ML20027D616

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Updated LER 82-068/03X-1:on 820902,hydrogen Analyzer a Declared Inoperable.Caused by Wire Lifted to 1-FSV-76-57 by Technician.Hydrogen Sample Inlet Pump a Power Relay Contacts Failed.Contacts Replaced & Engineer Reinstructed
ML20027D616
Person / Time
Site: Browns Ferry Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 10/27/1982
From: Carter S
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML20027D605 List:
References
LER-82-068-03X, LER-82-68-3X, NUDOCS 8211080162
Download: ML20027D616 (2)


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Evv.T D ATL ie h 6 teOsit DATE 44 EVEf47 DESCHIPTIOfJ AfJD PHODAOLE CONSCOUENCES h Dl Durf rm norm 11 onera tion. while nerforminn SI 4. 7. A. 2.n-3 (Primary Containment l j] l Tsolation Valve Leak Rate Test) on unit 2, "A" hydrogen analyzer for unit 1 became l B I inoperable (T.S. 3.7.H.2). There was ne effect on public health and safety. "B" l

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] l Test ennineer inadvertently had wires lifted to 1-FSV-76-57. On return to service. l

] I hydronen sample inlet pump "A" power relay contacts were found failed. Allen Bradley I

]l 700-N400Al contacts were replaced and successfully tested. Engineer was reinstructed.;

)) Panel will be labeled. Procedure will be revised. Relay contact investigation l

]l results expected by 3/1/83.

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. Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Form BF 17

. BF 15.2 LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION BFRO-50-259 /82068 Rl' Technical Specification Involved 3'.7.H.2 i

Reported Under Technical Specification 6.7.2.F.(2)

  • Date Due NRC N/A f Event Narrative:

e-2 Unit 1 was operating at 97-percent power and unit 2 was in a refueling outage.

These units were unaffected by this event. With unit 1 operating at 98-percent

' power, during the performance of SI 4.7.A.2.g-3 (Primary Containment Isolation Valve Leak Rate Test) on unit 2, the. unit 1 "A" hydrogen analyzer became i inoperable when test personnel inadvertently lifted the power supply lead wires for 1-FSV-76-57 instead of 2-FSV-76-57. The wires involved are located in adjacent panels 1-9-54 and 2-9-54 in the units 1 and 2 control room. FSV-76-57 f is a hydrogen-oxygen analyzer "A" sample return valve which closed when the wires were lifted. There was no effect on public health and safety. Technical I. Specification 3.7.H.2 allows operation for thirty days with one hydrogen analyzer operable. "B" hydrogen analyzer was available and operable. Upon return to service, during the performance of Surveillance Instruction 4.7.H, the unit 1 "A" hydrogen sample inlet pump was discovered to have failed after FSV-76-57 closed. -

Investigation revealed that the relay R2 contacts had failed. Relay R2 contacts

'j were replaced and Special Maintenance Instruction 176 and SI 4.7.H were successfully completed. The test engineer involved was reinstructed. The panels involved (1-9-54 and 2-9-54) are being relabelled to clearly identify each unit.

The procedure is being revised for clarity. Thc failure of relay R2 contacts is being investigated in conjunction with LER 259/82031. The results of the investigation are expected by March 1, 1983.

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  • Previous Simi!ar Events:

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