isolation. If one system is found to be hoperable.there is not immediate threat to the containment system performance. Therefore, reactor operation or refueling operation may continue whUe repairs are being made. If neither circuit is operable, the plant is placed in a condition that does not require a standby gas treatment system.

WhUs only a small amount of particulates are released from the primary containment as a result of the loss-of.

coolant accident, high4fficancy particulate filters before and after the charcoal filters are specified to mmi.

mire potentis! particulate release to the environment and to prevent clogging of the charcoal adsorbers. The charcoal adsorbers are hstalled to reduce the potential release of radioidine to the environment.(Thein-place test results should mdicate a system lenktigntness of less than 1% bypass leakage for the charcoal adsorbers using halogenstad hydrocarbon and a HEPA fDter efficiency of at least 99% removal of DOP particulates.

3.7/C-13 Amendmast 46

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p QUAD-CI11ES

. DPR-30

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g the seal sudace

2) Vacuum breaker position in-dication and alarm systems

3) The position alarm system shall be calibrated and func.

will annunciate in the control tionally tested.

room if the valve pg 3) At least 25% of the vacuum exceeds the equivalent of breakers shall be inspected 1/16 snch at all points along sud eat allvacuum bMm the seal surface of the disk.

shall have been inspected fol-

b. Any pressure-suppression cham- lowing every fourth refueling ber-drywell vacuum breaker may outage. If denciencies are be non fully closed asindicated by found, all vacuum breakers the position indication and alarm shall be inspected and den-systems provided that drywell to ciencies corrected.

suppression chamber differential 4) A drywell to suppression Pressure decay rate is demon- chamber leak test shall dem-strated to be not greater than 25%

onstrate that with Mial dir-of the diferential pressure decay ferential pressure of not less rate for a!! vacuum breakers open than 1.0 psi, the diferential the equivalent of 1/16 inch at all ss m rm de not points along the seal surface of the exceed the rate which would disk. occur through a I inch orince

c. Reactor operation may continue without the addition of air or provided that no more than one nitrogen.

{ quarter of the number of pressure suppression chamber drywell vac-num breakers are determined to be inoperable provided that they are secured or known to be in the closed position.

d. If failure occurs in one of the two-position alarm systems for one or

~

more vacuum breakers, reactor operation may continue provided that a diferential pressure decay rate test is initiated immediately and performed every 15 days thereaner until the failure is cor- ,

rected. The test shall meet the re-quirements of Specincation 3.7.A.4.b.

5. Oxygen Concentration 5. Oxygen Concentration

a. Aner completion of the startup The primary containment oxygen con-test program and demonstration centration shall be measured and re-of plant electrical output, the pri- corded on a weekly basis.

mary containment atmosphere l shall be reduce $ to less than 44 7  :. CNY9en by vehme with nitrogen x.

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gas during reactor tower cperation -

1 with reactor coolant pressure above 90 psig 3.7/47-4

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L-QUA D-CITIES DPR-30 j{9 except as specified ki Specification 3.7.A.5.b.

l b. Within the 48-hour period sucee-quent to placing the reactor in the Run mode following a shutdown, the l contairrtent atmosphere cuygen cryi-centration shall be reduced to less l than 44 by voltne, and naintained in this conditicri. Deinertirg may cxrrience 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> yrfor to a stutdown.

6. Containment Systems 6. Containment Systems Drywell. Suppression Chamber Differential Pres. Drywell4uppression Chamber Differential Pres-sure sure

a. Differential pressure between the drywell s. The pressure differential between the drywell and suppression chamber shall be maintained and suppression chamber shall be recorded at at equal to or greater than :.20 psid except least once each shift.

as specifwd in (1),(2), and (3) below:

(1) This differential shall be established f

" within the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period su.bsequent to placing the reactor mode switch into the RUN mode during a start.

up and may be relaxed 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> prior to reactor shutdown when the provisions of 3.7.A.5(b) apply.

(2) This differential may be decreased to less than 1.20 psid for a maximum of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> during required operability testing of the HPCI system pump, the RCIC system pump, the drywell-pressure suppression chamber vacuum breakers, and reactor pressure relief valves.

0 3.7/4.74a A h 46

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QUAD-CITIES DPR-30 h.a..

hydrogen, if it is gesent in sufficient quantities to result in excessively rapid reconcination, could result in a loss of containment integrity.

Tne as oxygen concentration by volume minimizes the possibility of hydrogen combustion following a loss-of. coolant accident. Sipificant cuantities of hydrogen could be generated if the core cooling system did not sufficiently cool the core. Providing an LCD by volume is consistent with the fact that the oxygen analyzer indicated in 2 oxygen by volume.

The occurrence of primary system leakage following a major refueling outage or other scheduled shutdown is such more probable than the occurrence of the loss-of-coolant accident upon which the specified oxygen concentration limit is based. Permitting access to the drywell for leak inspec-tions during a startup is judged prudent in terms of the added plant safety offered without sipi-ficantly reducing the margin of safety. Thus, to preclude the possibility of starting the reactor and operator and operating for extended periods of time with significant leaks in the primary system, leak inspections are scheduled during startup periods, when the primary system is at or near rated operating temperature and gessure.

The 46-hour period to provide inerting is judged to be sufficient to perform the leak inspection and establish the required oxygen concentration. lhe primary containment is normally sll@tly pressurized during periods of reactor operation. Nitrogen used for inerting could leak out of the containment but air could not leak in to increase oxygen concentration. Chce the containment is filled with nitrogen to the required concentration, no monitoring of oxygen is necessary. to wever, at least once a week, the oxygen concentration will be determined as added assurance.

In conjunction with the Mark I Containment Short Term Program, a plant unique analysis was performed (Reference 5) which demonstrated a factor of safety of at least two for the weakest element in the suppression chamber support system and attached piping. The maintenance of a drywell suppression chamber differential g

C- pressure of 1.20 psid and a suppression chamber water level conesponding to a downcomer submergence range of 3 21 to 3.54 feet will assure the integrity of the suppression chamber when subjected to post I.OCA sup.

pression pool hydrodynamic forces.

B. Standby Cas Treatment System The standby gas treatment system is designed to Alter and exhaust the reactor building atmosphere to the stack during secondary containment isolation conditions, with a minimum release of radioactive materials from the reactor bu0 ding to the environs. One standby gas treatment system circuit is designed to automatically start upon containment isolation and to maintain the reactor building presure at the design negative pressure so that allieskage should be inleakage. Should one circuit fall to start.the redundant alter.

nate standby gas treatment circuit is designed to start automatically. Each of the two circuits has 100%

capacity. Only one of the two standby gas treatment system circuits is needed to cleanup the reactor btilding strnosphere upon containment isolation. If one system is found to be inoperable,there is not immediate threat to the containment synem performance. Therefore, reactor operation or refueling operation may continue while repairs are being made. If neither circuit is operable, the plant is placed in a condition that does not require a standby gas treatment system.

While only a small amount of particulates are released from the primary containment as a result of the loss.of-coolant accident, high<fficiency particulate filters before and after the charcoal filters are specified to mmi.

mize potential particulate release to the environment and to prevent clogging of the charcoa! adsorbers. The charcoal adsorbers are installed to reduce the potentia! release of radioidine to the environment.(Thein-place test results should hdicate a system !caktigntriess of less than 1% bypass leaxage for the charcoal adsorbers using halogenstad hydrocarbon and a HEPA filter efficiency of at least 99% removal of DOP particulates.

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3.7/U-13 A===A-aat 46

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