ML20049H524
| ML20049H524 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 02/25/1982 |
| From: | Locke R PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8203030261 | |
| Download: ML20049H524 (83) | |
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD j
In the Matter of )
) Docket No. 50-275 PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-323 Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant )
Units Nos. 1 and 2 ) (Full Power Proceedings) l PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW i Submitted By PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY February 25, 1982 0
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/ 8203030261 820225 i PDR ADOCK 05000275 t G PDR
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M l 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS 2
3 Page 4
5 6 FINDINGS OF FACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 7 A. Prehearing Proceedings . . . . . . . . . 1 8 B. Evidentiary Hearing . . . . . . . . . . . 3 9 C. Contention 10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 10 D. Contention 12 and Clarified Combined Contentions 8 and 9 . . . . . . . . . . . 11 11 E. Contention 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 12
- 1. Factual Background . . . . . . . . . 22 13
- 2. Emergency Planning Standards 14 Compliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 15 10 C.F.R. 50.47(a) . . . . . . . . . 28 16 Planning Standard b(1) . . . . . . . 30 17 Planning Standard b(2) . . . . . . . 33 18 Planning Standard b(3) . . . . . . . 36 19 Planning Standard b(4) . . . . . . . 37 20 Planning Standard b(5) . . . . . . . 38 21 Planning Standard b(6) . . . . . . . 42 22 Planning Standard b(7) . . . . . . . 44 23 Planning Standard b(8) . . . . . . . 46 24 Planning Standard b(9) . . . . . . . 48 25 Planning Standard b(10) . . . . . . . 53 26 Planning Standard b(11) . . . . . . . 61
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1 Table of Contents (continued) 2 3 Page 4
Planning Standard b(12) . . . . . . . 62 5
Planning Standard b(13) . . . . . . . 64 6
Planning Standard b(14) . . . . . . . 65 7
Planning Standard b(15) . . . . . . . 67 8
Planning Standard b(16) . . . . . . . 69 9
Planning Standard c(2) . . . . . . . 72 10 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 11 12 13 14 15 ,
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
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1 FINDINGS OF FACT 2
3 A. Prehearing Proceedings 4 On May 9, 1979 the Joint Intervenors filed a 5 motion to reopen the Diablo Canyon full-power licensing 6 proceeding based in part on emergency planning issues which 7 arose out of the Three Mile Island accident. Joint 8 Intervenors filed a second motion on March 24, 1981, raising 9 seventeen additional TMI-related contentions.
10 The Board admitted an emergency planning 11 contention and a valve qualification contention in the low 12 . power hearings held May 19-22, 1981 but limited issues to 13 those relevant to fuel loading and low power testing. Full 14 compliance with the NRC's revised emergency planning 15 regulations for full power operation had therefore not been 16 previously litigated in this proceeding.
17 During a Conference of Counsel held on July 1, 18 1981, the parties discussed Joint Intervenors' Statement of 19 Clarified Contentions dated June 30, 1981. On August 4, 20 1981 the Board issued a Memorandum and Order admitting a 21 restated emergency planning contention.
22 On September 21, 1981 the Commission issued its 23 Memorandum and Order [CLI-81-22] authorizing fuel loading 24 and low power testing at Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Unit 1, 25 subject to ceveral enumerated conditions. One condition 26 required that contentions 10 and 12 from the Joint y ...
l Intervenors Statement of Contentions (for fuel load and low
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1 2 power testing) dated December 3, 1980 be included in the 3 full power proceeding. The Board accepted these contentions 4 for purposes of litigation in its order dated September 30, 5 1981. In an order dated December 11, 1981 the Appeal Board 6 noted that the Commission's acceptance of Contention 12 had 7 the practical effect of admitting Joint Intervenors 8 Clarified Combined Contentions 8 and 9 (for full power) 9 dated June 30, 1981. All of these contentions are set forth 10 h haec verba below.
11 Following the prehearing conference of 12 December 16, 1981 the Licensing Board issued its Memorandum 13 and Order of December 23, 1981 holding that: (i) Based on 14 the Commission's decision in the San Onofre case, CLI-81-33, 15 December 8, 1981, (in which the Commission held that current 16 regulations do not require consideration of impacts on 17 emergency planning of earthquakes which cause accidental 18 radiological releases or which occur during such a release) 19 it had no jurisdiction to consider impacts on emergency 20 planning of earthquakes which might cause, or occur during, 21 an accidental radiological release; (ii) Denied the Joint 22 Intervenors' request for certification to the Commission of 23 a question about the use of a " FEMA agency finding" or a 24 " FEMA staff report" in carrying out 10 CFR 50.47; and (iii) 25 Denied Joint Intervenors' revised Contention 14 relating to 26 the environmental qualification of Class 1-E equipment.
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1 B. Evidentiary Hearing 2 The hearing was held in Avila Beach, California, 3 January 19 through January 26, 1982. By agreement of the 4 Parties, evidence was heard first on the pressurizer heater 5 and valve contentions (Tr. 11586). 1/ At the hearing the 6 following exhibits were numbered for identification and, 7 where indicated, received in evidence.
8 9 Exhibit No. PGandE In Evidence :
10 70 Emergency Operating Procedure 11684 OP Emergency Shutdown 11 71 Emergency Operating Procedure 11684 12 OP Reactor Trip with Safety Injection 13 72 Emergency Operating Procedure 11684 14 OP Loss of Electrical Power 15 73 PGandE Site Emergency Plan 11765 16 - Rev. 3 2/
17 74 Emergency Procedures Volume 3A 11765 18 74A Emergency Procedures Volume 3B 11765 19 75 Emergency Procedures Plant 11765 Manual, Volume 3A as revised 20 through 1-15-82 21 i
22 23 1/ References in PGandE's prefiled testimony to " exhibits" 24 were changed to " attachments."
25 2/ Includes San Luis Obispo County Plan, May 1981 and the State of California Nuclear Power Plant Emergency 26 Response Plan, March 1981.
. l 1 Exhibit No. PGandE In Evidence 2 75A Emergency Procedures Plant 11765 Manual, Volume 3B as revised 3 through 1-15-82 4 76 Four Procedures (EP R-1, EP RB7, 11765 EP RB8, EPG-1) revised between 5 1-15-82 and 1-19-82 6 77 Corporate Emergency Response Plan 12087 and Procedures (CERP) 7 Rev. 1, 5-11-81 8 78 PRC Voorhees Evacuation Reports, 11765 Vol. I & II 9
79 TERA Report Volume 1 -
10 79A TERA Report Volume 2 -
11 79B TERA Report Volume 3 -
12 80 San Luis Obispo County Plan, 11765 13 Rev. B Parts I II, IV, V 14 80A Additions to plan (proposed) -
Sect. I.8, II. 13, II. 14, IV. 3 15 81 San Luis Obispo County Plan 11765 16 Part III, SOP's (Part 1) 17 81A San Luis Obispo County Plan 11765 Part III, SOP's (Part 2) 18 82 California Department of Health 11765 19 Services Procedures, State of California Emergency Plan 20 Annex 2 Volume 1 21 82A California Department of Health 11765 Services Procedures, State of 22 California Emergency Plan Annex 2 Volume 2, plus maps 23 83 Video Tape of August 19, 1981 11881 24 Exercise 25 84 TERA Report Section 4.0 12190 Evacuation Times Estimates (with 26 blacked out areas)
1 Exhibit No. PGandE In Evidence 2 85 Update to Response to JI 12772 Interrogatory No. 9 (first set) 3 Resolution of Open Items 4
5 Exhibit No. Joint Intervenors In Evidence 6 119 Memo to Norman C. Moseley from 11636 James M. Allen dated October 16, 7 1979 Operations Team Recommendations - NRC I&E/TMI 8 Unit 2 investigat ion 9 120 Applicant PGandE Response to 11793 Interrogatory 9 in Joint 10 Intervenors First Set of Interrogatories 11 121 FEMA Guidance Memorandum #19 12703 12 122 1-13-82 Memo from Melanie C. 12255 13 Billig to Board of Supervisors Forwarding Resolution of SLO 14 City Council 15 123 Correspondence between County 12481 Personnel Re Employees Included 16 in Emergency Plan 17 124 FEMA Findings on Diablo Canyon 12500 Exercise dated 9-17-81 18 125 FEMA Review of May Draft - 12714 19 San Luis Obispo County Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Response 20 Plan l 21 126 Memo dated 12-8-80 from Eldridge 12716
( regarding Warning System proposal 22 127 FEMA Memos dated 9-9-81 and 12717 23 10-21-81 regarding Communications / Warning 24 Information 25 ///
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1 Exhibit No. Governor Brown In Evidence 2 7 SLO Office of Emergency Services 12110 SOP Development Status Report 3
8 State of California OES 12523 4 Emergency Planning Zones for Serious Nuclear Power Plant 5 Accidents 6 9 PRC Voorhees Executive Summary 12553 (An Evaluation of the San Luis 7 Obispo County Public-Safety Communications System) 8 10 County of SLO Department of 12685 g Techical Services Five Year Communications Plan January 1982 10 11 Exhibit No. NRC Staff In Evidence 12 26 U.S. Department of Energy 11623 Attachment C EGG-SE- f.-5507 Quick 13 Look Report for SemAacale MOD-219-TEST- S-NC-2 14 27 NUREG CR-1570 EGG U.S. Department 11625 15 of Energy Experiment Data Report for Loft Nuclear Small Break 16 Experiment 13-7 17 28 Section 3.3 WCAP 9601 11629 Attachment F 18 29 Section 4.2 WCAP 9610 11630 19 Attachment G 20 30 Letter January 13, 1982 12569 from PACrane to Engleken 21 31 SER Supplement 15 10-22-81 11973 22 32 Letter to Mr. Frank Miraglia 11981 23 from PACrane signed by Oglesby 10-22-81 24 33 Letter from Thomas Urbanik to 11378 25 Mitzie Solberg 10-28-81 26 ///
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1 Exhibit No. NRC Staff In Evidence 2 34 Battelle Northwest Laboratory 11648 Emergency Plan Evaluation Report 3 of the Pacific Gas and Electric Company's Diablo Canyon Emergency 4 Slan 5 35 FEMA Memos dated 12-29-81 and 12695 12-15-81 re Dates for Corrective 6 Action Completion 7 In addition the Board took official notice of a 8 State of California document entitled " Office of Emergency 9 Services, Operations Guide and Procedures for Nuclear Power 10 Plant Emergencies" Revised 10-1-81 [Tr. 12771].
11 C. Contention 10 12 The Staff recognizes that pressurizer heaters and associated controls are 13 necessary to maintain natural circulation at hot stand-by conditions.
14 Therefore, this equipment should be classified as " components important to 15 safety" and required to meet all applicable safety-grade design criteria, 16 including but not limited to diversity (GDC 22), seismic and environmental 17 qualification (GDC 2 and 4), automatic initiation (GDC 20), separation and 18 independence (GDC 3 and 22), quality assurance (GDC 1), adequate, reliable 19 on-site power supplies (GDC 17) and the single failure criterion. The 20 Applicant's proposal to connect two out of four emergency power supplies does 21 not provide an equivalent or acceptable level of protection.
22 23 Messrs. John B. Hoch, Robert A. Young and Glenn E.
24 Lang presented evidence on behalf of PGandE. Mr. Walton L.
25 Jensen, Jr. testified on behalf of the NRC Staff. Messrs.
26 Dale G. Bridenbaugh and Gregory C. Minor presented testimony
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1 on behalf of Governor Brown. Joint Intervenors elected not 2 to present any direct testimony.
3 Only " safety-grade" y structures, systems and 4 components are required for the safety functions identified 5 in Section III.C of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 100. These 6 functions are those necessary to assure:
7 (1) The integrity of the reactor coolant pressure 8 boundary; 9 (2) The capability to shut down the reactor and 10 maintain it in a safe shutdown condition; or 11 (3) The capability to prevent or mitigate the 12 consequences of accidents which could result in 13 potential offsite exposures comparable to the 14 guideline exposures of 10 CFR Part 100.
15 Operation of the pressurizer heaters and associated controls 16 is not required to provide any of these safety functions and 17 the NRC therefore does not require them to be safety-grade.
18 [Jensen Testimony following Tr. 11621, p. 7; Hoch-Young 19 Testimony following Tr. 11550, pp. 2, 3; Tr. 11558, 11559, 20 11568, 11569, 11647, 11648.]
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22 23 3_/ The parties accepted the definitions of the terms "important to safety," " safety-related," and 24 safety-grade" as set forth in a memorandum dated November 20, 1981 from Harold R. Denton to the NRC 25 Staff and the attachment. These documents are included as Attachment B to the Minor-Bridenbaugh Testimony 26 following Tr. 11671 (Tr. 11558, 11559).
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1 While the pressurizer heaters may be used to 2 maintain natural circulation in the reactor coolant system 3 (RCS) during hot stand-by conditions they are not required 4 for this function. Tests performed at another Westinghouse 5 PWR during low power testing have shown that the pressurizer 6 heaters are not needed to maintain natural circulation in 7 the RCS during hot stand-by conditions. Specifically, test e results from the Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant s tbstantiate 9 this conclusion. NRC Staff witness Jensen testified that 10 the design of Sequoyah and Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP) 11 is similar and that he had not observed any major 12 differences that would cause the Sequoyah data to be 13 inappropriate for Diablo Canyon. [Hoch-Young Testimony 14 following Tr. 11550, p. 2; Jensen Testimony following Tr.
15 11621, pp. 3, 4; Tr. 11631, 11639, 11640, 11641.]
16 Pressure control in the RCS can be maintained by 17 systems other than the pressurizer heaters, e.g., by using 18 the safety-related normal charging and letdown system or the 19 safety-grade high head safety injection system. [Hoch-Young 20 Testimony following Tr. 11550, p. 2; Tr. 11562, 11567.]
21 Additional justification for classifying the pressurizer 22 heaters and associated controls as non-safety grade is the 23 NRC guidance in Item II .E.3.1 of NUREG-0737 which states i
24 these components are non-class I-E loads. Non-class I-E 25 components are not required to meet safety-grade design 26 criteria. [Hoch-Young Testimony following Tr. 11550, p. 3.]
.s .. _ _ _ . . . . . - . . . . - , , -
]
1 PGandE has designed and installed modifications to 2 provide an emergency power supply for pressurizer heaters 3 which is consistent with the positions and clarification of 4 Item II.E.3.1 of NUREG-0737. In providing the design and 5 installation of these modifications, PGandE considered 6 safety, regulatory, and engineering aspects related to 7 providing power to the pressurizer heaters from the 8 emergency power supply. [Hoch-Young Testimony following Tr.
9 11550, p. 3; Jensen Testimony following Tr. 11621, p. 4; Tr.
10 11554, 11556, 11575, 11576.]
11 The NRC Staff stated on page 2-21 of Supplement 12 No. 14 to NUREG-0675 " Safety Evaluation Report Related to 13 the Operation of Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Units 1 and 2,"
14 dated April, 1981, " Based on our review, we conclude that 15 the design for providing emergency power to the pressurizer 16 heaters at Diablo Canyon Nuclear Generating Stations Units 1 17 and 2 is consistent with the NRC positions and clarification 18 in NUREG-0737 and is acceptable."
19 Witnesses Bridenbaugh and Minor testified that 20 operating procedures to provide guidance to operators on the 21 use of alternate systems to provide primary pressure control 22 are not available. [Bridenbaugh and Minor Testimony 23 following Tr. 11671, p. 10.] However, PGandE witness 24 Patterson and Staff witness Jensen stated that there are 25 operating procedures which allow the operators to provide 26 alternate pressure control methods in the absence of
1 pressurizer heaters and allow the reactor to reach cold 2 shutdown without pressurizer heaters. [Jensen Testimony 3 following Tr. 11621, p. 3; Tr. 11551, 11552.] Patterson 4 indicated that Emergency Operating Procedure OP-0, " Reactor 5 Trip With Safety Injection" may be used to indicate to 6 operators how to maintain system pressure with systems other 7 than the pressurizer heaters. [Tr. 11557-11558.]
8 In addition PGandE witness Fridley stated that the 9 plant Technical Specifications require that an operator use 10 a procedure to place the plant in a cold shutdown condition 11 upon the loss of all pressurizer heaters. [Tr. 11566.]
12 In conclusion, this Board believes the evidence is 13 conclusive that PGandE complies with applicable regulations 14 as respects the pressurizer heaters. The pressurizer 15 heaters are not necessary to maintain natural circulation at 16 hot stand-by conditions. In addition, PGandE has made those 17 modifications necessary to comply with the requirements of 18 NUREG-0737 as approved by the Commission.
19 D. Contention 12 and Clarified Combined Contentions 8 and 9 20 21 Proper operation of power operated relief valves, associated block valves 22 and the instruments and controls for these valves is essential to mitigate 23 the consequences of accidents. In addition, their failure can cause or 24 aggravate a LOCA. Therefore, these valves must be classified as components 25 important to safety and required to meet all safety grade design criteria.
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1 Relief and Block Valves. Joint Intervenors contend that the present 2 classification of Diablo Canyon relief valves and associated block valves, 3 instruments and controls does not comply with 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, Criterion 1, 4 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Reg Guide 1.26 and SRP (Reg Guide 1.70), Section 5 3.22. Joint Intervenors also contend that General Design Criteria 1, 14, 15 6 and 30 are violated because relief and block valves have not been qualified 7 under all transient and accident conditions.
8 Proper operation of power operated relief valves, associated block valves 9 and the instruments and controls for these valves is essential to mitigate 10 the consequences of accidents. The TMI accident demonstrated this fact. In 11 addition, their failure can cause or aggravate a LOCA. Therefore, these 12 valves must be classified as components important to safety and required to meet 13 all safety-grade design criteria. How-ever, the Diablo Canyon block and relief 14 valves do not meet all safety-grade design criteria, in violation of the 15 regulatory practices listed above. In addition, reactor coolant system relief 16 valves form part of the reactor coolant system pressure boundary. When relief 17 valve operation is unreliable, series block valves are relied upon to maintain 18 the integrity of the pressure boundary.
Despite these important safety func-19 tions, appropriate qualification testing has not been done to verify the capabil-20 ities of these block valves to function during normal, transient and accident 21 conditions. In the absence of such testing and verification, the public 22 health and safety are endangered.
23 Messrs. John B. Hoch, Thomas N. Crawford, 24 Edward M. Burns, Robert M. Grayson and Rayrond J. Skwarek 25 preeanted evidence on behalf of PGandE. Mr. Walton L.
26 Jensen, Jr. testified on behalf of the NRC Staff. Messrs.
1 Dale G. Bridenbaugh and Gregory C. Minor presented testimony 2 on behalf of Governor Brown. Joint Intervenors elected not 3 to present any direct testimony.
4 The pressurizer of each unit of the DCPP has been 5 equipped with three power operated relief valves (PORVs) and 6 three associated block valves. These valves perform no 7 safety function and the NRC does not require that they be a safety-grade. Furthermore, proper operation of PORVs and 9 block valves is not required to mitigate the consequences t' 10 any design basis accidents considered in the FSAR.
11 [Hoch-Crawford Testimony following Tr. 11590, p. 4; Jensen 12 Testimony following Tr. 11621, pp. 9, 12, 14.]
13 The PORVs are designed to relieve steam to limit 14 the maximum pressures in the reactor coolant system (RCS).
15 These PORVs have been installed to prevent unnecessary 16 opening of the pressurizer safety valves and to provide a 17 backup means of depressurization and overpressure is protection. A separate block valve is installed upstream of 19 each of the PORVs. These block valves are provided to 20 permit isolation of a PORV for testing or maintenance, or 21 permit isolation of a leaking or failed-open PORV.
22 [Hoch-Crawford, Ibid.; Jensen Testimony following Tr. 11621, 23 p. 9, Tr. 11600.]
24 Only one PORV is needed to accomplish the intended 25 function of pressure relief from the RCS. A second PORV is 26 installed to provide redundancy. The third PORV performs no
1 safety-related function and was installed to provide the 2 capability for full load rejection without tripping the-3 reactor. Since the valve bodies of these PORVs and block 4 valves form a part of the RCS boundary, the valve bodies of 5 all three PORVs were classified by PGandE as components 6 important to safety and meet applicable safety-grade design 7 criteria indicated below. In addition, all three of the 8 block valves have been classified as components important to 9 safety and meet applicable safety grade design criteria as 10 indicated below. The PORVs and block valves have been 11 classified in accordance with the requirements of Design 12 Class I, Code Class I as described in the FSAR, Tables 13 3.2-1, 3.2-2, 3.2-3, and 3.2-4. [ Ibid., pp. 4, 5; Tr.
14 11594, 11604, 11613, 11653.]
15 The applicability of safety grade design criteria 16 with respect to these valves has been determined in 17 accordance with the requirements identified in the Standard 18 Review Plan, Section 7, Table 7-1 (Rev. 2, July, 1981). The 19 three PORVs, three associated block valves, the instruments 20 and controls for two of the three PORVs, and the instruments 21 and controls for all three block valves have been designed 22 to meet the following General Design Criteria: 1, 2, 4, 12, 23 13, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, and 29. [ Ibid., p. 5; Tr.
24 11601.]
25 Under normal conditions, the PORVs remain closed.
26 If the third PORV, which meets safety grade design criteria b,. _ . . _ . . . . _ _ . . . . . _ . . . . _ .
except for its instruments and controls, fails closed in its normal position, its pressure-relief function may still be Performed by either of the other two PORVs, whose 3
instruments and controls do meet applicable safety-grade 4
design criteria. If this third PORV fails open after 5
actuation, it may be isolated by its associated block valve, 6
which does meet applicable safety-grade design criteria.
7 These valves and their control circuitry have been designed 8
such that no credible failure mode associated with the 9
n n-safety grade components of the third PORV's control
, 10 g system would adversely affect the function of any safety grade components. In addition, an unisolated stuck-open PORV during a design basis accident considered in the Final Safety Analysis Report [FSAR] would not result in core damage, as demonstrated by analyses contained in Chapter 15 15 of the FSAR and in WCAP-9601. Therefore, the consequences of failure of the third PORV in either the closed or the Pen position during design basis accicents considered in 18 the FSAR have been shown by analyses to be insignificant.
In the FSAR accident analyses for DCPP, credit has not been g
taken for the automatic actuation of the pressurizer PORVs.
If automatic PORV actuation had been consid 2.ed in the analyses, the calculated consquences would have been even g less severe. [ Ibid., pp. 6, 7; Burns et al. Testimony W 9 , P. 12.]
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1 With regard to evaluations of postulated valve
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2 failures at Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Westinghouse has 3 Performed analyses of postulated loss-of-coolant accidents 4 (LOCAs) in the pressurizer vapor space for a plant 5 substantially identical to DCPP. These analyses were 6 Performed for 100 percent rated power level. Analyses 7 performed included the extremely unlikely case that all 8 three pressurizer PORVs of the size installed at DCPP were 9 postulated to have stuck completely open. These analyses 10 were performed with a U'hted States Nuclear Regulatory 11 Commission approved evaluation model, which includes the 12 assumption of minimum safeguards. No core uncovery was 13 Predicted to occur. Therefore, if all three of the 14 Pressurizer PORVs failed completely open at DCPP, no core 15 uncovery would be expected. It should be noted that these 16 PORV LOCA analyses also assume that the block valves associated with the pressurizer PORVs failed to close. The 17 18 analyses assumed certain other system failures and no 19 operator action. Therefore, even if all of the pressurizer 20 PORVs and their associated block valves failed to close at l
DCPP, no core uncovery would be expected. [ Burns, et al.
i 21 22 Testimony following Tr. 11590, p. 11; Tr. 11597, 11614, i 23 11615, 11639.]
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24 The PORVs supplied to DCPP were designed and i
25 manufactured by Masoneilan International and are identified l 26 as Masoneilan Model 20000 Series. The valves have two-inch a .. . _ . .
9 1 bodies with thren-inch end connections. These valves are 2 air-operated globe valves. The valves are designed to be 3 leak tight at the hydrostatic test pressure. The valve 4 bodies, bonnets and flanges were designed and built to 5 USAS-B16.5-1968 and tested to MSS-SP-61. [ Burns, et al.
6 Testimony following Tr. 11590, p. 12].
7 Prior to shipment to the DCPP, each of the valves 8 was inspected and subjected to testing. All pressure 9 boundary cast steel parts were radiographed and liquid 10 penetrant inspected. All forged parts were liquid penetrant 11 inspected. Tests on the assembled valves included a 12 hydrostatic test, as well as backseat and seat leakage 13 tests. All of the DCPP PORVs successfully completed these 14 tests. [ Ibid.; Tr. 11616.]
15 As part of the design verification process, valves 16 of the Model 20000 Series were successfully tested in a 17 thermal test loop at 2485 psig and 550 F. After 18 installation in the DCPP, these valves were successfully 19 tested during hot functional testing. In addition, 20 Masoneilan Model 20000 Series valves are installed in six 21 Westinghouse designed operating plants in the United States 22 and have also been successfully tested during hot functional 23 testing. [ Burns et al. Testimony following Tr. 11590, p.
24 13.] .
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1 Westinghouse has conducted a survey of 2 Westinghouse designed operating plants in the U nited States 3 to determine the number of times that pressurizer PORVs have 4 been opened during plant operations. This survey covered 5 plants with a total of 181 reactor years of operation 6 through October 1980. Responses to the survey indicated 7 that there were 163 occurrences of PORV openings with no 8 known failures to close. Of these occurrences, 59 of them 9 involved Masoneilan Model 20000 Series valves.
10 Additionally, there have been no known failures of these 11 valves in these plants since that su.wey. [ Ibid.]
12 The block valves supplied to DCPP were designed 13 and manufactured by Velan Engineering Company and are 14 identified as Velan Model B10-3054B-13MS. This model has a 15 three-inch inlet and a three-inch outlet. These valves are 16 motor-operated gate valves. The valve pressure boundary 17 parts are designed in accordance with USAS-B16.5-1968.
18 [ Ibid., p. 14.]
19 Prior to shipment to the DCPP, each or' the valves 20 was inspected and subjected to testing. All surfaces of 21 pressure containing cast parts were radiographed and liquid 22 penetrant inspected. Tests on the assembled valves incluc%d 23 a hydrostatic test, as well as backseat and seat leakage 24 valves. All of the DCPP PORV block valves successfully 25 completed these tests. [ Ibid.]
26 N/
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1 Velan Model B10-3054B-13MS block valves are 2 instal.le in 25 Westinghouse designed operating plants in 3 the United States. Twenty-one of these plants were included 4 in the survey conducted through October 1980. For these 5 plants, a combined total in excess of 1.6 million hours of 6 operation was achieved without a known failure of the block 7 valve. [ Ibid.:
8 Relevant information on confirmatory testing of 9 relief valve and block valves was presented as testimony 10 during the Fuel Load-Low Power Proceeding. Specific details 11 of further confirmatory testing of relief valves conducted 12 following that proceeding is summarized below, along with a 13 summary of existing information on block valve 14 qualification. [Hoch-Crawford Testimony following Tr.
15 11590, p. 7.]
16 As testified during the Low Power Proceeding, the 17 Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) has established a 18 performance testing program to obtain full scale data on the 19 operational performance of valves, including relief valves, 20 to operate under normal and accident conditions. A Velan 21 model B10-3054B-13MS block valve representative of DCPP was 22 tested by EPRI . This Velan block valve fully opened and 23 closed on demand in the EPRI tests, which included specific 24 test conditions representative of potential DCPP conditions.
25 [ Ibid.]
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1 A Masoneilan series 20000 model relief valve 2 representative of DCPP was tested by EPRI. Relevant 3 detailed information on EPRI steam tests of this relief 4 valve was provided as testimony during the Low Power 5 Proceeding. Other EPRI tests on this Masoneilan valve have 6 been completed following the Low Power Hearings. This valve 7 Passed testing criteria and fully operated on demand under 8 the EPRI test conditions which included full pressure steam, g water, transition and loop seal simulation conditions. The 10 conditions of these tests are representative of potential 11 P l ant conditions described in the FSAR, which may be 12 encountered by DCPP PORVs. Results of testing performed by 13 EPRI on relief and block valves is scheduled to be 14 documented formally by EPRI by July 1982. PGandE will 15 Prepare plant specific reports, to be submitted to the NRC 16 as required, including qualification data on block valves 17 and analyses of results of the EPRI relief valve testing, 18 for applicability to DCPP. [ Ibid., p. 8.]
19 In conclusion, since the PORVs and block valves 20 have been designed to meet applicable safety grade design 21 criteria, and have been' demonstrated to operate 22 satisfactorily through confirmatory testing, the PORVs and 23 associated block valves, as well as their instruments and 24 controls, comply with applicable regulatory requirements, 25 including General Design Criteria 1, 14, 15, and 30. Based 26 on the design and analysis of, as well as testing applicable
1 to, the pressurizer relief and block valves at Diablo 2 Canyon, these valves are expected to function as required.
3 Even in the hypothetical case of the pressurizer relief and 4 block valves failing to close, no core uncovery would be 5 expected. [ Ibid., Burns et al. Testimony following Tr.
6 11590, p. 14.]
7 E. Contention 1 8 PGandE and the combined onsite, state and local emergency response plans and 9 preparedness do not comply with 10CFR50.33(g), 50.47 and revised Appen-10 dix E to Part 50.
11 Drs. William K. Brunot and Dennis S. Mileti; Ms.
12 Kathleen M. Godfrey, Teresa A. Mack, and Faith J. Rockmaker; 13 and Messrs. Donald J. Baxter, Jerome V. Boots, William B.
14 Kaefer, William J. Keyworth, William S. MacElvaine, 15 August J. Nevolo, John L. Potter, Douglas P. Serpa, James D.
16 shiffer, Steven M. Skidmore, Garrison P. Smith, Richard H.
17 Thuillier and Reed H. Winslow presented evidence on behalf 18 of PGandE. Messrs. Brian K. Grimes, Dean M. Kunihiro, 19 John R. Sears, and Thomas Urbanik testified on behalf of the 20 NRC staff. Drs. Kai T. Erikson, James H. Johnson, 21 Sheldon C. Plotkin, and Messrs. Tim S. Ness, Miguel Pulido,
! 22 and Dave L. Richter testified on the behalf of the Joint 23 Intervenors. Messrs. Richard C. Hubbard and Gregory C.
24 Minor testified on behalf of Governor Brown.
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y,
l 1 1. Factual Background 2 After notice and comment, the NRC in August 1980 3 published a new regulation on emergency planning (45 4 Fed. Reg. 55042, August 19, 1980), which became effective on 5 November 3, 1980. The new regulations, which resulted from 6 perceived inadequacies in emergency response planning at 7 Three Mile Island, substantially modified and expanded the 8 NRC's emergency planning requirements. Additionally, the 9 regulations require the submission of revised emergency 10 plans complying with upgraded requirements and standards as 11 well as extending emergency planning considerations to newly 12 developed federal " Emergency P] anning Zones" as defined by 13 10 CFR 50.33(g). Pursuant to these regulations, an 14 applicant for authorization to operate a nuclear power 15 reactor is required to prepare and maintain emergency plans 16 which meet the 16 planning standards enumerated in 10 CFR 17 50.47(b) as well as the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, 18 Appendix E. See 10 CFR 50.54(q).
19 Under the regulations, applicant, state and local 20 emergency plans are reviewed by the NRC to determine whether 21 the state of emergency preparedness provides reasonable 22 assurance that appropriate protective measures can and will 23 be taken in the event of a radiological emergency. 10 CFR l 24 50.54(S)(2). In making this determination the NRC will base 25 its findings on a review of the Federal Emergency Management 26 Agency's (" FEMA") findings and determinations as to whether l
l
s 1 state and local emergency plans are adequate and capable of 2 being implemented and on the NRC's assessment as to whether 3 the applicant's emergency plans are adequate and capable of 4 being implemented. 4/
5 In furtherance of this process, FEMA, on June 24, 6 1980, published proposed rules (44 CFR Part 350) 7 establishing the formal FEMA procedures to be followed in 8 evaluating and approving state and local emergency plans.
9 45 Fed. Reg. 42341 (1980). 5f Separate and apart from FEMA's 10 review process under its proposed rules, interim FEMA 11 findings and determinations on the adquacy of state and 12 local emergency plans may be furnished for use in the NRC 13 licensing process pursuant to a " Memorandum of Understanding 14 Between NRC and FEMA Relating to Radiological Emergency 15 ///
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18 19 20 21 22 4/ On December 7, 1979 President Carter assigned to FEMA the responsibility for assessing and determining the 23 adequacy of state and local radiological emergency plans.
24 5/ In the proposed rulemaking, FEMA gave notice that it 25 intended to use generally the process described therein in the " approval" of any plan submitted to it prior to 26 final adoption of the rule.
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1 Planning and Preparedness" ("MOU") entered into on 2 November 4, 1980. [45 Fed. Reg. 82713.] 6/
3 Pursuant to this MOU, FEMA on September 8, 1981 4 issued an evaluation of the August 19, 1981 Diablo Canyon 5 Emergency Preparedness Exercise in which PGandE, San Luis 6 Obispo County, state, federal and local agencies 7 participated. 7/ FEMA stated that:
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11 12 13 14 6_/ The MOU provides in pertinent part that:
15 Notwithstanding the procedures which may 16 be set forth in 44 CFR 350 for request-ing and reaching a FEMA administrative 17 approval of State and local plans, findings and determinations on the 18 current status of emergency preparedness around particular sites may be requested 19 by the NRC through the NRC/ FEMA Steering Committee and provided by FEMA for use 20 as needed in the NRC licensing process.
These findings and determinations may be 21 based upon plans currently available to FEMA or furnished to FEMA by the NRC.
22 [45 Fed. Reg. 82714, 5 II.4.]
23 7/ In order to allow for a coordinated review of onsite and offsite radiological emergency response planning, 24 NRC and FEMA jointly issued "NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1. Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of 25 Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants (November 1980)"
26 ("NUREG-0654").
1 The evaluation conclusion is that due to the planning effort to date and the full 2 participation by all participants, the exercise succeeded in its three basic 3 goals. First, it demonstrated a capability to respond to a developing 4 emergency situation, second, it served as an excellent training device, and 5 third, it highlighted potential problem areas to be corrected. [PGandE Attach-6 ment 1 ff. Tr. 11782.]
7 The FEMA recommendations contained in the exercise 8 report were subsequently formalized in a FEMA memorandum on 9 its interim evaluation of the emergency preparedness for 10 Diablo Canyon. [ Memo from F. S. Manda to R. T. Jaske dated 11 November 2, 1981 PGandE Attachment 2 ff. Tr. 11903.] This 12 memorandum discussed twelve significant corrective actions 13 developed by FEMA after the August 19, 1981 exercise. FEMA 14 concluded that:
15 When the necessary corrective actions are accomplished to the satisfaction of 16 FEMA Region IX, and the County Plan is completed and submitted to the State for 17 formal review, we believe with reason-able assurance that an adequate level of 18 emergency preparedness will exist in San Luis Obispo County.
19 20 This conclusion together with supporting informa-21 tion was transmitted from FEMA to the NRC in a letter from 22 R. W. Krimm to B. Grimes, dated November 17, 1980 (sic) 23 ["1981"] which concluded that:
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1 Based on this information and pending the corrective actions noted, we concur 2 with the Director of Region IX, that there is reasonable assurance that an 3 adequate level of emergency preparedness will exist in San Luis Obispo County.
4 [PGandE Attachment 3 ff. Tr. 11778.]
5 The completion schedule for these corrective 6
actions was transmitted in a FEMA letter from F. S. Manda to 7
L. Thomas on December 15, 1981. All of the corrective 8
actions are scheduled for completion within the time frame 9
from January to June 1982. [PGandE Attachment 4 ff. Tr.
10 12052, Eldridge testimony Tr. 12689, 12690.]
11 In a letter dated October 7, 1981, NRC Region V 12 transmitted to PGandE the results of the NRC inspection of 13 the Diablo Canyon emergency preparedness field exercise on 14 August 19, 1981. The NRC letter stated that:
15 On the basis of the eight NRC inspector 16 observations made in the Control Room, Technical Support Center, Emergency 17 Operations Facility, and on observations made of other in-plant and on-site 18 emergency response activities the inspection team has concluded that the 19 exercise was well planned and executed, and met the objectives set forth in 20 Attachment B; that the exercise demon-strated the licensee's overall capabili-21 ty to implement their Emergency Plan and procedures and that no observations were 22 made that would indicate that appropri-ate measures would not or could not be 23 taken to protect the public health and safety in the event of a radiological 24 accident at the Diablo Canyon nuclear power plant. [PGandE Attachment 5 ff.
25 Tr. 11778.]
26 ///
1 PGandE submitted Revision 3 of the Diablo Canyon 2 Emergency Plan together with Implementing Procedures and a 3 report prepared by TERA Corporation discussing earthquake 4 emergency planning at Diablo Canyon to the Licensing Board 5 and the parties on September 28, 1981. On January 18, 1982 6 the San Luis Obispo County Board of Supervisors approved 7 Revision B (October, 1981) of the San Luis Obispo Nuclear 8 Power Plant Emergency Response Plan. [MacElvaine testimony 9 Tr. 12239.]
10 As will be discussed in detail below, this Board 11 finds that the state of preparedness for the response to an 12 emergency at Diablo Canyon is substantiated by the FEMA and 13 NRC conclusions as well as by substantial evidence in the 14 record. 8/ We are satisfied that there now exists, or will 15 exist prior to full power operation, 9/ a state of onsite 16 and offsite emergency preparedness that provides reasonable 17 assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be 18 taken in the event of a radiological emergency as required t 19 by 10 CFR 50.33(g), 50.47, and Appendix E of Part 50.
20 21 -8/ Each section of 10 CFR 50.47 is presented below with a discussion of how, as applicable, each item of the 22 regulation is addressed in Applicant, State and County emergency plans.
23 9f As Mr. Grimes, Director of the NRC's Division of Emer-24 gency Preparedness, testified, once a favorable finding is made in contested cases, verification that certain 25 corrective measures, e.g., those identified by FEMA, are complete, will be made by the NRC staff prior to 26 authorizing full power operation [Tr. 12652].
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1 2. Emergency Planning Standards Compliance 2 10CFR50.47 (a) 3 (1) No operating license for a nuclear power reactor will be issued unless a 4 finding is made by NRC that the state of onsite and offsite emergency prepared-5 ness provides reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and 6 will be taken in the event of a radio-logical emergency.
7 (2) The NRC will base its finding on the 8 review of the Federal Emergency Manage-ment Agency (FEMA) findings and deter-9 minations as to whether State and local emergency plans are adequate and capable 10 of being implemented, and on the NRC assessment as to whether the appli-11 cant's onsite emergency plans are ade-quate and capable of being implemented.
12 In any NRC licensing proceeding, a FEMA finding will constitute a rebuttable 13 Presumption on a question of adequacy.
14 The Region IX FEMA representative, Mr. John J.
15 Eldridge, testified that completion and sign-off of the 16 corrective actions listed in the FEMA Region IX report to 17 FEMA National Headquarters dated November 2, 1981 would 18 Provide reasonable assurance that an adequate level of 19 emergency preparedness exists in San Luis Obispo County.
20 [Eldridge testimony following Tr. 12688, p. 4-16.] He 21 further emphasized that there are no additional items 22 including radiation monitoring and communication equipment 23 needed to carry out the necessary response function.
24 [Eldridge testimony following Tr. 12688, p. 20.]
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1 FEMA has issued its interim findings to the NRC on 2 the state of emergency preparedness around the Diablo Canyon 3 Power Plant. [ Grimes Tr. 12693; Staff Exhibit 35.]
4 Mr. Tim S. Ness, the San Luis Obispo County Office 5 of Emergency Services Coordinator, testified that all 6 equipment and important corrective action items required to 7 Pl ace the County emergency response plan into effect would a be accomplished in approximately 120 days. [ Ness Tr.
9 12567.]
10 The NRC witness, Mr. John R. Sears, testified that 11 the sixteen planning standards of 10 CFR 53.47 and the 12 implementing criteria set forth in NUREG-0654 had all been 13 satisfactorily addressed by the PGandE Diablo Canyon 14 Emergency Plan and implementing procedures. [ Sears Tr.
15 12659.]
16 Mr. Grimes stated that the NRC full power hearing 17 testimony, in conjunction with the existing Safety 18 Evaluation Report (SER) Supplement 14 and the FEMA findings 19 of November 2, 1981 [PGandE attachment 2 ff. Tr. 11903]
20 Provide the NRC findings necessary for the purpose of the 21 ASLB to make findings of reasonable assurance. [ Grimes 22 testimony following Tr. 12630, p. 4, Tr. 12674, 12677 and i
l 23 12693.]
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1 Planning Standard b(1) 2 Primary responsibilities for emergency response by the nuclear facility 3 licensee and by State and local organi-zations within the Emergency Planning 4 Zones have been ascigned, the emergency responsibilities of the various support-5 ing organizations have been specifically established, and each principal response 6 organization has staff to respond and to augment its initial response on a con-7 tinuous basis.
8 This planning standard was addressed in the 9 submitted written testimony of PGandE Panel #1 [ Testimony 10 following Tr. 11778, pp. 1-1 to 1-2], as modified and 11 amended by Mr. S. M. Skidmore of PGandE regarding the 12 adequacy of State planning [Tr. 12782] and in the testimony 13 of Mr. J. R. Sears of the NRC Staff. [ Sears testimony 14 following Tr. 12638, pp. 2-7.]
15 Primary responsibilities for PGandE emergency 16 response personnel are assigned in Section 5 of the Diablo 17 Canyon Power Plant Emergency Plan [PGandE Exhibit 73] and in 18 Section 4 of Appendix A of the PGandE Corporate Emergency 19 Response Plan. [PGandE Exhibit 77.] County government 20 primary responsibilities are specified in Section 1 of the 21 County Plan. [PGandE Exhibit 80.] State responsibilities 22 are assigned in the State Plan which is included as 23 Appendix C to the PGandE Plan. [PGandE Exhibit 73.] Within 24 each of these plans the emergency responsibilities have been 25 specifically established and the principal response 26 ///
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1 organizations have staff to augment the initial response.
2 [PGandE Exhibits 73, 77, 80.]
3 The local offsite response organizations include 4 1 cal governments that geographically lie within the 5 Federally defined plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning 6 Zone (EPZ). [Skidmore Tr. 11802.] The definition of the 7 P l ume pathway EPZ is specifically addressed in 10 CFR 8 50.33(g) and Planning Standard 50.47c(2) and as such is 9 discussed later. Mr. Eldridge, the FEMA project manager for 10 Dir.blo Canyon, testified that applicable federal 11 requirements do not require that Santa Barbara County be 12 included in response plans for the Diablo Canyon Power 13 Plant. [Eldridge testimony following Tr. 12688, page 16, 14 and Tr. 12721-12723.]
15 Notwithstanding the applicable federal 16 requirements, PGandE has worked closely with the State OES 17 to develop a concept of operations and identify working 18 interrelationships to assure integration of the Diablo 19 Canyon Emergency Plan with the more expansive State and 20 County Emergency Plans. [Shiffer Tr. 11846 and Skidmore Tr.
21 11801.]
22 Mr. T. S. Ness stated that the County of San Luis 23 Obispo has chosen to act as the coordinating authority for 24 all agencies and cities in the county in the conceptual 25 development of the County Plan. [ Ness Tr. 12460-12462.]
26 While the subordinate cities have not yet signed the County
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o 1 Plan, the County, acting under its emergency powers 2 authority is able to implement an emergency response 3 regardless of city endorsement of the County plan. [ Ness 4 Tr. 12561.] Furthermore, completion of all the County 5 procedures for the cities and school districts is not 6 necessary for the implementation of the Plan since the 7 Planning effort is in effect complete and the procedures 8 serve primarily to apprise the sponsor of what they are 9 expected to do under instructions from the County Direction 10 and Control Group. Rather than requiring a formal approval, 11 the procedures only provide for ' authentication' by the 12 sponsoring organization. [ Ness Tr. 12528-12529.] Mr. Ness 13 pointed out that there are 21 procedures which are 14 considered important to carrying out a response according to 15 this plan and that they are all in place at this time.
16 [ Ness Tr. 12453.] Therefore, formal approval of the County 17 Plan, Revision B (PGandE Exhibit 80) by the subordinate 18 local governments (cities) or cooperating response agencies 19 in the EPZ is not required for the emergency plan to be 20 implemented.
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24 25 26 i
1 Planning Standard b(2) 2 On-shift facility licensee responsibil-ities for emergency response are unam-3 biguously defined, adequate staffing to provide initial facility accident 4 response in key functional areas is maintained at all times, timely augmen-5 tation of response capabilities is available and the interfaces among 6 various onsite response activities and offsite support and response activities 7 are specified.
l 8 This planning standard was addressed in the 9 submitted written testimony of PGandE Panel #1 [ Testimony 10 following Tr. 11778, pp. 1-3 to 1-4] and Mr. Sears of the 11 NRC Staff. [ Sears testimony following Tr. 12638, pp. 7-13.]
12 The on-shift Diablo Canyon Power Plant personnel 13 assignments and responsibilities are delineated in Section 5 14 of the PGandE Emergency Plan. [PGandE Exhibit 73.]
15 On-shift staffing provides sufficient operating personnel to 16 assure initial facility accident response in the key 17 functional areas. In emergency situations, timely 18 augmentation of shift staff is provided by off-shift 19 personnel who are on-call. The interfaces of the on-site 20 response organizations in the Control Room and the Technical 21 Support Center with the off-site Emergency Operations 22 Center / Emergency Operations Facility are specified in 23 Sections 5 and 7 of the PGandE Plan [PGandE Exhibit 73), and 24 the pertinent Implementing Procedures. [PCandE Exhibits 75 25 and 75A.]
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1 Sufficient licensed plant operators have been 2 qualified to meet the NRC staffing guidelines of NUREG-0654, 3 Table B-1, for licensee Emergency Response augmentation.
4 [Shiffer Tr. 11815-11816.] Mr. shiffer pointed out that the 5 guidelines provide for a timely on-shift augmentation goal 6 of thirty minutes for certain power plant response staff, 7 and sixty minutes for others. [Shiffer Tr. 11827 and 8 Skidmore Tr. 11828.] Plant staff augmentation at Diablo 9 Canyon has been shown to be timely [Kaefer Tr. 11827, 11910]
10 and has been determined by the NRC Staff as meeting the 11 standard. [SER Supplement 14, Appendix B, p. 3, Sears 12 testimony following Tr. 12683, p. 9.]
13 A question arose regarding offsite emergency 14 worker or plant operator behavior in responding to an 15 accident (" role conflict") even though such a requirement is 16 not specifically addressed in the criteria relative to 17 emergency response capabilities [Eldridge testimony 18 following Tr. 12688, p. 19, Tr. 12728] and is therefore not 19 addressed in the Diablo Canyon Emergency Plan. [Keyworth 20 Tr. 11909.] Dr. Mileti, an expert in the field of public 21 response to emergencies, testified that emergency workers 22 could generally be expected to report to their work station 23 and others would likely volunteer. [Mileti Tr. 12264-12265, .
l 24 12281-12282.]
25 Dr. Erickson, witness for Joint Intervenors, 26 hypothesized that emergency workers might not report for
1 service in an emergency due to role conflict. His testimony 2 alluded to some experience during the Three Mile Island 3 accident as a basis for this hypothesis. [Erickson 4 testimony following Tr. 12407, pp. 7-8.] However, under 5 cross-examination from the Board Dr. Erickson retreated from 6 this position and indicated that he could cite no examples 7 of such behavior during tne ';'hree Mile Island accident.
8 [Tr. 12424.] The simple hypothesis of potential " role 9 conflict" preventing emergency response is insufficient to 10 require modification to the current planning at Diablo 11 Canyon since the experience cited by Dr. Mileti demonstrates 12 " role conflict" will not prevent adequate emergency 13 response.
14 PGandE has also included working agreements with 15 various local support organizations and appropriate State 16 government organizations for a local area response to an 17 emergency at Diablo Canyon in the Diablo Canyon Emergency 18 Plan. [ Sears testimony following Tr. 12638, pp. 11-12; 19 Skidmore pp. 11802-11804.] Although similar agreements are 20 being prepared for County plan, their absence is not a major 21 factor in the Plan implementation since critical assignments 22 have been included in the 21 Standard Operating Procedures 23 already completed. [ Ness Tr. 12458.]
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9 4
1 Planning Standard b(3) 2 Arrangements for requesting and effec-tively using assistance resources have 3 been made, arrangements to accommodate State and local staff at the licensee's 4 near-site Emergency Operations Facility have been made, and other organizations 5 capable of augmenting the planned response have been identified.
6 7 This planning standard is addressed in the submit-8 ted written testimony of PGandE Panel #1 [ Testimony 9 following Tr. 11778, pp. 1-5 to 1-6] and the testimony of 10 Mr. Sears of the NRC Staff. [ Sears testimony following Tr.
11 12638, page 12.]
12 Prior arrangements for requesting assistance 13 resourcer- are included in Section 5 of the PGandE Plan 14 [PGandE Exhibit 73] and in Sections I and IV of the County 15 Plan. [PGandE Exhibit 80.] Effective use of these 16 resources is facilitated through defined organizational 17 relationships, assigned working spaces and dedicated 18 communications networks. Other organizations capable of 19 augmenting the planned response have been identified in the 20 principal response plans.
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24 25 26
1 Planning Standard b(4) 2 A standard emergency classification and action level scheme, the bases of which include facility system and effluent 3
parameters, is in use by the nuclear 4 facility licensee, and State and local response plans call for reliance on in-5 formation provided by facility licensees for determinations of minimum initial 6 offsite response measures.
7 This planning standard is addressed in the submit-8 ted written testimony of [PGandE Panel #1 testimony 9 following Tr. 11778, pp. 1-7 to 1-8] and that of the NRC 10 Staff. [ Sears testimony following Tr. 12638, pp. 13-14, and 11 Tr. 12667.]
12 A standardized emergency classification and action 13 level scheme has been developed in Section 4 of the PGandE 14 Plan [PGandE Exhibit 73] and incorporated into Section I of 15 the County Plan. [PGandE Exhibit 80.] The State Plan 16 [ Appendix C of PGandE Exhibit 73,Section III.B] also adopts 17 the same format and text for classification scheme of 18 Emergency Action levels. [PGandE panel #1 testimony 19 following Tr. 11778, p. 8.] The NRC staff consultant, 20 Battelle Northwest Laboratory, included a review of the 21 classification in their evaluation of PGandE's plan and i
22 recommended certain changes. [ Staff Exhibit 34.] Based upon 23 Battelle's cc.2ments , Mr. Sears testified that PGandE has 24 changed their implementing procedures to adopt and 25 incorporate these recommended changes. [ Sears Tr. 12666.]
26 Based upon Applicant and NRC Staff testimony of the adequacy
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1 of the emergency classification scheme, we conclude that 2 adequate determinations of minimum initial offsite response 3 measures would be made in the event of an accident at Diablo 4 Canyon Power Plant.
5 Planning Standard b(5) 6 Procedures have been established for notification by the licensee of State 7 and local response organizations and for notification of emergency personnel by 8 all organizations; the content of intiial and followup messages to 9 response organizations and the public has been established; and means to lo provide early notification and clear instruction to the populace within the 11 plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone have been established.
12 13 This planning standard is addressed in submitted 14 written testimony [PGandE Panel #2 testimony following Tr.
15 12118, pp. 2-1 to 2-3, 2-10 and 2-11), as amended by Mr.
16 Skidmore to include State planning references [Skidmore Tr.
17 12781], and the testimony of Mr. Sears of the NRC. [ Sears 18 testimony following Tr. 12638, pp. 15-17.]
19 Procedures have been established for notification 20 of State and County response organizations through initial 21 and follow-up messages from PGandE as described in the 22 Diablo Canyon Emergency Plan, Sections 5 and 6 [PGandE 23 Exhibit 73] and its implementing procedures. [PGandE 24 Exhibits 75 and 75A.] Notification of emergency workers is 25 provided in the PGandE Plan, Section 5 and procedures G-1 26 and G-3 [PGandE Exhibit 73], in the County Plan, Sections I,
i 1 11 and III [PGandE Exhibit 80], and in the State Plan 2 Section V.B. [ Appendix B to PGandE Exhibit 73.]
3 Notification procedures for the public within the plume 4 exposure Emergency Planning Zone are included in the County 5 P l an [PGandE Exhibits 80] and the Standard Operating 6 Procedures. [PGandE Exhibits 81 and 81A.]
7 On cross-examination Mr. Shiffer testified that 8 Public notification is a county government responsibility 9 and that there are a variety of primary and backup means of 10 notifying the public. [Tr. 11809.] These range from 11 minimum levels of public notification through normally 12 scheduled radio and television broadcasts [Shiffer Tr.
13 11872; Skidmore Tr. 12137; Baxter Tr. 12138] up to and 14 including use of the Emergency Broadcasting System (EBS) 15 should a public alerting by activation of the Early Warning 16 System (EWS) be considered appropriate. [ Ness Tr. 12483.]
17 Notification of handicapped residents (including 18 hard of hearing or deaf) in lieu of notification by the 19 siren system is being accomplished as discussed in the 20 County Plan. [PGandE Exhibit 80, Sections II.5 and III.07.]
21 As a part of the implementation of these sections of the 22 County Plan, the Public Information brochure to be 23 distributed by the County will include tear-out cards which 24 Will Provide local government agencies with a listing of 25 residents requiring special notification. [Godfrey Tr.
26 12128; Eldridge testimony following Tr.12688, p.12. ]
F 1 The County decision on the use of the EWS sirens 2 relative to the declared Emergency Action Lev.1 was 3 generally described by Mr. Shiffer. [Shiffer Tr.
4 12133-12135.] He pointed out that the criteria for 5 activation of this system have been established by the 6 County in their SOP's. These considerations include the 7 desirability of a balanced public reaction relative to the 8 identified need for a " protective action" response by the 9 public. [Shiffer Tr. 12134.] Mr. Ness further stated that 10 activation of the EWS would be solely to initiate a public 11 protective response. [ Ness Tr. 12510-12514.] In response 12 to Governor Brown's apparent desire for activation of the 13 sirens at the Alert stage, Mr. Ness explained the reasons 14 for limiting the actuation of the siren system to a Site 15 Area Emergency and a General Emergency. [ Ness Tr. 12485, 16 12487, 12490.] The FEMA project manager, Mr. Eldridge, also 17 agreed with Mr. Ness' position. [Eldridge testimony 18 following Tr. 12688, p. 21.]
19 The criteria for activating the EWS are contained 20 in a County standard operating procedure [NRC Staff Exhibit 21 30; Skidmore Tr. 11852; Ness Tr. 12568, 12515] to assure 22 prompt notification should it be likely that the public 23 would need protection. There now exist clear instructions 24 for timely Early Warning System activation by county 25 personnel at the Sheriff's facilities or the Emergency 26 Operations Center. [ Ness Tr. 12568; Skidmore, Tr. 11847,
1 11852.] The draft County Standard Operating Procedure used 1 2
in the Field Exercise of August 19, 1981 was modified to 3 assure an expedited alerting of the public in the case of a declaration of a General Emergency. [Skidmore, Tr. 11852.]
4 5 The timely activation of the system for these situations was 6 endorsed by County Supervisor MacElvaine. [MacElvaine Tr.
7 12258.] The approach used by the County was further 8 endorsed by Mr. Nass [ Ness Tr. 12568] and Mr. Sears. [ Sears 9 Tr. 12639.]
10 Dr. Mi.1eti, an expert on the response of Populations to disasters, te;tified [PGandE Panel #2, 11 12 following Tr. 12118, pp. 2-10 to 2-11, Mileti Tr. 12152, 13 12157, 12161, 12162, 12178] that there is no need to perform 14 a site-specific social study on public attitudes since there 15 is sufficient knowledge in the behavioral sciences to 16 address and design an effective and proper means of notifying the public. He further pointed out that the 17 18 validity of such a survey would be marginal in that a 19 Person's behavior is characteristically different under 20 stress in an emergency as compared to their perception of 21 how they react in a given emergency situation. [Mileti Tr.
22 12163, 12165.]
23 We conclude that applicable notification measures 24 Provide sufficient time for an early warning and contain clear instructions that will protect the population in the 25 Plume exposure pathway EPZ. There is no need to modify the 26
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1
.l 1 existing emergency plans to require use of the EWS at the 2 Alert stage nor is there a rational basis for requiring a i '
3 site-specific social study.
4 Planning Standard b(6) 5 Provisions exist for prompt communica-tions among principal response organiza-6 tions to emergency personnel and to the public.
7 8 This planning standard is addressed in the 9 submitted written testimony of PGandE Panel #3 [ Testimony 10 following Tr. 12052, pp. 3-1 to 3-4] and the testimony of 11 Mr. Sears of the NRC Staff. [ Sears testimony following Tr.
12 12638, pp. 19-22.]
13 Procedures are in place which provide for prompt 14 telecommunications capability between PGandE, the County, 15 the State and the NRC as described in Section 7 of the 16 PGandE Plan [PGandE Exhibit 73] and in Section III of the 17 County Plan. [PGandE Exhibit 80.]
18 The telecommunications capabilities for public 19 notification are described in Section III of the County Plan 20 [PGandE Exhibit 80] and the County Standard Operating 21 Procedures. [PGandE Exhibits 81 and 81A.]
22 County Supervisor MacElvaine testified that the 23 County plan was workable and personnel are capable of 24 performing their emergency response functions once certain 25 telecommunications equipment is available. [MacElvaine 26 testimony, Tr. 12241, 12256.] The additional
1 telecommunications equipment required to improve the 2 county's capability to implement the County Plan has been 3 identified in the FEMA, Region IX, findings forwarded to 4 FEMA Headquarters. [PGandE Attachment 1 ff. Tr. 12052.]
5 Scheduled equipment delivery or system completion dates are 6 indicated in the FEMA Region IX letter to FEMA Headquarters 7 dated November 2, 1381 and December 15, 1981. [PGandE 8 Attachment 4, ff. Tr. 11181; Eldridge testimony following 9 Tr. 12688, page 20 and Tr. 12689, 12690 and 12731.] A part 10 of this telecommunications equipment consisting of a number 11 f radio pagers for county personnel has already been 12 delivered. [Kaefer Tr. 12058; Nevolo Tr. 12058-12059.]
13 Additional equipment, while not included in the FEMA Region 14 IX list of requirements, but which PGandE believes would 15 enhance county communications, is also being provided.
16 [Nevolo Tr. 12063.] Therefore, sufficient communication 17 capability exists or will be provided to assure prompt 18 communications among the principal response organizations.
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22 23 24 25 26
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1 Planning Standard b(7) i l 2 Information is made available to the public on a periodic basis on how they 3 will be notified and what their initial actions should be in an emergency (e.g.,
4 listening to a local broadcast station and remaining indoors), the principal 5 Points of contract [ sic] with the news media for dissemination of information 6 during an emergency (including the physical locations or locations) are 7 established in advance, and procedures for coordinated dissemination of infor-8 mation to the public are established.
9 This planning standard is addressed in the 10 Prefiled written testimony of PGandE [ Panel #2] testimony 11 following Tr. 12118, pp. 2-4 to 2-11] as amended by Mr.
12 Skidmore to reflect State planning [Skidmore Tr. 12782], and 13 the testimony of Mr. Sears. [ Sears testimony Tr. 12638, pp.
14 22-24.]
15 The procedures for periodically providing 16 information to the public on response actions are described 17 in Section 5 of the PGandE Plan, [PGandE Exhibit 73] in 18 Appendix A, Section 4 of the Corporate Emergency Response 19 Plan [PGandE Exhibit 77] and more specifically in Sections 20 II and III of the County Plan. [PGandE Exhibit 80.]
21 The public education program provides information 22 through periodicals such as the PGandE "Diablo Canyon 23 Newsletters" and through local media briefings. Further 24 information is available through local telephone books. The 25 county will also provide specific public guidance and 26 emergency response background information in their public
1 information booklet. [ Panel #2 testimony following Tr.
2 12118, pp. 2-4 to 2-11.] The media contact location as 3 identified in Section I of the County Plan [PGandE Exhibit 4 80] as the cuesta college auditorium.
5 Dr. Mileti testified that the credibility of the 6 information source is a key factor in predicting public 7 response to notification [Mileti testimony, Tr. 12155].
8 PGandE has designated the County Public Information Officer 9 as the public spokesman. Additional conveyance of 10 information and instructions on protective actions would be 11 disseminated to the public via telecommunications (EBS or 12 regular news broadcast) the print media and/or television.
13 [Baxter testimony, Tr. 12172.] This approach further 14 enhances the public perception of the authenticity of the 15 information. Finally, Dr. Mileti opined that those who 16 might not see PGandE as a credible information source would 17 likely respond conservatively to any message suggesting a 18 Protective action which was known to have come from a PGandE 19 source. [Mileti testimony, Tr. 12173.]
20 Drs. Erickson and Johnson, on behalf of Joint 21 Intervenors, testified that a social survey should be 22 Performed to assist in defining public information programs.
23 [Erickson testimony following Tr. 12407 p. 11; Tr.
24 12428-30.] After review of the PGandE public education 25 Program, Dr. Mileti testified that it incorporates elements l
26 thought important by behavioral scientists and also includes
I those elements they believe to be the alternative ways that 2 information and education is best presented to the public.
3 [Mileti testimony, Tr. 12153-12154.] Based upon this 4 evidence, we find that an adequate public information 5 program has been developed to assure appropriate public 6 response to an emergency at Diablo Canyon.
7 Planning Standard b(8) 8 Adequate emergency facilities and equip-ment to support the emergency response 9 are provided and maintained.
10 This planning standard is addressed in the submit-11 ted written testimony of PGandE Panel #4 testimony following 12 Tr. 11903, pp. 4-1 to 4-7] and NRC Staff expert witnesses 13 Mr. John R. Sears. [ Testimony following Tr. 12638, pp.
14 24-27.]
15 Emergency facilities and equipment available for 16 emergency response are documented in PGandE Emergency Plan 17 Sections 7 and 8.3 [ Applicant Exhibit 73], and the Emergency 18 Procedures of the Plant Manual, Volume 3A, Procedures EF-1 19 through EF-7. [ Applicant Exhibit 75.] The facilities 20 described therein, including the Technical Support Center, 21 Operations Support Center, Corporate Incident Response 22 Center and Emergency Operations Facility are in place and 23 available for emergency response. These facilities, both 24 onsite and offsite, are intended to be used as emergency 25 response control centers and personnel staging areas.
26 Procedures for activiation and conduct of operations at 1 these facilities are .lso in place as described in the 2 documents referenced above. Staffing of these facilities by 3 PGandE, County and State to handle the wide variety of 4 emergency response needs are outlined in the PGandE Plan 5 [PGandE Exhibit 73], the State Plan [ Appendix C to PGandE 6 Exhibit 73] and the County Plan. [PGandE Exhibit 80.]
7 There were no staffing inadequacies identified in the FEMA 8 evaluation and findings of the August 19, 1981 Exercise.
9 [PGandE Attachment 1 ff. Tr. 11781.] Emergency equipment to 10 support the operations of these facilities and to initiate 11 the emergency measures as set forth in Section 4 of the 12 PGandE Emergency Plan are described in Section 7 of the 13 Emergency Plan. [PGandE Exhibit 73.]
14 PGandE, San Luis Obispo County, and the State of 15 California have made provisions to acquire data from (or to 16 obtain access to) offsite monitoring and analysis equipment.
17 The equipment that has been provided is discussed in the 18 PGandE Plan [Section 7, PGandE Exhibit 73], the County Plan, 19 Rev. B [PGandE Exhibit 80], and State of California 20 Department of Health Services, Radiologic Health Section 21 Procedures. [PGandE Exhioits 82 and 82A.] Equipment 22 maintenance and inventory activities for PGandE, County and 23 State emergency equipment are addressed in appropriate 24 sections of the aforementioned emergency plans. Mr. Sears 25 testified that adequate facilities and equipment are in 26 ///
I i
o .
1 place to meet the requirements of this planning standard.
2 [ Sears testimony following Tr. 12638, pp. 24-27.]
3 PGandE witnesses, Messrs. Serpa and Shiffer 4 expanded upon the panel's written t.estimony emphasizing that 5 adequate equipment is available in the TSC and EOF to 6 support a radiological emergency response. [Tr.
7 11911-11920.] PGandE Exhibits 73, 75 and 75A detail the 8 equipment available at the TSC, OSC, and EOF. Mr. Shiffer 9 also testified that the OSC has ' adequate equipment and 10 supplies to evacuate the OSC. [Shiffer Tr. 11920-11921.]
11 On the basis of the above evidence, we find that 12 adequate emergency facilities and equipment exist and 13 maintenance of this equipment and staffing of the facilities 14 are also identifiec and provided for.
15 Planning Standard b(9) 16 Adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or 17 Potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition are in 18 use.
19 This planning standard is addressed in the 20 submitted written testimony of PGandE [ Panel #5 testimony 21 following Tr. 11924, pp. 5-1 to 5-13] and NRC Staff witness 22 Mr. John R. Sears. [ Sears testimony ff. Tr. 12638, pp.
23 27-29.]
24 PGandE has provided the methodology, systems, and 25 equipment to assure proper functioning of engineered 26 safeguards and other systems to minimize the release of
- m. _ _ . . . . . . . . . _.. ..
1 radioactive materials. [Section 6.2 PGandE Exhibit 73.]
2 PGandE has also provided methodology, systems and equipment 3 to determine the source term of radioactive materials within 4 plant systems and to determine the magnitude of release of 5 radioactive materials from the plant on a predictive and 6 actual basis. [Section 7 of PGandE Exhibit 73, and the RB 7 series procedures in PGandE Exhibits 75 and 75A.]
8 Mr. Sears stated that methods, systems, and 9 equipment available to PGandE for assessing and monitoring 10 actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological 11 emergency condition satisfy this planning standard. [ Sears 12 testimony following Tr. 12638, p. 29.]
13 PGandE, the County, and the State have adequate 14 capability to make rapid assessments of actual or potential 15 magnitude and locations of any radiological hazards through 16 liquid or gaseous release pathways, and the capability to 17 relate the various measured environmental parameters to the 18 source term. [Section 6.2 PGandE Exhibit 73; the RB series 19 procedures of PGandE Exhibit 75 and 75A; Parts II and III of 20 the County Plan PGandE Exhibits 80, 81, 81A; and Annex 2 of 21 the State Plan PGandE Exhibits 82 and 82A.]
22 Messrs. Serpa and Shiffer testified that 23 radiological assessment calculations performed by San Luis 24 Obispo County personnel assigned to the Unified Dose 25 Assessment Center (UDAC), while complex, are straightforward 2'6 and covered by procedures. In addition, the major purpose
1 1 of the UDAC (which is a part of the EOC/ EOF complex) is to 2 provide a central point where PGandE and County personnel 3 may work side-by-side in the radiological assessment effort.
4 [Serpa and Shiffer Tr. 11929.]
5 Mr. Serpa testified that although operability of 6 all of the radiation monitoring system instrumentation 7 presented in Table 1 of the Panel No. 4 testimony would be 8 desirable in an emergency, it is not necessary that any of 9 the radiation monitors listed in that table be available.
10 [Serpa Tr. 11985.] Furthermore, only two of the monitors in 11 Table 1 are required to meet the requirements of NUREG 1.97, 12 Revision 2, and these monitors are both installed and meet 13 established criteria. [Serpa Tr. 11948-11949.] Finally, 14 Mr. Serpa testified that installation of four remaining 15 monitors will be completed before full power operation and 16 most likely in the next 30-45 days. [Serpa Tr. 11977.]
17 Mr. Shiffer testified that an overall integrated 18 approach using several independent methods is used by PGandE 19 to determine the radiological release rate, radiation levels 20 and deposition in offsite areas. Consequently, the accuracy 21 of individual instruments is not critical. This integrated 22 approach will utilize:
23 1) accident summaries analyzed as part of the FSAR;
- 24 2) the emergency classification system included in 25 PGandE Exhibits 73, 75, and 75A; 26 ///
1 3) laboratory analysis and radiation monitor 2 readings; 3 4) dispersion modeling, previously completed 4 atmospheric tracer studies, and professional 5 meteorologist expertise; and 6 5) field monitoring as provided in the PGandE, County 7 and State Plans. [Shiffer testimony, Tr.
8 11954-11955, 11965-11968.]
9 Messrs. Hubbard and Minor, witnesses for Governor 10 Brown, presented written testimony which suggested that 11 PGandE emergency procedures instructed the operators to rely 12 on non-safety related equipment. It is their position that 13 the procedures should specifically identify which equipment 14 is not safety-related. [Hubbard and Minor testimony 15 following Tr. 12313, pp. 15-16.] However, on 16 cross-examination Messrs. Hubbard and Minor admitted that 17 they had incorrectly interpreted the requirements of 18 NUREG-0654 and 10 CFR 50.47. [Hubbard Minor Tr.
19 12319-12326.] Neither NUREG-0654, 10 CFR 50.47, nor any 20 other regulation or regulatory guide require an operator to 21 rely only on safety-related equipment in accident situations 22 or to identify non-safety related equipment in emergency 23 operating procedures. Furthermore, Messrs. Minor and 24 Hubbard admitted they had never written an emergency 25 Operating procedure for a pressurized water reactor.
26 [Hubbard and Minor testimony, Tr. 12326.]
- 5 '. -
1 Messrs. Hubbard and Minor also questioned whether 2 certain non-safety related equipment should be safety-3 related. On cross-examination, they stated that the site 4 emergency alarm is not safety-related but that, in their 5 OPi nion, it should be. [Hubbard-Minor Tr. 12330-12332.]
6 While they later agreed that their statement was 7 inconsistent with the definition of " safety-related" they 8 Presented in testimony on Contentions 10 and 12, they were 9 unable to offer any reason why a different definition should 10 now be employed. [ Minor-Hubbard Tr. 12332.]
11 Messrs. Hubbard and Minor also stated that 12 compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.97 accident monitoring 13 instrumentation guidance has not been demonstrated, but 14 later admitted that the requirements of the Regulatory Guide 15 are not required to be in place until June 1983.
16 [Hubbard-Minor Tr. 12334-12336.] The exact purpose of such 17 testimony was unclear; however, PGandE has clearly committed 18 to making instrument modifications and equipment additions 19 in the time frame necessary to meet the dated requirement of 20 the regulatory guide. [NRC Staff Exhibit 33.]
21 We find that adequate methods, systems and 22 equipment for assessing and monitoring offsite consequences 23 are in place and would be used to protect the public.
24 Governor Brown's witnesses' testimony regarding use of 25 non-safety related equipment and use of such equipment in 26 emergency procedures was inconsistent with the accepted
1 definitions of safety-related equipment and the regulatory 2 criteria.
3 Planning Standard b(10) 4 A range of protective actions have been developed for the plume exposure pathway 5 EPZ for emergency workers and the pub-lic. Guidelines for the choice of 6 Protective actions during an emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, are 7 develop'ed and in place, and protective action for the ingestion exposure path-8 way EPZ appropriate to the locale have been developed.
9 10 This standard is addressed in the submitted 11 Written testimony of PGandE [ Panel #6 testimony following 12 Tr. 12184, pp. 6-1 to 6-13]; FEMA witness Mr. John W.
13 Eldridge, Jr. [Eldridge testimony following Tr. 12688, pp.
14 16-20]; NRC Staff witnesses Mr. John Sears [ Sears testimony 15 following Tr. 12638, pp. 29-34], Mr. Thomas Urbanik [Urbank 16 Tr. 12379-12380], and rebuttal testimony by PGandE witness 17 Reed H. Winslow. [ Winslow Tr. 12779-12781.]
18 PGandE has developed onsite protective action 19 criteria which are based on minimizing exposures to onsite 20 Personnel consistent with the need to accomplish protective 21 actions. Specific protective actions and associated 22 guidelines are developed for nonessential personnel and 23 onsite emergency workers. [Section 6.3, PGandE Exhibit 73, 24 and RB series Emergency Procedures in PGandE Exhibits 75, 25 and 75A.]
26 /N
, .m k' 4 , ., -_ _ _ ._
1 PGandE has made provisions to recommend offsite 2 protective actions to appropriate County and other offsite 3 authorities. [Section 6.3, PGandE Exhibit 73.] RB series l
4 Emergency Procedures describe the basis for the choice of l 5 the protective actions during emergency conditions. [PGandE 6 75 and 75A.] The County and State have made provisions for 7 offsite protective actions for both the plume and ingestion 8 exposure pathways. Plume exposure pathway protective 9 actions are discussed in Sections I.7 and II.7 of the County 10 Plan. [PGandE Exhibit 80.]
11 Ingestion pathway protective actions have been 12 developed by PGandE, the County and the State. They include 13 Preventive protective actions which responsible County and 14 State personnel would implement to prevent or reduce the 15 concentration of radioactivity in food or animal feed.
16 These protective actions are addressed in Section IV.B of 17 the State Plan [ Appendix B of Exhibit 73], Volume I, Section 18 lV of the State Department of Health Services Radiologic 19 Health Section Procedures [PGandE Exhibits 82 and 82A], and 20 Section II.10 of the County Plan. [PGandE Exhibit 80.] Mr.
21 Sears stated that PGandE's provisions for protective 22 response and for recommending protective actions conform to 23 the implementation criteria of the planning standard.
24 [ Sears testimony following Tr. 12638, p. 34.]
25 In response to Joint Intervenors' concern over 26 site evacuation should the north and south evacuation rcutes
1 be inaccessible, Mr. Shiffer testifed that in addition to 2 the southern and northern evacuation routes other means are 3 available to either evacuate non-essential personnel from 4 the site (i.e. alternate roads, helicopters, or boats) or to 5 relocate these persons onsite. [Shiffer testimony, Tr.
6 12773-12776.] Mr. Shiffer stated that in the rainy season 7 winds at the site typically blow from the south and regard-a less of the condition of the northern evacuation route.
9 Hence, this route would probably not be used because of 10 radiological implications. [Shiffer testimony Tr. 12774.]
11 In addition, Mr. Shiffer testified that Diablo Canyon 12 Emergency Procedure G-5 [PGandE Exhibit 75] addresses 13 evacuation of non-essential site personnel. [Shiffer 14 testimony Tr. 12776.] Mr. Sears based upon his personal 15 inspection of the route, testified that although plant 16 Personnel might have to walk approximately one mile to reach 17 a passible road for northern evacuation, the northern 18 evacuation route is indeed a reliable evacuation route even 19 in the rainy season. [ Sears testimony, Tr. 12649-12650, 20 12667-12668.]
21 Supervisor MacElvaine testified that the UDAC is l
l l
22 functional assuming that all necessary equipment is 23 supplied. [MacElvaine testimony, Tr. 12240]. The UDAC 24 Personnel provide recommendations to the responsible County 25 officials as to appropriate protective actions for the 26 ///
1 Public in the EPZ. [ Panel #6 testimony following Tr. 12184 2 PP. 6-3 to 6-7.]
3 Messrs. Boots, Serpa and Shiffer were questioned 4 on the administration of potassium iodide to emergency 5 workers. [ Boots, Serpa, Shiffer Tr. 11929-11933.] Mr.
6 Serpa testified that adequate potassium iodide was available 7 for field monitoring teams and that PGandE has seven 8 thousand doses of potassium iodide which would be available 9 to the county, if the county chooses to use it. [Serpa Tr.
10 11932-11933.]
11 Mr. Serpa testified that Santa Barbara and 12 Monterey counties were within the ingestion pathway zone.
13 [Serpa Tr. 12192-12193.] Mr. Eldridge testified that the 14 State of California has the primary responsibility to 15 develop coordination with Santa Barbara County. [Eldridge 16 Tr. 12722-12723.] This coordination exists in both the 17 State Plan Annex 2 (California Department of Health, 18 Radiologic Health Section) and the Implementing Procedures 19 contained in PGandE Exhibits 82 and 82A. Ingestion pathway 20 capabilities for San Luis Obispo County are set forth.
21 [ Panel #6 testimony following Tr. 12184 at pp. 6-6 and 6-7.]
22 Dr. Mileti testified that " role conflicts" during 23 emergencies can occur, but that generally emergency workers 24 Perform their responsibilities and many off duty personnel 25 will volunteer and report for work. [Mileti Tr.
26 12263-12266.] In addition, Mr. Eldridge testified that
1 NUREG-0654 does not require " role conflict" to be addressed 2 in emergency response planning. [Eldridge testimony 3 following Tr. 12688, p. 19 and Tr. 12727.]
4 PGandE's expert witnesses on evacuation, Mr. I:eed 5 Winslow and Mr. Garrison Smith, testified that the 6 evacuation plan for the plume EPZ satisfied NUREG-0654, 7 Revision 1 requirements. [ Winslow-Smith testimony following 8 Tr. 12184 pp. 6-10 to 6-13.] NRC staff expert Thomas 9 Urbanik also testified that the evacuation time estimates 10 given in the September 1980 PRC Voorhees report [ Applicant 11 Exhibit 78] satisfies NUREG-0654, Rev. 1. [Urbanik 12 testimony, Tr. 12379-12380.] Based upon Mr. Urbanik's 13 review and evaluation, Mr. Sears testified that the 14 guidelines of NUREG-0654, Appendix 4, have been met by 15 applicant. [ Sears testimony following Tr. 12638, pp.
16 30-32.] In addition, Mr. Eldridge testified that the 17 guidelines of Appendix 4 of NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP-1, Rev. 1 18 have been satis fied. [Eldridge testimony following Tr.
19 12688, p. 17.]
20 Joint Intervenor witness Dr. Plotkin stated in his 21 testimony that the voluntary evacuation of people from 22 outside the basic emergency planning zone will have a 23 significant impact on the evacuation of people from the San 24 Luis Obispo area in the event of an evacuation caused by an 25 accident at the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant. [Plotkin 26 testimony, Tr. 12626.] Dr. Plotkin admitted, however, that j
I he has not done a study of this phenomenon at San Luis 2 Obispo [Plotkin Tr. 12626] and that he does not even know 3 what the approximate populations of Atascadero and Paso 4 Robles, which are the closest cormunities located outside 5 the EPZ. [Plotkin Tr. 12630.] This casts serious doubt on 6 his ability to make such categorical statements.
7 The experience at Three Mile Island was cited as 8 evidence for the existence of this " shadow evacuation" 9 phenomenon. [Pulido Tr. 12628-12629.] However, the article 10 " Evacuation From a Nuclear Technological Disaster" (appended 11 to Dr. James Johnson's testimony), estimated that only 9% of 12 the households which were more than 15 miles away from the 13 Three Mile Island plant contained a_ny n members who 14 voluntarily evacuated. [ Johnson testimony following Tr.
15 12407.] Furthermore, the article stated that " Evacuees 16 living close to the plant were likely to leave earlier than 17 those living in the outlying communities" and that a 18 majority of those who evacuated from further than 10 miles 19 away from the plant did so several days after the beginning 20 of the emergency. Thus, the experience at Three Mile Island 21 does not support the conclusion that a massive voluntary 22 evacuation will occur at distances of 25 and 35 miles from 23 the site of a nuclear accident (which are the estimates Dr.
24 Plotkin gives for the distance between the Diablo Canyon 25 plant and Atascadero and Paso Robles, respectively).
26 [Plotkin Tr. 12630.] In fact, this cited experience of Dr.
1 Johnson supports the contrary position that large voluntary 2 evacuations at distances of greater than 15 miles is 3 unlikely, since only 9 percent of households voluntarily 4 evacuated several days after the Three Mile Island incident.
5 As Mr. Winslow stated, the basic (state defined) 6 evacuation planning zone at Diablo Canyon for which the 7 evacuation times were estimated includes all communities, 8 villages and towns within about 18 miles of the Diablo 9 Canyon plant. [ Winslow testimony, Tr. 12779-12780.] Mr.
10 Winslow also noted that the road network beyond the Santa 11 Lucia Mountains does fan out, thus providing additional 12 capacity for whatever small amount of voluntary evacuation 13 might take place outside of the basic emergency planning 14 zone. [ Winslow Tr. 12780-12781.] These facts when 15 considered in conjunction with the specific topography and 16 demography of the area led Mr. Winslow to opine that a large 17 traffic jam that would "back up into the EPZ is 18 inconceivable." [ Winslow testimony, Tr. 12781.]
19 Dr. Plotkin and Mr. Pulido stated in their 20 testimony that for a " realistic or anticipated evacuation 21 system condition" the evacuation time for the basic 22 emergency planning zone would be between 15 end 21 hours2.430556e-4 days <br />0.00583 hours <br />3.472222e-5 weeks <br />7.9905e-6 months <br /> if 23 no serious lane blockage were assumed, and between 21 and 36 24 hours if one lane of Highway 101 were blocked in each 25 direction. [Plotkin and Pulido testimony following Tr.
26 12580, p. 6.] These figures contrast sharply with the 6 to
.. ... ..~..-..- --.,.... ....... .-.. ~.
= ,
1 6-1/2 hour estimates [ Winslow testimony at Tr. 12203] which 2 were reached by both the TERA evacuation model and the 3 Voorhees evacuation model and the estimate of 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> for 4 the "no traffic control" scenario [ Smith Tr. 12216] which 5 was obtained from the TERA evaluation model. [PGandE 6 Exhibit 84.] Interestingly, whereas the TERA and Voorhees 7 evacuation models are described in detail in various 8 reports, and the Voorhees model has been favorably reviewed 9 by experts at the NRC and FEMA as well as an independent 10 expert (Thomas Urbanik), Dr. Plotkin and Mr. Pulido do not 11 describe what model they used to arrive at the figures they 12 give, other than to say that they assume an " anticipated" 13 flow rate during an evacuation of approximately 600 vehicles 14 per hour per lane on Highway 101. [ Testimony following Tr.
15 12580, pp. 5-6.] Hence it is not possible to scrutinize 16 their model and assumptions to determine its strengths 17 and/or weaknesses. Accordingly, the figures they give must is be viewed with some skepticism.
19 Moreover, it is obvious that Dr. Plotkin preferred 20 an extremely conservative approach, even though all 21 witnesses agreed that a realistic calculation of evacuation 22 time estimates is preferred. [Plotkin testimony following 23 Tr. 12580, p. 3; Urbanik Tr. 12384; Smith Tr. 12282-12284.]
24 An example of Dr. Plotkin's preference for layering 25 conservatism upon conservatism is illustrated by his 26 assumptions of 5 mile / hour traffic flow [Plotkin testimony
' ~
P' __ m
1 following Tr. 12580, p. 5] and large accidents occurring at 2 that low speed which would block one lane of all evacuation 3 routes for over 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br />. [ Ibid., p. 6.] Mr. Winslow 4 testified that accidents caused by driver inattention, 5 Pile-ups, and mass crashes would be very unlikely due to the 6 relatively low speeds involved under evacuation conditions.
7 [ Winslow Tr. 12200.] In addition, Mr. Urbanik testified 8 that he would not expect even minor accidents in an 9 evacuation. [Urbanik testimony, Tr. 12389.]
10 In summary, we find that a range of protective 11 actions have been developed for the plume exposure pathway 12 EPZ and ingestion exposure pathway EPZ for both emergency 13 workers and the public. The evidence presented by Joint 14 Intervenors regarding evacuation time estimates was simply 15 at odds with evidence and opinions by qualified experts for 16 both PGandE and NRC staff. We find the latter evidence to 17 be more persuasive.
18 Planning Standard b(11) 19 Means for controlling radiological expo-sures, in an emergency, are established 20 for emergency workers. The means for controlling radiological exposures shall 21 include exposure guidelines consistent with EPA Emergency Worker and Lifesaving 22 Activity Protective Action Guides.
23 This standard is addressed in the written 24 testimony of PGandE [ Panel #5 Testimony following Tr. 11924, 25 PP. 5-14 to 5-17], NRC staff witness Mr. John R. Sears 26 [ Testimony following Tr. 12638, pp. 34-36], and the FEMA w ._- _ ____-__-_________ :r_:_r___ _:: : - _r-_-_::T_:: _ - - ~
1 Project manager Mr. John W. Eldridge, Jr. [ Testimony 2 following Tr. 12688, p. 13]. Mr. John W. Eldridge also 3 Provided additional direct testimony on radiation dosimetry 4 for county emergency workers. [Eldridge Tr. 12719-12721.]
5 The PGandE site emergency plan [PGandE Exhibit 73 6 Sections 6.3 and Section 7.4] and Implementing Emergency 7 Procedures [PGandE Exhibits 74 and 74A]; the San Luis Obispo 8 County Plan and procedures [PGandE Exhibits 80, 81, and 81A]
9 and the State of California Plan [ Appendix B of PGandE 10 Exhibit 73] establish programs to control radiological 11 exposures. All of these programs follow the EPA guidelines.
12 Additionally, these programs and their implementing 13 Procedures include provisions for handling radiological 14 injuries, taking corrective actions, performing personnel 15 decontamination and providing personnel dosimetry. Mr.
16 Sears stated that PGandE has provided a means for 17 controlling exposures conforming to the requirements.
18 [ Sears testimony following Tr. 12638, p. 34.]
19 Governor Brown and Joint Intervenors presented no 20 evidence related to this planning standard. We find that 21 adequate planning and preparedness exist to assure l 22 appropriate means for controlling radiological exposures 23 would be taken for emergency workers.
24 Planning Standard b(12) 25 Arrangements are made for medical ser-vices for contaminated injured individ-26 uals.
l
[
y __ . ,. . . , _ . . . . . . . . . . _ . - . _ . . . . . _ . . . . . . . .~.
1 This planning standard is addressed in the 2 submitted written testimony of PGandE [ Panel #7 Following 3 Tr. 12065, pp. 7-1 to 7-3] and the testimony of Mr. Sears of 4 the NRC. [ Testimony following Tr. 12638, pp. 36-38.]
5 Arrangements have been made for medical services with French 6 Hospital in San Luis Obispo and Saint Francis Hospital in 7 San Francisco, as well as ambulance services in both 8 locations, for contaminated injured individuals as described 9 in Section 5 of the PGandE Plan. [PGandE Exhibit 73.]
10 Considerable specialized medical training for injuries 11 involving radioactive contamination has been provided in the 12 San Luis Obispo County medical community. [ Panel #7 13 Testimony following Tr. 12065, pp. 7-1 to 7-3.] Medical 14 response drills are scheduled and conducted as described in 15 Section 8 of the PGandE Plan. [PGandE Exhibit 73]. Mr.
16 Sears stated PGandE ' arrangements for medical services for 17 contaminated individuals meet the planning standard. [ sears 18 testimony following Tr. 12638, pp. 36-38.]
19 Mr. Eldridge testified that the county's medical 20 capability (doctors and hospitals) is sufficient to 21 accommodate a limited number of contaminated patients.
22 [Eldridge Tr. 12732.] Mr. Shiffer noted though that an 23 accident at a nuclear power plant would not require large 24 numbers of physicians to handle traumatic injuries.
25 [Shiffer Tr. 12071-12072.] Rather, most treatment would 26 involve simple decontamination which could be administered 1
l
......~. .-... .., ...., , .. .
g_ . .
1 by trained government or utility personnel. Mr. Shiffer 2 also observed that ambulances would probably not be needed 3 for removal of those contaminated in the plume EPZ [Shiffer 4 testimony Tr. 12075]. Finally, there has been considerable 5 radiological injury and decontamination training of 6 physicians in the County [Skidmore Tr. 12066].
7 Planning Standard b(13) 8 General plans for recovery and reentry are developed.
9 10 This planning standard is addressed in the 11 submitted written testimony of PGandE [ Panel #8 following 12 Tr. 11989, pp. 8-1 to 8-3] and the testimony of Mr. Sears of 13 the NRC. [ Sears testimony following Tr. 12638, p. 38.]
14 General plans for onsite recovery by PGandE are described in 15 Section 9 of the PGandE Plan [PGandE Exhibit 73]. Plans for 16 off-site recovery and reentry are addressed in Sections II 17 and III of the County Plan [PGandE Exhibit 80] and in 18 Section IV and Annex 2 of the State Plan [PGandE Exhibits 82 19 and 82A]. Mr. Sears stated that PGandE's plans for recovery 20 and reentry meet the planning standard. [ Sears testimony 21 following Tr. 12638, p. 38.]
22 Mr. Skidmore testified that there has been a great 23 deal of State planning for recovery and reentry. [Skidmore 24 Tr. 12015 -
12017.] In reference to Mr. John J. Kearns' 25 (Deputy Director State Office of Emergency Services) concern 26 regarding the adequacy of ' State planning, Mr. Skidmore
" ^~
M. j
1 testified that more detailed planning has indeed been 2 accomplished by another State organization, the State 3 Department of Health Services, than Mr. Kearns was 4 apparently aware of at that time. [Skidmore Tr. 12004 -
5 12005.] While the level of planning in this regard is not 6 as detailed as the planning for the plume exposure pathway, 7 it seems evident that a detailed level of planning is not 8 necessary. Rather, what is needed is a general outline of 9 response capability which can be activated in the period 10 following implementation of emergency protective actions for 11 the general population. Simply put, there is ample time to 12 execute recovery and reentry activities and hence more 13 general and less detailed ad hoc planning is sufficient.
14 Planning Standard b(14) 15 Periodic exercises are (will be) con-ducted to evaluate major portions of 16 emergency response capabilities, period drills are (will be) conducted to 17 develop and maintain key skills, and deficiencies identified as a result of 18 exercises or drills are (will be) corrected.
19 20 This planning standard is addressed in the 21 submitted written testimony of PGandE Panel #9 [Following 22 Tr. 11878, pp. 9-1 to 9-4], the testimony of Mr. Sears of 23 the NRC Staff [ Sears testimony following Tr. 12638, pp.
24 39-42] and Mr. Eldridge of FEMA [Eldridge testimony 25 following Tr. 12688, pp. 14-16, 22-23). The annual 26 emergency exercise which was conducted on August 19, 1981 1 included participation of all principal response 2 organizations and demonstrated that emergency response 3 capabilities were adequate. [ Attachment 2 ff. Tr. 11903.]
4 Before and after the field exercise, both offsite and onsite 5 drills have been conoucted to develop and maintain skills.
6 Deficiencies as noted in the FEMA and NRC critiques have 7 been identified for corrective actions by the principal 8 response organizations. Mr. Sears stated PGandE's o provisions for conducting drills and exercises and for 10 taking corrective actions meet the planning standard.
11 [ Sears testimony following Tr. 12638, pp. 39-42.]
12 Evacuation procedures were available [Skidmore Tr.
13 11882, 11889; MacElvaine, Tr. 12254], however, actual 14 civilian evacuation was not done as it is precluded by FEMA 15 guidelines. [Eldridge Tr. 12725-12726; 45 Fed. Reg. 55405.]
16 The scope of the exercise provided only limited involvement 17 of the cities even though they were invited to observe the 18 City of Morro Bay EOC as a test of the County -City 19 interface. [ Ness Tr. 12527-12528]
20 As pointed out by Mr. Shiffer [Shiffer Tr. 11834],
21 this was the first Diablo Canyon emergency exercise 22 integrated with local government authorities. Furthermore, 23 it was the first occasion to utilize the County draft plan 24 and procedures [Skidmora Tr. 11881] prior to their final 25 issuance. Joint Intervenors attempted to discredit the 26 ability of County government to respond in a timely manner
__ _ _ __. __. - . . . . - . . - . __ g
1 in activating the siren system. [ Ness Tr. 12486.] They 2 cited the fact that " General Emergency" was declared at 3 10:45 [Shiffer Tr. 11833] and approximately thirty seven 4 minutes later (allowing for a lunch break of about 5 thirty-five minutes [Shiffer, Tr. 11833]) activation of the 6 sirens was simulated (Shiffer, Tr. 11835]. This delay of 7 thirty seven minutes prior to simulated activation of the 8 sirens was later identified as an area needing improvement.
9 [Shiffer Tr. 11836.] This matter has been resolved by 10 revising the County Sheriff's SOP to require activation of 11 the Early Warning Syetem within 15 minutes of being notified 12 by PGandE of a general emergency at Diablo Canyon.
13 [Skidmore Tr. 11853; NRC Staff Exhibit 30.]
14 Planning Standard b(15) 15 Radiological emergency response training is provided tc those who may be called 16 on to assist in an emergency.
17 This planning standard is addressed in the 18 submitted written testimony of PGandE [ Panel #10, Testimony 19 following Tr. 12022, pp. 10-1 to 10-7], Mr. John W. Eldridge 20 [ Testimony following Tr. 12688, pp. 15 and 16] and Mr.
21 John R. Sears (Testimony following Tr. 12638, pp. 42-43].
22 Radiological training programs for both onsite and 23 offsite emergency response personnel are in place. PGandE 24 Programs are discussed in Section 8 of the PGandE Plan.
25 [PGandE Exhibit 73.] These programs include training and 26 drills for onsite workers as well as offsite personnel
- J
1 responding to the plant. PGandE has provided training to 2 medical, law enforcement, fire and other personnel having 3 offsite responsibilities. [Section 8 PGandE Exhibit 73.]
4 Additionally, PGandE, along with the County and 5 the State have provided radiological training for offsite 6 personnel responsible for radiological assessment and field 7 monitoring. The State and County radiological training 8 programs are discussed in Section V.J of the State Plan 9 [ Appendix C of PGandE Exhibit 73] and Section V.1 of the lo County Plan. [PGandE Exhibit 80.]
11 Mr. Eldridge stated that the first cycle of drills 12 and training was completed before the August 19, 1981 13 exercise and that the second cycle of training is under 14 development by the County, State, and PGandE. [Eldridge 15 testimony following Tr. 12688, pp. 15-16.]
16 Mr. Sears, stated that the radiological training 17 conforms to the criteria of this planning standard. [ Sears 18 testimony following Tr. 12638, pp. 42-43.]
19 Messrs. Kaefer and Skidmore testified that since 20 early June 1981 a training program has been in place for 21 County personnel. This includes both radiological training 22 as well as training on the County and State plans [Skidmore 23 Tr. 12023-12024, 12035]. Messrs. Kaefer, Keyworth, Serpa 24 and Skidmore testified that radiological training has been 25 Provided to local law enforcement agencies. [Kaefer, 26 Keyworth, Serpa and Skidmore Tr. 12025-12029.] Mr. Kaefer
_=._. .
1 also testified that radiological emergency training has been 2 Provided to fire officials and fire department personnel, 3 Caltrans, the American Red Cross, and California Department 4 cf Forestry (CDF). [Kaefer Tr. 12029, 12034-12035.] Mr.
5 Skidmore noted that radiological training is not required 6 for personnel not directly involved in field activities 7 (i.e., telephone operators, auto repair, etc.). [Skidmore 8 Tr. 12030-12031.] Mr. Skidmore went on to describe more 9 general training material for people not involved in field 10 activities such as mailings of information related to 11 radiation effects. [Skidmore Tr. 12035-12036.]
12 Finally, Ms. Mack testified that the radiological 13 training program objectives described in the State Plan are 14 in agreement with the criteria of NUREG-0654. [ Mack Tr.
15 12037-12038.] Mr. Skidmore, under cross-examination, 16 testified that PGandE has provided radiological emergency 17 training for emergency response organizations requesting 18 such training, and has committed to provide training for 19 such organizations lacking the resources to provide it.
20 [Skidmore Tr. 12047-12050.]
21 Planning Standard b(16) 22 Responsibilities for plan development and review and for distribution of 23 emergency plans are established, and planners are properly trained.
24 25 This standard is addressed in the written testi-26 mony of PGandE [ Panel #1 Testimony following Tr. 11778, pp.
- m. -. .. . . . . . . _
1 1-9 to 1-10] and the testimony of Mr. Sears of the NRC 2 [ Testimony following Tr. 12638, pgs. 43-45.] Responsibili-3 ties for plan development and review and for distribution of 4 emergency plans are addressed in Section 8 of the PGandE 5 Plan [PGandE Exhibit 73),Section V of the County Plan 6 [PGandE Exhibit 80] and Section V.K of the State Plan 7 [ Appendix C to PGandE Exhibit 73]. Emergency response 8 P l anner training is being provided through a combination of 9 industry and government sponsored or hosted programs and 10 courses which are regularly conducted on both a regional and 11 national basis. [ Panel #1 testimony following Tr. 11778, 12 PP. 1-9 to 1-10.] Mr. Sears stated PGandE's development, 13 Periodic review and distribution of emergency plans meet 14 this planning standard. [ Sears testimony following Tr.
15 12638, p. 45. ]
16 A program for handling changes and updates to the 17 Diablo Canyon Emergency Plan and implementing procedures as 18 controlled documents has been established. [Kaefer Tr.
19 11823 -
11825; Shiffer Tr. 11825; Keyworth Tr. 11896 -
20 11900.] Approved changes to the plan and implementing 21 Procedures including the updated draft County Plan, 22 Revision B will be handled as required by regulations.
23 [Skidmore Tr. 12777.] Rtvision B of the County Plan, which 24 includes the implementing procedures, received approval of l
25 the County Board of Supervisors on January 18, 1982.
26 ///
y, . ... . .,. ..
1 (MacElvaine Tr. 12239, 12256.] The County plan will be 2 issued as a change to the Diablo Canyon Emergency Plan.
3 Mr. Eldridge testified that FEMA primarily focused 4 on the content and substance of the County Plan since that 5 is where the primary responsibility for an emergency 6 response is assigned in the State of California. [Eldridge 7 Tr. 12710, 12745.] As a result, a detailed review of the 8 State plan was not required and its degree of completeness 9 is not significant relative to the implementing of the 10 county plan which is the basis for a finding of adequacy by 4
11 FEMA.
12 In spite of the incomplete status of the State 13 Plan, it was pointed out by Mr. Skidmore that a recent 14 addition to the State Plan (the Annex for the State Office 15 of Emergency Services) provided a significant contribution 16 to the State Plan potential for implementation. [Skidmore 17 Tr. 12765-12772.]
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21 22 23 24 25 26
1 Planning Standard c(2) 2 Generally, the plume exposure pathway EPZ for nuclear power plants shall 3 consist of an area about 10 miles (16 km) in radius and the ingestion 4 Pathway EPZ shall consist of an area about 50 miles (80 km) in radius. The 5 exact size and configuration of the EPZs surrounding a particular nuclear power 6 reactor shall be determined in relation to local emergency response needs and 7 capabilities as they are affected by such conditions as demography, topo-8 graphy, land characteristics, .gacess routes, and jur.tsoictional boundaries.
9 The size of the EPZs also a.y be deter-mined on a case-by-case basis for 10 gas-cooled nuclear reactors and for reactors with an authorized power level 11 less than 250 MW thermal. The plans for the ingestion pathway shall focus on 12 such actions as are appropriate to protect the food ingestion pathway.
13 14 These criteria are addressed in the submitted 15 written testimony of PGandE. [ Panel #11 Testimony following 16 Tr. 12078, pp. 11-1 to 11-5.]
17 The NRC has designated emergency planning zones 18 (EPZ) related to the plume exposure and ingestion pathways.
19 For the plume exposure EPZ, a zone of approximately a 20 ten-mile radius is specified. For the ingestion exposure 21 Pathway emergency planning zone, a zone of about 50 miles 22 radius is specified. As stated in NUREG-0396(p. 16), the 23 area of the EPZ was determined from the characteristics of a 24 spectrum of both design basis and class 9 accident (derived 25 from the WASH-1400 Reactor Safety Study) consequences.
26 [ Panel #11 Testimony following Tr. 12078, p. 11-2.]
]
1 The NRC concluded in NUREG-0396(p.24) that the 2 establishment of the 10 and 50-mile EPZs was sufficient for j 1
3 planning designated protective actions. The NRC also stated )
4 in NUREG-0396, (p. 17) that, at least in the case of the 5 10-mile EPZ, judgment should be used in adopting the 10-mile 6 distance based on characteristics of local conditions, such l l
7 as demography, topography, land characteristics, access 8 routes, and local jurisdictional boundaries. [ Panel #11 9 Testimony following Tr. 12078, p. 11-3.]
10 In developing the 10 and 50-mile EPZs, 11 conservative assumptions were used, involving a 12 straight-line Gaussian plume with constant direction of 13 transport (no wind shift) and plume dispersion based on 14 vertical temperature gradient. At the Diablo Canyon Power 15 Plant site, such assumptions are highly unrealistic. Tracer 16 studies (FSAR, appendix 2.3B) have indicated that local 17 conditions lead to a much greater degree of plume dilution 18 than assumed in the NRC/ EPA task force study. In the 19 quadrant northeast of the plant, a blocking action due to 20 the elevated terrain virtually eliminates transport beyond a 21 distance of a few miles from the plant. In addition, in 22 view of the relatively low incidence of precipitation 23 relative to that assumed by the NRC/ EPA task force, the 24 important effect of wet deposition is minimized in the i
25 vicinity of Diablo Canyon. All of these factors indicate 26 that the risk of exceeding protective action guides within a
1 10-mile radius of Diablo Canyon Power Plant is substantially 2 less than assumed by the NRC, especially in the quadrant 3 northeast of the plant. The 10-mile distance is perhaps 4 only appropriate in the northwest and southeast quadrants, 5 where transport paths would carry the plume along 6 trajectories roughly paralleling the coast line. [ Panel #11 7 Testimony following Tr. 12078, pp. 11-3, 11-4.]
8 The plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone 9 (EPZ) which has been identified by the State as the Basic 10 EPZ has been adopted for planning by PGandE and the County 11 and as such, encompasses the ten mile radius plume exposure 12 EPZ identified in 10 CFR 50.47. This is illustrated in the 13 PGandE Plan. [PGandE Exhibit '73. ]
14 For the ingestion pathway zone (IPZ), no 15 j usti fication exists for extending the 50-mile 16 recommendation of the NRC. Emergency response actions in 17 the IPZ are of a long term nature relative to the plume 18 exposure pathway EPZ. On that basis, PGandE and the State 19 have response programs in effect which are capable of 20 Providing adequate emergency response in the IPZ. [PGandE 21 Exhibit 73, Section 6.2, 7.3; County Plan, PGandE Exhibit 80 22 Section II .10; and State Plan PGandE Exhibit 73, Appendix C 23 Section V.D. ] In view of the site specific meteorology and 24 terrain, however, we conclude that the small portion of 25 Monterey County within the 50-mile zone can be eliminated 26 from planning coverage. We conclude that the ingestion EPZ
1 should corre.: pond to the portion of the 50-mile zone which 2 lies within San Luis Obispo and Santa Barbara counties, and 3 that no other counties need to be involved.
4 Messrs. Brunot, Shiffer, Skidmore, and Thuillier 5 testified that the EPZ used as the basis for emergency 6 Pl anning has considered jurisdictional boundaries. [Brunot, 7 Shiffer, Skidmore Tr. 12079-12083.]
8 Both Governor Brown and the Joint Intervenors 9 argued that the State of California emergency planning zones 10 should be followed in the proceedings. However, in this 11 Proceeding the NRC emergency planning zones are the 12 applicable zones. [Tr. 12541-12548.] Mr. Skidmore stated 13 that PGandE emergency planning met not only the NRC 14 requirements but those of the State. [Skidmore Tr.
15 11799-11802.] Mr. Eldridge confirmed that FEMA only 16 considers the federal emergency planning zone criteria 17 appropriat.. Therefore, plume exposure pathway emergency 18 Planning is not necessary nor required in Santa Barbara 19 County, and for the ingestion pathway, only coordination 20 Pl anning between Santa Barbara County and the State is 21 necessary. [Eldridge Tr. 12722-12723.]
22 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 23 The Board has considered all documentary and oral 24 evidence presented by the respective parties on the 25 contentions raised by the intervenors and those contentions 26 which the Commission directed for consideration. Based upon
1 a review of the entire record in this proceeding and the 2 Proposed findings of fact, the Board concludes as follows:
3 (a) Construction of the facility has been 4 substantially completed in conformity with the construction 5 permit and application as amended, the provisions of the 6 Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the rules and 7 regulations of the Commission; and 8 (b) The facility will operate in conformity with 9 the application as amended, the provisions of the Act, and 10 the rules and regulations of the Commission; and 11 (c) There is reasonable assurance (i) that the 12 activities authorized by the operating license can be 13 conducted without endangering the health and safety of the 14 public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in 15 compliance with the Commission's regulations; and 16 (d) PGandE is technically and financially 17 qualified to engage in the activities authorized by this is license in accordance with the Commission's regulations; and 19 (e) The applicable provisions of 10 C.F.R. Part 20 140 will be satisfied prior to these authorized activities; 21 and 22 (f) The issuance of this operating license will 23 not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the 24 health and sefety of the public.
25 Wherefore, It Is Ordered in accordance with the 26 Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the Commission's
'= - - - "
r r_r__~_r_-_ _"1ri_r_:__'_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ -
1 regulations, and based on the findings and conclusions set l
2 forth herein, that the Director of Nuclear Reactor 3 Regulation is authorized to issue a license, consistent with 4 the terms of this decision authorizing full term, full power j 5 operation.
6 It Is Further Ordered, in accordance with Sections 7 2.760, 2.762, 2.764, 2.785 and 2.786 of the Commission's 8 Rules of Practice, that this Decision shall not become 9 effective until 10 days from the date this decision is 10 transmitted to the Commission and shall constitute the final 11 action of the Commission subject to remain thereof under the 12 above-cited rules. Exceptions to this Decision may be filed 13 by any party within 10 days after the service of this 14 Decision. A brief in support of the exceptions shall be 15 filed within 30 days thereafter (40 days in the case of the 16 staff). Within 30 days after the service of this brief of 17 the appellant (40 days in the case of the staff), any other is ///
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21 22 23 24 25 26
.~. -...ne 3- -- .
1 Party may file a brief in support of, or in opposition to, 2 the exceptions.
3 Respectfully submitted, 4 MALCOLM H. FURBUSH PHILIP A. CRANE, JR.
5 RICHARD F. LOCKE Pacific Cas and Electric Company 6 P. O. Box 7442 San Francisco, California 94120 7 (415) 781-4211 a ARTHUR C. GEHR Snell & Wilmer 9 3100 Valley Bank Center Phoenix, Arizona 85073 10 (602) 257-7288 11 BRUCE NORTON Norton, Burke, Berry & French, P.C.
12 3216 N. Third Street Suite 300 13 Phoenix, Arizona 85012-2699 (602) 264-0033 14 Attorneys for 15 Pacific Gas and Electric Company 16 By 18 F RICHARD F. LOCKE 19 20 Dated: February 25, 1982 21 22 23 24 25 26 U )
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
- . NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION e
In the* Matter of )
)-
PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY ) Docket'No. 50-275
) Docket No. 50-323 Dichlo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, )
Unito 1 and 2 )
) .
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .
The foregoing document (49 of Pacific Gas and Electric Company hno (hara$ been served today on the following by deposit in the United States mail, properly stamped and. addressed:
Judge John F. Wolf Mrs. Sandra A. Silver Chairman N 1760 Alisal Street Atomic Safety and Licensing Board San Luis Obispo, California 93401 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Wachington, D. C. 20555 Mr. Gordon Silver 1760 Alisal Street San Luis Obispo, California 93401 Judga Glenn O. Bright Atomic Safety and Licensing Board John Phillips, Esq.
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Joel Reynolds, Esq.
W2chington, D. C. 20555 Center for Law in the Public Interest Pico Boulevard - Suite 300
~
Judge Jerry R. Kline 10951 W.
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Los Angeles, California 90064 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission David F. Fleischaker, Esq.
Wnchington, D. C. 20555 P. O. Box 1178 Oklahoma City Mrc. Elizabeth Apfelberg C/o Nancy Culver Oklahoma 73101 192 Luneta Drive Arthur C. Gehr, Esq.
Snn Luis Obispo, California 93401 Snell & Wilmer Jnnice E. Kerr, Esq.
3100 Valley Bank Center Phoenix, Arizona 85073 Dublic Utilities Commission of the State of California Bruce Norton, Esq.
5246 State Building Norton, Burke, Berry & French, P.C.
350 McAllister Street 3216 N. Third Street San Francisco, California 94102 Suite 300 Phoenix, Arizona 85012-2699 Mro. Raye Fleming 1920 Mattie Road Chairman Shall Beach, California 93449 Atomic Safety and Licensing Mr. Frederick Eissler Board Panel U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Sesnic Shoreline Preservation Washington, D. C. 20555 Conference, Inc.
4623 More Mesa Drive Santa Barbara, California 93105 m _
j
.s Judge Thomas S. Moore Chnirman Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Atomic Safety and Licensing Appsal Panel Appee.1 Board
- U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
. Wachington, D. C. 20555 Washington, D. C. 20555 Secretary Judge W. Reed Johnson U. S. Nuclear Regula, tory Commission Atomic Safety and Licensing W2shington, D. C. 20555 Appeal Board Docketing and Service Section U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn.: Washington, D. C. 20555
.Willitm J. Olmstead, Esq.
Crtdley W. Jones, Esq. Judge John H. Buck Atomic Safety and Licensing Office of Executive Legal Director Appeal Board
.DETH 042 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission lU. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission washington, D. C. 20555 Wachington, D. C. 20555
- Mr. Richard B. Hubbard MHB Technical Associates 1723 Hamilton Avenue, Suite K Sin Jose, California 95125 lMr. Carl Neiberger Talcoram Tribune ,
P. O. Box 112 S2n Luis Obispo, California 93402 l l
'Harbert H. Brown, Esq.
L wrence Coe Lanpher, Esq.
Christopher B. Hanback, Esq. ;
Kirkpatrick, Lockhart, Hill, I Christopher & Phillips 1900 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20036 Byron S. Georgiou, Esq.
- Lcgni Affairs Secretary
' Governor's Office Stcte Capitol Sncramento, California 95814 e
s P
/0 '*
lip A. Crane, Jr.
/ j l
Attorney Pacific Gas and Electric Company l
Date February 25, 1982 l
y