ML20005G658
| ML20005G658 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 01/12/1990 |
| From: | TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20005G656 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9001220075 | |
| Download: ML20005G658 (169) | |
Text
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ENCLOSURE l'
- PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE' 1 i
SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2- j DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328' ! (TVA-SQN-TS-90-05) l j .I-
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., LIST.OF AFFECTED PAGES ( ,
t h 4, r.- Unit'1 , j
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, -1 3/4 6-26 s .j 3/4 6-27 i e' *
- 3/4 6 .
l 3/4 6-30 '! B3/4 6 l Unit 2 ..-
-, t 3/4 6-27 -
- 3/4 6-28 .l
- 3/4 6-30-- l
, 3/4 6-31:- f B3/4 6-4 ,
i I 4 . I 3 f 3 L 4 .i i 1 4 - 9001220075 900112
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{ O4 (P - V. . CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS l-a t \ )
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3/4.6.5 ICE CONDENSER
, ICE BED ! LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.5.1. The ice bed shall be OPERABLE with:
a. The stored ice having a boron concentration of at least 1800 ppm boron as sodium tetraborate and a pH of 9.0 to 9.5,
- b. , Flow charnels through the ice condenser, c
A maximum ice bed temperature of less than or equal 27'F, i d. 2,24Q20 A total ice weight of at least 2,333,100-pounds at a 95% level of confidence, and R7
- e. 1944 ice baskets.
- APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.
ACTION: With the ice bed inoperable, restore the ice bed to OPERABLE status within
;(~N 48 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD v } SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours, SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.6.5.1 The ice condenser shall be determined OPERABLE:
a. At least once per 12 hours by using the ice bed temperature monitoring system to verify that the maximum ice bed temperature is less than or equal to 27 F. b.
-;t lent ente per 5 menth; during the 'frct 2 ye:r: felleHng initial-critice nt - t least once per 12. months th;rtof ter by:
A - -
- 1. Chemica analyses which verify that at least 9 representative samples of stored ice'have a boron concentration of at least 1800 ppm as sodium tetraborate and a pH of 9.0 to 9.5 at 20 C.
g.@ Weighing a representative sample of at least 144 ice bas ts R130 g Tyk27 and verifying that each basket contains at least ' lbs of ice. The representative sample shall include 6 baskets from y g7- j i 1 each of the 24 ice condenser bays and shall be constituted of p (- {
.V ) *^*ene-time extentier it permitted-tmti' the Unit--14yc4: 1 re fueling-eut-age- R130 i 2 Oc begi" ne 1 ster than-ApM1 1, 1000. i SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 6-26 Amendment No. 4 ,126 September 19, 1989 L
l p1- g C' r- .
-t j CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS LJ SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) i w
one basket each from Radial Rows 1, 2, 4, 6, 8 and 9 (or from 0 4 the same row of an adjacent bay if a basket from a designated
+
row cannot be obtained for weighing) within each bay, gg ;
- basket is found to contain less than-1200 pounds of ice, aif any bay shall be weighed. representative sample of 20 additionalgg
, basket; The minimum average weight of ice from ' the 20 additional baskets and the discrepant basket shall not R7 be less than +e M pounds / basket at a 95% level of confidence. The ice condenser baskets, as follows: shall also be subdivided into 3 groups of !
. bays 9 through 16, and Group 3 - bays 17The through 24. Gro !
minimum average ice weight of the sample baskets from Radial - , Rows 1, 2, 4, 6, 8 and 9 in each group shall not be less than R7 ' / basket at a 95% level of confidence. The minimum total ice condenser ice weight at a 95% level of confidence shall be calculated using all ice basket weights determined than-2,000,;00 during this-weighing program and shall not be less pounds. R7 i U c
% Q,2453f V) l 2 -/. Verifying, by visuiar iiispection of a representative random sample of at least 54 flow passages (33 percent) per ice !
\
f condenser bay, that the accumulation of frost or ice on flow ; ii passages between ice baskets, past lattice frames, through the E intermediate and top deck floor grating, or past the lower 1 or e plenum support structures and turning vanes is less than inlet ! 1 bay, qual to 15 percent blockage of the total flow area in each with a 95 percent level of confidence. J R102 .) If the summation of blockage from the sample fails to meet the bay shall be criteria, acceptance inspected. then 100 percent of the passages of that If the 100 percent inspection fails to meet the acceptance criteria, then the flow passages shall be cleaned to meet the acceptance criteria. Each flow passage ! that is cleaned will be reinspected. Any inaccessible flow l passage that is not inspected will be considered blocked. [ c. , i At least once per 40 months by lif ting and visually inspecting the l L accessible portions of at least two ice baskets from each 1/3 of the { ice condenser and verifying that the ice baskets are free of detrimental structural wear, cracks, corrosion or other damage. ! shall be raised at least 10 feet for this inspection. The ice baskets [ At least once. fer' 19 menNs ; ] j ( 'Cnsut Nrem ff % b'% k l l SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 6-27 Amendment No. 4, l ga January 30. 1989 4 6 ~ ~ ~ - ,-- _.-- _..-- -- _- - _ _ _ _ __--- _.--- - __---.-.._____--
b i e . ; i= . .. , r '$ CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS i
\ - -) 1CE CONDENSER DOORS 5
h ! L]MITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.5.3 The ice condenser inlet doors, intermediate deck doors, and top deck
- j. doors shall be closed and OPERABLE.
! APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4. e i l o ACTION: ' With one or more ice condenser doors open or otherwise inoperable POWER ! OPERATION may continue for up to 14 days provided the ice bed temperature is ' monitored at least once per 4 hours and the maximum ice bed temperature is maintained less than or equal to 27 , closedpositionsorOPERABLEstatuslf;otherwise,restorethedoorstotheir (as applicable) within 48 hours or be in ,
+
at least HOT following STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the 30 hours. i SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.5.3.1 Inlet Doors - Ice condenser inlet doors shall be:
- (<')*-
a. Continuously monitored and determined closed by the inlet door position monitoring system, and 4 b* Demonstrated OPERABLE '-- '"'"- - -' '---' ---- --- ' ---- 2..
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'I",i_l_'.." I;'4.41
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.___. , .!.]'a"t least once per ,QI8).nthD- th.r;;ft;r by: . . . _ R29
- 1. Verifying ~that the torque required to initially open each door is less than or equal to-675 inch pounds.
- 2. Verifying that opening of each door is not impaired by ice, frost or debris. .
- 3. .T : tin; ; :: ;l; ;f ;t 1;;;t 25% ef th; f::r; :nd (erifying that the torque required to open each door is-less than 195 inch pounds '
l when the door is 40 degrees open. This torque is defined as the " door opening torque" and is equal to the nominal door torque plus a frictional torque component. -The d;;r; ::1;;t:d fer- - l ' d;ter;ineti;n ;f the "d;;r ;;; ring'ter;;;" ;h:11 b; ;;1;cted te en ur: that
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!' derr: Or: te:ted et 1:2:t enet during ' cur t'st-e
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1 .. . , w . December 29, 1982 ll lI SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 6-29 Amendment No. 25 1
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i CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS _l 1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) i 1 V !
- 4. T::tir.; : : n l: Of t least 20% ef th; d:;r; :ne gerifying that the torque required to keep each door from closing is greater than 78 inch pounds when the doon is 40 degrees open.
j This torque is defined as the " door closing torque" and is ' equal to the nominal door torque minus a frictional torque component. Th: d:;r; : lected-fee-determin:tt:n Of th: "d:;r I
-:10;ing-terg.:" :h:11 b; ::1::t:d t: :n;;r: th:t Ol' d::r: Or:
4e64ed-:t 1 ::t :::: dur'n; f:er t::t ht:rv:10,
- 5. Calculation of the frictional torque of each door tested in !
e accordance with 3 and 4, above. The calculated frictional I torque shall be less than or equal to 40 inch pounds. l l 4.6.5.3.2 Intermediate Deck Doorss' Each ice condenser intermediate deck door i shall be: ' L
- a. Verified closed and free of frost accumulation by a visual inspection at least once per 7 days, and
- b. Demonstrated OPERABLE-:t 1 ::t :::: per 3 :: nth: during th: first '
y::r :ft:r th: '-'ti:1 ft: 5:d 1: din :nd at least once per 18 R29- i months th:r::ft:r by visually verifyi;gn no structural deterioration. ) by verifying free movement of the vent assemblies, and by ascertaining free movement when lifted with the applicable force shown below: , 4 L Door Liftino Force l 0-1, 0-5 Less than or equal to 33 lbs. 0-2, 0-6 Less than or equal to 30 lbs.
- 0-3, 0-7 Less than or equal to 28 lbs. '
0-4, 0-8 Less than or equal to 28 lbs. 4.6.5.3.3 Top Deck Doors - Ea.h ice condenser top deck door shall be determined closed and OPERABLE at least 01ce per 92 days by visually verifying: 1 ( a. That the doors are in place, and < l
- b. That no condensation, frost', or ice has formed on the. doors or blankets which would restrict their lif ting and opening if required.
,e e December 29, 198; SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 6-30
. Amendment No. 25
,\
( . R CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 'N BASES - tpf 3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL
%..?
Y; The OPERABILITY of the equipment and systems required for the detection f and control of hydrogen gas ensures that this equipment will be available to A.. . maintain the hydrogen concentration within containment below its flammable pH limit during post-LOCA conditions. Either recombiner unit or the hydrogen mitigation system, consisting of 68 hydrogen ignitions per unit, is capable of .T3 controlling the expected hydrogen generation associated with 1) zirconium-water reactions, 2) radiolytic decomposition of water and 3) corrosion of 3h ~ metals within containment. These hydrogen control systems are designed to BR mitigate the effects of an accident as described in Regulatory Guide 1.7,
" Control of Combustible Gas Concentrations in Containment following a LOCA",
a' revision 2 dated November 1978. #
.n
' The hydrogen mixing systems are provided to ensure adequate mixing of the containment atmosphere following a LOCA. This mixing action will prevent '
localized accumulations of hydrogen from exceeding the flammable limit. The operability of at least 66 of 68 ignitors in the hydrogen mitigation @P system will maintain an effective coverage throughout the containment. This u.' y system of ignitors will initiate combustion of any significant amount of BR 6;h hydrogen released after a degraded core accident. This system is to ensure w.. burning in a controlled manner as the hydrogen is released instead of allowing it to be ignited at high concentrations by a random ignition source. 3/4.6.5 ICE CONDENSER hi;})%' The requirements associated with each of the components of the ice con-
- denser ensure that the overall system will be available to provide sufficient 3.
pressure-suppression capability to limit the containment peak pressure tran-
.p &
*Nt .tii sient to less than 12 psig during LOCA conditions.
eji%.;
. s 3/4.6.5.1 ICE BED 3" The OPERABILITY of the ice bed ensures that the required ice inventory will 1) be distributed evenly through the containment bays, 2) contain suffi- sh cient boron to preclude dilution of the containment sump following the LOCA - -
and 3) contain sufficient heat removal capability to condense the reactor system volume released during a LOCA. These conditions are consistent with the assumptions used in the accident anal nses, The minimum weight figure e- ofHCS)
-H00-(pounds of ice per basket15contains
% aA 405 conservative allowance for ice loss through sublimation which is a factor of R7 16 higher than assumed for the ice condenser design. The minimum weight 4-figure of 2,333,100 ..
allowance to account for\ systematic pounds of error ice also containsinstruments. an additionalIn1% theconservative$ in weighing f..h", 1 > SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 Amendment 4, 5 B 3/4 6-4 Revised 08/18/87 BR
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i r CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS (, ( ) - 3/4.6.5 ICE CONDENSER v - ICE BED LillITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION i 3.6.5.1 The ice bed shall be OPERABLE with: , j
- a. ;
The stored ice having a boron concentration of at least 1800 ppm boron as sodium tetraborate and a pH of 9.0 to 9.5, {
- b. I Flow channels through the ice condenser,
- c. i A maximum ice bed temperature of less than or equal to 27'F, !
2,M C320
- d. A total ice weight of at least i,033,100 pounds at a 95% level .i of confidence, and '
i
- e. 1944 ice baskets, i APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.
ACTION:
~Q!, J With the ice bed inoperable, restore the ice bed to OPERABLE status within U 48 hours or be SHUTDOWN in at within theleast HOT30 following STANOBY hours. within the next 6 hours and in COLD SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6,5.1 The ice condenser shall be determined OPERABLE:
a. At least once per 12 hours by using the ice bed temperature monitoring system to verify that the maximum ice bed temperature is less than or equal to 27'F. b.
^t 1 ::t :n;; per S :: nth; i:rtng the f4rs+ year 4-f+14 ewing-init4al.
-:riti::lity t least once per 12 monthhth:r;;ft:r by: R80l
- 1. Chemical analyses which verify that at least 9 representative samples of stored ice have a boron concentration of at least 1800 ppm as sodium tetraborate and a pH of 9.0 to 9.5 at 20*C.
in: ti : exten:f en te be perfer ;d ne let+e-then Unit 2, Cycle 2 refuel 4e Oute;e er hnuary ??,1989, "ichever eccurs first. R80 l t SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 6-27 Amendment N 80 November 28,o.1968
. -h bM
~ ~
o S CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)
,2f Weighingarepresentativesampleofatleast144icebaskets6 and verifying that each basket contains at least-it999bs of ice. The representative sample shall include 6 baskets from each of the 24 ice condenser bays and shall be constituted of one basket each from Radial Rows 1,-2, 4, 6, 8 and 9 (or from the same row of an adjacent bay if a basket from a designated row cannot be obtained for weighing) within each bay. If a basket is found to contain less than de0070unds of ice, a 1:55 representative sample of 20 additional baskets from the same bay shall be weighed. The minimum average weight of ice from the 20 additional baskets and the discrepant basket shall not be less than 4404 p s/ basket at a 95% level of confidence, snS The ice condenser sha also subdivided into 3 groups of baskets, as follows: Group 1 - bays 1 through 8. Group 2 -
bays 9 through 16, and Group 3 - bays 17 through 24. The minimum average ice weight of the sample baskets from Radial Rows 1, 2, 4, 6, 8 and 9 in each group shall not be less than de9& po / basket at a 95% level of confidence. IISS The min mum total ice condenser ice weight at a 95% level of confidence shall be calculated using all ice basket weights determined during this weighing program and shall not be less than 2,333,100"pouads. T2,246,320) 2 /. Verifying, by visual inspection of a representative random sample of at least 54 flow passages (33 percent) per ice condenser bay, that the accumulation of frost or ice on flow passages between ice baskets, past lattice frames, through the intermediate and top deck floor grating or past the lower inlet plenum support structures and turning vanes is less than or equal to 15-percent blockage of the total flow area in each bay, with a 95 percent level of confidence. 37 If the summation of blockage from the sample fails to meet the acceptance criteria, then 100 percent of the passages of that bay shall be inspected. If the 100 percent inspection fails to meet the acceptance criteria, then the flow passages shall be cleaned to meet the acceptance criteria. Each flow passage that is cleaned will be reinspected. Any inaccessible flow passage that is not inspected will be considered blocked,
- c. At least once per 40 months by lifting and visually inspecting the accessible portions of at least two ice baskets from each 1/3 of the ice condenser and verifying that the ice baskets are free of detri-mental structural wear, cracks, corrosion or other damage. The ice baskets shall be raised at least 10 feet for this inspection.
- d. At least once pv i s , nuns b:
>- 3 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 6-28 Amendment No. 80,. 87 ,.
January 30, 1989 i
I l CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS r ICE CONDENSER 000R$
, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION '
t 3.6.5.3 The ice condenser inlet doors, intermediate deck doors, and top deck i doors shall be closed and OPERABLE. !
- i. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4. !
ACTION: i With one or more ice condenser doors open or otherwise inoperable, POWER , OPERATION may continue.for up to 14 days provided the ice bed temperature is monitored at least once per 4 hours and the maximum ice bed temperature is maintained less than or equal to 27 F; otherwise, restore the doors to their closed positions or OPERABLE status (as applicable) within 48 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUT 00WN within the following 30 hours. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.5.3.1 Inlet Doors - Ice condenser inlet doors shall be: ,
- a. Continuously monitored and determined closed by the inlet door position monitoring system, and
- b. Demonstrated OPERABLE during :hutdcun et le :t On p ^ r 3 =0n%s-
- during the first ye e--e(4ee-the-44t4e4--ke-beddee44ng-end at ieast once per y:Or theleaf ter by: R13 1% menns '
l 1. Verifying t a ie torque required to initially open each door i l is less than or equal to 675 inch pounds. .
- 2. Verifying that opening of each door is not impaired by ice, frost or debris.
l V
- 3. Tc3 ting a sagic of at 1 :;t 25"' cf the d: r; andkerifying that the torque required to open each door is less than 195 inch-pounds when the door is 40 degrees open. This torque is defined as the " door opening torque" and is equal to the nominal door torque.
, plus a frictional torque component.' The docr; : lected fee-deter ' nation cf th; "docr Opering torque" chall be telected to
-sM ure that !' d0cr cre te:ted-at-4+a&t--ence during four tut-
. -4" -- -'-
December 29, 1982 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 6-30 Amendment No. 13 1
+-
4 t 1 o CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 4l L )' SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) i i
- 4. T;;;ing : :::;.1 ;f Ot-1:::t 25% of the d::r: :nd f. /erify ng that the torque required to keep each door from closing s .
greaterthen78 inch-poundswhenthedooris40degreesopen, i This torque is defined as the " door closing torque and is
. equal to the nominal door torque minus a frictional torque !
component, th: d::r: ::10:ted f:r d:t: min:ti:n of th: "d::7 !
<! :in; terque" cht!' be it!Mted te emre that el' ter: :r: ;
t::t;d :t 1:::t :n;; during f;;r t::t 19t:rv:10. '
- 5. Calculation of the frictional torqua of each door tested in ,
accordance with 3 and 4, above. The calculated frictional torque shall be less than or equal to 40 inch pounds, t 4.6.5.3.2 intermediate Deck Doors fEach ice condenser intermediate deck door j shall be:
- a. Verified closed and free of frost accumulation by a visual inspection at least once per 7 days, and I s
- b. Demonstrated OPERABLE +4-4eest :n:: p;r 3 ::nthe-de4*g-the-f4est y::r ef ter the "it444 ice 5:d leading :nd at least once per 18 R13 ' ]
L months there:f tw by visually verifying no structural deterioration, '
,/] y by verifying free movement of the vent assemblies, and by ascertaining free movement when lifted with the applicable force shown below:
Door Lifting Force l 1 1. 0-1, 0-5 5 33 lbs. . 1 . . L 2. 0-2, 0-6 j 30 lbs, f r
- 3. 0-3, 0-7 j 28 lbs. I
- 4. 0-4, 0-8 < 28 lbs. I 4.6.5.3.3 Top Deck Doors - Each ice condenser' top deck door'shall be determined P
closed and OPERABLE at least once per 92 days by visually verifying: 3 l a. That the doors are in place, and L b. That no condensation, frost, or ice has formed on the doors or I blankets which would restrict their-lifting and opening if required.
- e ,
V ~ December 29, 1982 ! . .f"% . SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 6-31 Amendment No. 13 i. l l
- - - - - - - - . - . . _ _ - . - - - - . . - _ - - . ~ . - - - _ _ _ - - - - - - - _ . _ - - - - - - - a-. . - < - ~ , --
C ; v .. !
.,. CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS !
-BASES 3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL The OPERABILITY of the equipment and systems required for the detection and control of hydrogen gas ensures that this equipment will be available to maintain the hydrogen concentration within containment below its flammable limit during post-LOCA conditions. Either recombiner unit or the hydrogen !
mitigation system, consisting of 68 hydrogen igniters per unit, is capable of controlling the expected hydrogen generation associated with 1) zirconium-water BR reactions, 2) radiolytic decomposition of water and 3) corrosion of metals ' within containment. These hydrogen control systems are designed to mitigate i the effects of an accident as described in Regulatory Guide 1.7, " Control of Combustible Gas Concentrations in Containment following a LOCA," Revision 2, dated November 1978. t The hydrogen mixing systems are provided to ensure adequate mixing of the containment atmosphere following a LOCA. This mixing action will prevent localized accumulations of hydrogen from exceeding the flammable limit. ! The operability of at least 66 of 68 igniters in the hydrogen control R21 distributed ignition system will maintain an effective coverage throughout the containment. This system of ignitors will initiate combustion of any signifi-cant amount of hydrogen released after a degraded core accident. This system is to ensure burning in a controlled manner as the hydrogen is released instead of allowing it to be ign s ed at high concentrations by a random ignition source. 3/4.6.5 ICE CONDENSER The requirements associated with each of the components of the ice condenser ensure that the overall system will be available to provide sufficient pressure suppression capability to limit the containment peak pressure transient to ; less than 12 psig during LOCA conditions. 3/4.6.5.1 ICE BE0 - I The OPERABILITY of the ice bed ensures that the required ice inventory ' will 1) be distributed evenly through the containment bays, 2) contain suf fi- I cient boron to preclude dilution of the containment sump following the LOCA and 3) contain sufficient heat removal capability to condense the reactor system volume released during a LOCA. These conditions are consistent with the assumptions used in the accident a es, la w 16 7o The minimum weight figure of -1400 pounds of ice per basket contains a 404 conservative allowance for ice loss through sublimation which is a factor of l l6 49-higher than assumed for the ice condenser design. The minimum weight t
- - m figure ofJ,333.100 pounds of ice also contains an additional 1*; conservative
~
i D3D allowance to account for systematic error in weighing instruments. In the t event that observed sublimation rates are equal to or lower than design predictions after three years of operation, the minimum ice baskets weight may i be adjusted downward. In addition, the number of ice baskets required to be I weighed each 9 months may be reduced after 3 years of operation if such a y , reduction is supported by observed sublimation data. SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 8 3/4 6-4 Amendment No. 21 Revised: August 18, I
- Bases Revision (BR)
p;- , ENCLOSURE 2 PROPOSED TECKNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 i DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328 i-(TVA-SQN-TS-90-05) DESCRIPTION AND JUSTIFICATION FOR l- -REVISING SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS ! 4.6.5.1.b.2 and 4.6.5.3.1.b n i i G
ENCLOSURE 2 Description of Change Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) proposes to modify the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN) Units 1 and 2 technical specifications (TSs) to revise , Surveillance Requirement (SR) 4.6.5.1.b.2 to extend the 12-month ice I weighing interval to 18 months. An associated 12-month SR for ice 1 condenser lower inlet doors (SR 4.6.5.3.1.b) is also_being extended to ! coincide with the proposed 18-month interval for weighing ice. ! Additionally, TVA is, proposing to lower SQN's minimum TS basket weight from 1,200 pounds (1b) to 1,155 lb, thus lowering the overall ice ' condenser weight from 2,333,100 lb to 2,245,320 lb. A one-time TS provision contained in a footnote on each unit is no longer applicable and - has also been deleted. Text changes have been made to SRs 4.6.5.1.b. 4.6.5.3.1.b, and 4.6.5.3.2.b to delete requirements regarding test milestones that were previously completed during the first two years of SQN operation and are thereby no longer applicable. ,
, Reason for Change TVA is requesting an extension of SRs 4.6.5.1.b.2 and 4.6.5.3.1.b to extend weighing of ice and testing of ice condenser lower inlet doors to be coincident with refueling outages. This extension would provide increased plant availability and would allow for more efficient use of manpower. Revised design basis analyses performed by Westinghouse Electric Corporation, using staff-approved modeling enhancements, have shown that the amount of ice required for accident mitigation may be reduced without decreasing safety margins. TVA proposes to incorporate '
the results of the Westinghouse analyses into the plant design basis.
~
Justification for Change SR 4.6.5.1.b.2 currently requires that each basket contain at least , 1,200 lb of ice and that the average ice weight for each bay and each group-row combination not be less than 1,200 lb per basket at a 95 percent level of confidence at the start of the surveillance interval. SQN's L current 1,200-lb TS limit is based on a containment analysis that assumes l an even distribution of 1.080 lb per basket throughout the ice condenser. The 1,200-lb-per-basket TS limit contains a conservative allowance for ice loss through sublimation during the weighing interval between and a conservative allowance for ice-weighing instrument error. These values are currently 10 percent and 1 percent, respectively. The above limits ensure, at a 95 percent level of confidence, a minimum total ice weight of 2.333.100 lb. l' A revised containment analysis (refer to Enclosure 4) utilizing new mass and energy releases (Westinghouse WCAP-10325-P-A) has resulted in a net l decrease in the current peak containment pressure even with a reduced TS ice weight. The current containment analysis using the TS ice weight 1 1
p , q t i yields a peak containment pressure of 11.09 pounds per square inch (psi) ! following a design-basis loss of coolant accident (LOCA). The new containment analysis, utilizing the revised mass and energy model and an i ice weight of 993 lb per basket, predicts a peak design-basis LOCA ^ containment pressure of 10.9 psi. Ice-weight sensitivity analyses, utilizing lesser quantities of ice, have shown acceptable peak containment pressures with accompanying decreases in the margin of acceptability. Therefore, in order to maintain the current margin between the containment design pressure and the current predicted peak containment pressure following~a LOCA, TVA will use the 993 lb per basket as the basis for i revising the ice weight TS. In addition, because of the increase in time between ice-weighing intervals, the sublimation allowance will be ' increased to 15 percent. This 15 percent is based on the conservative ' assumption that sublimation is a linear function for the 18-month ' interval. The TS limit for minimum basket weight la being revised to specify a weight that is based on 15 percent sublimation and 1 percent instrument error. Therefore, the minimum basket weight will be: 993 x ' 1.15 x 1.01 = 1.155 lb (approximately). This value will further translate into a total TS weight of 2,245,320 lb at a 95 percent level of confidence. The current method for determining the 95 percent level of confidence will remain the same. It can be concluded, based on the revised containment analysis, that sufficient ice will be present at the end of an 18-month cycle to ensure that in the event of a LOCA, containment design pressure will not be exceeded. Additionally, the current margin between the design pressure and the peak LOCA pressure will not be reduced. Thus justification exists for extending the ice-weighing interval and reducing the overall weight required in the ice condenser. SR 4.6.5.3.1.b currently requires that the ice condenser inlet doors be tested once per year-to verify that each door meets a minimum torque requirement of 675 inch-pounds (in-lb) and that the door is not impaired from opening by ice, frost, or debris. In addition, a test sample of at least 25 percent of the inlet doors must be verified to have a " door opening torque" of less than 195 in-lb and a "docr closing torque" of greater than 78 in-lb when the door is open 40 degrees. The 25 percent sample must be selected so that all inlet doors are tested at least once during four test intervals. The " door opening torque" and the " door closing torque" are made up of two components: a nominal door torque and a frictional torque. The frictional torque component for each door tested under the 25 percent sampling is required to be less than or equal to 40 in-lb. TVA's proposed change to extend the surveillance frequency for inlet doors to once every 18 months is based on historical inlet door test results and TVA's proposed revision to eliminate the 25 percent sample to include all inlet doors for the opening / closing torque test. A review of past performances of the inlet door tests since the commencement of operation (1979 for Unit 1 and 1981 for Unit 2) indicates that these doors
['" , l i l }
- j. consistently meet their acceptance criteria for opening / closing torque and the inspections for unimpaired door movement. TVA has included a change to SRs 4.6.5.3.1.b.3 and 4.6.5.3.1.b.4 to test all inlet doors i (opening / closing torque) every 18 months. This change provides an increased level of testing for the lower inlet doors since the current requirement would only require that a 25 percent sample undergo testing every 12 months. Under this proposal, the lower inlet doors will be tested more than twice as often. Consequently, TVA finds this change to :
be justified. TVA's proposed text change to SRs 4.6.5.1.b 4.6.5.3.1.b and 4.6.5.3.2.b is an administrative change that removes previously completed test milestones during the first two years of SQN operation. These requirements are no longer applicable and are being deleted for clarity I and to avoid the possibility of confusion. Environmental Impact Evaluation 1 The proposed change request does not involve an unreviewed environmental j question because operation of SQN Units 1 and 2 in accordance with this change would not
- 1. Result in a significant increase in any adverse environmental impact previously evaluated in the Final Environmental Statement (FES) as modified by the Staff's testimony to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, supplements to the FES, environmental impact appraisals, or decisions of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board. i
- 2. Result in a significant change in effluents or power levels.
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- 3. Result in matters not previously reviewed in the licensing basis for SQN that may have a significant environmental impact.
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-.'3 p t ENCLOSURE.3
- PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE h1 SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 i
, .- DOCKET NOS. 50-327.AND 50-328 h
(TVA-SQN-TS-90-05) g, ii.; ; DETERMINATION OF NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS o I, . '. . a p. h s .i
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ENCLOSURE 3 L Significant Har.ards Evaluation ! L TVA has evaluated the proposed TS change and has determined that it does not represent a significant hazards consideration based on criteria ; established in 10 CFR 50.92(c). Operation of SQN in accordance with the , proposed amendment will not ' (1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of - an accident previously evaluated. ; TVA proposes to modify the SQN Unit 1 and Unit 2 TSs to revise SR 4.6.5.1.6.2 to allow extension of the 12-month ice-weighing
'nterval
. to 18 months. TVA is requesting an extension to allow the ice weighing to be conducted coincident with the refueling outages.
An associr.ted 12-month SR for ice condenser lower inlet doors (SR 4.6.5.3.1.b) is also being extended to coincide with the 18-month interval for weighing ice. The ice condenser system is provided to absorb thermal energy release following a LOCA or high energy line break (HELB) and to limit the peak pressure inside containment. The current containment analysis -
'for SQN is based on a minimum of 1,080 lb of ice per basket evenly -
distributed throughout the ice condenser. The revised containment , analysis shows that for the predicted sublimation rate of 15 percent ! for 18 months, an average basket weight of 993 lb at the end of the 18-month period would ensure containment design pressure is not exceeded. Based on TVA's evaluation and the revised containment analysis, TVA considers the reduction of ice weight to be acceptable for satisfying the safety function of the ice condenser for the proposed 18-month ice-weighing interval. Based on TVA's findings from the review of historical test data for lower inlet doors along with the expansion of the 25 percent test sample to include testing of all lower inlet doors for opening / closing torque, TVA considers the extended 18-month test interval to be acceptable for satisfying the safety function of these doors. TVA's proposed text change to SRs 4.6.5.1.b, 4.6.5.3.1.b, and 4.6.5.3.2.b is an administrative change that removes previously completed test milestones during the first two years of SQN operation. These requirements are no longer applicable and are , being deleted for clarity and to avoid the possibility of confusion. The proposed change therefore does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evalt:ted.
e - I i l 9 l l (2) ' Crea'c e the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from l any previously analyzed. ' TVA's request for an 18-month ice-volghing interval will not result ; in a new or.different kind of accident from that previously analyzed j in SQN's Final Safety Analysis Report. SQN~s ice condenser serves to l limit the peak pressure inside containment following a LOCA. TVA has evaluated the revised containment pressure analysis for SQN and ' determined.that sufficient ice would be present at all tinee to keep i th3 peak containment pressure below SQN's containment design pressure of 12 pounds per square inch Esge (psig). TVA's request for au 18-month lower inlet door surveillance frequency ! will not result in a new or different kind of accident from that ' i previously antlyzed. Surveillance tecting of the lower inlet doors continues ta ensure the reactor coolant system fluid released during a LOCA will be diverted through the ice condenser bays for heat , removal and that excessive sublimation of the ice bed will not occur i because of warm air intrusion. TVA's proposed text change to SRs 4.6.5.1.b. 4.6.5.3.1.b, and 4.6.5.3.2.b is an administrative change that removes previously completed test milestones during the first two years of SQN operation. These requirements are no longer applicable and are being deleted for clarity and to avoid the possibility of confusion. This > administrative change would not result in a new or different kind of - accident from any previously analyzed. I (3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The ice condenser system is provided to absorb thermal energy release following a LOCA and to limit the peak pressure inside containment. The current ice condenser analysis for SQN is based on a minimum of ' 1.080 lb of ice per basket. The revised containment analysis changes the minimum ice weight assim-d in the analysis to 993 lb per basket. The revised containment analysis shows that using an average basket weight of 1,155 lb and a sublimation allowance of 15 percent, all bays would have en average basket weight of 993 lb at the end of the 18-month interval. The revised analysis utilizes new mass and energy releases (refer to Westtaghouse WCAP-10325-P-A). which substantially delays ice-bed meltout and limits the initial containment peak pressure to approximately 7.15 psig during the blowdown phase. The ice-bed meltout delay allows the second containment pressure peak, which is driven mainly by the decay heat, to be limited to approximately 10.9 psig, which is below the containment design pressure of 12 psig. ,
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.s Based on TVA's evaluation and the revised containment analysis. TVA considers the reductior. of the average basket weight to be acceptable j for satisfying the safety function of the ice condenser for the proposed 18-month interval. TVA's extension of the lower inlet door tests to coincide with the 18-month ice weight interval is considered i to be acceptable based on the results of previous tests and TVA's !
change for expanding the 25 percent test sample to include a !
- 100 percent sample. TVA's proposed text change to SRs 4.6.5.1.b. .
4.6.5.3.1.b. and 4.6.5.3.2.b is an administrative change that removes previously completed test milestones during the first two years of . SQN operation. These requirements are no longer applicable and are , being deleted for clarity and to avoid the possibility of confusion. 1 The proposed change, therefore, does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.
'4 9
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7 t,- ,- ! ENCLOSURE 4 : i- WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION i i , t !- WCAP 12455 : I CONTAINMENT PRESSURE CALCULATIONS WITH < AM EXTENDED CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP . l DIESEL GENERATOR LOADING DELAY FOR THE !
! SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANTS UNITS 1 AND 2 (DESIGN BASIS ANALYSIS) s (B25 891128 002) -
L [ y f $1 s i P I i 5 I I
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W g W Hestinghouse Class 3 4
, s NCAP-12455
..s-1, e CONTAINMENT PRESSURE CALCULATIONS WITH AN EXTENDED CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP DIESEL GENERATOR LOADING-DELAY FOR THE SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS'l AND 2 (DESIGN BASIS ANALYSIS)
By
'( J. A. Kolano L. C. Smith 1
NOVEMBER 1989 y Approved by: [] '
- 4. A. Gresham, Manager ,
Containment Design and Sk!R Technology
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Hestinghouse Electric Corporation l 1.. Nucioar and Advance Technology Division
- F P. O. Box 355 .
l: q. Pittsburgh, Pa. 15230 l i
.1998v:10/112289-
yg. hy ' P' , ( TABLE OF CONTENTS lLilt M 11 ABSTRACT I INTRODUCTION 2 BACKGROUND 4 METHOD OF ANALYSIS DESCRIPTION OF ANALYSIS 8 Offsite Power Not Available at Event Initiation 12
SUMMARY
AN0 CONCLUSIONS ( REFERENCES I4 APPENDIX A - Mass and Energy Release Analysis for Postulated 42 Loss-of-Coolant Accidents 57 APPENDIX B - Containment Pressure Calculation Ice Mass -2.1 Million Pounds Loss of Power at Event Initiation 100 APPENDIX C - Containment Pressure Calculation Ice Mass 1.88 Million Pounds Loss of Power at Event Initiation 147 APPENDIX D - Containment Pressure Calculation Ice Mass 1.93 Million Pounds Loss of Power at Event Initiation AP;ENDIX E - Emergency Core Cooling Flow Basis 194 i
~
l (' ABSTRACT ) 1 The purpose.of the analysis was_to update the plant design basis analysis to
,. . reflect planned plant parameters (loading delay) and proposed configuration changes (ice weight reduction).
Sequoyah specific calculations were performed to evaluate the effect that delayed loading of the containment spray pumps on the emergency power bus would have on long term LOCA containment pressure response. A series of ! containment analyses were performed using the LOTIC-I version of the LOTIC : Computer Code [ Reference 13. These analyses examined various scenarios I associated with the containment spray pump loading delay time onto the diesel generator following a loss of off-site power and the initial ice condenser ice mass. The results, which indicate that the limiting case will remain below the Sequoyah containment design pressure of 12.0 psig based upon minimum ice mass. are as follows:
' Assumed loss cf offsite power coincident with event initiation; initial ice mass 1.88 x 10 6lbm; resulting peak calculated ,
containment pressure 11.7 psig. s 11 1998v:10/112289 '
.i
( INTRODUCTION Westinghouse has completed a study evaluating a revised containment spray pump
. diesel loading time. The change in the delay is to 250 seconds (Reference 2). Long Term Containment Pressure Calculations, FSAR Section 6.2.1, were p" performed to determine the impact of this modification and to demonstrate containment integrity for the Sequoyah Units 1 and 2.
This analysis was completed to update the plant design basis analysis to reflect pinnned plant parameters (loading delay) and proposed configuration changes (ice weight reduction). In addition, in support of the containment spray pump diesel loading study, attached as Appendicies are: Appendix A, revised Mass and Energy Release Analysis for Postulated Loss-of-Coolant Accidents; Appendix B, revised Sequoyah FSAR Section 6.2.1.3.4, Containment Pressure Transient - Long Term Analysis for an ice mass of 2.1 million pounds; Appendix C, revised Sequoyah FSAR 6.2.1.3.4, Containment Pressure Transient - Long Term Analysis for an ice { mass of 1.88 million pounds and its associated " marked up" Technical Specification revision; and, Appendix D, revised Sequoyah FSAR Section 6.2.1.3.a. Containment Pressure Transient - Long Term Analysis for an ice mass of 1.93 million pounds and associated " marked up" Technical Specification revision. ( 1998v:lD/112289 I
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; f V BACKGROUND Historically, the peak containment pressure will occur as a result of a large ;
-break:LOCA. !
Based.upon the planned change in-the loading sequence of the containment spray _ pumps onto the diesel generators, an analysis was performed to determine if-this proposed change would adversely impact the calculated containment peak.
. pressure transient.
In the past,'the Technical Specification specified that the maximum allowable delay time for the containment spray system to achieve full flow was 58 seconds (Reference 33. .This total delay time is defined to be from the safeguards signal initiation to the time that full spray pump flow is achieved. The basis of this delay is a containment spray pump diesel loading time of 30 seconds and a 28 second delay required to achieve full flow. h The proposed change would result in an increase of the containment spray pump-diesel loading delay time and therefore the time until the containment spray reaches full flow to approximately 220 seconds. The intent of this analysis : is to model a bounding delay time, therefore, as an analytical basis a 250
-second delay was assumed.
The critical parameters which affect the acceptability of this change are the energy removal capability of the containment spray system, and the time of containment spray switchover from the refueling water storage tank (RHST) to i the containment sump relative to the time of ice bed meltout. The calculated switchover time for the containment spray is-2803 seconds. The time at which the containment sprays resume full flow, drawing from the sump is 3113 seconds. The containment spray switchover is based upon several factors: 1) Initial RHST volume and the ECCS draw from the RHST; 2) Operator action time (5 minutes) 3) RHST low-low level alarm, i 1996v:1D/112289 2 -
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h [ The' Engineered Safeguard Systems modeled consist of Safety Injection and Spray Systems,'and the Ice Bed. Because of decay heat produced by the reactor core f after a loss-of-coolant accident, cooling water has to be supplied to the core-
.o by the Safety Injection System. Under the assumption that the core cooling takes place by boil-off of the Safety Injection water, energy is added to the
. containment atmosphere.
In ice condenser plants, the containment spray system has little impact on the containment pressure transient calculation while ice mass is present. The containment sprays do not actively remove energy from the containment atmosphere until the ice mass has been depleted. Following ice bed meltout, the containment sprays are the only active means of heat removal from the containment atmosphere. The heat removal capability of the containment sprays is strongly influenced by temperature and is determined by whether the containment spray system draws its water from the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RHST), or from the emergency sump following switchover. Hence, the time at which the containment spray system suction is switched from (' the RHST to the emergency sump will affect the containment heat removal capability. 4 % k a
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1996v:1D/112289 3 . 1
[ NETHOD OF ANALYSIS A series of containment pressure calculations were performed utilizing the LOTIC-I-version of-the LOTIC Computer Code [ Reference 1). The primary purpose or scope of this study was to provide support for the installation of the sequencers, and provide analyses to verify that this modification would not have an adverse impact on the containment response for a design basis loss of coolant accident (LOCA) event. The current design basis analysis is based upon an ice' weight of 2.1 million pounds of ice and a loss of off-site power assumption modeled at the event initiation, with an associated delay of 45 seconds. This study employed the base analytical assumptions of the current design basis Sequoyah FSAR Analysis identified in Section 6.2, (initial ice mass 2.1 (106-) pounds) with several identified modifications (*). Containment Pressure Calculation The following are the major input assumptions used to calculate the
' containment transients for the FSAR limiting break case (pump suction pipe rupture).
- 1. Minimum containment safeguards are employed in all calculations, e.g., one of.two spray-pumps and one of two spray heat exchangers (UA - 2.932 x 106Btu /Hr *F); one of two RiiR pumps providing flow.
6 to the core and one of two RHR heat exchangers (UA - 1.402 x 10 Btu /Hr 'F); and the component cooling heat exchanger was modeled with a UA of 2.793 x 106 Btu /Hr *F; one of two safety-injection pumps and one of two centrifugal charging pumps; and one of two air return fans returning air at a rate of 40,000 cfm from the upper to lower compartment. All heat exchangers were modeled as strictly
- counterflow heat exchangers. This assumption is consistent with
^
the current Sequoyah FSAR Section 6.2 parametric studies performed for the ultimate heat sink calculations. (Reference SQN-6, FSAR 6.2-24) { 1 19 & :1D/112289 4 . v
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3'" [' " };T e2.. Initial ice mass sensitivityt (Determined per Ref.!2)
,. Base cr.se - a) 2.1 million pounds t,
b) 2.015 million pounds
. c) 1.93 million pounds.
d) 1.88 million pounds o
*3. The Blowdown, Reflood, and Post Reflood mass and energy release rates are outlined in Appendix A based upon the methodology.
described in Reference 4., (Note: .The mass and energy releases - are calculated to the-time that the unbroken loop steam generator cools down (approximately 2313 seconds), from this time to the end of the transient LOTIC-1 calculates core bolloff.
'4. Blowdown and post-blowdown ice condenser drain temperatures of 190*F and 130'F were used. (These values are based on the Long-Term Waltz-M111 ice condenser test-data described in NCAP-8110-Sup. 6.)
;{.
- 5. Nitrogen from the cold leg accumulators in the amount of 5942 lbs is included-in the calculations. (Effects of the Upper Head Injection Accumulators were conservatively neglected, therefore UHI removal will have no effect on the. containment pressure calculation.)
- 6. The air recirculation fan is: assumed to be effective 10 minutes after the transient is initiated.
- 7. Even distribution of steam flow into the ice bed is assumed.
- 8. -No ice condenser bypass is assumed. (This assumption depletes the ice in the shortest time and thus is conservative.)
{. q 1998v:1D/112289 5 2
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, 9. 'The initial conditions modeled in the containment are a temperature of '
100*F'in the lower and dead-ended volumes, a temperature of 15'F in ;
'the' ice condenser, and a temperature of 85'F in the upper volume. All -
1 volumes are at a pressure of 0.3 psig and a 10% relative humidity, except the ice condenser which is at 100% relative humidity. f ~ I
*10. The minimum ECCS and Spray flow rates versus time assumed in the peak ,
containment pressure calculations were calculated based upon the assumption of the loss of offsite power (Table 1). The modeled centrifugal charging and safety injection pump flows were adjusted to I account,for the assumed RCS pressure during injection (APPENDIX E). Note:- The mass and energy release analysis calculations were based 4 upon: minimum safeguard criteria-(APPENDIX A). The safety injection i g flows are modeled over a range of RCS system backpressure. The prima'ry effect of the pump injection concerns steam condensation in 3- the RCS system. J s( -The containment response calculations following a LOCA are based upon ' bounding safety injection flow assumptions. The pumped injection flow
. rates were calculated based on the system delivering flow to all four RCS cold legs against-a system backpressure of 11.4 psig. Even though f the pump flows are affected by system backpressure and the containment l design-is 12.0 psig, the effects due to the difference-(11.4 versus 12 L psig) are conservative. During'the long term phase of the containment calculation the SI system modeling pertains to. core boiloff and RHR l . spray flow effects. The current pump injection flowrate at a backpressure of 11.4 psig is more than sufficient to handle core .
boiloff, with the remaining core flow spilled to the containment. In i addition, other containment pressure calculation sensitivities have revealed that during the long term phase (after the RCS system cools down lower flows passing through the RHR heat exchanger increase the performance of the h~ eat exchanger and therefore provide a benefit in heat removal space. Therefore, in conclusion,.the variance in 4 3 .
,1998v:1D/112289 6 -
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f i ( safety injection-flowrate derived due to 11.4 versus 12.0 psig )
- 3. - backpressure will be negligible and conservative. i
*11, 3 The residual heat removal pump;and containment spray pump data is identified as part of Item 10 (Switchover - Injection to Sump' j Recirculation).
*12. Containment structural heat sinks are modeled as outlined in Table 2, (Reference 5 and 8). Note: The Dead-Ended compartment structural heat sinks were conservatively neglected, i: *13. Containment compartment volumes were based on the following: Upper 3
Compartment 651,000 ft3 ; Lower Compartment 248500 ft ; and Dead-Ended Compartment 129900 ft3 (Reference 9). Provision is made in the containment pressure analysts for' heat storage in interior and exterior walls. Each wall is divided into a number of nodes. For each node, a conservation of energy equation expressed in finite L-( difference form accounts for transient conduction into and out of the node and temperature-rise of the node. 1 l The heat transfer coefficient to the containment structure in the lower and L r Lice condenser compartments.is calculated by LOTIC-1 based primarily on the l~ work of.Tagami'. From this work, it was determined that the value of the heat. : transfer coefftelent' increases parabolica11y to a peak value at the end"of L . blowdown.and then decreases exponentially to a stagnation heat transfer ; coefficient which is a function of steam to air weight ratio. When applying the Tagami correlations, a conservative limit-was placed on the lower i compartment stagnant heat transfer coefficients. They were limited to a , steam / air ratio of 1.4 according to the Tagami correlation. The imposition of this limitation is to restrict the use of the Tagami correlation within the ; test range of steam / air ratios where the correlation was derived.
*14. The normalized decay heat, which is used to calculate mass and energy releases after the steam generator equilibrates is presented
{ in Table 3, (Reference 6) 1998v:lD/112289 T
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[ DESCRIPTION OF ANALYSIS 0FFSITE POWER NOT AVAILABLE AT EVENT INITIATION CASE 1 - 2.1 Million Pounds of Ice / Base Case This sensitivity case was based upon the current Sequoyah FSAR ice weight limit of 2.1 million pounds of ice (Basis for Technical Specification limit of
- 2.3331 million pounds which includes 10.0 percent allowance for sublimation and 1.0% error in weighing instruments). ,
f The LOTIC-I containment model is based upon the assumptions as identified in; : the previous " Method.of Analysis" section, except for the following CASE 1 specific modifications: l A) Containment spray flow delay was modeled at 250 seconds (Injection Phase based upon an assumed loss of off-site power coincident with [ the event initiation / Diesel Failure) {~ B)~ Containment Spray (CS) switchover injection to recirculation was modeled to account for the initial loading.onto the diesel generator .; (See Table'_1 for Pump Flow versus Time modeling) l L. The emergency core cooling system switchover procedure is modeled as outlined in fable 1. l. L The calculated peak containment pressure was 10.1 psig occurring at approximately.9168 seconds. Ice bed meltout occurred at approximately 4073 seconds. . 4 Yhe following plots have been provided: Figure 1, Containment System Pressure Transient Figure 2, Containment Upper Compartment Temperature Transient p Figure 3, Containment Lower Compartment Temperature Transient
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I 1998v:1D/112289 8 .
s .i-h [ . Figure 4.-Temperature-Transients'of the Active and Inactive Sumps v.f Figure 5,: Ice Melt versus Time
. .: CASE 2 - 2.015-M1111on Pounds-of Ice / Loss of Power at Event Initiation (Diesel Failure)
This CASE was completed to model the 2.015 million pound case with the CASE 1 (Base, Case) assumption (loss of off-site power at event initiation; 250 second CS delay) concerning pump performance.
. Specific CASE 2 modifications:
-- A) Initial ice mass 2.015 million pounds B) Essential safety systems pump models per Table 1 The calculated containment peak pressure was 10.5 psig occurring at 7207 seconds. The ice bed meltout occurred at approximately 3680 seconds.
-{
.The following plots are provided to illustrate the transients:
Figure 6, Containment System Pressure Transient Figure 7, Containment Upper Compartment Temperature Transient Figure 8. Containment Lower Compartment Temperature Transient Figure 9. Temperature Transients of the Active and Inactive Sumps Figure 10, Ice Melt versus Time CASK 3-1.93MillionPoundsofIce/LossofPoweratEventInitiation (Diesel Fallure) This analysis case was identical to CASE 1 (BASE CASE), except for the initial ice mass. This sensitivity was based upon 1.93 million pounds. l 1998v:10/112289 9 .
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b
' Specific CASE 3 assumptions:
A)- Initial Ice mass 1.93 million pounds p: Loss of off-site power modeled at event initiation s - B) - C) ECCS/CS pump initiation /switchover model is' outlined in Table 1-r The calculated peak containment pressure was 10.9 psig occurring at
'6391 seconds. .
Ice bed.meltout occurred at approximately 3272 seconds. ! 1 l The following figures are provided: L L Figure 11, Containment System Pressure Transient !, Figure 12, Containment Upper Compartment Temperature Transient Figure 13, Containment Lower Compartment Temperature Transient (' Figure 14, Temperature Transients of the Active and Inactive Sumps Figure ~15. Ice Melt versus Time ,
' CASE 4 - 1.88 Million Pounds of Ice / Loss of Power at Event Initiation l- (Diesel' Failure) 1' Based upon the results derived in CASES 1 through 3 (ice weight reduction L, ' sensitivities with a loss of off-site power assumption at event initiation) this case was completed with the objective to determine the lowest ice mass
=which results in an accident pressure which remains below the design pressure of 12.0 psig. This case was performed with an ice mass of 1.88 million n pounds. The LOTIC-I-input model was the same as CASE 1 except for the ice
. weight parameter.
The calculated peak containment pressure was 11.7 psig, occurring at 3113 l; seconds. The ice bed meltout occurred at approximately 3038 seconds into c.e transient. L
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1 l-1998v:1D/112289 10 .,
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- The following figures illustrate the transient trends:
' Figure 16, Containment System Pressure Transient
-; F1gure 17, Containment Upper Compartment Temperature Transient
~ Figure 18, Containment Lower Compartment Temperature Transient figure 19, Temperature Transients of the Active and Inactive Sumps Figure 20, Ice Melt versus Time 4
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SUMMARY
AND CONCLUSIONS. Table 4,. outlines the results for the cases performed for the design basis 3; analyses (loss of off-site power at event initiation). The critical factors Lfor evaluating the acceptability of an increased delay time due to diesel i loading in the injection phase are the energy removal role of the sprays
-before ice bed moltout and the containment spray switchover time relative to
'i' ice bed-meltout. The most limiting case in terms of peak calculated containment pressure and minimum ice weight was calculated in CASE 4, based uponian ice weight of'1.88 million pounds. The calculated peak pressure for
'this case was.11.7 psig. i
~
In summary, from the results presented in Table 4, the calculated peak containment pressure for Sequoyah-can be kept below the. design pressure of 112.0 psig following a postulated LOCA accident,.and provide some margin to the design pressure, if a minimum ice mass of 1.88 million pounds is maintained in '
.the ice condenser. (Note: This is the modeled analytical limit not the Technical Specification limit.)
Figure 21.111ustrates the results of the ice mass versus containment pressure , parametric studies. . Therefore, the limiting factors in these sensitivities are containment spray system operability, and initial ice mass. Early in the transient the. sprays are actually a negative factor, due to the fact the 105'F water which. pulled from the RHST by the containment spray pumps adds energy to the containment. Later in the transient, the loss of containment sprays due to recirculation switchover at ice bed meltout-leaves the containment without adequate heat. removal capability.. 4 5 13g _ 1998v:10/112289- 12
5 RELEVANT NOTES ON TRENDS AND OBSERN TIONS 7, :
- A review of.the pressure and temperature transients for all cases reflect a drop;in.'the pressure and temperature at approximately 540 Li seconds.. The cause of.the decrease is a result of a decrease in the
. mass and energy release to the containment. In addltion, this trend continues and becomes more prevalent at 600 seconds as the deck fans start. l
.- .The expected effect of the RHR syst'em switchover on the calculated.
~ containment pressure is minimized during the time of RHR switchover because a'significant portion of the safety injection flow.to the '
~
-core is betng delivered via.the CCP and SIP from the RHST. .The reduction in steam condensation due to the higher enthalpy sump water r >
is minimized. 'However, the pressure and temperature transient do L show a gradual increase till the time that the steam generator in the
, unbroken loop totally cools down, which is at approximately 2313 l
(; seconds. 1 I 1 v l f l 1998v:10/112289 13 .
~ , ;
< a.
, [. REFERENCES
;n '
- 1. Grimm, N. P., Colenbrander. H. G. C., "Long-Term-Ice Condenser
; . Containment Code - LOTIC CODE," HCAP-8354-P-A,' July 1974, (Proprietary),
HCAP-8355-A (Non-Proprietary), July 1974.
- 2. P. G. Trudel, " Request for. Delivery (Rd) No. RD-462646 - Containment-Integrity Ice. Height Reduction Sensitivity ~ Analysis - N2N-039," Letter
.No.-N7971, May 22, 1989.
4
- 3. Sequoyah Technical Specification, Table 3.3-5, P. 3/4-31, Amendment No.
'12.
- 4. - '" Westinghouse LOCA Mass and Energy Release Model for Containment Design -
March 1979 Version," HCAP-10325, April I, 1979 (Proprietary),
,- 5. TVA Letter No. 2579, letter from D. B. Heaver (TVA) to H. E. Wright (H),
" Structural Heat Sinks Inside Containment". December 8, 1972.
- 6. "American: National' Standard for Decay Heat Power in Light Water '
Reactors", ANSI /ANS-5.1-1979, August 29, 1979. l
- 7. TVA letter No. 3001,-letter from D. R. Patterson (TVA) to H. E. Wright
-(H), "Long: Term Containment Pressure Analysis", June 8, 1973.
t l l-
- 8. TVA letter No. N7994, letter from P. G. Trudel (TVA) to T. A. Lordi (B),
L " Containment Integrity. Ice Height Reduction Sensitivity Analysis," (confirmation of structural heat sinks), July 6, 1989. 1
- 9. TVA letter No N8027, letter from P. G. Trudel (TVA) to T. A. Lordi (B),
" Containment Integrity Ice Height Reduction Sensitivity Analysis and f
. Safety Evaluation," (containment volume revision), August 30, 1989.
I 1998v:10/112289 14 .
4 1
.L
( TABLE 1 LOS$ OF 0FF-$1TE POWER AT EVENT INITIATION
;" CONTAINMENT PRESSURE CALCULATION PUMP FLOW VS, TIME TIME AFTER ECCS FLOW RHR ECCS FLOW SAFEGUARDS- TO CORE SPRAY $ PRAY TO CORE INITIATION (RwST) .[],QM M f$ UMP) COMMENTS (SEC) (GPM) GPM (GPM) (GPM) 0 0 0 0 0 "S" - Signal 21.9 0 0 0 0 22.0 1019 0 0 0 CCP/ SIP Start 26.9 1019 0 0 0 27.0 - '4858 0 0 0 RHR/CCP/$1P ECCs Flow 249.9 4858 0 0 0 250.0 4858 4750 0 0 Containment Spray Start 4858 4750 0 0 1690.0 1691 0 1019 4750 0 2500 RHR $witchover 1710.9 1019 4750 0 2500 1711. 0 4750 0 3519 CCP/$1P Switchover 2802.9 0 4750 0 3519
.f 0' 3519 'CS Pump Stopped
. ,(' 2803. 0 0
. -3112.9 0 0 0 3519 3113. 0 4750 0 3519 CS Pump $witchover 3600.9 0 4750 0 3519
-3601. 0 4750 2000 1019 RHR Alignment for Auxiliary CS End of 0 4750 2000 1019 Transient
- 4858 gpm Total ECCS Flow (RWST) 422 gpm - 1 Centrifugal Charging Pump 597 gpm - 1 Safety Injection Pump 3839 gpm - 1 RHR Pump-9-
i
'1998v:1D/112289 15 .
c
, , 4- 1 n- .
n: v
~ 7g TABLE 21 ;
r y 's ^ SE000YAH STRUCTURAL HEAT SINKS CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY ANALYSIS g , , Passive Heat Sinks ; r
. ~A. LM aterial Pronerties (Reference 7)' .!
i Volumetric Thermal Heat
~ _ Conductivity Capac ty BTU /ft{-F
.Haterial BTU /hr-F-ft Paint j 0.2000 14.0 :l 0.0833 28.4 Paint2 l Concrete 0.8 28.8 .
*? Stainless l Steel 9.4 56.35 h
iCarbon Steel '26.0 56.35 s B. Surfaces- ' Area Layer: and' Thickness Heat Sink ' Material (ft 2) (ft) ,
.'noer U comoartment
- 1) Operating Deck. Concrete 4,800 1.07 Concrete 2). Crane Wall -
Concrete 18,280 0.0005 Paint 1,29 Concrete-
- 3) Refueling Canal Steel-lined 0.0208 Stainless Concrete 3,840 Steel 1.5 Concrete
- 4) Operating Deck. Concrete 760 0.00125 Paint
- (s -
i 1.5 Concrete 1998v:10/112289 I6 -
-t
~
-( ( TABLE 2 (Continued) SE000YAH STRUCTURAL HEAT SINKS
.; CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY ANALYSIS Arta layer and-Thickness Heat Sink Material (ft') (ft)
Unner Comnartment:(Continued)
- 5) Containment:Shell Steel 49,960 0.000625 Paint
~& Misc. Steel 0.0403 Steel
- 6) Misc. Steel Steel 2,260 0.000625 Paint 0.12 Steel Lower Comoartment
." 7) Operating Deck, Crane-Hall &
Interior Concrete 32.200 1.416 Concrete Concrete
'8) Area in Contact Concrete 15,540 0.0005 Paint with sump Water 1.6 Concrete
- 9) Interior Concrete Concrete 2,830 .00125 Paint 1.0 Concrete
- 10) Interior Concrete Concrete 760 0.0005 Paint 1.75 Concrete i .- 11) Reactor Cavity Steel-Lined 2,270 0.02082 Stainless Concrete Steel 2.0 Concrete 19 W :10/112289 I7 -
3 .... . .;
. . .- .~ _ ..
m 57'
~
- -TABLE 2 (Continued)-
SE000YAH STRUCTURAL HEAT SINKS 1I CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY ANALYSIS Arta Layer and Thickness Heat Sink Material (ftz) (ft) Lower Comoartment (Continued) l12) Containment Shell Steel 19,500 0.000625 Paint
& Misc. Steel 0.0495 Steel
- 13) Hisc. Steel Steel 9,000- 0.000625 Paint O.1008 Steel
. .. Ice Condenser-y-
'14) Ice Basket Steel 180,600 .00663 Steel p- .
- 15) Lattice-Frames Steel 76,650 0.217 Steel l
i L '16i Lower Support 5 Structure Steel 28,670 0.276 Steel L 17) Ice Condensef Floor Concrete 3,336 .000833 Paint 4 18) Containment Wal1 Composite 19,100 1.0 Steel & Panels & Containment panel Insulation Shell. steel and 0.625 Steel Shell insulation
- 19) Crane Hall composite 13,055 1.0 Steel &
( Panels and Crane Wall panel steel and 1.0 Insulation Concrete insulation 1998v:10/112289 I8 '
. _. _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ -. _ _ _ _ _____ _ _ _ _ _ ___ _ __ _ _ __--_-_ _.-.-._____ _ _ _ E
.m .r ,
# r s /
o
, 7. : .
. . .s M TABLE 3 0- Westinghouse Model Decay Heat Curve (1979 ANS Plus-2% Uncertainty)-
i DECAY HEAT TIME- GENERATION RATE
'(SEC) (BTU / BTU) 1.00E+01 0.053876
- . 1.50E+01- 0.050401 2.00E+01 0.048018 4.00E+01 0.042401 6.00E+01 0.039244 8.00E+01 0.037065 1.00E+02 0.035466
..1.50E+02 0.032724
'2.00E+02 0.030936 4.00E+02 0.027078 6.00E+02 0.024931 8.00E+02 0.023389 1.00E403 0.022156
. 1.50E+03 0.019921 2.00E+03 0.018315
*l(.
- 4.00E+03 0.014781 0.013040
.* 6.00E+03 8.00E+03 0.012000 1.00E+04 0.011262 1.50E+04 0.010097 4.00E+04 0.007778 1;00E+05 0.006021 4.00E+05 0.003770 6.00E+05 0.003201-8.00E+05 0.002834 1.00E+06 0.002580 1.50E+06 0.002530 2.00E+06 0.001909
-4.00E+06 0.001355 6.00E+06 0.001091 8.00E+06 0.000927 1.00E+07 0.000808 y
6 l 19 m :10/112289 19 - o
',' 4 # L t', .,
( r
'( .[:~ , .1 t,. : em ,
[ < TABLE 4 -
+ ..
SUMMARY
; X ,
}
~ LOSS OF OFF-SITE POWER AT EVENT-INITIATION (DESIGN BASIS ASSUMPTION) i e
CASE . ICE MASS ICE MELTOUT TIME PEAK PRESSURE i
. l.
-(lbs)10 6
~
p. (Seconds) (psig) L 1 1 2.1- 4098 10.1 . ll 2' 2.015 3680 10.5-
. .. .e
'3 1.93 3272 10.9 L- . 4' l.88 3038 11.7 l
l l
?
s. 4 1 1996v:10/112289- 20 .
A l vu _ [ PIGURE 1 ) ll CASE 1 (BASE CASE) l 2.1 Million Founds of Ice i Ioss of Power Assuasd at Event Initiation
.1 l
SEQUOYAH CONTAINMENT PRESSURE ANALYSIS CONTAINMENT SYSTEM PRESSURE TRANSIENT s l 14
- 12. -
e [m10. r N w , / \. , o ,
~s y 6. sj 3 ,
a s ..
- 4 1 2.
Ig2 gg5 4 5 gg 6
' tel- 10 10 TINE SEC 4
21 f
g .y. .__ . _ _ . _ . . _ . . - ___._ . . A
~
i k.. FIGURE 2' SEQUDYAH CONTAINMENT PRESSURE ANALYSIS f CASE 1 (thSE CASE) 2.1 Million Pounds of Ice Emss of Power Assumed at Event Initiation CONTAINMENT UPPER COMPARTMENT TEMPERATURE TRANSIENT
.26C+5 ;
.2dC+5
.22E*5
+
l k
,ygg,5 k- o' m
- 18C+5 s.
. 16t*5 "
/ N ,
t :, j s
. 14E 5
.12C 5 1.
1 '" L .1OE+5 , 1 .. 4 10 5 gg 6 l- ' tel 102 gg5 10 u TIME SEC k. 22 { -
?
-..- .-- - -. ~ .- --
- y. _
l< bi J 1
; .. #I 3 SEQUOYAH CONTAINMENT PRESSURE ANALYSIS CASE 1 (BASE CASE) ;
2.1 Million Pounds of Zoe Loss of Power Assumed at Event Initiation '
= CONTAINMENT ZbWER COMPARTMENT TEMPERATURE TRANSIENT
.26E*5 a
. 24C*5 a
,ggg.s \ ;
h
. 20E*5 g l~
.18E*5 s 1
M f N ,
.16E*5 w ,
.14E 5
.12E*5
.10E*5 80't el ig2 .gg5 104 105 106 ,
TIME SEC t 23 d . _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _
( , , E
- i 'i fy' '
cx i { , FIGURE' 4 . SEQUOYAH CONTAINMENT PRESSURE ANALYSIS , I CASE 1-(RASE CASE)'-
'2.1 Million Pounds of Ice Imse of Power Assumed at Event Initiation . '!
i TEMPERATURE TRANSIENT OF ACTIVE AND INACTIVE SUMPS
.26E*5
.24E*5 b
.22E*5 l 'g .20E 5 g _
.1SE*5 s , INACTIVE i
.16E*5
\ '
\, i
.14E 5 -
N- ,
.,12C.5 ACIE l
.10E*5 .
1'
- 80. 6 10I 102 gg5 gg4 105 10 T!ME SEC t
=
24
1 i( L.t j i
, i
. l: - 1 ll l
FIGURE 5 i 1 o SE000YAH CONTAINMENT PRESSURE ANALYSIS l CASE 1 (RASE CASE) 2.1 Million Pounds of Ice ! ICE MELT (L8S) ' Loss of Power Assumed at; Event Initiation '
.3K.7 4 l
l k A I
.3eg.1 I
.lM*7
$ . .., .l
- l
.iate7 .
a
' . t's j
.ia., ,
l' .lua7
/
( / l 1 A I \, . 0L's t- .._ . ----/ < (- .su.s ies i4 i., ip i ist te a- .) IM iKCI ! l-1 1 i 4 I l-l l-l, l
- l l
l i 8 l l 25 , 1 _.__E___-_.______._______-___________.____.__.___. -- ,---- ' ' " ' '
i FIGURE 6
~
( CASE a 3.015 Million Pounds of Ice less of Power Assumed at Event Initiat!,on SE000VAH CONTAlWMENT PRESSURE ANALYSIS coNTAINNI2tt 8YSTEM PRESSURE TRAN8IENT 16. I 14 12. ta ' [10. ]N W 9. g -
\N ,
' 9
@ g ,,
8 ,,/ N 2. 9. 101 102 105 gge gg5 gg 6 TIME SEC O 4 26
. ...- -._~ .-.
t. t FIGURE 7 SEQUOYAH CONTAINMENT PRES $URE ANALYSil CASE 3 2.015 Million pounds of Zoe Loss of Power Assumed at Event Initiation t- CONTAINNDfT UPPER COMPARTMENT TDtPERATURE TRANSIENT j' .26C+5
.24C*5
.22C*$
- ^
N .20C+5 j a' c ggt.5 - l W
! N I.16C+5
.14C+5
.12C*5
\
\
' ~'
.10C*5 ,
.se.
ISI 182 105 gg4 gg5 gg 6 TIME SEC
. i 27
I l l 1
~
)
i FIGURE 8 l i SEQUOYAH CONTAINMENT PRES $URE ANALYll5 CASE 2 l 2.015 Million Pounds of Ice 1mes of Power Assumed at Event Initiation
- CONTAINMENT IAMER COMPARTMENT TEMPERATURE TRANSIENT ,
l- .26C*5 "-
.24E*5 ,
s ; \
.22C*5 \ l ,
l [. She
~
;( g.20C'5 L c-
.N .19t*5 hN !
\ ,
l.16E*5
.14t*5
.12C'5 i
7
.100 5
- 90. 6 tel 192 gg5 gg4 ;g5 18 TIME SEC e
28
-f 1
1 l I (, ! FIGURE 9
, SE000YAH CONTAINMENT PRESSURE ANALYSIS CASE 2 I 2.015 Million Founds of Ice l Zoss of Power Assumed at Event Initiation l TEMPERATURE TRANSIENT OF ACTIVE AND INACTIVE SUMPS
.26C*5 i-
.2dt 5
.22E 5 ;
S
.20E 5
{
.18E 5 s ,
, INACTIVE
.16E'5 % . . . . . . _ . _ . .
\ . m 1
\ l %'
1 .14E*5 ' ACTIVE * ,
.12C*5
.10E*5 80.
tel 102 ig5 gg4 le to TIME SEC 29
FIGURE 10 SE000YAH CONTAINMENT PRESSURE Ak'ALYSIS
' CASE 2 ICE MELT (LBS) 2.015 Million Founds of Ice i
Imss of Power Assumed at Rvent Initiation 1.. ~.4K 4 L
.. m .1 -
r J
.iK.7 f
g .tu.7
/
O i . .., e.
...., /
p
.iKv7 p
.DK.4
/
* ** i,5 isi i ,a ses ie. is.
fist IKCl . l k a 30
. 5 i
. i FIGURE 11 CASE 3 ,
1.93 Million pounds of Ice Imss of Power Assumed at Event Initiation SEQUOYAH CONTAINMENT PRES.SURE ANALYSIS l L CONTAINNINT SYSTEN PRESSURE TRANSIENT : 16. i 14
- 12. 7 8 f p le. p 3
l N' ! W8 s i h. m x r- 1
\ ,
- 6. 3j i 4
2.
' lel 102 gg5 led le s gg 6 TIME SEC i
1 m
$ g h
- 31 9
- _. - ..._ __.- _. _ _ , - . . . - .. ,,,.,n ,,.
i i h (1 1 I FIGURE 12 ! t l
$EQU0YAH CONTAINMENT PRESSURE ANALYSIS :
CASE 3 { 1.93 Million Pounds of Ice ,
' Imss of Power Assumed at Event Initiation '
CONTAINNENT UPPER COMPARTNENT TEMPERATURE TRANSIENT
.26E*5 i
.24C*5 ,
L
- .22E*5 ;
b { g .20E 5 s :
.18E*5
-h \
I.16E*5
.14E*5
.12E*5
\
i
.10E*5
~
~~~--..,' l
%/
80. 101 102 105 104 6 105 10 l TIME SEC l
. 6 32
^
. . I i
1
- \
( l . l . 4 . FIGURE 13 l SEQUDYAH CONTAINMENT PRESSURE ANALYSIS CASE 3 : 1.93 Million Founds of Ice I 14ss of Power Assumed at Event Initiation !
- l. CONTAINNENT EDWER C09tPARTMENT TEMPERATURE TRANSIENT j
.26Ce5
.24t*5 i
%-._ \
.22C*5 \ , l
, g'.20C*5 g
.18C+5 -
I h \\
.16t*5 l -- .14E*5 l
.12C*$ i l
l
.10C 5 , ,
90't el ,182 105 gg4 gg 5 gg 6 TIME SEC r 33 L . 1 , l
i
~
I i FIGtJRE 14 .
' SEQUDYAH CONTAINMENT PRESSURE ANALYSIS CASE 3 1.93 Million Founds of Ice '
Loss of Power Assumed at Event Initiation i TEMPERATtJRE TRANSIENT OF ACTIVE AND INACTIVE SUMPS .
.26C*5
. tac *5
.22C*5 h.
d .20C+5 ( ,
\ INACTIVE g .19C+5 s ,
l! k s' . __,.. ..
.16C+5
\V l ,
S l N
- . tac *5 ACTIVE \-
.12C*5 l 1 l
.10C*5 l
l l 80'l et tg2 gg5 ga a gg 5 gg6 TINC SCC , 34 _m...
3 FIGURE 15 SE000YAH CONTAINMENT PRESSURE ANALYSIS CASE 3 1.93 Million Pounds of Ice
!CE MELT (LBS)
Loss of Power Assumed at Event Initiation
.8E
- 7
.1 K '?
j
.,K.,
.1el*7
/
- a g lK'? g ,
. lK'? p r
/
)
.est's
** "**gg i i,a. ies te* tel to' tlE IKCl e
35 1
i ( '
. FIGURE 16 CASE 4 1.88 Million Founds of Ice Emss o,f Power Assumed at Event Initiation SEQUDYAH CONTAINMENT PRESSURE ANALYSIS mm . .-mo .
t6. 14
- 12. g g y-- ,
p t6. 3 N
- e. \\
( 5 I h/ l
$ % ,, /
4 2. B. 105 gg4 gg5 gg6 10I 102 TIME SEC
. s l
I 36
.- , - _ . . - - . . -- , . - . - . . - - , , - --e - - ~ -
i i f
. (( ,
FIGURE 17 ; SEQUDYAH CONTAINMENT PR $$URE ANAL.YSIS CASE 4 1.88 Million Pounds of Ice , Loss of Power Assumed at Event Initiation CONTAINNENT UPPER COMPARTMDIT TEMPERATURE TRANSIENT
.26C*5 ,
l ' i .24t*5 l ;
.22C'5 ;
A . L g .20E*5 l
- (- E
. .18E*5 .
N
.16E*5 $
N
.14E*5 ;
.12t'5
' ~~
.10C+5
- l. %/
- 6 ggl . gg2 1g5 ted 105 10 TIME SEC 4
37
I (
-I FIGURE 19 SEQUDYAH CONTAINMENT PRESSURE ANALYSIS CASE 4 1.88 Million Pounds of Ice ,
Imss of Power Assumed at Event Initistion TEMPERATURE TRANSIENT OF ACTIVE AND ZNAC"f2VE SUMPS
.26C*5
.24t*5
.22C*5 l A o' .20E*5
{ .5 l . W .19E*5 4
, INACTIVE h N' ' .
.16E*5
\ '
~~"
\'
.14E*5 s .
ACTIVE '
.12E*5
.10C*5 l l l 1
101 102 gg5 gg4 105 gg 6 TIME SEC m 39
i e l l 1* * ( l 1 l i l l l i 1
- i 1
l: i (' ! FIGURE 20 l
\
SEQUDYAH CONTAINMENT PRESSURE ANALYSIS
- j. CASE 4 l 1.88 Million Pounds of Ice 1 ICE MELT (LBS)
Imss of Power Assumed at Event Initiation
. pet *7 1
l l
.lE*7 !
.16t*7
\. -
. l
,-( l I.i.L.7 3 y ' I l- g .'t K*? , j l - , , l e I - l /
.lE*? r '
/
/ '
.DK at
/ ,
. .. - - / !
l isi tee ses see ise is 6 .3 itK sKci s 5 l i 1 l i l I i .. 4 ' f t 0
~
40 . S
't.
. .~- . ~ _ _ _ _ . . _ _- _ _ _ _ _.____.____________________________.__._____._____.________._.___m
4 FIGURE 21 SEQUDYAH CONTAINMENT PRES $URE ANALYSIS (LOSS OF POWER ASSUMED AT EVENT INITI ATION) ICE MASS PARAMETRIC STUDY-l 15. > 14 15. 2 2. ('.- E 1 N x gII. w
$ N w 10.
E 9 L 8. I6 7*
.lBE.7 .19E.7 .20E.7 .2)E.7 . 22E.7 ICE MASS 4
i. 41
,,w - - . .- , , .
- l APPENDIX A
?
l MASS AND ENERGY RELEASE ANALYSIS FOR POSTULATED LOSS-OF-COOLANT ACCIDENTS i l Introduction and Backaround I This analysis presents the mass and energy releases to the containment j ! subsequent to a hypothetical loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA). The release ! ! rates are calculated for pipe failure at.three distinct locations:
- 1. Hot leg (between vessel and steam generator) l 2. Pump suction-(between steam generator and pump) 1
- 3. Cold leg (between pump and vessel)
{ During the reflood phase, these breaks have the following different characteristics. For a cold leg pipe break, all of the fluid which leaves the l core must vent through a steam generator and becomes superheated. However, l relative to breaks at the other locations, the core flooding rate (and ] therefore the rate of fluid leaving the core) is low, because all the core j vent paths include the resistance of the reactor coolant pump. For a hot leg ' pipe break, the vent path resistance is relatively low, which results in a .
'high core flooding rate, but the majority of the fluid which exits the core i bypasses the steam generators in venting to the containment. The pump suction break combines the effects of the relatively high core flooding rate, as in the hot leg break, and steam generator heat addition, as in the cold leg break. As a result, t.he pump suction break yields the highest energy flow rates during the post-blowdown period.
42 1996v 1D/111689 - (:
1 (
^
The spectrum of breaks analyzed includes the largest cold and hot leg breaks, reactor inlet and outlet, respectively, and pump suction breaks from the 2 largest 10.48 ft to 6.288 ft2 (0.6 Double Ended Pump Suction) break. Because of the phenomena of reflood as discussed above, the pump suction break l location is 'the worst case for long term containment depressurization. This j conclusion is supported by studies of smaller hot leg breaks which have been l shown on similar plants to be less severe than the double-ended hot leg. ' Cold leg breaks, however, are lower both in the blowdown peak and in the reflood ] pressure rise. Thus, an analysis of smaller pump suction breaks is representative of the spectrum of break sizes. The hot leg break is the worst case for containment i at the end of blowdown.
- 1. Blowdown - which includes the period from accident occurrence (when the reactor is at steady state operation) to the time when the total I
break flow stops. , ( l
- 2. Refill - the period of time when the lower plenum is being filled by l-accumulatorandsafetyinjectionwater. (This phase is conservatively neglected in computing mass and energy releases for containment l
evaluations.) l 3. Reflood - begins when the water from the lower plenum enters the core i and ends when the core is completely quenched. ,
- 4. Post-Reflood - describes the period following the reflood transient.
For the pump suction and cold leg breaks, a two-phase mixture exits the core, passes through the hot legs, and is superheated in the steam . generators. After the broken loop steam generator cools, the break , l- flow becomes two phase. l '. L i 43 1998v:10/111689
. ~ . _ __ . . _ _ . . _ . _
- i I
Model Descriotion Blowdown Model The model used for the blowdown transient (SATAN-VI) is the same as that used for the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) calculation. This model is described in References 1 and 2. NCAP-10325-P-A (Reference 3) provides the method by which the model is used. Refill Model ! At the end of blowdown, a large amount of water remains in the cold legs, downtomer, and lower plenum. To conservatively model the refili period for the purpose of containment mass and energy releases, this water is instantaneously transferred to the lower plenum along with sufficient i accumulator water to completely fill the lower plenum. Thus, the time required for refill is conservatively neglected. I Reflood Model The model used for the reflood transient (HREFLOOD) is a slightly modified , version of that used in the ECCS calculation. This model is described in References 1 and 4. Reference 3 describes the method by which this model is used and the modifications. Transients of the principal parameters during i l. reflood are given in Tables A-5 for the double-ended pump suction break with minimumsafetyinjection. Post-Reflood Model (Two Phase) l The transient model (FROTH), along with its method of use, is described in Reference 5. The mass and energy rates calculated by FROTH are utilized in the containment analysis to the time of containment depressurization. f b 44 1998v:1D/1116c9 .,
Long Ters (Dry Steam) After despressurization, the mass and energy release from decay is based on ANS (1979) and the following input. :
- 1. Decay heat sources considered are fission product decay and heavy j element decay of U-239 and Np-239.
1
- 2. Decay heat power from fissioning isotopes other than U-235 is assumed j to be identical to that of U-235. _
l
- 3. Fission rate is constant over the operating history of maximum power I l- level. l 1
- 4. The factor accounting for neutron capture in fission products has been taken from Table 10 of ANS (1979) (Reference 6).
' 5. Operation time before shutdown is 3 years. {
- 6. The total recoverable energy associated with one fission has been assumed to be 200 Me/ fission.
- 7. Two sigma uncertainty has been applied to the fission product decay.
1 1 Single Failure Analysis l The effect of single failure of various ECCS components on the mass and energy j releases is included in this data. Two analyses (minimum and maximum safety l- injection) bound this effect for the pump suction double-ended rupture. ] No single failure is assumed in determining the mass and energy releases for the maximum safeguards case. For the minimum safeguards case, the single i L failure assumed is the loss of one emergency diesel. This failure results in l-the loss of one pumped safety injection train. Previous sensitivity analyses
. of both maximum safeguards cases ensure that the effect of all credible single failures is bounded.
45 1998v:10/111689 ,
o ; u- ]
)
i
~
' A single failure analysis is not performed for the hot leg double-ended i rupture since the ECCS has no effect on the maximum containment pressure, which occurs at the end of blowdown. ECCS is not actuated by the end of.
blowdown. [ I Metal-Water Reaction r In the mass and energy release data presented, no Zr-H 2O reaction heat was l considered because the clad temperature did not rise high enough for the rate l of Zr-H 0 to be of any significance. 2 Kev Model Inouts The methods and assumptions used to release the various energy sources are given in Reference 3. The following items ensure that the core energy release is conservatively ( analyzed for maximum containment pressure:
- 1. Maximum expected operating temperature
- 2. Allowance in temperature for instrument error and dead band (+4'F) l
- 3. Margin in volume (1.4 percent) ;
- 4. Allowance in volume for thermal expansion (1.6 percent)
- 5. Allowance for calorimetric error (2 percent of NSSS)
- 6. Conservatively modified coefficients of heat transfer i
$ 7. Allowance in core stored energy for effect of fuel densification
- 8. Margin in core stored energy (+15)
^
46 ' 1998v:10/111689 ,
b' Additional Information Required for Confirmatory Analysis System parameters needed to perform confirmatory analyses are provided in
- Table A-6, which are consistent with current power capability parameters.
Matt and Enerav Release Data Blowdown Mass and Energy Release Data Table A-1 present the calculated mass and energy releases for the blowdown phase. The mass and energy releases for the pump suction double-ended break, given in Table A-1, terminate 29.6 seconds after the postulated accident. Since safety injection does not become effective until about the time blowdown terminates, these releases apply for both power availability assumptions with minimum safetyinjection. Reflood Mass and Energy Release Data Table A-2 presents the calculated mass and energy releases for the reflood phase. Consistent with current design base analysis assumptions, safety injection was modeled to begin at approximately the beginning of the reflood phase. Two Phase Post-Reflood Mass and Energy Release Data Table A-3 present the two phase mass and energy release data for the double-ended pump suction break case. 47 1998v:10/111689 . 1
- 1. -
)
. f.
Energy Sources l The energy inventories considered in the LOCA mass and energy release analysis l are given in Table 4. The energy sources include: i 1
.1. . Reactor coolant system )
)
- 2. Accumulators j 1
- 3. Pumpedinjection l l
- 4. Decay h?at 1
- 5. Core stored energy )
- 6. Primary metal energy
~
- 7. Secondary metal energy .
]
- 8. Steam generator secondary energy i
L
- g. Secondary transfer of energy (feedwater into and steam out of the !
steam generator secondary) ] 1 ! The inventories.are presented at the following times, as appropriate: - l i
- 1. Time zero (initial conditions) ]
)
- - 2. End of blowdown time j l
- 3. End of refill time l l
. 4. End of reflood time
; 5. End of analysis 1
48 l 1996v:10/111689 l
. _ , . .__._..m
- - _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - _ _ _______.__.m__ ___ _ _-_..
l
.(
REFERENCES i
- 1. Westinghouse ECCS Evaluation Model, February 1978 Version WCAP-9220
~I February 1978. !
- 2. F. M. Bordelon, et. al., SATAN-VI Program: Comprehensive Space-Time Dependent Analysis of Loss-of-Coolant, NCAP-6174. June 1974.
- 3. Westinghouse LOCA Mass and Energy Release Model for Containment Design - !
March 1979 Version, NCAP-10325-P-A, May 5, 1983 (Proprietary), NCAP-10326A, May 5, 1983 (Non-Proprietary). .
- 4. G. Collier, et. al., Calculational Model for Core Reflooding After a Loss f of Coolant Accident (NREFLOOD Code) NCAP-8170, June 1974.
- 5. R. M. Shepard, et. al. Mestinghouse Mass and Energy Release Data for Containment Design WCAP-8312-A, August 1975. .
- 6. "American National Standard for Decay Heat Power in Light Water Reactors",
ANSI /ANS-5.1-1979, August 29, 1979. l l' , b ! 49 1998v 1D/111689
- ~c ----r - -e--- - ---, ,,~ . . .- - ,, - -,, - , - - -,-- - -
l 1 i i l ( TABLE A-1
; BLONDOWN MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES - DOUBLE ENDED PUMP SUCTION GUILLOTINE BREAK l TIME BREAK PATH NO. 1 FLOW BREAK PATH NO. 2 FLOW THOUSAND THOUSAND SECONDS LBM/SEC BTU /SEC LBM/SEC 8TU/SEC 0.000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.100 40484.4 22003.4 21647.9 11740.2 0.300 44141.6 24203.5 23045.5 12511.0 ,
0.800 43836.2 25154.2 19028.8 10351.4 1.10 40447.2 23783.4 17419.0 9472.2 1.70 31396.6 19502.3 16223.0 8831.5 2.60 19834.3 12784.9 15574.0 8548.9 14654.6 8121.8 ! 3.10 17687.3 11420.3 4.00, 18020.2 11458.2 12987.8 7311.0 ! 4.60 18133.6 11562.8 13900.5 7863.9 ' 5.80 15906.8 10342.5 13020.1 7398.4 7.00 16258.4 10390.5 12448.9 7067.0 7.60 12317.9 8520.9 12128.8 6873.8 , 8.00 13074.6 8924.4 11949.0 6765.2 ,
; 9.00 16863.2 10965.0 11437.3 6450.5 ;
10.4 17919.5 11389.5 10490.7 5895.3 C 10.8 23486.2 14774.6 10007.3 5619.0 ' 11.2 23454.1 14609.3 9571.4 5370,0 L 12.2 20868.7 12878.0 8539.0 4795.8
- 12.6 5495.8 5951.9 8711.7 4912.3 l
p 13.2 6607.2 4478.2 8505.8 4813.3 13.8 7908.6 5225.1 8504.5 4856.1 L 14.6 5620.0 4737.0 8041.9 4685.0 : 15.8 5166.7 4292.6 6449.8 4136.8 E -17.8 3934.9 3539.5 6234.3 3092.6 18.2 3532.8 3286.8 10860.8 5326.8 , 18.4 3329.6 3251.5 5114.3 2533.2 l 20.4 2434.7 2526.9 5284.6 2172.7 . l 21,2 2087.9 2355.3 3871.4 1543.1 21.6 1901.2 2230.7 5090.8 1888.8 28.0 234.8 296.5 1605.6 394.2 l 28.6 34.5 44.2 1600.1 376.4 29.2 26.4 33.8 0.0 0.0 29.4 0.0 0.0 2229.0 502.7 29.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 l . b 50 1998v:10/111689
.m-, -,-- . . , - , , , - - - - - _ , - - - -
- l TABLE A-2
. REFLOOD MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES - DOUBLE ENDED !
PUMP SUCTION GUILLOTINE BREAK MINIMUM SAFEGUARDS TIME BREAK PATH NO. 1 FLOW BREAK FATH NO. 2 FLOW THOUSAND THOUSAND SECONDS LBM/SEC BTU /SEC LBM/SEC BTU /SEC 29.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 30.0 111.3 130.4 1980.7 171.9 30.4 100.0 117.0 1959.5 170.0 31.1 110.4 129.2 1918.1 166.4 33.7 132.7 155.4 1800.7 156.0 37.7 140.1 164.2 1761.9 152.6 36.7 154.1 180.6 1691.2 146.4 38.7 167.0 195.8 1628.2 140.9 39.7 346.5 408.3 4423.6 533.1 40.7 386.9 456.6 4887.5 622.2 41.7 .385.8 455.2 4875.1 624.4 42.7 380.6 449.1 4815.2 618.2 46.7 360,1 424.5 4573.2 591.3 48.7 350.7 413.4 4461.3 578.7
. 52.7 333.8 393.3 4255.8 555.6 ;
53.7 282.7 332.6 3417.9 487.8
,C 54.8 291.2 342.6 269.7 ,
143.9
.. 55.8 293.8 345.7 270.7 145.4 l 67.8 270.5 318.1 261.1 132.8 75.8 259.6 305.2 256.5 127.0 :
76.8 258.7 304.1 256.6 126.5-92.8 250.0 293.8 264.3 122.2 100.8 246.9 290.1 269.4 120.9
- l. 116.8 242.1 284.5 282.3 119.4 l 118.8 241.6 283.9 284.1 119.2 l
128.8 238.8 280.6 293.7 118.7 144.8' 233.5 274.2 310.1 117.9 , 176.8 217.6 255.5 344.9 116.0 194.8 205.8 241.5 364.8 114.9
.196.8 204.3 239.8 366.9 114.8 224.8 181.2 212.5 399.8 113.4 232.8 173.9 203.9 411.1 113.6 234.8 171.9 201.6 414.0 113.7 250.8 155.7 182.5 436.7 114.1 254.8 151.4 177.4 442.6 114.3 i -(
1998vi10/111689
l TABLE A-3
' POST REFLOOD MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES - DOUBLE ENDED i i
PUMP SUCTION GUILLOTINE BREAK MINIMUM SAFEGUARDS i TIME BREAK PATH NO. 1 FLOH 8REAK PATH NO. 2 FLON THOUSAND THOUSAND l SECONDS LBM/SEC 8TU/SEC L8M/SEC BTU /SEC l
! 254.8 157.6 193.7 497.6 116.5 l l- 259.8 157.1 193.0 498.1 116.5 I 264.8 156.6 192.4 498.6 116.5 1 294.8 153.4 188.4 501.8 116.5 299.8 153.6 188.7 501.6 116.4 i 344.8 148.7 182.6 .506.5 116.5 {
349.8 148.8 182.8 506.4 116.4 369.8
)
146.6 180.1 508.6 116.4 ! 374.8 120.1 147.5 535.1 116.7 379.8' 119.7 147.1 535.5 116.7 , 429.8 113.2 139.1 542.0 117.2 l 449.8 110.9 136.3 544.3 117.3 454.8 110.7 136.0 544.5 117.2 i 524.8 101.0 124.0 554.2 118.0 529.8 100.8 123.8 554.4 118.0 534.8 130.5 160.3 524.8 .116.7
-( 574.8 126.0 154.8 529.2 116.8 L .' 584.8 125.2 153.8 530.0 116.8 639.8 118.3 145.3 536.9 117.1 j 659.8 115.8 142.3 539.4 117.3 i
-664.8 115.5 141.9 539.7 117.2 1 L 689.8 112.2 137.9 543.0 117.4 l
724.8 106.9 131.3 548.3 117.8 734.8 105.8 130.0 549.4 117.9 1 774.8 99.6 122.3 555.6 118.3 l l 794.8 96.2 118.1 559.1 118.6 ; I 889.8- 95.4 117.2 559.8 116.8 1690.0 95.4 117.2 559.8 116.8 1691.0 97.2 119.3 412.3 116.8 1979.8 97.2 119.3 412.3 116.8 1979.9 67.5 82.4 414.1 117.5 2313.1 67.1 77.2 414.5 47.2
\
( 1998v:10/111689
i l ( 148LE A-4 l
)
DOUBLE-ENDED F W $UCTION GUILLOTINE GREAK (LO$$ OF OFF$1TE POWER AT EVENT INITIATION) MA$$ BALANCE . TIME ($ECONOS) 0.00 29.60 29.60 254.78 1984.80 2313.05 " i MAS $ (THOUSAND LBM) INITIAL IN RC$ AND ACC 762.85 762.85 7ft.85 762.85 762.85 762.85 ADDED MA$$ PUMPED IN1ECTION 0.00 0.00 0.00 143.24 1226.41 1364.50 TOTAL ADDED 0.00 0.00 0.00 143.24 1226.41 1364.50 ,
"* TOTAL AVAILABLE "* 762.85 762.85 762.85 906.09 1989.26 2147.35 :
O!$TRIBUTION REACTOR COOLANT 533.06 57.26 70.96 143.08 143.08 143.08 ACCUPULATOR 229.79 144.44 130.74 0.00 0.00 0.00 ! L TOTAL CONTENTS 762.85-201.71 201.71 143.08 143.08 143.08 ; l EFFLUENT BREAK FLOW 0.0 561.13 561.13 762.99 1846.17 2004.25
. ECC$ $ PILL 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 TOTAL EFFLUENT 0.00 561.13 561.13 762.99 1846.17 2004.25
"" TOTAL ACCOUNTABLE "* 762.85 762.84 762.84 906.08 1989.25 2147.33 1
l t s 4 k 1998v:10/111689
o I i TABLE A-4 (Continued) ; l < s
, e DOUBLE-ENDED PUMP $UCTION GUILLOTINE BREAK
* (LOS5 0F 0FF5tTE POWER AT EVENT INITIATION) 1 ENERGY 8ALANCE l TIME (SECONOS) 0.00 29.60 29.60 254.78 1984.80 2313.05 .!
l -) ENERGY (MILLION BTU) INITIAL ENERGY IN RCS, ACC, $ GEN 848.91 848.91 848.9) 848.9) '$48.91 848.91 ) I s PUMPED IN.1ECTION 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.46 94.11 110.77 ADDED ENERGY C,ECAY HEAT 0.00 13.28 13.28. 38.86 166.59 186.20 NEAT FROM SECONDAR 0.00 -6.45 -4.45 -6.45 8.14 8.14 - TOTAL ADDED 0.00 6.83 6.83 42.87 268.85 305.12 ;
"* TOTAL AVAILABLE
"" 848.9) 855.74 855.74 891.78 1117.76 1154.03 l I
REACTOR COOLANT 307.96 11.70 12.91 32.78 32.78 32.78 i 0!$TRIBUTION 3
' 0.00 0.00 l ACCUPtJLATOR 15.99 10.05 8.84 0.00 CORE STORED 27.01 10.48 10.48 4.31 3.88 3.77 i PRIMARY METAL 158.29 147.45 147.45 126.40 66.67 60.30 SECONDARY METAL 93.61 91.84 91.84 82.09 45.26 39.30 .
246.05 245.00 245.00 214.94 125.08 110.08 STEAM GENERATOR 848.9) 516.52 016.52 460.52 273.67 246.23 TOTAL CONIENTS EFFLUENT BREAK FLOW 0.0 339.23 339.23 433.63 846.46 910.17 , 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 ECC$ $ PILL TOTAL EFFLUENT 0.00 339.23 339.23 433.63 846.46 910.17 ;
*" TOTAL ACCOUNTABLE
"* 848.91 855.75 855.75 P94.15 1120.12 1156.39 e
L 54 1998v:10/111689
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' TABLE A-5 00U8LE ENDEO PUPF SUCTION GUILLOTINE BREAK'- MINIfRM SAFEGUARDS 00ldNC0pER FL0tf INJECTION TIME FLOODING CARRYOVER CORE HEIGHT HEIGHT FRACTION TOTAL- ACCUMULATOR SPILL ENTHALPY TEMP RATE FRACTION 8TU/L8M IN/SEC FT FT (POUNDS MASS PER SECONO)
SECONOS DEGREE F 0.250 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.00 29.6 204.1 0.000 0.000 0.00 0.00 1.000 7668.4 7320.7 0.0 86.79 30.1 201.5 21.773 0.000 0.51 0.50 1/MO 7946.5' 7298.8 0.0 86.78 200.7 22.347 0.000 0.70 0.50 30.2 7255.6 0.0 86.78 0.000 1.05 0.53 1.000 7903.4 30.4 199.3 19.291 86.76 1.28 0.94 L000 7814.3 7166.3 0.0 30.7 198.5 1.822 0.084 86.75 1.58 0.831 7733.1 7084.9 0.0 31.1 198.6 3.493 'O.147 1.35 0.643 7555.0 6906.5 0.0 86.72 32.0 198.7 2.289 0.316 1.50 3.25 0.521 7094.0 6444.8 0.0 85.63 34.7 199.9 1.988 0.530 1.76 8.12 0.477 6618.4 5968.4 0.0 86.53-201.5 2.109 0.636 2.00 13.98 38.1 5042.0 0.0 86.40 0.684 2.21 15.99 0.622 5645.7 40.7 202.3 3.549
$ 202.9 3.384 0.707 2.38 16.00- 0.621 5459.0 4853.7 0.0 86.34 42.7 4732.3 0.0 86.30 0.718 2.50 16.00 0.619 5399.5 44.2 203.5 ').274 0.0 86.11 3.00 16.00 0.610 4853.2 4237.7-51.5 206.7 2.926 0.743 85.57
'O.567 38/5.8 3245.3 0.0 53.7 207.8 2.549 0.748 3.14- - 16.00 0.586 627.4 0.0 0.0 73.06 208.3 2.618 0.7 48 - 3.19 15.99 54.8 628.2 0.0 0.0 -73.06 2.519 0.754 3.50 15.84 0.584 60.6 211.6 0.0 0.0 73.06 0.760 4.00 15.71 0.579 631.3 70.7 218.6 2.367 0.0 73.06 . ,
4.51 15.70 0.577 633.1 0.0 81.8 227.0 2.263- 0.766 73.06 15.74 0.578 633.9 0.0 0.0 93.3 234.8 2.194 0.771 5.00. 73.06 15.81 0.580 634.6 0.0 0.0 106.8 242.2 2.130 0.777 5.55 0.582 635.0 0.0 0.0 73.06 118.4 247.4 2.083 0.781 6.00 15.87 0.584 635.5 0.0 0.0 73.06 252.7 2.026 0.786 6.54 15.93 132.8 636.2 0.0 0.0 73.06 1.%9 0.791 7.00 15.97 0.586 146.0 256.7 0.00 0.0 .'73.06 0.796 7.56 15.99 0.587 637.2 162.8 260.8 1.888 73.06 16.00 0.586 638.4 0.0 0.0 177.0 263.6 1.812 0.801 8.00 0.584 640.1 0.0 0.0 73.06 265.3 1.714 0.805 8.51 16.00 194.8 641.7 0.0 0.0 73.06 1.638 0.804 8.90 16.00 0.579 208.8 264.2 0.0 0.0 73.06 0.804 9.00 16.00 0.578 642.2 212.8 264.1 1.615 0.0 73.06 9.51 16.00 0.567 644.6 0.0 232.8 265.2 1.485 0.808 73.06 0.548 647.6 0.0 0.0 - 264.7 1.338 0.809 10.00 16.00 254.8
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'9 \' . TABLE A-6' o 1 SYST:IH PARAMETERS -
4: ,, u. 1 : DESIGN i PLANT N00EL. 4 loop. 12 ft c. ore ,; CORE POWER 3491.5 MHt i
" CORE INLET TEMPERATURE 550.7'F 4
' STEAM' PRESSURE 857 PSI s- 1 l I L . ASSUMED INITIAL CONTAINMENT 26.7 PSIA 11 BACK PRESSURE 'l
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- i APPENDIX'B l CONTAINHENT-PRESSURE CALCULATION 4
-ICE MASS - 2.1-MILLION POUNDS
. LOSS OF POWER AT EVENT INITIATION I
1 w I L g. x 4--
-1
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1998v:1D/112289 57 O'.-' L___________________.________________
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' iW l) SQN-6 o Choked-Flow Characteristics ha. The data in Figure 6.2.1-16 lllustrate the behavior of mass flow rate as > I
- a function of upstream and downstream pressures, including the effects of flow choking. The upper plot shows mass flow rate as a function of-up- !
l stream pressure for various assumed values of-downstream pressure. For zero back: pressure (P. 0), the entire curve represents choked flow conditions with'the flow rate approximately proportional to upstream i pressure, Pu. -For higher back pressure, the flow rates are lower until
-the upstream pressure is high enough to provide choked flow. After the- '
~1ncrease in upstream pressure is sufficient to provide flow choking, further increases in upstream pressure cause increases in mass flow rate ,
along the curve for P. . O. The key point in this tilustration is that
. flow rate continues to increase with increasing upstream pressure, even after flow choking conditions have been reached. Thus choking does not represent a threshold beyond which dramatically sharper increases in compartment pressures could be expected because of itmitations on flow relief to adjacent compartments.
The phenomemon of flow choking is more frequently explained by assuming a fixed upstream pressure and examining the dependence of. flow rate with
'c respect to decreasing downstream pressure. This approach.is illustrated .
for an. assumed upstream pressure of 30 psia as shown in the upper plot with the results plotted vs. downstream pressere in the lower plot. For ,
~
flued upstream condttions, flow choking represents an upper limit flow 7('< - ' rate beyond which further decreases in back pressure will not produce any
- increase in mass flow rate.
6.2.1'3.4 Containment Pressure Transient - Lono Term Analysis Introduction'
-Early in the-ice condenser development _ program-It was recognized that '
there was a need for computer modeling of Ice condenser containment performance. It was realized that the model would have to have capa- ; bilities comparable to those of the dry containment (COCO) model. These m capabilities would permit the model to be used to solve problems of containment design and optimize the containment and safeguards systems. This has been accomplished in the development of the LOTIC code. (See , Reference 18). -Another computer code, MONSTER, with capabilities comparable to those of the LOTIC code.has been developed to solve similar 6 containment design problems. (See Reference 62.) Method of Solution The model of the containment for the LOTIC computer code consists of five distinct control volumes, the upper compartment, the lower compartment, the portion of the ice bed from which the ice has melted, the ' portion of the ice bed containing unmelted ice, and the deaa ended compartment. The ice condenser control volume with unmelted and melted ice is further subdivided into stx subcompartments to allow for maldistribution of break l flow to the ice bed. 6.2-15 0058F/COC4 58
l" a 1
.SQN-6 l
f The conditions in these compartments are obtained as a function of time
', L by;the use of fundamental equations solved through numerical techniques.
Those equations are solved for three distinct phases in. time. Each phase corresponds to a distinct physical characteristic of the problem. Each of:these-phases has a unique set of simplifying assumptions based on test results from the Ice condenser test facility. These phases are the blowdown period, the depressurization period, and the long term period.
-Blowdown Period ,
This' phase coincides with the blowdown of the reactor coolant system.- During this phase no attempt is made to calculate the pressure, flow, and temperature translents in the containment in the LOTIC code. Instead, this complicated analysis is accomplished with the TMD code, a code created specifically for this short term analysis (discussed in
- 6. 2._1. 3. 3 ) . - The pressure and temperatures in the containment are held constant during this phase. - Input values are determined from TH0 analyses and ccepression ratio calculations._ Physically, tests at the ice _ condenser Waltz Mill Test facility have shown that this phase
- represents that period of time in which the lower compartment air and a
_' portion of the Ice condenser air are displaced and compressed into the
. upper compartment and the remainder of the ice condenser. (The initial pre-blowdown atmosphere in the dead ended compartment is retained at that time.) The code represents this phenomenon through the use of an input value for the fraction of the ice bed which retains air during this phase. This fraction, determined from test data, is also used to estabitsh the volumes of the two ice condenser control volumes, which are held constant during this phase.
.{. The temperatures in the upper and'1ower compartments are calculated from
-the input pressure. The portions.of the containment which are primarily air-filled, t.e., the dead ended compartment and a portion of the ice bed, are assumed to be at upper compartment temperature during this phase.- Deck-leakage considerations resulted in consideration of the upper compartment atmosphere as saturated, at this temperature.
Deoressurization period This phase of the analysis corresponds to the period of time between the end of blowdown and the establishment of a circulation' flow between the control volumes. During this phase, the noncondensable nitrogen blowdown from the accumulator occurs, the decay heat bolloff is initiated, and the engineered safeguards come into operation. Maximum decay heat bolloff is achieved by assuming that the safety injection system is disabled to the-point that only en'ough water is delivered to the core to replace the water boiled, and the remaining safety injection is spilled to the sump, (although varying degrees of SIS effectiveness can be simult.ted). The engineered safeguards which are initiated in this phase are the return fan, the cafety injection system, and the spray system. The return fan forces upper compartment air through the dead ended compartments and into $ the lower compartner.t atmosphere. During this phase the spray systems i and safety injection system take water from the refueling water storage r 1 6.2-16 005BF/COC4
)
59 .
- i___..
m , y n: y; n: SQN-6 tank and pump it into the containment, with the spray flow passing through the spray heat exchanger. The models for the spray system and heat exchangers are discussed in Subparagraph 6.2.1.3.4. At the beginning of.this phase the blowdown ice melt is computed using the blowdown energy. This result is used to compute the actual volume of-the melted out portion of the Ice condenser, which.ls used to change the ice condenser volumes from the compressed value associated with the air displacement in- the blowdown phase. -to.the actual value computed from the ice melt. . As soon as the return fan is started, the dead ended compartment begins to undergo a conversion to upper compartment atmosphere. This continues until all the dead ended compartment 6 atmosphere has been converted to upper compartment. It is also possible I to select an input option in the code such that the dead ended
' compartment-is always treated s,s upper compartment volume.
As soon as return fan flow is initiated, the lower compartment begins to fill with an air / steam mixture composed of the upper / dead ended b compartment air from the fan flow and decay heat bolloff steam..This - steam air mixture displaces the previous steam atmosphere of the lower. compartment through the ice bed, like the motion of -a piston. As this occurs the code-calculates the conditions in the upper and lower compartment from the compartment conditions and the spray and flow characteristics. This phase of the analysis ends when the alr/ steam mixture fills both the lower compartment and the melted out portion of the' ice bed. { l.ong' Term This phase of the analysis begins as soon as the circulation of air through the containment has been established and continues until the problem is terminated. The major occurrences during this phase are recirculation and ice meltout. Recirculation occurs when the refueling water storage tank has reached its low level and the level in the 6 containment sump has reached high level. At this time the safety l injection and spray system begin drawing from the active sump instead of the refueling water storage tank (the two sump model is discussed in Sub-paragraph 6.2.1.3.4).. The spray system flow continues to be routed through the spray heat enchanger during this period, and the safety injection and residual spray flows are routed through the residual heat
-exchanger.
Meltout occurs when there is no longer enough ice in the ice bed to prevent steam from flowing directly from the lower compartment to the upper compartment. As long as there is more than a foot of ice in the
. ice compartment, the temperatures in the two Ice compartment control v olumes remain at different constant values which were determined from Waltz Mill test data. When the ice in a subcompartment of the ice bed volume is gone, the subcompartment is assumed to contain lower compartment atnesphere. (Due to maldistribution which is input to the code, the sub-compartments may melt in a sequenced manner rather than simultaneously.) During the long term phase the fan flow from the upper
(\ compartment and the flow out of the lower compartment are assumed to be at the respective compartment temperatures. 6.2-17 005BF/COC4 60 m
c , l , SQL6 Primary Assumotlons The most'significant simplification of the problem 15 the assumption that , the total pressure in the containment is uniform. This assumption is
' justified by the fact that after the initial blowdown of the reactor coolant system, the remaining mass and energy released from this system into the containment are small and very slowly changing. The resulting flow rates between the control volumes will also be relatively small.
These small< flow rates then are unable to maintain significant pressure
^
T differences between the compartments. In the control volumes, which are always assumed to be saturated, steam and air are assumed to be uniformly mixed and at the control volume temperature.. When the air return fan is in operation, the fan flow and the reactor-coolant system bolloff are mixed before entering the lower compartment. The-air is considered a perfect gas, and the thermodynamic properties of steam are taken from the ASME steam table (1975 version). , 6 The: condensation of steam is assumed to take place in a condensing node which-is located, for the purpose of calculation, between the two control o volumes in the ice condenser compartment. The exit temperature of the air leaving this node is set equal to the temperature of the ice filled control-volume of the ice storage compartment. Lower compartment exit temperature is used if the ice bed section is melted. Comoression Ratio Analysts As blowdown continues following the initial pressure peak from a double
-ended cold leg break, the pressure in the lower compartment again increases.-reaching a peak at or before the end of blowdown. The pressure in the upper compartment continues-to rise from beginning of s blowdown and reaches a peak which ts approximately equal to the lower compartment pressure. After blowdown is complete, the steam in the Icwer compartment continues to flow through the doors into the ice bed compartment.and is condensed.
The primary factor in producing this upper containment pressure peak and therefore, in determining design pressure, is the displacement of air - from the lower compartment into the upper containment. The ice condenser quite effectively performs its function of condensing virtually all the steam that enters the ice beds. Essentially, the only source of steam entering the upper containment is from leakage through the drain holes and other leakage.around crack openings in hatches in the operating deck separating the lower and upper portions of the containment building. A method of analysis of the compression peak pressure was developed based
.on the results of full-scale section tests. This method consists of the calculation of the air mass compression ratto, the polytropic exponent for the compression process, and the effect of steam bypass through the operating deck on this compression.
6.2-18 005BF/COC4 61 .
1 y, *
' . .5 nc.'
-" . SON-6
.- 7.16 The compression peak' pressure in the upper containment for the Sequoyah- i plant design is calculated to be psig (for an initial. air pressure of
. 0.3 psig). This compression pressure includes the effect of a pressure i increase _of 0.4 ps) from steam bypass and also for the effects of the ,
dead-ended volumes. . The nitrogen partial pressure from the accumulators is not included since this nitrogen.ls not added to the containment until
-after the compression peak pressure has been reduced, which is after ,
-blowdown is completed. This nitrogen is considered in the analysts of .
~
pressure decay following blowdown as presented in the long. term. performance analysis using the LOTIC code. In the following sections, a. ,
. discussion of the major parameters affecting the compression peak will be discussed. Specifically they are: air compression, steam bypass, t blowdown rate and blowdown energy.
Air Comoression Process Description , The volumes of the various containment compartments determine directly i the att volume compression ratio. This is basically the ratio of the [_ total-active containment air volume to the compressed air volume during L blowdown'and'Is definedlin' detail In equation (2) of Subparagraph- 6- ! L' 6.2.1.3.4. During blowcown air-1s displaced from the lower compartment and compressed into the ice condenser beds and into the upper containment above the operating deck. It is this air compression process which
- primarily determines the peak in-containment pressure, following the l6' l' Initial' blowdown release. A peak compression pressure of *:2 psig is
'(-
- based on the Sequoyah Plant design compartment volumes shown in Table :
- 6.2.1-6.
Methods of Calculation and Results Full Scale Section Tests The actual Waltz Mill test compression ratios were found by performing air mass balances before the blowdown and at the time of the compression peak pressure, using the results of three.specjal full-scale section
. tests. These three tests were conducted with an energy input '
representative of the plant design. , In the calculation of the mass balance for the ice condenser, the compartment is divided into two sub-volumes; one volume representing the , flow channels and one volume representing the' ice baskets. The flow 3 channel volume is further divided into four sub-volumes, and the partial H air pressure and' mass in each sub-volume is found from thermocouple readings that the air is saturated with steam at the measured temper-ature. From these results, the average temperature of the air in the ice condenser compartment is found, and the volume occupied by the air at the I total condenser pressure is found from the equation of state as follows: L V.,.M.>R.T., (1)
. Po C
6.2-19 0058F/COC4 62 - w
- _ - - - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - - _ . _ . - - . - - - - - _ - _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ . _ _ - _ - _ - _ =
SQN -
.+
. (;
. where:' '
V. , - Volune of Ice condenser occupied by air (f t')' ' ( n M. , = Mass of air in.lce condenser compartment (Ib) T. , - Average temperature of air in Ice condenser ('F) P, m' Total' ice condenser pressure (Ib/ft') ! J
.The partial pressure and mass of air in the;1ower compartment are found .
by averaging the temperatures Indicated by the thermocouples located in that compartment'and assuming saturation conditions. For these three tests. It was found that the partial pressure, and hence the mass of air in the lower compartment, was zero at the time of the compression peak _ pressure. f n The actual Waltz Mill test compression ratto is then found from the l following:' C, = V , + V, + V , (2)~ V 3 + V.:,- ' where: Vi . Lower-compartment volume (ft')
.U V, = Ice condenser compartment volume (ft')
^ ,
V = , Upper compartment volume (f t') The polytopic exponent for these tests is then found from.the measured ' compression pressure and the compression ratto calculated above. Also considered is the pressure increase that results from the leakage of
- steam through:the deck into the upper compartment.
' The compression peak pressure in the upper compartment for the tests or ?
containment design is then given by-P - P. (C,)" + AP.... (3)
~ where:
Po = initial pressure (psla) P~ = Compression peak pressure (psla) C, = Volume compression ratio n = polytropic esponent
.AP.... .
Pressure increase caused by deck leakage (psi) 6.2-20 0058F/COC4 63
t
.SQN-6
' Using the method of calculation described above, the compression ratio is calculated for the.three full-scale section tests. From the results of
~
'., 'the air mass = balances; it was found that alr occupied 0.645 of the ice condenser compartment volume at the time of peak compression, or V. , = 0.645.V, (4)
The. final compression volume includes the volume of the upper compartment as well as part of,the volume of air in the ice condenser. The results-of the full-scale section tests (Figure 6.2.1.-17) show a variation in steam partial pressure from 100% near the bottom of the ice condenser to essentially zero near the top. The thermocouples and pressure detectors
. confirm that at the time-when the compression peak pressure is reached
' steam occupies less than half of the volume of the-ice condenser. The analytical model used in defining the containment pressure peak uses upper compartment volume plus 64.5 percent of the ice condenser air volumes as the final-volume. This 64.5% value was determined from appropriate test results.
- The calculated volume compression ratios are shown in Figure 6.2.1-18, along with the compression peak pressures-for these tests.. The compression peak pressure is determined from the measured pressure, after accounting for the deck leakage contribution. From the results shown in Figure 6.2.1-18, the' polytropic exponent for these tests.ls found to be
-1.13.
{ plant Case For the Sequoyah design, the volume compression ratto, not including the 6 upper plenum as part of the. ice condenser and.not accounting for dead-ended volume effect, is calculated using Equation 2 and Table 6.2.1-6. C; = - ^ :-3 .::^ (5)
'^ '^^
698,000 + 0.645 xs( llo > SLO l.SN The peak compression pressure, based on an initial containment pressure of 15.0 psia, is then given by Equation 3 as: 1.3'Pf P = 15.0 (2::23.)' + 0.4 2h28 *
*1.1 B P = **-* psia or Mpsig This peak compression pressure includes a pressure increase of 0.4 psi from steam bypass through the deck (see Subparagraph 6.2.1.3.5). The
~
effect of the dead-ended compartment volumes is to trap additional air and thus reduce the compression ratto and the above calculated peak pressure. , 6.2-21 0058F/COC4 64
_ . ~ . . ~_. _ . . _ __ _ _ __ _ _ __
)
SQN-6
-. Sensitivity'To Blowdown Enerav ,
The sensitivity of .the upper and lower compartment peak pressure versus
. blowdown rate as measured.from the-1974 Waltz Mill Tests is shown in *
( Figure 6.2.1 19.. This figure shows the magnitude of the peak pressure versus the amount of energy released in-terms of percentage of RCS energy release rate. Percent energy blowdown rate was selected for the plot
- because energy. flow rate more directly relates to volume flow rate and
' therefore pressure. There are two important effects to. note from the
' peak-upper compartment pressure versus blowdowi rate. One, the magnitude of the final peak pressure in the upper compartment is low-(about 9 psig) for.the plant design DECL blowdown rate; two, even an increase in thic rate up to 141 percent of the blowdown energy rate produces only a small increase.in the magnitude'of this peak pressure (about 1 psi). The major factor setting the-peak pressure reached in the upper compartment is the
~
compression of alr displaced by steam from the lower compartment 1nto the
~
p L upper compartment. -'The lower compartment initial peak pressure shows a L relatively low peak pressure of 12.9 psig for the design basis DECL , blowdown. rate, and even a-substantial increase in blowdown energy rate
~
- r. .
(141 percent reference-initial DECL) would cause an increase in initial t peak pressure of.only 3 psi. The. peak pressure in the lower compartment is.due.mainly. to flow resistance caused by displacement of air from the lower compartment into the upper compartment. !' /, For a'further discussion, see Section 5 of Reference 21. h Containment Pressure Calculation The following are the major input assumptions 'used to calculate the ' containment transients for the pump suction pipe rupture cases with the steam generators considered as an active. heat source for the Sequoyah Nuclear l Station Containment: l '. Minimum containment safeguards are employed, in all calculations, e.g., one'of two spray pumps and one of two spray heat exchangers; - one of two RHR pumps and one of two air recirculation fans.
. 2. Initial-ice weight in the Ice condenser as specified in Table 6.2.1-1. - 6 3.. The Blowdown and Reflood mass and energy releases calculational model's descr1 bed in Reference M :tfr.
4.- Blowdown and post-blowdown Ice condenser drain temperature of 190*F and 130*F were.used. (These numbers are based on the long-term Haltz 6 M111 tce condenser test data described in Reference 21).
- 5. Nitrogen from the accumulators in the amount of 5942 lbs. is included
- in the calculations.
- 6. The air recirculation fan is assumed to be effective, approximately 10 minutes after the transient is initiated.
6.2-22 0058F/COC4 65 ,
, s ,
'. 6 l ; f . ['t .:
u c' , . 6 f v'I , , SON Post Reflood mass and energy described in Section 6.2.1.3.6 were 7. m,. used. 4 1 8.- Even distribution of steam flow into the ice bed is assumed. 'l
- 9. No Ice condenser bypass is assumed. (This assumption depletes the ice in the shortest time and is thus conservative.)
~
- 10. !The' initial conditions in the containment are a temperature ofL100*F in-the <1ower and dead-ended volumes,'a temperature of 15'r in the :)
. ice condenser, and a temperature of 85'F in the upper volume. A111 '
- volumes are at a pressure of 0.3 psig and a 10% relative humidity, except for the ice condenser which is at a 100% relative humidity. 'I
- 11. The pump flows vs. time given in Table 6.2.1-7.were used.
-12. A residual spray of 2000 gpm is assumed at I hour into the ,
accident. ' Residual heat removal pump and spray pump take suction t from the sump, af ter *tte: seconds, and :Stht:. seconds respectively. , IMI. .3163
- 13. Containment structural heat sinks are assumed with conservatively i H, low heat transfer rates, o
l
; 14. T eration of one containment spray heat exchanger *
- t:: t;x IO*) mad. one containment RHR heat exchanger
"' A
~.
.~ 2.9 ~
M **~ hed
- (UA = lt::32 x 10') L-s ---.. - u m..m J t nucl eaa. com romt coo l'd'/ barns assauc d. ;.
L . s; :I.YCL su.km9s u. (un a f 7 9 3 s o e ' st @. ~ *F) %s L. ' 15. The normalized decay heat wRich is used to calculate mass and energy , ' : releases after the-steam generator equilibrates is presented in i
- Tabl e ! 6.2.1-8.
With-these- assumptions, the heat removal capability of 'the Sequoyah Plant Is sufficient to absorb the energy releases and still keep the maximum
- calculated pressure below design. The long-term transients trere calculated by the I. OTIC computer code. -
The following plots have been provided: l ' Figure 6.2.1-20 Containment Pressure Transient -
- q - : : -7' 1::= = t = ' = = - : : - W ";= : = ' 'z :: '= = = :tc Figure 6.2.1-22 -' Temperature Transient of the Active Sump and Inactive Sump .
Figure 6.2.1-2 F Ice Melt versus Time ? ,
< The following tables have also been provided:
Table 6.2.1-9 Energy tfntil end of reflood Table 6.2.1-10 Energy accounting at time of ice melt Table 6.2.1-11 Energy accounting at time of peak pressure Ih!6%I O C* T'b'"i Fipe 4.2..l-2.1a. 7.Membre. Trmsicut Ga. Vff
- r L + u. , . - ,.,n. -s,.a c.. -wa 6.2-23 0058F/COC4 ,
66
f
.. INSERT A.
1 These tables provide an accounting for the heat removal of' the major
-' systems taken at.four particular slices of time pertaining to the calculated = containment transient.
The selected periods can be 1 correlated to the major time frames of the. analysis; the blowdown phase, the reflood phase,.the time when ice bed moltout-occurs and the time of the calculated peak containment pressure. 3 specifically,.these tables reflect the integrated heat removed by the-ice', the structural ~ heat sinks, and the RNR and Containment Spray Heat-
- Exchangers. Additionally, the tables include the. energy content of the' sump and the amount of ice melted at the respective. times. ,
}
a (
'h ti-e
.'O .
( 67
y a SQN-6
; p.1 14.8
.(
The peak- pressure was calculated to be 22::fts. psig (2$=1 psia) occurring 6 i
- _at approximately 380Ct seconds. An energy accounting at:26de seconds, is ,
,givenin1 Table 6.2.1-lh q,gg c Rs8 4' ~
Parametric studies which varied the ice mass, the ultimate heat sink , (i.e..ERCW)- temperature, and the emergency raw cooling water flow rates !
;(ERCW).have been performed. The results of ice mass parametric study which were calculated with the LOTIC computer code are provided in Figure ,
6.2.1-24.- The parametric studies of the ultimate heat sink temperature
-and ERCH flow rates were performed uttllzing the NONSTER computer code.
The MONSTER model was benchmarked against the base case LOTIC FSAR analysis. The peak containment pressure calculated by the MONSTER base . case analysis was within 21 of ~ the LOTIC base case with MONSTER being
- conservatively higher.
The parametric-analysis on ultimate heat sink temperature showed that an ,; increase of 0.14 pst Lin containment peak pressure occurs for a increase from 83*F to 85'F in:the ultimate heat sink temperature, , The analysis to quantify the'effect of a reduction in the ERCW flow rate l from the FSAR base case required adjustments to the heat exchanger duties
- i. - of the containment spray and component cooling heat exchangers. The g adjustments to the duties also corrected 4-conservative but erroneous modeling. assumption in the LOTIC base case analysis and accounted for different tube plugging percentages. .All heat exchangers were modeled as r
. strictly counterflow heat exchangers with the following duties and tube
- (-
( plugging; percentages; containment spray - 2.932 X '10* btu /hr .*F (7.5% tubes plugged) and component cooling - 2.793 X 10* btu /hr *F (14.5%
' ~
tubes plugged). The duty of the residual heat removal heat exchanger was changed'to 1.402 X 10' btu /hr *F to adjust for the strictly wcountercurrent. modeling. ERCW flow rates to the containment spray heat _. exchanger and to t_he component cooling heat exchanger were reduced from
~ Table 6.2.1-l~ values to 3546 gpm and 3996 gpm respectively. The net p "effect of changes to the ERCH flow rate and heat exchangers was to i wincrease containment pressure by 0.05 psi.
E
?.3=orst case analysis utilizing the most: conservative ERCW' flow rate, p W heats xchanger e adjustments, and an 85'F ERCW temperature resulted in a S peak; containment pressure of 11.50 psi. This peak pressure is 0.5 pst W lest than the containment design pressure and provides assurance that
' 13ecreased 'ERCH flow rates and increased ERCH temperatures can be py g ry ed without exceeding the containment design pressure.
Structural Heat Removal
._ Pr.ovision is made-in the containment pressure analysis for heat storage in interior and exterior walls. Each wall is divided into number of S- nodes. For each node, a conservation of energy equation expressed in finite difference form accounts for transient conduction into and out of the node and temperature rise of the node. Table ; i 2 is a summary of the containment structural heat sinks used in the analysis including the material property data used.
; , 4.1. ( - 5 0 I.
6.2-24 0058F/COC4 68
Iw
~
f SQN
-The heat-transfer coefficient to the containment structure,in the lower
-and ice condenser compartments is calculated by the code based primarily.
# '. : in the work of.Tagamt. From this work, it was-determined that the value of the heat transfer coefficient increases parabolica11y to a peak value y at the end of blowdown and then decreased exponentially to a stagnation heat transfer coefficient which is a function of. steam to air weight
. ratio.. When applying the Tagant correlations, a conservative limit was placed on the lower compartment stagnant heat transfer coefficients.
They were:11mited to a steam / alt ratto of 1.4 according,to the Tagami correlation.-. The imposition of this Ilmitation is to restrict the use of the Tagaai' correlation within the test range of steam / alt ratios where-the correlation was derived. . i Figure 6.2.1-25 sis a' plot of the heat removal rate of one RHR spray pump and one containment spray pump as a function of water temperature and containment atmosphere temperature. 6.2.1.3.5 ' Effect of Steam Bypass
?The sensitivity of the compression peak pressure to' deck bypass is shown in Figure 6.2.1-26, which shows that an increase in deck bypass area of 50 percent would cause an increase of about 0.2 psi in final peak compression pressure. Also, it is important to note that the plant final t : peak compression pressure of:t:2. ig already includes a contribution of 0.4 psi from the plant deck bypas area of 5 ft'.
2 7.18
- This effect of deck leakage on upper containment pressure has been vert-fled-by-a series of four special, full-scale section tests. These tests were a11' identical except different size deck-leakage areas were used.
The results of these tests are given in Figure 6.2.1-27 which includes
.two curves of. test results. Each curve shows the difference in upper
. compartment pressure between one. test and another resulting from a difference'in deck leakage area. One curve shows the increase in upper compartment pressure at the end of the boiler blowdown (after the compression peak pressure, at about 50 seconds in these tests), and the second curve shows the increase in upper compartment peak pressure (at' about.10 seconds in these tests). It should be noted that the pressure at the end of the blowdown is less than the peak compression ratio
-pressure occurring ct about 10 seconds for reference blowdown test.
The containment. pressure increase due to deck leakage is directly proportional to'the. total amount of steam leakage into the upper compartment, and the amount of this steam leakage is, in turn, propprtional to the amount of steam released from the boiler, less the inventory of steam remaining in the lower compartment. Notably, the
', e increase in upper _ compartment compression peak pressure is substantially
'less than the upper compartment pressure increase at the end of blowdown, because the peak compression pressure occurs before the boiler has released all of its energy, and measured increase in peak compression
, pressure due to increased deck leakage, is proportionately reduced. For the case of the plant design, the final peak compression pressure is k-6.2-25 0058F/COC4 69 1
,p-
- c. ,4, : .
l
.SQN-6
- 4 3 ,
.p,. ( > 62. l rde1 An. Frank M..' SATANV. WCAP-7750,'"A Computer Space Time pendent Analysis of Loss of Coolant,"-August 1971,
- f
- 63. MONSTER - Containment Analysis Computer Program TVA Topical Report.
TVA-TR85-01. i A fo8t.
, el. '\Miedegb us' LOCA Nass 4 fasqy Ibluse. MeJed
. Coob,.J ewt 0,esi)w - NME M 7.9 VersioM, " wcAP -/o325-P-4 4
by 5 ,1913 (PropndAq)y w cap .fe3 ,t g. g , 4 7 5 ,19 4 3 cu.~ - e,.g . u.1 ) . A I
'(
4 W 4 C. . 6.2-137 0059F/COC4 70 , , ' f 5' , t
-~ _ . _ . -- . -.. -. - - . . . - . .-
, : ,; , E i
s
' i i
( . TABLE 6.2.1-1 (Sheet 1) CENERAL:INFORMATION RELATED TO CONTAINM[NT [ . I. General'Information f*' A.' Design pressure, psig - - 12 ,
, 8. Destgn temperature, F - 327.-
C. Free volume, ft'
- N 1 166,110- 3 D.- Design and maximum allowable leak ,
- 0.25 i rates, 1/ day. l l !! 'Inttial Condltions a>
A. Reactor Coolant System (at design overpower of.102% and at normal liquid levels) P 1 '. Reactor power level, evt- - - m 's e t . 5 ;
. 2. Average coolant tesperature. 'T - 577.6
- 3. Mass of Reactor Coolant System - 538,640 g
-liqui d . .- Ibn L
4; . Mass of Reactor Coolant System - 4660 l
. Steam,.Ibn 5. Liquid plus steam energy,
- BTU - 334.6~x 10'
[ , L
- 8. -Containment
- 1. ; Normal' pressure, pstg - 0
-2. -Normal.inside temperature,
( A- i 'F - upper compartment - 85
- lower compartment. - 100 j~
- ice condenser - 15
- 3. Outside temperature, 'F
- Not applicable ,
t
- 4. Average relative humidity, 1 - 30 p
- 5. Maximum essential raw water - 83 temperature. *F
- 6. :Maxtaum refueling water temperature - 105 (if applicable), 'F i
o 7. Initial ice mass.(min.), Ib - 2.10 x 10' < l C. Stored Water (as applicable)
- 375,000
- 1. Refuelingwaterstoragetank, gal Not appilcable
- 2. Quench spray tank, ft -
l L 3. All accumulators (safety injection - 4,372 maximum tanks, ft' - 4.253 minimum per unit i, . t
'All energies are relative to 32*F 71
,t
[
b - ;l 97 i
'i
.c. . .
i
' :(?'
TABLE 6.2.1-1 (Sheet 2)
' 1 (Continued) ]
' GENERAL INFORMATION RELATED TO CONTAINMENT- j m .
ce :
= 4. Condensate storage tanks..ft' - 106,337 total
' of two tanks for both units
!!![TheDeslanBasisAccident See Figures 6.2.1-20, 6.2.1-21, and 6.2.1-23; IV. Mass and Energy Addition Tables o See Tables 6.2.1-13, 6.2.1-16 and 6.2.1-204 -
4 4 A
.A. '
l[ 1 e 8 B S f 4 4 ' 0327F/COC4 ( 72 4 6
l, ' i',
..: SQN- ,
TABLE 6.2.1-1 ($heet 9) (Continued)' ,
; *c_
GENERAL INFORMATION 'RELATED -TO CONTAINMENT : ; Value Used 7 for Full Containment Capacity Analysts
. Containment Cooling Fan j
E. Systems-3
- 1. Number of unit 5- NoneESF 0 .
F. -Neat Eschangers.
- 1. RHR System Shell & U-Tube a._ Type Shell & U-Tube .,
(single - pass)- (single - pass) 1 !
- b. Number 2 1
.c. Heat transfer !
-area, ft' each 4.275 4.275 a -
- d. Excess capacity for tube
{.'
! plugging 1 each 5
- 10 L e. Heat > transfer capacity 10' BTU /hr each 31 :3t: 28.3
- f. Heat transfer coefficient (pA),
10' BTU /hr *F 1 r: each Modeled with 5% tube plugging - I' and maximum fouling factor 1.52 ats:te: 1 402. (* ** d '
- g. Flow rates: co w lttt A o W -TYPE 1.' Tube Side. N M " " 5 8 8-)
, gpm each 4.500 st;end: 306 (at-3.600 seconds)
- 4. RHR spray.
.gpm each 2.000 2.000 0327F/COC4
-{
73 L L . o 1 __ __ - _ _ _ - _ _ _____ - - __ J
_g 3 ' Z '
-]fj. ,
4 4 1
- m
, SQN . ;
y; - ; y ;tl$;- , (j' TABLE 6.2'.1-1 (Sheet 10)-
'J .
-(Continued)- ;
*~
CENERAL INFORMATION RELATED 70 (DNTAINNENT - , Value Used-na for-s T
-Fv11 Contalnaent Capactty Analysis
- b. RHR to RCS 2,500 / 2dok e in-spray joiq mode gpm each '
- 2. Shell side, gpa each 5,000 5,000 h.- Source of coo 11ng water CCS CCS .
4
. ~1.- Flow begins, I M \.
seconds Automatic 2:$ tic. level control s
- 2. Containment Spray System 1
- a. Type- Shell & U-Tube Shell & U-Tube Counterflow Counterflow -
-i z h' : b. -Number 2 1
- c. Heat transfer area, ft' each 9,891 2:222 1% IIB ,
- d. Excess capacity i .for tube plugging. ,
l .- % each 30 : Sit:. 10.
, e. Heat transfer ,
capacity. 10'- - t
; , BTU /hr each 64 .tk 7 8.T U
f
- f. Heat-transfer W coefficient l
j modeled wtth 30% tube plugging factor (pA) 2.44 M 2.9 B A 10' BTU /hr *F each @ """ D " couwise.fi.sw Tyrt MaM #AcH PW6 e,R.) , 0327F/COC4 {.' 1 l L 74 l L i- { '- 'f' { {
SON TABLE 6.2.1-1 (Sheet 11)-
~
?
(Continued)- GENERAL INFORMATION RELATED TO CDNTAINNENT-
' Value used for Full Conta1noent CaDacity Analysts g.- Flow rates
- 1. Tubeside-(spray flow) gpa each- 4,750 4,750
- 2. Shell side gpa each 5,000- .-2:282: 35 %
- h. Source of cooling '
water- ERCW ERCH 1.'~ Flow begins, seconds '45 Jtic 25o (maximum)
- 3. Component Cooling Water
( (- a. Type- Shell & Tube (Spitt Flow) Shell & Tube (Spitt flow)
-b.
Number 2 1
- c. Heat transfer area, ft' each 17,010 N 16 3:43 di Excess capacity
. for tube plugging, % each 5 :3: 15
~
- e. Heat transfer capactty, 10*
BTU /hr each,
.wh1ch includes LOCA load for RHR Hz only 31 :th 32,.55 P
0327F/COC4
-k 75
~
r
- f. i .
e
\
L: {t 6
)
TABLE 6.2.1-1 (Sheet 12)
-(Continued) j
- GENERAL INFORMATION RELATED TO CONTAINMENT 'I
... Value Used- -i for Full Contelnment Canacity Analysis !
Heat transfer
- f. 4 coefficient (pA) 10' 1
BTU /hr.'F each, f modeled with 57, tube plugging, , maximum fouling:
-factor, and a '
split flow correction p--' factor of 0.72 2.66 2=fd: 2.79J . . l g. Flow rates-(googun as couwtat.neN
.T v e e H a.n r E x H A N 6 G R I
!' 1. Tubeside. l (ERCW), gpm each- 4.000, 4.000 ;
- 2. She11 side.
.{ gpm each 5.000 5,000
!L
- h. ' Source of Cooling Nater ERCN ERCH- !
L l-l s P 0327F/C0C4 76 e 9
-ff
,-_.'g,e b-
l n> -
-50N. -
TABLE 6.2.1-6 ICE CONDENSER PARAMETERS USED IN
. COMPRESSION PEAK PRESSURE ANALYSIS Upper Compartoent -ft* 651,000 * ,
l Ice Condenser, ft' Lower Plenum 24,200 Ice Sed :Afa:thit: ~ g,37.o Upper Plenue 47,000 l Lower Compartment (active), ft*' N EV P, co o q Total Active Volume, f t' " t,06 7,02 0 ' Lower Compartment (dead ended), ft* 6 IM too W i Total Containment Volume, ft' 3,,gq9toz l Reactor. Containment Air Compressor Ratio assets ;,374 l; Rtactor Power, MWt .-adfik:: 3 y9g.s _; Design Energy Release to Containment Initial Blowdown Mass Release, Ib. N 633,059 Initial Blowdown Energy Release, BTU -au-6-M2 3 o7,9 gg Q Ice Condenser Parameters l' Neight of Ice in Condenser, Ib. W 2.1 (tob l . < l r.( . 1. l-l e l l-l' 1 t
#
- All volumes are not free volumes.
0637F/COC4 77 l , l 3
- w -
p; . x F ao ,
, , , snN
{ .
!l' M, TABLE 6.2.1-7 CONTAINMENT PRES 5URE CALCULATION PUMP FLOW VS, TIME R
. Time Afte Jt safeguards Flow to Spray Spray-InttIatton- Core Flow Flow (sec) (GPM) (GPM) (GPM) .
0 0. ', 0
'44.9 0 0-
~45.0. 4913 '4750 0 4913 4750 0
.1585.0 1586.0- 3839 4750 0 -
1605.0 3839 '4750 0
- 1895.0 383 750 0 4 0 ~
2205.0 9 > 2206.0 3839 4750 'O 3839 4750 0 r 2215.0 3839- 4750 0
~ 2216.0 3600.0' 3839 4750 2000 i Lt - 2000 L 3601.0- 1074 4750 1074 4750 0 End f: ,
p T sient 4 l: (! be \e{e' Ast $ Re plAes us s N
~
'NEW TABLE (. . Z . l - 7 9
9 m O 0637F/COC4 k 78
.., , .- - ... . .- . . . ~ . - - . . . - - -- -- . - ' ~
i s.;j _ 2 '} y s s ' \ '. s G l
![
0 j
" ? TABLE 6.2.1-7
,p,. - m
,c.- +
J LOSS OF OFF-51TE POWER AT EVENT INITIATION Y CONTAINMENT PRES $URE CALCULATION PUMP FLOW VS. TIME .;
- p : .
i h u; }
.,c 4 TIME AFTER ECCS FLW RHR ECC$ FLOW MFEGUARD$ TO CORE SPRAY SPRAY TO CORE -i
+
INITIATION fRWST) _Ight igbL (SUMP) CDP 91ENTS
-(SEC)' -(GPM) GPM (GPM) (GPM) 1 0 0 0 0 0 *$" - Signal l 21.9 0 0 0 0 i
.22.0 1019 0 0 0 CCP/$1P Start' I
'26.9 1019 0 0 0 27.0 84858 0 0 , O RHR/CCP/ SIP ECCs Flow 1 249.9 4858 0 0 0- i
, 250.0. 4858 4750 0 0 Containment Spray' Start l 1690.0- 4858 4750 0 0 l 1691.0 1019 4750 0 2500 RHR Switchover I i- 1710.9- 1019 4750 0 2500 l 1711. 0 4750 0 3519 CCP/ SIP Switchover l l 2802.9 0 4750 0 3519 l l
f, 2803.. 0 0 0 3519 CS Pump Stopped e(' (- 3112.9 3113. 0 0 0 4750 0 0 3519 3519 C$ Pump Switchover L
= 3600.9 0 4750 0 3519 i- 3601. 0 4750 2000 1019 RHR Aligvuwnt for l~ Auxiliary CS-End of 0 4750 2000 1019 Transient l'
- 4858 gem Total ECCS Flow (RWST) i: 422 gym - 1 Centrifugal Charging Pop d- 597 gpm - 1 Safety Injection Pump -
I' > 3839 gpm - 1 RHR Po p l' l l l [ 1 c {
']k~
n s 7 (- 1998v:10/111689 79 L< , 1 . 1
h ,9, ) 50N- $ - 1
. i, t- TABLE 6.2.1 [.<. i
- NORMALIZED DECAY NEAT.
l
*\ ':
- Time -!
Decay Heat Fracti M- '
)
- 1. E+02 4.2230E-02
- 2. C+02 3.6030E-0 - ! i~; 4 , 4. +02 3.0597E 2.
J f 6.0000 02 2.7717 -02 e 1.0000E+ '2.43 E-02
. . 2.0000E+03 1. 5E-02 !
4.0000E+03~ '1 359E-02 6.0000E+03 .3537E-02 ' a5 .
' . 1.0000E+04' 1.1622E-02 2.0000E+04' 9.4630E 4.0000E+04 7.7030E-03 6.0000E+04 6.7920E-03 1.0000E+05 5.7620E-03
" 4.5400E-03 2.0000E+05 4.0000E+05 .4770E-03 a r - 6.0000E+05 840E-03 1.0000E+06 2. 90E-03 2.0000E,06 1.66 E-03 '
- 4.0000E+06 1.1390 03 '
6.0000E+ 8.8600E-
, 1.0000 07 7.1000E-p
(< ,
-
- Total decay heat ound by multiplying fraction by reactor er, i lc .I i
u
,, "NI.W" TABLE 6. 2.l- E ,
s'
.t -
o l 0637F/COC4 [h u 80 e a e- - . - - -____e-- - _ _ - _ _ - - - _ _ _ .___m__- _-m_ _ _ _ - _ ___ - - - -
t a [
,( TABLE 6'.2.1 - 8 ,
- NORMALIZED DECAY HEAT <
DECAY HEAT i TIME GENERATION RATE l (SEC) (BTU / BTU) ;
'1.00E+01 0.053876 1.50E+01 0.050401 2.00E+01 0.048018 4.00E+01 0.042401 E
6.00E+01 0.039244
- 8.00E+01 0.037065 '
lE 1.00E+02: 0.035466 : 1.50E+02 0.032724 ! 2.00E+02 0.030936 4.00E+02 0.027078 6.00E+02 0.024931 8.00E+02- 0.023389 i 1.00E+03 0.022156 i 1.50E+03 0.019921 . 4
.h. .
2.00E+03 0.018315
- 4.00E+03 0.014781 6.00E+03 0.013040 8.00E+03 0.012000 1.00E+04. 0.011262
( -1.50E+04 0.010097
~4 00E+04- 0.007776
'1.00E+05 0.006021 4.00E+05- 0.003770 l 6.00E+05 0.003201
! 8.00E+05 0;002834 L- 1.00E+06- 0.002580
~1.50E+06 0.002530 2.00E+06 0.001909 -
l 4.00E+06 0.001355 o 6.00E+06 0.001091 8.00E+06 0.000927 L- 1.00E+07 0.000808 ; L
- Total decay heat found by multiplying fraction by reactor power r
l 81 l . 1 ,7 -
4 SQN.
-b TA81.E 6.2.1-9 !< ENERGY-thbhM006-At CO*NT 8d4 Approximate >
Slowdown _
$1nk (BTU) (t.10 see) End (BTU)of(t.tet.sec Refloodo) 2.65 264 ' t49.J ,
=tet:(10') :088.(10')
' - Ice Heat Removal' 4 Structural Neat-Sinks b(10') "
(10') _
' 'RNR Heat Enchanger Heat Removal 0.0 0.0
# . Spray Neat Exchanger Neat Removal 0.0 0.0 l40.3 ' 2 40.J L
Energy Content of Sump- est:t:.(10') :sth(10') l- Ice Melted (Pounds) :0:$1.(10') 2:$th(10')
- 0. '1 0 84 ,
I [ N yrwked ENst9sts ii I e i. p , 1 l j . L 9 0637F/COC4 82
$0N - j b
TABLE 6.2.1-10 .
;(~ / vo9s (NERGY ACCOUNTING AT $0th sic.oN05 i 1
(Approulante fles of ice bed moltout) l (BTO .
*!ce Neat Removal Att SW (lo") ,
*5tructural Neat links Atd.'. 76.9 (te') !
'AHR Heat Enchanger West temoval Akt. 52.7 (la') :
*$ pray Meat Enchanger Neat Removal shds 3 L,3 (s t') >
I Energy of Susps Attd. 6 59.t (It ') Pounds of Ice Melted 2.10 (10') i
' Integrated Energies I
I l
- c. ,
Y , I 1 l l l l 0637F/CDC4 1(L 83 1 .
,e
L
! SON
-( TABLE 4.2.1-11
\ 916B (N
... ERG.Y AC. COU.NTING.AT e_Ge_k.
5ecoNas. . (Approttaate time of peak pressure)
, (ev u) 6
- Ice Heat temoval 564.(10)
- Structural Neat $1nk .st=s: itI.O (I '9
- RNA Heat Eschenger Heat temoval :ste. f53,9 (s09
- Spray Neat Eschanger Heat temoval :At=$:- 254.3 (8'N Energy of Susps :382:2 Mo.3 (10 9 Pounds of Ice Netted 2.10(10')
- Integrated Energies a
9
- 9 I4 P
0637F/COC4 84 t p
1
~
TABLE 6.2.1 - 13A BLOWOOWN KASS AND ENERGY RELEASES - DOUBLE ENDE0
- PUMP SUCTION GUILLOTINE BREAK ,
11ME BREAK PATH NO. 1 FLOW BREAK PATH NO. 2 FLOW THOUSAND THOUSAND , SECONOS LbM/SEC BTU /SEC LBM/SEC STU/SEC I O.000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 ; i 0.100 40484.4 22003.4 21647.9 11740.2 0.300 44141.6 24203.5 23045.5 12511.0 0.800 43836.2 25154.2 19028.8 10351.4 1.10 40447.2 23783.4 17419.0 9472.2 [ ' 1.70 31396.6 19502.3 16223.0 8831.5 l 2.60 19834.3 12784.9 15574.0 8548.9 3.10 17687.3 11420.3 14654.6 8121.8
,. 4.00 18020.2 11458.2 12987.8 7311.0
. 4.60 18133.6 11562.8 13900.5 7863.9 5.80 15906.8 10342.5 13020.1 7398.4 .
7.00 16258.4 10390.5 12448.9- 7067.0 , 7.60 12317.9 8520.9 12128.8 6873.8 i 8.00 13074.6 8924.4 11949.0 6765.2 9.00 16863.2 -10965.0 11437.3 6450.5 10.4 17919.5 11389.5 10490.7 5895.3 10.8 23486.2 14774.6 10007.3 5619.0 . [ 11.2 23454.1 14609.3 9571.4 5370.0 , 12.2 20868.7 12678.0 8539.0 4795.8 12.6 9495.8 5951.9 8711.7 4912.3 13.2 6607.2 4478.2 8505.8 4813.3 13.8 7908.6 5225.1 8504.5 4856.1 14.6 5620.0 4737.0 8041.9 4685.0 15.8 5166.7 4292.6 6449.8 4136.8 , 17.8 3934.0 3539.5 6234.3 3092.6 l 85
- c. . . . . . _ . _ _ _ . - . . . . ,
- . _ ~ . _ _ _ _ _ . . _ . _ _ _ _
H:q ; )
)
1 I TABLE 6.2.1 - 13A (Cont) ( SLOWDOWN KASS AND ENERGY RELEASES - 00VBLE ENDED l j PUMP SUCTION GUILLOTINE 8REAK i j TIME BREAK PATH NO.1 FLOW 8REAK PATH N0. 2 FLOW THOUSAND . THOUSAND SECONDS L8M/SEC BTU /SEC L8M/SEC BTU /SEC 18.2 3532.8 3286.8 10860.8 5326.8 18.4 3329.6 3251.5 5114.3 2533.2 ; 2172.7 i 20.4 2434.7 2526.9 5284.6-21.2 2087.9 2355.3 3871.4 1543.1 : 21.6 1901.2 2230.7 5090.8 1888.8 28.0 234.8 296.5 1605.6 394.2 28.6 34.5 44.2 1600.1 376.4 29.2 26.4 33.8 0.0 0.0
. 29.4 0.0 0.0 2229.0 502.7 ,
29.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 ([ a l l l . 4 ( 85 i-
. . - .- .. .-_ . - . - - - - . _ - . - ~- -_
4 TABLE 6.2.1 - 16A ! (. l REFLOOD NAS$ AND ENERGY RELEASES - DOUBLE-ENDED PUNP SUCTION GUILLOTINE BREAK NINIMUM SAFEGUARDS ,
, -TIME 8REAK PATH NO. 1 FLOW BREAK PATH NO. 2 FLOW THOUSAND THOUSAND :
SECONDS LBM/SEC BTU /SEC LBM/SEC BTU /SEC 29.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 30.0 111.3 130.4 1980.7 171.9 30.4 100.0 117.0 1959.5 170.0 31.1 110.4 129.2 1918.1 166.4 i 33.7 132.7 155.4 1800.7 156.0 34.7 140.1- 164.2 1761.9 152.6 36.7 154.1 180.6 1691.2 146.4 : 38.7 167.0 195.8 1628.2 140.9 ' 39.7 346.5 408.3 4423.6 533.1 . 40.7 386.9 456.6 4887.5 622.2 41.7 385.8 455.2 4875.1 624.4 . 42.7 380.6 449.1 4815.2 618.2 i 46.7- 360,1 424.5 4573.2 591.3 48.7 350.7 413.4 4461.3 578.7 ,
- 52.7
~
333.8 393.3 4255.8 555.6 53.7 282.7 332.6 3417.9 487.8 - C 54.8 291.2 342.6 269.7 143.9 55.8 293.8 345.7 270.7 145.4 67.8 270.5 318.1 261.1 132.8 ' 75.8 259.6 305.2 256.5 127.0 76.8 258.7 304.1 256.6 126.5
- 92.8 250.0 293.8 264.3 122.2 100.8 246.9 290.1 269.4 120.9 t 116.8 282.3 4
242.1 284.5 119.4 118.8 241.6 283.9 284.1 119.2 128.8 238.8 280.6 293.7 118.7 : 144.8 233.5 274.2 310.1 117.9 , 176.8 217.6 255.5 244.9 116.0 l 194.8 205.8 241.5 364.8 114.9 196.8 , 204.3 239.8 366.9 114.8 224.8 181.2 212.5 399.8 113.4 232.8 173.9 203.9 411.1 113.6 234.8 171.9 201.6 414.0 113.7 250.8 155.7 182.5 436.7 114.1 254.8 151.4 177.4 442.6 114.3
.b 87 j
,--n, ,- ,- -.-.,-.,-n.~ -
,..v. ---
p- ,
],
a j n ; V { TABLE 6.2.1 - 20A POST REFLOOD MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES - DOUBLE-ENDED PUMP SUCTION GUILLOTINE BREAK - MINIMUM SAFEGUARDS i
~
TIME BREAK PATH NO.1 FLOW BREAK PATH NO. 2 FLOW l THOUSAND . THOUSAND SECONDS LBM/SEC BRI/SEC LAWSEC BTU /SEC i 251.8 157.6 193.7 497.6 116.5 259.8 157.1 193.0 498.1 116.5
" 264.8~ 156.6 192.4 498.6 116.5 294.8 153.4 188.4 501.8 116.5 299.8 153.6 188.7 501.6 116.4 '
344.8 148.7 182.6 506.5 116.5 182.8 506.4 116.4 1 349.8 148.8 369.8 146.6 180.1 508.6 116.4 374.8 120.1 147.5 535.1 116.7 379.8 119.7 147.1 535.5 116.7 . l 429.8 113.2 139.1 542.0 117.2 449.8 110.9 136.3 544.3 117.3 I L 454.8 110.7 136.0 544.5 117.2 524.8 101.0 124.0 554.2 118.0 ( 529,8 534.8 100.8 130.5 123.8 160.3 154.8 554.4 524.8 529.2 118.0 116.7 116.8
574.8 126.0 584.8 125.2 153.8 530.0 116.8 639.8 118.3 145.3 536.9 117.1 i 659.8 115.8 142.3 539.4 117.3 664.8 115.5 141.9 539.7 117.2 689.8 112.2 137.9 543.0 117.4 '
724.8 106.9 131.3 548.3 117.8 r 734.8 105.8 130.0 549.4 117.9 2 774.8 99.6 122.3 555.6 118.3 794.8 96.2 118.1 559.1 118.6 889.8 95.4 117.2 559.8 116.8 1690.0 95.4 117.2 559.8 116.8 1691.0 , 97.2 119.3 412.3 116.8 1979.8 97.2 119.3 412.3 116.8 1979.9 67.5 82.4 414.1 117.5 414.5 47.2 2313.1 67.1 77.2
- l. .
( 88
4 50N-1 !
'(-
- TABLE 6.2.1 22 4 ;
1 0006LE ENDED PLMP SUCTION LOCA MIN!RM SAFEGUARDS {gtal Ttme (sec) l Rupture 0 Accumulator flow starts 15.5 ! g ' End of blowdown :the 19.& I ! pissume4 initia4eoW d E48 s c.o I
- 30;
. . . . . . . . .. .... . . . , . , . , . . . ]
Accumulators empt $kdt: 54.0 I l Assme.d suitiet y.n of spray sysien g s o, o j End of reflood . tat:tt 254 9 Low level alare of refueling water storage tank :htet. 1691. Rectreulation phase of safeguards operation .1999: 164l RNR spray realignment 3600 . Peak containment pressure .900ft. -J C 916 6 . t 9 Revised by Amendment 1 e s 0362F/COC4 89
?
f .
. 1
$0N l TABLE 6.2.1 - 24A '
( MAS $ AND INERGY RELEASE DATA DOUBLE ENDED PLMP $UCTION QUILL 0 TINE. MIN!nm SAFETY INJECTION !
, TIME (SECOND$) 0.00 29.60 29.60 254.78 1984.80 2313.05 ,
MA$$ (THOU$AND LBM) 762.85 762.85 762.85 762.85 762.85 762.85 INITIAL IN RC$ AND ACC l ADDED MA$$ PUMPED INJECT!DN 0.00 0.00 0.00 143.24 1226.41 1304.50 I TOTAL ADDED 0.00 0.00 0.00 143.24 1226.41 1384.50
*** TOTAL AVAILABLE
*** 762.85 762.85 762.85 906.09 1989.26 2147.35 57.26 70.96 143.08 143.08 143.08 :
DISTR 18UT10N REACTOR COOLANT 533.06 229.79 144.44 130.74 0.00 0.00 0.00 ' ACCUMULATOR 762.85 201.71 201.71 143.08 143.08 143.08 TOTAL CONTENTS I EFFLUENT .DREAK PLOW 0.0 561.13 561.13 762.99 1846.17 2004.25 ; 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 ECCS SP!LL TOTAL EFFLUENT 0.00 561.13 561.13 762.99 1846.17 2004.25
*** TOTAL ACCOUNTABLE *** 762.ES 762.84 762.84 906.08 1989.25 2147.33 ENERGY BALANCE ,
l T!ut ($ECOND$) 0.00 29.60 29.60 254.78 1984.80 2313.05 ;
- j. ?
ENERGY (MILLION BTU)
- 848 91 040'91 ;
1NITIAL ENERGY IN RC$ ACC. $ GEN 848.91 848.91 848.91 848.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.46 94.11 110.77 ADDED ENERGY PUMPED INJECTION 0.00 13.28 13.28 38.86 1E6.59 186.20 CECAY HEAT 0.00 -6.45 -6.45 -6.45 8.14 8.14 NEAT FROM $ECONDAR
- 0.00 6.83 6.83 42.87 268.85 305.12 TOTAL ADDED
*" *** 848.91 855.74 855.74 891.78 1117.76 11!4.03 l TOTAL AVAILABLE 5
307.96 11.70 12.91 32.78 32.78 32.78 DIS *R18UTION REACTOR COOLANT 0.00 i ACCUMULATOR 15.99 10.05 8.84 0.00 0.00 3.77 ! CORE $TORED 27.01 10.48 10.48 4.31 3.88 158.29 147.45 147.45 126.40 66.67 60.30 PRIMARY METAL 93.61 91.84 91.84 82.09 45.26 39.30
$ECONDARY METAL 246.05 245.00 245,00 214.94 125.08 110.08 ;
$ TEAM GENERATOR-
- 848.91 516.52 516.52 460.52 273.67 246.23 TOTAL CONTENTS r 0.0 339.23 339.23 433.63 846.46 910.17 EFFLUENT BREAK FLOW ECCS $P!LL 0.00 0.00- 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 TOTAL EFFLUENT 0.00 339.23 339.23 433.63 846.46 910.17 .
'" TOTAL ACCOUNTABLE *" 848.91 855.75 855.75 894.15 1120.12 1156.39 90
- ,---.,y.
.. - . .. - _---.~. . - . - -. - - . - - _-
l l TABLE 6.2.1-50 (Sheet 1) l SE000YAH STRUCTURAL HEAT SINKS j CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY ANALYSIS l Pattive Heat Sinks I l A. Material Pronertiet (Reference 7) Volumetric Thermal Heat Conductivity 8TU/hr-F-ft BTU /ft}-FCapac ty Material Paint j 0.2000 14.0 Paint 2 0.0833 28.4 Concrete 0.8 28.8 Stainless Steel 9.4 56.35 , Carbon Steel P.6.0 56.35 ,
, 8. Surfaces :
Area Layer and TMckness Heat Sink ' Material (ft 2) (ft) Unner cameartment
- 1) Operating Deck Concrete 4,800 1.07 Concrete
- 2) Crane Hall Concrete 18,280 0.0005 Paint 1.29 Concrete
- 3) Refueling Canal Steel-lined 0.0208 Stainless Concrete 3,840 Steel 1.5 Concrete
- 4) Operating Deck Concrete 760 0.00125 Paint 1.5- Concrete 1e98v 1D/111689 91 5
TABLE 6.2.1-50 (Sheet 2) SE000YAH STRUCTURAL HEAT SINKS CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY ANALYSIS l Arta Layer and Thickness , Heat Sink Material (ftz) (ft) 1 Unner Comnartment (Continued) , i
- 5) Containment Shell Steel 49,960 0.000625 Paint
& Misc. Steel 0.0403 Steel i
- 6) Misc. Steel Steel 2,260 0.000625 Paint ;
0.12 Steel Lower Comnartment ,
- 7) Operating Deck, ,
Crane Hall & Interior Concrete 32.200 1.416 Concrete Concrete l l 8) Area in Contact Concrete 15.540 0.0005 Paint with sump Hater 1.6 Concrete
- 9) Interior Concrete Concrett 2,830 .00125 Paint 1.0 Concrete
- 10) Interior Concrete Concrete 760 0.0W5 Paint -
1.75 Concrete
- 11) Reactor Cavity Steel-Lined 2,270 0.02082 Stainless Concrete Steel 2.0 Concrete i
9-L 199sv:10/111649 92
,e
l l l 1 l TASLE 6.2.1-50 (sheet 3) SE000YAH STRUCTURAL HEAT SINKS CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY ANALYSIS I Ar Layer and Thickness Heat Sink Naterial (ftga) (ft) ; Lower camaartment (Continued) j I
- 12) Containment Shell Steel 19,500 0.000625 Paint ;
& Misc. Steel 0.0495 Steel
]
- 13) Misc. Steel Steel 9,000 0.000625 Paint 0.1008 Steel !
Ice Condenser
- 14) Ice Basket Steel 180,600 .00663 Steel
- 15) Lattice Frames Steel 76,650 0.217 Steel I
- 16) Lower Support Structure Steel 28,670 0.276 Steel
- 17) Ice Condenser
! Floor Concrete 3,336 .000833 Paint i (
- 18) Containment Hall Composite 19.100 1.0 Steel &
Panels 4 Containment panel Insulation : Shell steel and 0.625 Steel Shell insulatten
- 19) Crane Hall composite 13.055 1.0 Steel &
Panels and panel Insulation Crane Will steel and 1.0 Concrete
; insulation b
1e98v:1D/111689 93
l 4 I FIGURE 6.2.1-20 CASE 1 (RASE CASE) i 2.1 Million Pounds of Ice Imse of Power Assumed at Event Initiation l l I SEQUDYAH CONTAINMENT PRESSURE ANAL.YSIS . .. ! i CONTAINMENT SYSTEN PRESEURE TRANSIENT I i 16. i 14
- 12. -
o [18. e 3
\s l B. s, m N ~1 i -
g 6. 3j 3 a, s.. 4 2. l u I l l ' lel 102 105 led 10 5 gg 6 l ] TIMt SCC ' i l 1 l l : l l l l \
\
l j l( 94 i 9
( FIGURE 6.2.1-21a y y_ SEQUOYAH CONTAINMENT PRES $URE ANALYS!$ CA88 1 (East CASE) 2.1 Million Pounds of Ice Ecos of Power Assumed at Event Initiation CONTAINMENT UPPER COMPARTMENT TEMPERATURE TRANSIENT
.26C+5 ;
.34C*$
.22C*5
.,.20C+5 B
- 18C+5
( W h.16C+5 ,
.14C 5
/ \ ,
} N
.12C*5
.10C'5 K '
3 J ' ge s 80 'g gi tg2 gg5 gg4 te s T it:C SCC 1
._j 4
95 I
l
.1 f ,
1 FIGURE 6.2.1-21b r SEQUOYAH CONTAINMENT PRESSURE ANALYSIS i i CASE 1 (RASE CASE) 2.1 Million Pounds of Ice Emss of Power Assumed at Event Initiation CONTAINMENT 14WER COMPARTMENT TEMPERATURE TRANSIENT . 1 e
.26t*5 l
1
.2eC 5 )
N -.. "
.22E*5 vu -
b.- \
. 20C*5 <
g . .- ..... o ( N
.19E*5 u
s g( Ns , I.16C'5
.14t*5
.t2C*5 i
.lBE*5 .
I igS 105 ted gg6 181 102 TIME SEC a N W SED 1 9 m 96 e e
- ,. - -- ---w
( FIGURE 6 2.1.22
! SEQUDYAH CONTAINMENT PRESSURE ANAL.YS!$
! 1 CASE 1 (BASE CASE) 8.1 Million Founds of Ice i Loss of Power Assumed at Event Initiation TEMPERATURE TRANSIENT OF ACTIVE AND INACTIVE SUMPS
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( 'I b : C . i l FIGURE 6.2.1-23 l SEQUDYAH CONTAINMENT PRESSURE ANALYS!$ i CASE 1 (BASE CASE) i 3.1 Million pounds of Ice ICE MELT (LBS) Imss of Power Assumed at Event Initiation , l
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l SEQUOYAH CONTAINMENT PRESSURE ANALYSIS l (LOSS OF POWER ASSUMED AT EVENT INITIATION) , ICE MASS PARAMETRIC STUDY IS. , p , 14 ; i l-15. n - S 12.^ I N
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l APPENDIX C P i l CONTAINMENT PRESSURE CALCULATION I ICE MASS 1.88 MILLION POUNDS ! LOSS OF POWER AT EVENT INITIATION !! L l '. i
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.I APPENMX D CONTAINMENT PRESSURE CALCULATION [
ICE MASS 1.93 MILLION POUNDS ! LOSS OF POWER AT EVENT INITIATION ,
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199'J V: 1D/11t289 147 P 5
m ) i SQN-6 l h Choked Flow Characteristics j
-the data in Figure 6.2,1-16 1119 strate the behavior of mass flow rate as a function of upstream and downstream pressures, including the effects of
- l. flow choking. The upper plot shows mass flow rate as a function of up- !
iL* stream pressure for various assumed values of downstream pressure. For l rero back pressure (P. 0), the entire curve represents choked flow l conditions with the flow rate approximately proportional to upstream , i pressure, Pu. For higher back pressure, the flow rates are lower untti ! l the upstream pressure is high enough to provide choked flow. After the ; l increase in upstream pressure is sufficient to provide flow choking, , further increases in upstream pressure cause increases in mass flow rate ; along the curve for P. - 0. The key point in this 111ustration is that l flow rate continues to increase with increasing upstream pressure, even after flow choking conditions have been reached. Thus choking does not represent a threshold beyond which dramatically sharper increases in 1 compartment pressures could be expected because of limitations on flow . relief to adjacent compartments. The phenomemon of flow choking is more frequently explained by assuming a flued upstream pressure and examining the dependence of flow rate with
. respect to decreasing downstream pressure. This approach is illustrated 't for an assumed upstream pressure of 30 psia as shown in the upper plot with the results plotted vs. downstream pressure in the lower plot. For :
flued upstream conditions, flow choking represents an upper limit flow rate beyond which further decreases in back pressure will not produce any ( increase in mass flow rate. 6.2.1.3.4 Containment Pressure Transient - Lona Term Analysis Introduction Early in the ice condenser development program it was recognized that i there was a need for computer modeling of Ice condenser containment . performance' It was realized Bat the model would have to have capa-bilities-comparable to those W 2he dry containment (COCO) model. These capabilities would permit th iodel to be used to solve problems of containment design and optimize the containment and safeguards systems. ; This has been accomplished in the development of the LOTIC code. (See - Reference 18). Another computer code, MONSTER, with capab111tles comparable to those of the LOTIC code has been developed to solve similar 6 containment design problems. (See Reference 62.) Method of Solution The model of the containment for the LOTIC computer code consists of five distinct control. volumes, the upper e,nngittent, the lower compartment, i the portion of the ice bed from which the tre has melted, the portion of the ice bed containing unmelted ice, and the dead ended compartment. The
' ice condenser control volume with unmelted and melted ice is further subdivided into sin subcompartments to allow for maldistributton of break flow to the ice bed.
6.2-15 005BF/COC4 148 t
- - - , . . - , - . . . ~.. - - - , , - - , -,--r- . , , , - , ,
i 50N-6 g The conditions in these compartments are obtained as a function of time
. by the use of fundamental equations solved through numerical techniques. ,
- These equations are solved for three distinct phases in time. Each phase i corresponds to a distinct physical characteristic of the prolelen. Each !
. of these phases has a unique set of simpitfying assumptions based on test ] . results from the ice condenser test facility. These phases are the blowdown period, the depressurization period, and the long term period.
Blowdown Period . This phase coincides with the blowdown of the reactor coolant system. During this phase no attempt is made to calculate the pressure, flow, and temperature transients in the containment in the 1.0 TIC code. Instead, this compilcated analysts is accomplished with the* TM0 code, a code created spectftcally for this short term analysis (discussed in 6.2.1.3.3). The pressure and temperatures in the containment are held constant during this phase. Input values are determined from TM0 analyses and compression ratto calculations. Physically, tests at the ice condenser Waltz Mill Test facility have shown that this phase represents that; period of time in which the lower compartment air and a portion of the Ice condenser air are displaced and compressed into the upper compartment and the remainder of the Ice condenser. (The initial pre-blowdown atmosphere in the dead ended compartment is retained at that time.). The code represents this phenomenon through the use of an input value for the fraction of the ice bed which retains air during this phase. This fraction, determined from test data, is also used to I
't - estabitsh the volumes of the two Ice condenser control volumes, which are ~
( held constant during this phase.
- The temperatures in the upper and lower compartments are calculated from . j the. input pressure. The portions of the containment which are primarily air-filled, i.e., the dead ended compartment and a portion of the ice bed, are assumed to be at upper compartment temperature during this phase. Deck leakage considerations resulted in consideration of the~
upper compartment atmosphere as saturated, at this temperature. Deoressurization Period ; This phase of the analysis corresponds to the period of time between the end of blowdown and the establishment of a circulation flow between the l:: control volumes. During this phase, the noncondensable nitrogen blowdown 1 l from the accumulator occurs, the decay heat bolloff is initiated, and the-engineered safeguards come into operation. Maximum decay heat bolloff is achieved by assuming that the safety injection system is disabled to the point that only enough water is delivered to the core to replace the water teiled, and the remaining safety injection is spilled to the sump, $ (althougn varying degrees of SIS effectiveness can be simulated). The engineered safeguards which are initiated in this phase are the return fan, the safety injection system, and the spray system. The return fan i forces upper compartment air through the dead ended compartments and into the lower compartment atmosphere. During this phase the spray systems 6 and safety injection system take water from the refueling water storage L - 6.2-16 0058F/COC4 149
* = ---%.- + ---~vw ._ -, _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ , . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
t
-- SQN-6 k
- tank and pump it into the containment, with the spray flow passing through the spray heat exchanger. The models for the spray system and -
heat exchangers are discussed in Subparagraph 6.2.1.3.4. At the
. beginning of this phase the blowdown ice melt is computed using the
- blowdown energy. This result is used to compute the actual volume of the melted out portion of the Ice condenser, which is used to change the ice condenser volumes from the compressed value associated with the air displacement in the blowdown phase. to the actual value computed from the ice melt. As soon as the return fan is started, the dead ended compartment begins to undergo a conversion to upper compartment atmosphere. This continues until all the dead ended compartment 6 atmosphere has been converted to upper compartaent. It is al50 possible i to select an input option in the code such that the dead ended compartment is always treated as upper compartment volume.
y As soon as return fan flow is initiated, the lower compartment begins to 6 fill with an atr/ steam alature composed of the upper / dead ended i - . compartment air from the fan flow and decay heat bolloff steam. This d steam air elature displaces the previous steam atmosphere of the lower F compsttment through the ice bed, like the motion of a piston. As this occurs the code calculates the conditions in the upper and lower compartment from the compartment conditions and the spray and flow characteristics. This phase of the analysts ends when the alr/ steam alsture fills both the lower compartment and the melted out portion of the ice bed, l.ona Term
- This phase of the analysts l'egins as soon as the circulation of air through the containment has been established and continues until the problem is terminated. The major occurrences during this phase are recirculation and ice meltout. Rectrculation occurs when the refueling water storage tank has reached its low level and the level in the $
containment sump has reached high level. At this time the safety 4 injection and spray system begin drawing from the active sump instead of the refueling water storage tank (the two sump model is discussed in Sub-paragraph 6.2.1.3.4). The spray system flow continues to be routed , through the spray heat enchanger during this period, and the $4fety injection and residual spray flows are routed through the residual heat , enchanger. Meltout occurs when there is no longer enough ice in the ice bed to prevent steam from flowing directly from the lower compartment to the upper compartment. As long as there is more than a foot of ice in the ice compartment, the temperatures in the two ice compartment control volumes remain at different constant values which were determined from Waltz Mill test data. When the ice in a subcompartment of the Ice bed volume is gone, the subcompartment is assumed to contain lower e comparteent atmosphere. (Due to maldistr1 button wh1ch is input to the code, the sub compartments may melt in a sequenced manner rather than simultaneously.) During the long term phase the fan flow from the upper
; compartment and the flow out of the lower compartment are assumed to be
.- at the respective compartment temperatures.
D 6.2-17 0058F/COC4 150 ,
SQN.6 i Primary Assumptions I The nost significant simpitftcation of the problem is the assumption that the total pressure in the containment is uniform. This assumption is . I justifled by the fact that after the initial blow:fown of the reactor l coolant system, the remaining mass and energy released from this system !
" into the containment are small and very slowly changing. The resulting i flow rates between the control volumes will also be relatively small, l these small flow rates then tre unable to maintain significant pressure '
differences between the compartments. ) In the control volumes, which are always assumed to be saturated, steam ' and air are assumed to be uniformly stred and at the control volume temperature. When the air return fan is in operation, the fan flow and the reactor coolant system bolloff are mined before entering the lower compartment. The air is considered a perfect gas, and the thermodynamic ; l properties of steam are taken from the ASME steam table (1975 version). 6 - L The condensation of steam is assumed to take place in a condensing node i which is located, for the purpose of calculation, between the two control :
' volumes in the ice condenser compartment. The eult temperature of the :
air _leavina this node is set equal to the temperature of the ice filled ' i controlvofumeoftheicestoragecompartment. Lower compartment exit temperature is used if the Ice bed section is melted. Comoression Ratto Analysis As blowdown continues following the initial pressure peak from a double
.( ended cold leg break, the pressure in the lower compartment again increases, reaching a peak at or before the end of blowdown. The pressure in the upper compartment continues to rise from beginning of i blowdown and reaches a peak which is approximately equal to the lower l
compartment pressure. After blowdown is complete, the steam in the lower l compartment continues to flow through the doors into the ice bed l compartment and is condensed. The primary factor in producing this upper containment pressure peak and therefore, in determining design pressure, is the displacement of air I from the lower compartment into the upper containment. The Ice condenser '
- quite effectively performs its function of condensing virtually all the '
steam that enters the ice beds. Essentially, the only source of steam entering the upper containment is from leakage through the drain holes and other leakage around crack openings in hatches in the operating deck separating the lower and upper portions of the containment building. A method of analysis of the compression peak pressure was developed based on the results of full-scale section tests. This method consists of the calculation of the air mass compression ratto, the polytropic exponent for the compression process, and the effect of steam bypass through the - operating deck oq this compression. L 6.2-18 0058F/COC4 151
' e SON-6 y, g t \
The compression peak pressure in the upper containment for the Sequoyah : plant design is calculated to be psig (for an initial air pressure of - l 0.3 psig). This compression pressure includes the effect of a pressure ; Increase of 0.4 pst from steam bypass and also for the effects of the
. dead-ended volumes. The nitrogen partial pressure from the accumulators is not included since this nitrogen is not added to the containment untti after the compression peak pressure has been reduced, which is after ,
blowdown is completed. This nitrogen is considered in the analysts of i pressure decay following blowdown as presented in the long term i performance analysis using the LOTIC code. In the following sections, a discussion of the major parameters affecting the compression peak will be f discussed. Specifically they are: air compression, steam bypass. l blowdown rate and blowdown energy. Air Comoression Process Description ; The volumes of the verlous containment compartments determine directly ! the air volume compression ratio. This is basically the ratio of the total active containment air volume to the compressed air volume during e i blowdown and is defined'in'detall In equation (2) of Subparagraph D r 6.2.1.3.4. During blowdown air is displaced from the lower compartment and compressed into the ice condenser beds and into the upper containment , L. above the operating deck. It is this air compression process which ; primarily determines the peak in-containment pressure, following the l6 initial blowdown release. A peak compression pressure of psig is ! 'f based on the Sequoyah Plant design compartment volumes shown in Table ; j ( 6.2.1-6. 1.19
. Methods of Calculation and Results ;
Full Scale Section Tests , The actual Waltz Mll) test compression ratios were found by performing , air mass balances before the blowdown and at the time of the compression peak pressure, using the results of three special full-scale section tests. These three tests were conducted with an energy input representative of the plant design. In the calculation of the mass balance for the ice condenser, the compartment is divided into two sub-volusiest one volume representing the flow channels and one volume representing the Ice baskets. The flew . t channel volume is further divided into four sub-volumes and the partial air pressure and mass in each sub-volume is found from thermocouple readings that the air is saturated with steam at the measured temper-ature. From these results, the average temperature of the air in the ice condenser compartment is found, and the volume occupied by the air at the total condenser pressure is found from the equation of state as follows: R. T. , (1) V, , . L , Po - t l 6.2-19 0058FICOC4 152 ,
-Ll---- ------en~*-
i
. SON where: (
V. , . Volume of ice condenser occupied by air (ft') M. . . Mass of air in ice condenser compartment (Ib) T. , . Average temperature of air in Ice condenser ('F) ; P, . Total ice condenser pressure (Ib/ft') , j The partial pressure and mass of air in the lower compartment are found - by averaging the temperatures indicated by the thermocouples located in that compartment and assuming saturation conditions. For these three tests, it was found that thw partial pressure, and hence the mass of air !
~
In the lower compartment, was zero at the time of the compression peak pressure. The actual Waltz Mill test compression ratto is then found from the I following: l C, Vi + V, + V. (2) V + V. a where: V. . Lower compartment volume (ft') : ( V4 . Ice condenser compartment volume (ft') Upper compartment volume (ft') V . l The polytopic esponent for these tests is then found from the m asured l compression pressure and the compression ratto calculated above. Also - considered is the pressure incrense that results from the leakage of steam through the deck into the upper compartment. The compression peak pressure in the upper compartment for the tests or containment design is then given by P . P. (C,)" + AP.... (3) where: P. . Initial pressure (psla) P = Compression peak pressure (psla) 1 C, = Volume compression ratto
, n . polytropic esponent AP.... . Pressure increase caused by deck leakage (psi)
T L 6.2-20 0058FICOCa 153 ,
1-d SQN-6
- Using the method of calculation described above the compression ratio is !
calculated for the three full-scale section tests. From the results of ' the air mass balances, it was found that air occupied 0.645 of the ice l tendenser compartment volume at the time of peak compression, or g . l V.-, . 0.645 V, (4) The final compression volume includes the volume of the upper compartment - as well as part of the volume of air in the ice condenser. The results of the full-scale section tests (Figure 6.2.1.-17) show a variation in ' steam partial pressure from 1007. near the bottom of the ice condenser to essentla11y zero near the top.- The thermocouples and pressure detectors confirm that at the time when the compression peak pressure is reached steam occupies less than half of the volume of the ice condenser. The ; i analytical model used in defining the containment pressure peak uses upper compartment volume plus 64.5 percent of the ice condenser air l volumes as the final volume. This 64.51. value was determined from appropriate test results. The calculated volume compression ratios are shown in Figure 6.2.1-18, along with the compression peak pressures for these tests. The , f compression peak pressure t$ determined from the measured pressure, after accounting for the deck leakage contribution. From the results shown in i Figure 6.2.1-18, the polytropic esponent for these tests is found to be 1.13.
+
( Plant Case For the Sequoyah design, the volume compression ratto, not including the O ' l upper plenum as part of the ice condenser and not accounting for i
> dead-ended volume effect, is calculated using Equation 2 and Table 6.2.1-6.
l o s 7, cle i C, . 2 .-:-?^ . ::: (5) ' 698.000 + 0.645 G i-.:::' stosao C, . A=tk . ; l.11Y The peak compression pressure, based on an initial containment pressure of 15.0 psia, is then given by Equation 3 as: I.31V P . 15.0 (4 46)' + 0.4 M,98 1.09 P. . 23:* psia or *:t psig This peak compression pressure includes a pressure increase of 0.4 pst , from steam bypass through the deck (see Subparagraph 6.2.1.3.5). The effect of the dead-ended compartment volumes is to trap additional air i and thus reduce the compression ratto and the above calculated peak pressure. , s . L 6.2-21 0058F/COC4 154 . t
, , . - .- . - - . , , ~ _ . . m -
t i 5006 Sensttivity To 81owdown Enercy
? The sensitivity of the upper and lower compartment peak pressure versus i blowdown rate as measured from the 1974 Waltz Mll) Tests is shown in
- j Figure 6.2.1 19. This figure shows the magnitude of the peak pressure versus the amount of energy released in terms of percentage of RCS energy releast rate. P6rcent energy blowdown rate was selected for the plot because energy flow rate more directly relates to volume flow rate and f therefore pressure. There are two important effects to note from the i peak upper compartment pressure versus blowdown rate. One, the magnttude of the final peak pressure in the upper compartment is low (about 9 psig) !
e for the plant design DECL blowdown rate; two, even an increase in this rate up to 141 percent of the blowdown energy rate produces only a small , increase in the magnitude of this peak pressure (about I pst). The major , ' factor setting the peak pressure reached in the upper compartment is the J- compression of air displaced by steam from the lower compartment into the i upper compartment. The lower compartment initial peak pressure shows a relatively low peak pressure of 12.9 psig for the cesign basis DECL blowdown rate, and even a substantial Increase in blowdown energy rate (141 percent reference initial DECL) would cause an increase in initial peak pressure of only 3 pst. The peak pressure in the lower compartment , is due mainly to flow resistance caused by displacement of alt from the i 10wer compartment into the upper compartment. For a further discussion, see Section 5 of Reference 21. ;
. Containment Pressure Calculation '
The following are the major input assumptions used to calculate the containment transtants for the pump suction pipe rupture cases with the ;
~
steam generators considered as an active. heat source for the Sequoyah Nuclear Station Containment: i
- 1. Minimum containment safeguards are employed, in all calculations, e.g., one of two spray pumps and one of two spray heat exchangers; one of two RHR pumps and one of two air recirculation fans. ,
- 2. Initial ice weight in the Ice condenser as specified in Table 6.1.1-1. 6
- 3. The 81owdown and Reflood mass and energy releases calculational model's described in Reference 26.
- 4. Blowdown and post-blowdown ice condenser drain temperature of 190*I' and 130*F were used. (These numbers are based on the long-term Waltz Mill ice condenser test data described in Reference 21). 6
- 5. Nitrogen from the accumulators in the amount of 5942 lbs. is included in the calculations.
. 6. The air rectreulation fan is assumed to be effective, approntmately 10 minutes after the transient is initiated. ,
h 6.2-22 0058F/COCa 155
+, -y. , - . ,- - . . . , , - . ..y,,_,_. _ . , , . _ _ , _ _ _ _ . .
f f l
.)
SQN 4, l
- 7. Post Reflood mass and energy described in Section 6.2.1.3.6 4were j used. A I
- 8. Even distributton of steam flow into the ice bed is assumed. ;
- 9. No ice condenser bypass is assumed. (This assumption depletes the tce in the shortest time and is thus conservative.) i
- 10. The initial conditions in the containment are . temperature of 100'F i
. In the lower and dead-ended volumes, a temperature of 15'T in the ;
ice condenser, and a temperature of 85'F in the upper volume. All .i volumes are at a pressure of 0.3 pstg and a 10% relative humidity, except for the ice condenser which is at a 1001 relative humidity. l
- 11. The pump flows vs. time given in Table 6.2.1-7 were used. j
- 12. A residual spra'y of 2000 gpm is assumed at I hour into the :
accident. Residual heat removal pump and spray pump take suction , from the sump, af ter stM. seconds, and :Sta* seconds respectively, i L 16 61 2969
- 13. Containment structural' heat sinks are assumed with conservatively i low heat transfer rates. ,
i 14 T operation of one containment spray heat exchanger j 2.932 (UA . Op*S's 10') amt one containment RHR heat exchanger . i
*I'* h**t ;
(UA e 3l=Qt:x.10') 1 481
- 4 J *ae 6 c eairomut c o eleu t *is a nke ug ee (u 4
- 2'. 79 J W # 6 a tw/N A *F ) hoe * * *J[
- 15. The normaltred decay heat which is used to calculate mass ar.d energy l releases after the steam generator equilibrates is presented in ;
Table 6.2.1-8.
- With these assumptions, the heat removal capability of the Sequoyah Plant is sufficient to absorb the energy releases and still keep the maximum -
calculated pressure below design. The long-term transients were calculated by the LOTIC computer code. The fol kwing plots have been provided:
~
Flgure 6.2.1 20 Containment Pressure Transient , g , ym
,,.m . , ,_,, ...,,r,r. ,r m .mrm .mr , ,7 7. , y,, ,,.,1 Figure 6.2.1-22 Temperature fransient of the Active Sump and Inactive Sump Figure 6.2.1-23 Ice Melt versus Time The following tables have also beta provided:
Table 6.2.1-9 Energy Tntil end of reflood Table 6.2.1-10 Energy actounting at time of ice melt Table 6.2.1-11 Energy accounting at time of peak pressure T MSEPJ A Fqare (,,1.1 1.1 s Temperebre. icws uf Q, g gg ,, C q .c W A ( F 3 et. 6.11 u h heer. Nee T'eausied b L wee. M a'M"t t 6.2-23 0058F/COC4 156 ,
u, i
~
,5+
INSERT A
;H f These tables provida an accounting for the heat removal of the major 1
e ,, 2
"* systems _taken at four particular' slices of time pertaining to the
- calculated' containment transient. -The selected periods can be
[ correlated-to the major time frames of the analysis;.the blowdown phase, the:reflood phase, the time when ice bed moltout occurs and the time of the calculated puak containment pressure. b specifically, these tables reflect the integrated heat rer>Wa4 by the
-ice, the_ structural heat sinks, and the RHR and Containment spray Heat h ,
- Exchangers. Additionally, the tables include the energy content-of the sump and-the' amount of ice melted at the respective times. ,
e t E -- g 9 k. w Y
$'=
157
^^
'4-' y
.p y
; n x fGl '
'SQN-6
~
lo. ct ' 35. y {
;{l e 1 The peak pressure was calculated to be:tt:0k psig (48:$'psla) occurring at approximately A6en seconds. - An energy accounting at:369ft seconds, is 6 ,
m given in Table 6.2.1-11D b3,t , Parametric studies which varied the ice mass, the ultimate heat sink A . (i.e. ERCW) temperature, and-the emergency raw cooling water flow rates (ERCN) have been performed. The results of;lce mass parametric study- , which were calculated with~the LOTIC computer code are provided in Figure- l 6.2.1-24. The parametric studies of the ultimate heat sink temperature t p and ERCH flow rates were performed utilizing- the MONSTER computer code. ) 'The MONSTER model was benchmarked against the base case LOTIC FSAR analysis. The peak containment pressure calculated by the MONSTER base '~ l case analysis was within 2% of the LOTIC base case with MONSTER being
. conservatively higher.
The parametric analysts on ultimate heat sink temperature showed that an t
. Increase of 0.14 psi in containment peak pressure occurs for a increase ;
from 83'F to 85'F in the ultimate heat sink temperature.
- The' analysis to quantify-the effect of a reduction in the ERCW flow-rate from the FSAR base case required adjustments to the heat exchanger duties g
P of the containment spray and component cooling heat exchangers. The ): ~a djustments to the duties also corrected a conservative but erroneous , modeling assumption:In the LOTIC base case analysis and accounted for L different tube. plugging percentages. All heat exchangers were modeled as L
~ strictly counterflow heat exchangers wtth the following duties and tube i u
plugging-percentages; containment spray - 2.932 X 10* btu /hr *F (7.5%
- /5 tubes plugged) and component cooling - 2.793 X 10' btu /hr *F (14.5% *
- (- tubes plugged). The duty of the residual heat removal heat exchanger was changed to 1.402 X 10' btu /hr *F to adjust for the strictly v
f countercurrent modeling. ERCH flow rates to the containment spray heat B- . exchanger. and to the component cooling heat exchanger were reduced from p Table 6.2.1-1 values to:3546 gpm and 3996 gpm respectively. The net D .effect of changes to the ERCH flow rate and heat exchangers was to inc. ease containment pressure by 0.05 psi. > A worst case analysis utilizing the most conservative ERCW' flow rate,
~
l-heat exchanger adjustments, and an 85'F ERCW temperature resulted in a i peak containment pressure of 11.50 pst. This peak pressure is 0.5 pst less than the containment desig.. pressure and provides assurance that 4 decreased ERCH flow rates and increased ERCW temperatures can be
~
tolerated without. exceeding the containment dusign pressure. l j_t,r_g51 ural Heat Removal J, Provision is made in the containment pressure analysis for heat storage in-Interior and exterior walls. Each wall is divided into number of nodes. For each node, a conservation of energy equation expressed in finite difference form accounts for transient conduction into and out of the node and temperature rise of the node. Table - ^
^
the containment structural heat sinks used in the analysis)is includinga the sumary of material property clata used. j (.7.1 50 m 6.2-24 0058F/COC4 158 I ,1 i
- -- ~ - . -. - - - . . - . . - - . - - . - . -
y ,
- SQN-
.The heat transfer coefficient to the containment structure in the lower and ice condenser compartments is calculated by the code based pri.marily.
in the work of Tagami. From this work, it was determined that the value - i of the heat transfer coefficient increases parabolically to a peak value
at the end of blowdown and then decreased exponentially to a stagnation
> heat. transfer coefficient which is a function of. steam to air weight g ,
ratto. When applying the'Tagami correlations,-a conservative limit was J placed on the lower compartment stagnant heat transfer coefficients. They were'11mited to a steam / air ratto of 1.4 according to the Tagaml l correlation. The imposition of this limitation is to restrict the use of , the Tagant correlation within the test range of steam / air ratios where
.the correlation was derived. .
' Figure 6.2.1-25 is a plot of the heat removal rate of one RHR spray pump and one containment spray pump as a function of water temperature and containment atmosphere temperature.
h 6.2.1.3.5 Effect of Steam Bypass The sensitivity of the compression peak pressure to deck bypass is shown in Figure 6.2.1-26, which shows that an increase in deck bypass area of - 50 percent would cause an' increase of about 0.2 pst in final peak .,
~'
compression pressure. Also, it is Important to note that the plant final peak. compression pressure of psig already includes a contribution of
.0.4 psi from the plant deck bypas area of 5 ft'.
7.18 .
'This effect of' deck leakage on upper containment pressure has been vert-fled by a settes of four special, full-scale section tests. These tests were all' identical except different size deck leakage areas were used.
.The results'of these tests are given in Figure 6.2.1-27 which includes
-two curves of test results. Each curve shows the difference in upper "
. compartment pressure between one test-and another resulting from a i
difference in deck leakage area. One curve shows the increase in upper h compartment pressure at the end of the boiler blowdown (after the compression peak pressure, at about 50 seconds in these tests), and the second curve shows the increase in upper compartment-peak pressure (at -'
-about 10 seconds in these tests). -It should be noted that the pressure
' . at the end of the blowdown is less than the peak compression ratio pressure occurring at about to seconds for reference blowdown test.
The containment pressure increase due to deck leakage is directly. proportional to the total amount of steam leakage into the upper l< compartment, and the amount.of this steam leakage is, in turn, l propprtional to the amount of steam released from the boiler, less the inventory of steam remaining in the lower compartment. Notably, the b increase in upper compartment compression peak pressure is substantially H less than the upper compartment pressure increase' at the end of. blowdown, because the peak compression pressure occurs before the boller has
'- released all of its energy, and measured increase in peak compression
. pressure due to increased deck leakage, is proportionately reduced. For the case of the plant cwsign, the final peak compression pressure is l.
L( , 6.2-25 0058F/COC4
. 159
l s, l [, SON b
' 62. rdelon, Frank M., SATANV,- NCAP-7750, *A Computer Space Time
- " ; pendent Analysis of Loss of- Coolant, August 1971. p
. 63.' MONSTER - Containment Analysis Computer Program, TVA Topical Report.
+
TVA-TR85-01. 4 Nedel Io#- W.
- Wes%gk wse. LoCA Mass Aud Ener<f y Aeleas e-Centswnedt Dewin - M m.k Iq)q Q earm, w cA P .t o 3af- P= A
. May SL 1983 (Peynelary( gg.jo; pas.p, g ay $, y g3
. c w . en poet y ) ,
t 4 ( .' t P 9 6.'2-137 0059F/COC4 160
-- - - - - -. __.__..__m-m.__ __._____.____.__ ___
}
SQW r 4 TABLE 6.2.1 1 (Sheet 1)
. , h. ,
?f' . GENERAL INFORMAT10N RELATED TO CONTAINMENT-l *' '!. ' General Informatton- . l'- A. Design pressure, psig - 12
- 8. Design temperature. F - 327
. C. Free volume, ft* /, s e(,,910
. D. Design and maximum allowable leak - 0.25 rates. 1/ day .
- !!. Initial Conditions
.A. . Reactor Coolant System (at design overpower of 102% and at l, -normal. liquid. levels)
- 1. Reactor power level, swt -:3:;8th 3991.'s-2 Average coolant temperature. 'F - 577.6
. c.
- 3. Mass of. Reactor Coolant System ' - 538,640 ,
11guld, Ibn
- 4. .-Mass of Reactor Coolant System - 4660-Steam, Ibn
- 5. Liquid plus steam energy, *8TU - 334.6 x 10'
'8. Contalnment
- 1. -Normal pressure, psig -0
-- 2. Normal inside temperature,
- f. *F - upper compartment - 85
. - lower compartoont - 100 ,
- Ice condenser - 15
- Not appilcable
-:' 3. Outside-temperature. 'F-
- 4. Average relative humidity,1 - 30
- 5. Maximum essential raw water - 83 :
temperature, 'F 6.. Maximum refueling water temperature - 105 (if appilcable), 'F f.q3
- 7. Inttla) ice mass (min.). Ib - 4WS x 10'
. C. Stored Mater (as applicable) ,
- 1. Refuelingwaterstoragetank, gal - 375,000 '
- 2. Quench spray tank, ft - Not applicable
- 3. All accumulators (safety injection - 4,372 maximum tanks, ft* - 4,253 minimum per unit
'All energies are relative to 32*F
..~
' ' 0327F/COC4 161 4.
-p
< SQW. -
r
- t TABLE 6.2.1-l'(Sheet 2) '
b{I (Continued)- l ." ~ GENERAL INFORMATION RELATED-TO CONTAINMENT K Condensate storage tanks, ft* - 106,337 total 4. ] ,' of two tanks for both units- , a i
.!!! The Deston Basis ACCM '
See Figures 6.2.t-20 6.2.1-21, and 6.2.1-23 LL IV. Nass and Enerav Addition Tables - See Tables 6.2.1-13, 6.2.1 16, and 6.2.1 20 A ., 1 4 a A A r L l,
- r l-ll s
L. i L L r l- ? s l l l 1 l l (: ,
' 0327F/COC4 h 162 e -- ,- e e-- , , , .,e y , --,,-
%g, j, f l SON
-(
TABLE 6.2.1-1 (Sheet 9)'
' (Continued) ,' GENERAL INFORMATION RELATED TO CONTAl m (NT "
Value Used 4 for Full Containment-Capacity Analysis
.E. Containment Cooling Fan
~5ystems
' NoneESF 0
- 1. Number of units F. Heat Exchangers 1.-. RER System
$ hell & U-Tube Shell & U-Tube a._ Type. (single - pass)
(single - pass) . 1 2
' b. Number
- c. Heat transfer 4et?5 area, ft' each 4,275
- d. Excess capacity
*1
-for tube ft. 40 plugging % each 5
- e. Heat-transfer capac1ty, 10' BTU /hr 31 ** ' 2.B . 3 each
- f. Neat transfer coefficient (pA).
10' BTU /hr *F-each Modeled with 5% tube plugging and maximum fouling l*4'1 . factor 1.52 W googssa g c.euarse.rcow n P6 N6AT grA& W 6Wt.)
'g. Flow rates:
3oiq
- 1. Tube Side. %;0th gpa each 4.500 (at 3.600 seconds)
- 4. RHR spray, gpm each 2,000 2.000 0327F/COC4
<L_
163 9 .
. . .- -- . - . - . - -~ .. .
- s
,~, o. .
t
. 7.;."g , . SON .
.. . _ -TABLE 6.2.1-1 (Sheet 10) .!
- 'ri (Continued)~ l (y ( 4 -r
/ L .' GENERAL INFORMAf t0W RELATED To CONTAINMENT '!
. Tie Value Used -
t for Full Containment l
- Capacity Analysis t e
- b. RHR to RCS 2,500 t: fife .
In spray (ot4 mode gpa ! i ' each ,
/ '2. lShell side, 5,000 gpm each- 5,000 -t
- h. Source of cooling
. water CCS CCS . .f a
I
- l. -Flow begins,
. seconds Automatic. hfitfr. 1%"I !
lh ( , level control I, 2. Containment Spray System l
.a,,
; Type Shell & U-Tube' Shell & U-Tube .. ;
Counterflow -Counterflow t (.
~b.
c. Number Heat transfer. 2 1 area, ft' each g,891 $3tt 1% #18 < Excess capacity d.
.for tube plugging, n
.1 each ' 30 Aft. 10~
Heat transfer e e capacity. 10' , BTU /hr each 64 it: 78.i y . p __, . f. Heat transfer i
~
coefficient ~ modeled with 30%
' tube plugging factor (pA) 2.44 2:12 2 9 3J 10' BTU /hr *F each (Moosub as coum6the TWE Hgo eM,rp4N6FQ.
0327F/COC4 a-1 .. -. 164 __'i f
j . '. 4 .
.E I TABLE 6.2.1-1 (Sheet-11) g rl: ,
(Continued) CENERAL INFORMATION RELATED TO CDNTAINNENT =
' Value Used for Full Containment 4 < Capacitte Analysis
- g. Flow rates ,-
- 1. Tubesite (spray f u s) gpa each 4,750 '4,750
- 2. Shell side gpa each 5,000 :$;000t . 35 % .
- h. _ Source of cooling '
water ERCH ERCH
'i. : Flow begins, seconds- 45 stk. 15. c (maximus)
" ~ 3.. Component Coo 11ng Nator I. - a. Type Shell & Tube Shell & Tube (Spilt Flow) (Split flow)
- b. Number 2 1
- c. . Heat transfer e area. ft' each 17,010 49;6ter. I b ,143
- d. Excess capac'ity for tube plugging, 7. each 5
- 16
- e. Heat transfer -
capacity.10' BTU /hr each, which includes LOCA load for RHR Hx only 31 $t= 11.5s 0 0327F/COC4 165 j ')
4 SON.
- f. TABLE 6.2.1-1 (Sheet 12).
(Coatinued)
; GENERAL INFORMATION ret.ATED TO CONTAINMENT Value Used h for J Full Containment a CaDacity Analysis *
. f. Heat transfer i H coefficient l .L (pA)'10' , l BTU /hr 'r each, modeled with 51. tube plugging, maximum fouling
- 1. factor, and a .
split flow correction . e factor of 0.72 2.66~ $=82 y,7ej (,n.osw.e, 4s c..wrearte.o
- g. Flow rates , , ,
p 1 Tubeside
- (ERCH), gpm I
acch 4.000, 4.000 1'
- 2. Shellside.
/ .gpm each 5.000 5,000 Source of-h.
D Cooling-Water ERCW ERCW i 4 s-o
- l. . .
l1 s t i s
, 0 ls l 0327F/COC4 s ,
l' - 166 L . a [ } k.
SQN 9 TABLE 6.2.1-6
!CE CONDENSER PARAMETERS USED IN D ~ CQ4 PRESS 10N-PEAK PRES $URE ANALYS!$
i' ~+ Upper Comparteent, f t' .651,000 * , L Ice Condenser, ft' L Lower Plenus 24,200 Ice Bed. .M ;488 0 (. 3 A o [ 47,000-Upper Plenus . Lower Compartment (active), f t' .ttt;000: 249500 ' L Total Active Volume, ft' s,o s7,eso
-Lower Compartment (dead ended), ft' :At;oodt: tu,teo .
. Total Containment. Volume, ft' N f,jn,q go Reactor Containment Air Compressor Ratio .t:22. f,3W i: Reactor Power, MWt 6 3948 5 Design Energy Release to Containment N 5 33, ti 6 9
' Initial Blowdown Mass Release Ib.
N Initial Blowdown Energy Release, BTU 3,7,9 (,p) . l Ice Condenser Parameters ; '" b .Neight of !ce in Condenser, Ib. l,93 (d) l
- t. !
l .. 1 l l l l l 1 L h
- All volumes are not free volumes.
1 l
0637F/COC4 1
167 1 l 1
% l
$)N .
TABLE 6.2.1 -j CONTAINNENT PRESSURE CALCULATION PUMP FLOW VS. TIME ! After. '
. RH Sa ards Flow to- Spray- pray Inittat Core- Flow Flow
.l.. .
(sec) (GPM)- (GPM) .(GPM) 0' 0 0 , 0 44.9 0 0
, 45.0 0- 0- -i 1585.0 4913 4750- 4 ,
i L '3839 4750- 0 1586.0 - 0 1605.0 3839 '4750 0 1895.0 .3839 4750- 0 l 2205.0: 3839 750 0: , 2206.0 383 4 0 1 2215.0- 9 4750- 0 1 2216.0 3839. 4750 0 ! 3600.0 3839 4750- 2000'
.3601.0 1074 4750 000 1 End of 1074 4750 2 l Transient I
L . ( . DKLE15 AMD RE 9LACF WlTN .
"N E W TA3LG' G, ,2.1 - ?
l q l L g , l'. I s .' . ! 0637F/COC4 )
'k- l 168 I i
. i
i R:-
-TABLE 6.2.1-7
, LC$$ 0F 0FF-51Ti POWER AT EVENT INITIATION CONTAINMENT PRES $URE CALCULATION PUMP FL W VS. TIME TIME AFTER ECC$ FLW RHR ECC$ FLW SAFEGUARDS' TO CORE SPRAY $ PRAY TO CORE-INITIATION (RWST) M M fSUMP) C0 mENTS -
(SEC) (GPM) : GPM (GPM) (GPM) ti 0- 0 0 0 0 '$" - $lgnal
- 21.9 - 0- 0 0 0-22.0 1019- 0 0 0 CCP/$1P Start l 26.9 1019 -0 0 0 27.0: "4858 0 0 0 RHR/CCP/$1P ECCs Flow
,249.9 4858- 0 0 0 250.0 4858 4750 0 0 contairment spray Start 1690.0 4858 4750 0 0
- 1. , '1691.0 1019: 4750 0 2500 RHR Switchover
'1710.9- 1019 4750- -0 2500 1711. O' 4750 0 3519 CCP/$1P Switchover ;.
D 2802.9 0 4750 0' 3519 Li 2803. 0 0 0 3519 CS P g Ctopped ; l' -3112.9' O O O 3519 l ' ) (. \ '- ' 3113.
'0 4750 0 3519 C$ P W $witchovtr l7 .3600.9 0- 4750 0 3519 jf !.- .. .'3601. 0 4750 2000 1019 .RHR Aligreent for Auxiliary CS-
[ , !- 'End of 0 4750 2000' '1019
- T ransient .
e l' l >
'
- 4858 9pm Total ECCS Flow (RWST) 422 gpa - 1 Centrifugal Charging Pump 597 opa - 1 Safety Injection Puno kn : 3839 gym - 1 RHR Pump i
7 L , a l:i-. ', 1998v:10/111689 169 4
- )'
y ;
- /n ,
SON
, a >
; TABLE 6.2.1-8 .
' NORMAL 12ED DECAY HEAT Ime .
F , Decay Heat Frac on
.1. E+02 4.2230E-
- 2. E+02 3.6030 2 *
- 4. +02 3.059 -02 - l 6.0000 02~ 2.77 E-02~ < ;f 1.0000E+ 3: 2. 99E-02 s
2.0000E+0 8925E-02 ! 4.0000E+03 .5359E-02 6.0000E+03- 1.3537E-02 , 1.0000E+04 1.1622E-02
-K 2.0000f+04 9.4630E-03 s 4.0000E+04 7.7030E-03 6.0000E+04 6.7920E-03 ;
1.0000E+05 - -5.7620E-03 i 2.0000E+05 4.5400E-03 4.0000E+05 3.4770E-03 6.0000E+05 2.8840E-03 1.0000E+06 2.2990E-03
'2.0000E+ 1.6600E-03 4.0000E 6 1.1390E-03
- 6. 406 's.8600E-04 i
~1. E+07 7.1000E-04 .
.." t s
L- ' Total decay h t found by multiplying fraction y reactor power.. s i
\ 1 i
DEL.ET E AND ' R E 94.AC E LU /7N
- MEW" TestE 4, .n .1- 8' f
.s I\. . .
-i 0637F/COC4 170 1
4 I L
m 4
- a:
Vljj O b " l l..'
- TABLE' 6.2.1 . ,
#
- HOR',MJZED DECAY HEAT DECAY HEAT TIME GENERATION RATE-(SEC) (BTU /BTV) 1.00E+01 0.053876
-1.50E+01 0.050401 2.00E+01' O.048018 i 0.042401 i L - 4.00E+01
- 6.00E+01- 0.039244 i i
0.037065 8.00E+01 h :1.00E+02 0.035466- i i- 1.50E+02 0.032724 l O.030936 l 2.00E+02'
-4.00E+02- 0.027078- .
6.00E+02 0.024931 l 0.023389- 1 8.00E+02 0.022156 ! l'.00E+03 '! , t 1,50E+03. 0.019921
- 1 2.00E+03~ 0.018315
- i. - 4.00E+03 '0.014781 1 m* 6.00E+03 0.013040
" 8.00E+03 0.012000 , 0.011262- ! 1.00E+04 ' 1.50E+04- 0.010097-~ 4.00E+04- 0.007778 l 1.00E+05- 0.006021 [ 4.00E+05' O.003770 t
' 6.00E+05 0.003201 -!
8.00E+05 0.002834 > E 1.00E+06 0.002580 0.002530 L 1.50E+06 2.00E+06 0.001909 4.00E+06 0.001355. 6.00E+06 0.001091 8.00E+06 0.000927
'1.00E+07 0.000808 Total decay heat found by multiplying fraction;by reactor power i,
4 171
.c _. __ . _ .. - . . _ _ . .-. - . _ ._ . . _ . _ .
F o:. , ;
..g, '
-{
_ SQN s c ::.,' ~
~D TABLE 6.2.1-9
~. , - -
acceuwTw cs , ENERGY ORBAN009 Approximate Slowdown End of Reflood f . 2.5'E
- l. .
g (BTU) (t.10 sec) (BTV) (t.t33 fec) L . -2cv 2Y 5.Y : ;
- m (10') W (10')'
I ' Ice Heat Removal
- Structural Heat Sinks (10') - (10')
V' RHR Heat Exchanger Heat Removal 0.0 0.0
Spray Heat Exchanger Heat Removal 0.0 0.0-189.9 247.7 L_. .itet (10')
=tstar (10')-
Energy Content of Sump Ice Melted (Pounds) 1k:82. (10') N (10') i l6 , 0.1 0 835 . I' :
"lwh $c4Ied Ewegsts L
L 9 1 i ie (
-y 0537F/COC4
_ (:- . 172 I I
7 .y , I rif. l'^ '
.: t SON-
's t : ,
' :Je l -TABLE 6.2.1-10 32.72. Scccisos 7
k ^. ~ ENERGY ACCOUNTING AT S Min. a 3,~ j I
' -(Approulmate time of ice bed moltout)
JA M l
,;.. *!ce Heat Removal W 6 S 1 1. 5 (10 ) -
At=te. 73,7 (fo6 )
*Structoral Neat Sinks ,
*RHR Neat Euchanger Neat Removal h 37,q (se6 )
- Spray Heat Euchanger Neat Removal St::t 6,5 (lo")
b
$35:$ M9.5(so )
# _ Energy of Sumps-Pounds of. Ice MeItod , A=it.(10')
I,93-3
- Integrated Energies p
1i *
-7 .~ ' '
l L -' - l .; 1 l .. i, e 18 . l a l 0637F/COC4 Q. 173 L
. . . - _ - - . _ . _ . ~ .
c ,, t . i son .i n , TABLE 6.2.1-11 4390.9
-(T
' .1 M'0401
.E.NERGY
. . . . A. C.. COUNTING.AT.M.e.d.
(Approntaate time of peak pressure).
- Ice Heat Removal 28L S 2I.S {se 0
- Structural Heat Sinks :st:st' / /3,7 (I)
- RHR Heat Euchanger Heat Removal A t::1 /08.4 ('O -
- Spray Neat Euchanger Heat Removal :2 t 3 /Fo,F (t* N Energy of Susps- $22=9 677.6 (t
- N- .l Pounds of Ice Melted .2=tdK 10' )
/. 93 8
- Integrated Energies
_{. L j 1 b, l l. l%; 4 3 0637F/COC4
.o 174 l
I I
'T
-TABLE 6.2.1
- 13A p'
t .
. BLOWDOWN NASS AND ENERGY RELEASES - DOUBLE ENDED PUMP SUCTION GUILLOTINE BREAK ,
i TIME: BREAK PATH NO. 1 FLOW- BREAK PATH.NO. 2 FLOW THOUSAND THOUSAND SECONDS LBM/SEC BTU /SEC LBM/SEC BTU /SEC 26 . .; 0.000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.100 40484.4' 22003.4 21647.9 11740.2 0.300 x44141.6- 24203.5 23045.5 12511.0 0.800- 43836.2 25154.2 19028.$ 10351.4 . 1.10 40447.2 23783.4 17419.0 9472.2 1.70 31396.6 19502.3 16223.0 8831.5 2.60 .19834.3 12784.9 15574.0 8548.9 3.10 17687.3 11420.3- :14654.6 8121.8 4.00 18020.2 11458.2 12987.8 7311.0
. . 4.60 -18133.6 11562.8 13900.5 7863.9 5.80 .15906.8 10342.5 13020.1 7398.4 0
[. 7.00 16258.4 10390.5 12448.9 7067.0 7.60- 12317.9 8520.9- 12128.8 6873.8 y 8.00 .13074.6 8924.4 11949.0 -6765.2 9.00 16863.2 10965.0 11437.3 6450.5- l s- , 10.4. 17919.5 11389.5 10490.7 5895.3 4 10.9 23486.2 14774.6- 10007.3 5619.0
.11.2 23454.1 14609.3 9571.4 5370.0 12.2- 20868.7 12878.0 8539.0 4795.8 5951.9 8711.7 4912.3 i 12.6 9495.8 13.2 6607.2 4478.2 8505.8 4813.3 13;8 7908.6 5225.1 8504.5 4856.1 8041.9 4685.0 14.6 5620.0 4737.0 15.8 5166.7 4292.6 6449.8 4136.8 17.8 3934.0 3539.5 6234.3 3092.6 O
t: . 175 W
TABLE 6' 2.1 - 13A - . (Cont)' h, . SLOWDOWN NASS AND ENERGY RELEASES - DOUBLE ENDED
-PUMP SUCTION GUILLOTINE BREAK
/l i
TIME- BREAK PATH NO. 1 FLOWJ BREAK PATH NO. 2' FLOW'
-4 o THOUSAND THOUSAND SECONDS LBM/SEC BTU /SEC LBM/SEC BTU /SEC r 18.2 3532.8 3286.8 1C860.8 5326.8 r,
.18.4 3329.6 3251.5 5114.3. 2533.2 3 20.4 2434.7. 2526.9 5284.6 2172.7 ,
21=2:
. 2087.9- 2355.3 3871.4 1543.1-21.6 1901.2 2230.7 5090.8 ,1868.8 j 28.0' 234.8 296.5 1605.6- 394.2
,28.6L 34.5 44.2- 1600.1 376.4
- 29.2: 26.4 33.8 0.0- 0.0-
.29.4 0. 0' O0 2229.0 502.7 ,
. . 29.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 g, .
l i, L (. i L
. e ..
l i l
.i g-176 b .
TABLE 6.2.1 - 16A
- REFLOOD MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES - DOUBLE-ENDED PUMP SUCTION--
GUILLOTINE BREAK MINIMUM SAFEGUARDS
' TIME BREAK PATH NO. 1 FLOW BREAK PATH NO. 2 FLOW THOUSAND~ THOUSAND SECONDS- L8M/SEC BTU /SEC - L8M/SEC BTU /SEC ,
29.6 0.0 0.0- 0.0 0.0 ~
-30.0 111.3 130.4 --1980.7 171.9
-30.4 100.0 117.0 1959.5 170,0 31,1- 110.4 129.2: 1918.1- 166.4 ,
33.7 132.7 155.4 1800.7 156.0 34.7 140.1 164.2- 1761.9 152.6 36.7 154.1 180.6 1691.2 146.4 38.7 167.0 195.8 1628.2 140.9 39.7 346.5- 408.3 4423.6 533.1 40.7 386.9 - 456.6- 4887.5 622.2 41.7- 385.8 455.2 4875.1 624.4 ; 618.2 ! 42.7 380.6 449.1 4815.2 - 46.7 360,1- 424.5 4573.2 591.3 48.7- .350.7 413.4 4461.3 578.7- , i o 52.7
~333.8 393.3 4255.8 555.6 L 53.7 282.7 332.6 3417.9 487.8 ,
269.7 143.9
)/JC 54 8
. 291.2 293.8 342.6 345.7 270.7 145.4 55.8 i
67.8 270.5- 318.1 261.1 132.8-l' 75.8- 259.6 305.2 256.5 127.0 76.8- 258.7 304.1 256.6 126.5 t. 92.8 250.0 293.8 264.3 122.2 !'F l-100.8
.116.8 246.9 242.1 290.1 284.5 269.4 282.3 120.9 119.4
;118.8- 241.6 283.9 284.1 119.2 .
-128.8 - 238.8 280.6 293.7 118.7 !
144.8 233.5 274.2 310.1 117.9 176.8 217.6 255.5 244.9 116.0 194.8: 205.8 241.5 364.8~ 114.9-196.8 , 204.3 239.8 366.9 114.8 224.8 181.2 212.5 399.8 113.4 232.8 173.9 203.9 411.1 113.6 r 234.8 171.9 201.6 414.0 113.7 250.8 155.7 182.5 436.7 114.1 254.8- 151.4 177.4 442.6 114.3 4
.g ;
177 _-A-l_--------_'--.--.__N___-______
g . t
~-
I TABLE 6.2.1 - 20A 4 POST RE' FLOOD' MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES - - DOUBLE-ENDED PUMP SUCTION GUILLOTINE BREAK - NIN! MUM SAFEGUARDS BREAK PAT. 9 NO.1 FLOW BREAK PATH NO. 2 FLOW TIME , THOUSAND THOUSAND BTWSEO LSH/SEC BTV/SEC SECONDS LBM/SEC 193.7 497.6 116.5
- 2254.B' 157.6 193.0 498.1 116.5 259.8 157.1 192.4 498.6 116.5 264.8 156.6' 501,8 188.4 116.5 294.8: 153.4 188.7 ~501.6 116.4 299.8 153.6 182.6 506.5 116.5-344.8 148.7 182.8 506.4 116.4 t -
349.8 148.8-180.1 508.6 116.4 369.8 146.6 147.5 535.1 116.7-
;374.8- 120.1 116.7 119.7 147.1 535.5 379.8' 542.0 117.2 429.8 113.2' 139.1 136.3 544.3 117.3 449.8 110.9 110.7 136.0 544.5 117.2-454.8 118.0 101.0 124.0 554.2
- 524.8 554.4 118.0 529,8- 100.8 123.8
- (< 534.8 130.5 160.3 524.8 116.7 126.0 154.8 529.2 116.8-574.8 116.8 125.2 153.8 530.0 l584.8 536.9 117.1-
.639.8 118.3 145.3 115.8 142.3 539.4 117.3 659.B: -117.2 115.5 141.9 532.7 664~.8 112.2 137.9 543.0 117.4 689.B: 117.8 724.8 ~106.9 131.3 548.3 105.8 130.0 549.4 117.9 734.8 118.3 99.6 122.3 555.6 774.8 559.1 118.6-794.8 96.2 118.1 95.4 117.2 559.8 116.8
.889.8 559.8 116.8 1690.0 95.4 117.2 97.2 119.3 412.3 116.8 1691.0- .
412.3 116.8 1979.8- 97.2 119.3 67.5 82.4 414.1 117.5 1979.9 47.2 67.1 77.2 414.5 2313.1 b L - 178
.; $QN-1 j
~
e a TABLE 6.2.1-22 4 (?'
~ DOUBLE ENDED PUMP SUCTION LOCA t
t MIN!EM SAFEGUARDS.
, .4 - ,
Time (see)
'U- g 0
Rupture-15.5 , Accumulator flow starts /4. O i ps .dzau,sfut#W af Sffay. J. . sy41em 38: r
- m 29 6 End of blowdown +
,__ ~ ,_ ..... ., y
'30.0 Aesumed smeteniew .f - Ecc's 4tdr. 54.0
- Accumulators empty I Mt=tl 254.# ,
End of reflood-p Low level alars of refueling water storage tank **80'. - / 48) , L Recirculation phase of safeguards operation ttt5: . /g q l, 3600 RHR spray realignment' 1800.' (,3 9 l .
."- Peak containment pressure 1 . - .'
-.j J [
l' Revised by Amendment.1 -
+
e c v
. s. 0362F/COC4
( 179
._2----__-----
1't SQN ~- TABLE 6.2.1.- 24A
- c ,
M SS AND ENERGY RELEASE DATA 000BLE ENDED PLMP SUCTION OUILLOTINE, MINIMUM SAFETY INJECTION jy
, TIME (SECONOS) 0.00 29.60 29.60 254.78 1984.80 2313.05 MASS (THOUSAND L8M)
IN RCS AND ACC 762.85 762.85 762.85 762.85 762.85 762.85 l INITIAL ADDED MASS PUMPED INlECTION 0.00 0.00 0.00 143.24 1226.41 1384.50 TOTAL ADDED 0.00 0.00 0.00 143.24 .1226.41 1384.50
*** TOTAL AVAILABLE *** 762.85 762.85 762.85 906.09 1989.26 2147.35 DISTRIBUTION' REACTOR-COOLANT 533.06 57.26 70.96 143.08 143.08 143.08 ACCUMULATOR 229.79 144.44 130.74 0.00 0.00 0.00 TOTAL CONTENTS 762.85 201.71 201.71 143.08 143.08 143.08
,f EFFLUENT BREAK FLOW 0.0 561.13 561.13 762.99 1846.17 2004.25 ECCS SPILL 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (
TOTAL EFFLUENT 0,00 561.13 561.13 762.99 1846.17 2004.25
*** TOTAL ACCOUNTABLE **
- 762.85 762.84 762.84 906.08 1989.25 2147.33 ENERGY SALANCE TIME (SECONDS) 0.00 29.60 29.60 254.78 1984.80 2313.05 A-' r 6 l(-
ENERGY (MILLION STU) INITI AL ENERGY. IN RCS. ACC. $ GEN 848.9) 848.91 848.91 848.91 848.91 848.91 ADDED ENERGY PUMPED INJECTION 0.00 0.00 0.00. 10.46 94.11 110.77 i DECAY HEAT 0.00. 13.28 13.28 38.86 166.59 186.20 s HEAT PROM SECONDAR 0.00 -6.45 -6.45 -6.45 8.14 8.14 TOTAL ADDED 0.00 6.83 6.83 42.87 268.85 305.12 m- TOTAL AVAILABLE - "* 848.91 855.74 855.74 891.78 1117.76 1154.03 . DISTRIBUTION REACTOR COOLANT 307.96 11.70- 12.91 32.78 32.78 32.78 ACCUMULATOR 15.99 10.05 8.84 0.00 0,00 0.00 CORE STORED 27.01 10.48 10.4E 4.31 3.88 3.77 PRIMARY METAL 158.29 147.45 147.45 126.40 66.67 60.30 SECONDARY METAL 93.61 91.84 91.84~ 82.09 45.26 39.30 < STEAM GENERATOR 246.05 245.00 245.00 214.94 125.08 110.08 TOTAL CONTENTS 848.91 516.52 516.52 460.52 273.67 246.23 EFFLUENT BREAK FLOW 0.0 339.23 339.23 433.63 846.46 910.17 ECCS SPILL 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 TOTAL EFFLUENT 0.00 339.23 339.23 433.63 446.46 910.17 m TOTAL ACCOUNTABLE *** 848.91 855.75 855.75 894.15 1120.12 1156.39 180 ___m____C.-__ii.'_E_____________________________-
9 <$r l IMAGE EVALUATION ,/,j// '[$g 4)%g@ , resi r-Ger <mm j,p f g, l.0 lf 2 014 y[ ' UM i,i [m HM 18_ j l.25 1.4 i.6 4 150mm > 4 6" >
^
r,
- $ '! f > ,f ,,,, ) .
I -) $ NN. .. ..- .. .i
- ung g s i ' " ' " ' ' "
4+ 49 9% IMAGE EVALUATION
,,,,g%j 4 4r /g, 4)fye : t/ TEST TARGET (MT-3) 4 #>,Q v/ %f<[O/
1.0 lf m M
" @ E4 ll E m HE l 1.8 l.25 1.4 1.6 150mm ?
4 4 6" >
>,f?'&>,, <#!b ssg////hN +, ,; pt ,y,,,,y a N// j W' w .
*^
^
III/ho J'#8<>4# N IMAGE EVALUATION
////
f[*#4
/ TEST TARGET (MT-3) f I0 lf 2 E
"[9HE E m IL2g ll 1.8 l
1.25 1.4 1.6 4 150mm > 4 6" > 8f ? -._ __
/$
n~ . a ,
M* 3 0
#@[k?,
# M' IMAGE EVALUATION .d TEST TARGET (MT-3) ///,gyNMef 4@4 #4 g),,,,//%!f//
W %,' l.0 'd 2 E24 pllNE I,i [f5 EM U1 l.25 1.4 1.6 4 150mm > 4 6" >
>,k % i,
,y,,,,, - -
/4%
g ;; sp\
+4/3)p
<ge' L
L.~- .
(T . , l , q r p v;_ s, .- b s J
- i. .
k
}( -
l g TABLE 6.2.1-50 -(Sheet 1)-
- s. . i h
' SEQUOYAH STRUCTURAL HEAT SINKS CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY ANALYSIS
- - Passive Heat Sinks 2
o. A. Material Pronerties (Reference 7).
, 1 Volumetric Thermal Heat I Conductivity- Capacity l BTU /hr-F-ft BTU /ft3-F j Material Paint j 0.2000' 14.0 l Paint 2- 0.0833 28.4 Concrete' O.8 28.8- .
Stainless. Steel 9.4' 56.35 Carbon Steel 26.0- 56.35
~. ..
ih B. Surfaces- : Area. Layer and Thickness Heat Sink Material (ft 2) (ft)
.Unner Comnartment
- 1) Operating Deck Concrete 4,800 1.07 Concrete
- 2) Crane Mall Concrete 18,280 0.0005 Paint 1.29 Concrete Stainless f
.3) Refueling Canal Steel-lined 0.0208 Concrete 3.840 Steel
' 1.5 Concrete
? *
- 4) Operating Deck Concrete 760 0.00125 Pair.t 1.5 Concrete
~
'1998v:1DA1489 1
o i p
.I 2 :
L r b TABLE 6.2.1-50 (Sheet 2) - SEQUOYAH STRUCTURAL HEAT SINKS ~ , CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY ANALYSIS 7 Y At a Layer and Thickness
. Heat Sink Material (ft ) (ft) ,
Unner ramnartment (Continued) ,
. 5) Containment Shell Steel 49,960 0.000625 Paint LR
! & Misc. Steel 0.0403 Steel
- 6) Misc. Steel Steel 2.260 0.000625 Paint 0.12 Steel
, ?
Lower Comnartment l
. 7) Operating Deck,
( Crane Hall & Interior Concrete 32,200 1.416 Concrete i Concrete
- 8) Area in Contact Concrete 15,540 0.0005 Paint with-sump Hater 1.6 Concrete 1
- 9) Interior Concrete Concrete 2,830 .00125 Paint 1.0 Concrete
- 10) Interior Concrete Concrete 760 0.0005 Paint 1.75 Concrete
- 11) Reactor Cavity Steel-Lined 2,270 0.02082 Stainless Concrete Steel 2.0 Concrete L
182 1998v:10/111689
-7
.l
} .'
~
{ TABLE 6.2.1-50 (Sheet 3) 1
~
.SEQUOYAH STRUCTURAL HEAT SINKS , l CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY ANALYSIS
- . -1 Layer and Thickness Heat Sink Material Ar!a (ft ) (ft). i I
Lgger Comnartment (Continued)
- 12) Containment Shell Steel 19,500 0.000625 Paint
& Misc. Steel 0.0495 Stee)
- 13) Nisc. Steel Steel 9,000 0.000625 Paint 0.1008 Steel
't Ice Condenser.
i i
- 14) Ice Basket Steel 180,600 .00663 Steel !
l( l . 15) Lattice Frames Steel 76,650 0.217 Steel , i
- 16) Lower Support I Structure-- Steel 28,670 0.276 Steel
- 17) Ice Condenser Floor Concrete 3,336 .000833 Paint L 18) Containment Hall Composite 19,100 l.0 Steel &
Panels & Containment panel Insulation I Shell steel and 0.625 Steel Shell . insulation
- 19) Crane Hall composite 13,055 1.0 Steel &
L* Panels and panel Insulation Crane Hall steel and 1.0 Concrete insulation
.(
0 1998v:1D/111689 0
W t FIGURE 6.2.1-20 CASE 3 1.93 Million Pounds of Ice ; i Ioss of Power Assumed at Event Initiation SEQUDYAH CONTAINMENT PRESSURE ~ ANALYSIS CONTAINMENT SYSTEM PRESSURE TRANSIENT 16.
- t, 14 12.
3 7' x p 10. r N N w
- e. 1
\ s +
w , M s e- , N,,/ 4 2. gg5 ggd le s gg 6 101 102 TIME SEC 4 0 184
g - I
~ ~
FIGURE 6.2.1-21b-SEQUOYAH CONTAINMENT PRES $URE ANALYSIS CASE 3 1.93 Million Pounds of Ice
.Ioss of Power Assumed at Event Initiation CONTAINNENT EDWER COMPARTMENT TEMPERATURF. TRANSIENT l
.26E+5 i
.24C*5
.22C*5 \ l h=
o' .20E*5 - ., g ..- f -
\ \
h-- 5*18t*5 g h \s ,
.16t*5 a.
E.14E*5 8 ,
.12C*5
.10C+5 ,
1
- 80. 5 6 tel 102 gg5 gg4 10 10 l-l TIME SEC j
<1 L
186
6 l [ i FIGURE 6.2.1-21a f
.SEQUDYAH CONTAINMENT PRESSURE ANAt.YSIS CASE 3 .
1.93 Million Pounds of Ice ' Loss of Power Assumed at Event Initiation 1 CONTAINMENT UPPER COMPAR'DG3fT TEMPERATURE TRANSIENT
.26E*5
.24t*5
.22C*5
- m. -
f~.20E*5 5 (~ . 18E*5 W
.16E*5 W s h.14E*5 N
\s
.12E*5 s
.10C*5 ,'~'
. j ig5 6 10' 10 se't el 102 105 TIME SEC 4
- 185
'.'. Y ll
)
f\ FIGUEM 6.2.1-22 ; j
' SEQUDYAH CONTAINMENT PRESSURE ANALYSIS l
CASE 3 1.93 Million Pounds of Ice 1 Essa of Power Assumed at Event Initiation ' TEMPERATLUt2 TRANSIENT OF ACTIVE AND INACTIVE SUMPS 1
.26t*5 ,
.24C+5
. 22E*5 I a.
- 6 20E*5 W.
.1BE*5 '
INACTIVE
-( s i
R% .. ........
\
.16E*5
\ v , '% \
- b. '
\ f.14E*5 s i ^"I" l
.12E*5
.10E*5
- 80. ggd 5 gg6 101 102 105 10 TIME SEC l
t 187 l-
. . . ~ . - - . ._ . . - --
1, r } ; \ (
' ? .; ,
FIGURE 6.2.1-23 SEQUDYAH CONTAINMENT PRESSURE ANALYSIS CASE-3 ICE MELT (LBS) 1.93 Million Pounds of Ice Imss-of Power Assumed at Event Initiation (- . 3K +7
) ?
.tK+7
. lR
- 7 f
i I .i.e.7 Y g .1X'?
= ,
.1E
- 7 p
/
- .SeCet
__ . .../ goe ge e - ist ge t get god fl4 IKCl g,, l-l' l I - o,. l t' 4 188
f,i' ,, g , i l I
]h , -I
. i 1
FIGURE 6.2.1-24 , SEQUDYAH CONTAINMENT PRESSURE ANALYSIS , (LOSS OF POWER ASSUMED AT EVENT INITIATION) ICE MASS PARAMETRIE STUDY
-IS.
14 15. ( 12. S N l -( gII.
\
w
-g. N w ie.
E 9 i>
- 8. !
- 7. .22C 7
- l. .18E*7 .19E*7 .20E*7 .2tE*7 ICE MASS l
l G 189 l l.
~ ^ ^^~ ^ ' ' " ^ ^ ' ~ ~ ' ^ ~ ~ ~ ' ' ' ' ~ ^ ^ ^'
3 i I 4 l CosePUTFD Daft CH(cato Datt
;[
1 i l 1A
^
A h 11 if I C I& I Vl W E E% h - _ _
& l Aida - , a -v s ; .(
5
.h . . .
o A 8 13 I f] ~ f]J : O_ F
.A Y.A l_ KH{r
k_. ay ; i t p APPENDIX E s EMERGENCY CORE COOLING FLOW BASIS , The. flows used in the safeguards Data Package for the Sequoyah Site and are in ; the Containment Analysis as follows: l Containment Analysis Data: Centrifugal Charging Pump flows. . . . . . . . . . . . . 422 gpm Safety Injection Pump Flows................. 597 gpm Residual Heat Removal Pump Flows. . . . . . . . . . . . 3839 gpm ; The following information are the assumptions used in the Fluid Systems Model to generate the Containment Analysis Data. Centrifugal Charging Pump Safety Injection System Minimum Safeguards Data I 1. The flowrates consider single failure, therefore only one pump is operating and delivering flow to the four RCS cold legs.
- 2. One RCS cold leg is established as the least resistive path and is odeled to deliver.3 gpm more than the other RCS raid legs.
- 3. The plant pre-operational test data and the as built piping layout were used to establish he system header and branch line resistances.
- 4. The pump performance characteristics are based upon the TVA test data minus a minimum of 57. of 5800 feet. Note: The TVA test pump performance-data when compared with the actual pump characteristics is conservative.
- 5. The pump mini-flow and RCP seal flows are in the system model and their flows are not included in the total RCS injected flows.
1998v:1D/112289 I94
([ 6. The system model delivers flow to all four RCS cold legs against a system backpressure of 11.4 psig.- l7.- - r
.*> 7. The system model assumes the suction source and the RCS piping are at the same elevation.
Safety Injection Pump Minimum Safeguards Data ! 4 f
- 1. The flowrates consider single failure, therefore only one pump is operating delivering to four RCS cold legs.
- 2. One RCS cold. leg is established as the least resistive path and delivers 10 gpm greater than the other RCS cold legs.
2
- 3. The plant pre-operational. test data.and the as built piping layout were used to determine the system header and branch line resistances.
, I 4. The pump performance characteristics is based upon the test data minus a minimum of 5% of 2400 feet.- Note: The TVA test pump performance data ' when compared with an actual pump characteristic curve is conservative.
- 5. The pump mini-flow is modeled and the flow is not included in the total RCS injected flows.
The system model. delivers flow through all four RCS cold legs against a f 6. k system backpressure of 11.4 psig. H 7. The system model assumes the suction source and the RCS piping are at the
. same elevations.
Residual Heat Removal Pump Minimum Safeguards Data
. 1. The flowrates consider single failure, therefore only one pump is operating delivering to four,RCS cold legs.
(_~ 1998v:10/112289 195
h 2. The piping layout used in the analysis >was-a higher resistance.than that-of Sequoyah. . Comparing the actual plant (1988 piping takeoffs) f- - y configuration with the original ECCS configuration there is 2.5% resistance conservatism using the ECCS model representing the flowrate of 3976 gpm.
- 3. The pump performance characteristics.is based upon a minimum performance Es test curve minus a of 5% of 350 feet. Note: The minimum pump performance
, test curve when compared with an actual pump characteristic curve is conservative.
- 4. The system model delivers flow through all four RCS cold legs against a system backpressure of 11.4 psig.
- 5. The system model assumes the suction source and the RCS piping are at the-
, same. elevations.
E
.h e
h e 1998v:10/112289 196 _ _ . . . . _ _}}