ML20042B697
| ML20042B697 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 03/19/1982 |
| From: | Reynolds J CENTER FOR LAW IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST, JOINT INTERVENORS - DIABLO CANYON |
| To: | |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8203250545 | |
| Download: ML20042B697 (87) | |
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(
3 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
'a2 MR 23 P1 :55 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD,,
)
In the Matter of
)
)
PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY )
Docket Nos. 50-275 O.L.
)
50-323 0.L.
(Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power
)
Plant, Units 1 and 2)
)
(Full Power Proceeding)
)
)
JOINT INTERVENORS' PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW JOEL R. REYNOLDS, ESQ.
JOHN R. PHILLIPS, ESQ.
Center for Law in the Public Interest 10951 W. Pico Boulevard N
Los Angeles, CA 90064 p
(213)470-3000 RECEIVED g
DAVID S. FLEISCHAKER, ESQ.
p P. O. Box 1178 i
MAR 241982n- ::
Oklahoma City, OK 73101 g
n nr.m t u rar a $
827g"ar s:
Attorneys for Join. Inter-venors g
yf SAN LUIS OBISPO MOTHERS FOR N
PEACE
~
SCENIC SHORELINE PRESERVATION CONFERENCE, INC.
ECOLOGY ACTION CLUB SANDRA SILVER hDRADOCK05000203250545 820319 ELIZABETH APFELBERG pph JOHN J. FORSTER G
f! I
)
)
TABLE OF CONTENTS Page I
INTRODUCTION.....................................
1 II EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANNING -- FINDINGS OF FACT..........................................
12 A.
Background and Regulatory Standard..........
12 B.
Ripeness of Diablo Canyon Proceeding........
17 C.
Adequacy of Diablo Canyon Emergency Plans...
22 1.
Consideration of Earthquake Effects....
22 2.
State Preparedness.....................
23 3.
County Standard Operating Procedures and Letters of Agreement...............
24 4.
Public Education.......................
27 5.
Public Response and Plan Implementation.........................
28 6.
Emergency Communications...............
32 7.
Outline of Deficiencies................
34 D.
Summary.....................................
62 III EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANNING -- CONCLUSIONS OF LAW...........................................
63 IV CLASSIFICATION OF PRESSURIZER HEATERS --
FINDINGS OF FACT.....................
........... 69 V
CLASSIFICATION OF PRESSURIZER HEATERS --
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW...............................
74 VI CLASSIFICATION AND TESTING OF VALVES --
FINDINGS OF FACT.................................
76 VII CLASSIFICATION AND TESTING OF VALVES --
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW...............................
81 VIII CONCLUSION.......................................
82 )
b
..\\
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD
)
In the Matter of
)
)
PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY )
Docket Nos. 50-275 O.L.
)
50-323 0.L.
(Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power
)
Plant, Units 1 and 2)
)
(Full Power Proceeding)
)
)
JOINT INTERVENORS' PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW I.
INTRODUCTION 1.
Pacific Gas and Electric Company ("PGandE") applied in 1973 for licenses to operate the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power
("Diablo Canyon"), Units 1 and 2, at full power levels.1!
Plant Since that time, administrative hearings before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (" Licensing Board") and the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board (" Appeal Board") of the Nuclear _ Regulatory 1/
Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant ("Diablo Canyon")
consists of two Westinghouse pressurized water reactors located on a 750-acre site in San Luis Obispo County, California.
The units are desion. d to generate at steady state power levels of 3338 and 3411 megawatts thermal, with a not total electrical output of approximately 2120 MWe.
PGandE is seeking authorization to aperate both units.,
e s
Commission ("NRC") have been held on a number of issues relevant to PGandE's applications, including, to some extent, the issues which are the subject of this decision.
2.
Before an initial decision had been issued, however, the most serious accident in the history of the United States commercial nuclear reactor program occurred at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2,
( "TMI-2 " ) in Pennsylvania on March 28, 1979.2/
Recognizing the possible implications of that event for several of the issues under litigation in this proceeding, this Board deferred any decision on those issues and, in our September 27, 1979 Partial Initial Decision
("PID"), stated that:
[ilt is not now known how the lessons learned from Three Mile Island-2 will impact on the Emergency Plan or Quality Assurance so these matters will be deferred and are not a part of this Partial Initial Decision.3/
No decision has been rendered to date by this Board with respect to either of those issues as they apply to PGandE's full power operating license applications.
3.
In the af termath of the TMI-2 accident, Joint Intervenors filed two separate motions to reopen the record in' this proceeding, the first on May 9, 1979, regarding emergency 2/
Report of the President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island, "The Need for Change: The Legacy of TMI" (Kemeny Commission Report), at 1 (October 30, 1979).
S/
In the Matter of Pacific Gas and Electric Company (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), Nos.
50-275,323, Partial Initial Decision, at 9 (September 27, 1979) (hereinaf ter cited as "PID").,
t response planning and Class 9 accident analyis,$/- and the second on March 24, 1981, regarding seventeen individual contentions focussing on specific components, systems, and operator action and inaction determined upon investigatica subsequent to the TMI accident to have caused or contributed to its occurrence and severity.5/
On June 30, 1981, Joint Intervonors filed a Statement of Clarified Contentions, consolidating, updating, and eliminating certain of the i
contentions raised in the two motions.
Following a prehearing conference on July 1, 1981, this Board issued its prehearing conference order on August 4, 1981, admitting for hearing only the clarified contention regarding emergency response planning and rejecting the remainder.
4.
On September 21, 1981, the Commission, in an order arising out of the low power test proceeding, directed this Board to include in the reopened full power hearing two contentions -- contentions 10 and 12 -- filed in opposition to PGandE's application for a low power test license and concerning the classification and testing of pressurizer heaters and reactor coolant system valves.5/
By memorandum and order dated September 30, 1981, this Board accepted the d!
Joint Intervenors Request to Reopen or, in the Alternative, Request for Directed Certification (May 9,1979).
E/
Joint Inter'enors Motion to Reopen (March 24, 1981).
v 5!
In the Matter of Pacific Gas and Electric Company (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-81-22, Memorandum and Order (September 21, 1981).,
s i
two contentions for hearing in the full power proceeding and i
established a discovery schedule.2/
5.
On October 8, 1981, Joint Intervenors filed a Request for Directed Certification seeking immediate review by i
1 the Commission of this Board's denial of contentions in the August 4, 1981 Prehearing Conference Order.
That application was: referred to the Appeal Board on October 29, 1981, and, after hearing oral argument on November 19, 1981, the Appeal Board issued a brief order on December 11, 1981 affirming the i
denial of contentions and clarifying the scope of the admitted low power contention 12.8/
6.
Following a second prehearing conference on December I
16, 1981 to consider various preliminary legal matters, this Board issued a second-prehearing. conference order on December 23, 1981, holding, inter alia, (1) that in light of the Commission's December 8, 1981 decision-in the. San Onofre proceeding, "no licensing board, including this one, has jurisdiction to consider impacts on emergency planning or V
j earthquakes which cause or occur during an accidental radiological release"E/
and (2) that an interim memorandum by' the Federal ~ Emergency Management Agency
(" FEMA") : satisfied the 2/
Id., Memorandum and Order (September 30, 19.81).
8/
See note 11 infra E!
In the Matter of Pacific Gas and Electric Company (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant), Nos. 50-275, 323, Memorandum and Order, at 1-2 (December 23, 1981).
1 -_
s regulatory requirement for a FEMA " finding" as to adequacy of the offsite emergency plans for the Diablo Canyon facility.
10 C.F.R. 5 50. 47 (a) (1).10/
7.
On December 21, 1981, PGandE and the hAC Staff
("S ta f f") filed motions seeking summary disposition of Joint Intervenors' contentions 10 and 12, regarding pressurizer heaters and valves.
On January 7, 1982, Joint Intervenors filed a motion for summary disposition of contention 1, regarding emergency response planning.
By orders dated January 18, 1982, this Board denied all motions and set for hearing the following contentions:
Contention 1.
PGandE and the combined onsite, state and local emergency response plans and preparedness do not comply with 10 C.F.R. 50.33 (g) ; 50.47 and revised Appendix E to Part 50.
Contention 10.
The Staff recognizes that pressurizer heaters and associated controls are necessary to maintain natural circulation at hot stand-by conditions.
Therefore, this equipment should be classified as " components important to safety" and required to meet all applicable safety-grade design criteria, including but not limited to diversity (GDC 22), seismic and environmental qualification (GDC 2 and 4),
automatic initiation (GDC 20), separation and independence (GDC 3 and 22), quality assurance (GDC 1), adequate, reliable on-site power supplies (DC 17) and the single failure criterion.
The Applicant's proposal to connect two out of four of the heater groups to the present on-site emergency power supplies does not provide an equivalent or acceptable level of protection.
Contention 12.
Proper operation of power operated relief valves, associated block valves and the instruments and controls for these valves is essential to mitigate the consequences of j
accidents.
In addition, their failure can cause 10/
Id., at 2-3.
s or aggravate a LOCA.
Therefore, these valves must be classified as components important to safety and required to meet all safety-grade design criteria.ll/
8.
Following the filing of direct testimony on January 11!
In its December 11, 1981 Order, the Appeal Board i
ruled that this contention necessarily encompasses the issue of valve testing and verification.
In the Matter of Pacific Gas and Electric Company (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-
, Order, at.2-3 (December 11, 1981).
The Appeal Board stated that "the Commission's action in admitting joint intervenors' low power contention 12 had the practical effect of admitting intervenors' clarified contentions 8 and 9."
Id. at 3.
Those contentions provide as follows:
Contentions 8 and 9.
Joint Intervenors contend that the present classification of Diablo Canyon relief valves and associated block valves, instruments and controls does not comply with 10 C.F.R. 50, Appendix A, Criterion 1, 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix B, Reg.
Guide 1.26 and SRP (Reg. Guide 1.70), Section 3.22.
Joint Intervenors also contend that General Design Criteria 1, 14, 15 and 30 are violated because relief and block valves have not been qualified under all transient and accident conditions.
Proper operation of power operated relief valves, associated block valves and the instruments and controls for these valves is essential to mitigate the consequences of accidents.
The TMI accident demonstrated this fact.
In addition, their failure can cause or aggravate a LOCA.
Therefore, these valves must be classified as components important to safety and required to meet all safety-grade design criteria.
However, the Diablo Canyon block and relief valves do not meet all safety-grade design criteria, in violation of the regulatory practices listed above.
In addition, reactor coolant system relief valves form part of the reactor coolant system pressure boundary.
When relief valve operation is unreliable, series block valves are, relied upon to maintain the integrity of the pressure boundary.
Despite these important safety functions, appropriate qualification testing has not been done to verify the capabilities of these block valves to function during normal, transient and accident conditons.
In the absence of such testing and verification, the public health and safety are endangered..__
11, 1982, evidentiary hearings were held in San Luis Obispo, California on January 19 through 26, 1982.
At the hearing, the following exhibits were marked for identification and, where indicated, admitted into evidence:
Exhibit No.
- PGandE, In Evidence 70 Emergency Operating Procedure 11684 OP Emergency Shutdown 71 Emergency Operating Procedure 11684 OP-O - Reactor Trip with Safety Injection 72 Emergency Operating Procedure 11684 OP Loss of Electrical Power 73 PGandE Site Emergency Plan 11765
- Rev. 3 74
' Emergency Procedures Volume 3A 11765 74A Emergency Procedures Volume 3B 11765 75 Emergency Procedures Plant 11765 Manual, Volume 3A as revised through 1-15-82 75A Emergency Procedures Plant
-11765 Manual, volume 3B as revised through 1-15-82 76 Four Procedures (EP R-1, EP RB7, 11765 EP RB8, EPG-1) revised between 1-15-82 and 1-19-82 l
77 Corporate Emergency Response Plan 12087 and Procedures (CERP) Rev. 1, 5-11-81 78 PRC Voorhees Evacuation Reports, 11765' Vol. I & II -_
Exhibit No.
PGandE In Evidence 79 TERA Report Volume 1 79A TERA Report Volume 2 79B TERA Report Volume 3 80 San Luis Obispo County Plan 11765 Rev. B Parts I, II, IV, V 80A Additions to plan (proposed)
Sect. I.8, II.13, II.14, IV.3 81 San Luis Obispo County Plan 11765 Part III, SOP's (Part 1) 81A San Luis Obispo County Plan 11765 Part III, SOP's (Part 2) 82 California Department of Health 11765 Services Procedures, State of California Emergency Plan Annex 2 volume 1 82A California Department of Health 11765 Services Procedures, State of California Emergency Plan Annex 2 Volume 2, plus maps 83 Video Tap'e of August 19, 1981 11881 Exercise 84 TERA Report Section 4.0 Evacuation 12190 Times Estimates (with blacked out areas 85 Update to Response to JI Interrogatory 12772 No. 9 (first set) Resolution of Open Items Exhibit No.
Joint Intervenors In Evidence 119 Memo to Norman C. Moseley from 11636 James M. Allen dated Octoer 16, 1979 Operations Team Recommendations - NRC I&E/TMI Unit 2 investigation 120 Applicant PGandE Response to 11793-Interrogatory 9 in Joint Inter-venors First Set of Interrogatories Exhibit No.
Joint Intervenors In Evidence 121 FEMA Guidance Memorandum #19 12703 122 1-13-82 Memo from Melanie C.
12255 Billig to Board of Supervisors Forwarding Resolution of SLO City Council 123 Correspondence between County 12481 Personnel Re Employees Included in Emergency P1an 124 FEMA Findings on Diablo Canyon 12500
~
Exercise dated 9-17-81 125 FEMA Review of May Draft -
12714 San Luis Obispo County Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Response Plan 126 Memo dated 12-8-80 from Eldridge 12716 regarding Warning System proposal 127 FEMA Memos dated 9-9-81 and 127178 10-21-81 regarding Communications / Warning Information Exhibit No.
Governor Brown In Evidence 7
SLO Office of Emergency Services 12110 SOP Development Status Report 8
State of California OES 12523 Emergency Planning Zones for Serious Nuclear Power Plant Accidents 9.
PRC Voorhees Executive Summary 12553 (An Evaluation of the San Luis Obispo County Public-Safety Communications System) 10 County of SLO Department of 12685 Technical Services Five Year Communications Plan January 1982 o
Exhibit No.
NRC Staff In Evidence 26 U.S. Department of Energy 11623 Attachment C EGG-SEMI-5507 Quick Look Report for Semiscale MOD-219-TEST-s-NC-2 27 NUREG CR-1570 EGG U.S. Department 11625 of Energy Experiment Data Report for Loft Nuclear Small Break Experiment 13-7 28 Section 3.3 WCAP 9601 11629 Attachment F 29 Section 4.2 WCAP 9610 11630 Attachment G 30 Letter January 13,-1982 12569 from PACrane to Engelken 31 SER Supplement 15 10-22-81 11973 32 Letter to Mr. Frank Miraglia 11981 from PACrane signed by Oglesby 10-22-81 33 Letter from Thomas Urbanik to 11378 Mitzie Solberg 10-28-81 d
34 Battelle Northwest Laboratory 11648 Emergency Plan Evaluation Report of the Pacific Gas and Electric i
Company's Diablo. Canyon Emergency Plan 35 FEMA Memos dated 12-29-81 and 12695 12-15-81 re Dates'for Corrective Action Completion.
In addition, the Board took judicial notice of the California Office of Emergency Services' Operations Guide and Procedures for Nuclear Power Plant Emergency (February 1980) (T r.
12,771).
9.
Following the hearing, proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law were filed by all parties pursuant to a schedule agreed upon oy the parties and adopted by the Board.
a 9
10.
Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 52.760 and based upon the evidence adduced at the hearing, the Board makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law, which constitute its Initial Decision in this reopened full power proceeding.
II.
EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANNING --- FINDINGS OF FACT A.
Background and Regulatory Standard 11.
In June 1979, the NRC began formal reconsideration of the role of emergency planning in' ensuring the continued protection of the public health and safety in areas around nuclear power facilities.
The Commission began this reconsideration in recognition of the need for-more effective emergency planning and in response to the TMI accident and to reports issued by responsible offices of government, including the NRC's congressional oversight committees.12/
12.
On December 19, 1979, the Commission published proposed amendments to its existing emergency planning regulations.
In explanation of the rationale for the revision, the Commission stated:
The proposed rule is predicated on the Commission's considered judgment in the aftermath of the accident at Three Mile Island that safe siting and design-engineered features alone do not optimize protection of the public health and safety.
Emergency planning was conceived as a secondary but additional measure to be exercised in the 1!
" Emergency Planning; Final Regulations," Preamble, 45 Fed. Reg. 5:402 (August 19, 1980).
unlikely event that an accident would happen.
The Commission's perspective was severely altered by the unexpected sequences of cvents that occurred at Three Mile Island.
The accident showed clearly that the protection provided by siting and engineered safety features must be bolstered by the ability to take protective measures during the course of an accident.
A conclusion the Commisson draws from this is that-in carrying out its statutory mandate to protect the public health and safety, the Commission must i
be in a position to know that off-site government plans have been reviewed and found adequate.13/
13.
Thus, as a direct consequence of the TMI-2 accident and the lessons learned therefrom, the Commission promulgated revised emergency planning regulations, which were issued in their final form on August 19, 1980 with an effective date of November 3, 1980.
These revised regulations reflect the Commission's conclusion that " adequate emergency preparedness is an essential aspect in the protection of the public health and safety," 45 Fed. Reg. at 55404, and, as is explained in the introduction to the revised Appendix E to 10 C.F.R. Part 50, they establish " minimum requirements for emergency plans for use in attaining an acceptable state of emergency preparedness."
Id. at 55411.
14.
As finalized, the upgraded regulations provide, inter alia, that
[nlo operating license for a nuclear power reactor will be issued unless a finding is made by NRC that the state of onsite and offsite emergency preparedness provides reasonable assurance that 13/
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, " Emergency planning,"
Preamble, 44 Fed. Reg. 75167, 75169 (December 19, 1979).._
. ~. -
adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency.14/
Such a finding by the NRC must be based (1) regarding offsite plans, on a review of findings and determinations by the Federal Emergency Management Agency.(" FEMA") "as to whether State and local emergency plans are adequate and capable of being implemented," and (2).regarding onsite plans, on an assessment by the NRC "as to whether the applicant's onsite 4
emergency plans are adequate and capable of being implemented."1E/
15.
The Commission's regulations further require that the onsite and offsite plans "must meet" the sixteen planning standards. set forth at 10 C.F.R. S50.47 (b).
Each standard is addressed by specific criteria in NUREG-0654, FEMA-REP-1, entitled " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response ~lans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," wnich is referenced in the regulations themselves.15/
NUREG-0654 was prepared by the Joint NRC/ FEMA Steering Committee as guidance for applicant, State, and local officials in developing radiological emergency plans and "will be used by reviewers in determining the adequacy of State, local, and nuclear power plant licensee 1SI 10 C.F.R. S 50.47 (a) (1).
SE!
10 C.F.R. S 50.47 (a) (2).
15/
NUREG-0654, as cited in the regulations, has been revised and superseded by NUREG-0654, FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1 (November 1980.
I..
omergency plans and preparedness."12/
14.
Section 50.47 (c) of 10 C.F.R.
requires that any failure to comply with the 350.47 (b) requirements be justified by a factual showing that the criteria for noncompliance have been met. Thus, if an applicant cannot demonstrate that the combined applicant, State, and local emergency response plans meet each of the sixteen regulatory standards of 10 C.F.R.
S 50. 47 (b), it has the burden of proof to demonstrate that the S 50. 47 (c) exemption criteria have been satisfied.
16.
The role of FEMA in this regulatory scheme is critical because FEMA, not the NRC, is responsible for reviewing the offsite emergency response plans for compliance with the Commmission's regulations and NUREG-0654.
Based on that review, FEMA is required to issue a " finding" as to the adequacy of the State and local plans for the jurisdictions surrounding the nuclear facility.
Once that finding has been issued, it forms the sole basis for the NRC's position that the offsite plans in question are or are not adequate and capable of being implemented.18/
Thus, until (1) State and local governments have completed and submitted their plans, (2) FEMA has conducted its review, and (3) its " finding" has been issued, the NRC has no basis to conclude that the state of offsite emergency preparedness, as embodied in the relevant offsite emergency plans, is adequate.
12/
Id. at i.
10/
e 17.
The jurisdictions of concern in this proceeding are those lying within the various emergency planning zones
("EPZ") established under federal, State, and local law and regulations.
Under the Commission's regulations, planning is required throughout (1) the plume exposure pathway EPZ,.an area approximately 10 miles in radius from the plant, and (2) the ingestion pathway EPZ, an area 50 miles in radius from the plant.
The exact size and configuration of the E?Zs surrounding a particular nuclear facility are determined in relation to local emergency response needs and capabilities as they are affected by such conditions as demography, topography, land characteristics, access routes, and jurisdictional boundaries.
The plans for the ingestion pathway shall focus on such actions as are appropriate to protect the food ingestion pathway.19/
The State and local jurisdictions falling at least in part within these zones for Diablo Canyon are the State of
\\.
California, San Luis Obispo County, Santa Barbara County, and Monterey County.
(Skidmore, Tr. 11,795-96.)
18.
Following extensive proceedings in which PGandE participated (Shif fer, Tr. 11,845), the State of California established a differing scheme of EPZs which has been adopted by the County of San Luis Obispa for purposes of its emergency planning.
(Gov. Brown Ex. 8; PGandE Ex. 80 (SLO County Plan),
1E/
10 C.F.R. S50.47 (c) (2) - -.
at I.5 (1)-(3). )
Those zones are the following:
(1) the Basic EPZ, (2) the Extended EPZ, and (3) the Ingestion Pathway EPZ.
These zones are irregular in shape, and the State and local jurisdictions lying at least in part within them for Diablo Canyon are the State of California, San Luis Obispo County, Santa Barbara County, and Ventura County.
(Skidmore, Shif fer,
Tr. 11,795-99.)
B.
Ripeness of Diablo Canyon Proceeding 19.
The Board's consideration at this time of the issue of compliance with the Commission's emergency response planning regulations is premature because, at best, the status of emergency planning for Diablo Canyon is incomplete in a number of significant respects.
First, FEMA has neither reviewed nor issued any finding regarding the current State of California Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Response Plan (March 1981).
FEMA emergency management specialist and Region IX representative John W. Eldridge, Jr.,
testified as follows:
MR. REYNOLDS:
Has FEMA conducted any detailed review of the California State plan, since March of 1981?
- SE!
MR. ELDRIDGE:
No.
- MR. REYNOLDS:
Is there a comparable finding for the state plan?
' MR. EDLRIDGE:
No.
There would not be.
Our finding was directed toward Diablo Canyon, and thus our finding was made on the county plan as the appropriate one for that.21/
22/
Tr. 12,708.
21/
Tr. 12,710; see also Tr. 12,745 i
Since the Commission's regulation's require that FEMA review and issue findings regarding both the State and local plans,
~
we conclude that its failure to do so here precludes any finding by this Board that the State plan is adequate.
Indeed, as described supra, the NRC relies upon FEMA to provide the basis for its own position on that issue, and it is undeniable that such a basis does not yet exist in this proceeding.
20.
Second, although FEMA' issued a so-called " Interim Evaluation and Status Report" with respect to the San Luis Obispo County Plan on November 2, 1981, even that interim finding is of little use to this Board at the present time.
Not only it it based on FEMA's June 1981 review of the outdated May 1981 draft of the plan, but FEMA's representative Eldridge admitted that FEMA had never done a detailed critique of the most current draft, the October 1981 Draft Plan Revision B (PGandE Ex. 80):
MR. REYNOLDS:
Has FEMA done a detailed critique of the October draft of the county plan?
MR. ELDRIDGE:
No, FEMA's intention is to do a review of that document when Voorhees completes its requirements under the contract.
In other words, we did not feel it was fruitful to perform a detailed review of the document until the current revisions which are under way, and have been, indeed way since the exercise, are completed.22/, under Moreover, even FEMA's tentative conclusion regarding the level of preparedness at the County level is conditioned on the 22/
Tr. 12,706.
assumption that the numerous corrective actions listed'in the Interim Evaluation and Status Report will be completed.22/ The majority -- if not all -- of those corrective actions have not yet been accomplished.
(Eldridge, Tr. 12,711, 12,748.)
21.
Third, there is apparently no dispute among the parties -- and the Board finds -- that virtually all of the affected jurisdictions are only beginning or are in the midst of the planning process and have not yet completed and adopted their emergency response plans.
The existing State of
'alifornia plan was prepared in March 1981, but the essential Standard Operating Procedures'are only now being prepared, and the full plan is not expected to be completed and submitted for FEMA review until July 1982.
(Eldridge, Tr. _12,708. ) 2f/
similarly, the San Luis Obispo County Plan is only in draft form, is undergoing continuing necessary revision and review, and has not been given final approval even by local or state officials, must less by FEMA or the NRC.
(McElvaine, Tr.
12,242-43, 12,249, 12,250, 12,256; Ness, Tr. 12,449-50, 12,454-57, 12,463-64, 12,565-66; Eldridge, 12,711.)
Santa SS!
FEMA Region IX Evaluation and Status Report on State and Local Emergency Preparedness Around the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, at 3 (November 2, 1981).
S$/
In this connection, it is notable and a matter of some concern to the Board that neither PGandE nor the Staff presented any witnesses from the Office of Emergency Services or any other State agency to testify regarding the status and adequacy of State planning.
In fact, in the midst of the hearings, PGandE withdrew its prior request that such a witness be produced for that purpose.
(T r. 12,36 4. )
See further discussion infra at 126.
Barbara County did not.begin its planning process until November 1981, and an emergency plan is not expected until July 1982 at the earliest.
(Skidmore, Tr. 11,818-20; Santa Barbara County-Board of Supervisors resolution, Tr.
11,940-42.)
Ik) further. testimony was offered regarding the status or adequacy of emergency preparedness in Santa Barbara County, and no testimony whatsoever was offered regarding the preparedness, if any, in Monterey and Ventura Counties in the event protective actions are required in the ingestion pathway zones.
Little testimony was presented regarding plans for such special State jurisdictions as California Polytechnic University at San Luis Obispo
(" Cal Poly") and California Men's Colony
(" CMC") except to the effect that plans for emergency response at those institutions have not been completed.
(McElvaine, Tr.
12,242-43; Urbanik, Tr. 12,392.)
22.
Fourth, at the County level in particular, a number of critical elements of a workable emergency response organization are currently missing.
For example, numerous Standard Operating Procedures have not been prepared (McElvaine, Tr. 12,245; Ness, Tr. 12,4 45; J.I. Ex. 122),
letters of agreement to assure availability of resources and support do not exist (Potter, Tr. 11,802-04; Ness, Tr. 12,457, 12,505), essential equipment has not been acquired or installed (McElvaine, Tr.
12,240, 12,256; Ness, 12,566; Gov.
Brown Ex. 10), and the public has little, if any, understanding of what to do in the event of an emergency because the County has not implemented a public education program (McElvaine, Tr.
12,249-51, 12,254; Ness, 12,566; _.
Eldridge, 12,719-20).21/
23.
These examples are simply illustrative of the general preliminary and developing character particularly of the State and local level planning that currently exists and which, in our view, precludes a finding by this Board that the public will be protected in the event of a radiological emergency at Diablo Canyon.
As such, they apply to each of i
the sixteen planning criteria set forth in the Commission's regulations.
We cannot accept PGandE's and the Staff's invitation to give a premature and anticipatory approval to an emergency response structure and plans so obviously incomplete.
Indeed, such an approval at this time could not be reconciled witn the orderly emergency plan review process prescribed by the Commission in its regulations.
Whether the relevant plans will be adequate when ultimately completed, we 21/
As expressed on cross-examination by Mr. Tim Ness, San Luis Obispo County Emergency Response Coordinator:
I have identified to the Boara of Supervisors a number of tasks that county staff ~ feels are necessary before -- and I'm not going to use words like workable or adoptable or anything like that -- before we can take the plan back to the Board of Supervisors, who are_the ultimate authority in adopting or. approving the plan.
Those are, No. 1, revision of plan by PRC Voorhees which, as you know, the County Board of Supervisors has given staff direction to do; second, the completin of the remaining standard operating procedures and agreements; third, put together equipment lists and do'everything we can to acquire, stockpile and distribute equipment in support of the plan; continue to pursue such activities as training drills and exercises; and lastly, to put together a public education program in continued pursuit of that particular system.
(T r. 12,5 6 5-6 6. ) - -
cannot and will not now predict.
C.
Adequacy of Diablo Canyon Emergency Plans 24.
The Board finds that the existing applicant, State, and local plans are inadequate and cannot now be implemented and, accordingly, that the state of onsite and offsite emergency preparedness fails to provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant.
This finding is based on numerous deficiencies in compliance with the planning standards set forth at 10 C.F.R. S 50.47 (b).
Although to some extent related to the general need for further plan development and planning discussed supra, the most significant deficiencies warrant special attention and, therefore, are discussed below.
25.
Consideration of Earthquake Effects.
None of the relevant emergency plans considers or allows for the effects of a major earthquake on emergency response to a radiological emergency at Diablo Canyon.
For the reasons set forth infra in our Conclusions of Law and notwithstanding any prior ruling by this Board, we believe that this failure violates the Commission's regulations and specifically the NUREG-0654 criterion regarding identification of and means for dealing with potential impediments to the use of evacuation routes and for contingency measures.21/ Given the recognized seismic risk 21/
NUREG-0654, Protective Response, II.J.10.K, at 63 (November 1980).
l associated with nuclear plants located on the coast of California, we believe that detailed consideration Or earthquake effects is essential to any finding that.the applicable plans are capable of implementation in the event of an emergency at Diablo Canyon.
26.
State Preparedness.
In addition to FEMA's failure to issue any " finding" regarding the adequacy of the State of California emergency plan, the Board finds that emergency preparedness at the State level and within the extended State zones is inadequate or non-existent.
We believe that PGandE's failure to call a witness from the State of California Office of Emergency Services to testify about State preparedness constitutes a serious failure to meet its burden of proof, particularly in light of the State plan's extensive non-compliance with the numerous applicable NUREG-0654 criteria conceded by PGandE as recently as September 1981.22/
- Instead, PGandE chose to rely on the few brief and conclusory references to the incomplete State plan and ingestion pathway 2!
In PGandE's response to Interrogatory No. 9 of Joint Intervenors' FiLit Set of Interrogatories (admitted into evidence as J.I.Ex. 120), PGandE cited 73 deficiencies in compliance with the fifteen applicable planning standa'rds set forth in the Commission's regulations.
On the final day of the hearing, PGandE offered into evidence its own " update" on the status of State plan compliance with NUREG-0654 criteria, concluding that twenty-six of the deficiencies either remained to be corrected or were the responsibility of the county.
(PGandE Ex. 85.) Provision for the remaining items could, according to PGandE, be found in one of three documents: the State plan, the Operations Plan of the California Office of Emergency Services, or the Emergency Plan and Operations Manual for the Radiological Health Section of the California Department of Health Services. -
zone planning contained in the direct testimony of PGandE personnel.
Those witnesses, however, made no attempt to' demonstrate compliance with the over 100 NUREG-0654 criteria applicable to the State plan, and FEMA representative Eldridge testified that-the State plan has-not even been submitted for FEMA review.
(Tr. 12,7 08. ) Plans for special State jurisdictions within San Luis Obispo -- such as Cal Poly San Luis Obispo, with 16,000 persons on campus on an average school day, and CMC, with 2,400 inmates -- have not been completed (Ness, Tr.
12,495-97), but PGandE once again did not even attempt to supply State testimony on the current status of planning for those institutions.
Finally, PGandE offered no testimony regarding preparedness in counties other than San Luis Obispo (Skidmore, Tr. 11,794, 11,800-01),
despite the fact that Monterey,-Santa Barbara, and Ventura Counties lie within the federal ingestion pathway zone, the State Extended EPZ, or the State ingestion pathway zone-
_ (Skidmore, Shif fer, Tr. 11',795-99) and may as a consequence be called upon to play a supporting or coordinated role in an emergency.
(Skidmore, Tr. 11,818-20; Eldridge, Tr. 12,723; Hubbard-Minor, at 7; PGandE Ex. 80, at I.l(4).)
Thus, the Board has absolutely no basis upon which to conclude that the public residing in those areas will be protected in the event of a radiological emergency at Diablo Canyon.
27.
County Standard Operating Procedures and Letters of Agreement.
We find that the secti'ons of the San Luis Obispo County Draft Plan most in need of further development are those most essential to implementation of its provisions --
O namely, the Standard Operating Procedures
(" SOP") and letters of agreement.
None of the SOPS has l'een finally approved or adopted, eleven have not yet been completed, and an unspecified number of the remainder are undergoing further revision.
(Ness, Tr. 12,458-59, 12,505-06.)
Included among.
those not yet completed are SOPS for the City of Pismo Beach, the City of Arroyo Grande, Grover City, the Cayucos Fire District, the Oceano Fire District, the' South Bay Fire District, the County Agricultural Commissioner, the Atascadero Unified School District, the Cayucos Elementary School District, and Cal Poly San Luis Obispo.
(PGandE Ex.
81; Ness, Tr. 12,545-55.)
Surprisingly absent from this list is the SOP for the City of San Luis Obispo.
In a January 13, 1982 letter to the Board of Supervisors, the Mayor of San Luis Obispo, on behalf of the City Council, requested further time not only to review the SOP prepared by Voorhees for use by the City, but perhaps to amend or even replace that SOP with another to be prepared by the City itself "which more fully reflects the city's resources and capabilities."
(J.I. Ex.
122.)
Such correspondence suggests to the Board that even the-SOPS " completed" by Voorhees are not necessarily workable-or satisfactory to the agencies or entities for which they,were intended.28/
28.
Also critical to implementation of the', San Luis U1/
The Commission's planning standards relevant to this deficiency include, inter alia,10 C.F.R. S 50.47 (b) (1), (2),
(5), (7), and (10).. -
Obispo County Plan are letters of-agreement which are intended to assure the availability of a broad range of resources needed for response to an emergency.
(Skidmore, Tr. 11,803.)
As is apparent from the testimony.of Tim Ness of the San Luis Obispo County Office of Emergency Services, no letters of agreement have been prepared nor,.apparently, have the number or nature of those agreements even been identified:
MR. REYNOLDS:
Is there a section in the County plan for
~
agreements?.
MR. NESS:
Yes, I can't say that there is a section in the plan at the present time for agreements, but we plan on havira a section in the plan which will include agreemenus.
MR. REYNOLDS:
But those are not there at this time?
MR. NESS:
There are no agreements in the plan at the present time.
MR. REYNOLDS:
What kinds of agreements are intended to be included?
MR. NESS:
We plan on conferring-and consulting with, and making contact with various organizations,
-businesses, and-facilities for support related to response to an accidtnt at the nuclear power plant.
We plan on making contacts with federal agencies, state agencies, private businesses such as private contractors for equipment and resources.
We plan on making contacts with such businesses a. banks and gas stations, et cetera.
4 We have not been able to fully identify at the present time, and we are currently working on,that, how many and the nature of those agreements.
MR. REYNOLDS:
And those, the purpose of those agreements, I take it from what you have said, is to assure that -- or to provide support that would be i
necessary to respond in an accident situation?
- 22/
MR. NESS:
Yes.
- 22/
Tr. 12,457, see also Potter, Tr. 11,802-04. -
No mere detail to be deferred, such agreements are an integral part of a workable and effective emergency response.
The Board finds that the County's present intention to address this omission at some unspecified future date is an inadequate response to the Commission's emergency planning requirements.2E/
29.
Public Education.
Neither the State of California nor the County of San Luis Ob'ispo has implemented a public education program as required by 10 C.F.R.
S 50.47 (b) (7),
and, as a consequence, the public understanding of essential emergency response information is virtually nonexistent.
(Ness, Tr.12,566; McElvaine, Tr. 12,249-51; Eldridge, Tr.
12,719-20.)
County Board of Supervisors member William McElvaine, called by PGandE as a witness, described as follows the shocking lack of public education in San Luis obispo County'concerning emergency response to a nuclear accident:
MR. REYNOLDS:
[W]ould you agree that the vast majority of the residents of the County really don't know what the evacuation routes are?
MR. McELVAINE: I'd say that that's probably a safe assumption.1 MR. REYNOLDS:
And they really don't know -- they really wouldn't have any idea what to do in the event of an emergency then?
At this point?
MR. McELVAINE: I'm sure there are some people, but I would say that y'our comment, probably the majority right now are not familiar with what the procedures wouldbe.dl/
EE/
10 C.F.R. S 50.47 (b) (1), (2), and (10).
21/
Tr. 12,251-52. -
Given the recognized relationship between an adequate educational program and effective emergency response (Erikson, Tr. 12,421; Eldridge, Tr. 12,719), the absence of an ongoing public education program sponsored by the County of-San Luis Obispo is inexcusable.
More so than any other of the Commission's planning standards, the requirement for public education on a periodic basis should be satisfied before licensing and operation of the plant in order to allay public concern, achieve the widest possible dissemination of information, and facilitate public response to an accident by eliminating uncertainty as to the appropriate actions to be taken.
Accordingly, the Board finds that the low level of public awareness amdng San Luis Obispo County residents is not only an indictment of the County's failur3 to comply with planning standard (b) (7), but it belies the confidence of PGandE and Staff witnesses that the County's plan can be implemented at all.
30.
Public Response and Plan Implementation.
The Board finds that no attem,it b's been made by PGandE, the State, or 1
the County to determin~ how the public is likely to respond in the event of a radiological emergency at Diablo Canyon.
(Ness, Tr. 12,477; Sears, Tr. 12,671) and, accordingly, that reasonable assurance that the various emergency plans can be implemented does not exist.
A brief discussion of the relevant testimony is useful with respect to this significant deficiency in emergency preparedness for Diablo Canyon.
On behalf of Joint Intervenors, Dr. Kai Erikson, Professor of Sociology at Yale University and Editor of the Yale Review,._
testified extensively about the need for a social and psychological profile of the loca] population as a basis for confidence that the various emergency plans are capable of implementation.
(Erikson, at 10-11.)
Dr. Erikson stated that the most recent draft emergency plan for San Luis Obispo County-and the Voorhees Evc uation Times Estimates prepared for PGandE must be supplemented in two respects:
first, by information about the way people typically respond or are likely to respond in crisis situations involving the risk of radiation or some other form of contamination, and second, by data on the attitudes and outlooks of the people who are expected to aid in the evacuation itself.
(Erikson, at 3.)
With respect to the former, Dr. Erikson described the basis for the deeper and more lasting form of anxiety often provoked by events involving radiation, and he cited the demonstrated tendency (for example, at TMI) of people both to under-and over-react when exposed to an immediate peril (e.g.,
" hyper-vigilance," " counter-disaster syndrome," " evacuation shadow phenomenon," " psychic numbing").
(Erikson, at 4-5. )
He noted also the " role conflict" which persons expected to assist in emergency response may feel between those duties and contrasting family obligations.
(Erikson at 5-6.)
With respect to the second category of information, he testified that a survey of the relevant population could serve as the basis for an examination of the many assumptions made throughout the emergency plans about the way emergency workers and evacuees will behave in an emergency.
(Er ikson, - at 6-10.)]2/
31.
Dr. James Johnson, Professor of Geography at the University of California at Los Angeles, concurred in Dr.
Erikson's conclusions and recommendations, relying primarily on the results of an extensive social survey of TMI-area residents which he and others conducted in the aftermath of the accident.
He de' scribed the significant findings of that survey and concluded that "it is unlikely that the current evacuation plans for Diablo Canyon will work, primarily because they fail to incorporate [the survey's] findings regarding population evacuation behaviot during the TMI accident."
(Johnson, at 7. ) 31/
In order to accommodate those findings, he recommended that a social survey of the J2/
Erikson discussed in detail the unjustified assumptions that: (1) emergency workers who reside within the danger zone can be counted on to report for duty whether or not their own families have assembled and evacuated; (2) emergency workers who reside outside the danger zone will move into it if asked to do so; (3) parents of school-age children will be willing to evacuate without first-hand reassurances that their offspring are being safely conveyed out of the-area; (4) residents will not only believe the warnings they receive but will follow the directives given them by local officials; (5) vehicular traffic will drain out of the danger zone in " preferred evacuation directions"; and (6) drivers will have no other object in mind than to vacate the danger zone along the given roads rather than having particular destinations in mind.
(Erikson, at 6-10.)
22!
Dr. Johnson cited specifically (1) the evacuation of a far greater percentage of the population than was advised to evacuate (144,000 people evacuated, 2,500 advised to do so)
(" evacuation shadow phenomenon"); (2) the failure of the majority of evacuees to utilize evacuation shelters; and (3) the various subjective factors which affect the willingness of evacuees to follow orders regarding evacuation routes, evacuation destinations, and direction of evacuation.
(Johnson, at 2-5. ) _
population residing within a 50-mile radius of the plant should be taken, and he described in detail the design of the survey instrument, the methodology to be employed, and the information to be obtained and incorporated into the emergency plans.
(Johnson, at. 5-6; Tr. 12,418-20.)2S/
32.
The Board finds the testimony.of Drs. Erikson and Johnson compelling.
Neither PGandE nor the Staff even attempted extensive cross-examination od either witness, relying instead on the testimony of Dr. Dennis Mileti, Professor of Sociology at Colorado State University.
Although Dr. Mileti expressed confidence in the ability of the public to respond during a radiological emergency, he conceded that he had no Diablo-specific information to support that 2S!
Dr. Johnson listed the possible uses of the data obtained:
The results of such a survey, combined with data on the institutional population and the physical characteristics of the area, should then be used as a basis for intelligent decision-making.
Specifically, the data could be utilized to (a) describe the population and settlement geographies of the potentially affected area; (b) determine the transportation routes that would be most suitable for evacuation; (c) establish optimal locations for evacuation shelters; (d) predict the movement patterns of evacuees in order to regulate the mass evacuation of an area; (e) plan for the delivery of emergency services and supplies in the evacuation field; (f) create networks for the communication of disaster information and for the delivery of services in the zone of evacuation; and (g) identify the locations that would be most dif ficult to evacuate because of physical constraints, personal immobility, or attitudinal resistance.
(Johnson, at 6-7. ) _ __.___
confidence (Tr. 12,14 6-47 ), that he had no personal knowledge whether PGandE was a credible source of information likely to be believed by the public (Tr. 12,15 6-57 ),- and that the body of knowledge upon which he based his conclusions was derived almost exclusively from non-nuclear emergencies.
Indeed, he did not even address the failure of the Diablo Canyon emergency plans to incorporate the findings of Dr. Johnson and others regarding the public's response'to the onl*/ example of public evacuation from a nuclear power plant accident that Dr.
Mileti could cite -- the TMI accident.
(Mileti, Tr.
12,145-46.)
On the other hand, Dr. Mileti agreed that the kind of survey suggested by Drs. Erikson and Johnson was feasible (Tr. 12,157), that studies of intended behavior do have a purpose (Tr. 12,16 5 ), and that some emergency workers may leave their jobs during an emergency to accompany their families. (Tr. 12,26 5. )
In light of the relevant testimony, the Board finds (1) that some attempt to determine the likely public response to an emergency is an essential prerequisite to a finding of reasonable assurance that the various Diablo Canyon emergency plans are capable of implementation, and (2) that the proposed social and psychological survey is a feasible and appropriate means to do so.31/
33.
Emergency Communications.
The Board finds seriously inadequate the current state of the San Luis Obispo County EE/
The Commission's planning standards relevant to this deficiency include, inter alia, 10 C.F.R. S 50.47 (b) (3), (5),
(7), and (10).
emergency communications system.
County officials McElvaine and Ness both conceded that essential communications equipment has not yet been either acquired or installed (McElvaine, Tr.
12,240; Ness, Tr. 12,459), as did PGandE witness Nevolo (Tr.
12,061-63).
Most telling, however, are the findings and recommendations of the San Luis Obispo County Department of Technical Services in its Five Year Communications Plan (January 1982) (Gov. Brown Ex.10) and'PRC Voorhees in its November 17, 1981 Communications Report (Gov. Brown Ex. 9).
Those documents ir,
,te numerous serious inadequacies in virtually every aspect of the County's communications system that is relevant to the Diablo. Canyon. plant.
Microwave transmitters are inoperative (Gov. Bown Ex.10, at 4),
equipment has never been calibrated (id., a t 5 ), repair equipment is characterized as " totally deficient" ( ijd. ),
capacity is outdated (id., at 6), coastal radio coverage is spotty or nonexistent (id.), and the entire communications system is threatened by the failure of a single fuse (id. ).
The Sheriff's communications systems are described as
" failure-prone" (id., at 10), and his dispatch center is only partially operable because parts have been " cannibalized" in order to maintain any operation at all (id., a t 13 ).
The local government UHF channel -- to be utilized by Health Physics teams in a Diablo Canyon emergency -- has only. limited coverage in Avila Beach, the area of most likely and immediate impact in the event of an accident ([d., a t 19 ).
Finally, as a result of added duties in connection with the Diablo Canyon plant, the county's communications maintenance O
facility is overburdened and understaffed (id., at 28).
Until these serious deficiencies in the communications system and equipment are remedied, the Board concurs in the view of Mr.
McElvaine that full power licensing must not be permitted (T r.
12,256), and we conclude that compliance with 10 C.F.R.
S50.47 (b) (6) and (8) does not exist.25!
34.
Outline of Deficiencies.
These and other principal deficiencies in compliance with 10 C.F.R. -S 50.47 (b) and NUREG-0654 are summarized briefly as follows:
(A)
Assignment of Resoonsibility (Organization Control)
(1)
Although this planning standard explicitly requires assignment of primary responsibilities by " State 25/
County Board of Supervisors member McElvaine testified as follows:
MR. LANPHER:
Supervisor McElvaine, I believe you stated that in your opinion, there is a need to obtain the additional equipment.
.before you personally believe that the plan is workable, is that a fair statement?
MR. McELVAINE: It may not have to be on hand right on the day of adoption of the plan, but it is going to have to be there within a reasonable period of time, and unlike most County documents that set policy, that are never followed up on, I believe that should not be the case with this document.
MR. LANPHER:
Would it be fair to say that you would certainly want to see the equipment you have referenced in place and operative before the plant operates?
MR. McELVAINE: Before any full power license, I would say yes.
Tr. 12,256. _.
and local organizations within the Emergency Planning Zones" (emphasis added), no evidence was presented regarding the Santa Barbara, Monterey, or Ventury County emergency response organizations.
(Skidmore, Tr.
11,794.)
(2)
State and local plans contain no letters of agreement.
(J.I. Ex.120; PGandE Ex. 85; Ness, Tr.
12,457; Potter, Tr.-11,802-04.)
(3)
PGandE, State and County standard operating procedures are not complete.
(Eldridge, 12,708; Ness, Tr. 12,458-59, 12,505-06; Hubbard-Minor, at 7-9.)
(4)
Santa Barbara County Plan is not complete.-
(Skidmore, Tr. 11,818-20.)
(5)
State plan is not in compliance with applicable regulations.
(J.I. Ex. 120.)
(6)
None of affected local jurisdictions have signed off or approved the SLO County Plan.
(McElvaine, Tr. 12,249; Ness, Tr. 12,463-64.)
(B)
Onsite Emergency organization (1)
Information presented in PGandE on-site plan, sections 5.1.7 and 5.2.1 and Table 5.2-1, is not sufficient to allow an evaluation of the staffing requirements of NUREG-0654, Table B-1.
The requirements of Table B-1 should be explicitly addressed.
(NRC Ex.
34.)
(2)
PGandE has not prepared for the contingency that during an accident licensed operators will leave the site should their families be forced to evacuate.
(J. I.
Ex. 119; Shiffer, Tr. 11,908-09.)
Such preparation was recommended by the NRC Staff I&E TMI Investigation Report (J. I. E x. 119), at 34.
(3)
PGandE does not comply with NUREG-0654 (b) (2) staffaugmentationregyirement.foreveningsandweekends.
(Skidmore, Tr. 11,827-28.)
(4)
Emergency Operating Procedures revision pursuant to NUREG-0737 requirements has not been completed.
(Shif fer, Tr. 11,825-26.)
(5)
PGandE Emergency Operating Procedures fail to provide the-operators with information as to the qualification status of equipment (i.e., whether safety-grade or nonsafety grade). (Hubbard-Minor, at 15-16. )
(C)
Emergency Response Support and Resources (1)
State and County plans contain no letters of agreement, and necessary support resources have not even been identified.
(J.I. Ex. 120; PGandE Ex. 85; Ness, Tr.
12,457; Potter, Tr. 11,802-04.)
(2)
State plan contains no detail as to extent of i
Federal assistance or times of arrival.
(J.I.
Ex. 120; PGandE Ex. 85.)
(3)
No evidence was presented regarding the degree of preparedness in counties other than San Luis Obispo County, and Santa Barbara County has only recently begun its planning process.
(Skidmore, Tr.11,794; Santa Barbara County resolution, Tr. 11,940-42.).
(4)
San Luis Obispo, Pismo Beach, Arroyo Grande, and Grover City -- all of which constitute supporting organizations -- have not completed SOPS; none of the cities or other supporting organizations in San Luis Obispo County has. adopted the county plan or.the applicable SOPS.
(Skidmore, Tr. 11,821-22; SLO County resolution and letter, Tr. 12,248; McElvaine, Tr. 12,249; Ness, 12,454-56, 12,463-64.)
(5)
The SLO County Plan improperly assumes that emergency workers outside the danger zone will move into it if asked to do so.
(Erikson, at 8.)
(D)
Emergency Classification' System (1)
The existing classification system failed to accomplish prompt public notification during the August 19, 1981 emergency planning exercise.
(Shif f er,
Tr.ll,805-11, 11,832-36.) In order to assure that~the public will be notified promptly, the classification system should require notification preferably at the Alert level, but as a minimum at the Site Area Emergency level.
Even PGandE witness Shiffer acknowledged that the latter would be prudent.
(Tr. 11,8 36-4 0. )
(2)
PGandE's emergency classification system is not in total compliance with the NUREG-0654 re~uirements.
(NRC Ex. 34.)
(E)
Notification Methods and Procedures (1)
No evidence was offered regarding Stute -
compliance with applicable criteria.'
(Skidmore, Tr.
12,119-20.) State ~ plan does not' comply with applicable NUREG-0654 criteria.
(J.I. _ Ex. 120. )
(2)
Notification capability withLthe Early Warning Siren System has never'been 'emonstrated._
(Shiffer, Tr.
d 12,126.)
(3)
EWS sirens are. located only in the Basic EPZ, although the San'Luis-Obispo. County plan states that.
evacuation of the~ Extended EPZ may be a necessary_
protective action.
(Skidmore,' Tr.12,124; PGandE Ex.
~
80, at I.3 (4).) Notification beyond the Basic EPZ is only on an a_d hoc basis.
(Ness, Tr. 12,485. )
(4)
Cascade or sequential warning system is used for county workers (Shif fer, Tr. 12,121; Ness, Tr.
l'2,490) in violation of NUREG-0654.
(NUREG-0654, App. ' 3, at.3-7: " Warning points cannot be encumbered by sequential call down processes nor_can response organizations accept the time lost by such processes.")
(5)
The EWS siren system may_be inadequate to notify persons inside large structures -- e.g.,
schools, hospitals, detention facilities -- or in areas-of high volume.
(PGandE Ex. 73 (PGandE Onsite Emergency Plan),-
at 7.2.2.1-B; Tr. 12,130-31.) -Alternative notification devices --
e.g.,
tone alerts -- have not been provided to all such institutions.
(Skidmore, Tr.
12,131.)
(6)
No means currently exist for notification of the deaf.
(Godf rey, Tr. 12,127.) _,
'^
(7)
The only backup system for notification is by
~ telephone and door-to-door by Sheriff.
(S kidmore,
~
Shiffer, Tr. 12,133.')
Neither the EWS nor the backup system was tested during the August 19 exercise.
(Skidmore, Tr. 11,882-94.)
(8)
During the August 19 exercise, prompt j.
notification of the public was not even simulated successfully since the. sirens were'not assumed to sound i
until an hour after the highest classification level --
General Emergency -- had been reached..Shiffer, Tr.
11,832-36.)
(9)
PGandE has failed to demonstrate that.the NUREG-0654 requirements for notification of 100% of the population within the required time can be met at'Diablo Canyon.
(Shif fer, - Godf rey, Skidmore, Tr. 12,126-33.)
(10) Alerting of.the public by sirens should be mandatory preferably at the Alert stage, but as a minimum at the Site Area Emergency Stage in order to assure that t
the public will be notified promptly.
(11) Reliance upon the telephone as a backup notification system to the EWS siren system provides inadequate assurance of safety in that (a) the phone system -- characterized as " Pathetic Tel" in a memorandum by FEMA representative Eldridge (J.I. Ex. 126)' -- is insufficiently reliable, and (b) the capability of,the phone system to support the number of calls reasonably anticipated in an emergency has not been studied.or demonstrated.
(Ness, Tr. 12,494; Eldridge, Tr. 12,718.) __
(12) PGandE has failed to provide reasonable assurance that the public can and will be promptly notified in the event of a radiological emergency at Diablo Canyon.
(F)
Emergency Communications 2/
3 (1)
None of the responsible emergency response organizations has established reliable primary or backup emergency communications systems.
The San Luis Obispo County Department of Technical Services cited numerous deficiencies in the existing system in its Five Year Communications Plan (January 1982), many attributable to the added functions and strain necessitated by the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant.
The implementation of necessary disaster communications facilities due to the Diablo Canyon plant has resulted in an overburdened and understaffed communications maintenance facility.
(Gov.
Brown Ex. 10, at 28.)
(2)
Because of the Diablo Canyon plant, the county's communications system is now required to perform-functions for which it was not originally des'igned.
(Id.
at li.)
(3)
The microwave system is the backbone of the county's radio system.
Problems include:
(a) incperable links between radio sites such 32/
See discussion supra at 1 33.,
i that if the Cuesta Peak transmitter becomes s
inoperable, other transmitters are lost as well; (b) a lack of test equipment for use in calibrating and aligning the microwave system, such that the microwave equipment has never been calibrated; (c) a total def'ciency in equipment necessary' to maintain the microwave system; (d) an inadequate microwave vault at the Sheriff's Department, such that if one fuse is blown the entire communications system would fail; (e) a lack of channel capacity for expansion of the system; (f) a need for an additional site to provide coverage to the coastal area from Cayucos to Nipomo; and (g) a need to improve security at all sites.
(Gov. Brown Ex. 10, at 4-7.)
(4)
Failures in the Sheriff's comunications system are becoming increasingly frequent, and the i
system is in need of replacement.
(Id.. at 10-11. )
(5)
The Sheriff's Dispatch Center, which is a vital.
link in the public safety communications system of San Luis-Obispo County, is only partially operable and is in a poor state of operation due to " cannibalization" of essential parts.
(Ijl., at 13. )
4
, 4
(6)
Medical Communications System base stations must be installed in order to provide for the dispatch of ambulances without the use of telephones.-
QBl., at 14-15.)
(7)
The Local Government UHF radio system, which willbeusedbyhealth;physicsteamsinaDiabloCanyon emergency, provides spotty or nonexistent coverage in the
, including.Avila northern and southern ends of the County, (I_d., at 19. )
d Beach.
(8)
An. emergency pager system must be installed to notify hospitals, schools, etc., of a disaster without relying on telephone communications.
QQl. at 22.)
(9)
In order to accommodate the added burden of the Diablo Canyon plant, the following improvements in the communications system area necessary:
(a) replacement of the Sheriff's Dispatch Center and relocation to a more secure and private area; (b) replacement.the older tube-type radio equipment which broadcasts the blue, yellow, and red channels for law enforcement; (c) increase communications staff from 2-1/2 positions to 3-1/2 positions; (d) add one more communications vehicle to allow the communications staff to travel to two remote communications sites at one time; (e) provide adequate test equipment to maintain the microwave system; (f) improve the microwave vault at the Sheriff's Department to adequately house the microwave equipment and at all sites to provide a more secure environment; (g) add one additional microwave site to provide better coverage to the coastal areas of the County.
This will also require additional multiplexor capabilities on the enti.re microwave system;.
(h) complete the microwave link from Black Mountain to Tepesquet Peak.
(Id. at 11-i11. )
(10) Phones 2re used for the bulk of emergency worker notification.
(Shif f er, Tr. 12,057. )
Phones cannot be depended on in emergency situations.
(J. I. Ex.
126; Gov. Brown Ex. 10, at 22.)
(11) Necessary communications equipment -- e.g.,
portable radio equipment, microwave voice channel, new transmitters --- are not all in place.
(Nevolo, Tr.
12,061-63; McElvaine, Tr. 12,240; Ness, Tr. 12,459.).
(G)
Public Education and InformationSE!
(1)
Public education is'a critical aspect of emergency response.
(Eldridge, Tr. 12,719; Erikson, Tr.
12,421.) NUREG-0654 criteria apply to all three levels of SE/
See discussion supra at 1 29.
i-.
o omergency response organizations.
(Shif fer, Tr. 12,14 0. )
(2)
Neither the State of California nor San Luis Obispo County has implemented a public education program, and the public understanding of essential emergency response information is virtually nonexistent.
(Ness, Tr. 12,566; McElvaine,' Tr. 12,249-51; Eldridge, Tr.
12,719-20.)
(3)
PGandE's public education program is not in compliance with FEMA Guidance Memorandum No.
19, regarding media contacts and public education.
PGandE has relied upon press briefings rather than personal visits with the media accompanied by FEMA and local government personnel.
(J.I. Ex. 121, at 8-9; Baxter, Tr.
12,143-44.)
(4)
No evidence was offered regarding PGandE's credibility with the general public as a source of information.
However, PGandE's January 1982 Diablo Canyon Newsletter erroneously suggests that the public will be notified at the alert stage when, in fact, the existing classification system does not make notification through use of the sirens mandatory until the general emergency stage.
(PGandE Panel 2, attachment 11.)
Such erroneous information has no place in a proper public education program and will not enhance PGandE's credibility as a source of information during an emergency.
(6)
A social and psychological survey of San Luis Obispo County residents would be invaluable in devising __
and implementing a public education program for the county.
(Er ikson, Tr. 12,4 28; Johnson, Tr. 12,4 29. ) Such a survey is feasible.
(Mileti, Tr.12,157; Erikson, at 10-11; Johnson, at 5-6, Tr. 12,418-20.)
~
(H)
Emergency Facilities and Equipment
~
(1)
The interim emergency operation facility
(" EOF") -- including the UDAC -- is housed in a trailer, and the permanent facility is not projected for completion until 1983.
(Skidmore, Tr. 11,289-30.) Until the permanent facility is completed, the functions and capabilities of the EOF and UDAC cannot be relied upon during adverse environmental conditions.
(2)
The operational support center ("OSC") is the largest primary assembly area for onsite personnel in the event of an emergency and may accommodate approximately 200 people.
(Kaefer, Tr. 11,904-05.) Currently only two emergency kits are stored in the OSC, in violation of the explicit NUREG-0654 requirement that specific equipment be stored there, including respiratory equipment, protective clothing, portable lighting, monitoring equipment, cameras, and communications equipment.
(Shif f er, Tr. 11,096; NUREG-0654, II.H.9. )
(3)
The State plan is not in compliance with the applicable NUREG-0654' criteria.
(J.I. Ex. 120.)
(4)
Neither the State nor the County has independent radiation monitors onsite, thus necessitating total reliance on PGandE to monitor and report onsite.
9
-s
radiation releases and to provide prompt notification of an emergency at the plant.
(Shif fer, Tr.11,907; Ness, Tr. 12,503.)
(5)
During the August 19 exercise, information was not distributed promptly from the EOF to UDAC.
(Keywor th, Tr. 11,915. )
This is critical because UDAC does not have EARS capability.
(Keyworth, Tr.
11,913-15.)
(6)
Not all equipment necessary to respond to a radiological emergency is currently in place, including UDAC equipment, health department vehicle radios, and communications equipment.
(McElvaine, Tr. 12,240; Ness, Tr. 12,459; Gov. Brown Ex. 10.)
(7)
The EOF, TSC, and OSC do not now comply with the requirements of NUREG-0696, NUREG-0654, and 10 C.F.R.
S 50.47 (b) (8).
(NRC Ex. 3 4, a t 11. )
(I)
Accident Assessment (1)
The problem inherent to the UDAC during an emergency is one of great time pressure to perform complicated but accurate calculations that will result in protective action recommendations that fit the immediate situation.
(FEMA Exercise Review, at II-9.)
County personnel don't perform the UDAC calculations in the course of their normal employment, and they receive only annual drills. (Keyworth, Tr. 11,926.)
This is not adequate to assure prompt, accurate, or effective functioning of the UDAC. B im
,_m
o (2). State plan does not comply with all applicable NUREG-0654 criteria.
(J. I. Ex. 120. )
(3)
The State, County, and EOF rely on PGandE plant vent monitor readings for release estimates.
PGandE procedures, however, do not specify how to calculate the error band.
In fact, PGandE hasn't quantified the error band, and some readings may not be very accurate.
There may be a 10% to 50% error band for the vent monitors.
(Shiffer, Boots, Tr. 11,952-59.)
The size of this error band precludes confidence that releases can and will be promptly and accurately assessed during an emergency at the plant.
(4)
PGandE hasn't quantified the error band-for deposition velocity of the plume, plume height, or dispersion prediction., (Shif fer, Tr. 11,963. )
(5)
PGandE has failed to demonstrate (a) compliance with applicable accident monitoring instrumentation guidance (Reg. Guide 1.97, Rev. 2) and (b) that adequate accident monitoring instrumentation equipment to support emergency response is provided, maintained, and in use.
(Hubbard-Minor, at 17-18. ) PGandE's plan does not comply with all applicable NUREG-0654 requirements.
(NRC Ex.
34.)
(6)
Neither the State nor County has independent radiation monitors onsite, thus necessitating total reliance on PGandE to monitor aad report onsite radiation releases and to provide prompt notification of an emergency at the plant.
(Shif fer, Tr. 11,907; Ness, Tr.
12,503.)
(7)
The Board finds that adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition are not in use.
(J )
Protective ResponseEE/
(1)
The Board finds that PGandE has failed to demonstrate that the onsite, State, and local emergency plans are capable of being implemented or that effective protective actions exist which can and will be taken in the event of an emergency at Diablo Canyon.
(2)
The State plan does not comply with all applicable NUREG-0654 criteria.
(J.I. Ex. 120; PGandE Ex. 85. )
(3)
The State and local plans (including San Luis Obispo and Santa Barbara Counties) are not complete in significant respects, including SOPS and letters of agreement.
(see discussion supra at 11 27-28.)
(4)
PGandE, the Staff, the State, and the County have failed even to attempt to determine the likely public response to a radiological emergency at Diablo Canyon.
(Ness, Tr. 12,477; Sears, Tr. 12,671; Erikson, at 2-11; Johnson, at 2-5.)
Therefore, no reasonable EE/
See discussion supra at 11 27, 28, and 30-32.
assurance' exists that (a) the various plans can be implemented, (b) the public will respond calmly and as assumed in the plans, (c) emergency workers will report for duty and remain on duty, (d) residents will believe the warnings or instructions given them by PGandE or County authorities, (e) evacuees will follow designated evacuation routes, (f) parents of school-age children will evacuate without their children, (g) those persons within the designated evacuation zones will follow orders regarding evacuation routes, evacuation destinations, and direction of evacuation, and (h) persons outside the designated evacuation zones will not evacuate r.rematurely, thereby complicating or delaying evacuation of others.
(Erikson, at 6-10; Johnson, at 2-5; see discussion supra at 11 30-32.)
(5)
During the TMI evacuation, approximately 144,000 persons evacuated despite the fact that only 2,500 persons were covered by the evacuation advisory, and few of the evacuees utilized designated evacuation shelters or stopped at designated evacuation destinations.
(Johnson, at 2-3. )
None of the TMI experience regarding public response to a radiological emergency has been incorporated into the Diablo Canyon local emergency plans.
(Johnson, at 3-5; Erikson, at 2-11.)
(6)
A social and psychological survey of local residents conducted by an interdisciplinary research team of sociologists, psychologists, and geographers is -
feasibic (Johnson, Tr. 12,418-20; Erikson, at 10-11; Mileti, Tr. 12,~157 ) and would provide useful information regarding the socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, daily activity patterns, images and attitudes, and disaster decision-making processes of the local population.
The results of the survey could be used, for example, to determine evacuation routes, establish optimal locations for shelters, predict movement patterns of evacuees, plan for the delivery of emergency services and supplies, and identify problem areas for evacuation.
(Johnson, at 6-7; Erikson, at 10-11.)
(7)
Evacuation plans which take for granted the readiness of emergency workers to report for duty and fail to consider and allow for the public evacuation behavior of the type demonstrated during the TMI accident run an unacceptably high risk of failure.
(Erikson, at 6; Johnson, at 7.)
(8)
The general evacuation principles discusssed and relied upon by Dr. Mileti were not borne out at TMI and do not necessarily apply to an emergency involving a radiation hazard.
Therefore, generalizations of the kind made by Dr. Mileti verge on the reckless.
(Erikson, Tr.
12,409, 12,411, 12,423-24; Johnson, Tr. 12,412.)
(9)
Surveys of intended behavior do have a purpose.
(Mileti, Tr.12,157; Erikson, passim; Johnson, passim.)
While such a survey is not 100% predictive, the survey would be a great deal more reliable than the absence of any information at all or information generalized from events not necessarily comparable.
(Erikson, Tr.
12,425-26.)
The information to be derived from the proposed survey would have been useful in erergency response to the TMI accident.
(Erikson, Tr. 12,434. )
(10) The evacuation times estimates set forth in the San Luis Obispo Draft Plan, Revision B, and the Voorhees Evacuation Times Assessments, Phase I and Phase II, are unrealistic in that they assume generally optimum conditions with little, if any, complications, and hence they do not constitute a sufficiently reliable basis upon which to determine and implement protective actions in the event of a radiological emergency at Diablo Canyon.
The basis for this conclusion includes the following:
(a) the estimates assume optimum traffic flow and capacity on the primary evacuation routes, Highway 101 and 1 (PGandE Ex. 80, at 1.5 (4); Winslow, Tr.
12,202).
This ignores the conceded fact that there is no way to assure that the freeway will not become clogged in an emergency (Urbanik, Tr. 12,394);
(b) the estimates assume no lane blockage, no accidents, and no stalled vehicles (Winslow, Tr.
12,195-96, 12,202);
(c) the estimates assume no failures in highway access control by California Highway Patrol (PGandE Ex. 80, at I.5 (4));
(d) the estimates do not consider a heavy fog or flooding scenario (Winslow, Tr. 12,205; Urbanik, Tr. 12,400);
(e) the estimates assume that the'public.is aware at all times of the emergency condition and evacuation orders (Winslow, Tr. 12,208);
(f) the estimates unjustifiably assume rational public behavior and obedience to orders throughout the evacuation and that drivers will behave more responsibly during an emergency than during normal conditions (Winslow, Tr. 12,212, 12,222);
(g) the estimates fail to include any accident that could not be cleared in 10 to 15 minutes (Urbanik, 12,388);
(h) the estimates supply no basis for the assumption that accidents would cause only a negligible increase in evacuation times; (i) the estimates fail to calculate the availability or number of ambulances or vehicle 1
[
trips needed to evacuate the handicapped (Urbanik, Tr. 12,392);
i (j) the estimates fail to calculate the availability or number of busses necessary to l
evacuate the carless, school, or institutionalized populations (Urbanik, Tr. 12,392);
i (k) the estimates fail to incorporate complications resulting from evacuation by persons dutside the designated evacuation zone (Urbanik, Tr.
12,399; Johnson, at 4, 7). l i
(11) The public response to the TMI accident --
e.g., evacuation shadow phenomenon -- was not addressed in the evacuation times estimates or in the San Luis Obispo County Plan.
(Johnson, at 4-5, 7. )
(12) None of the plans adequately considers evacuation complications arising from flooding or a major earthquake.
(13) The County has not adequately prepared for the evacuation of the handicapped.
(McElvaine, Tr. 12,24 5. )
(14) PGandE, the State of California, and San Luis Obispo County have not attempted to estimate the number of emergency workers necessary to evacuate the population within the Basic EPZ.
(Ness, Tr. 12,468; Keyworth, Tr.
11,932.) No survey has been conducted to determine the availability of County workers for duty during a radiological emergency.
(Ness, Tr. 12,477. ) The ' County has not yet resolved a labor dispute with its employees regarding duties to be performed by those workers during a radiological emergency.
(Ness, Tr. 12,477; J.I.
Ex.
123.)
The Board finds, therefore, that there is no assurance (1) that sufficient emergency workers will be available to respond to an emergency at Diablo Canyon and (2) that adequate supplies are available to equip such workers.
(15) The principal alternate evacuation route for the Diablo Canyon plant is an essential element of the onsite plan.
(Sears, Tr. 12,671. )
During heavy rains, however, it is impassable even by four-wheel-drive __
vehicles due to mud.
(Sears, Tr. 12,649. )
The Board disagrees with Staff witness Sears' conclusion that this route constitutes a " viable" evacuation route.
(Tr.
12,667.) Moreover, we find incredible PGandE witness Shiffer's testimony that other adequate alternate evacuation routes exist in light of his prior affidavit to the effect that those other routes are "not traversable with-land vehicles, especially in bad weather.
(Tr. 12,791. )
(16) The repeated suggestion by PGandE and the county that sheltering is a viable protective action is insufficiently justified in light of the fact that sheltering in a single-story house reduces exposure by only ten percent.
(Eldridge, Tr. 12,752. )
Earlier notification and evacuation is necessary, therefore, to provide maximum protection to the public.
(17) The San Luis Obispo County plan does not adequately provide for use, quantities, storage, or distribution of radio protective drugs, particularly to l
those persons expected to remain during an emergency to assist in evacuation.
(McElvaine, Tr. 12,245; Skidmore, Tr. 11,933-34; Boots, Tr. 11,933; Ness, Tr. 12,500.)
l (18) Excessive reliance on the phone system for notification of emergency workers, evacuation of carless and institutionalized persons, and rumor control j
threatens the health and safety of the public in the I
event the phone system becomes inoperable.
(Gov. Brown, Ex. 10 at 22; J.I. Ex. 126.) l l
i
(19) Neither the San Luis Obispo County Plan nor the Voorhees Evacuation Times Estimates study accurately calculates the number or availability of. vehicles to evacuate the carless population, institutionalized persons, the handicapped, and school populations.
The origin of the vehicles and the number of trips necessary-are ignored, perhaps o the mistaken assumption that the difficulty of calculation justifies the failure to' plan for this sizeable segment of the population.
On the contrary, planning is particularly necessary for such individuals to assure that their special transportation requirements can and will be met promptly.
(20) PGandE's onsite plan does not comply with all applicable NUREG-0654 criteria.
(NRC Ex. 34.)
(21) In light of PGandE's failure to present evidence regarding emergency preparedness in the ingestion pathway EPZ, this Board finds no basis to conclude that protective actions for such EPZ have been developed.
l (22) Based on the foregoing, the Board finds that a j
range of viable protective actions for the plume exposure EPZ has not yet been developed.
l (K)
Radiological Exposure Control (1)
State plan does not comply with all applicable l
NUREG-0654 requirements.
(J.I. Ex. 120; PGandE Ex. 85.)
(2)
The County has planned no radiological training for emergency workers to protect themselves from excessive exposure.
(Ness, Tr.
12,475.) Further training of the lower echelon emergency workers is nect,ssa ry.
(McElvaine, Tr.
12,224.)
(3)
The San Luis Obispo county plan does.not adequately provide for use, quantities, storage, or distribution of radio protective drugs, particularly to those persons expected to remain during an emergency to assist in an evacuation.
(McElvaine, Tr.,
12,245; Skidmore, Tr. 11,933-34; Boots, Tr. 11,933; Ness, Tr.
12,500.)
(4)
PGandE's onsite plan does not comply with all applicable NUREG-0654 criteria.
(NRC Ex. 34, at 14.)
(L)
Medical and Public Health Support (1)
State plan does not comply with all applicable NUREG-0654 criteria.
(J.I. Ex.120; PGandE Ex. 85.)
(2)
The County has only ten to twelve available j
ambulances, and of the 275 doctors in the county, only 90 have received decontamination training.
(Shiffer, Skidmore, Tr. 12,666-67.) Neither the State nor County plan contains letters of agreement to augment these resources.
(J. I. E x. 120; PGandE Ex. 85; Ness, Tr.
12,457; Potter, Tr. 11,802-04.)
No estimate of the doctors necessary to respond to a radiological emergency I
having major off-site consequences has been prepared.
i (Shif fer, Tr. 12,071.)
Although FEMA witness Eldridge
\\
j cited French and Sierra Vista Hospitals as those to be relied upon in the event of an accident, he was not even t
aware whether Sierra Vista Hospital has decontamination facilities.
(Eldr idge, Tr. 12,751. ) No drills have been held involving pickup and treatment of persons offsite.
(Shif fer, Tr. 12,072-73.)
(3)
In light of the foregoing, the Board finds no reasonable assurance that the county has adequate medical resources to respond to a radiological emergency at Diablo Canyon.
(M)
Recovery and Reentry (1)
Staff and PGandE onsite plans do not comply with all applicable NUREG-0654 criteria.
(J.I. Ex. 120; PGandE Ex. 85; NRC Ex. 34.)
(2)
PGandE has not even attempted to estimate the costs of recovery and reentry after a major accident.
(Shif fer, Tr. 11,955.)
Although reentry may not be possible for years following such a disaster, and extensive long-term relocation may be necessary, no consideraton has been given to the financial costs of such consequences.
(Shif fer, Tr. 11,996-97, 12,001.)
(3)
The State has principal responsibility for offsite recovery and reentry planning.
(Skidmore, - Tr.
I 12,003.)
State Office of Emergency Service, Deputy Director John Kearns testified at his deposition in'this proceeding in December 1981 that the plans for recovery and reentry were not adequate at this time.
(Skidmore, Tr. 12,005.) l l
(4)
The County has not estimated the cost of maintaining an adequate level of emergency response when J
PGandE no longer provides funding.
(Ness, Tr. 12,50 4. )
The County now has three personnel working full time on emergency response planning..
(Nes s, 12,5 08. )
The Board finds inadequate assurance that the County of San Luis Obispo is able or willing to assume the costs of recovery and reentry in the event of a major accident at Diablo Canyon.'
(N)
Exercises and Drills (1)
The August 19, 1981 emergency planning exercise failed to test as much of the relevant emergency plans as is reasonably achievable.
Specifically, it was deficient in numerous respects, including, but not necessarily linited to, the following:
(a) only the upper echelon personnel were involved (McElvaine, Tr. 12,253; Eldridge, Tr.-
12,725);
(b) with the exception of Morro Bay, none of i'
the cities in the County participated as players (Ness, Tr. 12,527);--
(c) the current PGandE onsite plan and current
[
draft of the San Luis Obispo County Plan were not available during the exercise (Skidmore, Tr.
11,881);
(d) neither the EWS siren system nor a backup wrrning and notification system was utilized l 1
(Skidmore, Tr. 11,882-94);
(e)
CMC and Cal Poly San Luis Obispo were not involved as players (i!.; Serpa, Tr. 12,790);
(f) only 45 persons were evacuated (Skidmore,
Tr. 11,882-94);
(g) only one vehicle used Highway 101 as an evacuation route (M.);
(h) no critical equipment was assumed to fail (M.);
(i) no adverse weather conditions were assumed (M.);
(j) the northern evacuation route was not utilized (id.);
(k) no shortage of emergency workers was assumed (id.);
4 (1) only one minor medical. complication was assumed (id.); and (m) evacuation, notification, and coordination with cities -- all basic elements of emergency response -- were not test 6d (Eldridge, Tr. 12,737).
(2)
In addition to the foreging deficiencies in the exercise scenario, numerous problems requiring corrective actions were cited by FEMA and by the State Office of Emergency Services.
(FEMA Exercise Report; J.I. Ex.
124.)
(3)
No evacuation drill involving membe'rs of the public as participants is planned.
(McElvaine, Tr.. -.
12,253.)
(4)
San Luis Obispo County has not even attempted to estimate the percentage of County workers trained to perform their functions under the County's SOPS.
(Necs,
Tr. 12,477.)
(5)
State plan does not comply with all applicable NUREG-0654 requirements criteria. (J. I. Ex. 120. )
(0)
Radiological Emergency Response Training (1)
State and PGandE onsite plans do not comply with all applicable NUREG-0654 criteria.
(J.I. Ex. 120; PGandE Ex. 85; NRC Ex. 34.0 (2)
State and local plans do not provide for training specified in NUREG-0654 nor is such training planned.
Specifically, no training is planned for auto repair, phone assistance, EBS personnel, and other emergency workers other than monitoring personnel.
(Ness, Tr.12,224; Skidmore, Tr.
12,030-32.)
l (3)
Further training of the lower echelon emergency I
response personnel is necessary.
(McElvaine, Tr.
12,224.)
t (P)
Responsibility for Planning Effort: Development and Periodic Review and Distribution of Emergency Plans I
(1)
State and PGandE onsite plan do not comply with all applicable NUREG-0654 criteria.
(J. I. Ex.
120; l
PGandE Ex. 85; NRC Ex. 34.)
(2)
San Luis Obispo County has not committed to
fund plan development and review to maintain an adequate level of emergency preparedness.
(Skidmore, Tr. 11,841.)
_(3)
State and County plans have not been completed, including SOPS and letters of agreement.
(See discussion supra at 11 27-28.)
35.
The Board rejects the testimony of PGandE's Panel 11 regarding the factual basis for the dimensions of the State of California emergency planning zones for Diablo Canyon.
As is evident from the extensive study by the State of California Office of Emergency Services entitled " Emergency Planning Zones for Serious Nuclear Power Plant Accidents" (November -
1980) (Gov. Brown Ex. 8), the State zones were determined after detailed consideration of the unique characteristics of
~
the Diablo Canyon facility and its surrounding geographic region, including topographical, meteorological, and demographic conditions.
As a matter of policy, we will not sanction PGandE now seeking to relitigate those State agency l
findiags, particularly in light TNE the fact that-PGandE l
participated in the original State proceeding.
(Shif f er,
Tr. 11,845.)
Moreover, as a factual matter, contrary to the suggestion of PGandE's Panel 11, we find that the dinensions of I
the' State zones have a substantial factual basis which is set forth in Governor Brown's Exhibit 8.
One example, regarding
)
(
Diablo Canyon's site specific meteorological conditions, is illustrative:
[I]n many critical sectors [around the Diablo Canyon site] the more hazardous, stable conditions l
are most probable.
This is particularly
). i P
noteworthy for the NW sector (wind blowing toward the SE -- the most probable wind direction at Diablo Canyon) where stable conditions are observed over'60% of the time.
Thus, when the wind blows in this direction, it frequently blows at relatively high velocities.
.for extended periods and under stable conditions.
If these conditions occurred simultaneously during the course of an accident, relatively large doses could be induced at large distances from the facility.
Gov. Brown Ex. 8, at 18 (emphasis added).
In view of such findings, we cannot second guess the determination of the State Office of Emergency Services as to the s'ize of emergency planning zor.es minimally necessary to protect the public in the event of an accident at Diablo Canyon.
D.
Summary 36.
Based on the foregoing discussion and extensive delineation of deficiencies in emergency preparedness, the Board finds that the combined applicant, State, and local emergency response plans for Diablo Canyon are incomplete and fail to comply in numerous significant respects with the Commission's emergency response planning requirements.
Such noncompliance extends to each of the Commission's sixteen planning standards (10 C.F.R. 5 50.47 (b) ) and consists of deficiencies in manpower, equipment, facilities, training, coordination, plan development, organization, and planning scope and policy (i.e., failure to address earthquake complications and unjustified reliance on assumed public response).
We find further that PGandE has failed to demonstrate that the existing plans can be implemented and that adequate protective actions can and will be taken in the event of an emergency at Diablo Canyon.
III. EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANNING -- CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 37.
PGandE, as the applicant, has the burden of proof to demonstrate compliance with all applicable regulations.
10 C.F.R. SS 2.732, 50.57.
38.
Intervenors may properly build their case on the basis of cross-examination.
In the Matter of Tennessee Valley Authority (Hartsville Nuclear Plant, Units lA, 2A, 1B, and 2B), ALAB-463, 7 NRC 341, 356 (1978); In the Matter of Commonwelath Edison co. (Zion Station, Units 1 and 2),
ALAB-226, 8 AEC 381, 389 (1974).
39.
The Board concludes that PGandE has failed to meet its burden of proof that (1) the Diablo Canyon combined applicant, State, and local emergency response plans comply with the Commission's regulations or (2) the deficiencies in compliance are not significant for Diablo Canyon during full power operation, adequate interim compensating actions have f
been or will be taken promptly, or other compelling reasons exist to permit plant operation.
10 C.F.R. S 50.47.
40.
The absence of compliance with 10 C.F.R. S 50.47 precludes findings by this Board that (a) the state of onsite and offsite emergency preparedness provides reasonable assurance that adequate l
protective measures can and will be taken in the event of I
a radiological emergency; (b) the facility will operate in conformity with the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C.
SS 2011 et seq., and regulations of the Commission; (c) there is reasonable assurance (1) that the activities authorized by the operating licenses can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; and (d) the issuance of the requested licenses will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
10 C.F.R. S 50.57.
41.
The Board concludes that the failure of the relevant emergency plans to consider or allow for the effects of a major earthquake on emergency response to a radiological emergency at Diablo Canyon violates the Commission's regulatons.
Section 50.47 (a) (1) of 10 C.F.R. Part 50 prohibits issuance of an operating license unless reasonable assurance exists that " adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency."
Section 50.47 (a) (2) requires a finding that State and local plans are " adequate and capable of being implemented."$S/
Neither standard is satisfied at this time at Diablo Canyon because, notwithstanding the recognized exceptional seismic SE!
See also NUREG-0654, Protective Response, II. J.
10.K, at 63, which requires in State and local emergency plans
" identification of and means for dealing with potential impediments.
.to use of evacuation routes, and contingency measures." l_
risk associated with the area in which the plant is located,$1/ the existing plans fail to address either (a) the complications of earthquakes on emergency response -- e.g.,
obstructed evacuation routes and broken communications lines
-- or (b) what actions can and should be taken to assure that earthquake effects will not preclude or significantly hamper implementation of the plans in the event of a radiological emergency.
Consistent with the unique importance of seismic safety in the Diablo Canyon proceeding, the Board considers this a significant deficiency in compliance with the Commission's regulations.
42.
The Board concludes also that its prior ruling barring evidence regarding earthquake effects on emergency response violates the right of all interested persons to a hearing at a meaningful time which is guaranteed both as a matter of due process 12/ and by S 189 (a) of the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. S 2239 (a).13/
Although our ruling was based on
$1!
See In the Matter of Pacific Gas and Electric Company (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2).
ALAB-519, NRC at 12 (January 23, 1978).
12/
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 548, 85 S.Ct. 1187 (1965); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
266, 90 S.Ct. 1011 (1970).
A!
Section 189 (a) of the Atomic Energy Act guarantees the right to a hearing prior to the granting of any license to operate a nuclear plant.
Brooks v. Atomic Energy Commission, 476 F.2d 924, 926 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (per curiam); Westinghouse Electric Corporation v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 598 F.2d 759, 772-73 (3rd Cir. 1979); Sholly and Hossler v.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, F.2d (1980) (per curiam).
the Commission's suggestion of possible generic consideration of the issue,$d/ no rulemaking has been-instituted nor has any notice of proposed ru1 making been published.
Thus, this-is not a situation where issues may properly be diverted from.
individual licensing proceedings to ongoing generic rulemaking proceedings.AE/
On the contrary, the effect of our prior ruling is to " fail to give [the issue] adequate consideration in either forum," which is clearly proscribed by established precedent.d5/
Moreover, to the extent-that generic consideration may be appropriate with respect-to issues affecting all or most nuclear plants uniformly (e.g., nuclear waste disposal), it is plainly not appropriate where, as here, the issue of seismic safety is and has always been of unique importance to an individual facility -- Diablo Canyon -- and AS/
In the Matter of Southern California Edison Company (San Onof re Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3),
CLI-81-33, Memorandum and Order (December 8, 1981).
A5/
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S.
519, 98 S.Ct. 1197 (1978); Union of Concerned Scientists v. Atomic Energy Commission, 499 F.2d 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
A5!
Natural Resources Defense Council v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,.547 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir.
1976), rev'd i
on other grounds, 435 U.S. 519, 98 S.Ct. 1197 (1978).
In that case, the Court stated:
What the agency may not do.
.is to fail to'give these issues adequate consideration in either forum.
Thus, until an adequate generic proceeding is held.
these issues will be ripe in individual licensing proceedings.
547 F.2d at'641, n. 17.
j
largely irrelevant to others.
Therefore, consistent with the foregoing, the parties to this proceeding must be provided a meaningful opportunity to be heard regarding the effects of a major carthquake on emergency response.
The failure to provide such opportunity precludes the granting of the requested operating license.S2/
43.
The Board concludes that a decision regarding the adequacy of the offsite emergency preparedness cannot be made until FEMA has completed its review of the State of California emergency plan and has issued the " finding" required by the Commission's regulations.
Section 50.47 (a) of 10 C.F.R. Part 50 sets forth a specific framework for review and approval of emergency plans and provides as follows:
(a) (1) No operating license for a nuclear power reactor will be issued unless a finding is made by NRC that the state of onsite and offsite emergency preparedness provides reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency.
(2) The NRC will base its findings on a
/
review of the Federal Emergency management Agency (FEMA) findings and determinations as to whether State and local emergency plans are adequate and capable of being implemented, and on the NRC assessment as to whether the applicant's onsite emergency plans are adequate and capable of being In any NRC licensing implemented. ~
proceeding, a FEMA finding will constitute a rebuttable presumption on a question of adequacy.
(Emphasis added.)
This subparagraph speaks in mandatory terms, and FEMA's
$2!
See n.
43 supra.
4 responsibilities are unequivocally stated.
Absent a FEMA review of the State plan, the NRC has no legal or factual basis upon which to approve or disapprove such plan or the adequacy of offsite preparedness.
Indeed, the NRC Staff presented no witnesses other than FEMA representative Eldridge to testify specifically about offsite preparedness at Diablo Canyon.
Because NRC approval of the offsite plans and preparedness is a mandatory prerequisite'to issuance of an operating license, FEMA's conceded failure in.this proceeding to review or issue its finding regarding the State of California plan precludes as a matter of law both (1) the requisite 50.47 (a) (1) finding by the NRC of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of an emergency and (2) the' issuance of operating licenses for Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant.
44.
The Board concludes that PGandE has failed to demonstrate an adequate level of emergency preparedness under both federal and Stat' of California standards.
Although PGandE now seeks through the testimony of its Panel 11 to challenge the factual basis for the State of California emergency planning zones-discussed supra, we note that those zones were established after extensive State proceedings in which PGandE participated and that their dimensions are based l
upon a voluminous study of the specific topographical, demographic, meteorological, and other conditions around m.t Diablo Canyon.
(See Gov. Brown Ex. 8.)
PGandE is a utility based and operating in California.
As such, this Board considers disingenuous at best PGandE's attempt to except h
,- 1
.=
1, f
itself from its State obligations.- Established principles of comity militate strongly against any actions Inr this Board'to 4
grant such exception or to undermine the requirements I
determined by the' State-of California to be minimally necessary, in light of Diablo Canyon-specific conditions, to protect the. health and saf ty of the public.
Indeed, as discussed supra, even the federal. emergency planning zones are to be determined.in relation to local needs, capabilities, and conditions.
10 C.F.R. S50.47 (c) (2).
Therefore, we conclude that the State of California emergency planning zones apply to j
Diablo Canyon and that PGandE has failed to demonstrate that an-adequate level of preparedness exists within those zones to assure that the health and safety of the public would be i.
prote: Led in the event of a radiological emergency at Diablo Canyon.
a IV.
CLASSIFICATION OF PRESSURIZER HEATERS --- FINDINGS OF FACT f-i 45.
The Board finds that'the' pressurizer heaters and associated controls at Diablo Canyon should be-formally classified as safety-grade and be designed-, manufactured, and constructed with all the care that must be afforded ~such components.
46.
The TMI accident demonstrated the need to reconsider-the safety classifications and design practices for nuclear systems and components.
In particular, the inoperability of the reactor coolant pumps and the low pressure decay heat removal systems emphasized the importance of the ability to remove heat from the reactor via natural circulation and
! i
required associated systems.
Thus, the NRC Lessons Learned Task Force, in NUREG-0578, at A-2, found that " maintenance of natural circulation capability is important to safety."
(Bridenbaugh-Minor, at 4; Hoch, Tr. 11,552-53; Jensen, Tr.
11,631.)
47.
The NRC Staff's I&E TMI Unit 2 Investigation Report concluded that:
[t]he pressurizer heaters should be evaluated for their performance in pressure codtrol to mitigate the demands on emergency systems for pressure control and for the assistance in establishing' natural circulation criterion.
The pressurizer heater system should be classified as '3afety grade which would assure emergency power availability and protection from failures due to environmental conditions.
(Emphasis added.)
(Jensen, Tr.11,637; J.I. Ex.119, at 23. )
48.
At Diablo Canyon, the pressurizer heater system is the normal and preferred system for the important capability of maintenance of natural circulation.
(Bridenbaugh-Minor, at 4; Hoch, Tr. 11,553; Fridley, Tr. 11,556.)
While it may be possible to maintain natural circulation at hot standby i
conditions without the use of the pressurizer heater and associated controls, such operation may be difficult to j
control and is contrary to the normal and emergency plant operating procedures.
(Bridenbaugh-Minor, at 4.)
In I
addition, the pressurizer heaters must also maintain physical integrity for the reactor coolant pressure boundary to be maintained.
(Bridenbaugh-Minor, at 4.)
49.
PGandE's claim that means other than the heater system for pressure control exist is belied by the fact that t
the applicable Diablo Canyon emergency operating procedures do not specify an alternative means to accomplish this critical function.
No less than nine such procedures call for use of the pressurizer heater system, but none specifically directs the operator how to proceed if the heater system becomes unavailable.
Thus, these procedures appear-to place total reliance on automatic or manual operation of the heaters.
(Bridenbaugh-Minor, at 5, 9-10, Tr. 11,694.)
50.
For example, OP-23, entitled " Natural Circulation of Reactor Coolant," relies on the pressurizer heater system to maintain pressure and does not specify an alternative in-the event that the heaters are lost, not even the alternative means suggested by PGandE witnesses Hoch-and Young.-
(Fridley, 11,555-56.)f8/
In the event that the heaters become Tr.
inoperable, the operators are expected to rely on their general training instead of emergency operating procedures.
(Fridley, Tr. 11,558.)
The better practice, however, is to specify in the procedure what actions to take and what components to rely upon, because one of the lessons of TMI is that operators are not well prepared to respond to abnormal conditions, particularly under stressful conditions likely to exist during an accident.
(Patterson, Tr. 11,583-84; Bridenbaugh, Tr. 11,681, 11,723).
Indeed, the primary purposes of proper emergency procedures are (1) to train and 38/
Similarly, OP-13, entitled " Malfunction of Reactor Pressure Control System," fails to provide guidance for use of the " alternate control methods" claimed by PGandE witnesses to exist.
(Bridenbaugh-Minor, at 10. )
familiarize operators with the correct actions and methods and (2) to instruct operators regarding what actions to take under normal and accident conditions.
(Patterson, Tr. 11,581-82; Minor, Tr. ll,723-24.)SE/
51.
Reliance by several witnesses on Sequoyah Nuclear Plant test data for the general proposition that pressurizer heaters are not essential is misplaced because such data have not been demonstrated to apply to Diablo Canyo.n.
(BridenbaughMinor, at 9.)
Further, during those tests none of the complications involved in the TMI accident sequence were assumed to occur, including, for example, occurrence of a LOCA and unavailability of the emergency feedwater system.
(Jensen, Tr. 11,632-33.)
52.
Another deficiency at Diablo Canyon affecting pressurizer heater reliability during emergency conditions is the method required to transfer some of the heaters to the onsite emergency power system.
This method -- dispatching an operator to the remote 100-foot level of the Auxiliary l
Building -- has not been demonstrated to be an adequate i
response to the post-TMI requirement that such transfer be SE!
As stated by witness Bridenbaugh on cross-examination:
I think that particularly in the emergency procedures, you need to identify the decisions and the transitions that have to be made as accurately as possible and to rely upon general knowledge of operators under stressful conditions of an accident or an emergency is not the best thing to do.
Tr. 11,723. -
accomplished in the control room.EE/
No evidence was presented regarding whether area radiation monitors will be available to assure immediate access to the area in question under accident conditions, whether the radiation exposure of 10 mrem claimed by PGandE has been verified, and what the extent of potential delays and disruption to area accessibility might be in a confusing post-accident situation.
(Bridenbaugh-Minor, at 11-12. )
53.
The pressurizer heaters at Diablo Canyon are not seismically qualified.
(Lang, Tr. 11,574-75.)
This is an especially significant deficiency in view of the critical importance of seismic safety in this proceeding.
- Moreover, their location at a fairly high elevation in the plant and their thin, elongated design indicate a likelihood that they will suffer high seismic loads during the safe shutdown earthquake.
(Minor, Tr. 11,7 25. )
54.
Construction to safety-grade standards is done to enhance reliability of operation.
(Hoch, Tr. 11,560-61.)
All par, ties concede that there are no negatives in classifying, designing, and constructing the pressurizer heaters as safety-grade components at Diablo Canyon.
(Lang, Tr. 11,567; Jensen, Tr. 11,643; Bridenbaugh-Minor, at 12.)
Further, there is no reason to believe that such upgrading could not be done from a
" state-of-the-art" standpoint.
EE!
NUREG-0737, II.E.3-1, item 4.
55.
On the other hand, the pressurizer heater system should become more reliable if the safety classification were to be upgraded.
Plant safety would be improved by minimizing the challenges to the system and by optimizing the operability and controllability of systems used in the mitigation and control of abnormal events.
The NRC Lessons Learned Task Force found that " maintenance of natural circulation is important to safety."
It is undeniable, in light of PGandE's own emergency operating procedures, that pressurizer heaters are the preferred components for this capability.
(Bridenbaugh-Minor, at 12-13. )
56.
Upgrading of the safety classification of-the pressurizer heater system would impose more of the safety design criteria on the Diablo Canyon system and its operability, including GDC 1, 2, 3, 20, and 22.
(Bridenbaugh-Minor, at 13.)
57.
Based on the foregoing, the Board concludes that the pressurizer heater system components at Diablo Canyon should be classified as safety-related components and required to meet all applicable general design criteria, including GDC 1, 2, 3, 4, 17, 20, and 22.
V.
CLASSIFICATION OF PRESSURIZER HEATERS -- CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 58.
PGandE, as the applicant, has the burden of proof to demonstrate compliance with all applicable regulations.
10 C.F.R. SS2.732, 50.57.
59.
Intervenors may properly build their case on the basis of cross-examination.
In the Matter of Tennessee Valley Authority (Hartsville Nuclear Plant, Units lA, 2A, 1B and 2B),
ALAB-463, 7 NRC 341, 356 (1978); In the Matter of Commonwealth Edison Co. (Zion Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-226, 8 AEC 381, 389 (1974).
60.
The Board concludes that PGandE failed to carry its burden of proof that GDC 1, 2, 3, 4, 17, 20, and 22 have been satisfied or that full power operation at Diablo Canyon would not endanger the public health and safety.
In light of the foregoing findings of fact, we cannot conclude that (a)
Diablo Canyon will operate in conformity with the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. S32011 et seq., and regulations of the Commission; (b) there is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by the operating licenses can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; and (c) the issuance of the requested license will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
10 C.F.R. S50.57.
///
///
///.
a VII. CLASSIFICATION AND TESTING OF VALVES -- FINDINGS OF FACT 61.
The Board finds that in light of the critical functions and required operations of the_ power operated relief valves ("PORV") and block valves, such valves and their instruments, controls, and structures should all be classified as safety-related and be designed, manufactured, and constructedwithallthecabethatmustbeaffordedsuch components.
62.
The events at TMI-2 and subsequent analyses gave the Commission and the nuclear industry as a whole a new awareness of the range of conditions ---including steam, transition, and water seal -- to which PORVs and block valves can be exposed during normal, transient, and accident conditions.
(See NUREG-0578.)
During the TMI accident the PORV opened but failed to reclose.
(Swarek, Tr. 11,591. )
The accident sequence included multiple failures which were aggravated by inappropriate operator action.
(Swarek, Tr. 11,5 9 2. )
63.
In the aftermath of the accident, numerous l
investigations and studies were instituted by the NRC Staff and others, leading to recommendations for reclassification and extensive testing of relief, block, and safety valves.
The NRC Staff I&E TMI Unit 2 Investigation Report recommended that relief and safety valves be upgraded to a safety-grade classification.
Regarding relief valves, the Report recommended that
[a]11 valves and attachments that constitute the reactor coolant boundary integrity should be reevaluated for safety grade (functional and seismic) classification.
(J. I. Ex. 119, at 22.) i i
Regarding block valves, the conclusion was similar: "The block valve should be upgraded to functional safety grade equipment."
(J. I. E x. 119, at 23.)
Detailed testing requirements over a broad range of conditions were adopted as part of NUREG-0737, II.D.1, in November 1980.
64.
The design of Diablo Canyon includes three PORV's and three associated block valves.
Although PGandE witnesses testified at the hearing that two of the PORV's and all three of the block valves meet safety-grade design criteria, the Board has been-informed since the hearing both by Board Notification (PNO-V-82-09) and by letter from PGandE (February 24, 1982) that incorrect seismic response spectra were. applied above the 140-foot level of the containment building where the valves in question are located.
As a result, the accelerations used in qualification of those valves may have been inappropriate and insufficiently conservative, and further modifications or additions to piping supports may, therefore, be necessary to meet applicable seismic safety criteria.
Accordingly, the Board finds that at this time PGandE has failed to demonstrate that the seismic qualification of any of the Diablo Canyon relief, safety, and block valves is adequate.
65.
The PORV's and/or block valves perform several functions which have safety significance consistent with the NRC Staff's definitions of the terms " safety-related,"
" safety-grade," or "important to safety": f
maintain integrity of the primary pressure boundary;-
a.
b.
provide pressure relief,?or Low Temperature Overpressurization conditions; c.
reduce the. number of challenges to the safety valves; d.
reduce the number of challenges to the ECCS; provide a bleed c'apability during the feed and-bleed
~
e.
mode of' operation to remove decay heat from the core.
The first two of-these functions fall within the Staff's definition of " safety-related."
(Bridenbaugh-Minor, at 4-5; see also Hoch, Tr. 11,599-600; Jensen, Tr. 11,638.).
66.
Documents which the operator relies on for guidance in operating the plant during emergency conditions (Emergency Operating Procedures) and deciding on an acceptable plant configuration (Diablo Canyon Technical Specifications) provide no evidence of differentiation between the greater or lesser qualified valves or associated equipment.
(Bridenbaugh-Minor, i
at 5-7.)
To prevent reliance by operators on the least i
i qualified of the PORV's, instructions to the operator in the emergency operating procedures and technical specifications is necessary as long as the difference in valve qualification continues to exist.
(p3.)
67.
The addition by PGandE of a third, less qualified PORV creates additional failure points which could result in a small LOCA, additional common mode failure mechanisms, and i
systems interactions, which potentially may impact other safety-related functions.
In addition, it is possible that the PORV with the lesser classified components would be the only valve operable at a time when PORV operation is called upon by a transient or accident.
(Bridenbaugh-Minor, at 7-8. )
68.
The accident analyses relied upon by PGandE and the Staff are inadequate for several reacons.
First, they are based on Chapter 15 of the FSAR which assumes and analyzes only design basis accidents (Minor, Tr. 11,7 27) and does not include a TMI-type accident or scenario. ~(Swarek, Tr.
11,593.)
Second, they do not assume inappropriate operator action as a complicating factor, thuc ignoring the fact that such action was a critical element in the TMI sequence.
(Jensen, Tr. 11,639; Swarek, Tr. 11,597. )
Third, they. provide no greater assurance that core uncovery will not occur at Diablo Canyon than did similar analyses prepared for TMI, Unit-2, prior to the accident.
PGandE witnesses were unable to cite any analysis that predicted the accident sequence that occurred at TMI on March 28, 1979.
(Swarek, Tr. 11,596. )
In short, this Board has little confidence either in the range of accidents covered or the results reached through the analyses described in the PGandE and Staff testimony.
None of the analyses considered the type of accident posing the greatest safety risk -- namely, that involving multiple failures, inappropriate operator action, and unavailability of critical safety systems.
69.
The qualification of the Diablo Canyon PORV's and block valves is incomplete.
The block valves have not been fully tested, and there are no plans for further testing..
-~
(Swarek, Tr. - ll,597; Bridenbaugh-Minor, ' at 8. )
The: full range of conditions,-including 105fS, has not been tested, and the
~
plant-specific documentation and' analyses have not:been
. prepared to. cover Diablo Canyon's design of relief and b, lock valves and their' components, systems,.and structures.
Thus,.
i there can be.no assurance that the configuration meets GDC 2 and 14.
(Bridenbaugh-Minor at 8-9; Swarek, Tr. 11,597; Hoch, Tr.'ll,599)
.70.
The scheduled completion of the valve tests and the i
plant-specific analyses has.been delayed until July 1, 1982.
}
(Bridenbaugh-Minor, at 9.)-
. 71. - Based on the-foregoing, the Board concludes that the Diablo Canyon PORV's, block valves, and instruments'and
-controls should be classified as safety-related components and required to meet all applicable general design criteria, 1
including GDC 1,.2, and 14..
In addition,.until' completion of the performance testing on relief,-safety, and block valves required by NUREG-0737, Item II.D.1, and submittal of the documentation; required therein, we cannot-find (1) that.such I
valves will perform at Diablo Canyon as intended-under all I
normal, transient, and accident conditions or (2) ' that GDC 1, l
14, 15, and 30 have been satisfied.
Accordingly, we conclude that operation of Diablo Canyon prior to upgrading to safety-I grade the classification, design, and construction of the valves, instruments,'and controls in question, completion of the valve performance testing, and submittal of the
[
documentation required by NUREG-0737, Item II.D.1, would endanger the health and safety of the public.
m m.
.,---r.
e t
VII. CLASSIFICATION AND TESTING OF VALVES -- CONCLUSIONS OF LAM 72.
PGandE, as the applicant, has the burden 1of proof'to demonstrate compliance with all applicable regulations.
10 i
C.F.R. 352.732, 50.57.
73.
Intervenors may properly build their-case on the
^
basis of cross-examination.
In the Matter of Tennessee Valley Authority (Har.tsville Nuclear Plant, Units lA,.2A, 1B, and 2B), ALAB-463, 7 NRC'341, 356 (1978); In the Matter of.
Commonwealth Edison Co. (Zion Station, Units 1 and 2),
i ALAB-226, 8 AEC 381, 389 (1974).
- 74. -The Board concludes that PGandE has failed to carry 4
its burden of. proof that GDC 1, 2, 14, 15, and 30 have been i
satisfied or that operation of Diablo Canyon.would not l
~ endanger the public health and' safety.
In light _of the i
foregoing findings of fact, we cannot conclude that (a)
Diablo Canyon will operate in conformity with the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C.
l SS 2011 et seq., and regulations of the Commission; l
i (b) there is a reasonable assurance (i) that.the activities authorized by.the operating licenses can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities sill be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; and
~
(c) the issuance of'the requested license will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to.the 4
health and safety of the public.
10 C.F.R. S50.57.
VII. CONCLUSION 75.
The-Board has car'efully considered the entire record of this proceeding.
. Based upon that review and the findings of fact and conclusions of law set forth'above, we must deny the application for licenses to operate Diablo Canyon, Units 1 and 2, because PGandE has failed to demonstrate compliance with the Commission's regulations and provide the requisite assurances that such operation can be conducted without undue risk to the public health and safety.
76.
This Initial Deci-lon is effective immediately and shall constitute the final action of the Commission subject to review pursuant to the applicable provisions of the Rules of Practice.
Exceptions to this Initial Decision may be filed by any party (s) within ten days after the service of this Initial Decision.
A brief in support of exceptions shall be filed within 30 days thereafter (40 days in the case of the-Staff.)
///
///
///, _ _
Within 30 days of the service of the brief of appellant (40 days in the case of Staff), any other party may file a brief in support of, or in opposition to, the exceptions.
DATED:
March 19, 1982 Respectfully submitted, JOEL R. REYNOLDS, ESQ.
/
JOHN R. PHILLIPS, ESQ.
Center for Law in the Public Interest 10951 W. Pico Boulevard Los Angeles, CA *90064 (213)470-3000 DAVID S. FLEISCHAKER, ESQ.
P. O. Box 1178 Oklahoma City, OK 73101 By
@M OpL-R. REYNOLDS Attorneys for Joint Inter-venors SAN LUIS OBISPO MOTHERS FOR PEACE I
SCENIC SHORELINE PRESERVATION CONFERENCE, INC.
ECOLOGY ACTION CLUB SANDRA SILVER ELIZABETH APFELBERG JOHN J. FORSTER l -
.s o
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD
)
In the Matter of
)
/
)
PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY )
Docket Nos. 50-275 O.L.
)
50-323 0.L.
(Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power
)
Plant, Units 1 and 2)
)
(Full Powe'r Proceeding)
)
)
CERTIFICATE OF E*i/ ICE I he.reby certify that on this 19th-day of March, 1982, I have served copies of the foregoing JOINT INTERVENORS' PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, together_with attached exhibits, mailing them through the U. S. mails, first class, postage prepaid.
I Admin. Judge John F. Wolf, Docket & Service Branch Chairman Office of the Secretary Atomic Safety & Licensing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory l
Board Commission U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Washington, D.C.
20555 Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 William Olmstead, Esq.
Marc R. Staenberg, Esq.
Glenn O. Bright Edward G. Ketchen, Esq.
Atomic Safety & Licensing Office of the Executive Legal Board Director - BETH 042 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory l
Commission Commission l
Washington, D.C.
20555 Washington, D.C.
20555
,e Dr. Jerry R. Kline Nancy Culver Atomic Safety & Licensing 192 Lunet.a Board San Luis Obispo, CA 93401 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Mr. Fredrick Eissler Malcolm H. Furbush, Esq.
Scenic Shoreline Preservation Vice President and General Conference, Inc.
Counsel Philip A. Crane, Esq.
4623 More Mesa Drive Santa Barbara, CA 93105 Pacific Gas & Electric Company P. O.-Sox 7442 Sandra A. Silver San Francisco, CA 94106 Gordon Silver 1760 Alisal Street Arthur C. Gehr, Esq.
San Luis Obispo, CA 93401 Snell & Wilmer 3100 Valley Center David S. Fleischaker, Esq.
Phoenix, AZ 85073 P. O. Box 1178.
Oklahoma City, OK 73101 Carl Neiburger Telegram Tribune Bruce Norton, Esq.
P. O. Box 112 3216 N. Third Street San Luis Obispo, CA 93402 Suite 202 Phoenix, AZ 85012 Byron Georgiou, Esq.
Legal Affairs Secretary to Janice E.
Kerr, Esq.
the Governor Lawrence Q. Garcia,'Esq.
State Capitol Building J. Calvin Simpson, Esq.
Sacramento, CA 95814 California Public Utilities Commission Lawrence Coe Lanpher, Esq.
5246 State Building Hill, Christopher & Phillips 350 McAllister Street 1900 M. Street, N.W.
San Francisco, CA 94102 Washington, D.C.
20036 MHB-Technical Associates 1723 Hamilton Avenue Suite K San Jose, CA 95725 dC A. S. VARONA