ML19332C631
| ML19332C631 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Grand Gulf  |
| Issue date: | 10/27/1989 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19332C627 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-416-89-23, NUDOCS 8911280364 | |
| Download: ML19332C631 (13) | |
See also: IR 05000416/1989023
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION 11
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101 MARIETTA ET., N.W.
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ATLANTA, GEORGLA 30323
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Report No.:
50-416/89-23
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Licensee: System Energy Resources, Inc.
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Jackson, MS 39205
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Docket No.: 50-416
License No.: NPF-29
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Facility Name: Grand Gulf
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Inspection Conducted: August 26 - September 30, 1989
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Inspectors:
H. D. Christensen, Senior Resident Inspection
Date Signed
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J. L. Mathis, Resident Inspector
Date Signed
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Approved by'
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F. 5. Cantrell _ Chief
Date 51gned
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Projects Section IB
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Reactor Projects Branch 1
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Division of Reactor Projects
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SUMMARY
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scope:
The resident inspectors conducted a rout'<ne inspection in the area:
operational safety verification, maintenaire observation, surveillance
observation, licensed operator training, action on previous inspection
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findings, meeting with local officials, and- renortable occurrences.
The
-inspectors conducted backshift inspections nn September 4,12, and 15,1989.
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Results*
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Within the ar2as inspected-orie violation with three examples was identified:
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Failure to follow procedures which resulted in the closure of the instrument
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air cross-tie valve, a half scram on reactor protection system division II,
and the inadvertent isolation of the reactor water cleanup system, paragraph 3.
This violation appears to be due to a leck of attention to detail by the
operations and I&C departments.
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REPORT DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
J. G. Cesare. Director, Nuclear Licensing
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W. T. Cottle, Vice President of Nuclear Operations
M. L. Crawford, Manager, Nuclear Licensing
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D. G. Cupstid, Manager, Plant Modifications and Construction
- L. F. Daughtery, Compliance Supervisor
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. J. P. Dinnette, Manager. Plent Maintenance
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S. M. Feith, Director. Quality Programs
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R. Hutchinson, GGNS General Manager
f. K. Mangan, Director, Plant Projects and Support
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R. H. McAnulty Electrical Superintendent
A. S. McCurdy Technical Asst., Plant Operations Manager
- L. B. Moulder, Operations Superintendent
W. R. Patterson, Technical Asst., General Manager
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- J. C. Roberts, Manager, Plant & System Engineering
G. Smith, Superintendent, Chemistry
- S. F. Tanner, Manager. Quality Services
L. G. Temple, I & C Superintendent
T. G. Tinney, Mech 6nical Superintendent
F. W. Titus, Director, Nuclear Plant Engineering
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M. J. Wright, Manager, Plant Support
- J. W. Yelverton. Mana5er, Plant Operations
- G. Zinke, Superintendent, Plant Licensing
Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators.
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security force members, and office persennel.
- Attended exit interview
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2.
Plant Status
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The plant began and ended the inspection period in mode one, power
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operations.
Additionally, the site conducted the annual emergency
exercise on September 27, 1989.
The exercise results will be documented
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in NRC inspection report 50-416/89-25.
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3.
Operational Safety (71707)
The inspectors were cognizant of the overall plant status, and of any
significant safety matters related to plant operations.
Daily discussions
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were held with plant management and various members of the plant operating
staff.
The inspectors made frequent visits to the control room.
Observations included the verification of instrument readings, setp91nts
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and recordings, status of operating systems, tags and clearances on
equipment controis and switches, annunciator alarss, adherence to limiting
conditions for operation, temporary alterations in effect, daily journals
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and data sheet entries, control room manning, and access controls.
This
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inspection activity included numerous informal discussions with operators
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and their supervisors,
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On a weekly basis selected engineered safety feature (ESF) systems were
confirmed operable.
The confirmation was made by verifying that
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accessible valve flow path alignrent was correct, power supply breaker and
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fuse status was correct and instrumentation was operational.
The
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tollowing systems were verified operable: LPCS, HPCS, and SLCS
General plant tours were conducted on a wcekly basis. Portions of the
control building, turbine building, auxiliary building and outside areas
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were visited.
The observations included safety related tagout
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verifications, shift turnovers, sampling programs, housekeeping and
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general plant conditions, the status of fire protection equipment, control
of activities in progress, problem identification systems, and containment
1 solation and the readiness of the onsite emergency response facilities.
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The inspectors observed health physics management involvement and
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awareness of significant plant activities, and observed plant radiation
controls.
Periodically the inspectors verified the adequacy of physical
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security control.
The inspectors reviewed safety related tagout, 892192 (water box vents) to
ensure that the tagout was properly prepared, and performed. Additionally,
the inspectors verified that the tagged components were in the required
position.
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The inspectors have noted that senior plant management makes routine tours
to the plant and the control room.
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The inspector toured the Local Public Document Room for Grand Gulf located
at the Hinds Junior College library near Raymond, Mississippi.
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The inspectors reviewed the activities associated with the events listed
below.
On September 9,1989, during performance of corrective maintenance on
Unit 1 instrunent air compressor, the compressor began to surge and
instrument air header pressure dropped from 125 psig to 90 psig. Unit 2
instrument air compressor was in service to provide instrument air
pressure.
The operators investigated the low air pressure and determined
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that the Unit 2 compressor was unable to supp)ly air to the Unit I air
header because the cross-tie valve (P53F013
was shut.
Further
investigation determined that valve F013 had been closed during the
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past midshift while hanging a Unit 2 instrument air compressor tagout.
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This tagout did not include the cross-tie valve (P63-F013) and the
operator did not inform the shift superintendent or log the valve
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repositioning.
Additionally, the repositioning was contrary to system
operating instruction 04-1-01-P53-1, Instrument Air System, normal
position. . The service air system was available to provide a backup air
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supply if the instrument air header pressure had dropped to 85 psig. The
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licensee has taken the following corrective actions:
The valve position
indication was verified to be operablo
5 warning label was placed next to
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the valve switch and the individual o + ounselled.
The failure to follow
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the requirements of S01 04-1-01-P53-2, is a violation of TS 6.8.1, which
states that written procedures shall be estchlished, implemented and
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maintained. This is example one of violation 89-23-01.
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On September 22, 1909, the reactor recirculation post accident sampling
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valve, B33-F127, motor operator breaker tripped and the motor burned up.
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The licensee notified the resident inspectors that the reactor recircula-
tion post accident sample point was inoperable as required by a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />
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notification comitment.
The motor operator was replaced and the valve
successfully passed the required LLRT on September 24, 1989.
On September 26, 1989, during the perfomance of surveillance
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06-0P-ID75-M-0001, attachment IV. Standby Diese) Generator II, the synchroniza-
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tion control circuit failed.
The 6 amp control fuse had blown. The fuse
was replaced and the surveillance successfully completed.
This failure
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was classified as a non-valid failure.
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On September 26, 1989, the unit received a half scram on division 11 RPS.
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This was caused by an I&C technician performing weekly APRM surveillance
06-IC-1C51-W-0006.
The technician took APRM flow card 'H' test switch to
test when he should have taken AP9fi 'D' test switch to test. A human
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performance evaluation (HPES) was initiated and individual was counselled.
This is the second example of failure to follow procedure and inattention
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to detail, violation 89-23-01.
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On September 29, 1989, during the perfotinance of surveillance
06-lC-1E31-A-1002, Main Steam Line Tunnel, RCIC Steam Pipe Tunnel and RCIC
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Equipment Room High Temperature /High Differential Tenperature Calibration,
an operator inadvertently placed the RWCU isolation bypass switch to the
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" normal" position.
This action resulted in a RWCU isolation.
The
procedure required the RCIC isolation bypass switch be placed in " bypass",
however, the operator repositioned the wrong switch. This is the third
example of failure to fu110w procedure and inattention to detail,
violation 89-23-01.
4.
MaintenanceObservation(62703)
During the reporting period, the inspectors observed portions of the
maintenance activities listed below.
The observations included a review
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of the MW0s and other related documents for adequacy;
dherence to
procedure, proper tagouts, technical specifications, quali 4 controls, and
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radiological controls; observation of work and/or retesting, and specified
retest requirements.
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MWO
DESCRIPTION
EL792
Inspection and calibration of 480
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volts breaker (RFPT B AC Main Oil Pump).
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E95428
Investigate / lower float voltage for
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IE 3 battery bank.
EL1860
Inspection and testing of ITE SKY power
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circuit breaker.
195269
Troubleshoot A recirculation flow control
valve.
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FHA pool exhaust recorder calibration.
IN3524
Calibrate turbo oil pressure indicator
(R015A)
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M1062A
Clean PSW side of TBCW beat exchanger.
MA5510
Replace rupture disc on HPCS/RCIC test
return.
M95457
Replace packing to SLCS Pump "B".
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On August 23, 1989, the semi-annual ADS air sample was taken.
The test
results indicated three parameters were out of specification for the
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instrument air supply to ADS. The parameters were total hydrocarbons, dew
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point, and particle count.
NNCR 0270-89 was generated and the evaluation
determined that the condensable hydrocarbons and particle size are within
specification.
However, the dew point was considered to be out of
specification.
A number of actions were recommended to correct the dew
point an evaluation stated that the present dew point should not result in
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moisture condensation in the instrument air system through the month of
November 1989.
The review of corrective action and resolution of the
instrument air dew point out of specification will be an inspector follow
up item 89-23-02.
On September 22, 1989, during troubleshooting of Rosemount trip unit,
1QE22N656, (MWO 195509) 18C technicians discovered air in the sensing
lines.
The technicians vented the high side of the transmitter.
Upon
completion of venting, the shift superintendent performed a functional
test to verify the minimum flow valve was operable.
The functional test
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was performed per S01 04-1-01-E22-1, section 5.2.
At approximately
1:45 a.m. the HPCS pump was started and flow was directed from the CST to
the CST test return.
Valves E22F010 and E22F011 were throttled to
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approximately 30 percent open and the N656 trip unit was verified to
operate properly.
At approximately 1:50, the HPCS pump was secured and
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returned to standby.
Approximately 45 minutes later the auxiliary
building operator reported that the rupture disk on the HPCS/RCIC test
return line was in alam indicating the ruptured disk had blown.
MWO
M95510 was eenerated to inspect / replace the rupture disc.
Upon
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inspecting, IAC found the rupture disc intact but the alarm strip was
broken.
The technician replaced the alarm strip on the rupture disc
indication circuit.
The licensee is investigating what caused the alarm
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strip to break.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
SurveillanceObservation(61726)
The inspectors observed the performance of portions of the surveillances
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listed below.
The observation included a review of the procedure for
technical adequacy, conformance to technical specifications and LCOs;
verification of test instrument calibration; observation of all or part of
the actual surveillances; removal and return to service of the system or
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component; and review of the data for acceptability based upon the
acceptance criteria.
06-IC-IC51-V-003, Revision 26, Source Range Monitor Channel B Calibration.
06-IC-SD17-A-1019, Revision 23, Offgas & Radwaste Building Yentilation
Calibration.
06-IC-1E12-M-005, Revision 24,ContainmentPressure(CTMTSpray)
Functional Test.
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08-S-03-128. Revision 3. Germanian System Calibration.
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06-IC-1E12-M-0002, Revision 25, Containment Spray Time Delay Calibration
and Functional Test,
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No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
LicensedOperatorTraining(41701)
The inspector reviewed procedures and interviewed the operation staff to
assure that controls were adequate to prevent non-licensed or non-
qualified licensed operators from willfully or inadvertently assuming
responsibility for licensed operator duties. Administrative Procedure
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01-S-06-2, Revision 23, Corduct of Operation, designates the operations
superintendent or his designee to verify that the licensee is current in
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the requalification training program.
1he inspector interviewed three
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shift superintendents to ensure they were able to determine the status of
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each of the on-watch operators who were standing a licensed required
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watch.
The shift superinter, dents depend on the operation superintendent
or.his designee to inform them if a licensed operator has failed his
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requalification examination.
Procedure 01-S-06-2, Conduct of Operation,
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states that the training superintendent will noti #y the operations
superintendent per memorandum if an individual does not successfully pass
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requalification training.
The operations superintendent will make
arrangements to remove that individual from licensed duties in a
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reasonable amount of time, i.e., not to exceed seven days from the date of
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notification.
Although it is not proceduralized the training superinten-
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dent calls the operations superintendent or his designee upon notification
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that :n individual failed his requalification examination so that the
individual can be removed from standing shift until he successfully passes
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the requalification examination.
In addition to procedure 01-5-06-2, the
- inspector reviewed the following procedures:
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01-S-04-1, Revision 10
Licensed Operators Training at.d Qualifi-
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cations Program.
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01-S-04-14. Revision 16. Training Records.
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01-S-04-2, Revision 7. Licensed Operator Requalification Training.
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02-5-01-7, Revision 2, Operations Personnel Qualifications.
The above procedures address the notification requirement for individuals
who fail the requalification exams or physical test. The inspector
reviewed the procedures to assure that they provided for an in-depth
defense against both unintentional and willful assumption of a licensed
watch station by an unlicensed or unqualified individual.
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Procedure 01-S-06-2, Revision 23, step 6.2.2.t states," The shift
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superintendent is responsible for training and assessment of assigned crew
members in the perfomance of plant operating procedures and operator
license requirements, and ensuring operators are pursuing their requalifica-
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tions."
Procedure 01-S-04-2 Licensed Operator Requalification Training,
Revision 7. section 6.9.3 states that the operations training supervisor
shall notify operations management when an individual fails to maintain
current or valid status in the requalification training program.
He shall
notify operations management of completion of any assigned accelerated
retraining program. In the procedures reviewed, no requirements existed
that hold the licened operator responsible for reporting disqualifing
conditions to management.
The inspector determined the names of two licensed operators who had
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failed the annual requalification exam in the recent past.
Control room
watch records were reviewed to determine that neither of these individuals
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stood a licensed watch during the time they were disqualified.
In
addition, the control room watch standing verification records were
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reviewed to ascertain whether persons required by administrative
prccedures recorded their qualification watchs.
Procedure 01-S-06-2,
Conduct of Operation should be corrected to indicate that failure of
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requalification' training requires that the individual be removed from
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licensec duties as soon as a replacement can be assigned.
This is
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identified as an inspector followup item (89-23-03).
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7.
ReportableOccurrences(90712&92700)
The event reports listed below were reviewed to determine if the
information provided met the NRC reporting requirements.
The determina-
tion included adequacy of event description and corrective action taken or
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planned, existence of potential generic problems and the relative safety
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significance of each event. Additional inplant reviews and discussions
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with plant personnel as appropriate were conducted for the reports
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indicated by an asterisk. The event reports were reviewed using the
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guidence of the general policy and procedure for NRC enforcement actions,
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regarding licensee identified violations.
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During the inspection period, two LER's were issued.
LER 89-012, Reactor scram due to condenser expansion joint failure,
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LER 89-013, MSIV failed to close due to extruded elastomer seat material.
Both events were documented in NRC Inspection Report 89-19.
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(Closed) LER 88-007, Failure to take the reouired action in technical
specification for inoperable radiation monitor on the standby service
water system.
The licensee revised the log sheets to provide a separate
list of items which can effect technical specification operability.
This
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item is closed.
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(Closed) LER 89-01, Power interruption to ESF bus causes secondary
containment isolation.
The event was discussed in NRC Inspection Report
B9-12, paragraph 8.
No other actions were required. This item is closed.
(Closed) LER 89-04, Shutdown cooling pump trip due to logic power supply
disturbance.
The event is discussed in NRC Inspection Report 89-14
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Paragraph 3.
No other corrective actions were required.
This item is
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closed.
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(Closed) LER 89-011, Missed chemistry surveillence due to personnel error,
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This event was documented in NRC Inspection Report 89-19, paragraph 5.
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The LER will be administrative 1y closed, and the corrective actions
trocked under violation 89-19-01.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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8.
Action on Previous Inspection Findings
(92701,92702)
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(Closed)TI 2515/95, Inspection for Verification of BWR Recirculation Pump
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Trip Multi-Plant Action Item C-02.
The licensee has installed ATWS
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recirculation pump trips.
The trip functions are reactor vessel water
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level and reactor vessel pressure level.
The instrument setpoints and
trip system operability are covered under TS.
This item is closed.
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(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 89-13-03, Develop and implement a program
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to routinely monitor valve performance.
All valves that are required to
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be tested in response to Bulletin 85-03 are scheduled for continued
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monitoring by the maintenance planning and scheduling system.
This item
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is closed.
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(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 88-08-02, Review the evaluation of the
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loose parts monitor alarm.
An engineering evaluation was perforned to
determine the cause of the loose parts alarm.
The evaluation stated the
source was the recirculation loop 8 discharge gate valve (01833F0678). A
radiograph of the valve was perfomed during RFO-3, and no loose parts
were detected.
MNCR 101-80 disposition states the noise is probebly
caused by rattling of the gate valves internal parts due to the force of
the flow through the valve. This item is closed.
(Closed) Inspector followup Item 87-33-02, Review procedures addressing
independent review for radioactive shipment paper work.
Procedure
08-S-06-21, Laundry Handling and Shipment, was revised to include an
independent review by the health physics supervisor. This item is closed.
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(Closed) Violation 89-16-02, Failure to take adequate corrective action to
prevent RCIC system isolation on high steam line flow.
The licensee
confirmed the violation in a letter dated July 27, 1989.
The following
corrective actions have been completed:
The RCIC steam line differential
pressure transmitter damping pots were restored to the covered valve; and
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procedure 01-5-07-8, Control of Permanent Plant I&C Equipment Calibra-
tions, was revised to include administrative controls on damping settings.
This item is closed.
(Closed) Unresolved Item 88-21-01, Review deficiency taggino system
improvements.
Procedure 01-S-06-38, Maintenance Work Order Deficiency
Tagging System, was revised to better document the deficiency tagging with
the maintenance work order process.
The procedure requires that the
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completed maintenance work order have the deficiency tag attached to the
work package.
Additionally, a review of the deficiency tag program is
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performed monthly. This item is closed.
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(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 87-33-01 Review licensee conmitment to
define the plant radiation energy spectrums and revise dose algorithms to
automatically measure and report whole body doses delivered to the lens of
the eyes from radiation identified in the energy spectrums.
Procedure
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08-S-02-49 Dose Calculations, was implemented to provide a method and
' algorithm to translate Panosonic UD-802 TLD response to deep, shallow and
lens of eye dose equivalents and to post this dose to the personnel
exposure data base.
Additionally, the licensee completed a plant
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radiation field characterization study, Document No.88-511.13-64.
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study conducted measurements of plant radiation fieldst describe the
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energy composition of beta radiation fields; and the photon field
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characteristics. This item is closed.
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(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 89-01-01. Evaluation of torque
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requirements for rosemount transmitters (MNCR 006-89).
The licensee
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completed the evaluation of MNCR 006-89 and determined that use of 3/8
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inch bolts torqued to 250 in-lb does not overstress the fastener or reduce
the clamping force required for the rigid mounting of the transmitter.
This item is closed.
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(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 87-01-01, Review controi room human
factor items identified during inspector walkdown. A minor change package
88/1067 has been issued to correct several increment indicators in the
control room and on the remote shutdown panels.
Minor Change Package
88/1052 was completed to expand the range of the suppression pool level
indicators at the remote shutdown panels.
DCP 87/3501 was completed for
human factor upgrades on panels Q1H13-P601 and P864.
The P870 panel
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indicating lights for the lower containment personnel air lock have been
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corrected. This item is closed.
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(Closed) Violation 87-40-01, Failure to perform a differential pressure
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instrumentation calibration on LPCS and LPCI.
The licensee responded to
the violation in letter dated March 23, 1988.
The following corrective
actions have been completed:
Procedure 03-1-01-2, Power Operations, was
revised to require recording of line break base line dato upon reaching
100% power and forwarding this information to system engineering for
evaluation.
This item is closed.
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(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 89-04-02, RCIC system labeling
differences.
The labels or the S0I have been changed to correct the
labeling differences. This item is closed.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 89-04-03, Correct RCIC walkdown
deficiencies.
The identified deficiencies were corrected.
This item is
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closed.
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(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 89-07-01, Correct walkdown deficiencies
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on the fire water pump house.
The identified deficiencies have been
corrected. This item is closed,
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(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 89-07-02, Correct HPCS diesel walkdown
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deficiencies.
The identified deficiencies were corrected.
This item is
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closed.
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(Closed) Violation 88-19-01, Failure to follow Administrative Procedure
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01-S-06-1, Protective Tagging System.
The licensee confirmed the
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violation in a letter dated October 31, 1988.
The following corrective
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actions have been completed:
Training on the event was conducted; a
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standing order on the use of power panel breakers for equipment tag-out
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was issued; caution labels were installed in all ESF power panels; and
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procedures were revised to require additional review and caution
statements. This item is closed,
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(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 87-10-08, Evaluate the numerous values
noted, detemine the appropriate value and revise the SDG fuel oil level-
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requirements. A surveillance control room rounds sheet has been developed
to evaluate technical specification accept criteria for diesel generator
fuel oil levels. This item is closed.
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(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 86-17-01, Review the retest requirements
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to check the local indication is functional following maintenance.
Procedure 01-S-07-2, Test and Retest Control, includes a test matrix which
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specifies retest requirements for valve position indications following
maintenance. This item is closed.
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(Closed) Unresolved Item 88-12-03
Determine if a safety evaluation per
10 CFR 50.59 should have been performed on inadvertent starts of the
Procedure 06-0P-1P75-M-0001, Standby
diesel auxiliary (lube oil pump.SDG) 11 Functional Test, was revised to require testi
'
Diesel Generator
to detemine if the auxiliary lube oil pump suction check valve is
'
properly seated. The licensee determined that a safety evaluation was not
-required. This item is closed.
(Closed) Violation 87-26-01, Failure to document and evaluate the test
discrepancies during standby liquid control system testing.
The licensee
confirmed the violation in a letter dated November 25, 1987.
The
following corrective actions have been completed, procedures were revised,-
!
a MNCR was generated to investigate the problem, a design change was
issued (DCP-85/4053) to increase system operating pressure and training
was-conducted on procedure changes.
This item is closed.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 87-01-06, Permanent action to prevent SRV
lifts during trip unit calibration checks.
The licensee installed DCP
87/0037, SRV Ground Voltage Differential Minimization and DCP 87/0038,
,
Relay Coil EMI Diodes.
These DCPs appear to have fixed the SRV lifting
problems during calibration checks.
This item is closed.
9.
Information Meeting with Local Officials (94600)
The resident inspectors met with Claiborne County Board of Supervisors and
Tensas Parish, La. Policy Jury to inform them of the NRC's mission and the
key NRC personnel associated with the facility.
Both meetings were
beneficial.
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10.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on October 2,1989, with
those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The licensee did not
.
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identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by
the inspectors during this inspection. The licensee had no comment on the
following inspection findings:
Item Number
Description and Reference
Violation 89-23-01
Failure to follow procedures with three
examples:
Mispositioning an instrument air
,
valve; a half scram on division II RPS; and
RWCU isolation.
l
IFI 89-23-02
Review corrective actions on instrument air
dew point.
!
IFI 89-23-03
Revise Procedure 01-S-06-2 to require prompt
,
removal of unqualified operator from duty.
,
10. Acronyms and Initialisms
ADHRS-
Alternate Decay Heat Removal System
Automatic Depressurization System
-
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ATWS -
Anticipated Transient Without Scram
APRM -
Average Power Range Monitor
Boiling Water Reactor
-
Control Rod Drive
-
Design Change Package
-
Diesel Generator
-
ECCS -
Engineering Safety Feature
-
Flow Control Valve
-
HPCS ~
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Hydraulic Power Unit
-
Instrumentation and Control
18C
-
Inspector Followup Item
IFI
-
Limiting Condition for Operation
LCO
-
Licensee Event Report
LER
-
LLRT -
Local Leak Rate Test
LPCI -
Low Pressure Core Injection
LPCS -
Low Pressure Core Spray
MNCR -
Material Nonconformance Report
MSIV -
MWO -
Maintenance Work Order
Nuclear Plant Engineering
- NPE
-
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NRC
-
Pressure Differential Switch
-
P&ID -
Piping and Instrument Diagram
Plant Service Water
PSW
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ODR
Quality Deficiency Report
-
RCIC -
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling
RF0
Refueling Outage
-
-
-
RWCU -
.-
Radiation Work Permit
-
SDG
Standby Diesel Generator
-
SERI -
System Energy Resource Incorporation
SLCS -
Standby Liquid Control System
SOI
System Operating Instruction
-
-
Standby Service Water
-
TCN
Temporary Change Notice
-
TS
Technical Specification
-
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