ML19341C466
| ML19341C466 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png |
| Issue date: | 02/18/1981 |
| From: | CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19341C461 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8103030554 | |
| Download: ML19341C466 (31) | |
Text
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INTRODUCTION As required by Code of Federal Regulations Title 10. Volume I, l
Part 50.59 entitled, Changes. Tests and Experiments, the following report for 1980 is submitted.
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CONNECTICUT YANIGE 10CFR50.59 REPORT - 1980 l
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INDEX PLANT DESIGN CHANGES PDC NO.
PDC TITLE 193 Radwaste Test Tank Discharge Line 324 Generator Hydrogen Condition Monitor Pipe and Valve Modification 326 Fire Suppression Systems Additions and Modifications 332 Auxiliary Feed Pump Bearing Oil Cooling System 333 Combustible Gas Detection System 336 Floor Drains Changes and Additions for Fire Protection a
344 Containment Isolation Reset Modification 349 Treatment of Waste Neutralization Tank and Floor Drain Sump Effluents 350 Moisture Separator / Reheater Tube Bundle Replacement 352 Install Isolation Valves in Fire Main 353 Pressurizer Capillary Valves 354 Primary Vent Stack Drain Line Check Valve 358 Vent deader Drain Tank 360 Containment Jib Crane 361 Containment Control Air Compressor and Receiver Piping Stand Modifications 362 Containment Isolation Modificatioes Phase II 365 Reactor Coolant Pump Motor Oil Collection System l
368 Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Water Supply Valves 369 Replacement of 4-12" Feedwater Check Valves 375 CC-CV-721 Replacement 379 Turbine control Circuit 386 Change Setpoint of Waste Gas Surge Tank Relief Valve WG-TV-1156C
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O PLANT DESIud Ct!ANGE NUMBER 193 Plant Design Change Number 193 entitled Radwaste Test Tank Discharge Line is complete.
Description of Change Add additional effluent monitor in Test Tank Discharge Line at or near effluent isolation valve FRCV 1003. Monitor signal will be used to close isolation valve. The monitor will have a read out and alarm incorporated into RNS panel in Control Room.
Reason for Change Present monitor is downstream of proposed addition and after dilution with service water. The dilution with service water makes detection of 10 CFR 20 limits impracticable. The present location cannot be abandoned due to other potential release paths in the service water system.
Safety Evaluation This change will provide the present liquid release system with an additional monitor for increased surveillance of liquid releases.
This change has been found not to constitute an unreviewed safety question. The change will therefore improve the existing system with an additional safety feature of the added monitor which will provide control room indication and alarm as well as closure of FRCV 1003. Closure will be set to actuate before 10CFR20 limits are exceeded in liquid af ter dilution.
PLANT DESIGN CHANGE NUMBER 324 Plant Pnsign Change Number 324 entitled Generator Hydrogen Condition Monitor Pipe and Valve Modification is complete.
Description of Change Add piping and valves to Generator Hydrogen system / generator condition monitor. One line and valve to be added between generator H2 supply and monitor input. Additional line and valve between monitor output and :12 vent line.
Reason for Change In the past there has been occurrence of the Generator Condition Monitor going into the alarm state. Checking all other Generator parameters, however, appeared to be normal. This would lead to questions of monitor malfunction or bad hydrogen.
The proposed change would permit, by valving, H2 direct to the monitor from the H2 regulator. This will permit monitor verification.
Additionally, new hydrogen can be verified when received.
Safety Evaluation This change involves secondary equipment and has no effect on nuclear safety. This change will increase the flexibility of existing equipment.
This changed has been reviewed with respect to 10CFR50.59 and found it does not constitute an unreviewed safety question as it does not:
- Increase the probability or severity of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safet previously analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report.
- Create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report.
- Decrease the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any technical specification.
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PLANT DESIGN CHANGE NUMBER 326 Plant Design Change Number 326 entitled Fire Suppression Systems Additions and Modifications is complete.
Description of Change 4
a.
Install sprinkler systems in Fire Zones A-1A, A-1B, A-lC, A-6,
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P-1, P-3, S-9, S-10, S-ll, S-12, S-13, S-14, S-15, S-16, S-18, S-19, S-20, S-21, S-23, T-1 & T-2.
b.
Install automatic fire suppression systers in Fire Zones D-1, D-2 and S-17.
c.
Install a backup CO2 suppression system for Fire Zone R-1.
d.
Install an automatic local application Halon suppression system for MCC-5, 480V switchgear panel, D.C. distribution panel and vital bus power supply cabinets in fire zone S-8.
e.
Install hose stations in Fire Zones A-1B, A-11,^ P-1 and S-8.
f.
Relocate supply line for sprinklers in T-1A from alternative source.
g.
Relocate hose station shutoff valves outside Fire Zone S-17.
h.
Modify support system for hose station header in Fire Zone S-17.
i.
Install inter-connection to hose station ring header from independent supply in Fire Zone S-26.
j.
Install independent feed to yard fire loop from fire pumps in P-1.
k.
Install an additional sectionalizing valve in yard fire loop.
Reason for Change To comply with license conditions in Safety Evaluation Report, other commitments to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in Fire Hazards Analysis and various administrative requirements.
Safety Evaluation The modifications and installations proposed by this PDC require change to the Safety Technical Specifications and as such require NRC approval,rior to implementation.
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f However, the PDC does not represent an unreviewed safety question in that the probability of a reviewed malfunction or the possibility of an unreviewed malfunction is not raised in implementing the changes. In addition, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Safety Technical Specification is not reduced in implementing the changes.
The fire protection modifications and installations of the PDC serve to expand previously established safety concepts (NRC Safety Evaluation Report) and do not introduce any new unevaluated safety considerations. On this basis, the PDC is not considered to involve an unreviewed safety question.
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PLANT DESIGN CHANGE NUM3ER 332 Plant Design Change Number 332 entitled Auxiliary Feed Pump Bearing Oil Cooling System is complete.
Description of Change Provide a self-contained auxiliary feedwater pump cooling water system which will circulate a portion of the first stage pump discharge flow to all necessary pump turbine bearings.
Reason for Change a.
This change vill provide a Category I Cooling System.
b.
This change is a direct result of the Three Mile Island evaluation of plant systems.
Safety Evaluation, The changes being done by. (PDC 332) will ensure that bearing cooling water is always available whenever the pumps are operated. The present arrangement of supplying bearing cooling water from the service water pumps is susceptible to a loss of AC electrical power. The proposed arrangement will make the auxiliary feed pumps cooling self-contained. These changes have been reviewed with respect to 10 CFR 50.59 and were determined not to constitute an unreviewed safety question. The probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident have not been increased by this change.
The possibility of an accident not considered has not been created and the margin of safety as defined in the basis cf the Technical Specifications has not been reduced.
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i PLANT DESIGN CHANGE NUMBER 333 4
- Plant Design. Change Number 333. entitled Combustible Cas Detection System is complete.
Description of Change l
Install a combustible gas detection system to monitor for the t
presence of combustible gases to read out and alarm in the control room. Detectors to be placed in selected locations such as the switchgear room, oil room.. chemistry lab, PAB pipe chase, waste disposal building, volume control tank cubicle, containment, etc.
where concentrations of combustible gases can occur.
1 Reason for Change 4
License commitment to the NRC to install combustible gas detection in the chemistry lab. Other fire protection concerns in the area of industrial safety.
l Safety Evaluation 1
- The system to be installed is a non Category I system. The system to be installed will not jeopardize any safety related systems, and does not constitute an unreviewed safety question.
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. PLANT DESIGN CHANGE NUMB';R 336 t'lant Design Change Number 336 entitled !1oor Drains Changes and Additions for Fire Protection is complete.
Description of Change Modify drain system in fire zones D-1 and D-2 to provide a.
drainage control.
- b.
Install drainage capability for diesel fire pump curbed area.
c.
Modify drain system in fire zone T-1A and T-1B to provide drainage control.
Reason for Change To satisfy commitments to the NRC.
Safety Evaluation The proposed changes do not constitute an unreviewed safety question.
The proposed modifications have been reviewed in accordance with 10CFR50.59. The proposed changes do not increase the probability or consequences of a previously analyzed accident, do not introduce the possibility of a new type of accident, and do not reduce any tech.
spec. margin of safety.
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PLANT DESIGN CHANGE NUMBER 344 Plant Design Change Number 344 entitled Centslaaent Isolation Reset Modification is complete.
Description of Change To provide a control logic system which prevents a selective group of Containment Isolation Valves (CIV) from reopening upon reset of the Containment Isolation (CI) signal without subsequent and deliberate operator action.
Reason for Change As indicated by Item 2.1.4 of the NRC's Lessons Learned Task Force Status Report and Short Term Recommendations - NUREG 0578.
This document and subsequent correspondence has defined the require-ments for CI.
"The design of control systems for automatic (CI) valves shall be such that resetting the isolating signal will not result in the automatic reopening of (CIVs). Reopening of (CIVs) shall require deliberate operator action".
Safety Evaluation Electrical The subject Godification has been reviewed against the requirements j
of 10CFR50.59 such that: there has not been an increase in probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the safety analysis. There is no increase in the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis, and there has been no decrease in the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification. Therefore, this system does not involve an unreviewed safety quastion.
The above evaluation is based on the fact that the subject modification is independent of originally installed control equip-ment such that equipment failures will only effect the reset portion,f the system. These failures will not compromise the isolation of the containment which is the first safety considera-tion. Failures in the new hardware will prevent speedy restoration after the transient or accident is over.
This situation does not compromise safety or violate the licensing lease because sufficient time is available for repair in order to restore certain systems which become isolated.
d The system is vulnerable to operator error in areas of implementing the CI reset which blocks the S/I input as.
discussed in item 3.
Suitable procedures and operator r
training is needed in order to assure prompt operator action.
Mechanical i
This Plant Design Change has been reviewed with respect to r
the criteria contained in 10CFR50.59. The change has been determined to not involve an unreviewed safety question.
This evaluation is based on the following:
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The probability, of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report has not been increased.
1.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a f
different type than any evaluated previously in the i
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Safety Analysis Report has not been created.
3.
The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification has not been reduced.
i This evaluation is based on the review of the control system
- design criteria and philosophy which was used to develop the i
. design' change. The criteria used for the change is contained in item 2.1.4 of NUREG-0578 and requires that resetting the isolation signal will not result in the automatic reopening of containment isolation valves. This change will make deliberate operator action necessary in order to initiate reopening of containment isolation valves. The valves identified isolate on both high containment pressure and safety injection signals to provide containment integrity i
during accident conditions, and provide assurance of containment isolation over the range of previously evaluated design basis events and system transients. The philosophy of making deliberate operator action necessary to reopen i
the subject valves has been reviewed from a Mechanical Engineering viewpoint and has been determined to be appropriate from a systems approach with no adverse inter-l actions ~ identified.
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PLANT DESIGN CHANGE NUMBER 349 Plant Design Change Number 349 entitled Treatment of Waste Neutralization Tank and Floor Drain Sump Effluents is complete.
Description of Change Modify the Secondary Waste Water Treatment System so that sludge and oil will be removed from the Waste Neutralization Tank and from the Floor Drafn sumps prior to passing through the particulate filters and subsequently into the river.
After neutralization, the effluent will be pumped into a plate-type G;avity Separator tank where sludge will be trapped and oil removed.
The water will flow by gravity through a weir-like level control out the Gravity Separator tank to an overflow (holding) sump. From this it will be pumped through the particulate filter and into the river.
Sludge sollected in the Gravity Separator tank will be pumped to (
Waste Storage tank by a skid-mounted Sludge Removal and Transfer unit, automatically. From this tank the sludge will be drained to 55 gallon drums for easy disposal. Any liquid surfacing in this tank may be drawn off for reprocessing through the Gravity Separator.
A new Level Controller will be installed in the Waste Neutralization Tank to alarm at the Water Treatment Panel when the tank level is approaching the full level. This level control will also automatically shut off the Waste Neutralization Tank Transfer pumps when the tank reaches a minimum level.
Reason for Change To maintain the Total Suspended Solids (TSS) and Total Oil and Grease (T06G) discharged to the environment below National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit limits.
References:
1)
EWR No.192, "CY-Effluent Control System - NPDES-001D" 2)
EWR No. 141, " Treatment Facilities - NPDES" 3)
PA No.76-580, " Connecticut Yankee Treatment Facilities - NPDES" l
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Safety Evaluation This PDC has been reviewed with respect to the criteria contained in 10CFR50.59. The change has been determined to not involve an unreviewed safety question. This evaluation is based on the following:
1.
The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the safety analysis report has not been increased, 2.
the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report has not been created, and 3.
the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification has not been reduced.
The addition of this system will greatly enhance the probability of protecting against releases of oil and total suspended solids which could find its way into the floor drains. The new system will also improve the mixing of the waste neutralization tank and assure proper pH control before release.
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_ PLANT DESIGN CHANGE NUMBER 350 Plant Design Change Number 350 entitled Moisture Separator / Reheater Tube Bundle Replacement is complete.
Description of Change Replacement of complete tube bundles with improved design and stainless steel tubes for MSR's "C"
& "D" along with the following associated piping and component compatibility changes:
Replacement of four (4) reheat steam control valves for MSR's a.
"A",
"B",
"C", and "D".
b.
Addition of a larger equalizing vent line from new bundles to existing drain ' tank (TK-24-lC) including a new 4" nozzle installation on tank.
Partial in-place retirement and modification of existing "C"
& "D" c.
scavenger vent chamber piping for use as exc.ss steam line fron drain tank, including manual control valve and orifice flow
- meter, d.
Removal of "C"
& "D" equalizing vent lines, excess steam lines, and drain line check valves.
Reason for Change To preclude possible forced outages due to tube failures resulting from the present stage of deterioration and to reduce the copper bearing material in use in steam cycle. In addition, the new tube bundle design and sup ort system is intended to improve operating reliability and extend operating life.
Safety Evaluation The MSR replacements and supportirg modifications proposed by this PDC do not require changes to the Jafety Technical Specifications and as such, do not require NRC app. oval prior to implementation.
The change will be described in the.'DSA.
The PDC does not represent an unreview'd safety question in that the probability of a reviewed malfunction or the possibility of an unreviewed malfunction is not raised in bnplementing the changes.
In addition, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Safety Technical Specification is not reduced in implementing the changes.
The installations and modifications of the PDC serve to improve the operation and reliability of an existing system without introducing any new unevaluated safety considerations. On this basis the PDC is not considered to involve an unreviewed safety question.
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PT ANT DESIGN CHANGE NIMBER 352 Plant Design Change Number 352 entitled Install Isolation Valves in Fire Main is complete.
Description of Change Install two new 12" isolation valves in the uaderground fire loop on either side of the new spent resin storage facility which is to be built.
Reason for Change National Fire Protection Association Codes and Standards No. 24 requires that valves be installated to shut off sections of pipe under buildings.
Safety Evaluation This PDC has been reviewed with respect to the criteria contained in 10CFR50.59. The change has been determined to not involve an unreviewed safety question. This evaluation is based on the following:
1.
The protability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report has not been increased.
The possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different
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type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report has not been created, and 3.
The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification has not been reduced.
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PLANT DESIGN CHANGE NUMBER 353 Plant Design Change Number 353 entitled Pressurizer Capillary Valves is complete.
Description of Change a.
Replace existing isolation valves with bellows seal valves Ref. Stone and Webster Drawing FP-3M b.
Mount the isolation valves on rigid support Reason for Change To reduce maintenance and airborne activity.
a.
The existing valves have been a continuous source of airborne activity because of leakage thru the packing. They are 1/2" Edwards Fig. 3626 valves bushed down to 3/8" tubing. The replacement valves would be 2500 psi NUPRO Fig. SS-6UW.
The NUPRO valves are an all stainless steel high temperature, high pressure, compact, packless hermetically sealed valve.
b.
To reduce stress' on small capillary tubes from isolation valves.
Safety Evaluation This PDC has been reviewed with respect to the criteria contained in 10CFR50.59. The change has been determined to not involve an unreviewed safety question. This evaluation is based on the following:
1.
The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or nalfunction of equipment important to safety previously esaluated in the Safe.cy Analysis Report has not been increased, 2.
The possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the % fety Analysis Report has r.ot been created, and 3.
The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification has not been reduced.
This chcnge will cut down on the airborne activity in containment and will also add the proper support for these valves to eliminate any chance of a safety problem.
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PLANT DESIGN CHANGE NUMBER 354 Plant Design Change Number 354 entitled Primary Vent Stack Drain Line Check Valve is complete.
Description of Change To improve drainage from the base of the stack, the existing horizontal lif t check valve should be replaced with a swing check valve.
Reason for Change
. A swing check valve offers very little resistance to flow whereas as horizontal lif t check has a globe valve body and requires a much greater pressure drop to fully lift the disk.
Safety Evaluation This PDC has been reviewed with respect to the criteria contained in 10CFR50.59. The change has been determined to not involve an unreviewed safety question. This evaluation is based on the following:
1.
The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report has r.ot been increased, 2.
The possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report has not been created, and 3.
The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification has not been reduced.
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i PLANT DESIGN CHANGE NUMBER 358 t
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Plant Design Change Number 358 entitled Vent Head== Orain Tank is complete.
I Description of Change l
a.:
Add a drain tank to the vent header in the PAB pipe chase.
Install a water trap on the drain tan,k to drain any trapped water to the ADT. The tank should have a 3/4" dia. nipple with an isolation valve from trouble shooting of the vent
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i b.
Remove flow meter at eductor.
c.
Replace 1/4" nipple and isolation valve at eductor and replace with 3/4".
Reason for Change 1
l a.
Vent header in pipe chase is a low point with no drains and collects water. The educator will only pull about a 14" of water vacuum, so any water in the vent header stops the flow of air from the containment vent header. Stopping air flow through the vent header causes delays during major outages by increasing the amount of time required to gain entry into the steam generators, time required to air sweep the reactor l'
vessel head for lifting or removal of TC or TH bonnets or RCP seal removal. It can also cause airborne problems during 1
filling and venting operations and air or N2 sweeps of the loops.
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b.
Flow meter sticks, stopping air flow.
c.
For trouble shooting.
_Eafety Evaluation i
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~ his PDC has been reviewed with respect to the criteria contained in 10CFR50.59. The change has been determined to not involve an u1 reviewed safety question. This evaluation is based on the fallowing:
1.
The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety i
I previously evaluated in the 3afety Analysis Report has not been increased, i
i 2.
The possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report has not been created, and l
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3.
The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification has not been reduced.
The proposed change should eliminate the water blockage of the air flow in this vent system.
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PLANT DESIGN CIULNGE NL'MBER 360 Plant Design Change Number 360 entitled Containment Jib Crane is complete.
Description of Change Install a one-ton capacity jib crane on the charging floor (elevation 48' 6") inside the containment structure. The crane will be mounted to a 4' 6" square by 2" thick steel plate which will be thru-bolted to the charging floor.
Reason for Change The installation of the new jib crane will provide more freedom of the existing containment. polar crane to work in other areas of the containment concurrent with reactor vessel disassembly and assembly.
The jib crane will be utilized to remove and replace reactor vessel studs, insulation, and other miscellaneous materials within the reactor cavity. In addition, it will be utilized to ' remove and replace code safety valves for maintenance purposes from the pressurizer platform.
Safety Evaluation Installation of the jib crane is not an unreviewed safety item.
Installation in accordance with the drawings will not degrade the capacity of the operating floor slab. During plant operation, the jib crane boom is removed and tied down to the floor.
In this disassembled condition, the jib crane is inaffected by seismic loadings.
Therefore, the installation of the jib crane will not affect or increase any previously analyzed accident, will not create the possibility of a new type accident, and does not affect r reduce any tech. spec. margins of safety.
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PLANT DESIGN CHANGE NUMBER 361 Plant Design Change Number 361 entitled Containment control Air Compressor and Receiver Piping Stand Modifications is complete.
Description of Change Modify compressor discharge piping and receiver drain piping per attached drawings 16103-20237 and 20238. Also raise height or units 18" with installation.: aew stands.
Reason for Change To install new type moisture drain traps. This will prevent excessive water buildup On the receivers.
Safety Evaluation This PDC has been reviewed with respect to the criteria contained in 10CFR50.59. The change has been determined to not involve an unreviewed safety question. This evaluation is based on the following:
1.
The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report has not been increased, 2.
The possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report has not been created, and 9
3.
The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification has not been reduced.
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PLANT DESIGN CHANGE NUMBER 362 Plant Design Change Number 362 entitled Containment Isolation Modifications Phase II is complete.
Description of Change
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To provide each of the valves listed on the Attachment with a l
corresponding, manually reset, pilot solenoid valve, (PSV), to prevent the repositioning of more than one valve by one deliberate operation action.
Reason for Change As indicated by Item 2.1.4 of the NRC's Lessons Learned Task Force Status Report and Short Term Recomr.endations - NUREG-0578, this document and subsequent correspondence has defined the requirements for containment isolation "The Design of Control Systems for Automatic (CI) valves shall be such that resetting the isolating signal will not result in the automatic reopening
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of ClV's".
Reopening of (CIVs) shall require deliberate operator action. The NRC has recognized a need for having each valve operated from its own PSV. The reason can be found in the following NRC/NU correspondence:
H. R. Denton letter to W. G. Counsil, dated 2/1/81 W. G. Counsil letter to H. R. Denton, dated 2/7/80 Safety Evaluation The proposed change to provide individual pilot solenoid valves (Attachment) for each Containment Isolation Valve (CIV) utilizes qualified components and installation criteria consistent with the original design basis. The modification provides individual control of the CIVs in accessible locations for easy operator action. The system does not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety or the introduction of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluation previously and does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications.
Therefore, the modification is not considered an Unreviewed Safety Issue.
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s ns s ~.~.s CONTAINMENT ISOIATION = CONNECTICUT YA!GTE INSTALIATION OF INDIVIDUAL PILCff SOIZNOID VALVES (20- W -4)
DH-W-1842 Valve Stem Leakoff Header DH-TV-1843 Vapor Seal Head Drain Tank DH-TV-1847 Drain Header (20-W -2)
SG-TV-1312-1
- 1 Steam Generator Blowdown SG-TV-1312-2 42 Steam Generator Blowdown SG-TV-1312-3 93 Steam Generator Blowdown SG <'?-1312-4 64 Steam Generator Blowdown (20-W-3 )
CC-TV-1831 Neutron Shield Tank Cooling Water Return CC-TV-1411 RCP Bearing Cooling Water PAturn (20-T/-1)
MS-TV-1212 Main Steam Line Drain to Blowdown Tank MS-TV-1213 Main Steam Line Drain To Condenser (20-TV-5)
I WD-TV-1946 Containment Sump Pump Discharge DH-TV-1844 Pressurircr, Pressure Relief Tank Drain WG-TV-1345 Pressurirer, Pressure Relief Tank Vent RM-TV-1848 Air Activity Monitor Inlet IM-TV-18113 Containment Imak Monitoring
ATTACHMENT II Jfq f
CONTA~!OENT ICOLATION - CC:OTECTICUT YANKEE INSTALLATION OF INDIVIDUAL PIIDF SOLEHOID VALVES ON (CIV's)
P.A.79-191 kHASE II
- PSv, S
CIV DESCRIPTION DH-TV-1842 Valve Stem I4akoff Header 20-TV-1842 DH-W-1843 Vspor Seal Head Drain Tank 20-TV-1843 DR-TV-1847 Drain Header 20-TV-1847
'0-TV-1312-1 2
SG-TV-1312-1
- 1 S/G Blowdown SG-TV-1312-2 42 S/G Blowdown 20-TV-1312-2 SG-TV-1312-3
- 3 S/G Blowdown 20-TV-1312-3 SG-TV-1312-4 84 S/G Blowdown 20-W-1312-4 CC-TV-1831 Neutron Shield Tank Cooling Water Return 20-TV-1831 CC-TV-1411 RCP Bearing Cooling Water Return 20-TV-1411 MS-TV-1212 Main Steam Line Drain to Blowdown Tank 20-TV-1212 MS-TV-1213 Main Steam Line Drain to Condenser 20-TV-1213 WD-TV-1846 Containment Sump Pump Discharge 20-TV-1846 DH-TV-1844 Pressuriser, Pressure Relief Tank Drain 20-TV-1844 DH-TV-1845 Pressurizer, Pressure Relief Tank Vent 20-TV-1845 RM-TV-1848 Air Activity Monitor Inlet 20-TV-1848 IM-TV-18113 Containnent Leak Monitoring 20-TV-1811B
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PLANT DESIGN CHANGE NUMBER 365 Plant Design Change Number 365 entitled Reactor Coolant Pump Motor Oil Collection System is complete.
~ Description of Change Install drip pans, drain tubing and collection tanks to collect possible oil leakage from motor bearings.
Reason for Change
- To meet NRC Fire Protection commitments as specified in the NRC
. branch technical position.
Safety Evaluation The Reactor Coolant Pump 011 Collection System does not represent an unreviewed safety question in that the probability of a reviewed or the possibility of an unreviewed malfunction is not raised in implementing the proposed modification. In addition, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Safety Technical Specification is not reduced in implementing the change.
The proposed modification will not require a change to the Plant Safety Technical Specifications.
The fire protection modification described serves to expand the previously established safety concepts and does not introduce any new unevaluated safety considerations. On this basis, the PDC is not considered to involve an unreviewed safety question.
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PLANT DESIGN CHANGE NLHBER 368 Plant Design Change Number 368 entitled Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Water Supply Valves is complete.
Description of Change.
a.
Replace existing 3/4" Rockwell Edward Fig. 3626 Isolation Valves with Rockwell hermetically sealed valves.
b.
Add Reach Rod to each of the new valves in order that they can be operated from the upper floor in the Sample Room.
. Reason for Change a.
The existing valves have seat leakage and because of their loose backseal design are a continuous source of airborne activity. The new valves are hermetically sealed and cannot leak to the environment.
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This would provide remote RCP seal water supply adjustment while the operator observes the seal water supply flow meters.
Safety Evaluation This PDC has been reviewed with respect to the criteria contained in 10CFR50.59. The change has been determined to not involve an unreviewed safety questien. This evaluation is based on the following:
1)
.The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety l
previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report has not been increased, 2).
The possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report has not been created, and 3)
The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification has not been reduced.
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i PLANT DESIGN CHANGE NUMBER 369 Plant Design Change Number _369 entitled Replacement of 4-12" Feedwater Check Valves is complete.
Description of Change-Replace existing 600 lb.12" check valves (weight each,1410 lbs.)
with 12" Pacific 58809-7-WE-X, Class 900, tilting disk check valve.
Reason for Change Excessive leakage of existing check valves.
Safety Evaluation The replacement of the existing feedwater check valves with tilting dise Pacific check valves has been reviewed in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59. These valves are not classified as containment isolation valves for purposes of 10 f.YR 50 Appendix J and therefore, low pressure seat-leakage testing is r.ot a requirement. The weight 4
and center of gravity of the valves was reviewed relative to analysis of the feedwater system piping. Due to the fact that the new valves are lighter and the valves are located in close proximity to the penetration anchor it is judged that the change will not adversely affect the system. The revised valve weights will be incorporated into the I&E Bulletin 79-14 system walkdown information packages recently prepared by Stone & Webster.
This change does not constitute an unreviewed safety question because the probability or consequences of a previously analyzed accident or equipment malfunction are not increased and the possibility for a different type of accident or malfunction is not created. The margin of safety relative to the integrity of the feedwater system is unaffected.
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PLANT DESIGN CHANGE NUMBER 375 Plant Design Change Nrmber 375 entitled CC-CV-721 Replacement is complete.
Description of Change Remove the existing Edwards tilting disk check valve (CC-CV-721) from the component cooling water line return from the RCP thermal
-barrier, and replace it with an Edwards piston style pressure seal horizontal check valve.
Reason for Change Existing valve consistently fails penetration leak tests. Replacement valve is an improved design for the application.
Safetv Evaluation This PDC has been reviewed with respect to the criteria contained in 10CFR50.59. The change has been determined to not involve an unreviewed safety question. This evaluatio. is based on the following:
1.
The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report has not been increased, 2.
The possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report has not been created, and 3.
The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical i
specification has not been reduced.
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PLANT DESIGN CHANGE NUMBER 379 Plant Design Change Number 379 entitled Turbine Control Circuit is complete.
Description of Change On circulating water pumps, change series / parallel Breaker Auxiliary Contacts to spare Mechanism Operated Contacts.
Reason for Change To allow cire pump related turbine trip circuit to remain intact while breakers are removed from switchgear, or racked out.
Safety Evaluation This PDC has been reviewed with respect to the criteria contained in 10CFR50.59. The change has been determined to not involve an unreviewed safety question. This evaluation is based on the following:
1.
The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the safety analysis report has not been increased, 2.
The possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report has not been created, and 3.
The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification has not been reduced.
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PLANT DESIGN CHANGE NUMBER 386 Plant Design Change Number 386 entitled Change Setpoint of Waste Gas Surge Tank Relief Valve WG-TV-1156C is complete.
Description of Change-Change pressure transmitter PT-1156 from existing 0-3 psig range to a transmitter with a range of 0-10 psig. Change setpoint of PS-1156D to open valve WG-TV-1156C-at 9.5 psig from the present 3.0 psig.
Reason for Change To provide greater margin between tank operating pressure and
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relief valve setpoint. This change will reduce the potential for unplanned releases of radioactive gases when venting to the waste gas surge tank.
1 Safety Evaluation This PDC has been reviewed with respect to the criteria contained in 10CFR50.59. The change has been determined to not involve an unreviewed safety question. This evaluation is based on the l-following:
1.
The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety i
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previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report has not been increased, 2.
The possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report has not been created, and 3.
The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification has not been reduced.
.This change will prevent release of radioactive gas to the atmosphere on small pressure surges. The setpoint is well below 4
the safety valve setpoint, therefore not jeopardizing the system integrity.
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