ML20071H154

Views Re Radiological Emergency Planning in Response to Commission 830505 Order.Fema & NRC Should Rule That Plants No Longer Have Significant Deficiencies Based on Improvement & Interim Compensating Actions

ML20071H154
Person / Time
Site:	Indian Point
Issue date:	05/20/1983
From:	Block J, Brandenburg B CONSOLIDATED EDISON CO. OF NEW YORK, INC.
To:
References
NUDOCS 8305240527
Download: ML20071H154 (41)

Text

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tNITED STNI'ES OF AMERICA DOCKETED

"'I^

NUCLEAR REGUUdDRY CBNISSICN OCPMISSICNERS:

'83 MAY 23 A7 :59 Nunz: 7 J. Palladino, Chairmri i Victor Gilinsky John F. Ahearne

'Dxxnas M. Roberts James K. Asselstine X --- - . - - - -

In the Matter of l

CONSOLIDATED EDISCE OCHPANY OF ,

NEW YORK (Inchan Point, Docket Nos. 50-247 Unit No. 2)

, '1 50-286 PGER AUTHORIT'I OF THE STATE OF  :

NEW YORK (indian Point,  :

Unit No. 3)  ;

X VIRE OF CON EDISCE RESPECTING RADIOIOGICAL EMERGE 2CI PIANNING AT INDIAN POINT IN RESPCNSE 'IO THE CM4ISSICN'S MAY 5,1983 ORDER Dated: New York, New York CONSOLIDATED EDISON CCMPANY OF May 20,1983 NEW YORK, INC.

• Licensee of Indian Point i Unit 2 8305240527 830520 4 Irving Place .

. New York, New York 10003

{DRADOCK 05000247 PDR (212)460-4600

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O y , , . . - - , , , , - - , - . - - , _ , . - - , , - . , - . - . - . , . -

TABLE OF CCNIENTS __

_ Page No.

9m==7 of Funu.yaucy Planning Activitie.3 in the Vicinity of . _- ..

Tndian Point Since 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ._._. . . . . .. 2 I. BASED UPCN IMPBCMiMENIS AND INIERDi CX11PENSATING _ __Z T- ~_~ -

"_ ACTIOTS FOR OFF-SITE EMERGENCY PLANNING HHICH ARE IT:T - -~ - - - . ;-- : _ .-_

. BE3NG TAKEN AT INDIAN POINE SINCE 'IHE MARCH 9,1983 T I-- ~ -' :~- ' _ : 2--

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, y gy9 y y - --- ._ - -- .

ARE NO IaiGER ANY SIGNIFICANT DEFICIENCIES . . . . . . ; . :12 7 T~

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II. FEMA'S POST-EXERCISE ANN DOES NC7f SUPPLY 'IHE ~~ _-

BASIS EUR A SHUIDCHN OF THE INDIAN POINI PIANT . ..... 16 A. FH R did not intend to suggest in its Post-Exercise Assessment that there were conditions making con-sideration of shutdown aw w glate ........ . 16 B. '!he two deficiencies c'1aracterized as significant_ -

at Indian Point have been found to be generic . . . .- 19 C. h significa= of the Rockland County deficiency is confined to the exercise, and does not relate to the actual level of preparedness in the area . . . . 21 l

III. THE FHG Cuu Lu;CIES ICULD NOT BE SIGNIFICANT IN AN - --

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23 HIEPGENC'I . . . . . . ............... ...

A. Under the NRC's Regulations, the NBC must itself ..

dacida whether planning is adequate for a radio-logical emergency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 B. h FD R Maf4ciencies cannot possibly be "signi-ficant" for purgeses of the C - iasion's regulations since they would have an insignificant effect on the p$h14c in the event of a radiological me.rgency at Indian Point . ............. ......

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4 Pace No.

IV. THERE ARE CCMPELIJNG REASONS WhT THE INDIAN POH7f CNITS SHOUID BE PEBMITIED 'IO CCNTE;UE OPERATICN . . ..... -

31 A. It wx21d be wholly impewer iate to permit local -

_ , govar==nt veto of nuclear power plant operations . ~ ~ --11 - - - - -

B.

Any interruption.of the continued operation of the -

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Indian Point Units would have a severe adverse - - - -

. effect upon the New York meL.upulitan area . . . . . ---- 34~ -

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1 UNITFD STATES OF AMERICA NDCLEAR REGUIA'IORY CDHISSION COMISSICEERS:

bbnzio J. Palladino, Chairman _.

Victor Gilinsky John F. Ahearne -

'Ihmas M. Roberts -

James F. Asselstine ,

x - - - - --- = - - - - - - - - - -

In the Matter of  :

OCNSOLIDATED EDISON CDiPANY OF  : - -

N W YORK (Indian Point,  :

Unit bb. 2)  : Docket Nos. 50-247

50-286 POWER AUIFORITY CF TRE STATE CF  :

MEW YORK (Indian Point,  :

Unit No. 3)  :

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

VIEWS OF CON EDISW - - -

RESPECFIb'G RADIOLCGICAL ENERCEBXN PLANNING AT INDIAN POIIE IN RESPONSE 'IO THE CDHISSION'S MAY 5,1983 ORDER .___

Cbnsolidated Edison Ccupany of New York, Inc., (" Con Edison"),

licensee of the Indian Point Unit 2 nuclear power plant, submits its views on

- the w.w iateness r of enforcement action relating to energency preparedness at- -

Indian Ibint pursuant to leave granted by Crder of the tbclear Reculatory Ccmission ("Cmmission") datei May 5,1983. - -

On April 14, 1983 the Federal Dnergency Management Agency (" FEMA")

released a pcst-exercise assessment relating to an emergency planning exercise

. conducted at Indian Point en March 9, 1983. That assessment asserts that two sianificant deficiencies in plans for a serious radiolcaical accident at Indian

Point were identified in the course of the exercise. h Fm A deficiencies relate.to the nonparticipation of one of four counties within the Indian Point J 10 mile mergency planning zone ("EPZ") in the March 9 exercise, and a lack of

- assurance of sufficient public transportation resources for evacuation of transit-dependent persons in another county.  ::.-- .

j x- :2 _ .

.- For the reasons set forth below, con Edison submits that further - -

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.- - enforcenent action against the Indian Point licensees would-be wholly -

inappropriate. The history of our involvement in off-site enernency planning is one of responsible generosity and cooperation with State and local ,

goverments, and no licensee could be %ted to have done more. At the presen.t time, interim off-site emergency planning measures are being put in place Aich will provide further assurances that the public is amply protected

!~ frcm the aw aaMvgly low risks posed by the plant. h -F E A deficiencies, even if cou.act, would have a de minimis impact on the public were- an accident to occur. 'me severe and immediate adverse economic consequences to the citizens of the New York ird.glitan area frcm any interruption in the cperation of the Indian Point units is a ccupelling reason which is sufficient of itself to permit their continued operation. -

Surmary of Emergency Planning Activities -

in the Vicinity of Indian Point Since 1979 ..--. - .- .- -- -

In order for the Ocnnission to fully understand the present status of offsite radiological emeroency plannino in the vicinity of Indian Point, it should have an overview of the state, licensee and county activities to inprove

. emeruency planning at this site since the NRC amended its regulations.

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When the NRC proposed i:Tr_iG .uls to its energency planning regulations,10 CFR Part 50 and App. E, in Novenber 1979, Indian Point ~ was on.e of the few operating nuclear power plant sites to have cmprehensive errergency planning in place. Prior to the Three Mile Island incident, Con Edison had -

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'already implenented arergency planning, which included a plan. coordinated -with - - n I l

i M etbe State and Westchester County, an on-site meteorology system, a backup and =_;

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primary energency cwL.cl center, field monitoring teams with -radio'- - - - :_,

emmunicatien equipoent, and agreements with various organizations to provide assistance in the event of an incident. -

Con Edison also Wy-ted ongoing evergency planning training and drills with local fim, anbulance and police. The Con Edison Indian Point .

Brergency Planning Director had for a nunber of years been maintaining regular contact with emergency services officials in both Westchester and Rockland -

Counties, and these contacts increased as efforts to cmply with the NRC's new -

regulations got under way. Starting in late 1979, Con Edison officials had nunerous meetings with county officials to solicit advice on emergency planning efforts.

In December 1979, con Edison and the New York Power Authority retained a leading civil engineering firm, Parsons, Brinckerhoff,. OIade and Douglas, to prepare evacuation time estimates'. In early 1980 the licensees proposed to the _

four counties around Indian Point that licensees fund the activities of consultants to develop county and state radiological energency response plats which would conform to the NRC's new regulations. With the assistance of energency planners frm the state and the counties, a specification was prepared and proposals were solicited frm over 30 vendors. Five vendors gave prcposals to a ccmwittee caprised of county and utility representatives, and

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on March 17, 1980, with the support of Pockland and Westchester Counties, the firm of EDS Nuclear tea selected to develop overall energency plans. Because of its familiarity with the Indian Ebint EPZ aained in preparing the evacuation time estimates, the Parsons, Brinckerhoff firm was retained to prepare the -

evacuation portion of the plans. Although ccupensated by the utilities, tnese

- - two fims acted as consultants for the state and the-four Indian-Point - - - - - -

counties.  :-

Cn April 29, 1980, several months aftar the initial issuance of a

i NUREG-0654 by NRC and FEMA, Few York's five nuclear utilities entered into 'a contract with the State of New York to fund the State's Radiological Dnergency Preparefness Group ("REPG"). In exchange for payments ultimately ageregating 4

$439,000, the State assumed the responsibility for preparing radiological energency response plans and implenenting procedures, which would ccmply with all Federal regulations and guidance, for the nuclear power plants in the-State. 7he centract provides that the State:

". . . shall see to it that the plan and implenenting procedures submitted by the State fully caply with all applicable Federal regulations and gn W nce."

The ce h act also makes the State:

". . . responsible for the coordination and review of local radiological response plans and written implementing procedures."

Throughout 1980 and much of 1981, the consultants preparing the plans and State representatives met frequently with officials of the four Indian Point ccunties. These county officials included those responsible for civil defense, law enforcement, health, schools, public works and highways, fire and

- rescue, anbulance corps, social services and transportation. Every effort was made to maintain close ccnnunication with the various participating agencies in the fcur counties.

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, 1 By early 1980, EDS Nuclear had designated an emergency planner to work full-time with Pockland County. Frequent meetings were held with Rockland (bunty officials to prepare and discuss three successive revisiens to the draft Rockland County plan. All draft plan materials were also discussed with the State's Radiological Emergency Preparedness Croup and the Office of Disaster - -1 r;- Preparedness. By S@ternber 1980, EDS Nuclear had irc;rprated all wa..eWcs - _

made by the counties and the State into the emergency' plans. Meanwhile, -

Parsons, Brinckerhoff planners held meetings on almost_a daily basis.with officials frcin schools, nursing hares, hospitals and various public agencies in -

the four counties to assess evacuation needs and to inventory equipnent and perscnnel that would be available to aid in re W ing to an accident.

EDS Nuclear maintained continuing contact with the County Executives of hL-lester, Putnan and Orange Ctunties, and the then-01 airman of the Bockland County Iagislature,* throughout the course of the Indian Point -

project. In Rockland County, EDS Nuclear also maintained continuing contact with the Deputy Director of the Office of Dnergency Services, as well as the County Sheriff, the Canmissioner of Health, the County Radiological Health Swialist, and the Superintendent of Highways. In mid-1981, EDS met with the 1

i Oliefs of Police of at least seven Bockland County nunicipalities, who stated that the draft county plan was acceptable. - --

• The p.esent Chaiman of the Rockland County Legislature assumed his duties on January 8, 1983.

Parsons, Brinckerhoff also maintained an extensive contact p%au with schools and bus ccupanies in the four counties, concentrating on the evacuation ccroponent of the plan. Through 1981, Parsons had contacted 38

- school administrators in Rockland County alone whose schools were located -

within the EPZ. In Westchester County, Parsons met with.seven bus ccupanies - -- -

1- and cperators, all of which indicated that they would: participate in the plan. . . - -

. Radiological mergency response plans for the four counties: --. --

surrounding Indian Point were submitted to NRC on Decenber 30, 1980, and revised county plans were submitted on .kigust 17, 1981.- By this time, the two .-

consultant firms had devoted in excess of 1,300 man-hours to contacts with local and county representatives, not including the many hundreds of additional hours devoted to this purpose by utility and New York State REPG personnel.

In testimony recently given before the Indian Point Licensing Board, the official ra e nsible for radiological emergency planning in Orange County described the county's involvement with the censultants in plan preparation as follcws:

1 "I was very impressed with Parsens Brinckerhoff, the pecple that worked for them, the type of work they do....

As the plan develcped, Parsons Brinckerhoff did not put a plan together for us. 'Ihey worked with us. Every month we had a departnent head neeting. We had all our ccnnissioners and depa m e_nt heads and we sat down with Parsons Brinckerhcff so that anything we put together would be tailored to how thines functiened in Orange County. This is hcw the plan evolved. It was with direct input frcm all our agency heads and department heads."*

" Transcript of Indian Point Special Proceeding, Nuclear

. Peculatory Comission; Docket Fo. 50-247 SP and 50-286 SP, at pages 12074-77 (hereinafter "Tr.").

he Putnam Ccunty Civil Defense Director characterize 3 county radiological plan developnent in a similar fashicn:

" Parsons Brinckerhoff gave us the first draft. @e first draft had quite a few thinas in it that were wronc. We took this plan and we called the services in, for instance, the transportation plan. Some of the roads were narned wrong, which would be - I think it would be par for the course for --

anybcdy who is making a plan. -

We took our own pecple, cur sheriffs, our highway departrent people and we showed them the plan. We showed then the reps. Bey pointed out-where the mistakes were on the roads and stuff. We made these corrections.. We made- .

these corrections two years ago; two years ago we made these corrections.

Almost anything we wanted - anything they want to do, we had the irput." -

(Tr. at p. 12075.)

In early 1981, NRC and FWA publicly expressed concern over whether in -

the event of a radiological enernency State officials and the Covernor would have sufficient authority to insure the participation and direct the activities of county and local workers. State planners also wished to initiate a permanent p1.cg.c.u to provide continuous funding for radiological energency _

preparedness tc r@ lace the contractual arrangenents started in April 1980. On a21y 9,1981 the New York State Legislature passed Chapter 708 of the Laws of 1981.* This legislation gives the Governer er his designee ccipplete powers to direct the participation and activities cf county officials and other local workers in the event of a radiological energency.

This legislatien also imposes an annual fee of $250,000 per reactor -

upon utility licensees in New York State to be used for radiological energsncy preparedness purposes at both the state and local levels. In the 22 months

• Now cod.Lfied as Executive Law, Art. 2-B, McFirmey's Consolidated Laws of New York. ,

this law has been in effect, the State Disaster Preparedness Carmission and th'e REPG have received fees amounting to $3,450,000 for nuclear energency planning, '

$1,150,000 from the Indian Point licensees alone. Cbn Edison and the Power

_. Authority each pay to the State the highest annual assessment for radiological -

emergencyplanningofanynuclearutilityinthecounO. -

From the funds received through utility assessments, the State REPG ~{

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nakes annud . direct cash orants for radiological evergericy ; planning to af'fected"

. counties throughout the State. In 1982, the four counties surrounding Indian -

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Point received payments totalling $212,247, of which Rockland Ccunty reciived

$57,870. In addition to these cash grants, the State has to date also purchased and provided to the four TMian Point counties fran utility payments  ;

under the funding legislation over $73,000 in equipment, including 950 dosimeters and over 3000 TIDs.

In 1980, the utilities began to receive equipnent repests directly--

frm the fcur counties. Two carplete ocbile radiation ' monitoring kits were delivered to each county in 1980, and with the assistance of county officials, l includino Pockland County, a network of fixed-site Indlum and Reuter-Stokes radiation monitors was installed in each county. The utilities also agreed to supply extensive comunications and camuter equimnt to each of the four 1

counties, and by mid-1981, the anergency Cperations Center in each county was supplied with a conputer to access meteorolocical arxf radiation data fran Indian Point. A dedicated notline and a backup systen were also installed at utility expense which pemit instantaneous comunications among the State, four counties and the site.

After the passage of the radiolte cal energency planning funding legislation, and the counties' receipt of the cash and equignent described I

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above both frm the Indian Ibint licensees directly and frcrn the State, two of ..

the four Indian Point counties (but not other counties within the State)

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asserted that they were still without sufficient resources to maintain adequate

- planning. So in Decenber 1982, Con Edison and the Power Authority made a further voluntary payment to the State, beyond that required by law,- of -

- $210,000, to be used in the four Indian Point counties.. 'Ibese funds have been-applied as follows: .

Rockland County

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Fadiological Consultant $30,000 Cost of 1982 Exercise 30,000 Paging Equipment 1,750 Westchester County Pass Transit Study 23,3C0 Police Training 21,640 Orance County Padiological Specialist

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15,000 Training Expenses 10,000 Mass Transic Study 20,000 Putnam County Public Informatien Specialist

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30,000 Stand-by Electric Cenerator 13,750 Radiological Specialist 15,000 Con Edison and the Pcwer Authority have expended considerable funds  ;

for Indian Point energency planning in addition to the legislative assessments I and voluntary grants described above. To date, the licensees have made capital expenditures for radiological emergency planning arountina to approximately

$11,885,000, exclusive of the tbousands of hours of utility personnel time

. which have been devoted to planning activities. These funds have been expended as follows:

. State and County plan devel p t S 2,488,000 MIDAS (Meteorological Information and Dose Assessnent Systen) 618,000 Peteorological equignent 390,000 Pespirator Test facility 57,000 l

g. _ __

Emeroency Cperations Facility 1,104,000 Radiation Monitoring Station 590,000 Fortable Radiation Instrumenta- 204,000 tation ECC Radios 1,106,000 State and County Ccnnunica- 366,000

. tions Equipment --

Alert Fotification (Siren) 4,693,000 -

. Syde -

Public Information System 150,000 Demand Breathing Syst e 49,000 -

Warning Point Notification 70,000 -

. Total $11,885,000 -

I The lion's share of this amount, S7,761,000, has been spent off-site '

for such items as the public notification system, plan devel + a t. and- _-

radiation monitors. Moreover, licensees have incurred additional expenses in excess of $1,900,000 for operation and maintenance of the emergency planning system. See of these expenses include the installation and maintenance of the New York State / County hotline and preparation of the emergency planning public information booklets. - - -

In addition to the funds expended for direct off-site emergency planning, as a result of the Three Mile Island incident, Con Edison has made further expenditures under the " lessons learned" program for modifications which substantially enhance plant operator ability to diagnose and respond to an emergency at Indian Point Unit 2. To date, approximately $57,000,000 has been expended for facilities and equipment which would inprove emergency response, including a Technical Support Center, Post-Accident Sampling, Radiation Monitors, and inproved Control Ibom habitability. ..

1 In addition to cash experditures, both the State and the licensees l l

have devoted considerable effort to the training of county emergency response workers. Since February 9,1981, Con Edison has trained over 163 county emeroency workers frm the various counties in field monitorina and dose

assessrrent. Additionally, prior to the initial Indian Ibint exercise in March 1982, Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation was retained by the Power Authority to conduct radiological mergency response training sessions for ccunty personnel. Frtm January 28 until March 1, 1982, twenty four separate -

county worker training sessions were conducted at various locations within the "four county-area. The total county trainee attendance at these sessions was- -

. approximately 400. - --

Starting in March 1982, the State REPG has also been providing radiological energency response training regularly to state and local workers in the four counties surrounding Indian Point. This training was described in detail in testimony given by the State of New York before the Indian Point Licensing Board [ To date, State-sponsored training has been given to a total of 4,892 attendees, 1,045 of whcm attended courses in Pockland County.

Those who have received training include police, firenen, ambulance and rescue teams, radiolcgical exposure and decontamination workers, bus drivers, hospital workers, and school superintendents.

Thus the Indian Point licensees as well as the State have devoted an enormous amunt of resources to the development of local govement erergency response capability in the vicinity of Indian Ibint. The Orange Catmty official who testified before the Indian Point Licensing Board described those resources as follcws:

"(W]e have always received equipment from the state in the form of war related activities, radioloaical equipment. A nunber of those pieces of equipment are or can be used in this type of a scenario. The utilities, however, did provide us with a trenendous amount of nuch more sophisticated equipment to work in the peacetire nuclear scenario. . . . In addition, l

. the utilities, if I may, continue with that, provided us with ccepr.ters, I telefax machines, telephones, really anything we requested to insure that I cur plan would work." (Tr. at pp. 12093-94.)

• Exh.ibit 9 to the Testimony of Donald B. Davidoff and Lawrence B. Czech.

The Putnam County Civil Defense Director testified in the hearings that:

"The utilities, also, gave us all kinds of equipreent. As a matter of fact, anything we want, they have been more than decent about giving us."

(Tr. at p.12095.)

The witness added that the sarre policy was applied to training:

"'Ibe-State will give us any assistance we want and the utilities will give

- us' any assistance - I could ask the utility for armdwly on 2:00 on Sunday ~

- afternoon to train smebody. Fe's there. 'Ihe state will-do the same thing. We have no~ prcblem getting anybody to give us a hand." (Tr. at p.

12099.)

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BASED UPCN IMPROVDDFTS APO INTERIM CCMPENSATINC ACTIWS EUR TF-SITE mWCY PLANNING WHIG ARE BEING TAKEN AT DDIAN POINT SINCE THE MAPCF 9,1983 EXERCISE, FDIA AND THE NRC SHOUID FIlO THAT TFERE ARE NO I4NCER ANY SIGIFICANT DEFICIDICIES. ._.

'In its post-exercise assessnent FEMA acknowledges that " substantial progress" in inproving off-site ernercency plannirs in the vicinity of Indian Point "is being made alnest on a daily basis." This statenent is an accurate characterization of the entire period frm the Parch 9,1983 exercise to date.

The licensees, the State of New York, and Westchester and Rockland Counties have been working intensively over recent weeks to inprove planning and to alleviate the situations characterized as significantly deficient by FEMA in its post-exercise assessment.

In Westchester Ccunty, the FEMA cbjecticns have been overcme through a nurrber of significant breakthroughs. One of FEMA's concerns related to bus driver trainina in Westchester (bunty. A cmiritment has been received frcm the unions representing the majority of Westchester bus drivers whereby 1,500 drivers will receive classrom orientation on radiation energency response 1

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procedures. The sessions ccmnenced on May 19, with over 40 drivers. The timetable anticipates that 1,500 drivers will be trained within a six-week period.

In testimony before the Indian Point Licensing Board (Tr. at p.

14977), FDIA testified that agreements with bus ccupanies to provide - -

transportation sewices in the event of an mergency wxild be satisfactory to - --

FD*A. Within the past few days, agreements have beeri reached to sign letters of intent whereby up to 1,000 buses would be made available for possible use in an actual emergency, which is at least twice the nunber which would be required for evacuation of the entire Westchester County portion of the EPZ. Since the March 9 exercise, Westchester County has also requested and received a ccanitrent frce the State of New York to provide the bus empanies with 1,000 dosimet.ers,1,000 bottles of potassian iodide tablets, and other materials which would aid in the evacuation cwycros. of an emergency. -

In another significant development, Con Edison and the Power Authority have executed an agreerant with the State of New York's Radiological Brergency Planning Group and paid $241,725 for the services of the Transportation Safety Planning Group ("TSPG") to conduct a study of the evacuation portion of the Westchester Radiological Drergency Preparedness Plan. A written agrement I

between TSPG and Westchester County to conduct the study was signed on May 20, and the study will be underway shortly.

In Rockland County, substantial progress is also beina made to address

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the FEMA significant deficiency. There recently appears to be increased receinition aneng responsible Rockland County elected officials that scme interim arrangeents formalizing a County or State / County respc.nse capability are desirable for the benefit of Ccunty residents during the several aanths I

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while the County is preparing its own plan. Cn May 17, the Philti-Services l Cmmittee of the Rockland County Legislature approved and sent to the full Legislature a Resolution providing in pertinent part that:

"RESCLVED, that the Legislature of Rockland County hereby expresses its intent to accept an interim energency evacuation plan frcm any responsible individual or entity pending the acceptance by the legislature of a final enercency evacuatien plan for the County of Pockland. . .' ." -

The Resolution, which makes any interim energency plan subject to Ccunty wwval, will be considered by the Legislature at its meeting on June 2,1983.

At the time Rockland County withdrew frcm the coordinated enercency .

1 planning prccess in 1982, it established a Citizens' Advisory Cmmittee to )

assist the County in pr q aring its own plan. At a meeting of the County Legislature en May 16, the Iegislature heard a report fran the Chairwanan of the Citizens' Advisory Otmnittm who stated that " great strides" had been made in develcping the plan. The Cannittee has been rneeting regularly, and the l

Chairman of the County Legislature has recently suggested that a Con Edison representative who is a resident of Pcckland County be proposed for mettership in the Ctmnittee. Con Edison welcaned the cpportunity and has reiterated to County officials that it stands ready to assist in radiological erergency preparedness activities wherever possible. The County called upon the l

licensees to provide such assistance last mek, when at the County's request licensees provided an additicnal 300 dosimeters and four field monitoring kits to Pockland County.

FD4A found deficient the State's carpensatory action program to substitute State personnel for Pockland County officials who ceased participating after 9 A.M. during the March 9 exercise. FD4A's position was in

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larae part because there was no written plan providing for substitution of State workers. The State has recently indicated a willingness to make the plan 1

changes necessary to acccatodate this FEFA concern. Cbn Edison has expressed 1 its support for this new State activity and has offered any assistance that may -

be of use.

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The NRC Staff has itself recently recognized the efforts of Con Edison .;

in inproving off-site emergency plannina in the vicinity of Indian Point. In its May 20, 1983 Systenatic Assessnent of Licensee Performance (SALP) report on

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Indian Point Unit 2, the NRC Staff cbserved that:

"The licensee has been very cooperative in assisting the State of New York and local officials in upgrading offsite energency preparedness."

Referring to corrected deficiencies fran the 1982 exercise, the SALP report states that: <

"The licensee comtitted significant resources to - -

accorplish the corrective actions." - - - - -

Based on the foregoing, there are at present adequate interim -

ccnpensating acticns that are being taken prcnptly to correct or overcom the FEMA significant deficiencies. Having met the requirements of the CCMmission's May 5 Order, Con Edison submits that further enforcement action would no longer be apprcpriate.

II.

FDIA'S EOST-EXERCISE ASSESS!M?T DOES NOT SUPPLY THE

_ BASIS EUR A SHUTrGN OF Tf!E INDIAN POINT PIM?P. _

A. FEMA Did Not Intend To Suggest In Its Post-Exercise -

Assessnent That There Were Conditions Making - -

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Consideration of Shutdown Poprmriate. )

The_ extensive changes in the energency planning picture around Indian --

Point dis::ussed above are of' thanselves cause for the Ctmnission not to pursue any enforcenent action at this time. The current status of emergency prepas&#.ss is thus now considerably different fran what it was at the time of the March 9 exercise, as considered in FEMA's April 14, 1983 Indian Point post-exercise assessment. Yet even if this were the only information before the Carmission, it is quite clear from FD'A's explanations to the Indian Ibint Licensing Board that there would be no justification-for further enforcevent action under the NRC's regulations. -

J Tha ETMA post-exercise assessnent is renarkable in only two respects:

the letter which transmits it to the FRC states that " FEMA cannot assure that i

public health and safety can be protected in the ten mile EPZ around Indian

{

Point," and two deficiencies found by FEMA are singled out for special  ;

i characterization as "significant." Exactly what FEMA intended to convey by l these statenents is evidently not clear fran the post-exercise assessrent I

-itself, nor fran FEMA's April 20, 1983 oral briefing to the Ocmrission. Tims FEMA's "ciubet assure" may cr may not be equivalent to "there is a lack of l protection," and a deficiency might be "significant" fran a great variety of

, st W ints.

l Fortunately, however, the intent and meaning cf the principal authors of the post-exercise assessment was fully explained when they testified before the Indian Nint Licensing Ecard on April 28, 1983. 2e testimony of the FEA

, . witnesses makes abundantly clear that in the post-exercise assessment there was no intent to suggest that conditions warrantina enforcenent action such as shutdcwn exist at Indian m int. r- - -

_ WithrespecttoFmA's"cannotassure" statement,'theNEAwitnesses testified that all FmA intended to ccnnunicate to NRC was that Indian Point had not successfully ccupleted the prcposed 44 CFR 350 process, whereby FmA gives accreditation to emergency response plans at various sites. FmA testified that:

"O. Well, then, is the statenent that the assurance that public health and safety cannot be protected, in your view, Mr. McIntire, the equivalent of saying that proposed 44 CFR 350 accreditaticn is not appropriate? Are you saying is one in the same, are the two statements one in the same?

A. (Witness McIntire) What was the last word following 40 CFR 350?

O. Accreditation.

A. (Witness McIntire) Could pu be a little nere specific?

C. What do you characterize what we have been calling the 350 process as?

A. I think I understand new. We are involved in each site, including Indian Point, with a 350 process. The ultimate goal of the 350 process is to have the regional director certify and assure to associate director, state and local procrams in Washington, that he can assure that public health and safety can be protected. That is the end product of the 350 process frm the regional point of view.

In respect to Mr. Petrone's letter, he was requested as of April 14 to

. make a statement at that point in time of whether he could or could not assure the health and safety cf the public, and that he did. . . .

c. Well, was, in your view, Mr. Petrone attetpting to ccnnunicate that public health and safety was imperiled in any way or simply that he was unable to give the assurances that would follow a successful ccmpletion of a 350 procedure?

A. (Witness McIntire) h latter." (Tr. at pp. 14861-62). -

Moreover, ETEA went on to testify that only 16 of 87 plants have -

successfully empleted the 350 accreditation process, and that FDR was not suagestina that there were lesser assurances of protecting the public at Indian Point-than at any other of the 61 plants not accredited. Thus, far frm being

- :-. .in a unique category of one site where the public ms at risk frm sorely _

)

inadequate ernergency planninc, the FDR witnesses believed that-Indian Point ~l 4

was one of a great nurrber of plants for which FatA similarly was unable to

" assure that public health and safety can be protected."- FDR testified that:

"O, Now, if I recall your earlier testinony, there are see 78 or so pl:mts that are currently in operation around the United States, is that right? Approximately?

A. I think the nunter es 87 but I am not sure.

Q. 87 is even better. You said 16 have successfully gone through the 350 process? -

A. ht's rny unde 2.mi.Eumiing.

O. So there is a substantial nurrber, 61, if rry subtraction works, for which FD8A similarly cannot assure the public health and safety can be protected at this time, is that right?

i A. (Witness McIntire) ht would be my assurrption." (Tr. at pp.

14862-63)

Thus, as far as the FD4A authors of the post-exercise assessment are concerned, Indian Point is in exactly the same situatien as all other sites where accreditatien is not yet warranted. The reason *y Indian Point was singled out was only because the NRC requested an overall assessment, and had t

NRC requested a bottm line on erergency planning at any of the other i unaccredited sites, FDR would also have used the same language describing emergency planning at those sites as it used regarding Indian Point here.

I

! . _ . _ _ = _ . _- . _ - _ - -.

With respect to FDIA's characterization of the Pockland County -

exercise nonparticipation and Westchester County transportation issues as i "significant" deficiencies, FDR similarly did not intend to supply a prawhte

. for-NRC enforce,ent. This is because FD!A Inade no connection between its

.: - characterization of these risks as "sionificant," and- increase ^d risk to the

~~

public. FD4A testified that: . -- - .

"Q.: Was there a'ny atterpt made by FD4A, either independently or through consultation with your NRC pecple to match your use of the tem significant with public health risks?

A. (Witness McIntire) Not to my knowledge." (Tr. at pp. 14831-32).

Thus FD% did not intend to convey in its post-exercise assessnent that the two deficiencies labeled as "significant" would be at all significant in tems of their inpact on the public in the event of an accident. Since FD8A was admittedly not even looking at whether an accident at Indian Point would have greater consequences in licht of these two deficiencies, clearly the FDR evaluation cannet possibly supply a basis for invoking an enforcenent action such as shutdown under the NRC's regulatiens.

B. 'Ihe Two Mficiencies Garacterized As Significant At Indian Point Have Been Fcund To Be Ceneric. __ _ _ _ _ _

FD!A has acknowledged both in testimony before the Indian Point .

Licensing Beard and in discovery by the licensees

• that the two deficiencies

• See Tr. at pp. 14885-88; Exhibits G and N to the PcM Authority's May 3,

. 1983 letter to Gairman Palladino, et al.

,e-rr -- - - - . + - - . , - - - - - - -,,w -- , , - - - - ,,,-, , ,, ,-------w- , -. ----,, -.---m --

which it bas characterized as significant at Indian Ebint are in fact generic to at least a large nunber of plants. Thus in a Septenber 1982 publication entitled " Generic Deficiencies in Off Site Dnergency Preparedness at Ccmnercial Nuclear Power Plants," FEA states that "prcblens associated with evacuation (school' bus utilization prcblens. . .)" has been identified as a generic deficiency recurnng in many exercises cbserved by FmA throughout- the _

country. " Assignment of responsibility (organizational control) - lack of written agreenents between government agencies" is similarly identified as a generic deficiency which FEMA has noted.

F m A has thus paradoxically characterized ncnparticipation of a local government in exercises and uncertainty about evacuation of transit-dependent persons as generic, wbile only Indian Point is faced with major enforcement action. Insights into how this could occur cczne frcm testimony before the Indian Point Licensing Board, where FEMA testified that the New York and Few Jersey regional office which prepared the post-exercise assessment had received no guidance frcm FEA's national officials as to when, and under what circumstances, a deficiency should be characterized as "significant" or otherwise. FmA testified that:

"O. Did FEMA national give you any guidance as to whether you should judge a deficiency as significant or insignificant?

A. (Witness McIntire): Not to my knowledge.

O. Am I correct in saying that, Mr. McIntire, you have very little personal knowledge of deficiencies that have been identified in energency plans in other recions?

A. (Witness McIntire): Yes." (Tr. at p.14963) .

If the two presumably significant deficiencies identified at Indian Point are in fact generic as stated by FEA, then it is wholly inapprcpriate

for these licensees alone to be facing serious enforement action, particularly when the matters at issue are beyond the powers of the licensees to correct.

Since FEMA believes that the issues are generic in nature, to the extent NRC concurs it should cive the generic treatment through- rulemaking, rather than unfairly singling out one particular site for threatened enforceent action. -

C. We Significance of he Rockland Chunty Deficiency Is Confir:ed To me Exercise, And Coes Fat Relate To The Actual Level Of Preparedness In The Area. _

In its post-exercise assessment, FmA did not make adjust 2nent for a crucial distinction between Pockland County's actions on March 9 and what they would be in an actual mergency. Rcckland County declined to participate in the exercise, but in the event of an actual emergency the County Legislature has:

" Resolved, that in the event of a nuclear occurrence of the Indian Point Fecilities, the Legislature of Pockland County hereby authorizes, mpowers and directs its Chaianan, notwithstanding this resolution, to take any and all action in ccordinating and ccoperating with any and all Federal and State agencies to protect the lives and prcperty of the citizens of -

Pockland County. . . ." (Resolution No. 320 of the Rockland County Legislature, May 18, 1982.)

Since EmA was previously concerned with activities en March 9, its assessnent did not look to other indicators of the effectiveness of the County's reponse to an actual mergency, such as the extent of training of Rocklarxl personnel (see, especially, page 11 above), or how Rockland responds to nonradiological accidents.

Ecwever, the limited secpe cf the post-exercise assessrent and FEMA's principal concern with the absence of approved Pockland County plans has caused County officials to dispute FFA's assessment of the County's capabilities to

respond to a radiological accident. The Ceputy Directer of Rockland County's Office of anergency Services, who is the official in day-to-day charge of energency planning, testified at his deposition taken in connection with the o Indian Point I.icensing Board proceedings that Rockland County workers could have performed all of the cperations recruired in the March 9 exercise. When asked to ccrnment on the apprcpriaterass of the m!A post-exercise assessment as a neasure of Rockland County's abilit.y to respond to an actual emergency, the .

County official testified as follows:

"O. You said that in your view, FEMA doesn't know at what preparedness level the County is at?

A. I don't think they do know.

O. Is that because they haven't gone beyond the fact that there's no written acoroved plan?

A. I think that's what they're basing it on, there's no written approved plan.

O. So is it your cpinion then that miA has not gone beyond the absence cf a plan to look at the question of what would the quality of Rockland County's response be, if there were an accident tcznorrow?

A. In my opinion, they have not looked at that, right."

As set forth in Point IIIA belcw, under its regulations NRC must make its own independent findings en preparedness. We submit that because the questiens before the Ccmnission are nuch broader than those considered by FEMA, the Ccmnissicn "shculd accept the evaluation of Reckland County as set forth above and conclude that in an actual emergency, with both State and Ccunty participation, the public would be adequately protected.

Not only would Rockland County participate, but State ccznpensatina

, resources would be available as well. These were criticized in the post-exercise assessment for reascns which he submit were accurately 4

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characterized by one Carmissioner as " legalistic rather than substantive."

(Renarks of Comtissicner Ahearne dated May 5,1983).

III.

TFE FDfA DEFICIENCIES WUIE PCT

. BE SIGTIFICA?7f IF AN EMEPGDICY.

A. Under The !!RC's Regulations, The .

NRC Must Itself Decide Whether Planning Is Adecuate For A Padiological Drercencv . _ _ . _ , _ _

Under the Ctmnission regulation here involved,10 CFTt S50.54(s)

(2)(ii), the NRC - not FD!A - must evaluate what the significance of claimed deficiencies m uld be in the event of an accident. While the Pay 5 Order stated that the Cc:grission " accord [s] FEMA's view with great weight," under the Caratission's regulations the ultimate evaluation of planning adequacy and the sicnificarce of supposed deficiencies must be that of the NRC.

We submit that the history and intended meaning of the post-exercise assessment, as amplified by the FD!A witnesses' testimony before the Indian Point Licensing Board and as discussed in Point II above, de not supply a basis for the W C to conclude that reasonable assurances of adequate prctective measures are lackina at Indian Point. Surely the absence of 44 CFR 350 plan 1'

accreditation is not sufficient, becausq dozens of sites muld than be subject to enforcerent action on an e: pal basis with Indian Point. Ebrthermore, the admittedly generic nature of the FEMA deficiencies and the weaknesses in the i -

FEMA analysis which led to its conclusio1s of significant deficiency would

, appear to deprive the FDdA conclusions of whatever weight they muld otherwise be entitled to in the prccess by which NRC performs the independent assessment 1

required by its regulations.

I l

However, the ImC is required to take another inportant step in which l- it is empletely unaided by FmA. To the extent that the NRC's independent assessrent establishes the existence of deficiencies,.in proceeding to consider -

. a shutdown or other enforcement action the Ccmrission nust determine whether I

.the deficiencies revealed by its independent inquiry are "significant for the .

l l

plant in question," 10 CFR S 50.54(c)(2)(ii). The Ocmnission's May 5 Order  ;

acknowledged as noch when it stated that: .  ; -

"Our emelusions under the regulation is broader than FEA's; where FmA is concerned primarily with the significance of deficiencies in energency planning and preparedness, and the adequacy of interim cmpensating  ;

neasures, our regulations require us to consider other factors when we make i a decision on the desirability of enforcerent action."

As discussed above, at p.18-19, FD!A did not even atterpt to  !

distinguish between deficiencies labeled as "significant" or " minor" based upon an etaluation of the potential risk inpact on the public (Tr. at pp.

14831-32). Nor did the authors of the FM A post-exercise assessment seek ,

guidance frm the FmA national office as to the standards to be used in assessing significance. And certainly FEA did not examine whether it believed l its deficiencies were significant for the plant in question, since expertise in I

how accidents could be ayected to unfold at "the plant in question" lies with l the NRC rath6r than FDIA.

1 Whether a deficiency is "significant for the plant in question" must of course be evaluated frm the standpoint of the inpact which the deficiency 1

would have on protective measures for the public in the event of an actual l I

. accident. If an accident at a particular " plant in question" would have the l same or substantially the same effects on the public irrespective of whether a particular energency planning deficiency was or wes not present, then that deficiency cculd not possibly be categorized as "significant" under 10 CFR i

8 --- - - - -

l

. l S50.54(s)(2)(ii), and a shutdown or other major enforcenent action would be urnerranted and inapprcpriate. These are judgmants which are required by the cited regulation,* and which only the NRC is able to make.

B. Se FENA Deficiencies Cannot Possibly Pe ~ .~

"Significant" For Purposes Of t e Ocnnission's Regulations Since They Would .

Fave An Insignificant Effect On @ e Public .

In The Event Of A. Radiological Emergency .

At Indian Point.

~

If an accident at Indian Point would have the same mnaapences to the ~

public inaspect.ive of acckland County's nonparticipation in the March 9 exercise, and irrespective of a lack of agreements with bus cwpanies in j Westchester County, then clearly those deficiencies cannot be "significant for the plant in question" and enforcenent action such as shutdown is not

• A careful scrutiny of the public " significance" of the deficiencies found by NRC to the effects upon the public fran an accident at "the plant in question" may be required by due process and Atanic Energy Act E=T6-dTe.ni.s as well. In Industrial Union v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607 (1980), the Suprene Court invalidated " safety" reculations prarulgated by the Secretary of Labor under the Cbcupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) when the Secretary did not deconstrate that the regulations were " reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment." me Suprene Court held that OSHA did not give the Secretary " discretion to adopt standards designed to create absolutely risk-free workplaces regardless of costs," 448 U.S. at pp.

613-15. An irquiry by NRC here into the risk significance of the supposed deficiencies would appear to be essential to preserve the validity of its energency planning reculations under Industrial Union. The NRC's statutory mission in the area of energency plannmg - to provide " reasonable assurance that public health and safety is not endangered" (Pub. L.96-295, 94 Stat. 780 (1980) - is virtually identical to the OSHA standard held to require "a

, reasonable relationship to the expected benefits" and a " balancing" of costs in that case, see 448 U.S. at pp. 667-668.

8 warranted. mis does not mean, as scme have suggested, that the Ca: mission would not be " stand [ing] behind [its] regulaticas," or that "sergency planning will rapidly deteriorate nationwide,"* but rather that.in furtherance of its

. reaulations the Ccnnission has matched its enforcenent renedy with an actual determination of "sianificance for the plant in question" under 10 CFR 550.54(s)(2)(ii).

. The inquiry into risk significance required by the regulations necessarily involves an analysis of the vey in which serious accidents can be expected to unfold at Indian Point. Fortunately, this very tcpic was exhaustively addressed in the recently ccepleted hearings of the Indian Point Licensing Board. Indeed, the record before the Licensing Board is rich with insights into the relative risk reduction value of various of the NRC's erergency planning regulations, and should be reviewed in connection with the ongoing FEMA /NRC project to reassess NUREC-0654.** 2e record before the Board indicates that in order to make meaninaful assessments of the adequacy of emeroency planning, one must consider such factors as the nature of the emergency, the time required for a public response, the preferred nature of that resoonse, and the resources required to respend.

Testimny by the NRC Staff and the licensees before the Licensing Board establishes that the most prcbable accident scenario at Indian Point is a -

slowly evolving gradual overpressurization of the containrent building, for which the median frequency is about once in 30,000 reactor years. In these sequences, containment failure would occur no sooner than 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, and nere likely more than 24 hcurs, after the accident began. Thus no fewer than 12

• Separate renarks of Ccmnissioner Ahearne dated May 5,1983 herein.

• • Ietter from Iee M. Romas to William Dircks dated February 8,1983.

U 4

hours and most likely more than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> warning tine would be available to i effect an emergency response prier to any off-site release of radiation. This accident is not likely to cause early fatalities. It could lead to an

- extremely small increase above the backaround cancer fatality rate occurring -

over 30 years. Specifically, the median frequency of accidents resultina in an -

increase of one percent or nere above the natural cancer- fatality rate, sploying WASH-1400 source term assumptions (see below), is roughly 'once in 10,000,000 years. The slow development of the overpressurization sequence would allow ample time to terminate the accident or to ccupensate for a delayed protective response due to, for example, a shcrtage of buses in Westchester Ocunty. (Indeed, the travel velocities required to avoid plume exposure are so slew that walking cut of the EPZ would be sufficient.) There would also be anple time for the State to csyensate for any lack of preparedness caused by Pockland County's refusal to participate in exercises. .

The only other accident scenario contributing substantially to the risk at Indian Point is the.so-called V sequence or interfacing systes IOCA.

'Ihe median frequency of this sequence is about once in 25 million reactor years. This sequence, although exceedingly unlikely, evolves quickly and releases raMeive raterials in a matter of a few hours, making it inpossible to evacuate before plume passage even with optimum preparedness. The preferred protective resoonse to this type of accident is therefore sheltering until after the plume has passed, followed by relcication frce contaminated areas only

• Licensees Testirony on Cmmission Ouestion One at p. 29.

27 -

l

~

O (but not the entire EPZ). Calculations by both the licensees and the NRC Staff show that sheltering followed by early relocation is nearly as effective in lin'itirg early fatality risk as ineediate evacuation (through the plume).*

Se innediate response requirenents for the V requence scenario would be limited to prapt ccnunication of sheltering instructions to the public,

'and nepping of ground contamination. After sheltering, the preferred protective response naed entail no more than moving people frcm emparatively sna11 areas of highly contaminated ground short distances (less than 1.5 miles)** to the nearest areas where contamination is low or absent. Be shelter followed by relocation cption'would require far less use of mass transit than would evacuation, and would be sirple to implement. The response recuirements for county personnel during a V sequence accident would be minimal and involve activation of sirens and the mmrgency Brnaamst System

("EBS"). S e adequacy of the siren system as confirmed during the exercise was also acknowledged by Rockland and Orange County officials testifying before the Indian Point Licensing Board. (Tr. at pp. 4073-74, 12104).

Se risk of anyone near the plant incurring any adverse health effect is snall. Even unrealistically assuming that no one would evacuate or take special. shelter for a day following a rapidly developing accident ( i.e., that

~

pecple would ccntinue their daily activities), the average early fatality risk-i

• Direct Testincny of ' Frank Rowsme and Roger Blond (NRC) Concerning Camission )

Cuestion 1 (IV.B) at p.12; Licensees' Testimony on Canission Cuestion One and

. Board Question 1.1 at pp.118,122-25.

• • Ibid. Licensees' Testimony en Comission Question one at p.124.

~

• • • Ibid. Rowscue and Blond at p.13.

• • • • Ibid. Licensees' Testimony on Ccamission Question one at p.131. 1 l

to an individual within a mile of the plant would be about once in 17,000,000 years. Early fatality risk decreases markedly with increasing distance frcm the plant.

-More than 95% of the early fatality risk is confined to a four-mile radius, assuming that there are no protective measures (evacuation or sheltering) taken by the public. Mcst of Rockland County's population is located beyond four miles frcn the plant. Since the Hudson River separates the plant from Rockland County, few or no people reside within one mile of the plant. In fact, the Rockland County Radiological Drergency Response Plan (Volume 1, 7ppendix G, Tables G-10 through G-17) indicates there are rene.

These tables also indicate that approximately 700 Rockland residents are within 2 miles of the plant; approximately 3800 within 3 miles and approximately 10,000 within 4 miles. 'Ite 4-mile total represents only approximately 10% of the total Rockland County pcpulation within the 10-mile EPZ. The total

~

population frcm all fcur Counties within 4 miles of the plant is approximately 43,000. Rockland Ccunty represents about 24% of the total population within 4 miles of Indian Point. Mditionally, local wind patterns make it unlikely that released radicactive material would reach Rockland Ccunty. Because of the sparse population distribution and infrequent wind patterns in the direction cf Bockland Ocunty, it is reasonable to conclude that Pockland County represents a ,

i small portion cf the total early fatality risk which in itself is already small. l

. \

• Licensees' (uestion 1 Testimony at p.120a.

• • Licensees cuestion 1 Testimony at p.112.

, ,- e ,,- - - - - ,,

-- , -, ,-y

1 1

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Even these indicators of risk would appear to overstate the possible consequences of serious accidents at Indian Point. During the special Indian 1 Point proceeding requested by this Ccomission, extensive testimony was received

- by the Licensing Board concerning the amount and type of radioactive material i

released frm accidents (source tem). While there may still be scme debate as to the precise cmposition of the source tem, there is widespread technical ai hccad. that current risk assessnents, including those prepared by the licensees and the NRC Staff, have overstated the source term and, therefore,

~

overstated the risk. The NRC Staff's witness, Ecbert Bernero, testified that it was his personal expectation that the source terms used in current assessments were overstated by a factor of 10, and that an understanding of the biases introduced by current WASH-1400-based scurce tems was necessary to make informed regulatory judaments (Tr. at pp. 12597-602). Con Edison's experts testified that with a more realistic source term no early fatalities result frm accidents at Indian Point.

Thus an inquiry into whether the FDIA deficiencies are indeed "significant for the plant in question" has already occurred before the Indian.

Point Licensing Board. That inquiry shows that prcblems associated with

• Licensees' Testimony of William R. Stratton, Walton A. Podger, and Thmas E.

Potter on (bestion One at 5, 61; see Staff Testimony of Robert M. Bernero on Severe Accident Scurce Term.1 at 3; Testimony of Dr. Sarbeswar Acharya Regarding NRC Staff Assessment of Accident Consequences and Risks at III.C.A.-20 to

- III.C.A.-21.

• • Licensees' Testimony of William R. Stratton, Walton R. Rodger, and Thmas E.

. Potter en Cuestion One at 6; see Licensees' Testinony en Cmmission cuestion One, Board Ouestion 1.1, and Cententien 1.1, at 125-27.

30 -

O delayed energency response, the unwillingness of Pockland County officials to participate in exercises, or a possible shortage of buses in Westchester County are illusory frcm the standpoint of their significance to public risk.

IV.

THERE APE CXNPELLING REASCt3 WHY THE INDIAN POIhT I' NITS SB00LD BE PEINITTED 'IO CDTIINUE -

OPERATION. --. .- . . - .- . ...

, A. It Would Be Wholly Inapprcpriate To Permit Local GUve.umwd. Veto Of Nuclear Power Plant Operations The history of the Indian Point licensees' efforts to achieve ccmpliance with the NRC's surgency planning regulations respecting State and local oevemnents, pp. 2-12 above, is one in which no effort or expense has been spared. Since the passage of the NRC's new emrgency planning regulations, over $11 million has been spent for achieving ccmpliance, more than $7 reillion for off-site preparedness. 'Ihese substantial amcunts are in stark contrast to the Ocmnission's own estimates, when the regulations were prcrulgated, that:

" typical costs to State and local gcvemMa to achieve a positive finding from NRC concurrence in their energency response plans would be about $360,000 initial costs, plus $74,000 in annual updating costs."

(SECY-80-275)

Nor have the Indian Point licensees' efforts been confined to financing. As noted by the ernergency planning director of one of the Indian Point counties before the Indian Point Licensing Board:

"The utilities, also, gave us all kinds of equipnent. As a tratter of fact, anythina we want, they have been more than decent about giving us."

(Tr. at p. 12095.)

l

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._. . . - ._ -_ . - - . _ . .=. - - - . - - -. ._ - . _ _

In the particular Indian Mint situation, local gove,.w w L efforts to close the plant through a lack of cocperation in energency plannirig appear to be a purposeful tactic. The m airman of the Rockland Cbunty Legislature was

. recently quoted as saying "Our strategy is working beautifully."

(Gannett WeCle. ster Newsomoers, April 23, 1983.) Whether-this-will prove to -.

be the case is now in the hands of the Ctanission.

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Rockland County withdrew frm cwetive radiological emergency ~

s planning with the passage of Resolution 320 on May 18, 1982, although in the sane resoluticn the County Lecislature arphasized that it would cooperate fully with state and federal officials in the event of an actual energency. In Deceit >er, when the NRC declinei to shut down Indian Point following expiration of a 120-day clock, Rockland County sued the NRL n the Secend Circuit Court of Appeals seeking to ecurpel a shutdown, a suit which is still pending.

(County of Rockland v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccmnissione Docket No.-83-4004.) -- -

i Such an eventuality was not unanticipated by Congress. The legislative history of the FY 1980 NRC Authorization Bill (Public Law 96-295, 94 Stat. 780) which first required the NRC to upgrade & & vency planning requirenents clearly indicates that Cs.v =ss did not intend to permit local goveu..u.L efforts to shut down nuclear plants through nG- m-plation in off-site energency planning. House Conference Report No. 96-1070'on the FY 1980 Authorizatim Bill states that:

l "The [ House and Senate] conferees soucht to avoid penalizino an applicant for an coerating license if a State or locality does not submit an energency response plan to the NRC for review or if the submitted plan does not satisfy all the guidelines or rules. In the absence of a State or local plan that emplies with the guidelines or rules, the emprmise i .

permits NRC to issue an operating license if it detemim that a State, -

local or utility plan, such as the energency preparedness plan submitted by i

the applicant, provides reasonable assurance that the public health and safety is not endangered by cperation of the facility."

- - ,-w --..,.-------.-_--.-,,.--m .,_--..,e

" I

'1his policy was reiterated by Conoress in the FY 1983 NRC Authorization Bill (Public Law 97-415). Senate Report No.97-113 states that:  !

"the ccmmittee seeks to undersecre the intent of Congress, as evidenced by section 109 of Public Iaw 96-295, that the NRC, in the absence of an

- w proved state or local emergency preparedness plan, issue an operating license for a nuclear power plant if it determines that a state, local or utility energency preparedness plan, or sczne integration of these plans, provides reasonable assurance that public health and safety is not endancered by operation of the plant."

i The absence of any endangerment to Rockland County citizens due to the County's lack of participation in exercises is established in Point IIIB, above. Ebually laportant, however, is that FEMA's evaluation of the Rockland County situation in its post-exercise assessment was not consistent with the

, principles articulated by Congress.

FEMA declined to evaluate the State of New York's procedures to wyc-nsate for a lack of Rockland County participation in the exercise. FDR also declined to go beyond the County's nonparticipation and assess what its capabilities would be in an actual emeroency, when it'would cooperate fully.

FEMA stated in its post-exercise assessment that:

"As for Rockland County, a judgment on adequacy will not be able to be

' made until the County plan is developed and exercised with full County participation." (Fnivue to McIcughlin letter at p. '3.)

FEMA confirned in testimony before the Indian Point Licensing Board that " full County participation" was indeed a pr w 11tien to approval:

i "C. Ist me rephrase the question. Can you form a judgment as to the adequacy of energency preparedness in Rockland County short of develegroent of a county plan and the exercise of that plan?

A. (Witness McIntire): No." (Tr. at p. 14920.)

, l We submit that in considering enforcement action, the Ommission should take a broader view as it addresses the wide variety of factors set forth in 10 CFR S 50.54(s)(2)(ii). A ccmpelling reason to permit continued I

l

operation of Indian Point must surely be that the licensees have done everything which could reasonably be expected of them to achieve empliance with erergency planning regulations.

Public health and safety cannot be endangered, both for the reasons set forth in Point IIIB above, and because continued operation will spur Rockland County to praptly caplete its own plan. It will also avoid the creation of a precedent elsewhere, one which Secretary of Energy Bodel has sugaested " threatens the viability of the nuclear power industry."

(New York Times, May 12, 1983.) _ ..

B. Any Interruption Of The Continued Operation Of 'Ibe Indian Point Units Would Have A Severe i Adverse Effect Upon The Econany Of The Few Ycrk Metrecolitan Area.

A further ccupelling reason for the Cmmission to permit. continued operation of the Indian Point units is the severe and intrediate adverse inpact which a shutdown would have upon public and private energy consumers in New York City and Westchester County. A shutdown of Indian Point after the Ccrmission's ruling on June 9 would result in an increase in the cost of electric energy to con Edison's custcmers of approximately S600,000 per day throughout the suntner. The closina of Indian h t muld result in about an additional $800,000 per day costs to ct'el t k fic custcners throughout New York State. The great bulk of these additional costs, approximately ,

• Testimony presented by Cbn Edison before the Indian Point Licensing Board enployed sanewhat differing assunptions more appropriate for long-term unit unavailability. The pc Jdction penalty shcwn above was determined on the basis of current oil prices of $30 per barrel, and includes associated taxes to electricity censumers. Since neither of the Indian Point units is scheduled for refuelina during the remainder of 1983, prcporticnately higher costs would  !

be incurred than tould be the case over the long term.

1

i

$700,000 per day, would be borne by the Power Authority's goverrspental and  !

1 l

~

other public sector custmers within the Con Edison service area, such as )

i public housing authorities, schools and other publicly owned institutions.

Private, residential consumers would be required to bear a disp w 1.i.ionate share of this $1,400,000 per day burden. Not only uould they bear a portion of the cost of a shutdown directly in their electric bills, but they would also indirectly bear the burden of increased enercy ccsts to the ccmnercial and governmental sector in the form of higher prices for goods and services, and increases in transit fares and taxes.

Because of a snaller custarer base, the irrpact on the Power Authority's custcmers would be particularly dramatic. Due to contractual and statutory mquirerrents, the Power Authority has quite limited % w.i. unities to reallocate energy frcm cAher areas of the State, and only cne other generating unit (which roust burn expensive Icw-sulfur oil) is regularly available to service Power Authority custaners in the New York City iret2.plitan area.

We are informed by Power Authority officials that if the scheduled restart of its Indian Point 3 unit next month were interrupted, electricty costs for its metrcpolitan area custaners would increase to a level 25 to 30 percent higher than if Indian Point were permitted to cperate.

While these amounts represent the licensees' best current estimates, sane persons have asserted that the costs of even a terporary shutdown of Indian Point have been overstated. Con Edison does not agree, and refers the l

NRC to a prior occasion on which the actual increased eneray costs of an Indian Point shutdcwn were detennined in a contested proceeding before the New York Public Service Ccmrission. Following the Octcber 1980 containment flooding event at Indian Point Unit 2, the Public Service Ccmnission determined that Con

O Edison's electric custcmers incurred increased energy costs amounting to

$33,700,000 for 59 days of lost cperaticns of just one of the Indian Point units, or $571,000 per day, exclusive of interest.

Although the costs of even a tsporary shutdown of the Indian Point plant would be burdenseme to New York H=d.ylitan area electric censuners, the '

l l

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direct and indirect consecuences of a prolonged shutdown are truly staggering.

The cost to Cbn' Edison's custcmers alone for a shutdown for the calendar year 1984 would be $200 million. The corresponding increase in costs to the remainina custcmers in the State, which would be borne mostly by New York Power Authority custcmers in the New York metropolitan area, would be about $250 million.

Fewever, the consequences of a shutdown of such a duration would extend far beyond custcmers' utility bills. If the Indian Point units were to be shut down in the 1983-84 period, 92% of the replacenent energy would eme frm the burning of oil, much of it imported. A permanent shutdcwn would necessitate an increase in oil censunption of scme 200 million barrels by the turn of the century, a significant blcw to our nation's effort to reduce i

deoendence en foreign oil. l l

Che of Indian Point's custcmers which would be most severely hit by a prolonged shutdown is and the Metrcpolitan Transportation Authority. The Power 1

Authority has estimated that approximately one-fifth of the costs of a shutdown j would have to be borne by the users of public transit. This increase in energy l costs to the Metrcpolitan Transportation Authority would necessitate a 60 increase in the New York City subway fare, or a reduction in an already inadecuate level of service to cover the deficit. Even the least disruptive alternative of raising the subway fare would cause reduced transit usage, which

. u would in turn cause a loss of over 11,000 jcts and $323,000,000 in lost incme in New York City. This reduced transit usage would cause City tax revenues to decline by $34,000,000, and all of these transit inpacts would be even higher if service were to be reduced to avoid the 6C fare increase.

A permanent shutdown of Indian Ebint would,be the cruelest blow of all to the State and to the New York City metropolitan area.. Licensees have calculated that the present discounted value of the New York statewide costs of a shutdown of the unit fran 1984-2009 would be $9.0 billion. These estimates assume an ambitious coal conversion p w gam, construction of additional generating units, and installation of transnission inpwvene.nts. If any of these projects do not ccme to fruition or are delayed, the costs to consumers would increase.

Substantial shutdown costs have also been estimated by non-utility witnesses before the Indian Point Licensing Board. New York State witness James Pannalee testified that the present worth cost of shutting down Indian Point would total $2.3 billion just through 1996 (Tr. at p.13727). Similarly, Vince Taylor, a witness sponsored by the Union of Concerned Scientists, estimated the cost of a permanent shutdown of Indian Ibint as being over $4.0 billion on a present worth basis (Tr. at p.13298).

Thus the costs of losing the energy frcan Indian Ebint for even a day are substantial, and the costs of a prolonged or permanent shutdown are more than one State and one h@lis can be expected to bear. Costs of shutdown are innediate and they are real. Cmpared to the uncertainty, at best, of the inpact on the public which the stpposed energency planning deficiencies wculd

• Testimony of Sally Hunt Streiter at 2.

have (we pp. 25-31 above), the unmistakable draconian econcmic effects alone surely supply a capelling reason for pemitting continued peration of Indian Point.

Conclusien _

For the foreoing reapns, in accordarca with its regulations,10 GR

- - 350.54(s)(2)(ii), the Cmmission should determine that no further enforcement action is apprcpriate against Con Edison at this tire.

ectfully submitted, h.$/ocL4 t

Joseph D. Block Executive Vice esident and General Counsel Brent L. Branddnburg Assistant Gendral Counsel CONSOLIDATED EDISON CCEPANY OF NEW YORK, INC.

4 Irving Place New York, New York (212)460-4600 Dated: New York, New York May 20, 1983 e

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