ML20054B695
| ML20054B695 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point  |
| Issue date: | 04/15/1982 |
| From: | Brandenburg B, Morgan C CONSOLIDATED EDISON CO. OF NEW YORK, INC., MORGAN ASSOCIATES, POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK |
| To: | |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-SP, NUDOCS 8204190090 | |
| Download: ML20054B695 (44) | |
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c' T2 Ei? 15 19 53 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD Before Administrative Judges:
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Louis J.
Carter, Chairman
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JD'N Frederick J.
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Dr. Oscar H.
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$Y '9, VU' E.q In the Matter of
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CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK,
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50-247 SP INC. (Indian Point, Unit No. 2)
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50-286 SP
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POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
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April 15, 1982 (Indian Point, Unit No. 3)
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l LICENSEES' SUBMISSION IN SUPPORT OF OBJECTIONS TO CONSIDERATION OF EXPANDING EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE 3
950 s
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ATTORNEYS FILING THIS DOCUMENT:
Charles Morgan, Jr.
Brent L.
Brandenburg MORGAN ASSOCIATES, CHARTERED CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF 1899 L Street, N.W.
NEW YORK, INC.
Washington, D.C.
20036 4 Irving Place (202) 466-7000 New York, New York 10003 (212) 460-4600 82041900 0 02 7 0
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Licensees' Submission Pursuant to the Board's request at the Second Special Pre-Hearing Conference held on April 13-14, 1982, Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc., licensee of Indian Point Station, Unit No. 2 and Power Authority of the State of New York, licensee of Indian Point 3 Nuclear Power Plant (collectively the " licensees"), annex as exhibits hereto the following authori-ties which upon review, :he licensees believe directly support their objection to Contention 4.1 contained in the Board's April 9,1982 Order or any other contention that the size of the plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone surrounding Indian Point should be expanded beyond 10 miles:
Exhibit A Southern California Edison Co.
(San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), 14 NRC 691 (1981).
(See especially p.
698.)
Exhibit B Emergency Planning; Final Regulations, 45 Fed. Reg. 55401 (August 19, 1980).
(See especially p. 55406.)
E Respectfully submitted, s
/e Brent L.'Brandenburg Charles Morgan, Jr.
Paul F.
Colarulli Joseph J.
Levin, Jr.
CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY MORGAN ASSOCIATES, CHARTERED OF NEW YORK, INC.
1899 L Street, N.W.
Licensee of Indian Point Washington, D.C.
20036 Unit 2 (202) 466-7000 4 Irving Place New York, New York 10003
(,212) 460-4600 Thomas R.
Frey General Counsel Charles M. Pratt Assistant General Counsel POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATF OF NEW YORK Licensee of Indian Point Unit 3 10 Columbus Circle New York, Nee York 10019 (212) 397-62LO Bernard D.
Fischman Michael Curley Richard F. Czaja David H.
Pikus SHEA & GOULD 330 Madison Avenue New York, New York 10017 (212) 370-8000 Dated:
April 15, 1982 i
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Cite as 14 NRC 691 (1981)
LBP-81-36 UNITED STATES OC AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD Before Administrative Judges:
James L Kelley, Chairman Elizabeth B. Johnson Cadet H. Hand in the Matter of Docket Nos. 50-361-OL 50-362-OL l
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA I
EDISON COMPANY, et af.
(San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3)
September 14,1981 The Licensing Board refers to the Appeal Board a Licensing Board order raising on the Board's own motion the issue of possible effects on emegency plans of an earthquake of a magnitude greater than the Safe Shutdown Earthquake at the facility. In connection with the issue raised, the Licensing Board directs the parties to address questions of evacuation time in the event of earthquake damage to highways, per effect of structural damage to possible shelters from a radioactive plume or radioac, tive particulate debris, and radiation dose estimates in the event of delayed
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4-d EMERGENCY PLANS:
EART11 QUAKE EXCEEDING SSE in a seismically active area a Licensing ' Board should consider the h
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possible effects of a very large earthquake on emergency plans. This YM R ggfs g consideration could involve an earthquake exceeding the SSE and causing 4 ' l '. ' ' TI. ) 7 g?.'j f
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3-M [;> ['r[@.fi['M h REGULATIONS:
INTERPRETATION (10 CFR { 2.760s)
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Very specific or detailed factual f' dings are not a prerequisite to sua m
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a sponte review of an issue that is a serious safety matter. The Board need only give its reasons for raising the issue.
I LICENSING BOARD:
SUA SPONTE REVIEW A Licensing Board may raise a safety issue sua sponte when sufficient evidence of a serious safety matter has been presented that reasonable minds would inquire further. Very specific findings are not required since they could cause prejudgement problems.
.='2 EMERGENCY PLAN:
EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE A
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The size of the EPZ has been decided generically and is inappropriate
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for site specific analysis.
LICENSING BOARD:
CONSIDERATION OF GENERIC ISSUES Size of the EPZ is a generic issue, but other aspects of emergency plans, particularly evacuation routes, are site specific.
REGULATIONS:
INTERPRETATION (10 CFR { 50.47(a)
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A finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures Q
g can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency goes beyond h
a checklist determination whether a plan meets the standards at 10 CFR
$50.47(b).
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RULES OF PRACTICE: REFERRAL OF RULING TO APPEAL BOARD Y'
Referral of the carthquake issue in this case is based upon its possible significant ramifications for other cases, y
RULES OF PRACTICE: REFERRAL OF RULING TO COMMISSION lj Referral directly to the Commission by the Licensing Board will not be h
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TECHNICAL ISSUES DlSCUSSED: EMERGENCY PLAN MULTIPLE DISASTERS ORDER (Modifying Prior Orders Concerning Earthquakes and Emergency Planning and Referring Such Orders to l
the Atomic Safety snd Licensing Appeal Board)
Introduction
_-e-wm On July 29 and August 7,1981, the Board issued orders on its own 5
l motion raising certain issues concerning the possible effects on emergency plans of an earthquake of a magnitude greater than the Safe Shutdown i
Earthquake determined for the San Onofre facility. We hypothesized the l
occurrence of such an earthquake with resulting structural damage to the facility, to communications and highways designed as evacuation routes, and with resulting radiological releases at a level sufficient to trigger eva;uation of the plume exposure pathway EPZ. In these assumed circum-x stances, we asked -
what steps could be taken by the applicants and responding jurisdictions to carry out evacuation in a timely manner and/or protect those in the EPZ pending evacuation? What federal re-sources, including military resources, could be brought in to assist in this situation, and how would federal assisthnce be accom-plished?
While the quoted language is an accurate general statement of our con-cerns as they were first developed during the seismic part of these hear-l ings, we believe it would be helpful to particularize further the questions EQB3%N we want the parties to address and the degree of proof we expect on some P-questions, in light of the record as now developed in the emergency J,
planni;g part of these hearings.
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v Board Questions The situation we have hypothesized reflects our concern that substantial ed numbers of people might be trapped by the damaged highways in the populated areas of the EPZ' and unable to evacuate until after some of them received injurious or !cthal doses of radiation. In order to explore this possibility, the Board wishes the parties to address the following questions:
- 1. Evacuation time. Approximately how long might earthquake darnage to highways and structures (e.g., bridges, overpasses) delay evacuation, assuming that evacuation is precluded by such
^ g77 damage for some period? This question does require some expert assessment of the kind and extent of highway damage to be anticipated.: But we do not ex pect, for exampic, structure-by-structure detailed engineering analyses, or ground motion stud-ies related to particular faults; rough estimates from qualified experts will suffice. In addition, this question will require some rough estimate of speed of repairing or construction of alternate route capabilities available from Caltrans, Camp Pendleton, and perhaps other sources. Might completion of evacuation be delayed by as long as 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> from the time the need for it was determined?
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- 2. Shelter from radiation. The plans generally prescribe taking shel-
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ter to avoid exposure to a radioactive plume or to radioactive particulate debris after the plume passes. The Board assumes that i
As initially formulated our questions assumed "a need to evacuate virtually all of the people in the plume exposure pathway EPZ." In view of the tendency of radioactive releases to i
travel in plumes and the fact that virtually all of the people in the EPZ live near the coast to the r. orth and west of the facility (encept for Camp Pend:eton) the parties should focus their attention on what the Applicants have termed the North Sector of the "catended EPZ." See
%) bur Smith and Associates Evacuation Time Study. Revision 2. Figure 7a. Because of the special training and equipment available to residents of Camp Pend'eton, it appears that they wou d be much less vulnerable to radiological injury than civilians in the North Sector.
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in our Order of August 7. we made it clear that we were not exclusively interested in 2
1i situations where evacuation was entirely precluded by damage to hrghways We stated that we did not know what magnitude earthquake would be required to render the highways tevrarily impasubie Since then, however, the Applicants have virtually conceded tat damage to highways from an earthquake at or below the SSE could take away the evacuation option Tr 8346 And we have heard testimony from a Caltrans official concerning th,1971 San Fernando earthquake and its devastating effect on the high*ays in that area. Tr.
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That carthquake was a magnitude Ms 6 3, wc!! below the level proposed by the t5413 841$
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Staff and Apphcar.ts in this case as the SSE for the San Onofre facility Accordingly, our interest is now focused primarily, if not exclusively, on the case where high*ay damage does tem;urarily preclude evacuation.
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u-an earthquake of a magnitude sufficient to cause a radioactive j
release at the facility and highway damage severe enough to temporarily preclude evacuation would also cause serious damage to many residences and other structures. Again, without under-
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taking structure-by-structure engineering analyses, the parties should attempt to provide expert gross estimates of the extent of E - O structural damage to be anticipated. Would such damage (a) not t
effect, (b) seriously impair, or (c) totally destroy the usefulness of many or most structures in the EPZ as a shelter from radiation?
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- 3. Radiation dose estimates. Assuming that the evidence will show 1
some substantial delay in evacuation and degraded capability to take shelter, the Board asks the parties to provide an envelope of radiation dose estimates that will result, both in terms of mag-3'
'1-l nitude and r;mbers of persons effected. Assumed radiation re-
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leases should be those postulated in the PWR 2 accident in the Reactor Safety Study, WASH 1400 (NUREG-75/014) and refer-f, red to in the affidavit of Brian K. Grimes dated August 4,1981.
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in addition, the Board asks the parties for their gross estimates of the acute and chronic radiation effects, including fatalities, that may occur as a result of such exposures. The Board is aware of the controversies surrounding some aspects of the health effects of radiation. It would be both unnecessary and inappropriate for this proceeding to attempt to explore in any depth these essentially NSC _
generic issues. We ask for gross estimates of health effects only because they are necessary for us to arrive at a reasoned (albeit GM T very approximate) assessment of the risks to people posed by the l
postulated accident. Assuming that the parties may present dif-
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testimony, such a range may be adequate for our limited purposes.
Accordingly, we intend to impose very strict limits on cross-examination,if any, to be allowed on this issue.
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- 4. Methods of esseustion. Given the possible radiation injuries that m,
may result from long delayed evacuation by motor vehicle, are cffective alternatives available? For example, would it be possible for the able bodied population to walk safely cut of the EPZ (less than five miles for most of those involved) after the plume passes, i;
even though the ground may be contaminated? Presumably, those m
who are unable to walk could be ferried out by helicopter or other l
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In light of the fact that we are today referring this issue to the Atomic W
Safets and Licensing Appeal Board for its review, it will be helpful if we
.N il state our position on three points that are raised in memoranda from the t.
Applicants and the Staff in opposition to the issue and in support of
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referral.
a gq So-Called " Multiple Disasters". A " multiple disaster" in this context is SE.5 E
_ C[b a phrase coined by the Applicants to describe the coincident happening of 1
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two events that are very unlikely even when separately considered - c.g.,
a major earthquake near a nuclear power plant and a major radiological "d
emergency arisi g at the same time, but from independent 1
(non-earthquake) causes. In a prehearing order rejecting this concept, we made it crystal clear that such an exceedingly remote contingency "can be r
safely disregarded for any regulatory purpose."' Out only concern here is
.g-with the more credible event of an earthquake exceeding the SSE which f
gI causes a major radiological emergency and also delays evacuation.
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We find it necessary to refer once more to this matter only because fh much of the Applicants' Memorandum in Opposition to the Board's issue, while acknowledging our rejection of the concept, is nevertheless cast as an g
attack on " multiple disaster" planning. See Memorandum at pp.4,10-15, 19, 27-28. This may be explained in part by the Applicants' argument l
2 (Memorandum at p. 27) that because consideration of an earthquake in excess of the SSE is allegedly beycnd our authority, the Board is " forced
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he (emphasis added) - i.e., a "multye disaster' We are not " forced to Y
gY assume" anything of the sort. Although the question is not free from doubt, we think that the issue we hase raised and now refer is within our
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authority. But if we are wrong and are later resersed, we will simply drop
$2 the issue. Nothing will " force" us to explore our concerns in the wholly unrealistic framework of the Applicant' " multiple disaster" scenario.
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' Col. Jack Wallace. rer'esenting the U.S Manne Corps at Camp Pend:eton, testified about n.::
9315. et seq He cupressed plans to evacuate the Camp Pendleton secto' of the EPZ Tr confidence that the Mannes with their overland vehicles, could also evacuate the rest of the
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EPZ. if necessary Ho*ner. the present erre*gency plaas do not address such a contiagency
'.,,M in any detail Apparert;y. no in derth conside'ation has been gnen to this approach, apart A
fror-the general readmess of military forces to render aid in an emergency
- Memorandum and Order of Apn! 17,1981, pp 3-7. A copy of the relevant pornon of this T.M order is attached
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fees Factual Basis for the Board's Issue. Both the Applicant and the Staff Or-question the sufficiency of the factual basis for the Board's issue. Without y
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reference to the seismic record developed in this case, the Applicants find a
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" total absence of facts suggesting the existence of a serious.. safety is.ue."
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Memorandum, pp. 35-36. The Staff does refer to the seismic record, but
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c-These contentions raise a question about how far a Board must go in
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-P Ghc the way of analyzing evidence and making detailed findings as a predicate S ; J 4 g 5 M,, y of to raising an issue on its own motion. In our Order of July 29, we gave our t:
-a'IY' reasons for raising this issue and concluded with a finding that the issue is RfM is a serious safety matter within the meaning of 10 CFR 2.760a. We think
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h of that this complies with the Commission's recent directive to the Board on 6
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this subject and that no more is required by 10 CFR 2.760a.
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%I We referred to the Commission's Vermont Yan4ce' decision for the let general proposition that successively more conservative accident assump-be tior.s may be postulated for different regulatory purposes. The Staff seeks b
support in that case for a different proposition - that a Licensing Board
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context of emergency planning." In the first place, Vermont Vanket did
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Secondly, the case does not support the Staff even inferentially because, as ff 1 -
)n we read it, it deals only with the findings that are a necessary prerequisite b
S, to imposition of a regulatory requirement, not to the factual basis, if any.
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imposed.
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There are other reasons for holding that very specific or detailed b
findings are not a prerequisite under 10 CFR 2.760a to Board con-sideration of the question we have posed. Issues raised on a Board's own a
motion are necessarily raised at a preliminary stage, hopefully prior to gg hearing and at least well before initial decision. To force a Board to e
p premature detailed findings on what may be contested issues in order to y
raise a related issue suggests some serious prejudgement problems, pro-7-m-blems we have been at pains to avoid in this case. Beyond that, the whole concept of prior findings - beyond the generalized safety finding required
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by 10 CFR 2.760a - fundamentally inconsistent with the purpose of sua
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S Memorandum from the Secretary of the Commission to the Chairman of the Licensing 21 Board Panel dated Jane 30.1981, concerning sua sponte issues.
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sponte Board issues, namely, to find out whether a possible problem
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affecting the public health and safety requires remedial action.
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The foregoing reasons explain why we have not, to date, explicitly e Rp%f.Q-fC[(..
_n., s predicated our Orders of July 29 and August 7 on analysis and findings based upon the evidentiary record in this case. In fact, however, these P.
.,,( l orders are supported by evidence adduced during the seismic portion of the
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hearings conducted between June 22 and August 4,1981. The Intervenors
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Carstens, et al. put on a substanital case. The general thrust of their position was that the Safe Shutdown Earthquake previously determined C
and now proposed by the Applicants and the Staff is not sufficiently conservative - i.e., than an earthquake of greater magnitude or one
=s producing more destructive shaking at the site could occur. As illustrative of this evidence, we refer to the testimony of Dr. James Brune (following
_ _E m RBwas!!Egh Tr. 4122), Dr. J. Enrique Luco (Tr. 4976 5036), and Dr. Clarence Allen (Tr. 4725-4733).
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Both the Applicants and the Staff also put on substantial cases on these
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Inter enors' evidence here should not be read to imply any judgment on
.;gi these issues at this point. We refer to this evidence to show that we did T -
consider it in raising the issue in question and to refute suggestions that we were acting in a vacuum. We add only that, considered with reference to the issue we have raised, we think this evidence is " sufficient to require reasonabic minds to inquire further." Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant), 7 AEC 19, 32, note 27 (1974), affd sub nom. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council 435 U.S. 519, n
554 (1978).
Site Specific Accident Analyses. The Staff argues that -
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an adequate planning basis is assured by conformance with the Commission's regulations and site specific analyses are not re-('
quired for the extremely large releases already generically con-sidered in establishing the regulations.
y We agree with this argument as it applies to one provision of the emer.
gency planning regulations - establishing a plume exposure pathway EPZ of "about 10 miles," subject to minor adjustments for local conditions. 910 CFR 50.47(c)(2). In this case, we rejected as an impermissible attack on the rule a proposed contention that postulated a need for an EPZ of about twice that size. Tr. 3497-3499.
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But many aspects of emergency plans, particularly evacuation routes, N
are by their very nature site specific. We doubt whether the Commission could prescribe, by rule, a generic emergency plan suitable for all reactor sites, as the Staff's argument seems to suggest. In any event, the Commis-p f
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>blem sion did not try to do that, either in 10 CFR 50.47(b) or in Appendix E to
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, E i R *M Q Part 50. Except for the specific 10 mile EPZ, the rule speaks in general icitly terms, such as " adequate" emergency facilities, equipment, methods, h%
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..E dings systems. {50.47(8), (9). A Board can only judge " adequacy" with re-A' ' c
.. - b these ference to levels of risk, some aspects of which vary from site to site. In k# i
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)f the addition, Licensing Boards are required to make an overall general fmding 4
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'[hi;[p?kI 3"0T5 1 heir taken in the event of a radiological emergency." iS0.47(a). Such a finding A
p goes beyond a check-list determination whether a plan meets the standards nined fi.
ently of 10 CFR 50.47(b). And when, as here, a particular facility is built in a l'. % k, [.. g1 m
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seismically active area, we read the rule as requiring us to consider the
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'*I"8 The Applicants' and the Staff have advanced some other legal ar-
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guments against the Board's order which we have considered and with Allen which we disagree. Separate discussion of all these arguments is unneces-M E
&#T" sary to an understanding of our position and would unduly prolong this these h
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quir The Applicants have requested us to refer' our orders of July 29 and Pi8E5MiiM August 7 to the Commission. The Staff supports that request. We are lland granting that request, subject to the qualifications noted below.
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First, both the Applicants and the Staff mischaracterize the issue, as the Board views it. The Applicants' characterization states that we are gN acting "without factual basis" and requiring consideration of " multiple O
disasters." Request for Certification, p.2. As discussed above, neither of
.W the these claims has any merit. The Staffs proposed formulation of the issue
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' re-of a " severe natural phenomena" occurring "during" a radiological emer-con-7 W^33 gency, implying a lack ofcausal relationship between the phenomenon and T
c the emergency. Staff Response to Applicants' Request, p.1.
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' Both parties use the term
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- rather than " refer." The rules appear to conternplate
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- cerofication* under to CFR 2.718(i) where a board does not first decide the disputed Eston question, and " refer s!" under 10 CFR 2.730(f) where the board first rules and then requests inter cut ry review. Since c have ruled in this case, me are in a referral posture. Except for ic*.or mis-the fact that the rules and cases speak in these different terrns, the distinction appears to be unirnportant.
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J The issue we are referring for review is the issue as we have stated it in our Orders of July 29 and August 7, as further specified in this Order.
The basic legal question is whether, in the site-specific circumstances of this case, we are within our authority in postulating an earthquake ex-ceeding the SSE for the San Onofre facility in order to test the adequacy of the Applicants' emergency plans.' The arguments of the parties address this basic question and related issues in detail.
Rulings may be referred where necessary "to prevent detriment to the q{
public interest or unusual delay or expense." 10 CFR 2.730(f). See Public Service Co. of Ir. diana (Marble Hill), 5 NRC 1190,1192 (1977), and
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cases cited. In addition, the Commission has recently encouraged referrals "if a significant legal or policy question is presented." Statement of Policy s
- 'i on Conduct of Licensing Proceedings,46 Fed Reg. 28533,28535.
5 A hearing on the referred issue need not cause delay, unusual or otherwise, in deciding this case. The Applicants have filed a motion for a fuel loading and low-power license. Such a license would be predicated on m.wwgm.
4n a partial initial decision on the seismic issues and a showing of com-y parative lower risks, for emergency planning purposes, frcm low-power operations. This means that given the present posture of the case and assuming the Applicants prevail, they could receive a low-power license toward the end of November. On that schedule, they probably would not be ready for full power operations before February,1982, and perhaps later. In the meantime, we expect to finish the emergency planning hearings, minus the referred issue, in early October, and to be ready to decide those issues in January. This means that if the Appeal Board can q
decide the legal challenges to the Board's referred ruling by about the end C
of October, this issue can be heard in a week or so and factored into our
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decision on all remaining issues without any additional delay.'
l Nor do we see unusual expense resulting to the Applicants from going MME to hearing on the Board's issue. They contend that the issue will require them to develop a new emergency plan. But it is premature to speculate about what the Board may require, if anything, in the way of additional
' Arguably cur basic questior. about the adequacy of the Apphcants' emergency plans might have been raised in a different way. namely by postulating an earthquake of a magnitude shghtly below the SSE which causes a majer facihty accident and highway damage precluding rapid evacuation. Although there is no issue in this case about the actual integr ty of the facibty, a Board might hypothesire such a failure for the sole purpose of testing emergency p'anning capabihties. Although we have not chosen to frame the issue in this way, either approach presur ably would raise the planning issues that concern us.
- We sought the vices of the parties on whether we should go ahead and hear this issue while the referral *as pendeg. or await the result of the referral. No party tock any firm position i
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on the questien Tr. 9387 939 Given the possibihty of reversal and the present demands on our time. the Board intends to await the result of the referral. at least if it will be forthcoming by the end of October.
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i planning; all we are seeking at this point is information on the dimensions in r.
of the risk.
We believe that the Board's issue may have significant ramifications for of some other cases. That and the fact that it interprets a newly-adopted, t-broad regulatory scheme for emergency planning suggests the advisability
.4.
of early appellate review. We have considerable doubt, however, whether
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ss our issue has the sweeping rami 3 cations envisioned by the Staff. Staff
./J;.f.g? 'UJ P Response, pp. 910. Since scismic standards are set at some level for all
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le reactors, even in areas not regarded as seismically active, the Staff argues
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ic id that there are "no distinguishing characteristics which would prevent the application of the Board's approach to all Part 50 facilities." We think this k..l.f i f.C j ?.y
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is is an unrealistic appraisal of the situation. The San Onofre facility has NYMSYI 7
been constructed in a seismically active area; earthquakes are a serious safety concern. In areas of very low seismicity (much of the United States)
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presumably no comparable concerns would anse.
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>r The Staff also suggests that regulatory consideration of earthquakes can
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.n be equated with other natural phenomena, such as " blizzards, fog, tornados gg.g-1-
or hurricanes." With the possible exception of fog, it appears that these tr phenomena could temporarily close an evacuation route. But we question j
d whether they could, at the same time, cause a serious radiological accident
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e at a nuclear power plant. Large carthquakes appear to be unique in their
.'). ' l.;7T ~f it sudden destructive force and therefore to require special regulatory con-
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in conclusion, both the Applicants and the Staff seek referral from us f%$
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sideration.
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0 direct to the Commission, by passing the Appeal Board. At least prior to n
d the Commission's recent Statement of Policy on Conduct of Licensing J T=
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Proceedings, it has always been the practice to refer and certify issues
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from Licensing Boards to the Appeal Board, not to the Commission. In mrs-U=-
the Policy Statement, liowever, the Commission did speak of referring or g
certifying to the Appeal Board "or the Commission."
e We are uncertain whether this statement represents a deliberate depar-g e
ture from prior practice and, if so, what standards we should follow in I
deciding where to refer a ruling. Moreover, we are reluctant to by-pass our
-w immediate reviewing body in the absence of a strong reason or doing so.
f Accordingly, we are denying this aspect of the Applicants' request and referring our ruling to the Appeal Board. However, since this is an issue raised on the Board's own motion, we are, as instructed, serving a copy of e
y it Although the rules 10 CFR 2.718 and 730 refer to the
- Cort.nission.' the Comtnission's e
'O functions under those rules are delegated to the Appeal Board by 10 CFR 2.785(bHI).
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r this Order on the General Counsel and the Commissioners. The Commis-sion can, of course, take up this matter at any time on its own motion."
FOR THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD l
4 N
James L. Kelley, Chairman A"'
ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE m
Dated at Bethesda, Maryland
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this 14th day of August 1981.
Attachments:
1.
List of Documents i
2.
Portion of Licensing Board Order dtd 4/17/81
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Strictly speaking. there is no " record
- underlyirg these rulings Attached hereto. however,is a list of documents in this case which bear directly on the questions presented and which may l
be helpful to the Argal Board.
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Attachment I Ust of Documents t,.j Relating to the
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Ucensing Board's Referred issue
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A Title Date Board's Memorandum and Order I
(Ruling on Motion for Protective Order)
April 17,1981 Applicants' Memorandum of Law Opposing any Exercise of ASLB Authority.
June 22,1981 NRC Staff Views
.. in the Area of Emergency Planning June 22,1981 Intervenor GUARD's Comments Concerning Emergency Planning June 23,1981 Intervenor Carstens' Comments
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Concerning Emergency Planning June 22,1981 Board Order (Raising on the Board's Motion g-an issue Concerning
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Earthquakes and Emergency Planning)
. July 29,1981 Ce h
i NRC Staff Comments on Board's Order of July 29,1981 August 4,1981 Board's Order
.t (Modifying an issue Concerning ej Earthquakes and Emergency Planning)
August 7,1981 H
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Applicants' Request for i
Certification to the Commission and Accompanying Memoranda in Support August 17,1981 NRC Staff's Response to Applicants' Request for Certification August 31,1981 I
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Licensing Board Order dated April 17,1981 f
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'K that approach when a case can be allowed to proceed in a leisurely 4~ g ]v fashion, it is certainly outweighed by the resultant delay where, as here,
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construction is almost complete and efforts at: being made to ccnclude t
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discosery so that the case can go to hearing.
To alleviate this delay problem, objecting parties are directed from now
- f on to notify the Board Chairman's office by telephone if they intend to file
- e r-gw an answer to a motion to compel. If no such message is timely received, the Board will proceed to rule on motions to compel as soon as practicable
['
following their receipt. Beyond that, the Board is considering other meas-ures it might adopt to expedite the remaining discovery in this proceeding, W
including the elimination of answers to motions to compel. Such measures
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will be discussed at the upcoming prehearing conference.
In the present circumstances, however, the Board has considered the Applicants' motion for protectise order and reconsidered each of the
.6 pertinent rulings in our April 8 Order. For the reasons that follow The Board declines to change its April 8 rulings, except in the few minor
+-
respects noted below.
Earthquakes and Emergency Planning. The O.-der of April 8 expressed
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the Board's tentative conclusion that the effects of earthquakes should be i.
factored into emergency plans under 10 CFR 50.47 and Appendix E. We accordingly directed the Applicants to answer FOE's interrogatories about earthquake effects.
The Applicants' motion is largely devoted to presentation of their position that they have:
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no legal obligation under applicable NRC regulations to fashion plans to consider or mitigate the consequences of a major
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e_rthquake on the capability of Applicants and offsite assistance
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agencies to respond to a radiological emergency at SONGS 2 and l
3." Motion, p. 5
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i We stated in the April 8 Order and we repeat here, for emphasis, that our j
present rulings on legal issues "are for purposes of discovery only, and are without prejudice to their subsequent reconsideration." At the upcoming
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prehearing conference we intend to call for briefs from the parties on several legal questior s, including this one. that need to be addressed and decided before the hearing. In these circumstances, therefore, we will not speak to each of the points adsanced in the Applicants' lengthy legal argument. Suffice it to say thzt iney have not yet changed the Board's tentative view that possib'e earthqt ab effects are at least relevant to emergency planning, and may require that additional precautions be taken.
It may be helpful, however, to discuss briefly two considerations that are influencing the Board's present thinking on this difficult legal question.
First, throughout their argument, the Applicants cast the earthquake-emergency planning issue in terms of whether they must engage in
" multiple disaster" planning. As they acknowledge, neither that phrase nor any analogous term is used in NRC regulations. Motion, p. 2, note 1. The Applicants' definition of a " multiple disaster", as we understand it, can be roughly paraphrased as the simultaneous occurrence of a major earthquake j
(or other rarely I
[page 5]
occurring disaster and a radiological emergency at the reactor arising from i
2 other causes. They characterize a " multiple disaster," so defined, as 1 " 5 7 ':
"relatively improbable". Id. We would go much further. Without in any h
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sense questioning the need for guarding against the event,'and whatever n
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the mathematical odds may be, one can say that the likelihood of a major radiological emergency with serious offsite effects at a particular nuclear power plant is "relatively improbable." Similarly, even in a seismically active area, one can say that the chances of a major earthquake's b
occurring in the forty-year life of a nuclear plant and disrupting key b-elements of its emergency plan is "relatively improbable." That both of these "relatively improbable" events would occur at or about the same a
time-the Applicants' " multiple disaster"-seems virtually inconceivable.
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2 We confine this discussion to carthquakes for the sake of simplicity and because carthquakes appear to have the greatest potential for major damage to a reactor.
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pc N ihaammHEdhmh Such a remote contingency can be safely disregarded for any regulatory purpose.'
The Board's present concerns about earthquake effects arise not from
" multiple disaster' scenarios, but from the possibility that a major carth-quake might cause a radiological emergency at the site
[page6) and also extensise damage to offsite transportation, communications and the like. One might respond that such concerns suggest an inpermissible attack on the rules because they postulate an earthquake exceedirg the
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" Safe Shutdown Earthquake" the facilities have been designed to (and, by hypothesis, will) withstand. In this connection, the Applicants express their opposition "to use of any ' earthquake
- which exceeds the ' Safe Shutdown Eanhquake' established for SONGS 2 and 3 for any regulatory purpose r
related to this proceeding " Motion, p. 3, note 2.
Which brings us to the second matter we wish the parties to consider. It is true as a general proposition that the Commission's rules are not subject to attack in adjudicatory proceedings.10 CFR 2.758. Once an Applicant shows, for example, that its facility has been designed to withstar.d the applicable Safe Shutdown Earthquake, an effort to postulate a more severe carthquake for design purposes would be forec!osed as an impermissible attack on the rules. But it does not necessarily follow that the accident g
assumptions contained in or underlying one safety rule are also applicable to other safety rules. As the former Atomic En rgy Commission stated in Vermont l'ankee Nuclear Poser Corp., 8 AEC 809, 812 (197l):
"Thus, the accident postulated in the ECCS criteria need not necessarily be regarded as the accident to be postulated for con-tamment design purposes. Rather, as shown in our discussion of defense.in depth the use of successively increasing conservatism in postulated accidents contributes an added measure of protection
.e9 to the pubhc health and safety."
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Were the Vermont Van 4er principle to be founc applicable in the present case, the carthquake hazards found to cust for SONGS design purposes L
3 Comenably. there are other natural daacen ehm rate of frecency may be such that to y
piulate t heir h a ppe n.rg concurrently
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[page 7) might not necessarily be the maximum hazards to be postulated i.
l for emergency planning purposes. Whether that principle should apply here might depend on the various factors, such as the different purposes to be i,
served by the two rules, and comparative costs involved in design changes and emergency plans.
In addition to their legal argument, the Applicants now contend that l.
FOE's earthquake interrogatories are not within its emergency planning contention admitted for discovery purposes. The thrust of that contention is
' i' towad coordination of emergency plans; carthquakes are not mentioned.
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The Board agrees that FOE's emergency planning contention does not i
encompass its carthquake questions. Neither, for that matter, do the GUARD contentions. However, the Board has the authority to inquire into a matter on its own motion when it concludes that a serious safety issue is presented. lo CFR 2.760a. See also Consolidated Edison Co. of New York
~
(Indian Point, Unit 3), O AEC 7,9 (1974). The Board has not yet reached such a conclusion in this instance. We believe, however, that a serious question may be presented and that the answers to the FOE earthquake interrogatories will assist us in determining whether to pure these con-cerns further.
There does not appear to be any question of undue burden on the Applicants in requiring answers to FOE's earthquake questions. From what has been said on the subject, we gather that a simple "no" will answer most of these questions. Accordingly. Applicants are directed to answer 3
,. y FOE interrogatories 1-22 and 77(b). Upon reconsideration, it appears that
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the NRC Staff is in a better position to respond to t-sg.~
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2 Tuesday August 19,1980 N
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Part Vill a
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Nuclear Regulatory i
Commission k3 Emergency Planning; Final Regulations W
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55402 Federal Register / Vol. 45, No.162 / TuTsd;y, August 19,1960 / Rules cnd Regulations NUCLEAR REGULATORY The final regulation contains the comments / suggestions in connection COMMISSION following elements:
with the proposed amendments within
- 1. In order to continue operations or to 60 days after publication in the Federal 10 CFR Parts 50 and 70 receive an operating license an Register. During this comment period (in l
applicant / licensee will be required to January 1980) the Commission
)
Emergency Planning submit its emergency plans, as well as conducted four regional workshops with State and local governmental emergency State and local officials, utility AGENCv:U.S. Nuclear Regulatory response plans, to NRC. The NRC will representatives.,and the public to Commission.
then make a finding as to whether the discuss the feasibility of the various ACTsoN: Final rule.
state of onsite and offsite emergency portions of the proposed amendments, preparedness provides reasonable their impact, and the procedures
SUMMARY
- The Nuclear Regulatory assurance that adequate protective proposed for complying with their Commission is upgrading its emergency measures can and will be taken in the provisions. The NRC used the planning regulations in order to assure event of a radiological emergency.The information from these workehops along P
that adequate protective measures can NRC will base its finding on a review of with the public comment letters to and will be taken in the event of a the Federal Emergency Management develop the final rule (more than 200 radiological emergency. Nuclear power Agency (FEMA) findings and comment letters and the points made in plants and certain otherlicensed determinations as to whether State and two petitions for rulemaking were also facilities are required to submit their local emergency plans are adequate and considered).
emergency plans, together with the capable of being implemented and on In addition to the above, on June 25 emergency response plans of State and the NRC assessment as to whether the 1980. the Commission was briefed by local governments, to the Commission.
licensee s/apphcant,s eriergency plans three panels of pubh,c commenters on The Commission and the Federal Energy are adequate and capable of being the rule, one each comprised of Management Agency will review the implemented. These issues may be representatives from the industry, State plans for adequacy. The amendment raised in NRC operating license and local governments, and public also extends emergency planning hearings, but a FEMA finding will interest groups. Each panel raised considerations to " Emergency Planning c natitute a rebuttable presumption on important concerns regarding the final Zones", and makes additional the question of adequacy, rule. On July 3,1980, the Commission clarifications *
- 2. Emergency planmng considerations was briefed by its staff in response to EFFECTIVE DATE: November 3,1980.
will be extended to " Emergency these panels, including several Planning Zones,"
modifications to the proposed final Note-The Nuclear Regulatory
- 3. Detailed emergency plan rules. Finally, on July 23,1980, at the Commission has submitted this rule to the implementing proceudres of licensees /
final Commission consideration of these Comptroller General for review of 'ac applicants will be required to be rules the Commission was briefed by reporting requirements in the rule, pursuant submitted to NRC for review, and the General Counsel on the substance of
- 4. Requirements in 10 CFR Part 50, conversations with Congressional staff
.S.
. e da e on ic the te rting requirements of the rule become effect.ve Appendix E are clarified and upgraded.
members who were involved with includes a 45-day penod, which the statute BackE und passage of the NRC Authorization Act allows for Comptroller General review (44 for fiscal year 1980. Pub. L No.96-295 U.S C. 3512(c)(211 In June 1979. the Nuclear Regulatory The General Counsel advised the FOR FURTHER INFORM ATION CONTACT:
Ission eat 6e E bal &
Mr. Michael T. jamsochian, Office of rec nsideration of the role of emergency were consistent with that Act.The Standards Development. U.S. Nuclear planning in ensuring the continued Commission has relied on all of the Regulatory Commission. Washington, protection of the public health and above information in its consideration of D.C. 20555 (telephone: 301-443-5966).
safety in areas around nuclear power these final rules. In addition, the fac lities.The Commission began this Commission directs that the transcripts SUPPLEMENTAR Y INFORM ATION:On September 19,1979 and on December 19 reconsideration in recognition of the of these meetings shall be part of the 1979. the Commission published for need for more effective emergency administrative record in this rulemaking.
public comment (44 FR 54308 and 44 FR planning and in response to the TMI However, the transcripts have not been I
75167) proposed amendments to its accident and to reports issued by reviewed for accuracy and, therefore, emergency planning regulations for responsible offices of government and are only an informal record of the production and utilization facilities.
the NRC's Congressional oversight matters discussed.
committees.
After evaluating all public comment Extensive comments were received, all On December 19,1979, the Nuclear letters received and all the information of which were evaluated and considered Regulatory Commission published in the obtained during the workshops as wel in deseloping the final rule The Federal Register (44 FR 75167) proposed as additional reports such as the l
comments received and the staff's amendments to 10 CFR Part 50 and Presidential Commission and the NRC evaluation is contained in NUREG-0684 In addition, the NRC conducted four Appendix E to Part 50 ofits regulations.
SpecialInquiry Group Reports, the Regional Workshops to solicit Publication of these final rule changes in Commission has decided to publish the the Federal Register is not only related final rule changes described below.
comments; these comments are to the December 19,1979 proposed rule available in NUREG/CP-0011 (April changes but also incorporates the Descnpt. ion of Final Rule Changes 1980).'
proposed changes to 10 CFR Parts 50 The Commission has decided to adopt
~
and 70 (44 FR 54308) published on a version of the proposed rules similar
' Copies of N11 REC documents are assilable at the commission s Public Document Room. uu H September 19,1979. Interested persons to alternative A described in Sections i
sueet. Nw w ashmston. D C. 20sss Copies ma> be were invited to submit written 50.47 and 50.54 in the Federal Register purchased from the Gosernment Pnntmg Office.
Notice dated December 19.1979 (44 FR r
information on curreni pnces ma> be obiamed by w.shmston. D C. 20555 Attention Publicauons 75107), as mod.fied in light of comments.
(
s=ritmg the U S Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Sates htenager.
These rules are consistent with the 1
e
19, 1980 / Ruhs cnd Reguhtirms 55403 Feder;l R;gister / Vol. 45, No.182 / Tue:d;y, August j
cpproach outlined by FEMA and NRC in apptcant/ licensee will be required to C. Requirement for specialized training a Memorandum of Understanding (45 FR submit its emergency plans, as well as (Section IV.F)
- 7. Provisions for up-to-date plan State and local governmental emergency maintenance (Section IV.G) 5847. January 24.1980). No new response plans, to NRC.The NRC will Applicants for a construction permit operating license will be granted unless then make a finding as to whether the would be required to submit more the NRC can make a favorable finding state of onsite and offsite emergency information as required in the new that the integration of onsite and offsite preparedness provides reasonable Section 11 of Appendix E.
cmergency planning provides assurance that adequate protective reasonab!'e assurance that adequate measures can and will be taken in the Rationale for the Final Rules protective measures can and will be event of a radiological emergency.
The Commiss. ion's final rules are tiken in the event of a radiological The NRC will base its finding on a based on the sigmficance of adequate emergency. In the case of an operating review of the FEMA findings and emergency planning and pt,eparedness reactor, if it is determined that there are i
such deficiencies that a favorable NRC determinations as to whether State and to ensure adequate protection of the finding is not warranted and if the local emergency plans are adequate and I
sa ec deficiencies are not corrected within 4 capable of being implemented and on d
a the NRC assessment as to whether the described in the proposed rules (44 FR months of that determination, the appbcant s/ licensee's emergency plans 75169) and the public record compiled in Commission will determine are adequate and capable of being a rulemakm.g.
nsite and offsite expeditiously whether the reactor implemented. In any NRC licensing should be shut down or whether some proceeding, a IMA finding wul proper siting and engineered design other enforcement action is appropriate, consitute,a rebuttable presumption on features are needed to protect the health Pursuant to procedures provided for in to CFR 2.200-2.206. In any case where the question of adequacy.Specifically:
and safety of the public. As the
- a. An operating license will not be Commission reacted to the accident at the Commission believes that the public issued unless a favorable NRC overall Three Mile Island,it became clear that health, safety, or interest so requires, the plant will be required to shut down finding can be made.
the protection provided by siting and
- b. After April 1,1981, an operating engineered design features must be immediately (10 CFR 2.202(f), see 5 plant may be required to shut down ifit bolstered by the ability to take U.S.C. 558(c)).
is determined that there are deficiencies protective measures during the course of The standards that the NRC will use
~
in making its determinations under these such that a favorable NRC findmg an accident.%e accident also showed rules are set forth in the final regulation. cannot be made or is nolonger clearly that onsite conditions and Wheres er possible, these standards may warranted and the deficiencies are not actions, even if they do not cause blend with other emergency planning corrected within 4 months of that significant offsite radiological determination.
consequences, will affect the way the procedures for nonnuclear emergencies
- 2. Emergency planning consideraticas various State and local entities react to presently in existence. The standards must be extended to " Emergency protect the public from any dangers cre a restatement of basic NRC and now joint NRC-FEMA guidance to licensees Planning Zones," and associated with the accident. In order to and to State and local governments. See
- 3. Detailed emergency planning discharge effectively its statutory NUREG 0654. FEMA-REP-1, " Criteria implementing procedures of both responsibilities, the Commission must for Preparation and Evaluation of licensees and applicants for operating know that proper means and procedures Radiological Emergency Response Plans licenses must be submitted to NRC for will be in place to assess the course of an accident and its potential severity, and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear review.
Power Plants for Interim Use and In addition, the Commission is that NRC and other app *opriate Comment." ((anuary 1980). In deciding revising 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E'd authorities and the public will be whether to permit reactor operation in
" Emergency Plans for Production an notified promptly, and that adequa'7 the face of some deficiencies, the Utilization Facilities," in order to clarify, protective actions in response to ec ual Commission will examine among other expand, and upgrade the Commission's or anticipated conditions can erJ w Il factors whether the deficiencies, are emergency planning regulations.
be taken.
sigmficant for the reactor in question.
Sections of Appendix E that are The Commission's organic :tstutes whether adequate interim compensatory expanded include:
provide it with a unique degree of actions have been or will be taken
- 1. Specification of " Emergency Action discretion in the execution of agancy promptly, or whether other compelling Levels" (Sections IV.B and C) functions. Siegel v. AEC, 400 F.2d 778, reasons exist for reactor operation. In
- 2. Dissemination to the public of basic 783 (D.C. Cir.1968), see Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. NRC 598 F.2d 759. 771 determining the sufficiency of" adequate ' emergency planning informatien
& n.47 (3d Cir.1979). "Both the Atomic interim compensatory actions" under (Section IV.D) this rule, the Commission will examine
- 3. Provisions for the State and local Energy Act of1954 and the Energy I
State plans. local plans, and hcensee governmental authorities to ha ve a Reorganization Act of1974 confer broad plans to dctermine whether features of capability for rapid notification of the regulatory functions on the Commission and specifically authorize it to l
one plan can compensate for public during a serious reactor promulgate rules and regulations it deficiencies in another plan so that the emergency, with a design objective of deems necessary to fulfillits level of protection for the public health completing the initial notification within responsibilities under the Acts,42 U.S C.
i and safety is adequate.This 15 minutes after notification by the '
i 2201[p)." Public Service Co. of New interpretation is consistent with the licensee (Section IV.D)
Hompshire v. NRC, 582 F.2d 77,82 (1st prosisions of the NRC Authorization Act
- 4. A licensee onsite technical support for fiscal year 1980 Pub. L 96-295.
center and a licensee near site Cir.), cert. denied. 439 U.S.1046 (1978).
Sec 42 U.S C. 2133(a). As the Supreme The regulation contains the following emergency operations facility (Section Court stated almost 20 y ears ago, the three major changes from past practices: IV.El Atomic Energy Act " clearly
- 5. Provisions for redundant
- 1. In order to continue operations or to communications systems (Section IV.E) contemplates that the Commission shall recies e an operating license, an
Federal Ifegister / Vol. 45. No.162 / Tursdiy. August 554M
- 19. 1980 / Rules end Regulations by reguletion set f.rth what the public safety requirements are as a prerequisite propos:d rule changes. The following to the issuance of any license or permit major issues have been raised in the Commission's disposition to grant sud exemptions.
comments received.
under the Act."PowerReactor
- 5. The Commission,in developing th Development Co. v. International Union y,,,,,_. ygg Revie w and Co. ncurrence aspect of the proposed rule. must ofElectricalRadio Machine Worhers.
in 9 te andLocalRadiologicalPlans consider its own history. There was tu 367 U.S. 396. 404 (1961). Finally, it is also clear that " Congress, when it enacted
- 1. FEMA is best suited to assess the when regulation was characterized by
[42 U.S.C. 2236).. must have adequacy of State and local radiological the leaders of the agency by simple a'n.
envisioned that licensing standards.
emergency planning and preparedness very appropriate expressions. The especially in the areas of health and and report any adverse findings to NRC process was to be " effective and safety regula tion, would vary over time for assessment of the licensing efficient."The application of regulator 3 authority was to be " firm, but fair."
as more was learned about the hazards consequences of those findings.
- 2. The proposed rule fails to provide Regardless of the outcome of the of generating nuclear energy. Insofar as objective standards for NRC
" concurrence" issue, the Commission
. p..,
those standards became more concurrence, reconcurrence must appreciate that alternative B is no pn demanding. Congress surely would have withdrawal of concurrence., and fair. It is not effective regulation.
wanted the new standards,if the
- 3. In the absence of additional Issued PublicEducation Commission deemed it appropriate. to statutory authority, the proposed rule Only information required to inform apply to those nuclear facilities already frustrates Congressionalintent to the public about what to do in the even-licensed." Ft. Pierre Utilities Authority preempt State a,nd local government of a radiological emergency need be
./
- v. UnitedStates. 606 F.2d 986. 996 (D.C.veto power over nuclear power plant disseminated. There should be Cir.1979).
operation.
in response to and guided by the t Procedures and standards for flexibility, in any particular case, as to various reports and public comments, as adjudication of emergency planning disseminating such information.
who will be ultimately responsible for well as its own determination on the disputes are not adequately specified in sigmficance of emergency preparedness. the proposed rule.
Issue E: LegalAuthority the Commission has therefore concluded that adequate emergency preparedness Issue B. EmergencyP/anning Zones
- 1. A few commenters felt that NRC is an essential aspect in the protection
- l had no authority to promulgate a rule as of the public health and safety. The
- 1. Regulatory basis for imposition of
- 2. Other comments were the nature the one proposed.
Commission recognizes there is a the Emergency Planning Zone concept that NRC has statutory authority only i(I possibility that the operation of some should be expressly stated in the reactors may be affected by this rule regulation.
inside the limits of the plant site.
through inaction of State and local
- 2. Provisions regarding the plume
- 3. Some commenters suggested that governments or an inability to comply exposure pathway EPZ should provide a NRC and FEMA should seek addi believes that the potential restriction of maximum planning distance of to miles.
legislation to compel State and local with these rules. The Commission
- 3. References to NUREG-0396 should governments to have emergency plans. if plar t operation by State and local be deleted to avoid disputes over its that is what is necessary.
officials is not significantly different m, kind or effect from the means aircady meaning in licensing proceedings.
Issue F Schedulefor /mplementation available under existing law to prohibit
,'#)#
- "# 0 N" "
The schedule for implementing the proposed rule was considered to be reactor operation such as zoning and 3
land-use laws, certification of public
- 1. Neither alternative is necessary unrealistic and in some cases in confhct
-~
convenience and necessity. State because the Commission has sufficientwith various State schedules already in fmancial and rate considerations (10 authority to order a plant shut down for on the implementation schedule follows:
existence. A sampling of the comments CFR 50.33(fj). and Federal safety reasons and should be prepared environmental laws. The Commission to exercise that authority only on a
- 1. The 180 days in the schedule is an notes, however, that such considerations case.by-case basis and when a insufficient amount of time to generally relate to a one-time decision particular situation wariants such accomplish tasks of this magnitude; the on siting. whereas this rule requires a action.
Federal government does not work with periodic renewal of State and local
- 2. No case has been made by the such speed. States are bureaucracies commitments to emergency Commission for the need for automatic also, there is no reason to assume they preparedness. Relative to applying this shutdown. as would be required in can work faster. It took years of working rule in actual practice however, the alternative B. and certainly no other with States to get the plans that are Commission need not shut down a fac:.ity until all factors have been NRC regulations exist that would presently concurred in. It is just insufficient time for new concurrences thoroughly examined. The Commission require such action based on a concept and review. Also, to get a job done as amorphous as " concurrence in State belies es. based on the record created by and local emergency plans."
within that time frame means a hurried the public workshops, that State and job. rather than an acceptable and local officials as partners in this
- 3. The idea that the Commission might meaningful plan.
undertaking will endeavor to provide grant an exemption to the rules that would permit continued operation
- 2. The time provided is inadequate for fully for public protection.
(under alternative B) has little States to acquire the hardware needed.
States must go out for competitive bids Summary of Comments on Maj,or issues significance, primarily because 10 CFR just as the Federal government does.
The Commission appreciates the Part 50.12(a) already permits the extensive public comments on this granting of exemptions.
Between processing and accepting a bid
- 4. The process and procedures for and actual delivery of equipment. it may important rule. In addition to the record obtaining such exemptions are not take a year to get the hardware. The of the workshops, the NRC has received defined. nor is there any policy State budgets years ahead. therefore if oser 200 comment letters on the indication thal would indicate the a State or local government needs more money, it may have to go to the s
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Federal Register / Vol. 45 No.162 / Tuesday, August 19, 1980 / Rules and Regulations 55405 I
legislature. This is a time-consuming difficulties associated with such a
- 5. The basis for effective offsite public process that may not fit the requirement.
response capabilities is a sound 3
Federal schedule.
- 3. NRC and FEMA could not review 70 IssueIdaneigencMcuan Levels emergency preparedness program.
Federal support (funding and technical e
or more plans and provide concurrence Applicants, in cooperation with State assistance) for the development of State by January 1.1981. The Federal and local governmental authorities, and local offsite capabilities should be government moves slowly. Commenters should be permitted the necessary incorporated into FEMA's preparedness did not think that NRC and FEMA can flexibility to develop emergency action program for all emergencies.
review all the plans within the time level criteria appropriate for the facility frame scheduled. If the Federal in question, subject to NRC approval.
IssueM Geneml government cannot meet its schedule, inflexible NRC emergency action level
. The States support Federal oversight why or how should the States't standards are not necessary.
and guidance in the development of
- 4. Funding could not be appropriated y
by State and local governments before Issue A Tmining offsite response capabilities. However, many States feel the confusion and the deadline. It was suggested that the
- t. Mandatory provision for training uncertainty in planning requirements Commission use H. Rept. #96-413, local service personnel and local news following Three Mile Island is not a
" Emergency Planning U.S. Nuclear media persons is outside of NRC's proper environment in which to develop Power Plants: Nuclear Regulatory jurisdiction and is not necessary to effective capabili'ies nor does it serve Commission Oversight," for the time protect the public health and safety.
the best interests of their citizens. The frame rather than that in the proposed
- 2. Public participation in drills or development of effective nuclear facility rule or use a sliding-scale time frame critiques thereof should not be required.
incident response capabilities will since States are at various stages of 3.The provision regarding formal require close coordination and completing their emergency plans.
critiques should be clarified to mean the cooperation among responsible Federal Issue C: Impact ofPmposedRule licensee is responsible for developing agencies State government, and the and conducting such critiques.
nuclear industry. An orderly and
- 1. The proposed regulations were
- 4. Definitive per'ormance criteria for comprehensive approach to this effort considered by some commenters as evaluation of drills should be developed makes it necessary that omita unfair to utilities because it was felt by the licensee, subject to NRC responsibilities be clearly associated they place the utilities in the political approval.
with NRC and the nuclear industry and financial role that FEMA should be a ssuming. NRC is seen as in effect Issue K:Implen:enting Pmcedures while deferring offsite responsibilities to State government with appropriate giving State and local governments veto NRC review of implementing FEMA oversight and assistance.
over the operation of nuclear plants. It procedures is only necessary to apprise in addition to these comments, two was questioned whether this was an the NRC staff of the details of the plans petitions for rulemaking were filed in intent of the rule. In addition,it was felt for use by the NRC during the course of reference to the propose,d rule. These that utilities, their customers, and their an actual emergency.
were treated as public comments rather shareholders should not be penalized by a shutdown (with a resulting financial 7,,y, f, gy, ##8 than petitions and were considered in developing the final rule, burden) because of alleged deficiencies
- 1. Nuclear facilities, although located The Commission has placed the or lack of cooperation by State and local in one gove' nmental tax jurisdiction and planning objectivds from NUREG-0654:
r officials.
taxed by that jurisdiction, affect other FEMA-REP-1," Criteria for Preparation
- 2. It was suggested that NRC's Office jurisdictions that must bearimmediate and Evabation of Radiological of Inspection and Enforcement conduct and long. term planning costs without Emergency Response Plans and the reviews of the State and local having access to taxes frem the facility.
Preparedness in Support of Nuclear governmental emergency response plans
- 2. As the radius of planning Power Plants for Interim Use and in order to ensure prompt, effective, and requirements becomes greater, few Comment," January 1980, into the final consistent implementation of the facilities are the concern of a single regulations. Comments received proposed regulations.
county. The planning radius often concerning NUREG-0654 were available
- 3. One commenter noted that the encompasses county lines, State lines, in developing the final regulation. The public should be made aware of the and in some instances, international Commission notes that the planning issue ofintermediate and long-term boundaries.
objectives in NUREG-0654 were largely impacts of plant shutdowns.
- 3. As new regulations are generated to drawn from NUREG-75/111. " Guide and Specifically, people should be informed os ersee the nuclear industry and old Checklist for Development and of the possibility of " brownouts " cost ones expanded, there is an immediate Evaluation of State and Local increases to the consumer due to need to address fixed nuclear facility Government Radiological Emergency securing alternative energy sources, and planning at all levels of government, Response Plans in Support of Fixed the health and safety factors associated beginning at the lowest and going to the Nuclear Facilities," IDecember 1,1974) with those alternative sources.
highest. Alllevels of government need and Supplement 1 thereto dated March Issuell:PublicNotification access to immediate additional funds to 15,1977, which have been in use for upgrade their response capability, some time.
- 1. Ultimate responsibility for public'
- 4. It is well understood that the The approximately 60 public comment notification of a radiological emergency consumer ultimately must pay the price letters received on NUREG-0654 were must be placed on State and local for planning, regardless of the levelin not critical of the proposed plannine government, government at which costs are incurred.
objectives. The Commission also notes
- 2. The " fifteen minute" public It becomes a matter of how the that at the May 1,1980 ACRS meeting, notification rule is without scientific consumer will be taxed, who will the AtomicIndustrialForum justification fails to differentiate administer the tax receipts, and what is representative encouraged the use of the between areas close in and further away the most effective manner in which to planning objectives from NUREG-0654 from the site, and ignores the technical address the problem.
in the final regulations in order to
55406 Federal Register / Vd. 45. N.182 / Tuesd;y. August 1' M80 / Rules snd R:gul:tions reduce ambiguity and provide specificity capability of implementation of State and longer times to release significant to the final regulation.
and local plans.
amounts of activity in many scenarios).
Based on the above. the Commission
- 4. To make decisions with regard to Guidance regarding the radionuclides to has decided to modify the proposed rule the overall state of emergency be considered in planning is set forth in changes in the areas discussed in preparedness (i.e.. integration of the NUREG-0396. EPA 520/1-78-016.
paragraphs I through X below.
licensee's emergency preparedness as
" Planning Basis for the Development of determined by the NRC add of the State and Local Government I. FEMA /NRC Relationship State / local governments as determined Radiological Emergency Response Plans In issuing this rule. NRC recognizes by FEMA and reviewed by NRC) and in Support of Light. Water Nuclear the significant responsibilities assigned issuance of operating licenses or Power Plants." December 1978.
to FEMA. by Executive Order 12148 on shutdown of operating reactors.
IV. Rationale for Altematives Chosen July 15.1979. to coordinate the In addition. FEMA has prepared a emerEency planning functions of proposed rule regarding " Review and In a few areas of the proposed rule.
W executive agencies. In view of FEMA's Approval of State Radiological the Commission identified two new role. NRC agreed on September 11.
Emergency Plans and Preparedness"(44 alternatives that it was considering.
1979. that FEMA should henceforth chair FR 42342. dated june 24.1980).
Many public comments were received
)
the FederalInteragency Central According to the proposed FEMA rule, on these alternatives; based on due Coordmating Committee for FEMA will approve State and local consideration of all comments received Radiological Emergency Response emergency plans and preparedness, as well as the discussions presented Planning and Preparedness (FICCC). On where appropriate, based upon its during the workshops, the Commission December 7,1979, the President issued a findings and deterTninations with has determined which of each pair of directive assigning FENIA lead respect to the adequacy cf State and alternatives to retain in the final nile.
responsibility for offsite emergency local plans and the capabilities of State in Sections 50.47 and 50.54 (s) and (t).
preparedness around nuclear facilities.
and local governments to effectively the alternatives dealth with conditioning The NRC and FEhtA immediately implement these plans and the issuance of an operating license or initiated negotiations for a preparedness measures. Rese findings continued operation of a nuclear power hiemorandum of Understanding (h10U) and determinations will be provided to plant on the existence of State and local that lays out the agencies' roles and the NRC for use in its licensing process.
government emergency response plans cnu in asic provides for a smooth transfer of II. Emergency Planning Zone Concept difference between alternatives A and B
[
responsibilities. It is recognized that the The Commission notes that the in these sections was that, under
\\
htOU which became effective january 14.1980, supersedes some aspects of regulatory basis for adoption of the alternative A, the proposed rule would previous agreements. Specifically, the mergmy Manning Zone NZ) concept require a determination by NRC on is the Commission's decision to have a issuing a license or permitting continued h10U identifies FEMA responsibilities with respect to emergency preparedness conservative emergency planning policy operation of plants in those cases where in addition to the conservatism mherent relevant State and local emergency as they relate to NRC as the following:
- 1. To make findmgs and in the defense-in-depth philosophy.This response plans had not received NRC determinations as to whether State and policy was endorsed by the Commission concurrence. Denial of a license or Iocal emergency p1ans am adequate.
in a policy statement published on shutdown of a reactor would not follow
- 2. To venfy that State and local October 23.1979 (44 FR 61123). At that automatically in every case. Under time the Commission stated that two alternative B shutdown of the reactor emergency plans are capable of bem.g Emergency Planning Zones (EPZs) would be required automatically if the implemented (e g., adequacy and should be established around each light-appropriate State and local emerFency maintenance of procedures, training.
resources, staffing les els and water nuclearpower plant.%e EPZ for response plans had not received NRC' airborne exposure has a radius of about concurrence within the prescribed time quahfication, and equipment).
10 miles; the EPZ for contaminated food periods unless an exemption is granted.
- 3. To assume responsibility for and water has a radius of about 50 After consideration of the public j
emergency preparedness training of miles. Predetermined protective action record and on the recommendation of its l
State and local officials.
plans are needed for the EPZs. %e staff, the Commission has chosen a text j
- 4. To develop and issue an updated exact size and shape of each EPZ will be for Sections 50.47 and 50.54 (s) and (t) l series ofinteragency assignments that decided by emergancy planning officials that is similar to, but less restrictive delineate respective agency capabilities after they consider the specific than, alternative A in the proposed rule and responsibil ties and define conditions at each site.These distances Rather than providing for the shutdown procedures for coordination and are considered large enough to provide a of the reactor as the on!v enforcement direction for emeq;ency planning and response base that would support action and prescribing s'pecific resp m.
activity outside the planning zone preconditions for the rhutdown remedy, l
Specifically, the NRC responsibilities should this ever be needed.
the final rule makes clear that for I
or em r ency preparedness identified III. Position on Planning Basis for Small emer8ency planning rules. like all other es c o sh tdown a ut ined m
- 1. To assess licensee emergency plans Light. Water Reactors and FL St. Vrain y
for adequacy.
%e Commission has concluded that poss ble enforcement actions and many l
l
- 2. To verify that licensee emergency the operators of smalllight. water-cooled factors should be considered in plans are adequately implemented (e.g.,
power reactors (less than 250 MWt) and determining whether it is an appropriate adequacy and maintenance of the Ft. St. Vrain gas-cooled reactor may action in a given case. This Commission l
procedures, training, resources, staffing establish smaller planning zones which choice is consistent with most of the les els and qualifications, and will be evaluated on a case-by-case comments receised from State and local equipment).
basis. This conclusion is based on the
- 3. To review the FEMA findings and lower potential harard from these see sect.on y for a daunion concemies determinations on the adequacy and facilities (lower radionuclide inventory conemence -
l l
.~
Federal Register / Vol. 45, No.162 / Tuesday, August 19, 1980 / Rules and Regulations 55407 7
governments and is consistent with the the licensee emergency response plans.
basis for choice of notification provisions of Section 109 of the NRC After these two determinations have capability requirements for offsite fiscal year 1980 Authorization Act.
been made. NRC will make a finding in authorities and for the public.
Alternative B was seen by some of the the licensing process as to the overall Emergency plans must be developed commenters as potentially causing and integrated state of preparedness.
that will have the flexibility to ensure unnecessarily harsh economic and It was pointed out to the Commission social consequences to State and local at the workshops and in public comment response to a wide spectrum of governments, utilities, and the public, letters that the term " concurrence" was accidents.This wide spectrum of State and local governments that are confusing and ambiguous. Also, there potential accidents also reflects on the appropriate use of the offsite directly mvolved in implementing was a great deal of misunderstanding notification capability. The use of this planning objectives of the rule strongly with the use of the term because,in the favor alternat2ve A smce it provides for past, the obtam, mg of NRC notification capability will range from a cooperative effort with State and local " concurrence"in State emergency immediate notification of the public governments to reflect their concerns response plans was voluntary on behalf (within 15 minutes) to listen to d'
d and desires in these rules. This choice is of the States and not a regulatory h',*tio o be ore $ikel e ents where responsive to that effort. In addition, the requirement in the licensing process.
mdustry strongly supported alternative Previously too,' concurrence
- was there is substantial time available for as be g the more workable of the two s'tatewide rather than site-specific.
tate
- ), t make a jud m t h ther or In Appendix E. Sections II.C and III, VI. Fifteen-Minute Notification not to activate the public notification alternative A would require an The requirement for the capability for systen2.
applicant / licensee to outline "...
notification of the public within 15 Any accident involving severe fuel corrective measures to prevent damage minutes after the State / local authorities degradation or core melt that results in to onsite and offsite property," as well have been notified by the licensee has significant inventories of fission as protective measures for the public.
been expanded and clarified. It also has products in the containment would Alternative B addresses only protective been removed as a footnote and placed warrant immediate public notification measures for the public health and in the body of Appendix E. The and consideration, based on the safety. The Commission has chosen implementation schedule for this particular circumstances, of appropriate alte native B because public health and requirement has been extended to July 1, protective action because of the saft.y should take clear precedence 1981.This extension of time has been potential forleakage of the containment over actions to protect property.
adopted because most State and local building. In addition. the warning time Measures to protect property can be governments identified to the available for the public to take action taken on an ad hoc basis as resources Commission the difficulty in procuring become available after an accident.
bardware, contracting for installation, may be substantially less than the total in Appendix E, under Training, and developing procedures for operating time between the original initiating alternative A would provide for a joint the systems used to implement this event and the time at which significant licensee, Federal. State, and local requirement.
radioactive releases take place.
gos ernment exercise every 3 years.
The Commission is aware that various Specification of particular times as whereas alternative B would provide for commenters, largely from the industry, design objectives for notification of these exercises to be performed every 5 have objected to the nature of the 15-offs te authorities and the public are a years at each site. The Commisslun has minute notification requirement.
means of ensuring that a system will be chosen alternative B because the indicating that it may be both arbitrary p[Iace w in e pabi
" ti y the Commission is satisfied that the and unworkable.
n on Y provision that these exercises be Among the possible alternatives to listening to predesignated radio or performed every 5 years for each site this requirement are a longer television stations. The Commission will allow for an adequate level of notification time, a notification time that recognizes that not every individual preparedness among Federal emergency varies with distance from the facility, or would necessarily be reached by the response agencies. In addition, under no specified time. In determining what actual operation of such a system under these regulations, each licensee is that criterion should be, a line must be all conditions of system use. Ifowever, required to exercise annually with local drawn somewhere, and the Commission the Comnussion believes that provision governmental authorities. Furthermore, believes that providing as much time as 0f a general alertmg system will Federal emergency response agencies practicable for the taking of protective significantly improve the capability for may have difficulty supporting exercises action is in the interest of public health taking protective actions m the event of every 3 years for all of the nuclear and safety. The Commission recognizes an emergency. The reduction of facihties that would be required to that this requirement may present a notification times from the several hours comply with these rule changes, significant financialimpact and that the required for street.by. street notification V. Definition of Plan Approval Process technical basis for this requirement is to minutes will significantly increase the not without dispute. Moreover, there options available as protective actions The term " concurrence" has been may never be an accident requiring under severe accident conditions. These deleted from the proposed regulations using the 15-minute notification actions could include staying indoors in and replaced with reference to the capability. llowever, the essential the case of a release that has already actual procedure and standards that rationale behind emergency planning is occurred or a precautionary evacuation NRC and FEMA have agreed upon and to provide additional assurance for the in the case of a potential release thought are implementing. According to the public protection even during such an to be a few hours away. Accidents that agreed upon procedure, FEhtA will unexpected event. The 15-minute do not result in core melt may also make a finding and determination as to notification capability requirement is cause relatively quick releases for which the adequacy of State and local wholly consistent with that rationale.
protective actions, at least for the public pos ernment emergency response plans.
The Commission recognizes that no in the immediate plant vicinity, are The NRC will determine the adequacy of single accident scenario should form the desirable.
55408 Federal R gist;r / Vol. 45, Nc.162 / Tuesday, August 19, 1980 / Rules and Regu.ations Some comments received on the reasons exist for reactor operation.
seeking an operating license from NRC proposed rule advocated the use of a Finally, pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202(f), the that have not hed an exercise involving staged notification system with quick Commission may, in appropriate the State plan at that facility site.
notification required only near the plant. cimumstances, make the crtier De Commission has determined The Commission believes that the immedf ately effective, which could under the criteria in 10 CFR Part 51 that capability for quick notification within result in immediate plant shutdawn an envimnmentalimpact statement for the entire plume exposure emergency subject to a later hearing.
the amendments to 10 CFR Pan 50 and planning zone should be provided but recognizes that some planners may wish IX.Fu A Appendix E thereofis not required. This determination is based on to have the option of selectively in view of the requirements in these
" Environmental Assessment for Final actuating part of the system during an nde changes regardmg the actions to be Changes to 10 CFR Part 50 and actual response. Planners should taken in the event State and local Appendix E of to CFR Part 50 carefully consider the impact of the government planning and preparedness Emergency Planning Requirements for added decisions that offsite authorities are or become inadequate, a utility may Nuclear Power Plants" (NUREG-0685, would need to make and the desirability have an incentive, based on its own self June 1980). Comments on the " Draft of establishing an official interest as well as its responsibility to Negative Declaration: Finding of No communication link to all residents in provide power, to assist in providing Significant Impact" (45 FR 3913. january the plume exposure emergency planning mar. power, items of equipment or other 21,1980) were considered in the zone when determining whether to plan resources that the State and local preparation of NUREG-0685.
for a staged notification capability.
governments may need but are Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of VII. Effective Date of Rules and Other themselves unable to provide. The 1954, as afnended, the Energy Guidance Commission believes that in view of the Reorganization Act of1974, as amended.
President's Statement of December 7, and Sections 552 and 553 of Title 5 of the Prior to the publication of these 1979, giving ITMA the lead role in United States Code, notice is hereby amendments, two guidance documents offsite plar.ning and preparedness, the given that the following amendments to were published for public comment and question of whether the NRC should or Title to, Chapter 1. Code of Federal interim use. 'These are NUREG-0010, could require a utility to contribute to Regulations Parts 50 and 70, are,
" Draft Emergency Action Level the expenses incurred by State and local published as a document subject to Guidelines for Nuclear Power Plants."
governments in upgrading and codification.
ISeptember 1979) a nd NUREG-0654/
maintaining their emergency planning FEMA-REP-1, " Criteria for Preparation and preparedness (and ifit is to be Part 50--Domestic Ucensing of 8
and Evaluation of Radiological required, the mechanics for doing so) is Production and Utilization Facilities Emergency Response Plans and beyond the scope of the present rule Preparedness in Support of Nuclear change. lt should be noted, however,
- 1. Paragraph (g) of Section 50.33 is Power Plants for Interim Use and that any direct funding of State or local revised to read as follows:
Comment " (January 1980). It is expected govemments solely for emergency I 50.33 Contents of appucations; general that versions of these documents, preparedness purposes by the Federal information.
revised on the basis of public comments government would come through FEMA.
receis ed. will be issued to assist in defining acceptable levels of X. Exerdses (g)If the application is for an preparedness to meet this final On an annual basis, all commercial operating license for a nuclear power reactor, the applicant shall submit regulation. In the interim, these nuclear power facilities will be required radiological emergency response plans documents should continue to be used by NRC to exercise their plans; these of State and local governmental entities as guidance.
exercises should involve exercising the in the United States that are wholly or
\\,III. IIcaring Procedures Used in appropriate local government plans in Implementation of These Regulations support of these facilities. The State partially within the plume exposure may choose to limit its participation in pathway Ernergency Planning Zone (EPZ)', as well as the plans of State Should the NRC belicve that thef exercises at facilities other than the overall state of emergency preparednbss facihty (site) chosen for the annual governments wholly or partially within the in6estion pathway EPZ.' Generally, at and around a licensed facility is such exercise (s) of the State plan.
the plume exposure pathway EPZ for that there is some question whether a Each State and appropriate local nuclear power reactors shall consist of facility should be permitted to continue government shall annually conduct an an area about to miles (16 km)in radius to operate the Commission may issue exercise jointly with a commercial an order to the licensee to show cause, nuclear power facility. llowever. States and the ingestion pathway EPZ shall consist of an area about 50 miles (80 km) pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202, why the plant with more than one facility (site) shall in radius.The exact size and should not be shut down. This issue may schedule exercises such that each configuration of the EPZs surround ng a arise, for example, if NRC finds a individual facility (site) is exercised in particular nuclear power reactor shall significant deficiency in a licensee plan conjunction with the State and be determined in relation to the local or in the overall state of emergency appropriate local government plans not emergency response needs and preparedness.
less than once every 3 years for sites if the NRC decides to issue an order to with the plume exposure pathway EPZ
' Erne gency Pta sng zones (trzst are daenied show cause, it will provide the licensee partially or wholly within the State. and in MEGe EPA sm-rs@s.* Planrang Basis the opportunity to demonstrate to the not less than once every 5 years for sites ygl7 gmy"h*, S[* *"d $*
I Commission's satisfaction, for example, with the ingestion exposure pathway
,,p, or i.i,si w,,,, suci,,, p.,, pi,ni,y p,c,rns,r that the alleged deficiencies are not EPZ partially or wholly within the State.
is s
.s.
significant for the reactor in question, The State shall choose, on a rotational
'If the state and for !.mersency re. nonne plans w hether adequate interim compensating basis, the site (s) at which the required
[*j',bunytg pry e he c or actions base been or will be taken annual exercise (s)is to be conducted; n
n,a erb proude the arpropnate reference to rr:eet this promptly, or whether other compelling priority shall be given to new facilities rewrement.
m.:.. i. ;...
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Federal Register / Vol. 45, No.162 / Tuesday, August 19, 1980 / Rules and Regulations 55409 capabilities as they are affected by such (1) Arrangements for requesting and established for emergency workers. ne conditions aa demography, topography.
effectively using assistance resources rneans for controlling radiological land characteristics, access routes, and have been made, arrangements to exposures shallinclude exposare jurisdictional boundaries.The size of the accommodate State and local staff at guidelines consistent with EPA
~
EPZs also may be detennined on a case-the licmsee's near-site Emergency Emergency Worker and Lifesaving by-case basis for gas-cooled reactors Operations Facility have been made, Activity Protective Action Guides.
and for reactors with an ave-H and other organizations capable of (12) Arrangments are made for power level less than 250 M n a...nal.
augmenting the planned response have medical services for contaminated The plans for the ingestion pathway been identified.
Injured individuals.
shall focus on such actions as are (4) A standard emergency (13) General plans for recovery and appropriate to protect the food ingestion classification and action level scheme, reentry are developed.
pathway.
the bases of which include facihty (14) Periodic exercises are (will be)
- 2. A new 150.47 is added.
system and effluent parameters, is in conducted to evaluate major portions of
{
use by the nuclear facility licensee, and energency response capabilities,
$ p Emagney plana-State and local response plans call for periodic drille are (will be) conducted to
~
l (a)(1) No operating license for a reliance on information provided by develop and maintain key skills, and i
,1, nuclear power reactor will be issued facility licensees for determinaturns of deficiencies identified as a result of l
unless a finding is made by NRC that the minimum initial offsite response exercises or drills are (will be) t state of onsite and offsite emergency measures.
oorrected.
preparedness provides reasonable (5) Procedures have been established (15) Radiological emergency response assurance that adequate protective for notification. by the licensee,of State training is provided to those who may measures can and will be taken in the and local response organizations and for be called on to assist in an emergency.
event of a radiological emergency.
notification of emergency personnel by (16) Responsibilities for plan (2) The NRC willbase its finding on a all organizations; the content of initial development and review and for review of the Federa! Emergency and fotbwup messages e respese distribution of emergency plans are Management Agency (FEMA) findings orEanizations and the public bas been established, and planners are properly established; and means to provide early trained.
and determinations as to whether State notification and clear instruction to the (c)(1) Failure to meet the standards set I
and local emergency plans are adequate and capable of being implemented, and Populace within the plume exposure forth in paragraph (b) of this subsection on the NRC assessment as to whether, pathway Emergency Planning Zone have may result in the Commission declining bee e blished to issue an Operating License: however, j
the applicant's onsite emergency plans t for prompt are adequate and capable of being communications among prindp33 the applicant will have an opportunity implemented. In any NRClicensing to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the s nse a
I Commission that deficienciesin the proceeding, a FEMA finding will n
d constitute a rebuttable presumption on a (7)Information is made available to plans are not significant for the plant in question, that adequate interim question of adequacy.
the public on a periodic basis on how -
compensating actions have been or will (b) The onsite and offsite emergency they will be notified and what their response plans for nuclear power initial actions should be in an be taken promptly, or that there are
,i reactors must meet the followmg emergency (e.g., listening to a local other compelling reasons to pen, nit plant i
standanis:
broadcast station and remaining operation.
1 (1) Primary responsibilities for indoors), the principal points of contract (2) Generally, the plume exposure emergency response by the nuclear with the news media for dissemination pathway EPZ for nuclear power plants shall consist of an area about to miles facility licensee and by State and local ofinfonnation during an emergency organizations within the Emergency (including the physicallocation or (16 km)in radius and the ingestion Planning Zones have been assigned, the locations) are established in advance.
pathway EPZ shall consist of an area j
cmergency responsibilities of the and procedures for coordinated about 50 miles (80 km)in radius.The various supporting organizations have dissemination of ir.Tormation to the exact size and configuration of the EPZs i
been specifically established, and each public are established.
surrounding a particular nuclear power g
principal response organization has staff (8) Adequate emergency facilities and reactor shall be determined in relation g
to respond and to augment its initial equipment to support the emergency to local emergency response needs and t
response on a continuous basis.
response are provided and maintained.
capabilities as they are affected by such (2) On-shift facility licensee (9) Adequate methods, systems, and conditions as demography, topography, responsibilities for emergency response equipment for assessing and mocito ing land characteristics, access routes, and are unambiguously defined, adequate actual or potential offsite consegaences jurisdictional boundaries.The size of the 8
staffing to provide initial facility of a radiological emergency condition EPZs also may be determined on a case-f accident response in key functional are in use, by-case basis for gas-cooled nucleat' areas is maintained at all times, timely (10) A range of protective actions reactors and for reactors with an
{'
augmentation of response capabilities is have been developed for the plume authorized power levelless than 250 g
available and the interfaces among exposure pathway EPZ for emergency MW thermal. The plans for the ingestion I,
various onsite response activities and workers and the public. Guidelines for pathway shall focus on such actions as offsite support and response activit.es the choice of protective actions during are appropriate to protect the food t
are specified.
an emergency, consistent with Federal ingestion pathway.
[
guidance, are developed and in place.
- 3. Section 50.54 is amended by adding
'These standards are'addrened by specific and protective actions for the ingestion five new paragraphs (q). tr). (s). (t), and uneda in WRPG-as4 FTAtAREP-1 ent:tled
- exposure pathway EPZ appropriate to (u).
' crivens for Preparation and Fvakanos of the locale have been developed.
SYp.Yrt o$u o$e (11) Means for controlling radiologica] l 50.54 Conditions of licenses.
b er ants -
era nese 4
For Intenm (?se and Cornment" Januer) Waa exposures, in an emergency, are f
~
55410
' Federal Regi:ter / V:1, 45 No.162 / Tursday August 19, 1980 / Rules cnd R:gulations (q) A licensa cuthoriz;d ta possess within ou days of the effective date of significant for the plant in question. or and/or operate a nuclear power reactor this amendment the radiological that adequate interim compensating shall follow and maintain in effect emergency response plans of State and actions have been or will be taken emergency plans which meet the local governmental entities in the United promptly, or that there are other standards in i 50.47(b) and the States that are wholly or partially within compelling reasons for continued requirements in Appendix E of this Part.
a plume exposure pathway EPZ, as well operation.
A licensee authorized to possess and/or as the plans of State governments (3) The NRC will base its finding on a operate a research reactor or a fuel wholly or partially within an ingestion review of the FEMA findings and facility shall follow and maintain in pathway EPZ. Ten (10) copies of the determinations as to whether State and effect emergency plans which meet the above plans shall be forwarded to the local emergency plans are adequate and requirements in Appendix E of this Part.
Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation capable of being implemented, and on The nuclear power reactor licensee may with 3 copies to the Director of the the NRC assessment as to whether the make changes to these plans without appropriate NRC regional office.
licensee's emergency plans are adequate Commission approval only if such Generally, the plume exposure pathway and capable of being implemented.
m changes do not decrease the EPZ for nuclear power reactors shall Nothing in this paragraph shall be effectiveness of the plans and the plans, consist of an area about 10 miles (16 km) construed as limiting the authority of the x
as changed, continue to meet the in radius and the ingestion pathway EPZ Commission to take action under any
)
standards of f 50.47(b) and the shall consist of an area about 50 miles other regulation or authority of the requirements of Appendix E of this Part.
(80 km) in radius. The exact size and Commission or at any time other than The research reactor licensee and/or the configuration of the EPZa for a that specified in this paragraph.
fuel facility licensee may make changes particular nuclear power reactor shall (t) A nuclear power reactor licensee to these plans without Commission be determined in relation to local sha:1 provide for the development, approval only if such changes do not emergency response needs and revision, implementation, and decrease the effectiveness of the plans capabilities as they are affected by such maintenance of its emergency and the plans, as changed, continue to conditions as demography, topography, preparedness program. To this end, the meet the requirements of Appendix E of land characteristics, access routes, and licensee shall provide for a review of its this Part. Proposed changes that furisdictional boundaries.The size of the emergency preparedness program at decrease the effectiveness of the EPZs also may be determined on a case.
least every 12 months by persons who approsed emergency plans shall not be by. case basis for gas-cooled nuclear have no direct responsibility for implemented without application to and reactors and for reactors with an implementation of the emergency approval by the Commission. The authorized powerlevelless than 250 preparedness program. The review shall
(
hcensee shall furnish 3 copies of each MW thermal. The plans for the ingestion include an evaluation for adequacy of proposed change for approval; and/or if pathway EPZ shall focus on such interfaces with State and local a change is made without prior actions as are appropriate to protect the governments and oflicensee drills, approval,3 copies shall be submitted f d ingestion pathway, exercises, capabilities, and procedures.
within 30 days after the change is made (2) For operating power reactors, the The results of the review, along with or proposed to the Director of the licensee, State, and local emergency recommendations for improvements, appropriate NRC regional office response plans shall be implemented by, shall be documented, reported to the specified in Appendix D,10 CFR Part 20 April 1,1981, except as provided in licensee's corporate and plant with 10 copies to the Director of Nucleal Section IV,D.3 of Appendix E of this management, and retained for a period Reactor Regulation, or,if appropriate.
Part. If after April 1,1981, the NRC finds of five years.The part of the review the Director of Nuclear Material Safety that the state of emergency involving the evaluation for adequacy of and Safeguards U.S. Nuclear Regulatory preparedness does not provide interface with State and local Commission Washington, D.C. 20555.
nasonable assurance that appropriate governments shall be available to the (r) Each licensee who is authorized to pr tective measures can and will be appropriate State and local a n in mn a ra ga g wnmmts, possess and/or operate a research or test reactor facihty with an authorized emergency and if the deficiencies are (u) Within 60 days after the effective power les el greater than or equal to 500 not corrected within four months of that date of this amendment, each nuclear finding, the Commission will determine power reactor licensee shall submit to a!' u er a li e of the type whether the reactor shall be shut down the NRC plans for coping with edinl until such deficiencies are remedied or emergencies that meet standards in emergency plans complying with to CFR whether other enforament action is i 50.47(b) and the requirements of Part So, Appendix E, to the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation for approval appropriate. In determining whether a Appendix E of this Part.
shutdown or other enforcement action is wit n one ar fr the e cti e date appropriate, the Commission shall take 4.10 CFR Part 50 Appendix E,is into account, among other factors-amended as follows'-
authorized to possess and/or operate a whether the licensee can demonstrate to research reactor facility with an the Commission's satisfaction that the Appendis E-Ernergency Planning and authorized power leselless than 500 kW deficiencies in the plan are not Preparedne=s for Production and t tilization thermal, under a license of the type
- Facuities' specified in i 50 21(c), shall submit
' rae,ency nannina zone. [EPZa) m dmd Table of Contents emergency plans complying with 10 CFR in Ntstr,-CM UA s20/Wns " Planning Basis I. Introhon Part 50, Appendix E, to the Director of E rr the Denlopment of Safe and local Ceserunmt Radiologirat F.rne gency Response Plans in Su N,uclear Reactor Regulation for approval of tw waier sciear Power nanis. Dec.m@
within two years from the effective date
' Nar
-ha. desetoped two rega. tory gwdes:
18 a n a trn v > nannma fer Renard Re.cwrs."
of this amendment.
'If the Steine and locat ere gency ruponse plans and 3 42. " Err rgency Plannrg in Fuel Cyde (s)(1) Each licensee who is authorized
" b"* previoush prouded to the NRC for Fates and Plants IJterved l'nder 10 Cllt Parts to possess and/or operate a nuclear incleien in the lacjhty darbet. the app!! cant me.d 50 and 'a" aral a hint NH C/FFAf A report. NURPG only preytde the apprepnete refe.re, rue to rneet this oL54 IDIA-REP-1. "Critena for Pnparation and power reactor shall summit to NRC requirement.
Footnotes conunued on next pase
- 2. m. *. 2... _.,.
~
Tederal Register / Vol. 45. No. thZ f Tuesday August 19, 1980 / Rules End R:.guhtions 554M TL ne Preliminary Safety Analysis Report considerations as access roJtes. surmunding expression of the overallconcept of HL he Final Safe *y Analysis Report population 6stributions. land use, and local operation; they shall describe the essential IV. Content of Emergency Plans jurisdictional boundaries for the EPZs in the eleme ats of advance planning that have been V. Implementing Procedures case of nuclear power reactors as well as the considered and the provisions that have been means by M.d h standards d i 50.47(b) made to cope with emergency situations.The I' Introdiaction will be met.
plans shall incorporate infonnation about the Each applicant for a constmetion permit is As a minimum. the following items shall be emergency response roles of supportma required by 1 so.34(a) to include in the described:
~
organizations and offsite agencica. nat prebminary safety analysis report e A. Onsite and offsite organizations for information shall be sufficient to provide 6scussion of prehminary plans for coping coping with emergencies and the means for assurance of coordmation among the with emergencies. Each applicant for an notification.in the event of an emergency of supporting groups and with the bcensee.
operating bcense is required by I 50.34(b) to persons assigned to the emergency The plans submitted mast include a description of the elements set out m Section include in the final safety analysis report organizations.
plans for coping with emergencies.
B. Contacts and arrangements made and IV for the Emergency Planning Zones (EPZs) 8 h
nis appendix establishes minimum documented with local. State, and Federal to an extent sufScient to demonstrate that the plans provide reasonable assurance that requirements for emergency plans for use in governmental agencies with responsibility for-appropriate measures can and will be taken attaining an acceptable state of emergency coping with emergencies. including preparedness.%ese plans shall be described identification of the principal agencies, in the event of an emergency.
generally in the prehmmary safety analysis C. Protective measures to be taken within IV. Content of Emergency Plans report and submitted as a part of the final the site boundary and within each EPZ to ne applicant,s emergency plans shall safety analysis report.
protect health and safety in the event of an contain, but no. necessarily be lunited to,
%e potential radiological hazards to the accident; procedures by which these inf nna%n nW to demesnate pubhc associated with the operation of measures are to be carried out (e g4in the compliarce with the elements set forth research and test reactors and fuel facihties case of an evacuation. who authorizes the below,ii., organization for coping with licensed under 10 CFR Parts 50 and 70 evacuation. how the public is to be notified radiabon emergencies. assessment act on, invoin wnsiderations different than those and instructed,how the evacuauonis to be activation of emergency organization.
associated with nuclear power reactors.
carried out); and the expected response of n tificatie procedures, emergency facilities Consequently, the size of Emergency offsite agencies in the event of an emergency.
an equ pmmt traWng, maintaWng Planning Zones '(EPZs) for facihties othee (D) Features of the facility to be provided emerge cy Preparedness, and rcamy. In than power reactora and the degree to which for onsite emergency first aid and additie, the emergency respuse plans comphance with the requirements of this d'
" d fo 17to offsite submitted by an applicant for a nuclear Section and Sections II. III. IV, and V as transp tio of si i
power reactor operating license shall conta,m necessary will be detertnined on a case-by.
treatment facilities.
Information needed to demonstrate case asa, E. Provision 3 to be made for amergency compliance with the standards described in II.%a Preliminary Safety Analysis Report treatment at offsite facihties of individuale Section 50.47[b).'and they will be evaluated injured as a result of licensed activities.
against t. hose standards.The nuclear power The Prefuninary Safety Analysis Report F. Provisions for a training program for reactor operating license applicant shall also shall mntain sufficient informatwo to ensure employees of the licensee, includmg those provide an analysis of the time required to the compatibthty of proposed emergency who are assigned specific authority and evacuate and for taking other protective plar.s for both onsite areas and the EPZa.
resp nsibihty in the event of an emergency, actions for sarious sectors and distances with facihty design features, site layout, and and for other persons who are not employees within the plume exposure pathway EPZ for site location with respect to such of the licensee but whose assistance may be transient and permanent populations.
needed in the event of a radiological A. Olyanization Footnotes continued from last page emergency.
Freluation of Radiological Emergency Response C. A preliminary analysis that projects the The organization for coping with time and means to be employed in the radiolof,ical emegencies shau be described.
ow er Plan oI r an Co January Mail, to provide gmdance in developing rotification of State and local governments includir.g definition of authonties, pl.ns for copmg with emergencies Copies of these and the public in the event of an emergency.
responsibilities. and duties of individuale documents are available at the Comnnssion's Pubhc A nuclear power plant applicant shall assigne I to the licensee's emergency Document Room. m7 H Street. NW., Washington.
perform a preliminary analysis of the time organizration and the means for notification of I
D C. 2o555 Copies of these documents may be required to evacuate various sectors and such individuals in the event of an purchased from the Gosernment Pnnting Office.
distances within the plume exposur, emergency. Specifically, the fe!!owing shau
[
be included:
Information on current pnces may be obtained by pathway EPZ for transient and permanent
- 1. A description of the normal plant populmbons, noting major imped 2ments to the 4
as on. D A
t on P b o
evacuation or taking of protective actions.
Operating organization.
l Sales Manager.
- 2. A descnption of the onsite emergency i
j
'EPZa for power reactors are discussed in II. A preliminary analysis reflecting the response organization with a detailed l
NUREG-0396 EPA 5:o/1-?Mn6. "Pt nning Basis need to include facihties. systems. and discussion of.
for the Development of State and I al Govemment methods for identifying the degree of
- a. Authonties. responsibilities. and duties Radiologic al Emergency Response Pf ans in Support seriousness and potential scope of of the individual (s) who will take charge j
k cf Lasht Water Nuclear Power Plants? Decembe' radiological consequences of emergency during an emergency:
19'& The stre of the EPZa for a nuclear power plant situations within and outside the orte t
- b. Plant staff emergency assignments:
I f
shall be determmed 6n relation to local emergency boundary. Including capabilities for dose
- c. Authorities. responsibihties. and duties response needs and capabdities as they are affected dion using rnMime medopcal on an onsite emergency coordinator a bo g
by suri conditions es demography. topography.
p information and for dispatch of radiologica shall be in charge of the eschange of I
land charactenstics. access routes. and j
Junedictional boundanes The stze of the EPZa also monitoring teams within the EPZs; and a information with offsite authorities l
g me) be determined on a case-by-case basis for gas-preliminary analysis reflecting the role of the responsible for coordinatmg and l
cooled nuclear reaciors and for resetors with an onsite techmcel support center and of the imp ementing ofIsite emergency measures.
j I
l authonred power levelless tSan 25o MW thermal near-site emergency operations facility in
- 3. A description. by position and function Generat!y. the plume exposure pathway EPZ for assessing information, recommending j
aieclear power plants with an authonzed power proteche action, and disseminating I
{
les el greater than 25o MW thermal shall consist of Mormation to the public.
- These obiectives are addressed b) spec 2fic en area about to mdes (16 km) m radius and the I
critena in Nt* KEG-0654 FT.MA-REP-1 entitled ingestion pathws) EPZ ahall consist of an area til.%e F nel Safety Analysis Report about 50 miles leo km)in radius.
"Cnteria for Preparation and Evafustion of j
ne Final Safety Analys. Report shall Radiological Emergency Response Ptaris and is Vegulatory Culde 2 8 will be used as gul3ance f
for the acwptabihty of research and test reactor contain the plans for coping with Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Ptants I
emergene) response plans.
emergencies.De plans shaU be as for intenm Use and Comment" january 1980.
?
1 r
t 1
o e
554.12 Federal Register / Vol. 45. No.162 / Tu;sd y August 19, 1980 / Rul:s rnd Regulatibns hndqu rt;rs personnil who will be sent u th? pinnt sits tuugmint the tnsiti n;t;d for such ag _ncies. 'Ih em;rgency cm;rgency organizat on.
cl:sses d; fin;d shall includz (1) notification
- .Equipmint for d;tirmining the magmtua
- 4. Identification. by position and function of unusual events. (2) alert. (3) site area of and for continuously assessmg the impact of the release of radioactive materials to the to be performed. cf persons withm the emergency, and (4) general emergency. These environment; classes are further discussad in NUREG-0654; hcensee organization who will be responsible FEMA-REP-1.
- 3. Facihties and supplies at the site for for making offsite dose projections, and a decontamination of onsite individuals; description of how these projections will be a Mcotion Pmeedures
- 4. Facihties and medical supphes at the site made and the results transmitted to State and
- 1. Administrative and physical means for for appropnate emergency first aid treatment, local authcrities. NRC and other appropriate notifying local. State, and Federal officials physicians and other medical personnel
- 5. Arrangements for the senices of governmental entities.
and agencies and agreements reached with
- 5. Identificahon. by position and function these officials and agencies for the prompt quahfied to handle radiation emergencies on.
to be performed. of other employees of the notification of the pubhc and for public site; bcensee with special quahfications for coping evacuation or other protective measures,
- 6. Arrangements for transportation of with emergency condtuons that may arise.
should they become necessary, shall be contaminated injured indwiduals from the Other persons with special quahfications, descnbed. This description shallinclude site to specifically identified treatment such as consultants, who are not employees identification of the appropriate officials, by facihties outside the site boundary:
of the licensee and who may be called upon title and agency, of the State and local
- 7. Arrangements for treatment of W'
for assistance for emergencies shall also be identified The specialquahfications of these government agencies within the EPZt' individuals injured in support of licensed actwities on the site at treatment facihties persons shall be descnbed.
- 2. Provisions shall be desenbed fur yearly outside the site boundary;
- 6. A description of the loce! offsite services dissemination to the pubhc within the plume exposure pathway EPZ of basic emergency
- 8. A licensee onsite technical support to be provided in support of the hcensee's planning information, such as the methods center and a licensee near. site emergency emergency organization.
- 7. identification of, and assistance and times required for public notification and operations facihty from which effectne expected from. appropriate State. local, and the protective actions planned if an accident direction can be given and effectne control Federal agencies with responsibihties for occurs, general information as to the nature can be exercised during an emergency:
coping with emergencies.
and effects of radiation. and a hstmg of local
- 9. At least one onsite and one offsite
- 6. Identification of the State and/orlocal broadcast stations that will be used for communications system: each officials responsible for plannmg for, dissemination of information during an have a backup power source. system shall emergency. Signs or other measures shall All communication plans shall have ordenng. and controlling appropnate also be used to disseminate to any transient arrangements for emergencies. including protectae actions. including esecuations titles and alternates for those in charge at when neceasary.
population within the plume exposure pa'hway EPZ appropnate information that both eds of the communication links and the B. Assessment Actions would be helpfulif an acddeat occurs primary and backup means of
- 1. A licensee shall have the capabdity to commesation. Where consistent with the
[
ne it ans to be used for determining the notify responsible State and local function of the gasernmental agency, these magnitude of and for continually assessing governmental agencies within 15 minutes anargements willinclude:
\\
the impact of the release of radioactne mawnals shall be described, including after declaring an emergency. He licenses
- a. Provision for communications with emergency action leveis that are to be used shad deinonstra'e that the Stata/ local conkguous State / local governments within as entena for determining the need for officials have the capability to make a pubhc the phene axposure pathway EPZ. Such notification and participation oflocal and notification decision promptly on being communications aball be tested monthly.
State agencies. the Commission, and other informed by the hcensee of an emergency
- b. Prosisjon for communications with Federal agencies, and the emergency action condition. By July 1.1981, the nuclear power Federal emergency response organizations.
reactor licensee shall demonstrate that Such communications systems shall be testeb lesels that are to be used for determuung administrative and physical means have been annually.
when and what type of protective measures should be considered within and outside the estabhshed for alerting and providing prompt
- c. Provision for communications among the site boundary to protect health and safety.
instructions to the public within the plume nuclear power reactor control room, the The emergency action levels shall be based exposure pathway EPZ. He design objectn e onsite technical support center, and the near.
on in-plant conditions and instrumentation in shall be to have the capability to essentially site emergency operations facihty: and among the nuclear facihty the prmcipal State addition to onsite and offsite monitoring.
complete the initiat notification of the pubbc and local emergency opera,tions centers, and These emergency action levels shall be within the plume exposure pathway EPZ the field assessment teams. Such discussed and agreed on by the applicant and within about 15 rrinutes. The use of this State and local aos ernt, ental authonties and notification capabihty will range from communications systems shall be tested annually.
approsed by NRC. They sh J also be immediate notificati.n of the public (within reviewed with the State and local 15 minutes of the time that State and local
- d. Provisions for communications by the gasernmental authorities on an annual basis.
officials are notified that a situation exists licensee with NRC lleadquarters and the requiring urgent action) to the more hkely appropriate NRC Regional Office Operations C. Actwonon of Emergency Ozycm.
esents where there is substantial time Center from the nuclear power reactor zauon The entire spectrum of emergency available for the State and local control room. the onsite technical support conditions that invoh e the alerting or gesernmental officials to make a judgment center. and the near. site emergency acta ating of progressively larger segments of whether or not to activate the pubhc operations facihty. Such communications the total emergency organization shall be notification system. Where there is a decision shall be tested monthly, descnbed. The communication steps to be to activate the notification system, the State I h"l"8 taken to alert or activate emergency and local officials will determine whether to The program to provide for (1) the training personnel under each class of emergency actnate the entire notification system of employees and exercising. by periodic shall be descnbed, Emergency action levels simultaneously or in a graduated or staged (based not only on onsite and offsite manner. The responsibility for activating dri!!s. of radiation emergency plans to ensure radiation monitonng information but also on such a pubhc ratification system shall remain that employees of the licensee are famiha with their specific emergency response duties readings from a number of sensors that with the appropriate government authonties, and (2) the participation in the training and indicate a potential emergency, such as the E. Emetyency facihtz.es andEquipment dn!!s by other persons whose assistance may pressure in containment and the response of Adequate provisions shall be made and be needed in the event of a radiation the Emergency Core Cooling Sy stem) for notification of offsite agencies shall be described for emergency facihties and emergency shall be descnbed. This shall desenbed. De existence, but not the details.
equipment, includmg:
include a description of specialized init2al training and penodic retraining programs to of a message authentication scheme shall be
- 1. Equipment at the site for personnel be provided to each of the fo!!owing monitormg:
categories of emergency personnel.
Federal Register / W1. 45. No.162 / Tuesd y.' August 19, 1980 / Rules and Reguhtions 55413
- s. Directors and/or coordmators of the licensed for operation each year a fuu-sc4e furnish the Director of Nuclear Material plant emergency organization:
exercise is not conducted which involves the Safety and Safeguards. U.S. Nuclear l
- b. Personnel responsible for accident State (s) withm the plume exposure pathway Regulatory Commission. Washington, assessment. including control room shift EPZ.
D.C. 20555, with a copy to the personnel:
All training. including exercises, shall
- c. Radiological monitoring teams; provide for formal critiques in order to appropriate NRC Regional Office
- d. Fire control teams (fire brigades);
klentify weak areas that need corrections.
specified in Appendix D. Part 20 of this e Repair and damage control teams; Any weaknesses that are identified shall be Chapter, each change within six months
- f. First aid and rescue teams:
corrected.
efter the change is made. Proposed g Medical support personnel; changes that decrease the effectiveness
- h. Iacensee's headquarters support C Maintaining Emergency Preporedness of the approved emergency plan shall personnel; Provisions to be employed to ensure that not be implemented without prior
- i. Security personnel the emergency plan,its implementing application to and prior approval by the In addition, a radiological onentation procedures, and emergency equipment and Commission.
training program shall be made available to supplies are maintained up to date shall be local services personnel, e.g.. local Civil described.
t Defense. local law enforcement personnel.
(Sec.181b.,i.. and o Pub. L83-703. 88 Stat.
N A*C0F8'T 948 (42 U.S.C. 2201); Sec. 201, as amended.
local news media persons.
The plan shall describe provisions for the Critena to be used to determine when.
Pub. L 93-438. 88 Stat.1242. Pub. L 94-79. 89 conduct of emergency preparedness following an accident. neentry of the facility Stat. 413 (42 U.S C. 5341))
exercises. Exercises shaU test the adequacy would be appropriate or when operation Dated at Washington. D.C. this 11th day of r
1 of timing and content ofimplementing could be resumed shaU be described.
August 1980.
procedures and methods, test emergency j
y f,p ementing Procedure, For the Nuclear Regulatory Comrnission.
I equipment and communication networks, test the public notification system, and ensure No less than 180 days prior to scheduled SamueI J. Chik.
that emergency organization personnel are issuance of an operating license for a nuclear Secretary of the Commission.
familiar with their duties. Each licensee shall Power reactor or a license to possess nuclear p1t Doc soasm Ned e-n-aa a es amt exercise at least annually the emergency plan material. 3 copies of ear.h of the applicant's eswwo cow reso-et as for each site at which it has one or more detailed implementing procedures for its power reactors licensed for operation. Both emergency plan shall be submitted to the full-scale and small-scale exercises shall be Director of the appropriate NRC ReF onal 10 CFR Part 50 i
l conducted and shallinclude participation by Office with to copies to the Director of I
appropnate State and local government Nucitar Reactor Regulation or,if appropriate. Emergency Planning: Negative i
agencies as follows:
the Director of Nuclear Material Safety and
- 1. A full-scale exercise which testsins much Safeguards. In cases where a decision on an Declaration; Finding of no Signif. tant of the licensee. State. and local emergency perating license is scheduled less than one impact for Effective Rule Changes plans as is reasonably achievable without year after the effective date of this rule such AGENCY:U.S. Nuclear Regulatory mandatory public participation shall be implementing procedures shall be submitted Commission
- as soon as practicable but before full power conducted'ch site at which one or more
- a. For ea peration is authorized. Prior to March 1 ACTION: Final negative declaration:
power reactors are located and licensed for 1981. hcensees who are authorized to operate finding of no significant impact, operation. at least once every five 3 ears and a nuclear power facility shall submit 3 copies at a frequency wtuch wid enable each State each of the licensee's emergency plan
SUMMARY
- The Nuclear Regulatory and local gaserr. ment within the plume implementing procedures to the Director of Commission a regulations require that exposure pathway EPZ to participate in at the appropriate NRC Regional Office with to the environmental frapact of certain I
least one full-scale exercise per year and C pies to the Director of Nuclear Reactor regulatory actions, including substantive which will enable each State within the Regulation Three copies each of any changes amendments to 10 CFR Part 50, be
{
ingestion pathway to participate in at least to maintain these implementing procedures evaluated to determine if an one full-scale exercise escry three years.
up to date shall be submitted to the same environmental impact statement should f
- b. For each site at which a power reactor is NRC Regional Office with to copies to the be prepared. If it is determined an located for which the first operating hcense Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation or. if for that site is issued after the effectise date appropriate. the Director of Nuclear Material environmental impact statement need of this amendment, within one year before Safety and Safeguards within 30 days of such not be prepared, a negative dechration the issuance of the operating license for full changes.
will be issued. The NRC has evaluated power which will enable each State and the environmentalimpact of the l
local gosernment within the plume exposure PART 70-DOMESTIC LICENSING OF proposed chang 3 Part 50 dealing EPZ and each State within the ingestion SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL with emergency p ing requirements i T nuclear power ;. nts (published pathway EPZ to participate.
- 2. The plan shall also describe provisions
- 2. Section 70.32 is amended by adding elsewhere in this issue), and has for ins ohing Federal emergency response paragraph (i) to read as fo!!ows:
determined that the rule changes will agencies in a fuEscale emergency i 70.32 Conditions of Hcenses.
not have a significant ir? pact on the preparedness esercise for each site at which human environment.Therefore, an one or nore power reactors are located and I
bcensed for operation at least once every 5 (i)IJcensees required to submit environmentalimpact statement will not k
y ears; emergency plans in accordance with be prepared, and a negative declaration l
3 A small scale exercise which tests the i 70.22[i] shall follow and maintain in ts being issued.
j adequacy of communication luiks.
effect emergency plans approved by the DATES:The rule changes for emergency estabbshes that response agencies Commission. The licensee may make planning will become effective understand the emergency action les els. and changes to the approved plans without November 3,1980.
k d cat of sSte onitonngfo h ofinite Commission approval only if such ADDRESSES: Copies of the Final emergency response plan for licensee. State.
changes do not decrease the Environmental Assessment.NUREG-I f
and local emergency plans for jurisdications effectiveness of the plans and the plans.
0685, and the comments received by the within the plume exposure pathway EPZ as changed, continue to meet the Commission may be examined in the shall be conducted at each site at which one requirements of Appendix E.Section IV, Commission's Public Document Room at or more power reactors are located and to CFR Part 50. The licensee shall 1717 H Street NW., Washington, D.C.
.a t
i l
t r
5541"4 Federal Register / V;l. 45. No.162 / Tu:sdty. August 19, 1980 / Ruhs and R:gulitions and at loc;l Public Docum:nt Rooms.
(nvironmentalimpact st tement will not specified in the regulation that the Single copies of the final Environmental be prepaced for these m!e changes.
Commission will use in each case to Assessment (NUREG-0685) are available for pu ::hase through the NRC Anahs mments determine whether a shutdown is warranted. When considered together.
GPO sale @ gram for $4.25 (USNRC.
The groups that submitted comments the lack of any significant adverse Attention Sales Manager Washington, are identiDed on the Table together with comment from State and local D C. 20555).
their principal comments. No comments FOR FURTHER INFORstAT10N CONTACT.
were received from State or local governments, the necessity for Michael T. Jamgochian. Office of g vernments. other Federal agencies. or Commission action before a plant will Standards Development, U.S. Nuclear Public interest groups.
be shut dovm. and the conditions for Regula tory Commission. Washington, ne main point of each set of whether a shutdown is warranted, all D.C. 20555. Telephone: (301) 443-5966.
c mments was that an Environmental argue convincingly that the assumption SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On Impact Statement should be prepared that shutdowns will be infrequent and of January 21,1980 the Nuclear Regulatory for the rule changes and that the short duration is sound. nus, the Commission published a " Draft Environmental Assessment "...
assumption is retained in the final Negative Declaration. Finding of No inadequately addresses the Environmental Assessment (NUREG-
,y Significant Impact (45 FR 3913. January ' environmentalimpact of the Emergency OS85) and the impacts of extended 21.1980J for proposed changes to 10 CFR Planning Proposed Rule and the shutdowns are not considered valid Part 50, il 50.33,50.47,50.54 and economic and socialimpacts on U.S.
impacts of these rule changes.
Appendix E that deal with emergency industry of long-term or permanent The 14 reconstructed general comments and a discussion of each planning requirements for nuclear power premature shmdowns of nuclear plants" follow:
plants (44 FR 75167, December 19,1979).
(AEP). The comments have been
- 1. Three commenters (see Table)
A draft Environmental Assessment reconstructed into 14 general criticisms, contend that c/ternatives to the accompanied the draft Negat2ve which have been analyzed for their Declaration. The comment period ended relevance to the validity of the proposedrule changes are inadequately on February 18,1980.
conclusions in the " Draft Negative addressed. They specifically mention Sixteen sets of comments were Declaration: Finding of No Sigr:ificant alternative ways of achieving the some submitted and have been analyzed.
Impact."
endsuch as pmposing /egislation.
Although all 16 commenters felt that the One matter warrants additional In view of the existing safety record of the nuclear industry and the lack of draft Environmental Assessment was mention here. An assumption was made effective preparation for the TMI inadequate to support the Finding of No in preparation of the DEA that accident, the Commission had the
(
Significant Impact, the staff analysis shutdowns of nudear power plants as a does not support this view. The result of actions taken under these rule following three alternatives from which to choose:
changes would be infrequent and of A. He Commission could take no commenters suggested that some points short duration. nis assumption is immediate action itself while in the draft Environmental Assessment were in error, some required much more critical to the decision that an encouraging other parties, i.e., the detailed discussion, and some points Environmental Impact Statement should Congress, other Federal Agencies, the had been ignored. The errors have been not be prepared ne basis for this States and the utilities themselves to assumption was that, since State and take effective action. This "no action" corrected and do not significantly affect local authorities have the responsibility.
alternative would be counter to the the earlier conclusion. The levels of detail and the omissions are generally in common with the NRC, to protect Commission's legislative mandate to related to the penalties associated with public health and safety and are protect public health and safety. In fact.
noncompliance with the rule. The staff concerned with meeting the energy the TMI accident was a clear indication originally judged that invocations of the needs of their citizens, itis hkely that that this " urging without requiring" they will cooperate to ensure the noncompliance penaltics (i e., nuclear emergency preparedness had proved to power plant shutdown) would be continued safe operation or timely be ineffective. This alternative clearly infrequent and of short duration and the commencement of safe operation of could not stand in the face of the associated impacts w ould thus be nuclear generation capability within Commission's responsibility in this area their jurisdiction.The only significant B. The Commission is a regulatory insignificant. Commenters asserted that adverse reaction by the State and local agency and has as one ofits chief tools there will be frequent and long-term shutdowns which will have severe governments that must bear this burden the authority to issue regulations that has been that complications in funding bind those parties that it regulates. If an impacts w hich would require detailed of State programs and lead time for effective method for achieving consideration in an Environmental equipment acquisition might make it protection of public health and safety a impact Statement.The staff analysis has difficult to completely satisfy all of the available through promulgation of supported the judgment ofinfrequent, planning and preparedness regdations with specific requirements short term shutdowns and thus requirements by the date set forth in the and penalties and conditions governing concludes that no additional detailed proposed rule changes. As a direct result those requirements and penalties this i
studies are necessary.
of this, the deadline for plans and should be the proper way for the Minor revisions hase been made in implementation has been extended to Commission to proceed.
the ensironmental assessment reflecting April 1.1981, and the deadline for C. If the Commission judged that comments received, but its conclusions having warnirg systems in place has danger to public health and safety was hase not been altered. Based on this been extended to july 1,1981.These significant and imminent because of assessment. a final determination has extensions should be sufficient in most continued operation of existing plants been made by the Director Office of r
cases.
while effective regulations are t
L.
Standards Development, that the h should also be noted that the deseloped, it had the authority to proposed rule changes will not have a Commission has chosen the alternative impose immediate shutdowns until a i
signficant irnpact on the human that requires Commission action to solution could be found. The safety ensironment and, therefore, that an initiate a shutdown. Conditions are record of nuclear power,includmg the t
~
Feder=1 Cegister / Vcl. 45, No.162 / Tuisd:y. August 19, 1980 / Rul:s and Reguhtions 55415 TMI accident, does not support an industry wide judgment ofimminent, s:gnificant danger. However, potential does exist for significant harm to the public in the event of a severe accident and the events at TMI suggest that plans must be made to account for this potential problem. Notwithstanding this potential, given the likelihood of an accident requiring off-site emergency protective measures, immediate industry wide shutdown and the attendant severe long. term impacts are not warranted.
Alternatives A and C are clearly unacceptable. The discussion of alternatives in the Final Environmental Assessment has not been changed from that in the Draft Environmental Assessment.
- 2. Seven commenters (see Table) assert that the impacts ofshutdowns are underestimated and that shutdowns of multiple unit plants or severalin the same State were not considered.
BILLING Coot 7590-01-4s t
t I
i I
i 4
1 i
C E
8 016 Federal Register / Vol. 45. Ns 162 / Tuesday. August 19,1980 /
Rules cnd Regulttions
[759001]
Patrin Display of Ccriaenters and Major comunents
.N t e tersl E j j
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- w w <
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m e o e
1.
Alternattves inadeouately X
X addressed X
2.
Impacts of shutdowns X
x X
d 5
X X
X X
underestimated (costs)
F*
g
- 5 3.
Health effects of fossil X
X 5
substitution underestimated X
X
[
[
4 Challence assuention of in'recueat, short duration X
X X
X X
X X
X X
shutdow s 5.
Judgerent on State X
X X
X X
cocoeration unsubstantiated X
A 6.
tono term impacts not I
X X
X X
addressed 7.
Psycholoolcal and physical risks of false alarms not X
X evaluated X
X X
X 8.
Use of fuel-ela improper, variation in cost of X
X replacement power X
X X
9 Significant impacts due to Itnkage between approval X
X X
X X
and continued operation
- 10. Prooosed rule prior to X
FEMA X
- 11. Costs too low (15 etnute X
X X
X X
X X
warntno system not included)
- 12. Decisions grantino esemptions or restrption of oceration should be classified as I
categorical exclusions under Comission's NEPA regulations
- 13. No consideration of costs to utilities X
X 14 No consideration of plants under construction X
~~
'Eey to C<rneaters AIF - Atomic Industrial Forum PASNY. Power Authority of the State Yank.At..YankeeAtomicElecjricCo.
Com. Ed. - Cononwealth Edtson of %ew York ST,1E. Baltimore Gas and Electric Con. Ed.
' so11 dated Edison Comoany D & L. DeBevois & Litennan (for of New York. Inc.
AEP. American Electric Power Service three utt11 ties) i l
Corpora tion Duke - Duke Power Comcany EE! - Edison Electric Institute SPFLT. 5%aw Pittman, potts 4 1
LLLM - LeBeeuf. Lamb. Leity & FacRae Trowbridge (for eight (for five ut111ttes) utilities) i NU. Northeast Utilities 00E. U. 5. Department of Energy i
l LNEtA&T - Loweestein. Neman. Rets.
l Aselrod & Toll (for two l
utilities)
O i
i 1
l l
l
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Fed;ral Register / Vol. 45. No.162 / Tuisd:y. August'10.1980 / Rules tnd Regulations 55417 ne DEA was prepared with the Assessment. In any case. it would Since the basis for the assumption of understanding that ever increasing fuel appear that whether these impacts. if infrequent shutdowns has not received prices make it difficuh to make stable severe enough, constitute "other substantive challenge from the parties predictions of the costs of replacement compelling reasons" to permit continued directly involved, but there has instead power. While individual values of operation will be determined in the been activity that tends to confirm the replacement costs may be in error, the individual reviews.
assumption, it will remain as a upper end of the innge of costs of
- 3. Fourgroups comment that health fundamental assumption of the final replacement power, which is compared effects offossi/ substitution are Environmental Assessment.
in the Environmental Assessment to the underestimatedin the dmft The availability of replacement costs of compliance.js only changed by Environmenta/ Assessment and that capacity also hinges on this assumption.
about 36% when the heat rate is changed other effects are ignomd.
Part of the purpose of reserve capacity as suggested. The response to comment ne critical assumption in the draft is replacement during plant outages. As eleven indicates that the costs of and final Environmental Assessment is long as shutdowns are infrequent and of compliance were also underestimated.
that shutdowns will be infrequent and of short duration, they should fit into this the relative comparison of these two short duration. In such a case. the fossil normalpattern of utilization of costs was used to demonstrate the generating capacity is simply that which replacement capacity.,No additional strong economic incentive that exists for is available for normal replacement discussions of this topic have been a!! parties to strive for effective power during refueling and maintenance prepared for the final Environmental emergency planning e,d preparedness.
outages and would probably be used in Assessment.
ne staff agrees that the net plant beat periods of peak demand until the utility
- 5. Seven commenters contendthe rate assumed in the DEA is low and therefore changed the assumed heat rate phases it out of the generating system Judgment that ". itis likely that the cornpletely. (The impacts are thiis ones Si les Willo00Pemte to assure the from 9.400 Btu /kWh to 11.000 Btu /kWh.
that occur anyway, but at a different contmuedsafe opemtion or timely Accordingly, the cost figures have been time. Short, infrequent shutdowns will commencement ofsafe opemuon of modified in the Final Environmental only change the time period for suffering nucleargenemuon capability within Assessment; but these modifications do an impact that will most likely be felt th r/ ri ction,,is substantiated not alter the conclusions of the eventually anyway.) For such short-tenu Environmental Assessment.
replacement. no new plants will be built the absence of first-hand information.
ne question of multiple. plant The draft and final Environmental the experience of the Commission since shutdowns because of a common Assessment accepts these impacts as a December 1979, in attempting to work reason. i.e., an unacceptable State plan consequence ofinfrequent and brief with state and local government or multiple umts on a site where the shutdowns. (A more accura te analysis officials, has confirmed the accuracy of local plan is unacceptable. Is a'more might conclude that there is zero th' f7)[o(m)nters assert that difficult problem.The State plans are cumulative impact because the useful only a part of the overall Federal life of the replacement capability ts impacts oflong-term shutdowns are not Emergency Management Agency unaltered.) ne discussions in the Final addressed.
(FEMA) program to enhance the ability Environmental Assessment are The assumption that shutdowns will of State governments to handle unaltered on this subject.
be infrequent and of short duration emergencies. The economic incentive for
- 4. Nine commenters challenged the defines the scope of this Environmental the utilities to help the States in every assumption that shutdowns would be Assessment. As described above,long.
way possible should result in the infrequent andofshort duration and term shutdowns are not the expected preparation of plans and equipment for questioned the lack of treatment of the result of these rule changes. He goal of a nuclear plant emergency that will be a crai/ ability of replacement capacity.
these rule changes is timely sound, significant contribution to the The assumption that shutdowns will Implementation of adequate emergency overall capability of a State to handle be infrequent and of short duration is plans and programs. The draft and final many different kinds of emergencies.
critical to the validity of the Environmental Assessment address the impacts of this action based on the The provision of conditions that permit Environmental Assessment. At the time issuance of an operating license or when the Draft Environmental expected consequences and practical considerations ofimplementation of the continuation of operation the extension Assessment was prepared, this provisions of the rule changes. No of the compliance date and deadline for assumptien was based on the assertion j
warning systems to be in place, and the that State and local governments analysis of the effects oflong-term shutdowns has been added to the final record of cooperation from the States up (having in common with NRC the Environmental Assessment.
to the present time make it unlikely that responsibility to protect public health 7.Six commenters contend that t
any State's program will be so deficient and safety) will cooperate to provide psychologicalandphysicatrisAs to the l
l that shutdown of all plants in the State fully for protection of the public. Since public offalse alarms are not era /uated.
will be required.
that time, the Commission. in The Emergency Action Level The potential that an unsatisfactory cooperation with FEMA. has been Guidelines (NUREG-0610) recommend I
local plan might result in the shutdown working diligently to help State and notification of the public when a " Site of all units on a specific site appears to local gos ernments develop satisfactory Emergency" has been declared. The be significantly greater. Depending on emergency plans and programs. The expected frequency of an event of this the size and number of the units response of the State and local type is predicted to be l in 100 to f in invohed. the incentive of the utility for aid ng the local governments is also gosernments has confirmed the validity 5.000 per reactor per year. The high end of the earlier assumption. In addition, no of this range indicates that two such greater. The potential magnitude of the State or local government provided any warnings might occur over the effectise impact of shutdown in these cases is comment on the Praft Environmental life (40 years) for every five units. The two to three times greater than for the Assessment thus indicating at least low end indicates one event over the life single unit case. and this determination facit agreement with the basis for the of 125 units. Far from causing excessive has been added to the Environmental assumption.
psychological and physical risks, this 1
t.
l
6E418 Federal Register / V:1. 45. N:.162 / Tuesdry. August 19,1980 / Rul:s and Regul:tions kind cf behtvior should lead to a more
- 11. Seven commenters assert that the implement the National Environmental accurate public perception of the true
, costs ofimplementation am toolow and Policy Act of 1969. De Commission will incidence of risk from nuclear power that there may not be enough time consider this as a comment on the facilities and a more practical and allowed to achieve adequacyin all ongoing rulemaking on 10 CFR Part 51 considered response to an emergency areas ofemergencyplanning and (45 FR 13739).
when one occurs. No change has been preparedness.
- 13. Two commenters noted that no made in the final Ensironmental ne draft Environmental Assessment considemtion was given to the costs to Assessment.
based its estimates of cost of the utilities of those portions of the rule
- 8. Five commenters assert that the use implementation on information changes that upgmdeprevious onsite of the mix offuels alwadyin usein the contained in "Beyond Defense in Depth:
requirements.
State is a poorpredicter of what would Cost and Funding of State and Local This oversight has been corrected.
be the fueleplacement capacityfor a Government Radiological Emergency While these costs added a significant specificplant shutOwn.
Response Plans and Preparedness in increment to the total cost of A generic assessment must make Support of Commercial Nuclear Power implementation, this total cost is still some averaging assumptions or become Sta tions," NUREG-0553, October 1979.
Iow compared to the reference costs of hopelessly lost in detail. In this case, the This report did not consider the costs of (1) replacement power, (2) tax and fee commenters are correct that this is a a warning system that would effectively burden, and (3) capital in vestment.
" gross assumption."It is, however, warn everyone within to miles within 15 While several of the cost figures in the sufficient to establish the range of costs minutes of the time when the decision to final Environmental Assessment have r-for replacement power, which is the way warn the public is made. The cost been revised upward, the comparison of the detailed information was used. No estimates in the draft Environmental fs change has been made in the mix of Assessme'nt thus do not include the these costs has remained unchanged and the conclusions of the fuels used to generically assess the costs of 15-minute notification. The Environmental Assessment are range of costs of replacement power.
estimates provided by the commenters Q;
- 9. Five commenters observe that allof have been used to revise the cost unchanged.
- 14. One commenter observed that the significant impacts an due to estimate in the final Environmental there is no consideration given to plants
~
lin/nage between adequacy ofemergency Assessment. It shoufd be noted that all under construction.
plans and continuedplant operation.
cost figures are approximate and are The cost estimates were forecast for These commenters agree that the only intended to give an estimate of the inspects of compliance are insignificant normal magnitude of costs and fees all plants scheduled to be operating by the time the rule was to become and that if there were no penalty associated with building and operating a associated with inadequate emergency nuclear power plant. Significant effective. To go beyond this period would only complicate the estimates preparedness then an Environmental variations from these costs for individual cases should be expected.'
with future costs of greater uncertainty.
Assessment or no Environmental Assessment would be appropriate. The These changes do not affect the earlier The purpose here was to present an g
thrust of the rule is to protect the pubhc conclusions of the draft Environmental approximation of the relative through adequate emergency planning.
Assessment.
significance of the cost impacts to The thrust of the shutdown provision is determine whether a more detailed In response to comments that more adequate provision has not been and is time might be needed, the deadline for analysis is necessary. The relative to protect the public in the event that,
magnitude of these costs is well plans and implementation to be not being made to provide adequate established by the information at hand emergency planning and preparedness.
completed has been extended to Aprill, and these are clearly sufficient to The decision of how the public should 1981, and the deadline for installation of support a decision without the warning systems has been extended to be protected has been made, i.e., either.
emergency planning and preparedness is July 1,1981 to allow for procurement preparation on environmental impact s ta tement.
adequate or a plant may be placed in a problems. Appropriate changes have w.,,,,
condition of safe shutdown. The State been made in the Environmental Dated at Bethesda. Maryland, this 6th day and local authorities have the Assessment but the earlier conclusions remain unaffected.
For the Nucl ear Regulatory Commission.
responsibility to determine which option is in the best interest oitheir citizens.
- 12. One commenter suggested that Robert B. Minogue, The linkage remains in the eifective rule decisions on shutdowns, allowing Duettor. @ce ofStandants Development.
y changes. No additional discussion has continued operation despite inadequate U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commusion.
been provided in the final plans, or the usumption of operution p Doc a N5:48 Fded s-2-42 4 45 aml Environmental Assessment.
after a shutdown should be listedin 10 ema coon rsso-es-u
- 10. Two commenters observed that CFR Part 51 as a categoricalexclusion.
the proposed rule was issuedprior to The categorical exclusions in Part 51 the expanded role of FDL4 in are those Commission actions that have emergenc) planning for nuclearpower been judged as a class not to have any significant environmentalimpact and plants.
The NRC and FEMA are working thus have been excluded from further closel) to establish and carry out the.
consideration under those portions of ir respective roles in emergency planning the Commission's regulations that for nuclear power plants. The efrective rule has been changed to reflect this
- Northeast t'imi:es indvated costs as ma e 1.s umen bec queed in de F.nytronmental change in relationship between the two A. e..meni but.1 o cited unusual comphcations agencies. llowes er, the substantive an s wge numbm Wocal sun-is set 4
prosisions of the rule have not changed, 7 /*'}d *lft,,, C ;l,*l,',2 % *.n*,','[,
only the parties responsible for specific n
actions.
h Wues wre oaneidmd be>ond the usual rense of mets.
..--m..
wm..
w
i UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMIS.5 ION ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD Before Administrative Judges:
Louis J.
Carter, Chairman Frederick J.
Shon Dr. Oscar H.
Paris
)
In the Matter of
)
Docket Nos.
)
CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK, )
50-247 SP INC. (Indian Point, Unit No. 2)
)
50-286 SP POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK )
(Indian Point, Unit No. 3)
)
April 15, 1982
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of LICENSEES' SUBMISSION IN SUPPORT OF OBJECTIONS TO CONSIDERATION OF EXPANDING EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE in the above-captioned proceeding have been served on the following by deposit in the United States mail, first class, this 15th day of April, 1982.
Docketing and Service Branch
- Ellyn R. Weiss, Esq.
Of fice of the Secretary William S. Jordan, III, Esq.
U.
S. Nuclear Regulatory Harmon & Weiss Commission 1725 I Street, N.W.,
Suite 506 Washington, D.C.
20555 Washington, D.C.
20006 Louis J.
Carter, Esq., Chairman
- Joan Holt, Project Director Administrative Judge Indian Point Project Atomic Safety and Licensing New York Public Interest Board Research Group 7300 City Line Avenue 5 Beekman Street Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19151 New York, N.Y.
10038
s Dr. Oscar H.
Paris
- John Gilroy, Westchester Administrative Judge Coordinator Atomic Safety and Licensing Indian Point Project U.S. Nuclear Pegulatory New York Public Interest Commission Research Group Washington, D.C.
20555 240 Central Avenue White Plains, Nev York 10606 Mr. Frederick J.
Shon*
Janice Moore, Esq.
Administrative Judge Counsel for NRC Staff Atomic Safety and Licensing Office of the Executive Board Legal Director U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Washington, D.C.
20555 Jeffrey M.
Blum, Esq.*
New York University Law School 423 Vanderbilt Hall 40 Washington Square South New York, N.Y.
10012 Marc L.
Parris, Esq.
Charles J.
Maikish, Esq.
Eric Thorson, Esq.
Litigation Division County Attorney The Port Authority of County of Rockland New York and New Jersey 11 New Hemstead Road One World Trade Center New City, N.Y.
10956 New York, N.Y.
10048 Geoffrey Cobb Ryan Ezra I.
Bialik, Esq.
Conservation Committee Steve Leipsiz, Esq.
Cn a i rn.a n, Director Enviromental Protection Bureau New York City Audubon Society New York State Attorney 71 West 23rd Street, Suite 1828 General's Office New York, N.Y.
10010 Two World Trade Center New York, N.Y.
10047 Gre ater New York Council on Alfred B.
Del Bello Energy Westchester County Executive c/o Dean R.
10601 26 Stuyvesant Street New York, N.Y.
10003 D
Atomic Safety and Licensing Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Appeal Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Washington, D.C.
20555 Andrew S.
Roffe, Esq.
Honorable Richard L.
Brodsky New York State Assembly Member of the County Albany, N.Y.
12248 Legislature Westchester County County Office Building White Plains, N.Y.
10601 Renee Schwartz, Esq.
Pa t Posner, Spokesperson**
Botein, Hays, Sklar & Herzberg Parents Concerned About Attorneys for Metropolitan Indian Point Transportation Authority P.
O.
Box 125 200 Park Avenue Croton-on-Hudson, N.Y.
10520 New York, N.Y.
10166 Stanley B.
Klimberg Charles A.
Scheiner, Co-General Counsel Chairperson New York State Energy Office Westchester People's Action 2 Rockefeller State Plaza Coalition, Inc.
Albany, New York 12223 P.O.
Box 488 White Plains, N.Y.
10602 Honorable Ruth Messinger Alan Latman, Esq.
Member of the Council of the 44 Sunset Drive City of New York Croton-on-Hudson, N.Y.
10520 District No. 4 City Hall New York, New York 10007 Lorna Salzman Zipporah S.
Fleisher Mid-Atlantic Representative West Branch Conservation Friends of the Earth, Inc.
Association 208 West 13th Street 443 Buena Vista Road i
New York, N.Y.
10011 New City, N.Y.
10956 __
Mayor George V.
Begany Judith Kessler, Coordinator Village of Buchanan Rockland Citizens for Safe 236 Tate Avenue Energy
- Buchanan, N.Y.
10511 300 New Hempstead Road New City, N.Y.
10956 Ms. Amanda Potterfield, Esq.*
Mr. Donald L.
Sapir, Esq.
P.O.
Box 384 60 East Mount Airy Road Village Station RFD 1, Box 360 New York, New York 10014 Croton-on-Hudson, New York 10520 David H.
Pikus 1
Service effected by hand delivery.
- Service effected by Express Mail because no address available for hand delivery.
.