ML20041B586
| ML20041B586 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 02/18/1982 |
| From: | Bordenick B, Earley A LONG ISLAND LIGHTING CO., NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR (OELD) |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20041B584 | List: |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-CPA, ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8202240315 | |
| Download: ML20041B586 (68) | |
Text
,
February 18, 1982 00CKETED vy 3 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
'O U" '?
n4 vg NUCLEAR REGULATORY COM!!ISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board In the Matter of
)
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY
)
Docket No. 50-322 (OL)
)
Docket No. 50-322 (CPA)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station,
)
Unit 1)
)
CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT OF CONTENTIONS The Board has ordered LILCO and the NRC Staff to file a joint document consisting of these two parts: 1) a statement of the precise wording of all contentions which the parties have agreed are litigable; and 2) a statement setting forth the precise wording of all contentions which Intervenors now advance for litigation and to which the NRC Staff and/or LILCO object (from the standpoint of litigability).
Contentions advanced with respect to the CP extension shall be included.
With respect to part 2, the name of the i
objecting party and its objection or disa-t greement with the contention stated in sum-I mary form, shall be set forth.
As to both parts of the listing of contentions, there shall be indicated the source documents from which each of the contentions and the objec-tions have been extracted, including the date and page number.
In addition, LILCO and the NRC Staff shall include a summary cover index of the contentions in each part.
This should list the contentions by intervenor and number, accompanied by a capsule label of the subject j
matter of each contentivn and major subpart.
8202240315 820218 PDR ADOCK 05000322 L
G PDR j
_2_
Board Order of February 8, 1982, at 3-4.
The following is LILCO's and the NRC Staff's joint re-sponse.
It omits the emergency planning contentions that the Shoreham Opponents coalition (SOC) and Suffolk County (SC) have indicated a desire to raise but have not yet particularized because local and state emergency plans remain incomplete.
The emergency planning contention of the Oil Heat Institute of Long Island / North Shore Committee (OHILI/NSC) is included, however.
An index of the contentions begins on the next page.
As the Board requested, the contentions are divided into two groups:
(1) those which the parties have agreed are litigable and (2) those about whose justiciability the parties remain in disagreement.
4
.~o
,-,,. ~- -. -, -
--,.v1, y-r-.
..-s
INDEX OF CONTENTIONS I.
Contentions Which The Parties Have Agreed Are Litigable Contention Subject Page SOC 3 Regulatory Guide 1.97 7
SOC 6(a)(1)
Construction QA1!
8 SOC 7.A(1)
Human Factors -- Equipment 11 SOC 7.A(3)
Iodine Monitoring 12 SOC 7.A(4)
Safety Parameter 13 Display Conssle SOC 7.A(5)
SRV Test Program 13 SOC 7.A(6)
Reduction of SRV 13 Challenges SOC 8 Detection of Inadequate 14 Core Cooling SOC 9 Notification of Disabled 15 Safety System SOC 16 Clad Swelling and 16 Flow Blockage SOC 19(a)
Reg. Guides 1.2 and 17 1.150: RPV Integrity and Testing SOC 19(b)
Reg. Guides 1.26 and 18 1.29: Classification of Equipment SOC 19(c)
Reg. Guide 1.31: Ferrite 19 Content in Stainless Steel 1/
As discussed in note 3 below, LILCO moved for summary dis-position of SOC 6(a)(i) on July 13, 1981.
O i SOC 19(d)
Reg. Guide 1.44: Materials 19 SOC 19(e)
Reg. Guides 1.60 and 1.61:
20 Seismic Design SOC 19(f)
Reg. Guide 1.63: Electrical 21 Penetrations SOC 19(g)
Reg. Guide 1.75: Electrical 21 Separation i
SOC 19(h)
Reg. Guido 1.89: Environmental 22 Qualifications l
SOC 19(i)
Reg. Guide 1.100: Seismic 23 Qualifications SOC 19(j)
Reg. Guide 1.115:
23 Turbine Orientation SC 1 Remote Shutdown Panel 24-SC 2 Diesel Generator Relays 24 SC 3 Detection of Inadequate 24 Core Cooling SC 4 Water Hammer 25 SC 5 Loose Parts Monitoring 25 SC 8 Environmental Qualifi-26 cations SC 9 ECCS Pump Blockage 26 SC 10 ECCS Core Spr7y 27 SC 11 Passive Mechanical 27 Valve Failure SC 14 QA/QC -- NRC I&E Program 27 SC 15 QA/QC -- Review 28 and Inspections SC 17 Fire Protection 29
o
- SC 19 Human Factors -- Procedures 29 SC 21 Mark II Containment 30 SC 23 Containment Isolation 32 SC 24 Cracking of Materials 33 SC 25 ASME Section XI (PSI /ISI) 33 Program SC 26 ALARA Radiation 34 Exposures SC 27 Post-Accident Monitoring 35 SC 28(a)(i)
Cutoff of ECCS 35 SC 28(a)(ii)
Human Factors -- Equipment 35 SC 28(a)(iii)
Iodine Monitoring 35 SC 28(a)(iv)
Safety Parameter 36 Display Panel SC 28(a)(v)
SRV Test Program 36 SC 28(a)(vi)
Reduction of SRV 36 Challenges SC 31 Electrical Separation 36 II.
Contentions To Which The NRC Staff And/Or LILCO Object Contention Subject Page SOC 1 Emergency Planning Zones 37 SOC 2 Liquid Pathway 38 SOC 7.B(1)
IREP Analysis 38 SOC 7.B(2)
Systems Interaction 41 SOC 7.B(3)
Documentation of 42 Deviations SOC 7.B(4)
Expanded Safety 43 Classification
6-SOC 1 (CPA)
Class 9 Accidents 44 SOC 2 (CPA)
Financial Qualifications 55 SC 6 Expanded Safety 57 Classification SC 7 Systems Interaction 58 SC 12 QA/QC -- Design and 59 Construction SC 13 QA/QC -- Operations 61~
i i
SC 16 ATsiS 61 SC 18 Human Factors --
62 Equipment SC 20 Human Factors --
64 l
Simulator SC 22 SRV Test Program 64 SC 29 IREP Analysis 65 SC 30 Documentation of 65 Deviations OHILI/NSC 7(i)
Security 66 OHILI/NSC 7(j)
Emergency Planning 66 t
9 f
,--w.5-e---
._p---,
_.-._p,_.,,9,
,,,7ry y
pv y
-w-m y..
,m___gna
-ss e,-
ay
-%_.-_mg,w_c.
_r_.
w-.-
m
---m-p
s I.
CONTENTIONS WHICH THE PARTIES HAVE AGREED ARE LITIGABLE The parties agree that the contentions set out in this part are litigable.2/ The source documents cited include (a) the most recent pleading in which the contencion was submitted to the Board and (b) the Board's approval, if it has been given.
SOC 3:
REGULATORY GUIDE 1.97 Submitted:
LILCO/ Staff / SOC Stipulation of December 2,
- 1981, at 2-3.
Admitted:
Board Order of February 8, 1982, at 1.
The recent Revision 7 of Regulatory Guide 1.97,
" Instrumentation for Light-Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant Environs Conditions During and Following an Accident" details needed devices and qualifications of instru-ments.
Shoreham is deficient in the following areas:
(a) Radiation Exposure Rate Monitoring (Item 18, Table 1; Items 20 and 41, Table 2);*
(b) Radioactivity Concentration or Radiation Level in Circulating Primary Coolant (Item 11, Table 1; Item 14, Table 2);
(c) Continuous On-Line Monitoring of Halogen in Effluent (Item 39, Table 1; Item 43, Table 2);
2/
LILCO and the NRC Staff have not argued the specificity requirements of 10 CFR S 2.714 as to most SOC and County con-tentions in the interests of getting on with this proceeding and with the expectation that further discussions among the parties will provide whatever specificity may still be missing.
By agreeing to the litigability of these contentions, LILCO and the NRC Staff have not waived the right to seek suc-mary disposition of any or all of them.
s.
(d) Secondary Containment Area Radiation Monitor (Item 36, Table 1; Item 17, Table 2);
(e) Reactor Coolant System Soluble Boron Concentration (Item 3, Table 1; Item 4 Table 2);
(f) Analysis of Primary Coolant (Gamma Spectrum) (Item 12, Table 1; Item 15, Table 2);
(g) Drywell Spray Flow and Suppression Chamber Spray Flow (Items 21 and 24, Table 1; Items 23 and 23A, Table 2);
(h) Standby Liquid Control System Flow (Item 28, Table 1; Item 37, Table 2);
(i) Plant and Environment Radiation Monitoring (Item 40, Table 1; Item 45, Table 2);
(j) Post-Accident Sampling Capability (Item 42, Table 1; Item 47, Table 2); and (k) BWR Core Thermocouples (Item 5, Table 1; Item 13, Table 2).
- The item and table numbers used in this contention refer to the information provided in the Affidavit of Brian R.
McCaffrey submitted in support of LILCO's Motion for Summary Disposition of SOC Contention 3, dated July 13, 1981.
SOC 6(a)(1):
CONSTRUCTION QA /
3 3/
On July 13, 1981, LILCO filed a motion for summary dispo-sition of SOC 6(a)(i).
Responses to the motion were held in abeyance pending the outcome of settlement negotiations between LILCO and SC, a part of which dealt with QA/QC issues.
See LILCO/ Staff / SOC Stipulation of August 6, 1981, at 3 and LILCO/ Staff / SOC Stipulation of December 2, 1981, at 4.
The negotiations did not prove fruitful.
See Further LILCO Supplement to the Recent Status Report of the County and Staff, dated December 9, 1981, at 1.
LILCO understands that SOC is considering dropping 6(a)(i) because its concerns are covered by the proposed Suffolk County QA/QC Contentions.
LILCO expects SOC to either (a) formally drop 6(a)(i) in its response to this pleading due March 1, 1982, or (b) file its answer to LILCO's motion for sumiaary disposition of SOC 6(a)(i) within the time normally allowed for such responses calculated from the date of this pleading.
The NRC Staff fully supports LILCO's motion for summary disposition.
' Submitted:
LILCO/ Staff / SOC Stipulation of October 6,
- 1980, Attachment A, at 1-2.
Admitted:
Board Order of October 27, 1980, at 1.
Intervenors contend that the Applicant has not ade-quately developed and implemented a quality assurance / quality control program for the design, procurement, construction and installation of structures, systems, and coa.panents for the Shoreham Nuclear Station as required by 10 C.P.R.
Part 50, Appendix B, Criteria I through XVIII, and 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix A, Criterion I.
Specifically, Intervenors contend that based on the review of 30 allegations of construccion irregularities at the Shoreham site as described in NRC Investigation 50-322/79-24, an adequate level of safcty has not been achieved at the Shoreham site with regard to root causes of the irregularities are follows:
A.
(Timeliness of Quality Assurance Program)
Failure of the Applicant and Epplicant's contractors, agents, or con-sultants to establish and executa a Quality Assurance Program at the earliest, practicable time in accordance with Criteria 1 and 2 of Appendix B, as demonstrated by allegations 14, 20, and 21.
B.
(Quality Assurance Authority)
Failure of the Applicant to assure that persons and organizations performing quality assurance functions have sufficient independence from cost and schedule considerationc, and adequate "stop work" au-thority, in accordance with Criterian 1 of Appendix B, as dem-onstrated by allegations 14, 21, and 30.
C.
(Qualification and Training)
Failure of the Applicant to adequat21y assure that the indoctrination and training of on-site QA/QC personnel has been provided as neces-sary to assure that suitable proficiency is achieved and main-tained, in accordance with Criterion 2 of Appendix B, as demon-strated by allegations 7, 17, 19, 20, 21 and 29.
D.
(Process Control)
Failure of the Applicant to establish measures to assure that the special processes of welding, heat treating, brazing, nondestructive testing and cleaning are controlled and accomplished by qualified personnel using qualified procedures in accct3ance with applicable codes, standards, specifications, criteris, and other special requ',ra-ments imposed by the Applicant, or Applicant's contractors, agents or consultants, in accordance with Criterion 9 of Appendix B, as demonstrated by allegations 2, 10, 17, 19, 20, 21, 23 and 29.
E.
(Construction Verification)
Failure of the Applicant to establich measures to control materials, parts, or components which do not conform to requirements in order to prevent their inadvertent use or installation, in accordance with Criterion 15 of Appendix B, as demonstrated by allegations 1,
4, 5, 6, 8, 12, 15, 22, 23, 26 and 30.
F.
(Corrective Action)
Failure of the Applicant to establish corrective action measures to assure that significant conditions adverse to quality are determined and that correc-tive action is taken to preclude repetition, in accordance with Criterion 16 of Appendix B, as demonstrated by Viclation A and allegations 2 and 22.
G.
(Follow-up Audit)
Failure of the Applicant to take timely follow-up action, including reaudit, of deficiencies identified in audits, in accordance with Criterion 18 of Appendix B, as demonstrated by allegations 1, 5,
6 and 14.
SOC 7.A(1):
CUTOFF OF ECCS Sulaitted:
LILCO/ Staff / SOC Stipulation of December 2,
- 1981, at 19.
Admitted:
Board Order of February 8, 1982, at 1.
SOC contends that the NRC Staff has not adequately assessed and LILCO has not adequately resolved, both singularly and cumulatively, the generic unresolved issues applicable to a BWR of the Shoreham design..
As a result, the Staff has not required the Snoreham structures, systems, and components to be beckfit to current regulatory practices as required by 10 CFR S 50.55(a), S 50.57, and S 40.109, with regard to the follow-ing:
A.
LILCO has failed to resolve adequately certain gen-eric safety items identified as a result of the TMI-2 accident and contained in NUREG-0737, Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements (1980).
(1) The operator's decision to cut off coolant injec-tion at TMI-2 contributed to the accident sequence and fuel damage.
NUREG-0737, Item II.K.3.21 re-quires that the major low pressure emergency cool-ing systems for BWR's (core spray (CS) and low pressure coolant injection (LPCI)) incorporate an automatic restart on loss of water level if an ini-tiation signal is still present.
Since the
, t operator can shut off the flow from these systems at any time, there are conditions where it may be necessary to override the operator's action.
LILCO has not demonstrated that proper core cooling capa-bility will be available for all plant conditions, namely, shutdown of the CS or LPCI systems by the operator.
Thus, it has not ensured compliance with 10 CFR S 50.46 and S 50.55a(h).
SOC 7.A(2):
HUMAN FACTORS -- EQUIPMENT 4/
Submitted:
LILCO/ Staff / SOC Stipulation of December 2,
- 1981, at 19-20.
Admitted:
Board Order of February 8, 1982, at 1.
(2) The Shoreham control room is an older design which evolved without benefit of well-defined human fac-tors criteria.
To correct the human factors defi-r ciencies that contributed to the TMI-2 accident as well as other deficiencies that may be built into today's reactors, NUREG-0737, Item I.D.1 called for
' control room audits.
The NRC's Human Factors Engineering Branch carried out the Shoreham control room audit in April, 1981 using the latest guide-lines.
Their findings included 195 items, of which 97 were classed as high priority item.S based on the increased potential for operator error and the pos-sible consequences of that error.
LILCO has declined to change many of these high priority items.
This leaves a control room design that does not provide the necessary information and operator actions to ensure safe plant operation.
- Thus, Shoreham is not in compliance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, Criterion 13 and human factors criteria set forth in NUREG-0700.
The following deficien-cies exist:
(a) The automatic depressurization (ADS) and safety / relief valve (SRV) systems are critical to operation in accident conditions where depressurization is required.
The SRV pressure and temperature annunciator controls are not located in a manner consistent with reliable and safe operation.
4/
See SOC 7.A(1) on page 10 for introductory language.
(b) The Shoreham annunciator system design does not provide a "first out" alarm capability.
Instead, reliance is placed on a non-redundant, low reliability plant computer which has been shown to become overloaded by major accidents and to be incapable of supplying timely infor-mation on accident sequences.
The computer printout is not readily visible and is poorly located for use by the operators under accident conditions.
(c) The control room has not been reviewed against the design criteria of section 6 of NUREG-0700.
SOC 7.A(3):
IODINE MONITORING /
5 Submitted:
LILCO/ Staff / SOC Stipulation of December 2,
- 1981, at 20-21.
Admitted:
Board Order of February 8, 1982, at 1.
(3) The monitoring of iodine releases in the TMI-2 accident was both untimely and complicated by the iodine sampling and measuring techniques used.
The equipment needed for continuous on-line iodine gaseous effluent moni".oring is not presently avail-able at Shoreham.
NUREG-0737, Item II.F.1 allows the alternative of vent release sampling, provided it is powered by vital bus power and is accessible during an accident.
The Shoreham design does not satisfy either of these alternatives.
LILCO pro-poses instead to measure two other streams, those from the turbine. building and radwaste building, while assuming the reactor building ventilation contribution is zero.
These two sampling instru-ments are not powered by vital bus power.
- Thus, LILCO's iodine measurement system cannot account for leakage, incomplete isolation, or system mis-operation and thus may not be capable of accurately assessing the quantity of iodine released in the station vent.
The design is, therefore, not in compliance with 10 CRF Part 50, Appendix A, Criteria 13 and 64.
5/
See SOC 7.A(1) on page 10 for introductory language.
SOC 7.A(4):
SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY CONSOLE 6/
Submitted:
LILCO/ Staff / SOC Stipulation of December 2,
- 1981, at 21.
Admitted:
Board Order of February 8, 1982, at 1.
(4) The short-term design of the Safety Parameters Display Console (NUREG-0737, Item I.D.2) proposed by LILCO does not provide a high reliability dis-play console in that the CRT and plant computer are not safety-related equipment and cannot be relied upon to function during and following an accident.
For this reason, Shoreham violates 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, Criterion 13.
SOC 7.A(5):
SRV TEST PROGRAM /
7 Submitted:
LILCO/ Staff / SOC Stipulation of December 2,
- 1981, at 21.
Admitted:
Board Order of February 8, 1982, at 1.
(5) The testing of the Shoreham safety / relief valves (NUREG-0737, Item II.D.1) has not been completed and the results for the Shoreham piping arrangement have not been evaluated.
Moreover, the proposed test conditions are not inclusive of worst case conditions, such as ATWS.
Thus, Shoreham has not been demonstrated to comply with 10 CPR Part 50, Appendix A, Criteria 14 and 30.
SOC 7.A(6):
REDUCTION OF SRV CHALLENGES /
8 Submitted:
LILCO/ Staff / SOC Stipulation of December 2,
- 1981, at 21.
Admitted:
Board Order of February 8, 1982, at 1.
(6) LILCO hopes to accomplish a reduction in challenges to safety / relief valves (NUREG-0737, Item II.K.3.16) by procedural techniques, rather than by 6/
See SOC 7.A(1) en page 10 for introductory language.
7/
See SOC 7.A(1) on page 10 for introductory language.
8/
See SOC 7.A(1) on page 10 for introductory language.
system modifications.
But the reliability of the SRV's chosen for Shoreham has been historically poor.
Thus, LILCO has not demonstrated SRV compli-ance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, Criterion 30.
SOC 8:
DETECTION OF INADEQUATE CORE COOLING Submitted:
LILCO/ Staff / SOC Stipulation of December 2,
- 1981, at 6-7.
Admitted:
Board Order of February 8, 1982, at 1.
TMI-2 demonstrated the need to measure fuel cladding temperatures during accident conditions.
Criterion 13 of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, requires that:
Instrumentation shall be provided to monitor variables and systems over their anticipated ranges for normal operation, for anticipated operational occurrences, and for accident conditions as appropriate to assure ade-quate safety, including those variables and systems that can affect the fission process, the integrity of the reactor core, the reactor coolant pressure bound-ary, and the containment and its associated systems.
Appropriate controls shall be provided to maintain these variables and systems within prescribed operating ranges.
SOC contends that the Shoreham plant design does not have in-Strumentation to permit measurement of fuel clad temperature, in the range experienced at TMI-2, as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, Criterion 13.
Further, the Shoreham design does not provide adequate means to detect the onset of inade-quate core cooling (ICC) and this poses a threat to public health and safety similar to that posed at TMI-2.
TMI-2 opera-tors did not immediately detect the onset of ICC partly because there was no direct indication of it.
NUREG-0737, Item II.F.2 requires that each plant have instrumentation to provide an unambiguous, easy-to-interpret indication of ICC.
The Shoreham design is deficient in this area for the following reasons:
(a) LILCO has decided that no additional instruments, including in-core thermocouples, are needed for to detect ICC; it believes that water level instru-ments will suffice.
But these instruments are not a direct indication of core cooling and core tem-perature and thus cannot provide an easy-to-interpret indication of ICC or fuel failure.
(b) The other instruments upon which LILCO will rely for detection of fuel failure include fission prod-uct, steam line radiation and hydrogen monitors.
These instruments may be effective after fuel failure but do not indicate the onset of ICC.
Thus, Shoreham's design does not comply with 10 CFR S 50.55a(h) and Part 50, Appendix A, Criterion 13.
SOC 9:
NOTIFICATION OF DISABLED SAFETY SYSTEM Submitted:
LILCO/ Staff / SOC Stipulation of December 2,
- 1981, at 7-8.
Admitted:
Board Order of February 8, 1982, at 1.
As evidenced by the accident at Three Mile Island Unit 2,
accident conditions can be aggravated by the operation of the plant while one or more safety systems are inoperable.
At Three Mile Island, two auxiliary feedwater system valves were closed when they should have been open.
As specified below, SOC contends that Shoreham does not contain an adequate system to inform the reactor operator when a safety system has been deliberately disabled because the plant does not meet the spec-ifications of Regulatory Guide 1.47 or its equivalent.
Therefore, it does not adequately protect the public health and safety and does not comply with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, Criteria 20, 21 and 22.
Specifically, the plant does not meet Regulatory Guide 1.47 in the following respects:
(a) the system inoperative alarms for the screenwell pumphouse vent system relay, the emergency switch-gear room exhaust air system, the battery room vent system, the RBSWS chiller equipment room vent sys-tem and the diesel rooms emergency vent system can-not be manually activated in.the control room; (b) the portion of the compressed air system serving the SRV's does not have a unique system inoperative alarm; and (c) there is inadequate indication of the status (in-cluding bypass conditions) of systems and power sources on the Remote Shutdown Panel.
l
- I SOC 16:
CLAD SWELLING AND FLOW BLOCKAGE Submitted:
LILCO/ Staff / SOC Stipulation of December 2,
- 1981, at 9-10.
Admitted:
Board Order of February 8, 1982, a t 1.
The ECCS at Shoreham may not meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 because of clad swelling and flow blockage.
In SOC's view, new test results obtained by the NRC Staff and re-ported in NUREG-0630 show that modeling of clad swelling and flow blockage is inadequate.
Subsequent to the publication of NUREG-0630, the NRC Staff reviewed information submitted by LILCO and General Electric and concluded that operation of Shoreham during the first cycle will be acceptable.
SOC disa-grees and contends that:
(a) There is inadequate assurance that the ECCS system at Shoreham is acceptable because of clad swelling and flow blockage problems in that:
(i) there is no margin in the calculated LOCA peak centerline temperature (PCT);
(ii) the LOCA analysis used assumed unpressurized fuel but Shoreham will use pressurized fuel; (iii) the PCT increases due to enhanced fission gas release are only estimates and the analysis is incomplete; (iv) the calculated net increase in PCT (increase caused by deficiencies in the fission gas model less decrease due to improved thermal-hydraulic models) is the difference between two large, approximate numbers and therefore may have a large degree of uncertainty; (v) the decreases in PCT assumed as a result of using new thermal-hydraulic models are only estimates; (vi) the burst-strain sensitivity study neglected the effects of Zircaloy oxidation heat; and (vii) in the burst-strain sensitivity study, the base case flow blockage was not used in some of the cases analyzed.
(b) There is inadequate assurance that the reanalysis requested by the NRC Staff for Shoreham's second fuel cycle and beyond will show that the ECCS sys-tem meets 10 CPR S 50.46 and Part 50, Appendix K with respect to clad swelling and flow blockage.
SOC 19(a):
REG. GUIDES 1.2 AND 1.150:
RPV INTEGRITY AND TESTING Submitted:
LILCO/ Staff / SOC Stipulation of December 2,
- 1981, at 12-13.
Admitted:
Board Order of February 8, 1982, at 1.
A major contributing factor in the TMI-2 accident was that operating plants were not required by the NRC Staff (Staff) to be in compliance with current regulatory practices (i.e.,
Regulatory Guides, Branch Technical Positions, and Standard Review Plans).
The TMI-2 accident also demonstrated that the current regulatory practices, practices similar to those being applied by the Staff in their safety evaluation of Shoreham, were in a number of cases not suitably conservative to properly protect the health and safety of the oublic (i.e.,
hydrogen generation, radiation shielding, source terms, and single failure criterion).
SOC contends that the NRC Staff has not required LILCO to in-corporate measures to assure that Shoreham conforms with the standards or goals of safety criteria contained in recent regu-latory guides.
As a result, the Staff has not required that Shoreham structures, systems, and components be backfit as re-quired by 10 CPR S 50.55a, S 50.57, and S 50.109 with regard to:
(a) Regulatory Guides 1.2 and 1.150. -- LILCO has not adequately demonstrated that the design, pre-service examination, and in-service examination of the Shoreham reactor pressure vessel and vessel nozzles is in compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, Criteria 1 and 31.,
10 CFR S 50.55a, and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criteria XII and XVII, in that:
1.
Quality control of the ultrasonic testing (UT) equipment including the UT transducers does not meet Regulatory Guide 1.150 and thus is inadequate to provide reliable and reproducible UT results.
_1g_
l 2.
UT examination travel time does not meet Regulatory Guide 1.150 and thus is inadequate to assure detec-tion or defects of significant length (larger than the standard calibration holes) or significant depth.
3.
Radiation exposure to examination perconnel has not been demonstrated as meeting ALARA.
4.
Structural integrity of the pressure vessel has not been demonstrated in accordance with Regulatm y Guide 1.2 and thus there is inadequate assurance that failure of the vessel by brittle fracture as a result of the design basis accident will not occur.
SOC 19(b):
REG. GUIDES 1.26 AND 1.29:
CLASSIFICATION OF EQUIPMENTE/.
Submitted:
LILCO/ Staff / SOC Stipulation of December 2,
- 1981, at 13.
Admitted:
Board Order of February 8, 1982, a t 1.
(b) Regulatory Guides 1.26 and 1.29. -- LILCO's general list of quality group and seismic design classifi-cations listed in FSAR Table 3.2.1-1 is not in com-pliance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, Criteria 1 and 2, 10 CFR S 50.55a, and 10 CFR Part 100, Appendix A in that:
1.
the quality group classifications contained in FSAR Table 3.2.1-1 do not comply with the regulatory position of Revision 3 of Regulatory Guide 1.26 for safety-related components containing water, steam or radioactive materials; 2.
the seismic design classifications contained in FSAR Table 3.2.1-1 do not comply with the regula-tory position of Revision 3 of Regulatory Guide 1.29 with regard to control room habitability and radioactive waste systems; 3.
LILCO has not revised the FSAF. Table 3.2.1-1 to expand the list of safety-related equipment as re-flected in NUREG-0737 and as a result of the NRC Staff review of the Q-List as set forth in Supplement 1 of the SER on page 17-1; and 9/
See SOC 19(a) on page 17 for introductory language.
4.
LILCO's list of safety related equipment contained in FSAR Table 3.2.1-1 does not include equipment upon which the plant operators will rely in re-sponse to accidents outlined in the Shoreham emer-gency operating procedures, SOC 19(c):
REG. GUIDE 1.31:
FERRI.TE CONTENT IN STAINLESS STEEL 1M/
)
Submitted:
LILCO/ Staff / SOC Stipulation of December 2,
- 1981, at 14.
Admitted:
Board Order of February 8, 1982, at 1.
(c) Regulatory Guide 1.31. -- The control of ferrite content in stainless steel weld metal by LILCO com-plies with Revision 1 of the guide rather than Revision 3, with regard to verification of delta ferrite content of filler materials and to examina-tion for ferrite content by a magnetic measuring instrument.
Therefore, Shoreham does not comply with 10 CPR Part 50, Appendix A, Criteria 1 and 14.
SOC 19(d):
REG. GUIDE 1.44:
MATERIALSll/
Submitted:
LILCO/ Staff / SOC Stipulation of December 2,
- 1981, at 14-15.
Admitted:
Board Order of February 8, 1982, aA 1.
(d) Reg 11atory Guide 1.44. -- LILCO has not adequately demonstrated control of the application and pro-cessing of stainless steel to avoid severe sensiti-zation that could lead to stress corrosion cracking as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, Criteria 1 and 4 and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B in that Shoreham has failed to comply with the NRC Staff position described in NUREG-0313, Revision 1 as follows:*
1.
Portions of the reactor recirculation system (B31) and stainless steel to carber. steel transition welds between the reactor recirculation system and the reactor water clean-up, core spray, and 10/
See SOC 19(a) on page 17 for introductory language.
11/
See SOC 19(a) on page 17 for introductory language.
residual heat removal systems do not meet the guidelines set forth in NUREG-0313, Revision 1, for ASME code class I and II reactor coolant pressure boundary piping.
- 2. The commitment to inspect portions of the reactor recirculation system and transition welds that have been classified as "non-conforming" per NUREG-0313, Revision 1, has been conditioned by LILCO to be limited "to the extent practicable" due to physical interfer-ence in some locations.
NUREG-0313 does not specifi-cally allow for such deviations.
Also, LILCO has failed to identify specifically the number, location, and detailed justification for these deviations.
Further, LILCO's objection to the " service sensitive" classification of recirculation riser lines and inlet lines at the safe-end curves demonstrates a failure to comply with the requirements of NUREG-0313.
- 3. The limiting conditions for leakage included as part of the technical specifications has not been dem-onstrated in that the leak detection system may not adequately enhance the discovery of unidentified lea-kage as required by NUREG-0313.
- It should be noted that LILCO's use of alphanumeric designations is not in compliance with the nomenclature set forth in NUREG-0313, Revision 1.
This discrepancy makes LILCO's commitment inscrutable.
SOC 19(e):
REG. GUIDES 1.60 AND 1.61:
SEISMIC DESIGN 12/
Submitted:
LILCO/ Staff / SOC Stipulation of December 2,
- 1981, at 15.
Admitted:
Board Order of February 8, 1982, at 1.
(e) Regulatory Guides 1.60 and 1.61. -- The design re-sponse spectra for the seismic design of Shoreham are not based on the standards in Regulatory Guide 1.60.
Thus, the spectra have not been demonstrated to be sufficiently conservative to comply with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, Criterion 2, and 10 CPR Part 100, Appendix A.
In addition. LILCO did not use the Regulatory Guide 1.61 value of damping (4%)
for the operating basis earthquake analysis of 12/
See SOC 19(a) on page 17 for introductory language.
Category I reinforced concrete structures, but rather utilized a higher value of damping (5%),
thereby also violating the regulations just cited.
SOC 19(f):
REG. GUIDE 1.63:
ELECTRICAL PENETRATIONS 13/
Submitted:
LILCO/ Staff / SOC Stipulation of December 2,
- 1981, at 15-16.
Admitted:
Board Order of February 8, 1982, at 1.
(f) Regulatory Guide 1.63. -- Shoreham has installed General Electric containment electrical penetra-tions which utilize epoxy as a pressure sealant and as an insulator.
The GE-furnished epoxy has cracked and peeled due to aging and has deteriora-ted due to moisture absorption.
Therefore, it does not comply with Revision 0 of the guide.
In addi-tion, the electrical penetrations at Shoreham have been qualified to Revision 0 of the guide rather than the current Revision 2.
For these reasons Shoreham violates 10 CPR Part 50, Appendix A, Criteria 4 and 50.
SOC 19(g):
REG. GUIDE 1.75:
ELECTRICAL SEPARATION 11/
Submitted:
LILCO/ Staff / SOC Stipulation of December 2,
- 1981, at 16.
Admitted:
Board Order of February 8, 1982, at 1.
(g) Regulatory Gui_de 1.75. -- The design of the Shoreham electrical system fails to provide ade-quate physical independence of electrical cables and raceways as set forth in Revision 2 to Regulatory Guide 1.75 and therefore does not comply with 10 CPR S 50.55a and Part 50, Appendix A, Criteria 3, 17 and 21.
In addition, the minimum separation criteria for Shoreham stated in Section 3.12 of the PSAR have not been followed as noted in Inspection Report 50-322/79-07 dated August 21, 1979 and subsequent reports from the Office of Inspection and Enforcement.
Accordingly, each de-ficiency in separation for Shoreham electrical 13/
See SOC 19(a) on page 17 for introductory language.
14/
See SOC 19(a) on page 17 for introductory language.
. cables and raceways must be adequately demonstrated using one of the following options:
1.
correct the deficiency by meeting the electrical equipment meparation criteria set forth in Section 3.12 of the Shoreham Final Safety Analysis Report; 2.
correct the deficiency by meeting Regulatory Guide 1.75, " Physical Independence of Electric Systems,"
Revision 2 dated September, 1978; 3.
correct the deficiency by installing an acceptable barrier; or 4.
justify the deficiency by performing a specific analysis for each cable or raceway where the mini-mum separation is not met to demonstrate that a failure will not propagate because of the insuffi-cient separation.
SOC 19(h):
REG. GUIDE 1.89:
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATIONS l/
l Submitted:
LILCO/ Staff / SOC Stipulation of December 2,
- 1981, at 16-17.
Admitted:
Board Order of February 8, 1982, at 1.
(h) Regulatory Guide 1.89. -- LILCO, in its response tc NUREG-0588, failed to demonstrate adequate qualifi-cation of Class IE electrical equipment as de-scribed in this regulatory guide, and as specified in IEEE Standard 323-1974.
Therefore, Shoreham does not comply with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, Criteria 1, 2,
4 and 23, and Appendix B, Criteria II and III, in that:
1.
The limited test conditions posed in the Shoreham environmental qualification program are not suf-ficiently conservative.
2.
Equipment has been qualified by grandfathering to older, less stringent standards.
Inadequate consi-t deration has been given to the deteriorating effects of component aging, accuracy of instrument setpoints, test documentation requirements, and tolerance margins.
15/
See SOC 19(a) on page 17 for introductory language.
. +
3.
The list of emergency operating equipment to be qualified is inadequate.
4.
There has been an inadequate demonstration that all safety-related equipment has been properly quali-fied to meet aging and other life requirements.
5.
There is insufficient information to evaluate the overall adequacy of Shoreham's satisfaction of environmental qualification requirements for safety-related equipment.
SOC 19(i):
REG. GUIDE 1.100:
SEISMIC QUALIFICATIO 'S 5/
1 Submitted:
LILCO/ Staff / SOC Stipulation of December 2,
- 1931, at 17.
Admitted:
Board Order of February 8, 1982, at 1.
(i) Regulatory Guide 1.100. -- LILCO has failed to com-mit to conducting a seismic qualification program for Class IE electrical equipment as prescribed by Revision 0 and Revision 1 of this guide and there-fore does not comply with 10 CPR Part 50, Appendix h,
Cri'.erion 2 and Appendix B, Criterion III, with particular regard to the testing program, including multi-axis multi-frequency testing and the effects of aging prior to testing.
SOC 19(j):
REG. GUIDE 1.115:
TURBINE ORIENTATION 2/
1 Submitted:
LILCO/ Staff / SOC Stipulation of December 2,
- 1981, at 17-18.
Admitted:
Board Order of February 8, 1982, at 1.
(j) Regulatory Guide 1.115. -- The turbine orientation with respect to safety-related structures is unfa-vorable in the Shoreham design and thus results in additional probability of a turbine missile acci-dent endangering public health and safety.
LILCO's design for protection against low-trajectory tur-bine missiles, as described in Section 10.2.3 of the FSAR, is not in conformance with the latest 16,/
See SOC 19(a) on page 17 for introductory language.
17/
See SOC 19(a) on page 17 for introductory language.
procedures outlined in Revision 1 of this guide and therefore does not comply with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, Criterion 4.
SC 1:
REMOTE SHUTDONN PANEL Submitted:
Suffolk County Contentions, dated February 15, 1982, at 1.
Suffolk County contends that Shoreham's remote shutdown panel (RSP) does not have adequate instrumentation or controls to meet 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 19.
Specifically, the RSP instrumentation and controls for the following systems are in-adequate to provide an indication of operability of control valves and pumps with a potential for failures:
(a) Reactor Core Isolation System (valves, motor operators and pumps);
(b) Residual Heat Removal System (motor and air valve operators); and (c) Service Water System (motor and air valve operators).
l l
SC 2:
DIESEL GENERATOR RELAYS Submitted:
luffolk County Contentions, dated February 15, 1982, at 1.
1 Suffolk County contends that Shoreham's onsite emer-l gency generating system does not meet 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, l
GDC 17 because of the high probability of system failure due to accumulation of dirt in relays located in the diesel generator rooms.
SC 3:
DETECTION OF INADEQUATE CORE COOLING Submitted:
Suffolk County Contentions, dated February 15, 1982, at 2.
Suffolk County contends that LILCO and the NRC Staff have not demonstrated and confirmed that Shoreham has adequate instrumentation and procedures to detect and monitor the onset of inadequate core cooling (ICC).
NUREG-0737, item II.F.2 re-quires that instrumentation provide an unambiguous, easy-to-interpret indication of inadequate core cooling.
LILCO has taken the position that no additional instruments are needed and that current water level instruments are sufficient.
But
these instruments are not a direct indication of core cooling and cora temperature (as are in-core thermocouples) and thus may not provide an unambiguous, easy-to-interpret indication of ICC or fuel failure under certain conditions.
There is insuf-ficient diversity of instrumentation to assure that a common event (e.g., drywell high temperature interfering with water level measurement) cannot cause a loss of direct measurement capability.
Because there is no direct fuel temperature mea-surement and because other instruments (e.g.,
fission product detectors, steam line radiation monitors and hydrogen monitors) be;ome inoperative under some accident conditions, there is no assurance of indication of the onset of ICC.
Therefore, LILCO's design and instrumentation are inadequate to detect and monitor theonsetofICCanddonotcompl{8/with 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 13, and 10 CFR 50.55a(h)._
SC 4 :
WATER HAMMER Submitted:
Suffolk County Contentions, dated February 15, 1982, at 3.
Suffolk County contends that LILCO has not demonstrated adequate assurance of the operability of safety-related piping to prevent or withstand the effects of water hammer because the Company has not considered the start-up experience at similar BWR plants.
Therefore, Shoreham safety-related piping (e.g.,
ECCS, Reactor Decay Heat Removal Systems) does not meet 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 1, 31, and 46.
SC 5:
LOOSE PARTS MONITORING Submitted:
Suffolk County Contentions, dated February 15, 1982, at 3.
Suffolk County contends that Shoteham's Loose Parts Monitoring System could produce a large number of spurious (unwanted) alarms which, if not readily identified or ex-plained, could diminish operator performance and overall plant safety.
This would violate 10 CPR 50, Appendix A, GDC 1 and 13, as well as 10 CFR 20.l(c), and 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2), (3) and (5).
18/
The original text of this contention cited 10 CPR S 50.55(h);
the NRC Staff and LILCO believe that 10 CFR S 50.55a(h) is the proper reference.
SC 8:
ENVIRONMENTAL _ QUALIFICATIONS Submitted:
Suffolk County Contentions, dated February 15, 1982, at 5-6.
Suffolk County contends that the TMI-2 accident demon-strated that the severity of the environment in which equipment important to safety must operate was underestimated and that equipment previously deemed F.o be environmentally qualified had failed.
Shoreham's safety-related equipment has not been dem-onstrated to be capable of maintaining functional operability under all service conditions throughout its installed life, and during the time in which it is actually required to operate, thereby violating 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 1, 2,
4 and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Sections II, III.
Deficiencies in the qualification of Shoreham's safety-related equipment must be eliminated before operation can be authorized.
Specifically, (a) The limited test conditions posed in the Shoreham environmental qualification pro-gram are not sufficiently conservative; (b) Equipment has been qualified by grandfa-thering to older, less stringent stan-dards; (c) The list of emergency equipment to be qualified is inadequate; (d) There has been an inadequate demonstra-tion that all safety-related equipment has been properly qualified to meet aging and other life requirements; and (e) There is insufficient information to evaluate the overall adequacy of Shoreham's satisfaction of environmental qualification requirements for safety-related equipment.
SC 9:
ECCS PUMP BLOCKAGE Submitted:
Suffolk County Contentions, dated February 15, 1982, at 7.
Suffolk County contends that LILCO has not adequately demonstrated that drywell piping and equipment insulation loosened and/or damaged during a postulated loss of coolant accident will not unduly degrade the ECCS flow through the ECCS
4 suction strainers located in the suppression pool.
Therefore, the Shoreham design does not satisfy 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 35.
SC 10:
ECCS CORE SPRAY Submitted:
Suffolk County Contentions, dated February 15, 1982, at 7.
Suffolk County contends that LILCO and the NRC Staff have not adequately demonstrated that the Emergency Core Cooling System for Shoreham meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.46 and Appendix K with regard to core spray distribution and counter current flow, as shown by the recent Japanese test data described in BN-81-29.
SC ll:
PASSIVE MECHANICAL VALVE FAILURE Submitted:
Suffolk County Contentions, dated February 15, 1982, at 7.
Suffolk County contends that LILCO has not demonstrated that the valves used in the safety-related systems at Shoreham will not fail in an undetectable or unsafe mode, thereby jeop-ardizing the safe operation of Shoreham and violating 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 23, 34, 35, 37 and 40.
SC 14:
QA/QC -- NRP I&E PROGRAM Submitted:
Suffolk County Contentions, dated February 15, 1982, at 12-13.
Suffolk County contends that the NRC Staff's Inspection and Enforcement (I&E) Program has not adequately verified that LILCO's quality assurance program for Shoreham has been imple-mented in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.34(a),
paragraph 7 and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Sections I through XVIII, in that:
(a) The I&E Program has identified only the symptoms of the Shoreham quality defi-ciencies as nonconformances, and has not required LILCO to initiate corrective action to resolve the root causes; (b) The I&E Program's reliance on LILCO for primary inspections at Shoreham with NRC officials serving as auditors is not ade-quate because the same practice has recently proved to be inadequate in
l l
l -
timely identifying quality deficiencies at other nuclear facilities (e.g.,
Browns Ferry, North Anna, Davis Besse, and Rancho Seco); and (c) The I&E Program has no baseline criteria against which to measure quantitatively the effectiveness of the Shoreham quality program.
In order to draw conclusions from random inspections just such a sta-tistical base is desirable.
In addition, the I&E program has no means of determin-ing improvements in, or the effectiveness of, corrections as no comparative mea-sures are used.
Therefore, no general conclusions as to the adequacy of the LILCO program can be drawn by ISE.
SC 15:
QA/QC -- REVIEW AND INSPECTIONS Submitted:
Suffolk County Contentions, dated February 15, 1982, at 14-15.
Suffolk County contends that the Shoreham quality as-surance/ quality control program has involved inadequate review and physical inspection to verify compliance with 10 CPR 50, Appendix B.
The inability to verify full compliance with Appendix 3 is based on inadequacies discovered independently at Diablo Canyon, Zimmer, Midland and South Texas and on state-ments by NRC Chairman Palladino.
Similarly, the random, non-systematic approach taken by NRC I&C to verify quality programs is inadequate to provide appropriate assurance of compliance.
Also the random checks being conducted by the NRC resident in-spector at Shoreham indicate lapses, breakdowns and incon-sistencies that do not provide credible public assurance of an operable QA System.
For example, see NRC Inspections 50-322/79-05, 80-03, 80-06, 80-08, 80-14 and 81-02.
Because the NRC reports do not indicate what changes, if any, were made in procedures to correct for failures that have occurred, it is not possible to judge the adequacy of corrective actions.
Finally, there are no quantitative measures used to assure that NRC I&E and LILCO audits can be correlated statistically to provide verification of the adequacy of the QA system to detect system or equipment errors or distinguish between random errors and systematic failures.
Therefore, there is no assurance that LILCO has com-plied with 10 CPR 50.55(e) and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B,
Sections XVII and XVIII.
Suffolk County contends that NRC I&E and LILCO
cannot provide assurance of compliance without systematically auditing QA documentation against physically inspectable struc-tures and ccmponents.
This physical audit should be sufficiently detailed to provide statistically valid data to permit projection of the audit results to systems beyond those systems and QA records inspected.
SC 17:
FIRE PROTECTION Submitted:
Suffolk County Contentions, dated February 15, 1982, at 15-16.
Suffolk County contends that:
(a) LILCO has not >]emonstrated that Shoreham meets 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 3 and 19, due to the lack of a toxic gas detec-tion and warning system in the control room.
The Shoreham control room contains many items, especially cable and ventilation-duct insulation material, which present a potential toxic gas hazard.
Because one of the largest prob-lems during the Browns Ferry fire was the toxic gas given off by burning cable ma-terials, and because Shoreham has no de-tection or warning equipment for toxic gas in the control room, GDC's 3 and 19 have not been met.
(b) Shoreham's Fire Protection Program does not meet 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 3 due to the lack of manual fire alarms in the machine shop area at elevation 15 feet.
l In this area, it is expected that flamma-l ble, toxic and hazardous materials will be stored and used.
While automatic de-tectors are provided in the ventilation systems, a significant number of all BWR l
fires to date have been detected by plant personnel rather than automatic detection systems.
Lack of manual alarms may impede rapid personnel notification of a fire.
SC 19:
HUMAN FACTORS -- PROCEDURES l
Submitted:
Suffolk County Contentions, dated i
February 15, 1982, at 20-21.
l
Suffolk County contends that 10 CPR 50.40 and 50.57 requirements have not been met because:
(a) LILCO has not demonstrated that Shoreham's training program and proce-dures are both consistent and plant-specific.
For example, fire protection equipment used in the control room is different than that discussed in the training manual and the procedure calls for use of equipment different than that available.
(b) In addition, Shoreham's procedures are inadequate (i) to respond to station blackout, shift turnover, and operation in protective clothing or equipment, and (ii) to assure knowledge of shutdown sys-tem operability.
(c) Further, the human factors implications of responding to emergency procedures have not been adequately checked.
For example, locations of emergency equipment controls have not been checked for se-quential activities to assure proximity of controls or instruments used sequen-tially and to assure operators or super-visors are not overloaded.
(d) Also,.Shoreham's procedures are keyed to annunciators, and this method may not be optimum in diagnosing accidents to deter-mine the appropriate response when multi-ple alarms occur.
SC 21:
MARK II CONTAINMENT Submitted:
Suffolk County Contentions, dated February 15, 1982, at 22-24.
LILCO and the NRC Staff have not adequately demon-strated that Shoreham's primary containment, reactor pressure vessel supporting structure and attached and associated safety-related equipment meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 4, 16, 50, 51 and 52.
The specific concerns are as follows:
(a) Forces generated during the suppression pool LOCA dynamics have not been
.4 a
4
. completely and adequately determined and taken into account.
Of the numerous Mark II Containment loads assessed on a gen-eric and on a plant unique basis under the Mark II reassessment program underway for the past six years, several LOCA forces have not yet been shown to have been suitably handled in the design of the structures, systems, and components important to plant safety.
Included in this category are the forces due to Steam Condensation Downcomer Lateral Loads (Loads I.B.1.a & b in Table 6-1, NUREG-0420, Supp. No. 1), Steam 2ondensation Oscillation Loads (Loads I.B.2.a in Table 6-1, NUREG-0420, Supp.
No. 1), and Steam Condensation Chugging Loads (Loads I.B.2.c in Table 6-1, NUREG-0420, Supp. No. 1).
(b) Forces generated during safety relief valve (SRV) actuation, continuing SRV blowdown, and those due to suppression pool heatup resulting from such extended blowdowns have not been demonstrated to be adequately accommodated.
Concern spe-cifically remains for the Quencher Air Clearing Loads (Loads II.B in Table 6-1, NUREG-0420, Supp. No. 1), Steam Condensation Submerged Drag Loads (Loads III.C in Table 6-1, NUREG-0420, Supp. No.
1), and proper specification and accom-modation of the suppression pool tempera-ture limit (phenomenon II.A in Table 6-1, NUREG-0420, Supp. No. 1).
l (c) The capability and adequacy of the test procedure to periodically demonstrate an t
acceptable leakage rate of the drywell floor seal and downcomer vacuum breakers and other leakage paths that could lead l
to excessive steam bypass of the suppres-sion pool has not been demonstrated.
(d) Adequacy of the design to insure, with sufficient margin, that the primary con-tainment and associated safety-related I
structure can accommodate the simultane-ously applied loads of transient and LOCA events has not been demonstrated.
1 w
. ~ -
=
~e
~
(e) Suffolk County further contends that the extent of the deficiencies resulting from the Mark II containment design program may be further exacerbated by the fact that an adequate and properly controlled experimental design verification program as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Sections III and XI has not been per-formed.
The verification of the design adequacy of the primary containment, re-actor pressure vessel supporting struc-ture, and associated safety-related sys-tems and components is deficient with specific regard to testing under the most adverse design conditions, performance of tests under suitable environmental condi-tions, documentation and evaluation of test results, and use of test data devel-oped under a non-controlled (foreign) test program.
There is, therefore, lack of assurance that the acceptance criteria used by LILCO in evaluating the Shoreham design contains suitable conservatism.
SC 23:
CONTAINMENT ISOLATION Submitted:
Suf folk County Contentions, dated February 15, 1982, at 26.
Suffolk County contends that LILCO and the NRC Staf f have not adequately demonstrated that Shoreham meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 54, 55, 56, and 57 regarding the ade-quacy of the containment isolation valves.
Valve configuration and functionability relating to leak rate and intersystem leakage testing have not been sufficiently demonstrated.
Further, LILCO has not fully complied with NUREG-0737, item II.E.4.2 (con-tainment isolation dependability) in that the auto-matic icolation and operability of the containment purge valve have not been demonstrated.
- Further, LILCO has not demonstrated that the requirements of NUREG-0803 related to a postulated break in the scram discharge volume have been met.
SC 24:
CRACKING OF MATERIALS Submitted:
Suffolk County Contentions, dated February 15, 1982, at 26-27.
Suffolk County contends that LILCO has not demonstrated, and the NRC Staff has not verified, that Shoreham meets the requirements of 10 CPR 50, Appendix A, GDC 4, 14, 30, and 31, with regard to the adequacy of material selection and control and system design as follows:
(a) The use of appropriate materials and pro-cesses as specified by NUREG-0313, Revision 1, has not been fully followed in the design and construction of the Shoreham piping systems important to safety.
(b) Recommendations contained in NUREG-0619 (p. C-12) relating to the installation of a low flow controller to be used to con-trol feedwater flow over a range of flow from 0.5 percent to 10 percent of rated flow has not been implemented at Shoreham.
Analytical evidence shows that such a flow controller is necessary to limit crack growth in BWR feedwater noz-zles over the life of the plant.
SC 25:
ASME SECTION XI (PSI /ISI) PROGRAM 19/
Submitted:
Suffolk County Contentions, dated February 15, 1982, at 27-28.
Suffolk County contends that LILCO has not adequately demonstrated the effectiveness of the technology and methods available that are required to satisfy the inspection and tests l
specified by 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 32, 36, 39, and 45.
The technology used for the PSI inspection for the reactor I
pressure boundary cannot be correlated to that used for the ISI program.
And, further, the results from inspected areas of the reactor pressure boundary cannot be extended to non-inspectable areas.
Suffolk County further contends that the Shoreham plant does not comply with Reg. Guide 10 CFR 50.55a(g) [ sic]20/ which i
l 19/
The original text cites "ASME SECTION X"; the NRC Staff and LILCO believe the proper reference is "ASME SECTION XI."
l 20/
The reference to " Reg. Guide 10 CFR 50.55a(g)" is obviously l
incorrect; the County needs to correct the citation.
1 i
requires, for the ISI Program, use of the Edition and Addenda of Section XI of the ASME Code in effect 12 months prior to the date of issuance of the operating license.
Because the Shoreham piping configuration and reactor vessel design sub-stantially pre-date the latest code, LILCO has already identi-fled some Section XI inspection requirements for which exemp-tion has been requested.
Additional exemptions and/or waivers will undoubtedly be identified.
The impact of these deficien-cies has not been specified and analysis has not been presented to demonstrate the effectiveness of the ISI program.
SC 26:
ALARA RADIATION EXPOSURES Submitted:
Suffolk County Contentions, dated February 15, 1982, at 28-29.
Suffolk County contends that LILCO has not adequately demonstrated that Shoreham meets the requirements of 10 CPR 20.l(c), with regard to provisions for maintaining occupational radiation exposure as low as is reasonably achievable (ALARA).
Demonstration of compliance is inadequate as follows:
(a) Plant and equipment design has not been shown to be optimally developed for mini-mization of radiation exposure during maintenance of the plant by:
(i) Selection of low cobalt materials; (ii) Separation or isolation of various components and piping i
systems; (iii) Provisions for flushing or decontamination; (iv) Equipment layout and arrangement for ease and automation of mainten-ance and refueling; and (v) Condenser design utilizing the minimum number of shell connections.
(b) Procedures have not been developed and emplaced to provide:
(i) Limitation of iron-cobalt buildup in the primary system through water chemistry control; I
- (ii) Monitoring and control of individual and plant total annual occupational radiation doses, with individual exceedance of three tem per quarter and five rem per year occurring only on an emergency basis and requiring special management approval; and (iii) Action to reduce radiation levels and/or exposure if the in-plant totals significantly exceed U.S.
plant averages.
SC 27:
POST-ACCIDENT MONITORING Submitted:
Suffolk County Contentions, dated February 15, 1982, at 30-31.
The text of SC 27 is identical to that of SOC 3.
See page 7 above.
SC 28(a)(i):
CUTOFF OF ECCS Submitted:
Suffolk County Contentions, dated February 15, 1982, at 31-32.
The text of SC 28(a)(i) is identical to that of SOC 7.A(1) if "Suffolk County contends" is substi-tuted for " SOC contends."
See page 10 above.
SC 28(a)(ii):
HUMAN FACTORS -- EQUIPMENT Submitted:
Suffolk County Contentions, dated February 15, 1982, at 32-33.
The text of SC 28(a)(ii) is identical to that of SOC 7.A(2).
See page 11 above.
SC 28(a)(iii):
IODINE MONITORING Submitted:
Suffolk County Contentions, dated February 15, 1982, at 33-34.
The text of SC 28(a)(iii) is identical to that of SOC 7.A(3) if " Item II.B.1" in SC's conten-tion is changed to " Item II.F.1."
The NRC Staff and LILCO believe the latter in the correct reference.
See page 12 above.
SC 28(a)(iv):
SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY CONSOLE Submitted:
Suffolk County Contentions, dated February 15, 1982, at 34.
The text of SC 28(a)(iv) is identical to that of SOC 7.A(4).
See page 13 above.
SC 28(a)(v):
SRV TEST PROGRAM Submitted:
Suffolk County Contentions, dated February 15, 1982, at 34-35.
The text of SC 28(a)(v) is identical to that of SOC 7.A(5).
See page 13 above.
SC 28(a)(vi):
REDUCTION OF SRV CHALLENGES Submitted:
Suffolk County Contentions, dated February 15, 1982, at 35.
The text of SC 28(a)(vi) is identical to that of SOC 7.A(6).
See page 13 above.
SC 31:
ELECTRICAL SEPARATION Submitted:
Suffolk County Contentions, dated February 16, 1982, at 31-32.
The text of SC 31 is identical to that of SOC 19(g) with the addition of the following introductory language:
"Suffolk County contends that 10 CFR S 50.57 and S 50.109 requirements 21/ have not been made because:"
21/
The original text cites S 60.109; the NRC Staff and LILCO believe that S 50.109 is the correct reference.
1
. II.
CONTENTIONS TO WHICH THE NRC STAFF AND/OR LILCO OBJECT The following contentions have been advanced by intervenors in either the Shoreham operating license or construction permit extension proceedings.
For the reasons summarized below, LILCO and/or the NRC Staff have objected to the litigability of each.
SOC 1:
EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONES Submitted:
NRC Staff / SOC Stipulation of June 6, 1980, Appendix A, at 1.
Admitted:
Board Order of June 26, 1980, at 2 (modifying submitted con-tention).
Objecting Party:
NRC Staff /LILCO Siimmary of Objection:
The NRC Staff and LILCO be-lieve that SOC 1 impermissibly challenges NRC regulations.
LILCO Motion for Summary Disposition of SOC Contention 1, dated July 13, 1981; NRC Staff Response Supporting Applicant's Motion for Summary Disposition of SOC Contentions 1 and 2, dated September 18, 1981.
Intervenors contend that the energency plan-ning zones (EPZ) set forth by the Commission in the NRC Policy Statement of October 23, 1979 (44 Fed.
Reg. 61123) are inadequate for the Shoreham nuclear plant in that:
a.
The 10-mile (radius) EPZ plume exposure pathway fails to provide adequate consid-eration of the following local condi-tions:
demography, meteorology, topogra-phy, land use characteristics, access
routes, local jurisdictional boundaries and release time characteristics.
b.
The 50-mile (radius) EPZ ingestion path-way fails to provide adequate considera-tion of the following local conditions:
demography, meteorology, topography, land characteristics, and time of year of re-lease.
SOC 2:
LIQUID PAT 3WAY Submitted:
NRC Staff / SOC Stipulation of June 6, 1980, Appendix A, at 1.
Admitted:
Board Order of June 26, 1980, at 2.
Objecting Party:
NRC Staff /LILCO Summary of Objection:
The NRC Staff and LILCO be-lieve that SOC 2 impermissibly challenges NRC regulations.
LILCO Motion for Summary Disposition of SOC Contention 2, dated July 13, 1981; NRC Staff Response Supporting Applicant's Motion for Summary Disposition of SOC Contentions 1 and 2, dated September 18, 1981.
Intervenors contend that the emergency plan-ning requirements for the 50-mile (radius) ingestion pathway for the Shoreham facility, as set forth in the NRC Policy Statement of October 23, 1979, (44 Fed. Reg. 61123), are inadequate in that they do not adequately address the effects of releases through the liquid pathway.
SOC 7.B(1):
IRSP ANALYSIS;22/
Submitted:
LILCO/ Staff / SOC Stipulation of December 2,
- 1981, at 22-24.
22/
See SOC 7.A(1) on page 10 for introductory language.
l
Objecting Party:
NRC Staff /LILCO Summary of Objection:
The NRC Staff and LILCO be-lieve that SOC 7.B(1) is pre-cluded by the Commission's TMI Policy Statement.
To the extent SOC 7.B(1) demands litigation of Class 9 acci-dents, LILCO also believes it is precluded by the Commission's Class 9 Policy Statement.
NRC Staff Opposition to Intervenor SOC's Proposed Contention 7B [ Staff Opposition to SOC 7B] dated December 16, 1981, at 2-4; LILCO's Opposition to SOC Contention 7.8, dated December 18, 1981, at 2-6.
B.
The NRC has not required LILCO to resolve for Shoreham certain items contained in NUREG-0660, NRC Action Plan Developed as a Result of the TMI-2 Accident (1980), or to resolve certain TMI related Unresolved Safety Issues.
(1) Probabilistic Risk Assessment The NRC Staff's safety review of Shoreham has largely relied on design basis accidents and.the single failure criterion.
The Staff's review of TMI-2 used this same generic approach but did not anticipate the accident sequence, magnitude of core damage or types of systems used to mitigate the TMI-2 accident.
TMI demonstrated that serious re-actor core damage accidents are a possibility and that consideration of core degradation and melting beyond the design basis accidents set forth in Chapter 7 of the ER and Chapter 15 of the FSAR should be conducted.
NUREG-0660, vol.
1, at II-1.
Such evaluation of the so-called " Class Nine" acci-dents singularly and cumulatively has not been con-ducted for Shoreham.
Further, the issuance of an operating license may foreclose or preclude the modification of the shoreham facilif/ to accommo-date the additional safety features, both preven-tive and mitigative, which have the potential for significant risk reduction.
These additional safety features include items such as filtered
vented containment, molten core retention devices, and groundwater interdiction measures.
The design of Shoreham does not provide protection against Class Nine accidents.
There is no basis for concluding that such accidents are not credi-ble.
Indeed, the Staff has conceded that the acci-dent at TMI-2 falls within that classification.
The need for plant-specific assessment of accident probabilities, including Class Nine events, at all U.S.
reactors has been recognized following the TMI-2 accident by a number of groups, including the NRC's Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS).
See Letter from Milton Plesset to John F.
Ahearne, entitled "ACRS Report on Near Term Operating License Items From Draft 3 of NUREG-0660," dated March 11, 1980, NRC News Release 80-56.
NUREG-0660, Item II.C.1 identifies the need for an improved systems-oriented approach to safety review.
This approach, called an Interim Reliabili*.y Evaluation Program (IREP), uses proba-bilistic risk assessment techniques to find risk-dominant sequences, consider multiple failures and assess the reliability of systems that may be called on to mitigate an accident but that are not normally considered as ECCS (e.g.,
the reactor core isolation cooling system).
The assessment may be used to evaluate the need for plant specific safety improvements.
Techniques developed by the Staff in the Reactor Safety Study, WASH-1400 (e.g.,
event-tree and fault-tree techniques, accident radioac-tive release categorization) are being used on in-dividual plants in conjunction with data compiled in WASH-1400 and in subsequent data collection pro-l Jects.
I Shoreham has not had an IREP analysis.
SOC con-tends that LILCO should perform simplified system reliability analyses prior to issuance of an oper-l ating license for the following key plant systems:
subcriticality systems, reactor core isolation cooling systems, ECCS injection and recirculation systems, safety features actuation systems, and auxiliary systems upon which these depend (alter-i nating and direct current systems, compressed air systems, essential service water or cooling sys-tems, and heating, ventilation and air conditioning systems).
These analyses should use event-tree and fault-tree logic techniques to identify design weaknesses and possible system modifications that l
l l
l l
could be made to improve the capability and reliability of the above systems under various transient and LOCA events.
Particular emphasis should be given to determining potential failures that could result from human errors, common causes, single point vulnerabilities, and test and mainte-nance outages.
Without such an IREP, it cannot be assured that Shoreham complies with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, Criteria 10, 13, 21, 22, 35 and 37.
SOC 7.B(2):
SYSTEMS INTERACTION 23/
Submitted:
LILCO/ Staff / SOC Stipulation of December 2,
1981, at 24.
Objecting Party:
NRC Staff /LILCO Summary of Objection:
The NRC Staff and LILCO believe that SOC 7.B(2) is precluded by the Commission's TMI Policy Statement.
To the extent SOC 7.B(2) demands litigation of Class 9 accidents, LILCO also believes it is precluded by the Commission's Class 9 Policy Statement.
Staff Opposition to SOC 7B, dated December 16, 1981, at 2-4; LILCO's Opposition to SOC Contention 7.B, dated December 18, 1981, at 2-6.
(2) The TMI-2 accident showed how non-safety systems can interact with safety systems to cause or exa-cerbate an accident.
Systems interaction (SI) has also been the subject of an Unresolved Safety Issue (USI A-17).
NUREG-0606, Unresolved Safety Issues Summary (Aqua Book).
NUREG-0660, Item II.C.3 de-scribed approaches for analysis of systems interac-tion on plants either completed or very near com-pletion.
The Shoreham design has not been subject to an SI analysis.
Uncil such an analysis is com-pleted for Shoreham and reviewed by the NRC Staff, there is no assurance that the necessary interac-tions, failure combinations and accident sequences have been considered in assessing the ability of the plant design to meet 10 CFR S 50.46.
23/
See SOC 7.B(1) on page 39 for introductory language.
SOC 7.B(3):
DOCUMENTATION OF DEVIATIONS 24/
Submitted:
LILCO/ Staff / SOC Stipulation of December 2, 1981, at 24-25.
Objecting Party:
NRC Staff /LILCO Summary of Objection:
The NRC Staff and LILCO believe that SOC 7.B(3) is precluded by the Commission's TMI Policy Statement.
LILCO also be-lieves the contention is barred because of a pending rulemaking on the issue.
Staff Opposition to SOC 7B, dated December 16, 1981, at 2-4; LILCC's Opposition to SOC Contention 7.B, dated December 18, 1981, at 2-4, 6.
(3) The NRC Staff has failed to require documentation and justification of all Shoreham deviations from current regulatory practices.
The Shoreham facil-ity, due to its long licensing period, is basically of 1960's de.'gn and, in many instances has been reviewed by the Staff against guides and standards which are no longer in use.
Neither LILCO in the FSAR nor the Staff in the SER has systematically described the standards against which Shoreham has been reviewed and the basis for and acceptability of any deviations from current regulatory prac-tices.
This void in the record is not acceptable, particularly since the Board must make findings based upon the applicable regulatory requirements.
The TMI-2 accident demonstrated the need for docu-mentation of deviations.
A major contributing fac-tor in the TMI-2 accident was that the plant had not been required by the NRC Staff to comply with then-current regulatory practices.
(For example, the absence of an automatic indication system meet-ing Regulatory Guide 1.47 contributed to operation of the plant with the auxiliary feedwater system completely disabled.)
The TMI-2 accident also dem-onstrated that past Staff practices were not suita-bly conserv; rive to protect the health and safety of the public.
The Kemeny Commission (Kemeny Report, at 20, 35, 65-66), the Rogovin Special Inquiry (Rogovin Report, vol.
2, at 21), Congress 24/
See SOC 7.B(1) on page 39 for introductory language.
(Pub.
L.
No.96-295, Section 110), and the Commission in a recent proposed rulemaking (45 Fed.
Reg. 67099 (1980)) have all recognized the need for such documentation.
The need for documentation of deviations procedures for Shoreham was recognized by Ben C.
Rusche, NRC Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, in a letter dated September 20, 1976.
SOC contends that the NRC Staff has (i) failed to require LILCO to document in the FSAR where the Shoreham design, structures and components do not conform with current regulatory practices (i.e.,
Regulatory Guides, Branch Technical Positions, and Standard Review Plans) and the basis for and accep-tability of those deviations and (ii) failed to set forth in the Safety Evaluation Report the standards against which Shoreham has been reviewed and the basis for any deviations from current regulatory practices approved by the Staff.
Absent such docu-mentation, there is no basis for any Board finding that a level of safety equivalent to current regu-latory practices does, in fact, exist as required by 10 CFR S 50.34b, S 50.57, and S 50.109.
SOC 7.B(4):
EXPANDED SAFETY CLASSIFICATION 25/
Submitted:
LILCO/ Staff / SOC Stipulation of December 2,
1981, at 25-26.
Objecting Party:
NRC Staff /LILCO Summary of Objection:
The NRC Staff and LILCO believe that SOC 7.B(4) is precluded by the Commission's TMI Policy Statement.
Staff Opposition to SOC 7B, dated December 16, 1981, at 2-4; LILCO's Opposition to SOC Conten-tion 7.B, dated December 18, 1981, at 2-4, 6-7.
(4) The TMI-2 accident was partially monitored and mitigated by components and systems classed as non-safety-related.
The accident demonstrated that the licensing review of TMI-2 and the generic approach to classification of " safety" and "non-safety" equipment was not adequate to identify all equip-nent important to safety, to define the design basis for such equipment and ensure safe operation of the plant.
Shoreham equipment, reviewed and 25/
See SOC 7.B(1) on page 39 for introductory language.
44_
classified by the same general approach as used at TMI-2, should be subjected to a re-evaluation of its importance to safety.
All equipment subsequen-tly identified as important to safety should be properly qualified.
The TMI Action Plan calls for revising c-
'v classifications and expanding the QA list for ciants such as Shoreham (Items I.F.1 and II.F.5).
SOC contends this should be done be-fore fuel load.
Failure to do so may result in violations of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, Criteria 1, 2 and 4 and the conditions set forth in NUREG-0588, Interim Staff Position on Environmental Qualifications of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment (1979).
CLASS 9 ACCIDENTS Submitted:
Shoreham Opponents Coalition's Statement of Contentions
. with Respect to the Construction Permit Extension (SOC Statement of Contentions (CPA)] dated September 24, 1981, at 6-11.
Objecting Party:
NRC. Staff /LILCO Summary of Objection:
The NRC Staff and LILCO believe that (a)
SOC 1 (CPA) is not litigable in a CP extension proceeding under Northern Indiana Public Service Co. (Bailly Generating Station, Nuclear 1),
ALAB-619, 12 NRC 558 (1980), and (b) litigation of SOC 1 (CPA) is also pre-cluded by the Commission's Policy Statement on Class 9 Accidents.
NRC Staff Response to (SOC's] Statement of Contentions
[NRC Staff Response],
dated October 15, 1981, at 4-11; Applicant's Reply.to SOC's Statement of Contentions (Applicant's Reply],
4 dated October 15, 1981, at 2-10.
On December 1, 1971, the NRC's predecessor (the AEC) published (36 Fed. Reg. 22851) a proposed Annex to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix D, classifying potential nuclear plant accidents into nine categories.
Class 9 accidents were rather loosely defined as those involving " sequences of postulated successive failures more severe than those postulated for the design basis for protective systems and engineered safety features"-- that is, accidents beyond the designed capacity of the plant's
.-p
,g
- safety systems to control.
In shorthand, these Class 9 accidents, which include significant fuel damage or core melt events, are sometimes termed " accidents beyond the design basis."
The proposed Annex conceded that "[t] heir consequences could be severe," but took the position that they need not be considered in environmental analyses under the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") because "the probability of their occurrence is so small that their environmental risk is extremely low."
Since the issuance of the proposed Annex, NRC environmental statements, including the Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Shoreham, Unit 1, CP and the Shoreham PSAR, have not discussed the consequences of a Class 9 accident at Shoreham from a safety standpoint.
In fact, because of the supposed improbability of Class 9 accidents, nuclear plants--including Shoreham--are not designed to guard against their occurrence.
It is important to note that the environmen-tal aspect of these questions is not unrelated to the safety aspect.
The NRC has read NEPA to require not only the analysis of environmental consequences (e.g., potential radiation re-lease from an accident) to determine what those consequences are, but also the "tak(ing] (of] appropriate measures to miti-gate or eliminate" those consequences.
Offshore Power Systems, CLI-79-9, 10 N.R.C.
257, 261 (1979).
As to Class 9 accidents, however, this inquiry has never been undertaken for Shoreham.
Hence, there are two major unresolved issues concerning Class 9 accidents which have not been considered for the Shoreham nuclear facility from either a safety or an environmental (NEPA) standpoint:
--How probable is a Class 9 accident at Shoreham, and what can be done (including design modifications) to reduce that possibility?
--What would be the consequences of a Class 9 accident at Shoreham, and what can be done (including design modifications) to reduce or mitigate those conse-quences?
The exclusion of Class 9 accident considerations has in the past few years been based on two premises:
first, the " low probability" statement in the proposed Annex to 10 C.F.R.
Part 50, and second, the numerical estimate of the overall risk of reactor accidents in the "Rasmussen Report" (WASH-1400).
Statement of Interim Policy, 45 Fed. Reg. 40101, 40102 (1979).
Like most documents, the Sh'oreham FES (in Section 7) deals with Class 9 accidents only by restating the conclusion announced in 1971 in the proposed Annex and briefly referring to the quanti-tative analysis in WASH-1400.
However, in January 1979, the NRC formally concluded that NRC does not regard as reliable the (WASH-1400] numerical estimate of the overall risk of reactor
accidents, and the proposed Annex has now been officially withdrawn.
Consequently, the theoretical basis on which the exclusion of Class 9 accident considerations rested no longer exists.
Nor is there a practical basis for that exclusion.
The NRC Staff has formally concluded that the TMI-2 accident was a Class 9 accident.*
We now know that Class 9 accidents can and do happen.
After an exhaustive review of the origins of the NRC's Class 9 Accident Policy, as well as new information on the sub-ject, the President's Council on Environmental Quality ("CEQ")
has conclude.d that the exclusion of Class 9 accidents from con-sideration in licensing proceedings is "without credible scien-tific support."
(See attached CEQ letters dated March 20, 1980 and August 12, 1980.)
Moreover, CEQ has concluded that the NRC has no " legal justification" for failing to consider Class 9 accidents in environmental reviews.
The CEQ determined that the NRC should not only require consideration of Class 9 acci-dents in future environmental statements, but also supplement existing statements in this regard.
In a March 20, 1980 letter to NRC Chairman Ahearne, CEQ Chairman Speth stated:
"The results of our review of impact statements prepared by the NRC for nuclear power reactors are very disturbing.
The dis-cussion in these statement of potential acci-dents and their environmental impacts _was found to be largely perfunctory, remarkably standardized, and uninformative to the pub-lic...[V]irtually every EIS contains essen-tially identical, ' boiler-plate' language written in an unvarying format.
The typical EIS does not consider or analyze the possfbility of a major _ accident even though it is these ' Class 9' accidents which have 1
led to the greatest public concern.
Moreover, for those accidents which are typically discussed in an EIS, the potential impacts on human health and the environment are presented in a cursory and inadequate j
manner with little attention to public under-standing."
l The old Shoreham EIS typifies these problems.
In addi-tion, a great deal of critical knowledge has been acquired re-l garding severe reactor accidents since the first CP for Shoreham was issued.
This information must be discussed either in a new EIS on the CP extension application or in a supplement to the Final EIS on the original CP application.
Signif-icantly, CEQ has already held this to be the NRC's minimum
obligation under NEPA when the Commission reviews an application for a construction permit extension.
(See attached letter from CEQ to the Illinois Attorney General, dated August 12, 1980.)**
Neither the Applicant's FSAR nor Staff's SER or Final Shoreham EIS evaluate the probability or consequences of a Class 9 accident at Shoreham.
Accordingly, before any exten-sion of the Shoreham CP can be granted, SOC contends that Applicant and Staff must evaluate:
1)
The probability of a Class 9 accident occurring at Shoreham and what measures can be taken (including design modifications) to reduce that probability 2)
The consequences of a Class 9 accident occurrence at Shoreham, and what measures can be taken (in-cluding design modifications) to reduce or mitigate those consequences
- In Re Public Service Electric Gas Co., Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1, NRC Docket No.
50-272, NRC Staff Response To Board Question Number 4,
Regarding The Occurrence of A Class 9 At TMI, August 25, 1979.
- In his March 20, 1980 letter to the NRC, CEQ's Chairman concluded as follows:
"We believe that the new policy should be based on the sensible approach of discussing the environmental and other consequences of the full range _of accidents that might occur r
at nuclear reactors, including accfdents now j
classified as Class 9.
This should include core melt events.
In addition, EIS's should present the best estimates of the likelihood of such events.
In order to comply with the disclosure requirements of NEPA, the NRC should include in the analyses the likely range of environmental and other consequences from severe and other accidents....
We also urge the Commission to broaden its range of variaties (e.g.,
radiation pathways) in determining accident impacts, and expand its discussions in EIS's of the impacts of l
nuclear accidents on human health, the natural environment and local economies.
Site specific treatment of data should be
l substituted for 'boilerplate' assessment of accident initiating events and potential impacts, and EIS's should be comprehensible to non-technical members of the public."
LIQUID PATHWAY Submitted:
SOC Statement of Contentions (CPA),
dated September 24, 1931, at 12-17.
Party Objecting:
NRC Staff /LILCO Summary of Objection:
The NRC Staff and LILCO believe that SOC 2 (CPA) fails to meet the Bailly (ALAB-619) test.
Additionally, the NRC Staff argues that the contention has already been admitted in the OL proceed-ing.
NRC Staff Response, dated October 15, 1981, at 4-9, 11-12; Applicant's Reply, dated October 15, 1981, at 2-10.
Two of the potential environmental and safety conse-quences of a nuclear accident are the releases of radiation by the " air pathway" (i.e.,
into the atmosphere, where wind can carry it) and the " liquid pathway" (i.e.,
into groundwater which can contaminate rivers and streams).
Either " pathway" can lead to public exposure to uncontrolled releases of radia-tion from an accident.
In addition to the complete exclusion of Class 9 accidents, another major deficiency in the Shoreham Final EIS on the CP as well as other environmental and safety review documents is the lack of any specific discussion of the impact on the " liquid pathway" from a serious accident or po-tential corrective measures for such an accident.
As with the now-rejected Class 9 accident exclusion policy, the failure adequately to consider liquid pathway accident impacts and cor-rective measures has been severely criticized for some time, l
and has been an unresolved issue since NUREG-0410 was issued.
l This has particular significance for Shoreham in view of the hydrogeological characteristics of Long Island.
The failure to consider liquid pathway accident impacts and corrective measures stems in large part from the accident analysis in the "Rasmussen Report," WASH-1400, which stated that the " effects of contamination on water supplies have not i
been considered in detail" because of a broad assumption that streams and rivers would be contaminated for "only a short j
time."
(Main Report, pp. 76, 134 )
No detailed analysis was offered to support this conclusion.
The potential economic and safety effects of major liquid pathway contamination from l
S.
strontium-90 and oti.ar isotopes are very large, and the cursory treatment of water contamination in WASH-1400 is a major flaw.
This is particularly true of potential liquid pathway contamin-ation from core melt releases, which (perhaps because of a lack of direct experience and the ill-defined parameters of interac-tion between a molten core and the surrounding soil and water table) WASH-1400 did not evaluate with the same care given to the more readily observable effects of air pathway accident radiation releases.*
The Department of the Interior disagreed with the WASH-1400 assumptions and conclusions concerning liquid pathway accident impacts, and in 1977 recommended additional study of the problem, including the effects of variations in hydrogeolo-gical conditions between different nuclear plant sites.
Both the general inadequacy of NRC accident assessments and the spe-cific liquid pathway deficiency appear from the NRC Staff's 1978 " Description of Problem" in NRC Task Action Plan A-33:
"In 1971, the AEC determined that, consistent with NEPA, the environmental assessment of request for construction permits and oper-ating licenses should include consideration 1
of the possible impacts from accidents...
"The approach in these assessments, typically is limited to preparation of a two-page narrative summary that qualitatively de-scribes accident probabilities and the ra-tionale for concluding that accident risks are low and a one-page table that provides numerical estimates of consequences of various categories of accidents (including Class 9 events).
The approach to developing these consequence estimates also involves a largely simplistic analysis; minor adjust-3 ments are made from case to case (basically to account for variations in power level, exclusion boundary distance and population density).
These numerical estimates are also l
limited to air pathway consequences.
"The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Department of the Interior (DOI) ex-pressed the need for an improved treatment of accident risks and an expansion of the Staff assessments to include quantitative estimate of Class 9 accidents.
. After extended discussions, the NRC Staff reiterated its 1973 commitment to update the standard assumptions in the pro-posed Annex A.
As a precursor to this update, the Staff committed to an extension of the WASH-1400 study to include a mor_e in-depth evaluation of Class 3-8 accidents and to further explore the significance of variations in site and plant design characteristics.
The Department of the Interior has routinely suggested that more attention be given to the site risks associated with liquid pathway.
In mid-1977, DOI and NRC Staff met to discuss the DOI's generic concerns.
DOI was informed of the Staff's programs to augment the generic stu-dies in WASH-1400, but no commitments were made to revise the current approach (which, as noted above, includes no discussion on the impacts of accidental releases to the liquid pathway).
[ Emphasis added.]
Subsequently, the NRC accepted the Department of Interior sug-gestions and instituted a research program at Sandia Laboratories.
The Sandia study results were released in draft form to the NRC in January 1980.**
The differences between the radiaticn effects of air pathway releases and liquid pathway releases are significant.
While liquid pathway releases may have less immediately obvious effects, their long-term effects can be serious, and both the-liquid pathway dispersal mechanisms and the dominate liquid oathways themselves are more complex than their air-pathway counterparts.
Importantly, interdiction or prevention of liquid pathway releases at the source is often possible if ade-quate design and control measures are taken.
Because of the overall failure to consider liquid pathway releases, however, and also because this kind of interdiction is usually not pos-sible with air pathway releases, appropriate liquid pathway interdiction design and control measures have been examined inadequately or not at all for Shoreham.
The attached table drawn from the 1980 draft Sandia study, summarizes some of these significant air / liquid pathway differences.
After considering the air / liquid pathway difference, the Sandia authors drew the following pertinent conclusions:
- "The most probable [ WASH-1400] meltdown categories result in the largest releases to the hydrosphere,"
i.e.,
liquid pathway releases.
This is generally not true of air pathway releases.
- "Significant amounts radioactivity are generally expected to be released to the hydrosphere during any meltdown accident"
-- The Sandia calculations indicate that "if interdictive measures are not taken, then the liquid pathways can perhaps contribute significantly to the risk of a core meltdown accident."
Thus, a nuclear accident at Shoreham would have a sig-nificant potential for liquid pathway radioactive contamination and lethal radiation dosages to members of the public.
In par-ticular, in any core melt accident (Class 9), massive quanti-ties of radioactive materials may leach into the Long Island groundwater and eventually migrate into Long Island Sound.
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ATMOSPHERIC AND HYDROSPHERIC PATHWAYS (From Draft Sandia Study. Table 1.1)***
ATMOSPHERIC RELEASES HYDROSPHERIC RELEASES SOURCE Atmosphere:
Primarily Melt debris:
Primarily more volatile radio-less volatile radio-nuclides (I, Cs, nuclides (Ru, Sr, Te,...).
La,...).
DISPERSAL Population reached Population usually rapidly (hours).
reached slowly (months to centuries longer).
All radionuclides move Each radionuclide moves essentially together; through the ground at deposition mechanisms its own rate; each differ only for the radionuclide moves noble gases, through the surface waterbodies with its own set of interactions.
PATHWAYS Primarily inhalation Primarily ingestion and external (ground).
(drinking water, aquatic food) and external (shorelines).
Dominant pathways are Some dominant pathways relatively simple.
are very complex.
Populations are Populations are not straightforward obvious.
HEALTH EFFECTS Acute, latent and Primarily chronic.
chronic.
INTERDICTION Source:
not possible Source:
often possible.
Pathway:
possible Pathway:
possible.
These evaluations (Class 9 accident and liquid pathways analyses) should be undertaken before continued construction forecloses, or renders financially or otherwise impracticable, approximate design modifications and corrective measures.
Changes to the Shoreham site and plant should be made to recog-nize the facts that Class 9 accidents do happen, that liquid pathway releases are a potentially serious risk, and that emer-gency response may be ineffective in Suffolk County.
Safety devices which may prevent or delay the impacts of serious acci-dents, including Class 9 events, should be implemented now (these include, for instance, reactor containment venting sys-tems which reduce explosive pressures while filtering out radioactivity; additional systems to flood runaway reactor cores with cooling wator; and " core catchers" to contain a melting core for several days).
Preventive measures should be implemented.
An evaluaticts of the effects of liquid pathway interdiction (both close to the source and farther along the pathways to human population exposure) for the Shoreham site should be conducted as soon as possible using the models em-ployed in the Sandia study.
A design of liquid pathway inter-diction systems and the resulting safety improvements should be developed and implemented for Shoreham.
- Risk Assessment Review Group, Minutes of Meeeting Five, p.
57.
- Sandia Study (Draft) for USNRC, "Effect of Liquid l
Pathways on Consequences of Core Melt Accidents, January, 1980."
The final report was released in August of 1981."
l
- The same table appears at p.
19 of the final report.
SITING Submitted:
SCC Statement of Contentions (CPA),
(
dated September 24, 1981, at 18-22.
i Party 7bjecting:
NRC Staff /LILCO l
l l
t
I Summary of Objection:
The NRC Staff and LILCO believe that SOC i
3 (CPA) fails to meet the Bailly (ALAB-619) test.
Additionally, the NRC Staff suggests that i t is an impermissible challenge to the NRC's regulations on alternative site consideration.
NRC Staff Response, dated October 15, 1981,
]
at 4-9, 12-12; Applicant's Reply,. dated October 15, 1981, at 2-10.
j SOC contends that operating a nuclear power plant at the Shoreham site endangers public health and safety because i
the population density and distribution, the topography, and.
the configuration of transportation corridors would make prompt evacuation of Eastern Long Island virtually impossible during unfavorable weather conditions.
The Commission's regulativas (10 CFR Section 50.35(a)) require that the licensing board make a finding that "taking into consideration the site criteria contained in Part 100, the proposed facility can be contructed and operated at the proposed location without undue risk to the l
health and safety of the public before issuing a construction l
permit."
(Emphasis added.)
Pursuant to 10 CFR Section 50.91, j
this consideration would also govern the extension of a con-struction permit.
If a site is not adequate under relevant i
criteria, construction should not be allowed to go forward.
Thus, consideration of this issue should not be deferred until the operating license review.
The accident at Three Mile Island has sensitized the Commission to the importance of siting.
In NUREG-0642, the ACRS bluntly stated that Class 9 accidents "should be considered in deciding on the future ap-i proach to siting, to reactor design, and to emergency measures."
The NRC Staff acknowledges in NUREG-0396 that a ten-mile radius is not the furthest extent of the area threat-ened by plume exposure in the event of a " Class 9" accident.
The Commission recently directed its Staff to prepare i
new siting criteria which could be used as a basis for proposed rule-making on the issue of plant location.
In response, the Staff published NUREG-0625 in August, 1979.
In NUREG-0625, the j
Staff acknowledged that the risk of accidents including " Class 9" accidents is so high chat the consequences of such accidents should be considered in the siting decision.
See NUREG-0625, i
]
page 42.
The report recommends that a minimum radius for an 1
emergency planning zone would be ten miles and that the actual J
q 4
.w.--,_,.-.,,.
,,m m,y c....,.-,
.,y.,_m
,,.,,. =
,__..___r
emergency planning zone around a given plant should be determined by the relationship of topography, transportation corridors and population.
In any case, the emergency planning zone should be capable of being evacuated promptly.
See NUREG-0625, page 48.
The report also acknowledges that the consequences of a " Class 9" accident are not limited to the emergency planning zone but extend to an area twenty miles in radius.
Population density within this large area must be con-sidered in the siting decision.
See NUREG-0625, pages 48-50.
The report follows up this recommendation with a subsequent recommendation specifying that permitees avoid sites with char-acteristics that require compensatory, unique design features.
See NUREG-0625, page 57.
The report explicitly states as a premise that Although site acceptability is established during the construction permit review, substantive new information could require re-opening the issue of site acceptability any_ time during the plant life.
(emphasis added)
SOC contends that the Commission's recent acknowledge-ment that siting is a necessary component of "defensc in depth" is precisely the kind of "new information" which should be taken into consideration.
SCC contends that Long Island residents living east of Shoreham are trapped in an area from which they can only be evacuated by traveling closer to the plant.
The capacity of the roads serving the area does not permit "relatively prompt evacuation".
During the summer, a large seasonal population strains the road capacity even under non-emergency conditions.
During the winter, storms and snow accumulation frequently re-duce road capacity to a point that makes prompt evacuation im-possible.
LILCO admits in the January, 1979 version of the FSAR that it would take eighty minutes to notify and evacuate only the people living within a two-mile radius of the plant.
See Revision 15 of the FSAR dated January, 1979, figure 13.3.5-3.
NUREG-0625 also recommends that soil characteristics at the site of a nuclear power plant be such that it would be pos-sible to isolate a melted core before radioactive material escapes in large amounts into the acquifer.
See NUREG-0625, page 53.
The task force envisions plants being located on soil permitting only a slow rate of groundwater movement.
This makes it possible to take interdictive measures before ground-water transport contaminates large amounts of ground and sur-face water.
In contrast, Long Island soil and subsoil is ex-tremely porous and permits rapid groundwater transport.
In summary, both the Commission and Staff have recognized as a result of the accident at Three Mile Island, that " Class 9" accidents are possible and that siting must play a role in preventing such accidents from causing widespread harm.
To license Shoreham, with its unfavorable site charac-teristics, would constitute a distressing willingness to
" grandfather" plants now under construction even though the Commission recognized the importance of siting in protecting public health and safety.
It is essential that this issue be addressed at the CP extension stage and not at the operating license stage.
As the uppeal board put it in Northern Indiana Public Service Company (Bailey Generating Station, Nuclear 1) ALAB-619, 12 NRC 558, November 20, 1980:
[W]e are unimpressed with the argument of the applicant and the Jtaff that petitioners can appropriately be told to withold their site suitability contentions until the operating license stage has arrived.
It does no dis-service to the concept of a two-step licens-ing process to conclude that in circumstances such as those at bar, that suggestion offends reason (emphasis added).
Manifestly, if there currently exists substantial cause to believe that the... site is unacceptable, now is the time to explore the matter further--rather than years hence when, fol-lowing a substantial additional monetary in-vestment, the facility is nearing completion at that site.
The language of the Appeal Board is quite relevant to Shoreham, where the utility expects to expend another $500 Million on construction, exclusive of interest charges.
FINANCIAL QUALIFICATIONS Submitted:
SOC Statement of Contentions (CPA),
dated September 24, 1981, at 22-25.
Party Objecting:
NRC Staff /LILCO Summmary of Objection: The NRC Staff and LILCO believe that (a)
SCC 4 (CPA) fails to meet the Bailly (ALAB-619) test, and (b) it also is foreclosed by a pending rulemaking on the issue.
The NRC Staff argues as well that the contention is an impermissible
challenge to existing regulations.
NRC Staff Response, dated October 15, 1981, at 4-9, 13-15; Applicant's Reply, dated October 15, 1981, at 2-10.
SOC contends that LILCO has not demonstrated that it is financially qualified to complete the construction of the Shoreham plant as required by 42 USC Section 2232(a), 10 CFR Section 50.33(f); 50.40; 50.91; and Part 50, Appendix C.
Section 50.33(f) requires an Applicant to provide information sufficient to demonstrate to the Commission that it either has, or has reasonable assurance of obtaining, funds necessary to meet construction costs and fuel cycle costs.
As noted by SOC in its " Petition to Institute Proceedings" (pp. 11-16, January 23, 1981), testimony given by LILCO's Senior Vice President-Finance (Thomas O'Brien) under-scored the company's dire financial condition as the basis for its unprecedented rate requests of $228 million (PSC Case 27774).
Mr. O'Brien testified that the drain of Shoreham's construction expenditures on LILCO's cash flow was endangering the Company's ability to provide adequate service (Case 27774; Tr. 891) and that the failure tt provide adequate rate relief could place the financial position of the Company in jeopardy (Case 27774; Tr. 892).
Mr. O'Brien even admitted that the Company's cash flow position during 1981 would be "far from satisfactory...even it the full amount of rate relief which the Company is seeking is granted."
(Case 27774; Tr. 892.)
The Company was precluded from asking for a greater amount of rate relief in 1980 since "that would have placed too much of an increased burden on consumers."
(Case 27774; Tr. 893.)
On May 26, 1981 (Opinion and Order 81-9), the PSC granted LILCO $133.1 Million of its original S228 million request--a substantial sum, but significantly less than the Company desired.
Since that date, the Company's financial po-sition and its ability to cover construction and fuel cycle costs have been further undermined by at least the following factors:
(a) In July of 1981, LILCO announced yet another delay in Shoreham's fuel load date and its total cost, from May of 1982 (at $2.2 billion) to September of 1982 (at $2.5 billion).
The Company's tenuous yet serious financial situation as described by Mr.
O'Brien assumed the Company's ability to meet the earlier schedule and loect cost.
(b) The current monthly project reports prepared by the Company reveal that the Company is overrunning its 1981 expenditures at an annual rate of about $35 million and that it is experiencing serious delays in remaining design work, construction and material deliveries.
These factors are jeopardizing even the September 1982 fuel load date and $2.5 billion project cost.
(c) LILCO's uranium supplier, Bokum Resources Corp.,
will be unable to deliver uranium to LILCO as pro-vided by contract.
LILCO has in fact commenced foreclosure action against Bokum in order to try to recover LILCO's $77 million investment in the Company.
Before any extension of the Shoreham construction per-mit can be granted, SOC contends that LILCO must provide de-tailed financial information sufficient to demonstrate its present ability to cover remaining construction and fuel cycle costs.
Should LILCO's ability be contingent upon the granting of further rate relief by the PSC, LILCO must detail the nature, timing and magnitude of such relief and its basis
'o r concluding that such relief will be granted.
SC 6:
EXPANDED SAFETY CLASSIFICATION Submitted:
Suffolk County Contentions, dated February 15, 1982, at 3-4.
i Party Objecting:
NRC Staff /LILCO Summary of Objection:
The NRC Staff and LILCO believe that SC 6 is precluded by the Commission's TMI Policy Statement.
NRC Staff's Response to Proposed County Contentions 1 to 31, dated February 18, 1982, at 2; LILCO's Response to Proposed County Contentions 1 to 31, dated February 18, 1982, at 2-3.
TMI demonstrated the potential public health impact of a failure in equipment not classified as safety-related.
Suffolk County contends that LILCO has not systematically clas-sified all equipment important to Shoreham's safety as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 1.
A specific example of this deficiency is the case of the turbine control system, including its associated valves.
This system has the capability to cause severe operational
transients to the reactor presenting challenges to the various safety systems.
Accordingly, this sytem should be subjected to 10 CFR 50, Appendix B Quality Assurance standards because it is 1
a system that can prevent or mitigate the consequences of pos-tulated accidents that could cause undue risk to the health and safety of the public.
See 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Introduction.
Also, the Shoreham turb! e control system design has not been demonstrated to meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix, A,
Criteria 1 and 24.
Another example is LILCO's failure to review Emergency Operating Procedures to insure that all components and systems relied upon in them are properly classified and qualified.
Without a systematic, comprehensive event tree and fault tree accident sequence analysis for Shoreham, LILCO has not demonstrated that the current list of equipment "important to safety" at Shoreham is complete and accurate.
Therefore, all structures, systems and components important to safety at Shoreham have not been designed, con-structed and manufactured according to 10 CFR 50, Appendix A.
SC 7:
SYSTEMS INTERACTION Submitted:
Suffolk County Contentions, dated February 15, 1982, at 4.
Party Objecting:
NRC Staff /LILCO Summary of Objection:
The NRC-Staff and LILCO believe that SC 7 is precluded by the Commission's TMI Policy Statement.
NRC Staff's Response to Proposed County Contentions 1 to 31, dated February 18, 1982, at 2; LILCO's Response to Proposed County Contentions 1 to 31, dated February 18, 1982, at 2-3.
Suffolk County contends that LILCO has not investigated accident sequences and exacerbating conditions that may result from interaction of control systems and safety systems.
- Thus, there may be failure mechanisms of nonsafety-related components (e.g.,
control functions, power sources or support structures) which would interact with a safety signal or function in such a way that the safety function might not be able to be performed.
In addition, electrical separation characteristics at Shoreham are not adequate to assure that failure mechanisms involving power and control cables will not produce systems interaction detrimental to safety.
Detection of these interactions is not
amenable to discovery by analysis alone and requires physical inspection of the plant systems and components.
Because LILCO has not performed an adequate analysis and physical inspection of potential interaction of control and safety systems, there is no assurance that Shoreham's structures, systems and compo-nents important to safety comply with 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 2, 4,
13, 22, 23, 24 and 29, and 10 CFR 50.46.
SC 12:
QA/QC -- DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION Submitted:
Suffolk County Contentions, dated February 15, 1982, at 8-10.
Party Objecting:
NRC Staff /LILCO Summary of Objection:
The NRC Staff and LILCO believe that SOC 12 is not adequately particularized.
NRC Staff's Response to Proposed County Contentions 1 to 31, dated February 13, 1982, at 2; LILCO's Response to Proposed County Contentions 1 to 31, dated February 18, 1982 at 4-6.
Suffolk County contends that LILCO and the NRC Staff have not adequately demonstrated that the quality asurance pro-gram for the design and installation of structures, systems, and components for Shoreham was conducted in a timely manner in compliance with the pertinent portions of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Sections I to XVIII, and 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 1 with regard to the following:
(a) The designation of safety-related items to deter-mine whether the systems, structures and components have been properly classified in accordance with Shoreham's QA program; (b) The design verification records to assure the ade-quacy of design criteria bases, the adequacy of design implementation, including the internal and external transmittal, distribution, and use of design data, and the consistency between the design documents and the PSAR commitments.
Also included are the equipment qualification and the resulting qualification records; (c) Organizational independence of inspection and con-struction supervision;
f (d) LILCO's implementation of its quality program after a large portion of plant structures, systems and components had been designed and installed; (e) Control of special processes during construction; (f) Training, qualification and assessment of welders and welding procedures, including traceability of welding records to welders; (g) Internal audit frequency and reporting of results to management; (h) Documentation of test and inspection results; (i) Calibration and accuracy of measuring and test equipment; (j) Training and qualification records for NDT person-nel; (k) Records concerning the identification and control of installed material, parts and components, in-cluding the acceptance of incoming equipment and the release of uninspected equipment for installa-tion; (1) Identification, segregation, review and release of nonconforming items and the records concerning the adequacy of disposition of nonconformance; (m) Chronological records of detection and resolution of all safety-related problems detected during con-struction, including corrective action measures; (n) Revision control of design documents, including creation of "as-built" drawings and comparison of "as-built" drawings to actual plant configuration; (o) Selection, evaluation, and source inspection for suppliers of safety-related items and services; (p) Technical adequacy of procurement documents; (q) Control of changes to procurement documents; and i
(r) Determination of the adequacy of LILCO's and its major contractors' QA/QC programs and their imple-mentation based on all the above.
-Gi-SC 13:
_ A/QC -- OPERATIONS Q
Submitted:
Suffolk County Contentions, dated February 15, 1982 at 11-12.
Party Objecting:
NRC Staff /LILCO Summary of Objection:
The NRC Staff and LILCO believe that SC 13(a) is not adequately particularized.
NRC Staff's Response to Proposed County Contentions 1 to 31, dated February 18, 1982, at 2; LILCO's Response to Proposed County Contentions 1 to 31 dated February 18, 1982, at 6-7.
Suffolk County contends that the QA program description for the operation of Shoreham, as provided in the FSAR, does not comply with 10 CPR 50.34(b)(6)(ii) and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B,
Sections I to XVIII, with regard to:
(a) Failure to address, at a minimum, each of the cri-teria in Appendix B in sufficient detail to enable an independent reviewer to determine whether and how all the requirements of Appendix B and the guidance in all applicable regulatory guides will be satisfied; (b) Failure to provide for the adequate identification, reporting and analysis of all equipnent failures discovered during operation and maintenance at Shoreham and at other operating BWR stations with similar equipment; (c) Failure to ensure that replacement matarials and parts of systems classified as components "impor-tant to safety" will be equivalent to the original equipment, that replacements will be inctalled in accordance with adequate process procedures, and that the repaired or reworked structure, system, or component will be adequately inspected, tested, and documented in "as-built" drawings; and (d) Failure to provide an adequate number of qualified QA/QC personnel on the operating staff, including the availability of QC personnel on off-shifts.
SC 16:
ATWS Submitted:
Suffolk County Contentions, dated February 15, 1982, at 15.
1 Party Objecting:
NRC Staff /LILCO l
Summary of Objection:
The NRC Staff and LILCO believe that SC 16 is not adequately particularized.
Additionally, to the extent SC 16 chal-lenges the NRC's existing ATNS require-ments, the Staff believes that it does not comply with 10 CFR S 2.758 and LILCO believes that it is not litigable be-cause there is a rulemaking on the issue in progress.
NRC Staff's Response to Proposed County Contentions 1 to 31, dated February 18, 1982, at 2-4; LILCO's Response to Proposed County Contentions 1 to 31, dated February 18, 1982, at 7-8.
Suffolk County contends that LILCO and the NRC Staff have not adequately demonstrated that Shoreham meets the re-quirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 20, regarding correc-tion of the anticipated transients without scram (ATWS) prob-lem.
SC 18:
HUMAN FACTORS -- EQUIPMENT Submitted:
Suffolk County Contentions, dated February 15, 1982, at 17-20.
Party Objecting:
NRC Staff /LILCO Summary of Objection:
The NRC Staff and LILCO believe that (a)
SC 19(a) and 28(a)(ii)(2) are redundant and (b) SC 18(e) is not adequately par-ticularized because of the use of "for example."
NRC Staff's Response to Proposed County Contentions 1 to 31, dated February 18, 1982, at 2; LILCO's Response to Proposed County Contentiens 1 to 31, dated February 18, 1982, at 8-9.
Suffolk County contends that LILCO and the NRC Staff have not adequately demonstrated and confirmed that the control room design at Shoreham is adequate to provide the timely con-trol necessary to protect the health and safety of the public, and thus to satisfy 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 13, 19, 20, 22 and 29.
Specifically:
(a) There is no first-out alarm capability provided in the control room annunicator system that identifies
e,
the initating events when multiple annunciator alarms occur.
In view of this deficiency, the con-trol room operator is forced to rely on the events computer for the needed information.
The events computer is slow, not classified as safety-related, and not directly integrated with response proce-dures.
Accordingly, a reliable and timely response to all plant failures cannot be guaranteed.
Further, the following, taken in conjunction with the above, are other defects such that the information for control room operators is not presented in a manner that facilitates the recognition of developing off-normal conditions and the mitigation of accidents:
(b) There is no audio or visual annunciator indication to signal that an alarmed condition has cleared.
(c) There is no indication why an annunciator is lit --
whether because the system is, in fact, inoperable due to malfunction, or because it has been by-passed and is actually capable of functioning.
(d) The sequence of annunciator trips and events appears on the computer printer which is the only means available to communicate this information to the operator in the event of a major accident or transient.
However, the events computer is slow, not classified as safety-related, and not directly integrated with response procedures.
Accordingly, a reliable and timely response to all plant failures cannot be guaranteed.
(e) The LILCO responses to the control room human fac-tors audit report leave a considerable number of small equipment changes either delayed until fuel load, deferred for long-term review or not made at all.
Individually, these equipment inadequacies do not appear to be significant; however, taken as a whole, they could provide some serious operational difficulties over time.
Annunciator light failure frequency is unknown (Shoreham Safety Evaluation i
Report, Supp. No. 1 (SSER No. 1), Appendix C, Item 2.6) which, combined with lens problems (SSER No.
1, Appendix C, item 3.14), could lead to operator difficulties in visually detecting alarms.
Many other control room and control board problems, originally identified in the audit have not yet been resolved.
For example:
S (i) Ventilation in the control room; (ii) Background noise levels in the control room; (iii) Lighting level in the control room; (iv) Security console in the control room; (v) J-handled switches on the front row of control panels; (vi) Mirror image on IRM selectors; and (vii) Location of ADS service air controls.
SC 20:
HUMAN FACTORS -- SIMULATOR Submitted:
Suffolk County Contentions, dated February 15, 1982, at 21.
Party Objecting:
NRC Staff /LILCO Summary of Objection:
The NRC Staff and LILCO believe that SC 20 challenges the adequacy of the NRC's regulations without complying with 10 CFR S 2.758.
NRC Staff's Response to Proposed County Contentions 1 to 31, dated February 18, 1982, at 2; LILCO's Response to Proposed County Contentions 1 to 31, dated February 18, 1982, at 10.
Suffolk County contends that, in order to provide ade-quate training for Shoreham's operators over the life of the plant and to comply with 10 CFR 50 and 55, LILCO must provide a Shoreham-specific simulator for operator training as soon as is feasible.
SC 22:
SRV TEST PROGRAM Submitted:
Suffolk County Contentions, dat.ed February 15, 1982, at 22.
Objecting Party:
NRC Staff /LILCO Summary of Objection:
The NRC Staff and LILCO believe SC 22 and SC 28(a)(v) are redundant.
NRC Staff's Response to Ptoposed County Contentions 1 to 31, dated February 18, at 2; LILCO's Response to Proposed County Contentions 1 to 31, dated February 18, 1982, at 10.
t i
-+-
.-.i
.m.
7
-r
~.m y~
y
o
- Suffolk County contends that LILCO has not adequately demonstrated that the safety / relief valves to be used at Shoreham meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 4 and 30, and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Sections III and XI, in that the functionability of the valves, as-installed, has not been established by the generic test program results.
Specifically, NUREG-0737, item II.D.1, performance testing of BWR relief and safety valves, requires that BWR SRV valves be tested to demon-strate that the valves will open and reclose under the expected flow conditions.
It additionally requires that ATWS testing be considered although such testing was not required to be com-pleted by July 1, 1981.
LILCO has reported that the first test series was satisfactorily completed but has not yet provided a detailed plant specific evaluation of the Shoreham safety and relief valves, piping, and supports in accordance with the NUREG-0737 requirements.
Additionally, no commitment has been made on ATWS testing.
Therefore, it has not been demonstrated at this time that the specific requirements have been met.
SC 29:
IREP ANALYSIS Submitted:
Suffolk County Contentions, dated February 15, 1982, at 35-36.
Party Objecting:
NRC Staff /LILCO Summary of Objection:
The NRC Staff and LILCO believe that SC 29 is precluded by the Commission's TMI Policy Statement.
Staff's Response to Proposed County Contentions 1 to 31, dated February 18, 1982, at 2; LILCO's Response to Proposed County Contentions, dated February 18, 1982, at 2-3.
The text of SC 29 is identical to the final paragraph of SOC 7.B(1) if "The County contends" is substituted for " SOC contends."
See page 38 above.
SC 30:
DOCUMENTATION OF DEVIATIONS Submitted:
Suffolk County Contentions, dated February 15, 1982, at 36-37.
j Party Objecting:
NRC Staff /LILCO Summary of Objection:
The NRC Staff and LILCO believe that SC 30 is precluded by the Commission's TMI Policy Statement.
LILCO also believes
-ss-
\\
s the contention is barred because of a pending rulemaking on the issue.
Staff's Response to Proposed County Contentions 1 to 31, dated February 18, 1982, at 2; LILCO's Response to Proposed County Contentions 1 to 31, dated February 18, 1982, at 2-4.
The text of SC 30 is identical to that of SOC 7.B(3) if "Suffolk County contends that" is added to the beginning of SOC 7.B(3).
See page 42 above.
OHILI/NSC 7(i):
SECURITY Submitted:
Letter of Howard L.
Blau to Board, dated November 11, 1977, at 4.
Admitted:
Board Order of January 27, 1978, at 23 (admitted for discovery only; particu-larization required).
Objecting Party:
NRC Staff /LILCO Summary of Objection:
The NRC Staff and LILCO believe that this contention should be dismissed for failure to particularize.
In the more than four years since the contention was admitted for discovery purposes, none has been conducted.
Nor has a particu-larized contention been forthcoming.
The applicant has failed to provide adequate security measures against terrorists and saboteurs as required by 10 CFR S 73.55.
OHILI/NSC 7(j):
Emergency Planning Submitted:
Letter of Howard L.
Blau to Board, dated November 11, 1977, at 3.
Admitted:
Board Order of January 27, 1978, at 23 (admitted for discovery only; particu-larization required).
Objecting Party:
NRC Staff /LILCO Summary of Objection:
The NRC Staff and LILCO believe that this contention should be dismissed for failure to particularize.
In the more than four years since the contention was s
o
,. admitted for discovery purposes, none has been conducted.
Nor has a particu-larized contention been forthcoming.
The evacuation and emergency plans proposed by the ap-plicant are inadequate as evidenced by the failure of those plans to comply with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E.
III.
SOC CONTENTION 12 (PART 2)
In addition to requesting the above information, the Board asked the parties for information concerning SOC Contention 12 (Part 2).
In a stipulation dated August 6,
McCaffrey (accompanying LILCO's July 13, 1981 motion for summary disposition of the contention) were confirmed in Revision 5 of the Design Assessment Report (DAR).
DAR Revision 5 was supplied to SOC's consultants, MHB Technical Associates, on January 15, 1982.
LILCO believes that all of the assertions made in the McCaffrey Affidavit are confirmed in that document.
Thus, LILCO expects that SOC will indicate in its March 1, 1982, filing that it no longer wishes to pursue Contention 12 (Part 2).
o se* Respectfully submitted, LONG ISLA13D LIGHTING COMPANY
't l
0>t<4'y ( 0 1 1-
{%
W.' Taylor y eley, IfI ff /
Anthony F.vEarley, Jr. V/
NRC STAFF O
'Ber nard M. Bordenick
/
David A.
Repka DATED:
February 18, 1982 1
.i 4
4 e
y +
w e
ww--pr r
w m#--
.s ypm.
4 e----
-w r
e mm--
--+w
- - - - - - - -