ML20054B825
| ML20054B825 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 04/12/1982 |
| From: | Locke R PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8204190232 | |
| Download: ML20054B825 (40) | |
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BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING B ARD
u ;_ 4' In the Matter of )
) Docket No. 50-275 0.L.
PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-323 0.L.
Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant )
Units Nos. 1 and 2 ) (Full Power Proceeding) i RESPONSE OF PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY TO JOINT INTERVENORS' AND GOVERNOR BROWN'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW April 12, 1982 l
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8204190232 820412 PDR ADOCK 05900275 G PDR
1 TABLE OF CONTENTS 2
3 Page 4 I INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 5 II Contention 10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 6 III Contention 12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 7 IV Contention 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 8 A. The Adequacy Of The FEMA Findings . . . . 9 9 B. Emergency Planning Standards . . . . . . . 15 10 S 10 CFR 50.47(b)(1) . . . . . . . . . . . 15 11 s 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2) . . . . . . . . . . . 16 12 9 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3) . . . . . . . . . . . 18 13 S 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) . . . . . . . . . . . 18 14 S 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5) . . . . . . . . . . . 19 15 s 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6) . . . . . . . . . . . 20 16 $ 10 CFR 50.47(b)(7) . . . . . . . . . . . 22 17 5 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8) . . . . . . . . . . . 23 18 S 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9) . . . . . . . . . . . 24 19 5 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10) . . . . . . . . . . 25 20 9 10 CFR 50.47(b)(11) . . . . . . . . . . 31 21 6 10 CFR 50.47(b)(12) . . . . . . . . . . 32 22 9 10 CFR 50.47(b)(13) . . . . . . . . . . 32 23 $ 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14) . . . . . . . . . . 33 24 6 10 CFR 50.47(b)(15) . . . . . . . . . . 34 25 5 10 CFR 50.47(b)(16) . . . . . . . . . . 34 26 V CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
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l 1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA '
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 2
3 4 BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD 5
6 In the Matter of )
) Docket No. 50-275 O.L.
7 PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-323 0.L.
Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant )
8 Units Nos. 1 and 2 ) (Full Power Proceeding) 9 10 11 RESPONSE OF PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY TO JOINT INTERVENORS' AND GOVERNOR BROWN'S 12 PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 13 14 15 I 16 INTRODUCTION 17 After hearings on Pacific Gas and Electric 18 Company's ("PGandE") application for a full power operating 19 for its Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant were held from 20 January 19 through January 26, 1982, PGandE filed its 21 Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on 22 February 26, 1982. On March 19, 1982 the Joint Intervenors 23 and Governor Brown filed their respective Proposed Findings 24 ///
25 ///
26 ///
L 1 and Conclusions. The NRC Staff filed its Proposed Findings 2 and Conclusions on March 29, 1982. 1/
3 4 II 5 Contention 10 - Pressurizer Heaters 6 In paragraph 47 of the Joint Intervenors' Proposed 7 Findings of Fact [J.I. Findings] and paragraph 10 2/ of 8 Governor Brown's Proposed Findings of Fact (G.B. Findings]
9 reference is made to a recommendation by a unit of the NRC 10 Staff that the pressurizer heaters should be classified as 11 safety grade. However, this recommendation was not adopted 12 by the NRC in NUREG-0737, which is the only document in 13 which the Commission has given its approval for post-TMI 14 implementation items. [Tr. 11656.]
15 Paragraphs 48-51 of J.I. Findings and Paragraphs 2 16 through 8 of the G.B. Findings describe the function of the 17 pressurizer heaters in maintaining natural circulation.
18 However, both the NRC Staff witness and the PGandE witnesses 19 20 1/ PGandE has reviewed the Staff's Proposed Findings and Conclusions and, except as noted, is in substantial 21 agreement with them. The Staff's brief sets forth lengthy arguments refuting the legal and factual argu-22 ments made by the Joint Intervenors and Governor Brown.
PGandE will attempt to restrict its responses which in 23 almost all respects agree with the Staff's position.
However, we believe it important to place our response 24 on the record even though it repeats many of the argu-ments and conclusions reached by the Staff.
25
~2/ Governor Brown's findings and this contention are on 26 pages 49-56 of his Proposed Findings of Fact.
1 testified that the pressurizer heaters are not the only 2 means of maintaining natural circulation of Diablo Canyon.
3 [Hoch-Young testimony following Tr. 11550, p. 2; Jensen 4 testimony following Tr. 11621, pp. 3, 4; Tr. 11562, 11567.]
5 In support of its position PGandE and the NRC Staff cited 6 test data from the Sequoyah facility. Joint Intervenors and 7 Governor Brown fault the citation of this test data but the 8 Staff witness testified that he knew of no differences in 9 the facilities that would make the sequoyah data 10 inapplicable to Diablo Canyon. [Tr. 11641.] Further in 11 reviewing these tests it is not necessary to assume the 12 complications of a TMI-type accident because the heaters are 13 not required following such an accident. The Joint 14 Intervenors and Governor Brown also allege that PGandE 15 operating procedures fail to direct the operators what to do 16 if the heaters became unavailable. PGandE witnesses 17 testified that in such event the operators' general training 18 would tell them what to do and that there are procedures 19 available covering alternate methods of controlling i
20 pressure. [Tr. 11558, 11664, 11583, 11584.] It was also 21 pointed out that extensive cross-referencing between various 22 procedures would produce a document so lengthy as probably 23 to be unworkable. [Tr. 11580.]
24 In paragraph 52 of the J.I. Findings and 25 paragraph 6 of the G.B. Findings criticism is directed at 1
26 the method utilized by PGandE to transfer some of the
1 heaters to the on-site emergency power system. However, the 2 NRC Staff has approved this method because it permits 3 emergency power to be supplied to the heaters well within 4 the one-hour limit recommended by Westinghouse to meet the 5 applicable portion of NUREG-0737. [ Staff Ex. 25, SER Supp.
6 14, p. 2-21.] 3/
7 In Paragraphs 53 through 57 of the J.I. Findings 8 and 9 through 12 in the G.B. Findings reference is made to 9 the fact that the pressurizer heaters are not seismically 10 qualified and otherwise not qualified as safety-related.
11 However, the heaters are not required to be so qualified 12 because operation of the heaters is not required to provide 13 any of the safety functions identified in Section III .C of 14 Appendix A to 10 CFR 100. [Jensen testimony following Tr.
15 11621, p. 7; Hoch-Young testimony following Tr. 11550, 16 pp. 2, 3; Tr. 11558, 11559, 11568, 11569, 11647, 11648.]
17 ///
18 ///
19 ///
20 21 22 3/ In footnote 19, page 52, Governor Brown alleges that it is not common to connect a safety grade power supply to 23 non-safety grade equipment. However, PGandE witness Young explained the conditions under which such a 24 connection is permitted, and that such conditions exist at Diablo Canyon. [Tr. 11576, 11577.] Further, 25 NUREG-0737 requires that the heaters be connected to the emergency power supply. [Hoch-Young testimony 26 following Tr. 11550, p. 3.]
o 1 III 2 Contention 12 - Valves 3 Paragraph 61 of the J.I. Findings states that the 4 power operated relief valves (PORVs) and block valves, 5 together with their instruments and controls, chould be 6 classified as safety-related. Although in fact two of the 7 PORVs and the three block valves are so classified, such 8 classification is not required by the NRC because the valves 9 do not perform any of the critical functions identified in 10 the defi nition of safety related systems and components.
11 [Hoch-Crawford testimony following Tr. 11590, p. 4, Jensen 12 testimony following Tr. 11621, pp. 9, 12, 14.]
13 Paragraph 62 of the J.I. Findings discusses the '
14 TMI accident. However, that reactor had only one PORV so it 15 is not comparable to Diablo Canyon. [Tr. 11594.]
16 Paragraph 63 contains a reference to a Staff 17 report recommending that the relief and block valves be i 18 re-evaluated for safety grade classification. As with the 19 pressurizer heaters, this recommendation was not adopted by 20 the Commission in NUREG-0737.
~
l l 21 With regard to the seismic qualification of these 22 valves [J.I. Findings, paragraph 64], they were considered 23 by PGandE to be seismically qualified. PGandE is reviewing 24 this qualification and has committed itself to take whatever 25 steps are necessary to maintain qualification of the valves.
26 [PGandE letter 2/24/82; Board Notification PNO-V-82-09. ]
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1 In paragraph 65 [G.B. Findings, paragraph 2] 4j 2 Joint Intervenors list a number of functions of the valves 3 of alleged safety significance. Only the first two of these 4 functions are safety-related and, of these, only the second 5 (low temperature overpressurization) relates to an active 6 function of the PORVs. [Bridenbaugh-Minor testimony 7 following Tr. 11671, pp. 4, 5; Tr. 11599-11600.] Two of the 8 three PORVs are qualifed to perform that function. [Tr.
9 11607.] The first function listed is a passive function and i 10 all PORVs and block valves are qualified to perform it since 11 their valve bodies are safety-grade. [Hoch-Crawford 12 testimony following Tr. 11590, pp. 4, 5.] Further, since 13 the valves are designed to open and relieve pressure the 14 opening of a valve is not a violation of the reactor system 15 pressure boundary. [Tr. 11638.] 5/
16 In paragraph 66 [G.B. Findings, paragraph 6] Joint 17 Intervenors argue that procedures and the technical 18 specifications should differentiate between the safety-grade l 19 and non-safety-grade valves. However, the only function the 20 non-safety-grade valve cannot perform is low temperature 21 ///
t 22 4/ Governor Brown's valve findings are set forth in pages 23 56-61 of his Proposed Findings.
24 Sj Governor Brown in paragraph 3 of his findings attempts to make the additional point that PORVs reduce chal-25 lenges to safety valves. However, this is not a safe-ty-related function. [Bridenbaugh-Minor testimony 26 following Tr. 11671, pp. 4, 5; Tr. 11600.]
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1 overpressure protection, which is an automatic function.
2 [Tr. 11607.] 6/ In any event the operators are given 3 training as to which of the PORVs are safety-grade and which 4 one is not. [Tr. 11607.]
5 In paragraph 67 Joint Intervenors allege that the 6 addition of a non-qualified PORV creates additional failure 7 points. However, if this valve fails closed its function 8 may be performed by either of the other two valves. If the 9 valve fails open it may be isolated by its block valve, 10 which is safety-grade. These valves and their control 11 circuitry have been designed so that no credible failure 12 mode associated with the non-safety grade components of the 13 third PORV's control system would adversely affect the 14 function of any safety-grade components. In addition, an 13, unisolated stuck-open PORV during a design basis accident 16 considered in the FSAR would not result in core damage, as 17 ' demonstrated by analyses contained in Chapter 15 of the FSAR l
l 18 and WCAP-9601. Therefore, the consequences of failure of 19 the third PORV in either the closed or the open position 20 during design basis accidents considered in the FSAR have 21 y/f i 22 l 6f In paragraph 8 of his Proposed Findings, Governor Brown l 23 discusses low-temperature over-pressurization protec-tion. The reason the two PORVs were made safety-grade 24 was to provide this protection, and this design was accepted by the Staff. There are no current require-25 l ments for the PORVs to provide this protection for the I first fuel cycle. [Jensen testimony following Tr.
26 11621, p. 9; Tr. 11609, 11649-11651.]
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1 been shown by analysis to be insignificant. [Hoch-Crawford 2 testimony following Tr. 11590, pp. 6, 7.]
3 Next, Joint Intervenors state that the accident 4 analyses relied upon by PGandE and the Staff are inadequate.
5 [J.I. Findings, paragraph 68.] 2/ In addition to the 6 argument advanced in paragraph 7 PGandE's evidence showed 7 that all three PORVs and their associated block valves could 8 fail open without core uncovery and assuming no operator 9 action rather than no incorrect operator action. [ Burns et 10 al., testimony following Tr. 11590, p. 11; Tr. 11597, 11614, 11 11615, 11639.]
12 Paragraph 69 of the J.I. Findings and paragraph 5 13 of the Brown Findings concern the EPRI Test Program.
14 Details of the results of the test program to date were 15 presented at the hearing. The results of these tests and 16 plant specific analyses are scheduled to be documented by 17 EPRI and the various utilities by July 1, 1982 and PGandE 18 plans to meet this deadline. [Hoch-Crawford testimony 19 following Tr. 11590, pp. 7, 8; Tr. 11598.] 8/
20 ///
21 1/ Brown Findings, paragraph 4.
8_/ In paragraph 7 of his proposed findings, Governor Brown 23 alleges that a block valve manufactured by Velan "the same model as utilized at Diablo Canyon, has failed."
24 However, the testimony was that the valve failed to
" meet design specifications." [ Burns et al., testimony 25 following Tr. 11590, p. 14; Tr. 11617.] In any event that valve has a smaller operator than the equivalent 26 Diablo Canyon valve. [Tr. 11618.]
1 IV 2 Contention 1 - Emergency Planning 3 A. The Adequacy Of The FEMA Findings 4 Joint Intervenors and Governor Brown have raised 5 several questions regarding the legal adequacy of the FEMA 6 findings. First, they question the use of " interim 7 findings" and the level of review conducted by FEMA. Next, 8 they question whether the FEMA finding of " reasonable 9 assurance" can be made given the state of development of the 10 offsite emergency plans for Diablo Canyon. Finally, they 11 question the EPZ designation for Diablo Canyon and the 12 effects of earthquakes on emergency planning. These matters 13 are discussed seriatim.
14 The NRC in making its determination on the 15 adequacy of offsite emergency preparedness relies on the 16 Federal Emergency Management Agency (" FEMA") findings and 17 determination whether " state and local emergency plans are 18 adequate and capable of being implemented. . ." 10 CFR 50.47 19 (a)(2). The rule goes on to state that ". . .a FEMA finding 20 will constitute a rebuttable presumption on a question of 21 adequacy." 10 CFR 50.47 (a)(2). In order to facilitate this 22 Process, NRC and FEMA entered into a " Memorandum of 23 Understanding Between NRC and FEMA Relating to Radiological 24 Emergency Planning and Preparedness" ("MOU") on 25 November 4, 1980, which provided that FEMA could furnish to 26 the NRC interim findings and determinations for use in the
1 NRC licensing process notwithstanding the status of the FEMA 2 review and approval of state and local plans pursuant to the 3 FEMA rules contained in 44 CFR Part 350. (45 Fed. Reg.
4 82713).
5 In conformity with the MOU, FEMA issued its 6 interim findings in a November 2, 1981, report and 7 November 17, 1981, Memorandum stating that, with the 8 completion of 12 corrective actions relating to seven of the
" ...an adequate 9 16 planning standards in 10 CFR 50.47 (b),
10 level of emergency preparedness will exist in San Luis 11 Obispo County." [ Attachment 3 to PGandE Panel #1 Testimony, 12 TR. 11782.] FEMA further noted that the cited corrective 13 actions were "primarily administrative in nature" and should 14 not preclude "the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board from 15 making a finding of reasonable assurance of adequate offsite 16 preparedness capability at this time." [ Staff Exhibit 35.]
17 Governor Brown and Joint Intervenors argue that 18 since the State plan has not been finalized or formally 19 reviewed by FEMA, no FEMA finding can be made at this time 20 and, hence, consideration of emergency planning adequacy at 21 this time is premature. However, as noted above this 22 position is inconsistent with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.47 23 and the 1980 FEMA /NRC MOU. A corollary to this argument is 24 the assertion that the FEMA finding is incomplete since 25 there is no specific finding or evidence on the adequacy of 26 the State Plan and whether it is capable of being
1 implemented. However, the Governor and Joint Intervenors 2 refuse to recognize that in California the primary 3 responsibility for emergency response planning and execution 4 is at the county level not the state level. For that 5 reason, the FEMA review naturally concentrated on the County 6 Plan. Further, the record does reflect that FEMA did 7 review, and is cognizant of, state preparedness in the two 8 areas -- reentry and recovery and ingestion pathway sampling 9 and interdiction --
where the State is primarily 10 responsible. [Eldridge, TR. 12709].
11 The final argument with regard to the FEMA 12 findings on the adequacy of the county plans rests on the 13 contention that the May 1981 rather than the October 1981 14 County Plan was the Plan upon which the FEMA findings are 15 based. Once again, the Governor and Joint Intervenors 16 misunderstand the nature of the emergency review process 17 which is basically an ongoing and constantly evolving 18 process of plan development, review, and revision. Thus, it 19 is the nature of the process that plans will be changed in 20 response to reviews, critiques, and drills and exercises.
21 This is such a case. The FEMA findings confirm that the 22 current level of preparedness is sufficient. In fact, the j
23 FEMA review takes cognizance of this evolving process up to 24 and including the October 1981 County Plan as well as the 25 corrective actions scheduled to be completed by 26 June 20, 1982. [Eldridge, Tr. 12710, Staff Ex. 35.]
l l
1 1 Accordingly, the FEMA findings do support a finding that 2 state and local plans are adequate and capable of being 3 implemented.
4 Central to intervenors' arguments throughout their 5 briefs is the concept that all emergency planning and 6 preparedness criteria can and must be 100 percent satisfied 7 before the requisite approvals by this board can assue.
8 Notwithstanding the technical and administrative 9 impossibilities that intervenors' position yield, the 10 regulations clearly require no such showing. Instead a 11 standard of " reasonable assurance" is provided in 10 CFR 12 50.47(a)(1). More specifically, the Commission recognized 13 that there will be deficiencies and provided guidance that 14 "the Commission will examine State plans, local plans, and 15 licensee plans to determine whether features of one plan can 16 compensate for deficiencies in another plan." [45 Fed. Reg.
17 55403, August 19, 1980.] It is precisely this situation 18 existing at Diablo Canyon, where deficiencies in the State 19 of California Plan are compensated by SLO County and PGandE 20 plans, recognizing the limited role the State has in 21 emergency response.
22 Also, at odds with intervenors' position that 100 23 percent compliance with 100 percent of the 100 percent 24 literally construed criteria is required, is the recent 25 proposed rule dealing with exercises. [46 Fed. Reg. 61134-5 26 December 15, 1981.] In its statement of consideration, the
1 Commission proposes clarification of 10 CFR 50.47(a)(1) to 2 the effect "that findings on emergency planning required 3 prior to license issuance are predictive in nature and do 4 not need to reflect the actual state of preparedness at the 5 time the finding is made." Here, again, the situation at 6 Diablo Canyon is one where all parties are actively pursuing 7 improvements in preparedness. All reviewing authorities are 8 satisfied with the current levels, but recognize more will 9 be accomplished in the near future. NRC staff inspection 10 and enforcement actions, as well as FEMA interaction with 11 State and local emergency planning agencies assure that the 12 actual level of preparedness remains adequate. 9/
13 Governor Brown and Joint Intervenors also argue 14 that the State-adopted Basic Emergency Planning Zones (BEPZ) 15 and Extended Emergency Planning Zones (EEPZ) which extend 16 into Santa Barbara County are the appropriate and required 17 zones for consideration in this proceeding. These zones 18 extend far beyond the NRC required 10 and 50 mile zones of 19 ///
20 21 9/ Contrary to Staff's proposed Conclusion 3 (Staff Findings p. 141), applicant sees no need, nor basis to 22 require certification to this Licensing Board that FEMA corrective actions are completed prior to issuance of a 23 full power license. The Licensing Board findings on emergency preparedness are necessarily predictive [46 24 Fed. Reg. 61134-5, December 15, 1981] and NRC Staff has sufficient enforcement authority to assure satisfactory 25 completion of necessary corrective actions prior to full power operation even after such license issues.
26 [ Grimes, Tr. 12652.]
1 10 CFR 50.47 which were adopted from the joint NRC/ EPA 2 report, " Planning Basis for Development of State and Local 3 Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support 4 of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants," NUREG-0396 - EPA 5 520/1-78-016, December 1978.
6 We view this argument as nothing more than a 7 direct attack on a regulatory requirement (10 CFR 50.47 (c) 8 (2)) adopted after a formal rulemaking proceeding. While 9 the rule does allow that the exact size and characteristics 10 of the EPZ may be determined on a case-by-case basis, it is 11 abundantly clear that the EPZ cannot be made substantially 12 larger or smaller Metropolitan Edison Company, Docket 13 No. 50-289-SP. (Three Mile Island, Unit 1, Restart, 14 December 14, 1981.) In this case the State BEPZ extends in 15 excess of 20 miles to the southeast of the Diablo Canyon 16 Plant. This new zone clearly is not an adjustment based 17 upon local demography, topography, land characteristics, 18 access routes, and jurisdictional boundaries as demonstrated 19 in 10 CFR 50.47 (c)(2). In our view, the proper zones to be 20 used in this proceeding are those set in the 10 CFR 50.47 21 (c)(2). M/
j 22 Finally, Joint Intervenors and Governor Brown urge 23 again that the emergency response planning for Diablo Canyon 24 25 -10/ We note that neither Joint Intervenors nor Governor Brown presented expert testimony to justify this major 26 enlargement of the zone.
l
1 must take into account the effects of earthquakes. This 2 Board ruled on December 23, 1981, that it had no 3 jurisdiction to consider the impacts on emergency planning 4 of earthquakes which cause or occur during an accidental 5 release based upon the Commission's holding in the San 6 Onofre case (CLI-81-33, December 8, 1981). The Board 7 continues to hold that the Commission's action precludes 8 consideration of this factor in this proceeding.
9 10 B. Emergency Planning Standards 11 5 10 CFR 50.47(b)(1) - Assignment of Responsibility 12 Joint Intervenors' Proposed Findings of Fact (pp.
13 34 and 35) argue that assignment of primary responsibility 14 has not been made for counties other than San Luis Obispo 15 (SLO), State and local plans contain no letters of 16 agreement, standard operating procedures are incomplete; the 17 State plan is not in compliance with NUREG-0654; and local 18 jurisdictions have not approved the SLO County Plan. Joint 19 Intervenors fail to recognize that the organizations which 20 must be included in this planning standard are those within 21 the Federally defined EPZs and not those within the State 22 defined EPZs. Additionally, Joint Intervenors continue to 23 expect that all emergency planning activities must be 24 totally finished to meet these regulations. Clearly the 25 regulatory standard recognizes that certain activities would 26 be ongoing. [10 CFR 50.47(a)(1).]
1 More specifically, regarding letters of agreement, 2 Joint Intervenors ignore the testimony that planning 3 documents are, themselves, the " agreement instrument" in 4 many instances. [ Potter, Tr. 11804.] Also, the letters of 5 agreement for SLO County Plan are not important to the plan.
6 [ Ness, Tr. 12458.]
7 While all SLO County SOPS were not complete at the 8 time of the hearing, those within the 10 mile EPZ were 9 complete. [ Ness, Tr. 12559-61.] Furthermore, Joint 10 Intervenors misconstrue the testimony relating to approval 11 of the SLO County Plan or procedures by local jurisdictions 12 since no such sign off or approval is needed [ Ness, Tr.
13 12459-63] and the County has sufficient powers to implement 14 emergency response without local jurisdictions cooperation.
15 [ Ness, Tr. 12563-4.]
16 Joint Intervenors have argued that the State plan 17 is not in compliance with applicable regulations, but fail 18 to reflect the improvements in State planning [PGandE Ex.
19 85] or FEMA testimony that given the limited role of the 20 State in emergency response, sufficient planning has been 21 performed. [Eldridge, Tr. 12709.]
22 23 6 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2) - On-Site Emergency Organization 24 Both Governor Brown [G.B. Findings pp. 30-32] and 25 Joint Interv6nors [J.I. Findings pp. 35-36] argue that 26 PGandE's failure to strictly meet NUREG-0654's " goal" of i
1 timely augmentation of staff in case of an emergency is a 2 fatal flaw. Table B-1 of NUREG-0654 sets, as a goal, the 3 operator of a facility be able to bring to the site 11 4 people within 30 minutes and an additional 15 people within 5 60 minutes. Under normal workday conditions, PGandE can 6 meet both augmentation goals. [Tr. 11,827.] However, 7 because of the remote location of the site, PGandE can not, 8 at all times, meet the goal of having 11 people at the site 9 within 30 minutes although it can provide more than 26 (11 10 plus 15) additional people within 60 minutes. [SER Supp. 14 11 at B-2.] As set forth supra at p. 12, Governor Brown and 12 Joint Intervenors seemingly argue that 100% compliance with 13 100% of the 100% literally construed statutes, regulations, 14 regulatory guides, memos of understanding, and now " goals" 15 is necessary to provide " reasonable assurance that adequate 16 protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a 17 radiological emergency." [10 C.F.R. S 50.47(a)(1).] The 18 benefits of a " remote location" in the event of a 19 radiological emergency are self-evident. Obviously that 20 same beneficial remoteness is not without some 21 countervailing results such as the length of time for people 22 to travel from population centers to the site. It is 23 precisely these minor paradoxes which lead to words such as 24 " reasonable" and " goals" in regulations and regulatory 25 guides -- words Governor Brown and Joint Intervenors fail to 26 recognize as existent.
1 $ 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3) - Emergency Response Support and 2 Resources 3 Joint Intervenors argue deficiencies in State and 4 local planning using many of the same basis discussed above; 5 namely, the lack of letters of agreement, omissions in the 6 State Plan; the incomplete status of plans for jurisdictions 7 outside the Federally defined EPZ; and that certain SOPS 8 were still in preparation for local jurisdictions outside 9 the Federal but within the State BEPZ. These arguments are 10 deficient for the reasons discussed above.
11 Typical of Joint Intervenors frequent misstatement 12 of the evidence is their allegation that Joint Intervenors' 13 witness Erikson testified [J.I. Findings p. 37 citing 14 Erikson at p. 8] that emergency workers will not move into 15 the danger zone if asked to do so. The Licensing Board 16 specifically questioned Dr. Erikson regarding this 17 testimony, from which he quickly retreated [Tr. 12,422-5]
18 indicating that he had no data or other basis to support his 19 statements.
20 21 5 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) - Emergency Classification System 22 Joint Intervenors arguments are a total miscon-23 struction of the record, since in both instances [J.I.
24 p. 37] these perceived deficiencies had been corrected.
25 [ Staff's Ex. 30, MacElvaine, Tr. 12257-8, Sears, Tr.
26 12634-5, Grimes Tr. 12656-7, Sears, Tr. 12660-7.]
1 6 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5) - Notification Methods and Procedures 2 Joint Intervenors allege a number of deficiencies 3 in planning which are not supported by references to the 4 record, pertain to State planning zones not Federal planning 5 zones, or are not specified in regulatory criteria.
6 [Specifically items 3, 7, 8, 10, 11 and 12 of J.I. Findings 7 pp. 37-40.] They again reiterate deficiencies in the State 8 plan without any showing of significance or recognition of 9 the update to J.I. Ex. 120 contained in PGandE Ex. 85.
10 Joint Intervenors argue that " cascade or 11 sequential warning system" for county workers is 12 inconsistent with regulatory requirements, however, the 13 _
applicable requirement [ Appendix 3 to NUREG-0654] does not 14 pertain to internal notification of personnel within an 15 organization. Thus, since the SLO County Plan does require 16 all key personnel at the second level to be notified by the 17 initial warning point [PGandE Ex. 80, Attachment II.2-1] the 18 applicable requirement is satisfied.
19 All other Joint Intervenors' arguments pertain to 20 the adequacy of the Early Warning System, specifically that 21 its capability has not been demonstrated and that it may not 22 be adequate for alerting 100% of the population including 23 the deaf and people in large structures. While the EWS is 24 fully constructed [ Sears, Tr. 12638 at p. 17], local 25 permitting restrictions require that the EWS not be tested 26 until August 1982. However, full power operation will be l
l i
1 after this date and therefore earlier testing is not 2 necessarily required. Regarding the adequacy of the EWS for 3 alerting people located in large structures or the deaf, 4 NUREG-0654 [ Appendix 3 p. 3-3 and 3-8] specifically 5 addresses these special situations and the EWS is designed 6 to meet these requirements. [PGandE Ex. 73, Section 7.]
7 8 5 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6) - Emergency Communications 9 Both Governor Brown [G.B. Finding pp. 4, 22-29]
10 and Joint Intervenors [J.I. Finding pp. 32-34, 40-43] argue 11 that the communication systems of San Luis Obispo County are 12 inadequate. The primary basis upon which both parties mount 13 this attack is the " County of San Luis Obispo Department of 14 Technical Services Five Year Communications Plan," dated 15 January 1982. [G.B. Ex. 10.] Both parties repeatedly quote 16 the report as " proof" that communications facilities in San 17 Luis Obispo County are inadequate to provide reasonable 18 assurance that protective measures will be taken in the 19 event of a radiological emergency. The argument and, more l
20 importantly, the " evidence" is seriously flawed. Brown 21 Exhibit 10 was sponsored by a Mr. Richter, Director of the 22 County Department of Technical Services, who testified that i 23 the document was prepared under his direction and that the 24 conclusions and recommendations (of the report) were true 25 and correct. [Tr. 12682.] That is all to which he 26 testified. He was not qualified as an expert in 1
1 communications, emergency planning, radiological 2 emergencies, or in any other aspect relating to this 3 hearing. He offered no testimony whatsoever on the 4 significance of the document as respects emergency planning 5 in the event of a radiological emergency at Diablo Canyon.
6 That testimony was never brought forward at hearing in this 7 matter. Counsel for Joint Intervenors and Governor Brown 8 now attempt, in their pleadings, to so testify. It is 9 respectfully submitted that such testimony, if it could ever 10 have been adduced, should have been provided by qualified 11 witnesses at hearing. Counsel are neither qualified, under 12 oath, nor available for cross-examination.
13 Governor Brown and Joint Intervenors have once 14 again, and not surprisingly, found some aspect that is less 15 than perfect. What they have failed to do is set forth 16 evidence by expert testimony or show by law that a perfect 17 communications system is necessary or required. What they 18 have ignored is the evidence adduced through qualified 19 expert witnesses at hearing that dealt with communications 20 and equipment necessary to deal with a radiological 21 emergency. [See PGandE proposed findings at 42-43, Staff 22 Brief in Support of Findings at 61-64.] It is clear, from 23 the evidence, that there is reasonable assurance that 24 adequate off-site emergency communications will exist prior 25 to full-power operation at Diablo Canyon.
26 1 5 10 CFR 50.47(b)(7) - Public Education and Information 2 Joint Intervenors [J.I. Finding pp. 32, 43-45] and 3 Governor Brown [G.B. Findings pp. 32-42] both argue that the 4 public information and education requirements of 5 550.47(b)(7) have not been complied with at this point in 6 time. Governor Brown points out that while PGandE offered 7 evidence on the steps taken to date and intended to be taken 8 in the future, "the County itself offered no evidence of 9 steps it intends to take to institute a public information 10 program. (G.B. Findings p. 33). Such an argument is 11 without merit. The County is not a party to these 12 proceedings and " offered no evidence" on anything. The 13 evidence offered by PGandE on steps to be taken by the 14 County is in the record, undisputed, and in total compliance 15 with the requirements of 10 CFR $50.47(b)(7).
16 Governor Brown and Joint Intervenors spend a great 17 deal of time arguing that a " survey" must be taken of the 18 residents of San Luis Obispo County in order to, among other 19 things, have "an effective public education program." This 20 argument is based on the testimony of Drs. Erikson and 21 Johnson which was countered by the testimony of Dr. Mileti.
22 The testimony of these witnesses was diametrically opposed 23 and has been thoroughly aired in previous filings. (PGandE 24 Findings pp. 44-46, Staff Findings pp. 68-73). In summary, 25 Dr. Erikson and Dr. Johnson believe that a " social and 26 psychological profile of the local population . . . would
I help immensely in whatever program of public information is 2 being contemplated for the area." [Erikson Test. pp. 10-11, 3 ff. Tr. 12,407.] Neither Dr. Erikson or Dr. Johnson offered 4 any criticism of the public information ongoing or planned.
5 They simply believe it would be better with a survey. It is 6 respectfully submitted that is not the test. The test is 7 one of " reasonable assurance" that an " adequate" public 8 information program is or will be in place. The only 9 testimony offered on that test was offered by Dr. Mileti who 10 found the public information program for Diablo Canyon 11 sufficient. [Mileti, Tr. 12,153-12,154.]
12 13 $ 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8) - Emergency Facilities and Equipment 14 Many of Joint Intervenors' arguments are based 15 solely upon an assertion of what they think should be 16 required, unsupported by evidence, regulatory position or 17 expert opinion; specifically, the need for the permanent EOF 18 for adverse environmental conditions or independent on-site 19 radiation monitors are opinions of counsel, not qualified 20 expert opinion. Equipment and facilities necessary to 21 respond to an emergency are or will be provided prior to 22 full power operation. [ Sears ff. Tr. 12638, pp. 24-27; 23 PGandE Panel #4, ff. Tr. 11903, PGandE Ex. 73, 74a; Eldridge 24 ff. Tr. 12682.] Specifically, the OSC has sufficient 25 equipment to support evacuation and other equipment is 26 stored in the TSC. [Keyworth Tr. 11905-6, Shiffer Tr.
l
1 11906.] Any equipment that needs to be supplied to satisfy 2 FEMA's evaluation will be available prior to full power 3 operation. [ Staff Ex. 35.]
4 5 6 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9) - Accident Assessment 6 In attacking PGandE's compliance with 10 CFR 7 50.47(b)(9), both Governor Brown and Joint Intervenors use a 8 combination of argument as to what the applicable 9 regulations and regulatory guidelines should, but do not, 10 say and small bits of testimony from which they attempt to 11 argue " evidence" which does not exist in the record. An 12 example of the latter can be found at J. I . Findings, page 13 47, where it is argued that the size of error band for 14 monitoring equipment " precludes confidence that releases can 15 and will be promptly and accurately assessed during an 16 emergency." Such a statement cannot be found in the record.
17 In fact, just the opposite testimony is all that was adduced 18 at hearing. [Tr. 11,952-59.]
19 Governor Brown argues PGandE does not now comply 20 with Regulatory Guide 1.97 [G.B. Findings p. 21] despite the 21 fact that Regulatory Guide 1.97 does not need to be complied 22 with until June, 1983. PGandE testified that it has 23 complied with many of the 1.97 requirements now and will 24 comply with the remainder by June, 1983. Neither through 25 cross-examination nor direct testimony was this evidence 26 contradicted in any way. Governor Borwn simply argues that
1 PGandE's commitment is " cursory and conclusory, providing no 2 details of how PGandE intends to comply." [Id_.] Such an 3 argument is without merit. No such contention was ever 4 before this board.
5 Finally, Governor Brown and Joint Intervenors I 6 argue that PGandE's failure to set forth, literally within 7 emergency operating procedures (EOP's), the qualification 8 status of equipment to be used in EOP's is also " evidence" 9 of noncompliance with 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9). Messrs. Hubbard 10 and Minor are cited as authorities for this position despite 11 the fact that on cross-examination their misinterpretations 12 of NUREG-0654 and 10 CFR 50.47 on this point were shown, if 13 not admitted. [Tr. 12,319-326.] No regulation or 14 regulatory guide requires an operator to rely only on 15 safety-related equipment in emergency situations or to 16 identify non-safety related equipment in EOP's.
17 18 6 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10) - Protective Response 19 In addition to Joint Intervenors general arguments 20 which have been addressed above, both Governor Brown and 21 Joint Intervenors continue to stress the importance of 22 considering the so-called "evaucation shadow phenomenon" at 23 Diablo Canyon. [G.B. Findings pp. 36-38; J.I. Finding pp.
24 30, 49, 53.] Unfortunately, they also continue to ignore 25 the result reported by their own witness, Dr. James Johnson, 26 in the paper " Evacuation From a Nuclear Technological i
1 Disaster" [ appended to Dr. Johnson's testimony), that at TMI 2 only approximately 9% of the households farther than 12 3 miles from the plant had any members who evacuated, as 4 opposed to 53% for the area within 12 miles of the plant.
5 [P. 6 of the paper.] In other words, the evacuation shadow 6 phenomenon observed at TMI was primarily a "close-in" 7 phenomenon--i.e., it was primarily observed at distances of 8 less than 12 miles from the plant. The TMI experience thus 9 supports the hypothesis that large voluntary evacuations are 10 unlikely at distances of greater than 12 miles from the site 11 of a nuclear power plant accident. In spite of this, the 12 intervenors seem to have concluded that a large voluntary 13 evacuation is likely at distances of 25 to 35 miles from the 14 site of an accident at the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power 15 Plant.
16 Thus it is clear that whatever logic the inter-17 venors use, that logic is not based on the facts of the 18 Three Mile Island accident as they are reported by Dr.
19 Johnson in his paper. The Three Mile Island experience 20 simply does not support the intervenors' position that large 21 voluntary evacuations are likely at distances of 25 to 35 22 miles from a nuclear power plant accident--in fact, it 23 supports the opposite position.
24 In addition to this fact, the intervenors also 25 continue to ignore the report (also given by Dr. Johnson in 26 his paper) that at TMI " evacuees living close to the plant
1 were likely to leave earlier than those living in the 2 ,
outlying communities" and that the evacuation of those 3 living ten or more miles from the plant was spread over 4 several days. [P. 12 of Dr. Johnson's paper.] Thus, 5 whatever small amount of voluntary evacuation might take 6 place at distances of 25 to 35 miles from the Diablo Canyon 7 Nuclear Power Plant could be expected (based on the TMI 8 experience) to be spread over a period much longer than that 9 required to evacuate the 10 mile EPZ. This would reduce i
10 even further any impact which any small voluntary evacuation 11 from outlying areas might have on the evacuation of areas 12 closer to the plant.
13 These facts, coupled with the fact that the road 14 network beyond the Santa Lucia Mountains does fan out (thus 15 providing additional capacity for whatever small amount of 16 voluntary evacuation does take place from outlying communities) [ Winslow Tr. 12780-12781], make one wonder why 17 18 the intervenors have even brought up the subject of the 19 evacuation shadow phenomenon with respect to the Diablo
[
l 20 Canyon Nuclear Power Plant.
1 l
21 It has also been stated by the Joint Intervenors 22 that at TMI "few of the evacuees utilized designated 23 evacuation shelters or stopped at designated evacuation l
24 destinations." Findings p. 49.] This statement
( [J.I.
l 25 brings to mind the question, "Where is it stated that the i
26 goal of an evacuation is to have every evacuee (or even most
1 evacuees) utilize one of the designated evacuation shelters 2 or destinations?" These shelters and destinations are meant 3 to be used as they are needed, and the proportion of 4 evacuees which actually uses them is irrelevant to any kind 5 of measure of the " success" of an evacuation.
6 With regard to paragraphs 5, 8 and 11 in J.I.
7 Findings, the irrelevancy of the evacuation shadow 8 phenomenon to the Diablo Canyon site is discussed above. In 9 addition, Dr. Mileti stated that "the causes of human 10 behavior remain the same" in different types of disaster 11 situations [Mileti Tr. 12229] and that "what we've concluded 12 about other sorts of hazards seems applicable to events 13 involving nuclear materials" such as the Three Mile Island 14 experience. [Mileti Tr. 12232.] Thus, the TMI experience 15 is simply one of a number of disasters which has given rise 16 to a body of knowledge about how to design a warning and 17 notification system that can "get the word out to the 18 endangered population." [Mileti Tr. 12147.] Dr. Mileti 19 continued: "The knowledge and factors that are known (about 20 how to design such a system) have in many regards found j 21 their way into the plan" [Mileti Tr. 12153], and "the bases i
22 that need to exist in such a system are contained in 23 PGandE's plans." [Mileti Tr. 12154.]
24 With respect to paragraphs 6 and 9 in Joint 25 Intervenors' brief regarding the supposed need for a social i
26 survey, Dr. Mileti testified, regarding the correlation l
1 between the responses to a survey and future behavior, that 2 "how people report about past behavior is suspect enough in 3 terms of correlating with past behavior, that future 4 behavior and questions about it are even more suspect" and 5 "I would not expect that there would be a good correlation 6 between the two." [Mileti Tr. 12165.] Thus, in response to 7 a question about whether any benefits could accrue from 8 doing a social survey in the Diablo Canyon area, Dr. Mileti 9 stated:
10 "I would think that the human effort and that energy could be better spent in 11 other directions. I think we have enough knowledge to design a warning 12 system for San Luis Obispo County as well as anywhere else in reference to a 13 nuclear reactor, in reference to tsunamis, in reference to an earthquake 14 prediction warning, that doing a local specific survey would not produce re-i 15 sults that would be all that usable in assisting in designing and installing 16 that warning system." [Mileti, Tr.
l 12162.]
17 18 Joint Intervenors also state that " surveys of 19 intended behavior do have a purpose" citing Dr. Mileti's 20 testimony. [Tr. 12157.] However, the only mention which 21 Dr. Mileti makes with respect to the purpose of a social 22 survey is to say, "I don't feel that one for this purpose is 23 needed." [Mileti Tr. 12157.] The closest that Dr. Mileti 24 actually came to stating what he believes the purpose of 25 performing a social survey was when he stated, " Speaking as 26 a sociologist, the key benefits that come to sociologists l
1 from doing social surveys is getting data so that they can 2 draft potential publications so that they can get tenure and 3 raises in universities." [Mileti Tr. 12159.] Thus, while 4 it might be said that Dr. Mileti agrees with the view that 5 " surveys of intended behavior do have a purpose" [J.I.
6 Fndings p. 50], the purpose which Dr. Mileti ascribed to 7 them can scarcely be said to be the same purpose which Drs.
8 Erikson and Johnson seem to be ascribing to them.
9 With regard to behavior of emergency workers, Dr.
10 Mileti stated that once emergency workers "are able to find 11 out that their family is safe, [they] typically continue and 12 play out their emergency roles." [Mileti Tr. 12265.] Dr.
13 Mileti also stated that in disaster scenarios, 14 "What is typical is that a worker who is out of the area of duty, i.e. not at 15 their place of work, what is typical is for them to volunteer and report to work 16 without even being called up. For exam-ple, a fireman who is home and off duty, 17 and there are massive fires, reports to work without being called in.
18 The same in hospitals. In fact, that is 19 a phenomenon that is typically observed in all sorts of different disaster 20 events." [Mileti Tr. 12265-12266.]
21 Numerous other allegations by Joint Intervenors 22 fail to acknowledge or misconstrue the record. Specifical-23 ly, with regard to paragraphs 10a and 10c, TERA Corporation 24 did perform a "no traffic control" evacuation time estimate 25 which takes into account congestion on the freeways.
26 [ Winslow Tr. 12216-12217.] With respect to paragraphs 10b,
1 10g, and 10h, both Mr. Winslow and Mr. Urbanik stated that 2 accidents would be unlikely in an evacuation. [ Winslow Tr.
3 12200, Urbanik Tr. 12389.] With respect to paragraph 10d, 4 there is no regulatory requirement to consider a heavy fog 5 or flooding scenario. With respect to paragraphs 10e and 6 10f, Mr. Winslow testified that what the intervenors 7 consider to be unlikely is in fact the likely situation.
8 [ Winslow Tr. 12208, 12212, 12222.]
9 With respect to paragraphs 10j and 19, Attachment 10 CE-2, given in Section III.04 of the San Luis Obispo County 11 Plan, Part III, SOPS (Part 1) [PGandE Ex. 81] does in fact 12 give a tabulation of the estimated number of carless 13 population and busses for each erotective Action Zone. With 14 respect to paragraph 12, regulations do not require 15 " complications arising from flooding or a major earthquake"
- 16 to be considered.
17 18 5 10 CFR 50.47(b)(ll) - Radiological Exposure Control 19 As in other portions of Joint Intervenors' brief, 20 the record does not support the arguments presented. All 21 experts testified that adequate planning procedures and 22 equipment is or will be available to control radiological 23 exposures. [PGandE Panel #5, ff. Tr. 11924; PGandE Ex. 74a, 24 73, 80, 81, 82; Sears ff. Tr. 12638 pp. 34-36; Eldridge Tr.
25 12721.] Joint Intervenors did not offer any evidence to 26 support their position on this planning standard.
t a
1 $ 10 CFR 50.47(b)(12) - Medical and Public Health Support 2 Joint Intervenors' brief [pp. 56-7] ignores the 3 preponderance of testimony which supports the adequacy of 4 medical and public health support provided. [PGandE Panel 5 #7 ff. Tr. 12065, Attachments 16 and 17; Sears ff. Tr.
6 12638; Eldridge ff. Tr. 12682.] Neither Joint Intervenors 7 nor Governor Brown introduced testimony to rebut this 8 testimony. In their brief, Joint Intervenors allege that 9 certain facts impugn the adequacy of medical resources, but 10 offer no evidence to support their conclusion.
11 12 _$ 10 CFR 50.47(b)(13) - Recovery and Reentry 13 The only direct evidence that planning in this 14 area is not adequate were quotes from Mr. J. Kearns' 15 deposition to the effect that State recovery and reentry had 16 not been adequately addressed. [Skidmore Tr. 12005.]
17 However, additional evidence was provided that more detailed 18 planning was not required since there are no additional 19 protective actions required for recovery [Skidmore Tr.
l 20 12015] and that additional State planning was available that 21 might not have been known by Mr. Kearns. [Skidmore Tr.
22 12016-17.] Additionally, it was clear from other aspects or 23 Mr. Kearns' deposition that he believed adequate planning and preparedness exists at Diablo Canyon to allow full power l
l 24 t
25 operation. [Hubbard Tr. 12315-17.]
26 l
l
1 $ 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14) - Exercise and Drills 2 Joint Intervenors' list " deficiencies" in the 3 August 19, 1981 exercise; however, there was no testimony 4 that these items were in fact deficiencies or that this 5 exercise was anything except a success. Moreover, the 6 responsible reviewing authorities summarized the performance 7 of PGandE and the local governments during the exercise as 8 indicated below:
9 NRC Staff "On the basis of the eight NRC inspector observations made in the Control Room,-
10 Technical Support Center, Emergency Operations Facility, and on observations 11 made of other in-plant and on-site emergency response activities the 12 inspection team has concluded that the exercise was well planned and executed, 13 and met the objectives set forth in Attachment B; that the exercise demon-14 strated the licensee's overall capabil-ity to implement their Emergency Plan 15 and procedures; and that no observations were made that would indicate that 16 appropriate measures would not or could not be taken to protect the public 17 health and safety in the event of a radiological accident at Diablo Canyon."
18 [ Attachment 5 to PGandE Panel #1 Testi-mony ff. Tr. 11778.]
19 l FEMA "The evaluation conclusion is that due 20 to the planning effort to date and full participation by all participants, the 21 exercise succeeded in its three basic goals." [ Attachment 1 to PGandE Panel 22 #1 Testimony ff. Tr. 11778.]
23 All corrective items identified by FEMA [ Attach-24 ment 2 to PGandE Panel #1 Testimony ff. Tr. 11778; Staff Ex.
25 35] as a result of the exercise should be completed by 26 June 20, 1982. The completion of these items will be prior 1 to full power operation and subject to the review and 2 verification by both FEMA and NRC staff. [M. ] Both NRC 3 staff and FEMA view that the significance of these 4 corrective actions "do not represent matters which in any 5 way preclude the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board of making 6 a finding of reasonable assurance." (Grimes Tr. 12693.]
7 8 6 10 CFR 50.47(b)(15) - Radiological Emergency Response 9 Training 10 As discussed previously, Joint Intervenors' argu-11 ment that plans do not comply with NUREG-0654 criteria 12 misstates the record. [ Sears, ff. Tr. 12638 at 42, Tr.
13 12639-40; PGandE Ex. 73, Section 8 PGandE's Panel #10 ff. ._
14 Tr. 12022, Skidmore Tr. 12047-50, 12757-8, PGandE Ex. 85'.]
15 Persons performing support roles do not require specialized 16 training. [Skidmore, Shiffer and Kaefer, Tr. 12031-36; Ness I 17 Tr. 12473-4.]
18 19 9 10 CFR 50.47(b)(16) - Responsibility for Planning Effort 20 Here, as in the other arguments raised by Joint 21 Intervenors' brief, the references cited to the record 22 either do not support their assertion or the significance' of '
23 the issue surely does not support a finding of inadequate 24 planning or response capability. Specifically, the record 25 shows that NUREG-0654 criteria are satisfied. [PGandE Ex.
26 85; Skidmore Tr. 12757-58; Sears Tr.- 12639-40.] While the
~
a 1 ' transcript reference cited by Joint Intervenors states that 2 SLO County ha's not committed to fund plan development and i
3 review, the' record also shows that PGandE has committed to i
4 provide such' funding for the county and that currently it is 5 provided through State of California legislation. [Skidmore l 6 Tr. 11842-3.]
7 8 y 9 CONCLUSION
10 For the foregoing reasons, the Board should not 11 adopt the proposed findings of Joint Intervenors and 12 Governor Brown. ~ PGandE respectfully submits that the Board 13 ///
14 ///
15 ///
16
, 17 18 19 20 l
l l 21 l
22 23 '
l 24 25 26
u , .
1 adopt findings and conclusions consistent with those 2 proposed by PGandE.
3 4 Respectfully submitted, 5 MALCOLM H. FURBUSH PHILIP A. CRANE, JR.
6 RICHARD F. LOCKE Pacific Gas and Electric Company 7 P.O. Box 7442 San Francisco, California 94120 8 (415) 781-4211 9 ARTHUR C. GEHR Snell & Wilmer 10 3100 Valley Center Phoenix, Arizona 85073 l'. (602) 257-7288 12 BRUCE NORTON Norton, Burke, Berry & French, P.C.
13 3216 N. Third Street Suite 300 14 Phoenix, Arizona 85012 (602) 264-0033 15 Attorneys for 16 Pacific Gas and Electric Company 17 -
18 By /
- ' Richard F. Locke l 19 20 DATED
- April 12, 1981.
21 I
22 I
( 23 24 25 26 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the "atter of )
)
PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-275
) Docket No. 50-323 Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, )
Units 1 and 2 )
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE The foregoing document (s) of Pacific Gas and Electric Company has (have) been served today on the following by deposit in the United States mail, properly stamped and addressed:
Judge John F. Wolf Mrs. Sandra A. Silver Chairman 1760 Alisal Street Atomic Safety and Licensing Board San Luis Obispo, California 93401 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Mr. Gordon Silver 1760 Alisal Street Judge Glenn O. Bright San Luis Obispo, California 93401 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission John Phillips, Esq.
Washington, D. C. 20555 Joel Reynolds, Esq.
Center for Law in the Public Interest Judge Jerry R. Kline 10951 W. Pico Boulevard - Suite 300 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Los Angeles, California 90064 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 David F. Fleischaker, Esq.
P. O. Box 1178 Mrs. Elizabeth Apfelberg Oklahoma City C/o Nancy Culver Oklahoma 73101 192 Luneta Drive San Luis Obispo, California 93401 Arthur C. Gehr, Esq.
Snell & Wilmer Janice E. Kerr, Esq. 3100 Valley Bank Center Public Utilities Commission Phoenix, Arizona 85073 of the State of California 5246 State Building Bruce Norton, Esq.
350 McAllister Street Norton, Burke, Berry & French, P.C.
San Francisco, California 94102 3216 N. Third Street Suite 300 Mrs. Raye Fleming Phoenix, Arizona 85012-2699 1920 Mattie Road Shell Beach, California 93449 Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Mr. Frederick Eissler Board Panel Scenic Shoreline Preservation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Conference, Inc. Washington, D. C. 20555 4623 More Mesa Drive Santa Barbara, California 93105
Chairman Judge Thomas S. Moore Atomic Safety and Licensing Chairman Appeal Panel Atomic Safety and Licensing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Appeal Board Washington, D. C. 20555 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Secretary U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Judge W. Reed Johnson Washington, D. C. 20555 Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Attn.: Docketing and Service Section U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 William J. Olmstead, Esq.
Bradley W. Jones, Esq. Judge John H. Buck Office of Executive Legal Director Atomic Safety and Licensing BETH 042 Appeal Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Washington, D. C. 20555 Mr. Richard B. Hubbard MHB Technical Associates 1723 Hamilton Avenue, Suite K Scn Jose, California 95125 Mr. Carl Neiberger Telegram Tribune P. O. Box 112 S0n Luis Obispo, California 93402 Herbert H. Brown, Esq.
Lawrence Coe Lanpher, Esq.
Christopher B. Hanback, Esq.
Kirkpatr,ick, Lockhart, Hill, Christopher & Phillips 1900 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20036 Byron S. Georgiou, Esq.
Legal Affairs Secretary Governor's Office State Capitol j
Sacramento, California 95814 f
/ J QLA~fdv Richard F. Locke Attorney Pacific Gas and Electric Company Dato: April 12, 1982 l
.. . . . . ... .. . . . . . . . . . . . - ... ,.