ML19332C339

Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1989 for Oyster Creek Generating Station

ML19332C339
Person / Time
Site:	Oyster Creek
Issue date:	10/31/1989
From:	Baran R, Yeager J GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP.
To:
Shared Package
ML19332C338	List: ML19332C337 ML19332C339 ML19332C341
References
NUDOCS 8911270182
Download: ML19332C339 (7)

Text

--

. .; ~,,

i'

, I .i

• MONTHLY OPERATING REPORT - OCTOBER 1989 At the beginning of October, Oyster Creek was at full power with a generator load of 650 MWo. During the period of October 6 through 8, plant load was reduced about 100 MWe to repair leaks on valves in the hydraulic control units of the control rod drive system. The control rod pattern was adjusted to achieve a symmetrical pattern during this load reduction.

On October 25, while work was in progress on an electrical motor control center, a fault occurred which caused a loss of power to several pumps, lighting and control circuits. Due to the inability to measure reactor plant coolant leakage,.a reactor plant shutdown was commenced and an " unusual event",

the lowest emergency preparedness condition, was declared. A temporary jumper was installed to restore power within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> ending the unusual event and plant shutdown was terminated at 93% reactor power.

For the remainder of the report period, Oyster Creek operated at full power with a generator load of approximately 650 MWe.

.-7 8911270182 891114 PDR fiDOCK 03000219 R PDC  !

i i

. ~-

j_  %-

l-l MONTHLY OPERATING REPORT OCTOBER 1989 The following Licensee Event Reports were submitted during the month of October 4

1989:

i LER 89-019: Technical Snecification Shutdown Emeroenev Diesel Generator I Inoperable A-reactor plant shutdown and cooldown was completed as required by Technical Specifications due to the inoperability of Emergency Diesel Generator 1 (EDG 1) for greater than seven days. During a bi-weekly surveillance test, EDG 1 exhibited erratic load swings during its unloading sequence. One hour after it o

was shutdown, an attempt to start EDG 1 failed, and it was declared

, inoperable. During. subsequent troubleshooting, electrical load swings as high as 1 800 KW were observed. The EDG-1 inoperability was caused by the followings (1) The unloading l problem was caused by dirt on the wiper of a motorized potentiometer in the peaking load control circuit (2) The failure to start was attributed to latent heat expansion of the engine occuring approximately one hour after shutdown. Added engine friction caused starters ,

to stall in the reduced voltage slow roll mode. (3) The load swings were caused by two loose electrical connections on a " droop" input contact to the electric governor control. Fuel injectors were replaced with new units based on the suspicion that 50KW of the swings may have been due to injector check valves

. leaking internally. l The safety significance of this event is considered minimal since during this period EDG 2 was available for operation, and its operability was demonstrated daily in assordance with Technical Specifications. It should be noted that only the laaky fuel injectors would have affected performance under emergency start and loading conditions Corrective actions included replacement of all fuel injectors on EDG 1, decreasing the resistance of the slow roll starting circuit, replacement of the motorized potentiometer, and correction of the loose connections on the droop input circuit.

LER 89-020: DC control Power Selector Switch for AC Switchaear Selected to Non-Safety Related DC Subsystem Due to Procedural Inadecuaev on September 15, 1989, an operator trainee identified that the knife switch used to select the DC control power source for 480V AC Unit substation (USS) 1B2 was selected to the non-safety related source. Investigations have revealed that the DC control power selector switch for USS 1B2 had been in the  ;

wrong position since November of 1986. The cause of this occurrence is attributed to procedural inadequacy. The system was returned to normal after plant ~ modifications using the component lineup sheet in the system operating procedure. This lineup sheet did not include the DC control power selector switches for the 4160V AC or the 480V AC buses and it was not recognized that the switch for USS 1B2 had been left in the wrong position. Changes have been mada to the component lineup sheets in the syster.. operating procedure to include the control power selector switches for all of the 4160V and 480V AC switchgear units. This event report will be made required reading for all licensed and equipment operators.

I i

~_

y i

LER 98-021 Reactor Scram due to Turbine Trio as a Result of Personnel Error

Durina Surveillance Testino l On September 22, 1989, at approximately 1418 hours0.0164 days <br />0.394 hours <br />0.00234 weeks <br />5.39549e-4 months <br />, mechanical test equipment was inadvertently left connected to one of the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) water level instruments after testing was complete. While being placed back in service, the reference leg of the instrument was vented to the test equipment causing a falso high RPV water level signal to be generated in all five level instruments attached to that common reference leg. The false high RPV water level caused a trip of the turbine generator which resulted in a reactor scram. The technician performing the valve manipulation recognized the problem and closed the root valve. The cause of this event was personnel error since the test equipment was not removed as required by the surveillance procedure.

This event had minimal safety significance because the Reactor Protection ,

System is designed to protect the reactor from any turbine trip condition, and the excess flow check valves in the instrument line would have prevented any ,

significant loss of coolant. All engineered safety features would have functioned norn. ally due to redundant RPV level instrumentation. All instruments involved in this event were calibration checked to ensure no problems had resulted from the momenttry depressurization. The technicians involved in this event were counseled.

9

~

I

? .: e : . ..

.. OPERATING DATA REPORT f

I' ,'

OPERATING STATUS

1. ' DOCKET: 50-219

2. REPORTING PERIOD: 10/89 ,

3.- UTILITY CONTACT: JEFF YEAGER 609-971-4585 ,

4. LICENSED THERMAL POWER (MWt): 1930

5. NAMEPLATE RATING (GROSS MWe): 687.5 x 0.8 = 550

6. DESIGN ELECTRICAL RATING (NET MWe): 650

7. MAXIMUM DEPENDABLE CAPACITY (GROSS MWe): 642

8. MAXIMUM DEPENDABLE CAPACITY (NET MWe): 620

9. IF CHANGES OCCUR ABOVE SINCE LAST REPORT, GIVE REASONS:

NONE

10. POWER LEVEL TO WHICH RESTRICTED, IF ANY (NET MWe): NONE I

11. REASON FOR RESTRICTION, IF ANY: NONE

?

MONTH XIAB CUMULATIVE

12. REPORT PERIOD HRS 745.0 7296.0 174072.0

13. HOURS RX CRITICAL 745.0 3719.8 109965.2

14. RX RESERVE SHTDWN HRS 0.0 0.0 918.2

15. HRS GENERATOR ON-LINE 745.0 3417.0 106960.5

16. UT RESERVE SHTDWN HRS 0.0 0.0 1208.6 17 GROSS THERM ENER (MWH) 1432000 5452170 178973059

18. GROSS ELEC ENER (MWH) 484470 1743480 60347664 19._ NET ELEC ENER (MWH) 467317 1649666 57909534

20. UT SERVICE FACTOR 100.0 46.8 61.4

21. UT. AVAIL FACTOR 100.0 46.8 62.1

22. UT CAP FACTOR (MDC NET) 101.2 36.5 53.7

23. UT CAP FACTOR (DER NET) 96.5 34.8 51.2

24. UT FORCED OUTAGE RATE 0.0 17.1 11.7

25. FORCED OUTAGE HRS 0.0 706.7 14217.4

26. SHUTDOWNS SCHEDULED OVER NEXT 6 MONTHS (TYPE, DATE, DURATION):

None

27. IF CURRENTLY SHUTDOWN ESTIMATED STARTUP TIME: N/A 1619B l

c: 1 I

,5

,- )

e  ;

i AVERAGE DAILY POWER LEVEL j NET MWe r i i

l DOCKET #. . .. . . . - . .50219  ;

[ UNIT. . . .' . . . . . . . OYSTER CREEK #1 -l REPORT DATE . .. . . . .NOVERMER 1, 1989  !

COMPILED BY . . . . . . .JEFF YEAGER  ;

. TELEPHONE # . . ... . .609-971-4585 .

i 1

MONTH OCTOBER, 1989  ;

)

l o nar e nAr a J

1. 629 17. 624

2. 626 18. 625 -

3. 626 19. 629

4. 627 20. 629

5. 629 21, 630

6. 617 22, 631

7. 630 23. 630

8. 619 24. 630

9. 630 25. 626

10. 629 26. 629 l

11. 630 27. 629 l

12. 629 28. 630

13. 628 29. 648 14, 628 30. 630

15. 627 31. 621

16. 625 1619B ,;

l e' , - '-  ;

~

..' )

e - Oyster Creek Station #1 l' Docket No. 50-219 I

REFUELING INFORMATION - OCTOBER, 1989 I I

Name of Facility: Oyster Creek Station #1 l Scheduled date for next refueling shutdown: January 11, 1991 pending necessary state approval. ,

1 schoduled dato for restart following refueling: April 13, 1991 l Will refueling . or resumption of operatien thereafter require a Technical specification change or other license amendment?

I Yes l

Scheduled date(s) for submitting proposed licensing action and supporting i information:

July 15, 1990 Important licensing considerations associated with refueling, e.g., new or ,

different fuel design or supplier, unreviewed design or performance analysis methods, significant changes in fuel design, new operating procedures:

1. General Electric Fuel Assemblies - fuel design and performance ,

analysis methods have been approved by the NRC. *

2. Exxon Puel Assemblies - no major changes have been made nor are there any anticipated.

The number of fuel assemblies (a) in the core = 560 (b) in the spent fuel storage pool = 1595 (c) in dry storage = 37 7he.present licensed spent fuel pool storage capacity and the size of any ,

increase in licensed storage capacity that has been requested or is planned, in number of fuel assemblies:

Present licensed capacity: 2600 The projected date of the last refueling that can be discharged to the spent fuel pool assuming the present licensed capacity:

Reracking of the fuel pool is in progress. Nine (9) out of ten (10) racks have been installed to date. When reracking is completed, discharge capacity to the spent fuel pool will be available until 1994 refueling outage.

1619B ,

i i

l

.- . .~ ., - - . - ., . _._-.-. - - , _ , . _ . . . _ _ ..

.l UNIT SHUTDOWNS AND POWER REDUCTIONS

+

DOCKET No. 50-219 '--

UNIT NAME- Oyster Creek .

DATE October. 1989' COMPLETED BY R. Baran REPORT MONTH October. 1989 1

^

TYPE METHOD OF SHUTTING F: Forced DURATION DOWN THE REACTOR OR NO. DATE S: Scheduled (Hours) REASON (1)- REDUCING POWER (2) CORRECTIVE AC" IONS / COMMENTS C6 10/25/89 F 2.0 D 1 Commenced a plant shutdown from full load due to the loss of the integrators lfor the 1-8 sump and the Drywell Equip-rsent Drain Tank (DWEDT) ' and the high .

and low level alarm circuits for the 1-8 sump and DWEDT. Without the in-tegrators and alarms, the identiftai and unidentified leak rates were unable to be calculated. Shutdowr,was termin-ated at 93% reactor power after the

'drywell leak rate monitors were re-turned to service. Plant load at the time was 592 MWE (gross).

Summary (1) REASON (2) METHOD

a. Equipment Failure (Explain) e. Operator Training & License Exam 1. Manual

b. Maintenance or Test f. Administrative 2. Manual Scram

c. Refueling g. Operational Error (Explain) 3. Automatic Scram

d. Regulatory Restriction h. Other (Explain) 4. Other (Explain)

_ = . - . _ - - - - _ . - - _ . _ - _ _ _ - - _ _ -