ML20059A289
| ML20059A289 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Quad Cities  |
| Issue date: | 10/19/1993 |
| From: | Doornbos R, Jordan M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20059A281 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-254-OL-93-02, 50-254-OL-93-2, NUDOCS 9310260284 | |
| Download: ML20059A289 (10) | |
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b U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION s ,
REGIO!(yIli>3 Report No. 50-254/0L-93-02 -
A Docket Nos. 50-254; 50-265 Licenses No. DPR-29; No. DPR-30 :I Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company Opus West III
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1 1400 Opus Place i Downers Grove, IL 60515, Facility Name: Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station'- Units 1 and 2 Examination Administered At: Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Examination Conducted: Week of September 20, 1993 Examiners: R. Miller, Sonalysts D. Odland, Sonalysts Chief Examiner: f os
-x.) / /9, /993 Date '
RK. Door Approved By: / /f f3 M.Jgd(dan, Chief Date Opergtor Licensing Section 1 Examination Summary Examination administered durina the week of September 20. 1993 (Report No. 50-254/0L-93-02(DRS)): Written and operating requalification examinations were administered to six Senior Reactor Operators (SR0s), and four Reactor Operators (R0s). Three crews, made up of staff and operating personnel, were evaluated on the simulator portion of the NRC examination. Three SR0s and two '
R0s, who had been evaluated during previous examinations, participated during the dynamic simulator scenarios to complete the composition of the three Crews. '
Reaual Examination Results:
There were no individual or crew failures on the written, JPN or dynamic simulator portions of the NRC requalification examination. Based on the results of the examination and in accordance with the criteria of NUREG-1021, Revision 7, Operator Licensing Examiner Standards, ES-601, D.2.a, the Quad Cities Requalification Training Program has been assigned an overall program rating of satisfactory.
The following is a summary of the strengths and weaknesses noted during the performance of the examination and is provided for evaluation via your SAT based training program. No response is required. -
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Strenoths/ Weaknesses: ,Yr 5
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Strenoths
- Training and Operations Department policy to examine each SR0 in the i Shift Engineer position was good. (Section 3.a) '
- Evaluator performance during JPM administration was good. (Section 3.a) '
- Depth of knowledge tested by the static examination questions was good. -
1 (Section 3.b) e
- Crew communication during dynamic simulator scenarios was good. "
(Section 3.e)
Weakness
- Depth of knowledge tested by Category B exam questions was less than expected. (Section 3.b)
- Failure by two of three operators to meet the critical time expected by the Operations and Training Departments to perform a JPM (Section 3.c)
- Potential for predictability in scenarios (Section 3.d)
- Lack of defined scenario end points (Section 3.d)
- Failure to completely implement or refer to QC0A 1800-1, Area High Radiation procedure, in a timely manner (Section 3.e)
- Failure by the radiation protection group to identify the lack of entry control for the potentially contaminated laundry room (Section 4.b) 8 I
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4 REPORT DETAILS
- 1. Examiners M '
+*R. L. Doornbos, Chief Examiner, NRC, Region III R. Miller, Sonalysts D. Odland, Sonalysts
- 2. Persons Contacted a Facility
- D. Bax, Station Director' -
+*R. Armitage, License Training, Group Leader
+*J. Burkhead, SQV Superintendent '
- G. Campbell, CECO
- H. Hentschel, Operations Manager
+*J. Hoeller, Training Supervisor
- D. Kanakares, NRC Coordinator
- G. Klone, Operations Engineer, Station Lead Examiner
- J. Kudalls, Support Services Director
+*K. Rack, BWR Operations Training Supervisor
- B. Strub, Quad Cities - Asst. Supt. Operations
+*H. Swegle, Licensed Operations Instructor
+*C Symonds, Principle Instructor U. S. Nuclear Reaulatory Commission (NRC)
+*H. J. Jordan, Chief Operator Licensing Section, DRS ,
- T. Taylor, Senior Resident Inspector, Quad Cities
+*A. Mendiola, DET - OPS /TNG Team
+*D. O'Neal, General Engineer, NRC Headquarters
+ Denotes those present at the training exit on September 24, 1993.
- Denotes those present at the exit meeting on September 24, 1993.
- 3. Trainino Procram Observations
- a. Trainer / Evaluator Strenaths The trainers and evaluators were knowledgeable and courteous throughout the examination process. They put in extra time when necessary and maintained a professional attitude throughout the examination.
The evaluators did a good job of demonstrating their ability to handle the unexpected. When a JPM did not go as expected they quickly recognize ~d what to do and to'ok the appropriate actions.
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During the examination preparation week the simulator trainers and' i
~ hardware support employee provided excellent support in the diagnosis and correction of f,,.fagled simulator circuit card.
The training and operations (department policy to examine each SR0- '
in the Shift Engineer position was considered good. -
- b. Written Examination ' 'I Materials provided to support the requalification. examination showed improvement when compared to those provided for previous 9 l
7 requalification examinations.
Category A and B portions of the written examination were given in the simulator. The R0 and SR0 examinations had 20 questions each.
Two questions on the Category A portion .of the exam had to' be :
replaced. One was replaced because there was not enough information provided to the operator by the simulator to make an ,
informed choice and the other because the facility was unsure of.
the plant response to the fault described in the question. All
- operators completed the examination within the allowed 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />. '
The following strengths and weaknesses were identified.
- 1. Erenaths t The depth of knowledge tested by the static (Category A) exam: nation questions was good. The majority of the static 1
portion of the written examination included questions that required operators to analyze conditions and evaluate result:. in order to answer the questions. i
- 2. )Lqrknesses r
The depth of knowledge tested by Category B exam questions- :
was less than expected. Most of the Categ3ry B examination !
questions were at a low comprehension level. Category B' j questions did not challenge the operator's knowledge by i asking application, analysis, synthesis or evaluation type l questions as described in ES-602, Attachment 2. .] .
Operator JPM scores ranged from 80 percent to 97.5 percent with each operator performing five JPMs during their requalification examination. The following JPMs were performed during this examination.
- 1. JPMs performed in the control room / simulator were:
Perform a low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) Flow - i Rate Test on "A" Loop. -
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Bypass all Group 1 Isolation Signals.
Return Locked Fekdwater Regulator to Operation.
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Perform the Turbine Stop Valve Closure Scram Instrumentation Functional Test.
Insert Control Rods by Bypassing Scram Signals and +
Inserting a Manual Scram.
Perform the Periodic Reactor Core Isolation Cooling 7 (RCIC) Pump Operability Test.
- 2. JPMs performed in the plant were:
Locally start up a Diesel Generator with a failure of the vent fan to start.
Transfer the Safe Shutdown Make up Pump from Normal to Emergency Power.
Locally close a 4160 volt breaker with the pigtail device.
Perform an Emergency Diesel Shutdown following a failure of the engine driven cooling water pump.
The following strengths and weaknesses were identified.
- 3. Strenoths
- a. Individual operator style demonstrated during JPM performance was improved over previous examinations.
The operators appeared to know what the examiners and evaluators needed to observe in order to evaluate them and provide that information.
- b. Simulator JPM cues were well designed and provided the expected operator feedback for evolutions being performed outside the control room.
- 4. Weaknesses
- a. Two of three operators failed to meet the critical time ex; acted by the Operations and Training Departments to perform the JPM used for bypassing all Group 1 isolation signals.
. b. Cues provided on in plant JPMs for installation of jumpers did not take into account incorrect actions being performed by the operator. For example, one cue currently states " Jumpers are installed from terminal 5
l 40 to 41" however, a cue of " Jumpers are installed" would allow for jncorrect jumper placement by the operator. .u yw
- d. Simulator Scenarios _
l Simulator scenarios were completed in two days, therefore, six scenarios were required. A brief description of each scenario ?;l used during the examination is provided below, followed by iI strength and weaknesses identified.
1 Scenario #1 A Condensate Pumo Trio / Bus 13 Fire / Loss of 4 Vacuum /Unisolable Leak Outside. Containment: The crew will assume ;
the shift with the plant at 610 MWe and begin increasing load to~ l 700 MWe with recircs. The narrow range torus level instrument l will fail and the crew will refer to Technical Specifications. J The 1A condensate pump will trip; the crew will refer to Q0A 3300-1 to respond. The failed condensate pump will cause a fire which will result in the loss of Bus 13. The operators will scram the reactor to recover the plant in accordance with QOA 4400-4, but the remaining circ water pump will trip while in runout, resulting in a loss of condenser vacuum. A spurious Group 1 isolation will occur when the turbine trips, and the pressure transient will cause an unisolable leak in the HPCI system. Rising radiation levels will require the crew to blowdown the reactor per QGA 300.
The scenario is over when the RPV is blown down per QGA 500-1.
Scenario #8 - Taroet Rock Valve Sticks Closed /Electromatic Valve Sticks Open/Tailoiece Break - Blowdown: The crew will assume the shift with the plant at 100% power and perform QCOS 203-3, relief valve monthly surveillance. The Target Rock valve will stick closed forcing the crew into a shutdown condition per Technical Specification. The surveillance will be continued and a second relief valve will stick open with concurrent failure of the valve's downstream tailpiece, resulting in excessive pressure in the containment. The crew will blowdown the reactor per QGA 500-1 when pressure exceeds the Pressure Suppression Pressure (PSP) curve. Reactor manual and auto scrams will fail. The crew will refer to QGA 101 and rods will be inserted using Alternate Rod Insertion (ARI).
Scenario #9 - Loss of Auxiliary Power / Leak in Drywell: The crew will assume the shift with the plant at 100% power. Auxiliary power will be lost, and a small leak will occur in the drywell.
The crew will be unable to restore level using high pressure systems, and will perform the actions of QGA 500-1 to blowdown the vessel when level reaches the top of active fuel, after which level will be restored using low pressure syste'ms.
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Scenario #11 - Mispositioned Control Rod / Total loss of Hiah Pressure Feedwater: The crew will assume the shift with he plant at 100% power. An inadverten't bss of RPS "B" will occur which causes an individual control > rod'to scram. The crew will perform the actions of Q0A 300-4. A. leak will develop in the feedwater header in the steam tunnel, resulting in a loss of feedwater and a Group 1 isolation on high steam tunnel temperature. The pressure transient will cause a small break in the "B" recirc loop.
Several rods will fail to insert when the reactor scrams, but the reactor will remain shutdown. The HPCI system will fail and all high pressure injection will be lost. The crew will perform the 1 actions of the QGAs to blowdown the vessel and restore vessel level.
Scenario #19 - Battery charcer trio / Service water oumo trio / loss of instrument air /Unisolable steam line break: The crew will assume the shift with the plant at 100% power. A 125 VDC battery charger will trip and the crew will take action IAW the annunciator procedure. A running service water pump will trip; the crew will refer to Q0A 3900-1 and start an additional pump to restore service water pressure. The service water transient will result in the trip of an instrument air compressor, the crew will refer to Q0A 4700-2 and restart the compressor. Then a leak will develop in the reactor building instrument air header, leading to a loss of all instrument air. The crew will refer to Q0A 4700-1 and Q0A 4700-6 to respond. When the outboard MSIVs close the pressure transient will cause a steam leak in the steam tunnel, the "B" steam line will not isolate. The crew will carry out the actions of the QGA procedures and eventually blowdown when maximum safe operating radiation level is reached in two areas.
Scenario #26 - SBLC Souib Circuit Failure / Condensate Pumo Trio / Loss of Bus 14/ Diesel aenerator Failure / Station Blackout /LOCA-Steam Coolina: The crew will assume the shift with the plant at 50% power, an RHR loop is unavailable for LPCI, and '
the 14-1/24-1 crosstie is unavailable. The "A" SBLC Squib circuit will fail causing operators to take action IAW procedures and Technical Specifications. An electrical short will result in spurious closure of the Residual Heat Removal RHR 198 valve.
After the crew initiates an investigation of the failure, the IC condensate pump will trip, followed by loss of Bus 14. The Unit Diesel will fail to start during the transient; the crew will refer to Tech Specs, Q0A 6500-4, and Q0A 6500-6 to respond. A break will develop in the 1A recirc pump suction and high pressure injection systems will fail; the crew will refer to QC0A 201-1 and the QGA procedures to respond. When the reactor scrams, T-12 will trip and the 1/2 diesel will fail to auto start, rei.ulting in a station blackout. When the 1/2 diesel loads to 13-1, logic failure will prevent the low pressure ECCS from starting, .
resulting in loss of all possible injection sources to the vessel.
The crew will exit QGA 100 to QGA 500-2 when level reaches the top of active fuel. When the ADS valves are opened per QGA 500-2 the 7
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1 unit diesel will be restored, and low pressure. ECCS powered from the unit diesel will restoresvessel level. The scenario'is over-when vessel level has been re's. tared.
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- 1. Strenaths !
Scenario complexity was good. The depth the scenarios took the operators into the Emergency Operating Procedures was- !
good.
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1 2. Weaknesses The scenarios provided for administration on this
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examination had the potential for predictability, in that when electrical equipment was out of service the scenario always had electrical problems. Additionally, one crew had to respond to four scenarios, all of which resulted in .
reactor vessel blowdown. All six scenarios provided for the '
examination were blowdown scenarios.
l The majority of the scenarios provided did not have'a definitive end point. For example, several scenarios that -
ended in a blowdown with flooding allowed the use of QCOP 201-11, Determining RPV Level During Rapid Depressurization Below 450 psig, to exit flooding. Scenarios should have a specific.end point. If the intent of the scenario is to evaluate the crew's ability to' flood ~ the reactor or to flood the drywell, the scenario should be written such that the ability to exit flooding early is not available. However, if the intent.of the scenario is to evaluate the use of QCOP 201-11 then entry into flooding should not be accepted as !
successful achievement of the scenario objectives.
, e. Crew Performance:
All operators were graded as satisfactory in their performancs during the dynamic simulator scenarios. Strengths and weaknesses of the crews are discussed below. .
- 1. Strenaths Crew communication during dynamic scenarios was improved ,
over previous examinations. Two individuals on one crew either did not provide or had to be forced by other crew ,
members to provide the necessary repeat backs. However, ,
, overall the crews did well in this area.
- 2. Weaknesses Two of the three crews evaluated failed to completely implement or refer to QC0A 1800-1, Area High Radiation 8
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procedure during high in plant radiation conditions. This resulted in plant personnel not being evacuated during high radiation conditions in;the> reactor and turbine buildings in a timely manner. Only)thos'b persons being sent out to perform specific in plant evolutions were aware of the high radiation conditions. Those operators used to perform in plant evolutions were required to take a radiation '
technician with them.
- 4. Operations. Security. Rad Protection. Other ,
1 Overall interaction between the examiners and each of these +4 organizations was good. Specific strengths or weaknesses associated with particular organizations are identified below.
- a. Strenoth The security and radiation protection groups presented a professional demeanor while providing plant access to the examiners.
- b. Weakness The radiation protection group failed to identify the lack of entry control for the potentially contaminated laundry room. This room was left open without any type of radiation barrier at the door. When identified, the facility took appropriate action to correct the problem. *
- 5. Simulator Observ'atio_q
- a. No simulator discrepancies were identified.
- 6. Exit Meetina Separate training and management exit meetings were held at the Quad Cities training offices on September 24, 1993. Those attending these meetings are listed in Section 2 of this report. The following items were discussed during each exit meeting:
- Strengths-and weaknesses noted in this report.
- The general observations relating to the plant noted in Section 4.
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ENCLOSURE 2 REOUALIFICATIONPROGRdM.EVALUATIONREPORT
>< w Facility: Quad Cities Nuclear Power St$ tion 3 Examiners: R. Doornbos, Chief Examiner, Region III R. Miller, Sonalysts D. Odland, Sonalysts Dates of Evaluation: September 20 - 24, 1993 1
Areas Evaluated: X Written X Oral X Simulator h amination Results:
R0 SR0 Total Evaluation Pass / Fail Pass / Fail Pass / Fail (S or U)
Written Examination 4/0 6/0 10/0 S Operating Examination JPMs 4/0 6/0 10/0 S Simulator 6/0 9/0 15/0 S Evaluation of facility written examination grading S Crew Examination Results: 1 1
Crew 1 Crew 2 Crew 3 Evaluation Pass / Fail Pass / Fail Pass / Fail (S or U)
Operating Examination PASS PASS PASS S Overall Proaram Evaluat on '
Satisfactory l
l S .itted: Fo grded: Approved:
artukO R. Doornbos
$M. A6rdanu LL M. Ring Examiner , Section Chief Branch Chief 10/f7/93 10/l}/93 10/l4 /93 i
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