ML20054F935

Testimony of Dp Guido.Emergency Planning Drill Demonstrated That Directions Issued from Emergency Operating Ctr Could Not Be Implemented in Field Due to Variety of Deficiencies

ML20054F935
Person / Time
Site:	Indian Point
Issue date:	06/14/1982
From:	Guido D WESTCHESTER COUNTY, NY
To:
Shared Package
ML20054F925	List: ML20054F924 ML20054F932 ML20054F935 ML20054F944
References
NUDOCS 8206180230
Download: ML20054F935 (4)

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TESTIMONY OF WESTCHESTER COUNTY COMMISSIONER /SHERkFF DANIEL P. GUIDO DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY My name is Daniel P. Guido. I am the Commissioner / Sheriff of 3 5

ths Westchester County Department of Public Safety. This organization @

g was . created by a merger of the former County Parkway Police and the

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former Sheriff's Department. I thus retain all of the constitutional

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and statutory duties and responsibilities of a Sheriff, as well as .

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the responsibility for direction and control of this expanded Public  :

Safety Department. My role in connection with radiological emergencies at Indian Point can be summarized as follows:

In conjunction with local police agencies and the State L

Police, the maintenance of law, order, and public safety, and the protection of public and private property; subsumed  :

under these general headings would be the coordination of countywide traffic direction and control, including access to the radiologically af fected areas, and the general $

coordination of other normal police functions which the -

emergency may require.

The March 3rd drill confirmed, in large measure, that which fti we expected, with regard to the proposed emergency response plan; it L h

demonstrated that the various co mdssioners and other officials in Westchester County, who had major roles to play in managing the re-sponse to such a disaster, were capable of dealing effectively with such an event. It wal also made crystal clear, however, that whatever 3 5

directions did issue from the emergency operating center, simply could [

not be implemented in the field because of a variety of deficiencies. [

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These mainly fall under two (2) headings: lack of training and lack of equipment. In addition, there are.some untested assumptions, upon h which the evacuation plan depends, and which remain a matter of pure e i

speculation at this point. $m With regard to training, in my judgement, if we had a significant 3 5

radiological emergency at Indian Point today, we in the law enforcement / $

public safety community could not mount a meaningful response because our officers throughout the county have had virtually no training or E h

preparation for dealing with this kind of emergency. They do not { $

understand the elements of a radiological event, nor their proper role $

M in dealing with same. Similarly, our fire fighters and other volunteer E w

emergency workers, upon whom we will have to depend, will' require f such training if they are to be effective. We need an in-depth training h E

program to prepare these people. 5

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We are sadly lacking in very necessary equipment to fulfill @

the responsibilities that will devolve upon us in the event of such @

E an emergency. Our radio communications capability is woefully in- 2 5

adequate. Even in the immediate ton (10) mile zone surrounding the facility, the' various Police Departments do not share a common com-munications frequency. If the telephone lines become swamped and go g I5

'down', as well they might from an overload in an actual radiological 5

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emergency, the police coordinators will have no means of receiving g E

feedback regarding events occurring in the field. While there is a  :

w long-range, statewide program (the so-called M.R.D. Program) which  ;

E would remedy this situation, its implementation is scheduled over y

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many years, and would'not, accordingly, speak to our immediate needs. E Thare are other equipment deficiencies which have to be [

ti addressed. It will require, literally, thousands of workers to [

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adequately carry out our responsibilities in the affected area; we g V

have less than a thousand dosimeters. Those we do have are either too fa sensitive or not sensitive enough for the level of radioactivity we [L are expected to encounter. We have no protective clothing for these workers [

5 There are no maps with which to equip them so that they may better function in the affecting areas. Our facilities at the emergency operating center are inadequate; the room is too small, there are inadequate toilet facilities, it's much too cold in winter for _

L extended operating periods. Finally, the telephone capacity at our [

county warning point, which has a burden of making all initial notifica- "

tions to get the response mechanism implemented, is also inadequate.

While most of the above inadequacies can be remedied by the application of the necessary :esources (I say 'most' because there still may be some question as to the reaction of emergency workers when faced with a choice of attending to the immediate needs of their own families, who may live in an affected area, or fulfilling their assigned responsibilities under this plan) there is one major trouble- }

some item which the drill on March 3rd highlighted, the feasibility of evacuating 130,000 people from the affected area in the seven (7) or eight (8) hours which have been mandated. Apparently the evacuation plan is build on surmise, It appears to be based on premises which may or may not be valid. From past experience, it is predictable that a carefully orchestrated and controlled evacuation may not be possible, i.e., a substantial number of people will attempt to flee the area forthwith at the first sign of a major problem, thus acting in what they perceive to be their own best, immediate interest. The effect in terms of access, traffic congestion and possible frustration of l

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other portions of the response procedure, may be a situation wherein .

matters have gotten out of hand before adequate control mechanisms can be mobilized and are in place.

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. A complicating factor is that the surrounding road system does not. lend itself to the speedy movement of heavy traffic flows. Since we must first move buses in large numbers into this area to provide -$

m the means for this large-scale evacuation, we simply don't have enough information at this point to judge whether or not such an 2 exercise can be carried out at all, to say nothing of it being carried (i out quickly and safdly. We are'left with an admittedly unscientific, but seemingly sensible judgement, that it just won't be possible to .

meet these standards as the plan is presently structured.

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