ML20094P542

Comments on Dissenting Views of Chairman Gleason Re Safety of Plant Mods.Certificate of Svc Encl

ML20094P542
Person / Time
Site:	Indian Point
Issue date:	08/13/1984
From:	Brandenburg B CONSOLIDATED EDISON CO. OF NEW YORK, INC.
To:
References
SP, NUDOCS 8408170270
Download: ML20094P542 (12)

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l UNITED S"'ATES Ce A*iERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COW.ISSION BC' ORE THE CDriISSIONERS:  ;;yg g Nunzio J. Palladino, Chairman 'f? ;;

Thomas M. Poberts Jams K. Asselstine Frederick M. Bernthal '84 F.G016 Fi2 k,.,.e Lando W. Zech, Jr.

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In the Matter of

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CONSOLIDATED EDISCN COMPANY OF 50-247-SP 137 YORK, INC. ) 50-286-SP (Indian Point, Unit Ib. 2)

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POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF 1E1 YORK ) August 13, 1984 (Indian Point, Unit Ib. 3)

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X CON EDISON'S CCMOTIS ON THE LICENSING BOARD CHAIRMAN'S DISSEI7f IN THE RIO0t9EJDATIONS OF ' DIE IlDIAN POINT SPEX'IAL PROCEEDING Consolidated Edison Coc-any of New York, Inc. (" Con Edison"), licensee of Indian Point Unit Ib. 2, subnits these coments pursuant to the Comission's Order of July 30, 1984. 'Ihat Order permitted the parties to the Indian Point Special Proceeding to subnit carments on the dissenting views of Chairman James P. Gleason as set forth at pages 433-35 of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board's October 24, 1983 Recommendations to the Commission. Con Edison wishes to emphasize that Chairman Cleason's dissent, which is the only subject addressed in these commnts, does not indicate broad areas of disagreement I

anong the Board mmbers, the NRC Staff or the licensees. All of these parties '

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s appear to concur in the Board's unaniscus conclusion that the continued operation of the Indian noint units poces no undue risk to the public and dat the early fatality and delayed cancer risks posed by Indian Point are a very smll fraction of the ron-nuclear background risks to which the population around Indian Point is exposed. Licensees and Staff further concur with the Board's conclusion that such major nodifications to the plant as filtered vented contairrents and separate containments are not warranted.

The majority of the Board urged adoption of a severe accident standard for some sites nere stringent than that established by the NRC's existing body of regulations, to'which Chairman Gleason crocerly obiected.

In its orders of January 8 and September 18, 1981 the (bmission asked the Licensing Board to employ probabilistic risk assesscent (PRA) techniques to evaluate the risk of serious accidents at Indian Point. We do rot believe that the Ccmnission intended to imply any inadegaacies in the safety levels achieved by the licensees' compliance with all of the licensing requirements imposed by NRC on operating reactors generally. Instead, the Comission in essen said "take the Indian Point plants in their present state and location, and tell us

- using the only quantitative discipline we are aware of, PRA - what the risks of the plants are under the existing, in-place ' background' level of licensing regulation." The Ccrrr11ssion's orders went on to say that the Board could also develop a record on further safety measures not reouired by ,

existino NRC regulations if it appeared that they might be effective in reducirig risk.-

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in Chairman Gleason differed with the other Board nembers as to the logical step processes the majority f511med in concluding that at least one such measure was appropriate and should be recommended to the Conmission for i

' imposition on this one site. As its rationale for proposing that the Indian

~ Point licensees be required to' implement a safety assurance program, the Board' majority suggested that certain unspecified "high consequence" accidents could occur at the Indian Point, Zion, Limerick and Salem sites (Recomendations at 105),'and without regard to the extremely low probability or likelihot.d that these accidents could occur, it was therefore preferable for the NBC to require a further safety measure at Indian Point that is not required anywhere else.

The majority in effect said " forget how unlikely it is that a serious accident could occur, and just focus on how bad the aansequences cauld be." As 01 airman

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l~ Gleason noted, this was just what the Board had been asked not to do by the i

V Comission's initial orders, as well as its supplemental orders.of July 27, 1982 and September 17, 1982. The Ccmission's consistent guidance throughout the proceeding had enphasized that consequences should only be considered in '

conjunction with their associated probabilities.

Chairman Gleason also appears to have faulted the majority's logic in f

at least two other respects, and in both instances Con Edison is in agreement with the Chairman. First, by definition risk consists of the product of multiplying two components: the probability of the event occurring, and the consequences should the event occur. If one's cpal is to assess risk, then an understanding of both elements is essential, and if either one is missing then ,

risk simply cannot be assessed. For purposes of safety planning, it matters '

i very much whether events of pctential sipificance occur once .in a decade or 3-t e -n -= , 3,.-- ,- --,-,-sm'r#.--ev.

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once in 100,000 years. Chaimin Gleason prcperly faulted the majority's proposal to mke mcmentous decisions about exceeding current NRC regulations on a site-by-site basis while purposely ignoring the likelihood that the accidents of concern might occur.

Secondly, the Board mjority made its recortaandation for furtMr efforts to reduce risk in the face of a record which the Board itself unaninously found to denenstrate an exceedingly 1cw level of risk for the plants as is. The NRC Staff testified tMt a rigorous examnation of safety levels showed that the contribution to risk of early accidental death posed by serious reactor accidents at Indian Point is roughly 2.5 parts rer nillion of the 'cackground risk averaged over a 50-mile radius of the plant, or 0.0000025 percent of the overall risk of accidental death in the vicinity of the site.

Reconraendations at 64. Staff also determined that the contribution of severe accidents at Indian Point to the incidence of delayed cancer fatalities within 50 miles of the units was roughly 11 parts per million, or 0.00001 percent of the overall background cancer fatality risk. Rdccmendations at 66. The Board unaninously concluded that "the average annual early fatality risk and delayed cancer fatality risk, as calculated by PRA, are very small fractions of the ccxnpeting background non-nuclear risks." Pecomendations at 108.

4 With the hearing record clearly establishing that the risk of Indian Point was this lw corpared to other risks, Olaiman Gleason could rot understand hcw multi-million dollar excursions bayond existing NRC safety requirements could possibly be justified. As he put it, "the reccmendation seens to suggest an absolute and not the adecuate protection called for by the Atcmic Energy Act. It also tends to igrore an extensive bcx3y of regulation A

4 that has been enacted for the safe operation of nuclear power facilities which prcduce such low probabilities of accidents." - Recorrendations at 433.

Con Edison wholeheartedly agrees. Wheth3r high consequence accidents can occur or not (see below), the fact remains that the nest s]phisticated quantitative ranking of the public health risks confronting persons in the vicinity of Indian Point der'onstrates that the plants do not contribute significantly. Great uncertainty in the PRA results can be conceded and this bottom line does not change. 'Ihis being the case, substantial additional i expenditures to drive the risk even lower simply cannot be justified.

':he record before the Board does rot l . support the presumption of the majority l

that high consecuence accidents might om,r.

The Board majority's initial premise in . reaching its ultirate conclusion to recomend imposition of an additional safety measure at Indian

Point and three other sites was that " dangerous, low probability i

accidents . . . could, as Staff testirony has shown, result in fatalities that number in the hundreds or thousands." Reccrrendations at 107.

j Con Edison does not believe that the hearing record supports the majority's premise. Expert testirony offered try licensees at the hearings established that the anount of radioactive mterial wttich would be released in the event of a severe accident would be significantly less than had been supposed in earlier risk estimates such as the 1974 Reactor Safety Study (PSS) . These witnesses offerei testinony regarding data from Three Mile Island and a number of other actual accidents as well as prior research and experimental data which confirmed that physical and chemical processes would

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l reduce the amt of radionuclides that could te relear'd. The witnesses presented their own estimates of realistic source tems for the donunant accident secuences at Indian Point. Licensees' experts concluded, inter alia, that thsre would M no early fatalities from any accident scenarios at Indian Point, and that latent fatalities would be sucil that the consequences of even a

" worst cam" accident would be sinilar to other, large-scale industrial accident.s.

The Staff's witness testified that the NRC had no data or information which were inconsistent with licensees' testimonv on the release of radioactive materials. He also testified that the RSS methodology for saur tem calculation as used in Staff testirone leads to overestirates of risk.

On this uncontroverted record, wtiich as-a legal matter the Board was not entitled to ignore, con Edison subnits that there is simply no basis for concluding that " dangerous" accidents with fatalities "in the hundreds or thousands" might occur at Indian Point. Since the Board majority's decision to urge a further safety measure proceeds frcm such an unsupported asstr:tption, as proposed by Quuman Gleason it should be discarded by the Canission.

Chairman Glm en appropriately opposed a proposal to bias the NRC's safety emphasis towards accidents presumed to be of high consecuence.

After making unsupported assumptions as to radionuclide behavior, which led to the conclusion that high consegaence accidents might occur, the majority then made a leap of logic to conclude that nuclear plants located in nore densely populated areas in the norther :ern United States should be 'made safer than others. Even asstrning that the afety assurance program rE w..uerded l

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by the Board majority my be. successful in reducing Indian Point risk even lower (which is without supprt in the record), the net result would be that persons living in the vicinity of Indian Point would enjoy a " safer" plant than persons living near a plant in another area, where such a program was not required.

It was this dilema which was' of particular interest to former Ccmissioners Hendrie, Ahearne and Gilinsky in the Cartission's discussions throughout 1980 and 1981 on the proper focus for these hearings. Cbnmissioner Hendrie in particular questioned the wisdcm and the legality of a regulatory approach that would require reductions in the aggregate, societal risk around operating plants located in mare dansely populated areas, when the inevitable

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consequence of such a policy would be to make the risks to individuals living in the vicinity of various plants core unecual, liacause some safety measures would in required at a few sites but not others.

Whether the Ccmission's efforts to maintain nuclear plant safety frcm site to sice should be directed towards equating individual risks, on the one hand, or aggregate societal risks, on the other, is perhaps a major policy question. It certainly appeared so to nore than one Comissioner several years acp when this proceeding was being established, although it seems to have beccne more of a theoretical question as recent research on radionuclide behavicr and source terms has gained broader acceptance and virtually eliminated site-to-site variations in potential accident consequences.

Ibnetheless, the Board majority - without any discussion of the issue at all

- presumed that the cost appropriate safety direction for the Comission to take would be to attempt to 1cw_r aggregate societal risk at scrre sites. 2e i

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mjority's failure to acknowledge that such a policy would inevitably widen any differences between risks to individuals at various sites at the very least substantially weakens the proposal. Chairran Gleason appropriately cpposed it, stating that "the Board appears to be recarnending a new standard exclusively for Indian Point (and three other plants). . . .

Recomendations at 433-34.

The Chairran's dissent correctly observed that risk reducing reasures have already been implemented at Indian Point, which was imolicitiv disrecarded by the majoritv.

In his dissenting views, Chairman Gleason objected to the rajority's reliance on a statement in the 1980 Task Fcree Peport* attempting to compare plant and site risks separately at various plants. Chairman Gleason emphasized that "the Task Force Report was issued prior to the probabilistic risk assessments made to date on 14 or 15 nuclear power facilities, including Indian Point. ... It is nere than likely that the probability of a further reduction in risk discussed by the Task Force has already been accomplished."

Pecainendations at 434.

The. record before the Licensing Boar i clearly establishes that the accident risk posed by Indian Point has already been substantially reduced by voluntary licensee actions taken since the 1980 Task Force Report. Upon the canpletion of the Indian Point Probabilistic Safety Study (IPPSS) in 1982, licensees informed the Comnission and the Board that on their own initiative they were making certain plant nodifications at 1:oth units in order to take

• Peport of the Zion / Indian Point Task Ebrce, NUREG-0715 (August 1990).

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s advantage of risk reduction masures identified in the course of the study.*

These neasures include structural nodifications to reduce seismic vulnerability at both units, ch.tnges in electrical connections to certain safety equitnent to reduce fire vulnerability at both units, and adoption of an anticipatory shutdown procedure to reduce hurricane vulnerability at Unit 2.

Uncontested testinony in the hearings established that taken together, these neasures substantially reduced the likelihood of a severe accident at Indian Point below the already lw level which had existed previously. In fact, the Board itself unan1rously concluded elsewhere in its Reconrendations that "at Indian Point significant safety improvenents have been mde as.a result of IPPSS and the Sandia review." PecTrendations at 40 n.19. Chairmn

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Gleason was therefore correct in rejecting the mjority's reliance upon statenents mde in 1980, prior to the ccrapletion of IPPSS and the nakiry of the plant nodifications which inproved safety. It is indeed established fact that at Indian Point, significant risk reduction "has already been accomplished," as stated by the Chairman.

Resrectfully sutrtitted, Dated: New York, New York Brent L. Brandenburg August 13, 1984 Assistant General Counsel CO'50LIDATED EDISCti CCUPANY OF MEN YORK, INC.

Licensee of Indian Point Unit 2 4 Irving Place New Yo" , New York 10003 (212 , 60-4600

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• See Recx:crendations at 46-47, and the F#cch 5,1982 letter from John D.

O"Ibole and J. Phillip Bayne to Harold R. Denton transmitting the IPPSS to the Commission.

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CERTIFICATE CF SERVICE I hereby certify that on the 13thdayofAugustGlf84,Icauseda copy of Con Edison's Cc2ments on the Licensing' Board Chair:ran's Dissent in the Reccxmendations Of The Indian Point Spidhalb kicensing Board to be served by first class mail, postagee geoaid,,on:.:

F,0cKU;fG & SEh_e.

Nunzio J..Palladino,' Chairman Docketing N$ervice Branch U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccmnission Office of the Secretary Washington, D.C. 20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccmnissica Washington, D.C. 20555 Lando W. Zech, Jr, Camrissioner U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccmnission Joan Holt, Project Director Washington, D.C. 20555 Indian Point Project New York PuDlic Interest Research Th:2nas M. Rcberts, Ccmnissioner Group U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccmnission 9 Murray Street Washingten, D.C. 20555 New York, New York 10007 James K. Asselstine, Cc2=nissioner Jeffrey M. Blu:n, Esq.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccmnission New York University Law School Washington, D.C. 20555 423 Vanderbilt Hall 40 Washington Square South Frederick M. Bernthal, Ccanissioner New York, New York 10012 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccr=nission Washington, D.C. 20555 Charles J. Maikish, Esq.

Litigation Division James P. Gleason, Chairman 'Ihe Port Authority of New York Administrative Judge and New Jersey Atcmic Safety and Licensing Board One World Trade Center 513 Gilmoure Drive New York, New York 10048 Silver Spring, Maryland 20901 Charles M. Pratt, Esq.

Mr. Frederick J. Shon Stephen L. Bau:n, Esq.

Administrative Judge Power Authority of the Atcznic Safety and Licensing Board State of New York U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 10 Colu:nbus Circle Ccmnission New York, New York 10019 Washington, D.C. 20555 Janice Moore, Esq.

Dr. Oscar H. Paris Counsel for NRC Staff Administrative Judge Office of the Executive Atcmic Safety and Licensing Board Legal Director U.'S. Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cc=nission Ccr=nission Washingten, D.C. 20555 -

Washington, D.C. 20555 I

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, Paul F. Colarulli, Esq. Renee Schwart , Esq.

Joseph J. I. vin, Esq. Paul Chessin, Esq.

Susan Kaplan, Esq. Laurens R. Schwartz, Esq.

Morgan Associares, Chartered Margaret Cppel, Esq.

1899 L Street, N.W. Botein, Hays, Sk3ar and Hert::: erg Wash mgton, D.C. 20036 200 Park Avenue New York, New York 10166 Ellyn R. Weiss, Esq.

William S. Jordan, III, Esq. Honorable Ruth W. Messinger Har: ton and Weiss Member of the Ccuncil of the 1725 I Street, N.W., Suite 506 City of New York Washington, D.C. 20006 District #4 City Hall Charles A. Scheiner, Co-Chairperson New York, New York 10007 Westchester Pecple's Action Coalition, Inc.

Greater New York Council P.O. Box 488 on. Energy bhite Plains, New Yod 10602 c/o Dean R. Corren, Director New York University Alan Iat=an, Esq. 26 Stuyvesant Street 44 Sunset Drive New York, New Ycrk 10003 Croton-On-Hudson, New York 10520 Joan Miles Ezra I. Bialik, Esq. Indian Point Coordinator Steve Iaipzig, Esq. New York City Audubon Society Enviro: rental Protection Bureau 71 West 23rd Street, suite 1828 New York State Attorney New York, New York 10010 General's Office Tao World Trade Center Richard M. Hart:: man, Esq.

New York, New York 10047 Lorna Salzman Mid-Atlantic Representative Andres P. O'Rourke Friends of the Earth, Inc.

Nestchester County Executive 208 West 13th Street 148 Martine Avenue New York, New York 10011 hhite Plains, New York 10601 Stanley B. Klimberg, Esq.

Andrea S. Roffe, Esq. General Counsel New York State Assembly New York State Energy Office Albany, New York 12248 2 Rockefeller State Plaza Albany, New York 12223

, Marc L. Parris, Esq.

Eric Thorsen, Esq. Atonic Safety and Licensing County Attorney Board Panel County of Rockland U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccrt: mission 11 Nea Hempstead Road Washington, D.C. 20555 New City, New York 10956 Atcmic Safety and LicensirG Phyllis Rodriguez, Spokesperson Appeal Board Panel Parents Concerned About Indian U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ca:: mission Point Washington, D.C. 20555 P.O. Box 125 Croton-on-Hudson, New York 10520

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. . Honorable Richard L. Brodsky David R. Lewis, Esq.

Member of the County Legislature Atcmic Safety and Licensin; Scard 5%stchester County Panel Ccunty Office Building U.S. Nuclear Regulatcry C=-.ission White Plains, New York 10601 Washington, D.C. 20555 Zipporah S. Fleisher Michael D. Diederich, Jr., Esq.

West Branch Conservation Attorney-At-Law Association 11 South Highland Avenue (R:ute 9W) 443 Buena Vista Road ,

Nyack, New York 10960 New City, New York .10956 Steven C. Sholly Mayor George V. Begany Unicn of Concerned Scientis:s Village of Buchanan 1346 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.

236 Tate Avenue Suite 1101 Buchanan, New York 10511 Washington, D.C. 20036 Judith Kessler, Coordinator Spence W. Perry Rockland Citi ens for Safe Energy Office of General Counsel 300 New He:nstead Road Federal Emergency Managemen Agency New City, New York 10956 500 C Street, S.W.

Washington, D.C. 20472 David H. Pikus, Esq.

• Richard F. Czaja, Esq. Stewart M. Glass Shea & Gould Regional Counsel 330 Madison Avenue Roan 1349 New York, New York 10017 Federal Dnergency Manage:nen: Agency 26 Federal Plaza Amanda Potterfiel'd, Esq. New York, New York 10278 '

New York Public Interest Research Group Melvin Goldberg 9 Murray Street, 3rd Floor ' Staff Attorney New York, New York 10007 New York Public Interest Research Group Mr. Dziald Davidoff 9 Murray Street Director, Radiological Emergency New York, New York 10007 Preparedness Group Empire State Plaza Jonathan L. Levine, Esq.

Tower Building, Rm.1750 P. O. Box 280 Albany, New York 12237 New City, New York 10958 Craig Kaplan, Esq.

Levinson, Mogulescu & Kaplan 9 East 40th Street New York, New York 10016

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' Brent L. Brandenstrg

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