ML20072A071

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Statement Before House of Representatives Subcommittee on Energy Conservation & Power Re Emergency Planning.Public Must Be Involved in Planning & Testing Process
ML20072A071
Person / Time
Site: Indian Point  Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 06/08/1983
From:
PARENTS CONCERNED ABOUT INDIAN POINT
To:
References
NUDOCS 8306090347
Download: ML20072A071 (4)


Text

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STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF

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CR TON PARENTS CONCERNED AB0 tit I D A OIN D

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SUBC0101ITTEE ON ENERGY, CONSERVATIQ 'k PQ A

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Thank you for the opportunity to address this

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Committee on the crucial issues of emergency plannirg for

_ m an accident at nuclear power plants around the country.

Members of Parents Concerned About Indian Point i i are for the most part mothers like ourselves who take time from

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their families and other obligations.to become involved in s

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. y' hearings like these -- preparing statements and testimony, i

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,s making com' plex child care arrangements in order to go to

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y meetings and to travel -- 1:ecause we are determined to provide r

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a safe and healthy environment for children who are the future i

of America',

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When this country began its experiment with nuclear I*'

fission as a source of heat for boiling water to generate electri -

city, we were warned that the process is inherently dangerous.

Edward Teller, the Father of the H-Bomb, told the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in 1953:

I "The public hazard arising from reactor accidents is due to the fact that nuclear plants contain radioactive poisons. In a nuclear accident these poisons may be liberated into the atmosphere or into the water supply.

In fact the radioactive poisons producad in a powerful reactor will retain a danger-ous concentration even af ter they have been carried downwind to a distance of 10 miles.

Some danger might possibly exist to distances as great as 100 miles...The various committee:

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c dealing with reactor safety have come to the conclusion that none of the powerful reactors built or suggested up to the present time are absolutely safe.

Though the possibility seems small, a release of radioactive materials from a reactor in a city or densely populated area would lead to disastrous results."

The government and private utilities who acted on Dr. Teller's final advice to develop nuclear power rapidly settled on a " defense in depth" concept to contain radioactive materials in case of an accidents fuel cladding, reactor vessel, and containment building.

Of course, during this time there were a number of accidents at commercials, military, and experimental nuclear sites all over the world, including the United States.

Some of these names may be familiar to you:

Idaho Falls, Chalk River, Wyndham, Kyshtym, Fermi, Browns Ferry.

In 1979 we experienced the nuclear accident whibh is known to us all, Three Mile Island, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) decided that another layer of the defense in depth concept would be required to protect the health and safety of the public during a radiological emergency.

Engineered safeguards would not suffice to protect the public from offsite releases

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of radiation.

Emergency planning requirements would have to be significantly strengthened, and the NRC published new rules in You have invited us here today to discuss the relative roles of federal, state and local governments, and the utilities in emergency planning for a nuclear accident.

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We noticed immediately that the question did not include a role for the public.

From our perspective, those who Jmust carry out the plan and those who are most familiar with the commun-ities and their needs are the ones who should be responsible for the planning process.

Local governments and the public, who are expected to volunteer and co-operate during an emer-gency, should be the starting point.

The state would be needed tot co-ordinate the efforts of local governments, with Federal guidance and assistance.

Because the public and local governments were not involved in emergency planning at the Indian Point sites, major defects in the plans are evident, especially where planning b

for children is concerned.

There were many omissians and assumptions which would seriously affect the health and safety of our children.

For example, in the first plans, day care center were completely left out.

Many teachers, parents, school administrators and experts in psychology have testi-fled that the plan to bus children out of the area to reception centers is unacceptable.

The planners cannot assume that teachers f

will board buses and travel to reception centers with children.

Schools designated for use as reception cent'ers were'found by i

parents and teachers who investigated to.have been.p.ermanently closed'or rented out.

Many resolutions have been. passed by school districts, Parent-Teacher Associations, and teachers' unions stating their disapproval and unwillingness to partici-l I

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5 patn in the evacuatien plan.

Now York State United Teachers, representing the entire state, voted as recently as March of this year a resolution criticizing and opposing the plans..

Parents Concerned About Indian Point also suggests greater involvement of the public in testing as well as in developing emergency plans.

Since the present plans include provisions to send the children home at the alert stage of a nuclear emergency, a drill.of the phone-chain procedures to i

notify a responsible adult for each child should be required, to see how it would work.

We should practice co-ordinating i

Emergency Broadcast Messages with the running of bus evacuation routes to see if people can get to a designated bus stop in good time.

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1 Local emergency workers must be involved from the very beginning and comprehensive training of all emergency per-sonnel in the 10 mile EPZ around nuclear plants, including Indian Point.

This is essential for an immediate response in the event an evacuation is needed.

Training should be given to all police departments, fire departments, ambulance technicians, bus drivers, social service and health workers.

1 Training must include testing and re-testing, refresher courses, and practice involving the actual equipment and responsibilities needed in a real emergency.

Local governments around Indian Point have reacted with a resounding NO, they are not prepared for a nuclear emer-i gency at Indian Point.

The actual state of preparedness in our area is very poor, because local citizens and emergency workers have not been involved in the entire process.

A generic plan, or a plan submitted by utilitics without the full involvement of the people whose lives and property are at stake, will never meet the needs of a radiological accident.