ML19309E816

Annual Rept of Changes,Tests & Experiments 1979

ML19309E816
Person / Time
Site:	Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png
Issue date:	04/01/1980
From:	Graves R CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML19309E815	List: ML19309E814 ML19309E816
References
NUDOCS 8004240439
Download: ML19309E816 (46)

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INTRODUCTION I

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As required by Code of Federal Regulations Title 10. Volume I, I

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Part 50.59 entitled, Changes, Tests and Experiments, the

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following report for 1979 is submitted.

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Station Superintendent Date i

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CONNECTICUT YANKEE 10CFR50.59 REPORT - 1979 l

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o INDEX PLANT DESIGN CHANGES PDC #

PDC TITLE

1. 254

" Containment Control Air System"

1. 263

" Modification to Floor Drains in Turbine l

Building" l

1. 281

" Water Treatment System Vent Piping" 4

1. 282 "Switchgear Room Ventilation Improvement"

1. 285

" Fire Detection, Sealing Cable Penetrations, Fire Retardant Application"

1. 291

" Connecticut Yankee Plant Site Security System Installation"

1. 295

" Service Water Intake Structure Piles Removal" j

1. 296

" Spent Fuel Building Penetration Security Cables"

1. 297

" Cycle 9 Refueling"

1. 298

" Pressurizer Relief and Safety Valve Discharge 4

j Piping Modification"

1. 299

" Containment Air Recire. Fan Filter Capacity"

1. 300

" Diesel Sequencing Timers"

1. 301

" Steam Generator Blowdown Line Discharge Relocation"

1. 302

" Security System Emergency Power Supply"

1. 304

" Emergency Diesel Generator Alarm Modifications"

1. 305

" Main Transformer and Generator Protection and Control Modification"

1. 306

" Containment Fan Filters Timers"

1. 307

" Waste 011 Modification System"

1. 310

" Snubber Replacement" i

1. 311

" Waste Liquid Test Tank Effluent Piping Modification"

1. 313

" CAR Fan Charcoal Filter High Temperature Detection Wire Change"

9 PLC'#

PDC TITLE

1. 314

" Vital Area Protection of Control Room Under 10CFR Part 73.55"

1. 316

" Coating Exposed Structural Steel (Fire Protection)"

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1. 318

" Curb and Spill Barriers"

1. 319 "DWST Temperature Indication Alarm and Control"

1. 320

" Secondary Hydrogen Monitoring System"

1. 323

" Diesel and Electric Driven Fire Pumps"

1. 327

" Containment Air Recire. Fan Service Water Return Header Isolation Valve"

1. 328

" Diesel Room Heaters"

1. 329

" Manipulator Crane Dual Pressure Gripper Air Cylinder"

1. 330

" Control Air Header Dew Point Indicators"

1. 335

" Modification to LPSI System Suction Line Support"

1. 337 "TMI:

2.1.3B Detection of Inadequate Core Cooling"

1. 338 "PORV and S.V. Position Indication System" j

1. 339

" Aux. Feedwater Flow Indication, TMI, Item 2.1.7B" l

1. 340 "NUREG 0578 Item 2.1.4 Containment Isolation Modification"

1. 341 "TMI 2.2.2(b), On Site Technical Support Center (Closed Circuit T.V. System)"

1. 342

" Emergency Power to Pressurizer Heaters New Reg. 0578"

1. 343 "Hypochlorite System Pump Logic Modification" l

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Plant Design Change #254 Plant Design Change Number 254 entitled Containment Control Air System Modification is complete.

Proposed _ Change

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Install a 25 SCFM air compressor and dryer assembly to be used as operating control air compressor and use the existing compressors with new 2 H.P. motors and dryers attached as standby compressors.

The compressor receiver automatic blowdown lines and dryer filter blowdown lines will be connected by a common drain line to be installed such that the drains will enter the containment sump.

Reason For Change The present system does not have the capability to provide air dry enough for control systems. The capacity of the present systems is not sufficient to handle the operation of the new air operated pressurizer re.'ief valves. The drain lines on the existing compressors lead to the containment floor causing water to collect around the compressors, creating an unsafe condition.

Safety Evaluation This Plant Design Change Request has been reviewed with respect to the criteria contained in 10CFR50.59. The change has been determined to not involve an unreviewed safety question. This evaluation is based on the following:

1.

The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report has not been increased.

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The possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report has not been created.

3.

The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification has not been reduced.

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Plant Design Change #263 Plant Design Change Number 263 entitled Modification To,The Floor Drains Ir1 The Turbine Building is complete.

Proposed Change 1.

Divert the present seal water discharge from the Nash Condenser Vacuum pumps and gland steam exhaust condenser drain from the floor drain to the roof drain system.

2.

Modify the existing floor drain flume in the demineralizer area so that the discharge from this flume will be handled by the floor drain south loop.

3.

Install solid piping between mixed bed vents and drains to the sump at pumps 66-1A and 13.

4.

Install shut-off valves in the existing 12" lines at discharge 001C and 001D. Remove existing plug at discharge 001C.

Install pumps and piping to divert the water collecting in the traps at these discharges.

Reason For Change 1.

Meet the Conn. DEP NPDES requirement.

2.

Remove all floor drains contaminents from the influent to the new waste neutralization tank.

3.

Allow drains from mixed bed to enter the new waste neutralization tank with a minimum of contamination.

4.

Terminate the discharge of floor drains to the discharge tunnel and still permit use of the 12" discharge in case of emergency.

Safety Evaluation This Plant Design Change Request has been reviewed with respect to the criteria contained in 10CFR50.59. The change has been determined to not involve an unreviewed safety question. This evaluation is based on the following:

1.

The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report has not bee increased.

2.

The possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report has not been created.

3.

The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical i

specification has not been reduced.

Plant Design Change #281 Plant Design Change Number 281 entitled Water Treatment System Vent i

Piping is complete.

Proposed Change i

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Modify the Acid Tank, Caustic Tank and Waste Neutralization Tank vent lines such that the vapors from these tanks are vented to the outside. Modify the concentrated acid and caustic lines to the i

Waste Neutralization tank such that they do not both enter into the same tank penetration.

_F_ son For Change The present venting arrangement causes the accumulation of dangerous vapors around the Water Treatment Plant. The old arrangement for the Acid and Caustic lines into the Waste Neutralization Tank allowed the piping to become clogged, requiring maintenance to break the connections and physically remove the debris.

Safety Evaluation This Plant Design Change Request has been reviewed with respect to the criteria contained in 10CFR50.59. The change has been determined to not involve an unreviewed safety question. This evaluation is based on the following:

1.

The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report has not been increased.

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The possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report has not been created.

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The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification has not been reduced.

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k Plant Design Change #282 Plant Design Change Number 282 entitled Switchgear Room Ventilation Filters is complete.

Proposed Change Install roughing filters on the inlet duct for the Switchgear Room ventilation system.

Reason For Change The present system does not filter the inlet air which has caused j

the accumulation of dust and dirt on electrical components.

Safety Evaluation The addition of filters will increase the quality of air brought into the switchgear room and help prevent the accumulation of dust and foreign particles in the switchgear room. As such they should not decrease significantly the amount of cooling air.

This change has been reviewed with respect to 10CFR50.59 and found it not to be an unreviewed safety question as it does not:

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Increase the probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident, event, or malfunction important to the safety analysis.

2.

Create any accident or malfunction of a differert cype than previously analyzed in the safety analysis.

3.

Reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any technical specification.

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f Plant Design Change #285 Plant Design Change Number 285 entitled Connecticut Yankee i

Fire Detection Equipment, Seal Cable Penetrations is complete.

Proposed Change Install fire detection equipment, seal cable penetrations and other items.

Reason For Change To comply with the USNRC's requirements as described in their branch technical position APC-SB 9.5-1.

Safety Evaluation This change has been reviewed with respect to plant safety and does not constitute an unreviewed safety question.

It does not increase the probability or consequences of any previously analyzed accidents.

Implementation of this change should significantly increase the margin of fire safety in the plant.

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Plant Design Change #291 Plant Design Change Number 291 entitled CN[ Plant Site Security System Installation is complete.

Proposed Change To add security protection to the Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Plant in accordance with Section 2.2, " Design Features" of the Modified Amended Security Plan (Changed June 2, 1978) per 10CFR73.55.

Reason For Change To meet the requirements of 10CFR73.55, " Physical Protection of Plants and Materials", Part 73, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations.

Reference:

Letter Switzer to Schwencer dated December 21, 1977

" Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company, Haddam Neck Plant, Modified Amended Security Plan".

Safety Evaluation 1.

This change does not constitute an unreviewed safety question as the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FDSA is not increased.

The proposed security system addition does not increase the probability of an occurrence previously evaluated in the FDSA.

2.

The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FDSA is not created.

This installation does not create a new situation with regard to events previously analyzed in the FDSA.

3.

The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification is not reduced.

The contemplated change does not reduce any previously defined margin of safety.

s Plant Design Change #295 Plant Design Change Number 295 entitled Service Water, Intake Structure P,iles Removal is complete.

s Proposed Change Remove the sheet pile wall located in front of the service water intake structure.

I Reason For Change Removal of this barrier wall should reduce the accumulation of silt now present at the inner base of the existing wall. This wall removal modification will also increase the total cross section area flow which should lower approach velocities.

Safety Evaluation The change has been reviewed with respect to 10CFR50.59 and does not constitute an unextended safety question as it does not:

1.

Increase the probability or consequences of any previously analyzed accident or event.

2.

Decrease the margin of safety as described in Section 10 of the FDSA or as defined in the basis of any technical specification.

3.

Create any new or different accident or malfunction unanalyzed.

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Plant Design Change #296 Plant Design Change Number 296 entitled Spent Fuel Building Penetration Security Cable is complete.

Proposed Change The purpose of this Plant Design Change Request is to drill two (2), four (4) inch holes through the west-north wall of the Spent Fuel Building.

Reason For Change Tre reason for the change is to install conduit for security cables.

Safety Evaluation The change has been reviewed with respect to 10CFR50.59 and does not constitute an unreviewed safety question as it does not:

1.

Increase the probability or consequences of any previously analyzed accident or event.

2.

Decrease the margin of safety as lescribed in Section 10, of the FDSA or as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification.

3.

Create any new or different accident or malfunction unanalyzed.

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t Plant Design j enge #297 Plant Design Change Number 297 entitled Cycle 9, Refueling is complete.

i Proposed Change Fifty three (53) fuel assemblies will be discharged during the refueling outage and replaced by the same number of fresh Batch 11 assemblies. The Batch 9 and 10 assemblies still in the core will be shuffled to new locations, an a twice-burned Batch 7 assembly will be reinserted into the center.

Reason For Change End of Cycle 8.

Safety Evaluation The proposed design change (core VIII-IX refueling) involves replacing twice-and thrice-burned fuel assemblies with fresh assemblies of the same mechanical design, therefore the probability of occurrence of any accident is not increased and the possibility for an accident of a different type than any evaluated previously is not created.

The technical report compiled by B&W and reviewed by NUSCO in support of cycle IX operation verifies that the consequences of any FDSA chapter 10 accident has not been increased. The margin to safety as defined in the bases of the technical specifications has not been reduced.

Based upon the above evaluation, the proposed design change (cycle VIII-IX refueling and cycle IX operation to 410 EFPD) is determined not to be an unreviewed safety question pursuant to 10CFR50.59.

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l Plant Design Change #298 Plant Design Change Number 298 entitled Pressurizer Relief and Safety Valve Discharge Piping Modification is complete.

Proposed Change Replace the ten inch (10") discharge manifold, existing laterals and reroute the power operated valve (PR-A0V-568 and PR-A0V-570) discharge piping from the valves to the ten inch (10") manifold.

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Install pipe restraints as required.

Reason For Change Teledyne Technical Report TR-2726-2, dated December 5, 1977 recommends i

replacing the existing ten inch (10") manifold and 4" x 4" laterals to meet dynamic loading requirements, and reducing the peak steady state pressures at the Overpressure Protection spring relief valves associated with the opening of the power operated relief valves as currently installed.

l Safety Evaluation The reconfiguration of the pressurizer relief and safety valve discharge piping has no negative effect on the piping systems ability to adequately protect the pressurizer /RCS. It is only to provide better piping pressure profiles within the discharge piping.

This equipment was installed as per Plant Design Change 298 whose safety evaluation is applicable to this change.

i The discharge piping is not considered to be a nuclear grade safety related system.

This change was reviewed with respect to 10CFR50.59 and found it to not constitute an unreviewed safety question as it does not:

1.

Increase the probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident, event or malfunction important to the safety analysis.

2.

Create any accident or malfunction of a different type than previously analyzed in the safety analysis.

3.

Reduce tne margin of safety as defined in the basis of any technical specification.

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Plant Design Change #299 Plant Design Change Number 299 entitled Containment Air Recirculation Fan Filter Capacity is complete.

Proposed Change Add 40 additional charcoal. filters to each car fan unit. These additional filters are to be placed in existing filter tray housing, which are presently blanked out.

Reason For Change To reduce the flow rate per filter and thereby meet 10CFR100 criteria.

Safety Evaluation The subject Connecticut Yankee plant design change request proposes to add forty (40) charcoal filter trays to each containment air recirculation (CAR) unit, increasing the charcoal filter trays from eighty (80) to one hundred and twenty (120). The added charcoal filter banks will decrease the flow rate to 55 feet'-per-minute and increase the residence time with each CAR unit to improve the overall iodine absorption efficiency.

.his PDCR has been evaluated and reviewed per the requirements of 10CFR50.59 and is not an unreviewed safety question, does not degrade the safety margin bases of any technical specifications, and does not create the potential for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated in the FDSA.

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Plant Design Change #300 Plant Design Change Number 300 entitled Emergency Diesel Generators is complete.

Proposed Changi Replace 62-1, 62-2, 62-4, 62-5, 62-7, 62-8, 62-10, 62-11 sequencing timers on Emt.rgency Diesels EG2A and 2B with more reliable agastat timers.

Reason For Change To upgrade the existing timing circuits on the diesel generators. The reason for this PDCR is to change to internal connection diagram.

Safety Evaluation The change to the more reliable timers will reduce the probability of accidental overload of the diesels or improper sequencing of auxiliary equipment. The change will upgrade the diesel timer system.

I have reviewed this change with respect to 10CFR50.59 and found it to not constitute an unreviewed safety question as it does not:

1.

Increase the probability of occurrence of consequences of an accident, event or malfunction important to the safety analysis.

2.

Create any accident or malfunction of a different type than previously analyzed in the safety analysis.

3.

Reduce the targin of safety as defined in the basis of any technical specification.

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Plant Design Change #301 Plant Design Change Number 301 entitled Steam Generator Blowdown Line-Discharge Relocation is complete.

Proposed Change The proposed modification involves the relocation of the tie-in between the 4" WBTD-151-1 (S.G. Blowdown) and the 24" WS-121-93 (Service Water Discharge).

Reason For Change Proposed connection has a long history of leaks due to cracking at the weld where the S.C. Blowdown line and the service water line interface. The proposed modification provides a new connection location which provides structural changes in the connection which increase the integrity of the connection and resist the thermal effects caused by the injection of the hot S.G. Blowdown into the colder service water discharge.

Safety Evaluation This change will improve the structural integrity of the Steam Generator Blowdown Test Tank Drain and Service Water Discharge Piping. In the past two years when leaks have occurred it has caused release of midly contaminated liquid to the ground l

without proper dilution from the circulating water system.

The installation of the welded plate, weldolet and additional piping has no effect on the ability of the service water to discharge cooling water.

During the actual installation process methods must be employed to minimize the period when restricted service water is required.

This change has been reviewed with respect to 10CFR50.59 and found it to not constitute an unreviewed safety question as it does not:

1.

Increase the probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident of event or malfunction of equipment important to safety analysis.

2.

Create an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the safety analysis.

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Reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any technical specification.

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r Plant Design Change #302 Plant Design Change Number 302 entitled Security System - Emergency Power Supply (Diesel) is complete.

i Proposed Change Install 125 kva diesel generator to supply power for security system

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devices with automatic throwover breaker.

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Reason For Change To power security system components in the event of a loss of its normal power.

Safety Evaluation 4

The installation of a Security System Diesel Emergency Power Supply is not tied to any equipment which could effect the nuclear safety of the facility. The equipment will not be electrically tied to any Safety Related Busses. Its physical location is outside the north end of the turbine hall.

This change has been reviewed with respect to 10CFR50.59 and does constitute an unreviewed safety question as it does not:

1.

Increase the probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident or event or malfunction of equipment important to i

the Safety Analysis of the FDSA.

2.

Create an accident or malfunction of a different type than i

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Reduce the margin of safety described in the basis of any technical specification.

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I Plant Design Change #304 Plant Design Change Number 304 entitled Emergency Diesel Generator Alarm Modification is complete.

Proposed Change The purpose of this change is to provide annunciation in the control room of conditions which would render a Diesel Generator incapable i

of responding to an automatic emergency start signal. There will be four new annunciator windows - not ready for auto start, differential relay, control power failure, ACB auto trip - for each diesel.

These windows will be alarmed by several different but related parameters.

1.

Auto-local switch on engine control panel in local position.

2.

Removable circuit breaker element not in operating position.

3.

Diesel generator sequence timer's auto-test switch in test position.

4.

Diesel generator circuit breaker control switch "in pull to lock" position.

5.

Diesel generator differential relay not reset 6.

Loss of DC control power to diesel start and sequencing relays.

7.

Loss of DC control power to diesel generator breaker circuitry.

8.

Loss of DC control power to diesel eenerator governor control system.

9.

Loss of DC control power to diesel generator start systems one and two.

10.

Loss of DC field flashing power supply to diesel generator.

11.

Diesel generator field circuit breaker open.

12.

Engine overspeed relay not reset.

13.

Diesel generator overcurrent and reverse power lockout relay not reset.

In addition, existing shared annunciator alarms will be required to provide segregation such that the operator can determine which D/G has a malfunction.

These are:

1.

" Auto Start" to indicate the D/G has started under an automatic signal.

2.

" Unit Annunciator" to indicate that there is an annunciation alarm at that units local panel.

3.

" Fuel System Tank Hi-Lo Level" to appropriately indicate the fuel pump has either not stopped or started as required.

Reason For Change To clearly annunciate in the control room any disabling condition of the Tmergency Diesel Generators or which one has had a system / device malfunction. These changes have been reviewed and accepted by the NRC l

for fulfilling their stanard requirements.

Safety Evaluation The addition of new alarms in the control room to indicate when the diese1' generator is inoperable will increase the operations ability to surveil the diesel remotely for certain inoperable conditions.

Since these are alarm circuitry changes they will not degrade el e operation of the diesel control circuitry.

Plant Design Change #304 (continued)

I have reviewed this change with respect to 10CFR50.59 and found it not to be an unreviewed safety question as it does not:

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Increase the probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident, event or malfunction of equipment important to safety analysis.

2.

Create an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the safety analysis.

3.

Reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any technical specification.

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Plant Design Change #305 Plant Design Change Number 305 entitled Main Transformer and Generator Protection and Control Modification is complete.

Proposed Change Install Protective Relaying for the following conditions:

1.

Generator frequency below grid frequency 2.

Negative sequence current 3.

Transformer and generator exceeding volts / hertz limits (3 relays)

Reason For Change - Refering to above conditions 1.

If generator frequency drops below grid frequency the grid would notorize the generator. This change will prevent this from happening.

2.

Present Neg. sequence relay is electronmechanical, the new relay is solid state and much more precise and sensitive.

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The relay will service as backup line-line fault protection b.

If a single phase disconnect were open with other two closed, there would be semi normal currents (but not high fault currents) i in Generator and Transformer which existing relay would not see.

This would result in possibir u ternal overheating.

3.

The transformer and generator each b:ve limits of exciting volts for a given frequency (volt /Hz limits) iC exceeded, magnetic flux would go beyond laminated portions of machine causing eddy currents and resultant heat in the affected steel. While on line, two (2) relays (one for each device) will look at generator and transformer j

and be set for the appropriate current / time delay as required. A i

third relay will look at the transformer when off line and trying i

to match the grid. It would only trip the field breaker if volt /Hz limit would be exceeded.

Safety Evaluation I

The additional protective relaying for the main transformer and generator will increase their protection. This additional protection may cause

" loss of load" trips which is an analyzed accident but should do so only to protect the generator and main transformer which if failed would cause a loss of load trip.

i Plant Design Change #305 (cont r.ued) 1.

If the generator grid frequency were to drop it would mean that the turbine generator would be receiving too little or no steam from the nuclear steam supply. As such a trip of the turbine generator would have no effect on the reactor as it would most likely be below 10% power P-7 permissive. It would be very unlikely to be in a low frequency condition in any other situation. This, therefore, has no effect on the safety analysis.

2.

The negative sequence relay is presently installed protection but will be improved with the addition of a solid state device.

This has no effect on the safety analysis.

3.

The volt / Hertz limit protection will prevent possible overheating in the generator and transformer. This will protect the unit from a failure which would also cause a trip. The possibility of increased " loss of load" trips is not a factor. This unit will trip in a volts / Hertz transient but earlier in the transient to protect the main turbine and transformer from failure.

It is highly unlikely that any additional loss of load trips due to this change would be experienced.

i This change was reviewed with respect to 10CFR50.59 and found it to not be an unreviewed safety question as it does not:

1.

Increase the probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident, event or malfunction of equipment important to safety analysis.

1 2.

Create an accident or malfunctfan of a different type than previously analyzed in the safety analysis.

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Reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any technical specification.

Plant Design Change #306 Plant Design Change Number 306 entitled Containment Fan Filter Timers is complete.

Proposed Change Install timers in the M.C.B. which will monitor the time the charcoal filter face dampers are open.

Reason For Change The purpose of this PDCR is to provide a means of monitoring incident fan damper operating time as required by Reg. Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978.

Safety Evaluation The addition of timers on the main control board to record the time that the face dampers are open will utilize the position indication lights circuit only. It will not be part of the control mechanisms and will not effect their operation. However, the indicating lights are needed in the accident to provide positive indication of position.

The addition of the timers should not cause any effect on the indicating lights operation as the timers are a small electrical load.

The timers will also provide a better method of indicating how much use the charcoal filters have had.

This plant has been reviewed with respect to 10CFR50.59 and it is not found to be an unreviewed safety question as it does not-1.

Increase the probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident of event or malfunction of equipment important to safety analysis.

2.

Create an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the safety analysis.

3.

Reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any technical specification.

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Plant Design Change Number 307 entitled Waste 011 System Modification is complete.

Proposed Change Change the piping at the bottom of the waste oil tank to direct it to the underground sump pump discharge line.

(Heat trace the outside pipe).

Reason For Change 1.

Eliminate the red rubber drain hose.

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Provide a means to removing.the water from the waste oil tank, and keep outside lines from freezing.

Safety Evaluation The piping modification to the waste oil tank is on secondary equipment and has no effect on nuclear safety. This change will allow greater flexibility in the removal of oily water and waste oil.

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This change has been reviewed with respect to 10CFR50.59 and does not constitute an unreviewed safety question.

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Plant Design Change #310 Plant Design Change Number 310 entitled Connecticut Yankee Snubber Replacement is complete.

Proposed Change Replace eight (8) Hydraulic Snubbers with eight (8) Mechanical Snubbers.

Reason For Change Hydraulic Snubbers have a history of failure and require monthly inspections.

In "1977" all eight (8) Hydraulic Snubbers failed to meet tl.: taar reani-c:;nts. The installation of Mechanical Snubbers will eliminate Snubber failure, delete maintenance and change inspection schedule to reactor refueling.

Safety Evaluation The proposed replacement of eight (8) existing hydraulic shock arrestors with eight (8) mechanical shock arrestors has been reviewed and does not comprise an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10CFR50.59 or require a change in the technical specifications. The replacement mechanical shock arrestors have considerably better performance histories than the existing hydraulic models and do not require the degree of maintenance and inspection of the existing hydraulic shock arrestors. This change does not increase the probability of occurrence or severity of a previously analyzed accident and does not decrease the margin of safety of the feedwater system.

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Plant Design Change #311_

Plant Design Change Number 311 entitled Waste Liquid Test Tanks Effluent Piping Modification is complete.

Proposed Change Relocate the test tank effluent line from its underground connection

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to above ground. The line will be tied into the overhead service water return line.

Reason For Change The present underground location does not allow adequate observation of the piping condition. Two leaks have occurred in the underground location which is undesirable with respect to the radioactive fluid carried in the line.

Safety Evaluation The relocation of the test tank discharge connection to the Service Water piping will provide greater visibility of the piping in case of any potential leakage. Additionally, it will provide better mixing therefore, lower concentration of the radioactive waste liquid into the service water should any leaks occur at the Steam Generator blowdown and service water piping interface.

This change has been reviewed with respect to 10CFR50.59 and found it to not constitute an unreviewed safety question as it does not:

1.

Increase the probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident, event or malfunction important to the safety analysis.

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Create any accident or malfunction of a different type than previously analyzed in the safety analysis.

3.

Reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification.

Plant Design Change #313 Plant Design Change Number 313 entitled Car Fan Charcoal Filter High Temperature Detector Wire Change is complete.

Proposed Change Replace car fan filter high temperature detector teflon insulated interconnecting wire with LOCA qualified high temperature wire.

Reason For Change The SEP investigation revealed the possibility of charcoal filter fire detector interconnection wire having a low radiation i

resistance. Failure of the wire insulation could leak to inaccurate indication during accident conditions.

Safety Evaluation Based on the attached technical evaluation this change does not constitute an unreviewed safety question as it does not:

1.

Increase the probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident, event or malfunction of equipment important to safety analysis.

2.

Create an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the safety analysis.

3.

Reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any technical specifications.

Plant Design Change #314 Plant Design Change Number 314 entitled Vital Area Protection-Control Room 10CFR, Part 73.55 is complete.

Proposed Change Provide necessary modifications to the control room, visitors cage, and reactor engineer office (CAS) to meet the security requirements of 10CFR73.55.

Reason For Change To comply with the provisions of 10CFR73.55 regarding the physical security of the plant.

Safety Evaluation Review of the proposed change in the partition between the reactor engineer's office (new CAS area) and the operation supervisor's office in accordance with 10CFR50.59 indicates this is not an unreviewed safety item.

The probability or the consequence of an accident previously analyzed is not increased, the possibility of a new type accident is not introduced, and the margin of safety in the Tech. Specs. is not reduced.

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Plant Design Change #316 Plant Design Change Number 316 entitled Coating Exposed Structural Steel is complete.

Proposed Change Coat exposed structural steel in turbine building oil storage room with a fire retardant material.

Reason For Change To comply with license commitments to the NRC contained in the Safety Evaluation Review for fire protection.

Safety Evaluation The proposed modifications have been reviewed in accordance with 10CFR50.59. The proposed change (i) does not increase the probability or consequences of a previously evaluated accident, (ii) does not introduce the possibility of a new type of accident or (iii) does not reduce any tech. spec. margin of safety. The proposed change is not an unreviewed safety question.

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Plant Design Change #318 Plant Design Change Number 318 entitled Curbs and Spill Barriers is complete.

Proposed Change 1.

Construct curbs around diesel fire pump.

2.

Install spill barriers at ventilation openings and south door of turbine oil room.

3.

Construct curbing at north end of both diesel generator room and also between the diesel and emergency switchgear portion of each diesel room.

4.

Install curb between S-17 and S-9 fire zones (Health Physics, Storeroom and Cable Spreading Area corridor).

Reason For Change To comply with license commitments to the NRC contained in the Safety Evaluation Review for Fire Protection.

Safety Evaluation i

The proposed modifications have been reviewed in accordance with 10CFR50.59. The proposed change (1) does not increase the probability or consequences of a previously analyzed accident (ii) does not introduce the possibility of a new type of accident or (iii) does not reduce any Tech. Spec. margin of safety. The proposed change is not an unreviewed safety question.

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Plant Design Change #319 Plant Design Change Number 319 entitled DWST Temperature Indication Alarm and Control is complete.

Proposed Change Instali dual thermocouple in present DWST temperature well.

Install two indicating temperature controllers on water treatment panel, one for indication and Hi/Lo alarm second for indication and steam valve control.

Reason For Change To prevent overheating on DWST and give temperature indication of DWST.

Safety Evaluation The installation of this equipment will improve reliability of the auxiliary feed water pumps. By monitoring / alarming the temperature of the demineralized water storage tank (DWST) and steam valve position t:ct tank heater it will warn the operator of possible accidental overheating of the DWST. This will preclude the possibility of not meeting net positive suction head (NPSH) requirements of auxiliary feed pumps by limiting the tank temperature.

This change has been reviewed with respect to 10CFR50.59 and found it to not constitute an unreviewed safety question as it does not:

1.

Increase the probability of occurrence or consequences of aan accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the safety analysis report.

2.

Create an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report.

3.

Decrease the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any technical specification.

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Plant Design Change #320 Plant Design Change Number 320 entitled Secondary Hydrogen Monitoring System is complete.

Pr7 posed Change Install a Hydrogen Monitoring System on the secondary side. The Hydrogen Monitoring System will take sample for existing feedwater and main steam sampic lines. The system will be located in the turbine hall, elevation 21 ft.

Reason For Change This system is being installed as part of a study program for denting in Steam Generators. This systen would provide data which is believed to be indicative of corrosion rates, particularly regarding the denting phenomena, in steam g(nerators.

Safety Evaluation The installation of the Hydrogen Monitoring System has been reviewed and found to be an unreviewed safety question.

It will be connected to feed and steam piping systems with instrument piping which cannot significantly effect any nuclear accident. It does not meet any of the following criteria:

The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction or equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the safety analysis report may be increased; or a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a dif ferent type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report may be created; or the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical t

Plant Design Change #323 Plant Design Change Number 323 entitled Diesel Driven and Electric Driven Fire Pumps is complete.

Proposed Change Install a 1/2" copf or carbon steel line between the service water header and the discharge column of the diesel driven water pump and the electric driven water pump.

Reason For Ch'nge To prevent freezing of the diesel driven and electric driven fire pumps during severe weather conditions.

Safety Evaluation The proposed modification will take a small amount of service water to cause continuous flow through the fire pump to prevent freezing.

Failure of the cross tie cannot cause failure of either system.

Postulated spray damage to the fire pump, and potential system problems have been investigated.

The change does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident nor create an accident of a different type. The margin of safety as defined in the tech. specs. is not reduced. Therefore, this is not an unreviewed safety question as defined by 10CFR50.59.

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Plant Design Change #327 Plant Design Change Number 327 entitled Containment Air Recirculation Fan Service Water Return Header Isolation Valves is complete.

Proposed Change Replace the existing Containment Air Recirculation Fan Service Water Return Header Carbon Steel Ball Valves with Stainless Steel Ball Valves.

Reason For Change The existing Carbon Steel Ball Valves bodies are badly erroded.

Safety Evaluation The installation of the stainless steel ball valves in the service water to the containment recirculation fans will decrease maintenance and increase valve reliability. Since this is a safety system required to mitigate the consequences of an accident, the leak tightness of the valves are not tested as per 10CFR50 appendix "J" requirements.

This change has been reviewed with respect to 10CFR50.59 and found it to not create an unreviewed safety question as it does not:

1.

Increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report.

2.

Create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously analyzed Safety Report.

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Reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification.

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s Plant Design Change #328 Plant Design Change Number 328 entitled Diesel Room Heaters is complete.

Proposed Change Remove the existing steam heaters and associated piping from both Diesel Rooms and install an equivalent electric heater. Also install a 480 volt 3 phase power receptacle and a service air line. One existing penetration could be used for electricity and the other for air.

Reason For Change Insurance Company does not approve of a steam heater being located at the diesel intake. Presently, lines for air or welding must be run through lunch room to perform maintenance in Diesel Rooms.

Safety Evaluation This PDCR has been reviewed with respect to the criteria contained in 10CFR50.59. The change has been determined to not involve an unreviewed safety question. This evaluation is based on the following:

1.

The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report has not been increased.

2.

The possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report has not been created.

3.

The margin,f safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification has not been reduced.

Plant Design Change #329 Plant Design Change Number 329 entitled Manipulator Crane Dual Pressurizer Grip'per Air Cylinder is complete.

Proposed Change Replace the existing single action gripper air cylinder with a dual pressurized gripper air cylinder. This will insure a positive latching force in both the engage and disengage operations of the gripper.

Reason For Change This is a recommended change by the equipment manufacturer. There have been instances at other plants where they experienced trouble manually operating the latching device of the single action type unit.

Safety Evaluation This Plant Design Change Request has been reviewed with respect to the criteria contained in 10CFR50.59. The change has been determined to not involve an unreviewed safety question. This evaluation is based on the following:

1.

The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the safety analysis report has not been increased.

2.

The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report has not been created.

3.

The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification has not been reduced.

This evaluation is based on a review of the design concept of the replacement gripper air cylinder. The replacement assembly utilizes a gripper which is pressurized on both sides vice the current configuration which utilizes gravity / spring action gripper cylinder. The new arrangement requires positive pressurization for both bundle engage, and bundle disengage operations. This change increases the refueling machine reliability and decreases the probability of a dropped fuel bundle.

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Plant Design Change #330 Plant Design Change Number 330 entitled control Air Header Dew Point Indicators is complete.

Proposed Change Install a dew point indicator in each of the control air headers af ter the post dryer filter with a common alarm on the MCB.

Reason For Change This will alert the operators of any dryer malfunctions.

Safety Evaluation i

This PDCR has been reviewed with respect to the criteria contained in 10CFR50.59. The change has been determined to not involve an j

unreviewed safety question. This evaluation is based on the following:

1.

The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report has not been increased.

i 2.

The possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report has not been created.

3.

The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification has not been reduced.

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Plant Design Change #335 Plant Design Change Number 335 entitled Modification of,LPSI System Suction Line Support is complete.

Proposed Change Change design function of support W-RWL-G-101 from a 6-way anchor 7

to a 2-way (lateral and dead weight) restraint.

1 Reason For Change Pipe stresses significantly lower. Other work on anchor bolts and baseplates necessary to provide higher safety factor at baseplates.

This work would be performed in conjunction with baseplate and anchor bolt work, necessary under the requirements of I&E Bulletin 79-02.

Safety Evaluation The modification of the restraint on the safety injection suction lines upgrades the capability of the restraint. This is being

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performed per the requirements of IE Bulletin 79-02.

The new restraint design will meet all codes as applicable.

This change has been reviewed with respect to 10CFR50.59 and found it not to constitute an unreviewed safety question as it does not meet any of the following criteria:

The probability of occurrence of the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report may be increased.

A possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis may be created.

If the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical t

specification is reduced.

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Plant Design Change #337 Plant Design Change Number 337 entitled T.M.I. 2.1.3b Detection of Inadequate Core Cooling is complete.

Proposed Change Install a dedicated subcooling margin monitor using signals from selected in-core thermocouples and RCS pressure.

Reason For Change This will provide the operator a direct indication of the subcooling margin. Also, to comply with the NRC recommendation 2.1.3b of NUREG 0578.

Safety Evaluation This PDCR has been reviewed with respect to the criteria contained in 10CFR50.59. The change has been determined to not involve an unreviewed safety question. This evaluation is based on the following:

1.

The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident ar malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysir Report has not been increased.

2 The possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report has not been created.

e 3.

The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification has not been reduced.

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Plant Design Change #338 Plant Design Change Number 338 entitled PORV and S.V. Position Indication System is complete.

Proposed Change l

Install an acoustical valve monitoring system to determine the position of valves SRV 584, SRV 585, SRV 586, PRA0V568, and PRA0V570 at their common discharge header.

The accelerometer senses the flow (vibration) in the pipe when a safety relief valve or PORV is lifted. The signal created by the accelerometer is fed to a pre-amp located near the sensor. A shielded twisted pair cable (Nuclear Qualified N.U. Stock Code 13600024) is run from the pre-amp thru the containment penetration to the flow indication monitor (in control room). The monitor consist of Hi alarm set point light and a set of contacts. The contact is connected to a window on the annunciator.

Reason For Change To provide the operators an indication of the status of the PORV and S.V.

and to conform w'.th NUREG-0578 (Lessons Learned from TMI Task Force Report TMI 2.1.3a; Safety Evaluation This PDCR has been reviewed with respect to the criteria contained in 10CFR50. 59. The change has been determined to not involve an unreviewed safety question. This evaluation is based on the following:

1.

The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report has not been increased.

2.

The possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report has not been :reated.

3.

The margin of safety as defined in the basis for_any technical specification has not been reduced.

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Plant Design Change #339 Plant Design Change Number 339 entitled TMI Item 2.1.7B Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Indication is complete.

Proposed Change To add control room (control grade) indication of the Auxiliary Feedwater System.

Reason For Change As directed by the NRC's TMI Lessons Learned Task Force indicated in item 2.1.7B of NUREG-9578.

Safety Evaluation This modification will provide accurate auxiliary feedwater flow indication to each steam generator in the control room. Presently there is no auxiliary feedwater flow indication in the control room except for the parameter of steam generator-level. The proposed modification will install an annubar in each of the steam generator main feedwater bypass lines to provide the required auxiliary feedwater flow indication. These changes have been reviewed with respect to 10CFR50.59 and were determined not to constitute an unreviewed safety question. The probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident have not been increased by this change. The possibility of an accident not considered has not been created and the margin of safety as defined in the basis of technical specifications has not been reduced.

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Plant Design Change #340 Plant Design Change Number 340 entitled NU 0578 I*.em 2.1.4 Containment Isolation Modification is complete.

Proposed Change' i

1.

Initiate Containment Isolation (CI) upon receipt of a Safety Injection (SI) signal by adding contact from SI WL relay / switches 4A and 4B into logic for HCP WL relay / switches A and B.

2.

Add CI signal to MOV-331, " Common RCP #1 Seal Bypass, Seal

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Water; from HCP-c".

Reason For Change Item 2.1.4 of_NUREG 0578 requires " diverse signals to initiate CI, review isolation provisions for non-essential systems and revise as necessary, and modify containment isolation designs as necessary to eliminate the potential for inadvertent reopening upon reset of the isolation signal".

Safety Evaluation The circuit modifications to HCP relays A and B and MOV-331 do not introduce any potential of compromise to the existing safety analysis.

Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the safety analysis report will not be increased and the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated has not been introduced such that the subject modification is not an unreviewed safety question.

,,a Plant Lesign Change F341 Plant Design Change Number 341 entitled CY TMI 2.2.2(b) On Site Technical Support Center is complete.

Proposed Change To install a closed circ 0it television system. The camera will be mounted in the control roow, with one (1) camera control and one (1) cloeed circuit television located in the associate emergency response center.

Reason For Change Implementation of TMI lessons learned short-term requirements for TMI 2.2.2(b) to fulfill the requirements of NUREG-0578.

Safety Evaluation This Plant Design Change Request has been reviewed with respect to the criteria contained in 10CFR50.59. The change has been determined to not involve an unreviewed safety question. This evaluation is based on the following:

1.

The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report has not been increased.

2.

The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report has not been created.

3.

The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification has not been reduced.

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, Plant Design Change #342 4

Plant Design Change Number 342 entitled Emergency Power ]3t Pressurizer Heaters NUREG 0578 Item 2.1.1 is complete.

Proposed Change Provide trip signals to the 480 volt circuit breakers of backup pressurizer heaters groups A and E upon the occurrence of a safety injection actuation signal (SIAS) from either of the redundant safety injection initiation relays 4A or 43 (Westinghouse WL's).

Also provide electrical interlocks so that as long as either SIAS (4A or 4B) is present the circuit breakers for backup groups A and E cannot be closeo.

Reason For Change There is a need to use pressurizer heaters to maintain an overpressure condition on the reactor coolant system to maintain the coolant in a subcooled state and to ensure natural circulation when the reactor 6

coolant pumps are not available. This need should be satisfied with or without off-site power available. This need was formalized in Item 2.1.1 of Nuclear Regulatory Commission report TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force Status Report and Short-Term Recommendations (NUREG 0578).

Safety Evaluation 1.

The probability of an occurrence or malfunction of equipment important to safety is not significantly increased as a result of the modification to the circuit breaker control circuitry associated with backup pressurizer heater groups A and E.

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respect it should be noted that the only portion of this i

modification which is classified as Category IE are the existing contacts on SIAS relays 4A and 4B.

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The contemplated modification does not create a new situation with regard to events previously analyzed in the FDSA, and, therefore, the possibility for an accident o. malfunction of a differer.~ type other than those previously evalaated is not created.

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The margin of safety as defined in the basis for the technical specification is not reduced as a result of the modification.

Indeed, safety is enhanced by the provision of a feature which will strip a non-safety related load from the emergency power supplies when a safety injection signal is prescnt.

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F Plant Design Change #343 Plant Design Change Number 343 entitled Hypochlorite System -

l Pump Logic Modification is complete.

4 Proposed Change i

Modify the metering pump starting logic such that:

i 1.

Pump starting will be delayed by a preset value af ter a flow control valve is given a signal to open.

2.

The pump will continue to run only if one of tha four bay flow control valves has power to its associated timer and is given a signal to be in the open position.

r The modification requires connecting a time delay (on pickup) relay in place of the existing motor start relay and relocating connections for the motor start relay to parrellel timer contacts through contacts of the time delay relay.

Reason For Change i

1.

The time delay will give the flow control valves time to open fully before pump starting and therefore, eliminate pulsations in the piping and reduce relief valve operation.

2.

The modification will also insure the pumps start and stop by the timers and will not automatically run if all. valves are closed. This will prevent the relief valve from opening and hypochlorite being pumped to the vent / recirculation pipe.

Safety Evaluation The Plant Design Change Request has been reviewed with respect to the criteria contained in 10CFR50.59. The change has been determined not to involve an unreviewed safety question. This evaluation is based on the following:

1.

.The probability of occurrence or the consequences of int accident i

or malfunction of equipment important to safety-previously l

evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report has not been increased.

.2.

The possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different-type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report has not been created.

i 3.

The margin of safety as defined in_the basis for any technical i

specification has not been reduced.

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