ML19309E686
| ML19309E686 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas, Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 04/04/1980 |
| From: | Ahearn C, Knotts J DEBEVOISE & LIBERMAN, TEXAS UTILITIES ELECTRIC CO. (TU ELECTRIC) |
| To: | NRC ATOMIC SAFETY & LICENSING APPEAL PANEL (ASLAP) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8004240173 | |
| Download: ML19309E686 (22) | |
Text
. .
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ,
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD i
In the Matter of )
)
HOUSTON LIGHTING AND POWER CO., ) Docket No. 50-498A et al. ) 50-499A
)
(South Texas Project, Units )
1 and 2) )
)
TEXAS UTILITIES GENERATING ) Docket No. 50-445A COMPANY, et al. ) 50-446A
)
(Comanche Peak Steam Electric )
Station, Units 1 and 2) )
MEMORANDUM OF ADDITIONAL AUTHORITIES OF ,
TEXAS UTILITIES GENERATING COMPANY CONCERNING THE DISCOVERY OF SETTLEMENT DOCUMENTS f On March 28, 1980 the Appeal Board requested all parties !
involved with the petition for directed certification concerning the production of settlement documents to provide the Appeal I
Board with any additional authorities bearing on whether courts do or ought to recognize the existence of a privilege ;
against discovery of documents because of a relationship of one kind or another between those documents and the settle-ment process. Counsel for Texas Utilities Generating Company ("TUGCO") respectfully submits this memorandum of authorities bearing upon this issue.
I.
SUMMARY
i In the limited time available for research, no treatise l or law review article could be found which directly addressed p 8004240j%3 l
V the question of the producibility of settlement documents.
However, the treatises uniformly hold that matters which ;
would be inadmissible at trial due to " privilege" are not subject to discovery, and the modern trend (reflected in both law review articles and recent cases) is to consider the inadmissibility of evidence relating to settlement negotia-tions and conduct or statements therein to be a type of
" privilege".
Only one court case clearly on point was found, City of Groton v. Connecticut Light & Power Company, 84 F.R.D. 0420 l (D. Conn. 1979), where the request for production of docu-ments relating to the settlement between the defendant ,
and one group of plaintiffs made by the attorney for another group of plaintiffs was denied. The court in this case cited the prejudice which would result to the settling plaintiffs and "the strong public policy favoring settlement I l
of disputes." Id. at 423. See, infra at 9-11. Other :
federal, state, and administrative decisions support this {
conclusion, with the production of settlement documents f being allowed only in certain exceptional circumstances which are not pertinent to this proceeding.
II. DOCUMENTS WHICH ARE PRIVILEGED ARE NOT SUBJECT TO DISCOVERY Commentators on the law of discovery have long held that documents which are privileged are not subject to l
i
t discovery. As stated by one early authority: .
Every objection which would be tenable :
as of right at the trial is tenable when !
i the examination is held before the trial. -
It is as well a futile as an unjust thing to l allow the discovery of evidence which can be excluded at the trial on the ground that .
it is privileged. There is no necessity to !
inquire into reasons behind the rules of l privilege, for the paramount policies have !
already been decided in connection with the law of evidence generally. The safest course is to rely on the decisions in the law of i evidence which have been developed nver a much longer period of time and which have withstood the scrutiny of a more careful scholarship. The question to be asked ,
is, would a similar objection be tenable upon the actual trial of the case? Courts i generally have applied such a theory of :
decision in regard to objections which ,
i raise questions of privilege. (citations
, omitted). RAGLAND, DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL, ,
(1932), p. 146 (emphasis added).
Several years later, and immediately after the enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, another author reaffirmed this approach. ,
It is a general principle that statutes or rules never authorize the production of .
a book, or anything else, which, on account ;
of its confidential and privileged character, ;
could not be received in evidence. [ State v. i King County Superior Court, 56 Wash 649, 106 !
i' Pac 150 (1910)] DYER-SMITH, FEDERAL EXAMIN- l ATIONS BEFORE TRIAL AND DEPOSITIONS PRACTICE !
AT HOME AND ABROAD, (1939), S292, p. 226.
i In order to determine what is privileged matter, "the rules l i
of evidence must be consulted in each case." Ibid., S28, p. 45. ;
l Modern authorities agree that matter is privileged from i discovery if it would be privileged at trial under the applicable l
l
rules of evidence. See WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS, 3rd Ed., (1976), S81, p. 404; and WRIGHT &
i MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, (1970), Vol. 8, l S2016, p. 122. Both authorities cited the case of U.S. v. i Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 97 L.Ed. 727 (1953) for this proposi- l t
tion, and that case states that We think it should be clear that the term 'not privileged' as used in Rule 34, refers to ' privileges' as that term is understood in the law of evidence.
Id. at p. 6.
All of these authorities thus support the proposition that if settlement documents are not admissible at trial then they should not be subject to discovery. Since evidence of settlement negotiations and conduct and statements made pursuant thereto are inadmissible at trial under Federal Rule of Evidence 408, such evidence should not be discoverable. l The Federal Rules of Evidence have but a single rule relating to privileges, Rule 501, which states in pertinent -
part:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court ,
pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege :
i of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed i by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience.
t This rule is specifically made applicable "at all stages of all actions, cases, and proceedings" in Rule 1101(c).
If the basis for refusing to admit evidence of settlement i
negotiations or of statements or conduct made in such !
negotiations is a " privilege", then Federal Rule of Evi-dence 408 is likewise applicable at the discovery stage ;
(through the operation of Federal Rule of Evidence 1101(c))
to prevent the discovery of the same things.
While the inadmissibility of evidence of settlement !
negotiations has long been recognized, the basis for the exclusion of this evidence has not been universally agreed upon. Various authors have proposed theories of :
i contract, relevance, or privilege as a basis for the ;
exclusion. The relevance theory held sway earlier in the !
century but the current trend is to recognize privilege l as the correct basis for the exclusion. See Comment, Evidence--Admissibility Of Statements Of Fact Made During i
Negotiation For Compromise, 34 Michigan Law Review 524 l (1936); Bell, Admissions Arising Out of Compromise--Are i They Irrelevant?, 31 Texas Law Review 239 (1953); and
~
Waltz & Huston, The Rules Of Evidence In Settlement, [
t 5 Litigation 11 (1978). The~ court in the case of United !
States v. Reserve Mining Company, 412 F.Supp. 705 (D. Minn.
1 1976) described this exclusicn principle as a privilege, ;
i id. at 712, as did the court in Helene Curtis Industries v.
Sales Affiliates, Inc., 121 F.Supp. 490, 509 (S.D.N.Y. ,
1954).
Although the " settlement document privilege" may not arise as often as other privileges, this is not a reason e -
for denying the existence of the privilege in this case.
The Senate Committee on the Judiciary stated in the part of its report dealing with Rule 501 that
[t]he determination was made that the specific privilege rules proposed by the Court should be eliminated and a single rule (Rule 501) substituted, leaving the law in its current condition to be developed by the courts of the United States utilizing the principles
,of the common law (emphasis added). S. REP.
NO. 93-1277, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., (reprinted in 28 U.S.C.A. Federal Rules Of Evidence,
- p. 799 at 801).
The Senate thus recognized that the law of privilege is still developing and did not wish to " freeze" the Federal Rules of Evidence into considering only those privileges which were universally recognized at that time. This' Appeal Board should adhere to the developing trend and consider settlement negotiations and the conduct or statements made therein as privileged and thus immune from discovery.
III. FEDERAL COURT DECISIONS INVOLVING THE DISCOVERY OF SETTLEMENT DOCUMENTS There are very few decisions considering the question of whether settlement documents should be produced in discovery, and there are apparently only two cases that have been decided in this area since the Federal Rules of Evidence became effective on July 1, 1975.
The first of these cases, Magnaleasing, Inc. v. Staten Island Mall, 76 F.R.D. 559 (1977), involved a motion brought by a judgment creditor to compel production of a settlement
l
?
i
(!
agreement betweeen a bank and a judgment debtor. 1! The i
< judgment creditor (plaintiff Magnaleasing Inc.) had brought l suit seeking damages and recision of a lease agreement j between itself and defendant Staten Island Mall (the " Mall"). [
Recision was granted and damages of $156,769.99, plus r t
interest, were awarded. Before the plaintiff could satisfy its judgment, the defendants entered into an agreement with l Chase Manhatten Mortgage and Reality Trust (" Chase") under l which the Mall properties and certain intangibles were transferred to Chase and judgments were entered in a foreclosure action which had been begun by Chase against the defendants. The plaintiff then sought discovery .. aid of its federal judgment under Rule 69(a) of the Federal Rules ,
of Civil Procedure, and he specifically sought to compel ;
i production of the settlement agreement between the defen-dants and Chase. Plaintiff suggested that the settlement involved improper transfers of assets to and from defendants ;
i and that production of the agreement would aid the plaintiff in locating defendants' assets.
-1/ A line of cases similar to the concealment of assets cases involves the breach of fiduciary duty of an insurance ,
company to its policyholder in failing to settle a case within the policy li-Jits. See LaRocca v. State Farm l Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 47 F.R.D. 278 (W.D.Pa. l 1969), and Bogrget v. Government Employees Insurance Company, j 48 F.R.D. 29 (D. Conn. 1969). In these cases production of
' settlement documents was allowed because of the fiduciary duty between the company and its policyholder.
J
The court held that Rule 69(a) specifically authorized the type of discovery sought in this instance, stating:
The Rule authorizes discovery by a judgment I creditor for the purpose of discovering any concealed or fraudulently transferred assets.
The scope of discovery, however, is circumscribed by this purpose. Accordingly, the settlement agreement at issue here is relevant and discoverable oniv insofar as it relates to the exister.. r transfer of defendants' assets. Id. at 561. (emphasis added).
After an in-camera inspection, the court decided that limited portions of the agreement were relevant and concluded that the enumerated portions of the settlement agreement may indeed give .aintiff useful and necessary information concerning the whereabouts of property which might satisfy the judgment. Id. at 561.
The court then considered and rejected arguments that the
, attorney / client and work product privileges should apply to these documents.
This case is clearly distinguishable from the present proceeding due to the existence of a specific rule of law, FRCP 69(a), specifically authorizing discovery of concealed assets or fraudulent transfers. It should also be noted that the court took great pains to allow the discovery of only the matter needed by the plaintiff to locate assets. The case is further distinguished by the fact i
that the settlement was completed and involved a separate case from the one in which the settlement was sought to be prcduced.
The other case which addressed the issue of compelling production of settlement documents, City of Groton v.
Connecticut Light & Power Company, 84 F.R.D. 420 (D. Conn. ,
1979), bears several similarities to the present proceeding.
This case involved a suit by numerous cities contesting a FERC proceeding in which the defendant was involved. Though all the cities were initially united, they broke into two warring camps so that the proceeding essentially became three-sided. The issue of the case, strikingly similar to that before this board, was whether one plaintiff group could discover a partial settlement between the defendant and the other plaintiffs. The court considered the case to be one of first impression and refused to order the produc- l tion of the settlement documents sought.
The court in this instance used the language of relevancy in determining whether the documents sought should be produced.
The court extensively considered the case of Magnaleasing, supra, and said it was using the balancing process used there. However, the balancing process had been used in that ;
transfer of assets case for the limited purpose of selecting documents to be produced. That is, the balancing process was used in Magnaleasing after it had been decided that some documents should be produced, to determine which ones would be produced, rather than to dete. ine whether documents should be produced in the first place.
l i
(
In City of Groton, the Court started with a balance to l
determine whether to produce the documents at all, and found that the prejudice to the settling parties would be signifi- ;
cant if production of settlement documents was required. The court also stated that "beyond prejudice to the settling parties, f these results would contravene the strong public policy favoring !
settlement of disputes." Id. at 423. The court rsiected the arguments of the attorney for the non-settling cities that the settlement might have anticompetitive effects on the non-settling ,
plaintiffs which they would want to oppose in the present liti-gation and that the disclosure might turn up evidence of "addi-tional anticompetitive activities by defendants relevant to the on-going litigation." Id. at 423. The court then refused to order the documents produced.
Although this case did not specifically consider whether or j not the settlement documents should be protected from discovery as
" privileged" irt haec verba, it reached that result. By recognizing both the harm which could be done to the settling parties and the
" strong public policy favoring settlement of disputes," the court ;
was espousing exactly the grounds which are relied on by the i proponents of the " privilege theory" for the exclusion of evidence of settlement negotiations. Thus this case supports the privilege l theory, reaching the same result which would have been reached if ,
i that theory had been specifically adopted in those terms. Regard-l l
l l
l l
1
less of the theory used by the court, it was obviously requiring a yery strong showing of need before requiring these documents to be produced. 2/
f IV. STATE CASES ;
As a general matter, state court decisions recognize a i
privilege against the evidentiary use of documents created solely for the purpose of settlement negotiations. Like the i federal courts, the state courts ground this privilege on the public policy favoring settlement of controversies and the accompanying need to protect parties who negotiate in good faith from the disclosure of their negotiating positions. ;
See, e.g., Cantlin v. Pavlovich, 580 S.W. 2d 190, 191 (1979)
(citing Fed. R. Evid. 408); Yeager v. Durflinger, 280 N.W.
2d 1, 6 (Ia. 1979) and cases cited therein.
Research has revealed, however, relatively few decisions in which state courts examined questions relating to the discoverability of documenta prepared in connection with settlement negotiations. "ne cases which have been found 2/ Cf. In re Special November 1975 Grand Jury (Subpoena Duces Tecum Issued to Peat, Marwich, Mitchell and Company),
433 F.Supp. 1094 (N.D. Ill. 1977), involving a grand jury proceeding, where Federal Rule of Evidence 408 was held ;
inapplicable in view of Rule 1101(d)(2) which provides that the Rules (other than Rule 501) do not apply to grand jury ,
proceedings, id. at 1096, and that neither rule 408 or its '
legislative history could thus apply. Id. at 1097.
l i
l - - - - .
universally hold that documents prepared for such purposes need not be disclosed to third parties, at least in the absence of some independent use of those documents by the preparer.
In Manwearing v. New York, 339 N.Y.S. 2d 891, 72 Misc. 2d 486 (N.Y. Ct. C1. 1972), for instance, the New York Court of Claims examined the question whether the state had to produce a property appraisal prepared during the prelimi-nary stages of an eminent domain proceeding. The court held that a document created for negotiation and possible settle-ment purposes was not discoverable, since it would be inadmissible at trial. If, however, the individual who .
prepared the appraisal were to testify on property valuation issues, the court's decision would permit the use of the appraisal for impeachment purposes. In those circumstances, the appraisal might be relevant as a prior inconsistent statement. Id. at 893.
Similarly, in Lapsley v. Texas, 405 S.W. 2d 406, l 411, (Tx. Civ. App. 1966) (alternative holding), the [
Texas Court of Civil Appeals upheld a trial court ruling !
that recapitulation sheets prepared by the Texas Highway Department in an eminent domain proceeding were immune from discovery. To support this determination, the appeals court relied on the fact that the documents in question had been i
prepared for use in a statutorily mandated negotiation l
l I
process. As the court stated, "[t]he recapitulation sheets ,
are a part of and entwined in this negotiation and settlement ,
process and as such are not admissable as an admission l against interest, nor for any purpose appellants suggest."
I Id. at 411; accord, City of Houston v. Derby, 215 S.W. 2d 690 (Tx. Civ. App. 1948).
Manwearing, supra, followed without citation the approach taken by the New York Appellate Division in Edelman ,
- v. Goodman, 250 N.Y.S. 2d 572, 21 A.D. 2d 786 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1964). In that case, the court required the expunge-ment of proposed settlement stipulations from the record.
Id. at 574. As its decisional basis, the court relied on the general rule against the admissibility of documents relating to unaccepted settlement proposals. According to the court, no evidentiary use of such material was permis-sible, unless it contained factual admissions or conces- !
l sions. Accord, Union Bank v. Deshel, 139 App. Div. 217, 123 N.Y.S. 585 (App. Div. 1910).
Illinois appears to take an even more restrictive approach. Department of Public Works & Buildings v. Sun i
Oil, 383 N.E 2d 634, 66 Ill. App. 3d 64, 22 Ill. Dec. 826 i
(Ill. App. 1978), upheld a trial judge's ruling that a letter prepared for settlement negotiations could not be used for impeachment. According to the appeals court, such !
negotiations were absolutely inadmissible. Id. at 637.
l
Other state court decisions define the scope of the settlement privilege in the trial context. Under those decisions, counsel for one codefendant cannot mention, in the jury's presence, another codefendant's settlement with the plaintiff at least when the defendant who sett'ad does not continue as a party to the relevant proceeding. Compare ,
Parker v. South Louisiana Contractors Inc., 370 S. 2d 1310, 1314-15 (La. App. 1979) with Cox v. Kelsey-Haves Co., 594 P.
2d 354, 357-60, (Okla. 1978). This exception does not necessarily extend to all cases in which both settling ,
parties retain a stake in the controversy. Instead, evidence l of such an agreement is admissible only when the settling codefendant remains an active party in the action. See, e.g., City of Houston v. Sam P. Wallace & Co., 585 S.W. 2d 699 (Tx. Sup. Ct. 1979) at 673-74. While some states con- ;
tinue the practice of permitting the admission of statements of independent fact made during settlement negotiations, see, e.g., Knapp v. Hoerner, 22 Wash. App. 925, 591 P. 2d 127i, 1279 (Wa. Ct. App. 1979); Manwearing v. New York, supra, Rule 408 abandoned that practice at the federal level as of July 1, 1975.
s V. FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE TREATMENT i An examination of the treatment other federal agencies accord documents prepared for settlement negotiations i
reveals a similar pattern. In general, the agencies recognize privileges against the evidentiary use of material relating solely to settlement negotiations. Apparently, few agencies have ruled directly on the discoverability of such material.
The only available administrative decision on coint recognizes that the settlement privilege precludes the forced disclosure of documents prepared with a view toward settlement. That case, Black Marlin Pipeline Co., Docket No.
CP75-93 (Remand) (FERC I.D., Oct. 18, 1979), arose in the ,
context of the request for intracompany documents prepared -
by a pipeline company in connection with a Federal Energy I
Regulatory Commission ("FERC") investigative proceeding.
The presiding administrative law judge found applicable Section 1.18(e) of FERC's rules, 18 C.F.R. S 1.18(e), which proscribed the evidentiary use of an unaccepted settlement proposal upon a claim of privilege by the preparing party.
The presiding law judge rejected staff's contention that Section 1.18(e) governed only the admissibility of the evidence as opposed to its discoverability. Id. at 12. In the judge's view, the policies behind both the FERC rule and Rule 408 precluded mandatory discovery of the allegedly privileged documents. Id. at 12-13. Under this decision, both settlement proposals and settlement discussions are protected from forced discovery. Id. at 13.
Section 1.24 of FERC's rules, 18 C.F.R. S 1.24(g),
lends support to the holding in Black Marlin. Under that rule, a deponent may be questioned only with regard to matters relevant to the issues involved in the pending proceeding. If documents prepared solely for settlement negotiation purposes are inadmissable at a hearing, they are not discoverable. In addition, at least one FERC administrative law judge has ruled against any reference at a hearing to statements made during settlement negotiations.
Kentucky Utilities Co., Docket Nos. ER78-22 & 78-417 (Tr. 521-22). ,
Section 1.18(e) has withstood judicial review.
In Consolidated Gas Supply Corp. v. FERC, 606 F. 2d 323, 328 (D.C. Cir. 1979) the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir uit held that in view of that rule, FERC cannot rely on an unaccepted settlement proposal in an opinion on the merits.
Similarly, in economic enforcement proceedings before the Civil Aeronautics Board (" CAB"), a request for protection automatically precludes the disclosure of memoranda and documentation submitted in support of a proposed settlement agreement. 14 C.F.R S 302.215(b). The material may be I
l
i released later, however, unless the party requesting non-disclosure establishes the existence of legally sufficient reasons to ,
support non-disclosure. Prior to the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L.95-504, 92 Stat. 1743, the CAB's general standard for evaluating discovery requests examined the extent to which disclosure would adversely ,
affect the interests of the privilege claimer and was I required in the public interest. Under this approach, the ;
reasoning in Black Marlin would be fully applicable.
r This approach, however, assumed the applicability of former >
Section 1104 of the Federal Aviation Act, Pub. L.85-726, Title XI S 1104, 72 Stat. 797 (1958) (current version at 49 U.S.C. fil504).. While the Deregulation Act deleted all reference to the test previously applied, the CAB has not ,
altered ics rule in response to this new statute. 1/
l E/ 49 U.S.C. S 1504. The deletion was apparently inad- ;
vertent. Congress' sole purpose in amending Section 1104 was to ensure that the CAB, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Transportation would have suffi-cient authority to withhold information which might prejudice the United States' position in international negotiations or might adversely affect the competitive position of any air carrier of foreign air transporta-tion. See H.R. REP. NO. 1211, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 20 (1978), reprinted in [1978] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3737, 3756. Congress did not reveal any intent to alter ,
the circumstances upon which such information could be withheld from disclosure. See Id.
f
, The Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") follows a somewhat [
different approach. Under Section 3.31(b)(1) of the FTC's rules, 16 C.F.R. S 3.31(b)(1), material is available for ;
discovery upon a showing that the requested material is reasonably expected to yield information relevant in a j proceeding on the merits. The FTC permits protective orders f for the preservation of common law privileges "as they may l
be interpreted by the Commission in light of reason and ;
experience." 16 C.F.R. S S3.31(b)(2). These privileges may be asserted prior to the production of documents. 16 C.F.R S 3.38A.
In some circumstances, Congress has found it advisable f to provide for a settlement privilege by statute. Section ;
G10(a) of the Fair Housing Code, 42 U.S.C. S 3610(a), for
]
instance, provides that "(n]othing said in the course of I (settlement conferences] may be made public or used as i evidence in a subsequent proceeding under (the Fair Housing l
Code] without the written conscnt of the persons concerned." l This provision has been construed as requiring the exclusion from evidence of all statements made during HUD-sponsored settlement negotiations. Madison v. Jeffers, 494 F.2d 114 ,
(4th Cir. 1974) (per curiam). -
t I
l
VI. CONCLUSION The Appeal Board should follow the trend to recognize a l settlement privilege and protect the documents in question from disclosures.
ectfully submitted, i R
\ o y
[;"$[L- r ,.
Joseph B. Knotts,/ Jr. [
I /
0 .A4M C. Dennis Ahearn !
Counsel for Texas Utilities Generating Company DEBEVOISE & LIBERMAN 1200 Seventeenth Street, N.W. !
Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 857-9800 i
April 4, 1980 ;
P I
l l
l l
_. . ~ . . , _ . . _ .
I UNITED STATES OF AMERICA '
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of ) ,
) !
HOUSTON LIGHTING AND POWER CO. , ) Docket Nos. 50-498A i et al. ) 50-499A ,
)
(South Texas Project, Units )
1 and 2) )
)
TEXAS UTILITIES GENERATING ) Docket Nos. 50-445A COMPANY, _et _al . ) 50-446A i (Comanche Peak Steam Electric )
Station, Units 1.and 2) ) l CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of " Memorandum of Additional Authorities Of Texas Utilities Generating Company Concerning Discovery of Settlement Documents" in the above captioned matters, were served upon the following persons this 4th day of April, 1980 by deposit in the United States mail, first !
class postage prepaid, and hand-delivered to those persons indicated by an asterisk.
i
- Alan S. Rosenthal Michael L. Glaser, Esq. !'
Chairman 1150 17th Street, N.W.
4350 East / West Highway Washington, D.C. 20036 j East / West Towers 1 Room 529 Sheldon J. Wolfe, Esq.
Bethesda, Maryland U.S. Nuclear Regulatory !
Commission
- Michael C. Farrar Washington, D.C. 20555 4350 East / West Highway East / West Towers 1 Chase R. Stephens Room 529 Docketing and Service Branch ;
Bethesda, Maryland U.S. Nuclear Regulatory l Commission i
- Thomas S. Moore Washington, D.C. 20555 !
4350 East / West Towers 1 Room 529 Mr. Jerome D. Saltzman
- l Bethesda, Maryland Chief, Antitrust and Indemnity Group Marshall E. Miller, Esq. Nuclear Reactor Regulation i U.S. Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 i
e 5
i--
i l
l l
l J. Irion Worsham, Esq.
R. L. Hancock, Director ,
Merlyn D. Sampels, Esq. City of Austin Electric Utility i Spencer C. Relyea, Esq. P.O. Box 1086 Worsham, Forsythe & Sampels Austin, Texas 78767 l 2001 Bryan Tower, Suite 2500 l Dallas, Texas 75201 G.W. Oprea, Jr. !
Executive Vice President Jon C. Wood, Esq. Houston Lighting & Power l W. Roger Wilson, Esq. Company . , , _ ,
Matthews, Nowlin, Macfarlane P.O. Box 1700 ;
& Barrett Houston, Texas 77001 1500 Alamo National Building .
San Antonio, Texas 78205
- Susan B. Cyphert, _ Esq. l Frederick H. Parmenter, Esq.
Dick Terrell Brown, Esq. David A. Dopsovic, Esq. !
800 Milam Building Robert Fabirkant, Esq. l San Antonio, Texas 78205 Nancy Luque, Esq. !
Kenneth M. Glazier, ESq. l Charles G. Thrash, Jr., Esq. U.S. Department of Justice !
E. W. Barnett, Esq. Antitrust Division i Theodore F. Weiss, Esq. P.O. Box 14141 !
J. Gregory Copeland, Esq. Washington, D.C. 20444 i Baker & Botts 3000 One Shell Pla:a Don R. Butler, Esq. .
Houston, Texas 77002 211 East Seventh Street !
Austin, Texas 78701 l Steven R. Hunsicker, Esq. ;
R. Gordon Gooch, Esq. Jerry L. Harris, Esq. l John P. Mathis, Esq. Richard C. Balough, Esq.
Baker & Botts i City of Austin .
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. l P.O. Box 1088 I Washington, D.C. 20006 Austin, Texas 78767 l l
- Roy P. Lessy, Jr., Esq.
- Robert Lowenstein, Esq. l Michael B. Blume, Esq. J.A. Bouknight, Jr., Esq. :
Fredric D. Chanania, Esq. William J. Franklin, Esa. l Ann P. Hodgdon, Esq. Douglas G. Green, Esq. ,
L.S. Nuclear Regulatory Lowenstein, Newman, Reis l Commission Axelrad and Toll [
Washington, D.C. 20555 1025 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. ,
Washington, D.C. 20036 (
Roff Hardy Chairman and Chief Executive John W. Davidson, Esq.
Officer Sawtelle, Goode, Davidson & :
Central Power and Light Tioilo !
Company 1100 San Antonio Savings Bldg. I P.O. Box 2121 San Antonio, Texas 78204
, Corpus Christi, Texas 78403 I
( Douglas F. John, Esq. i Mr. Perry G. Brittain McDermott, Will and Emery President 1101 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. l Texas Utilities Generating Suite 1201 Company Washington, D.C. 20036 2001 Bryan Tower l Dallas, Texas 75201
__ _ . - . - _ _ . _ _ ~
i Bill D. St. Clair, Esq. Marc J. Wetterhahn, Esq.
Morgan Hunter, Esq. Robert M. Rader, Esq.
- McGinnis, Lockridge & Conner & Moore Kilgore 1747 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. ;
Fifth Floor Washington, D.C. 20006 Texas State Bank Building i 900 Congress Avenue Mr. William C. Price Auctin, Texas 78701 Central Power & Light Co.
P.O. Box 2121 David M. Stahl, Esq. Corpus Christi, Texas 78403 Isham, Lincoln & Beale ;
1050 17th Street, N.W. Mr. G. Holman King ;
Suite 701 West Texas Utilities Co.
Washington , D.C. 20036 P.O. Box 841 r Abilene, Texas 79604 i Sara Welling, Esq.
Michael I. Miller, Esq. Kevin B. Pratt, Esq.
James A. Carney, Esq. Attorney General's Office ;
Isham, Lincoln & Beale State of Texas One First National Plaza P.O. Box 12548 i Suite 4200 Austin, Texas 78711 Chicago, Illinois 60603 ,
Frederick H. Ritts, Esq.
Don H. Davidson William H. Burchette, Esq.
City Manager Northcutt Ely City of Austin Watergate 500 Building P.O. Box 1088 Washington, D.C. 20037 ;
Austin, Texas 78767 W.S. Robson General Manager South Texas Electric Cooperative, Inc. !
Route 6, Building 102 Joseph B. Knotts, Jr.
Victoria Regional Airport Victoria, Texas 77901 George Spiegel, Esq.
Robert C. McDiarmid, Esq.
Robert Jablon, Esq. h. AM Marc Poirier, Esq. C. Dennis Ahearn Spiegel & McDiarmid 2600 Virginia Avenue, N.W.
Suite 312 Washington, D.C. 20037 W.N. Woolsey, Esq.
Dyer and Redford '
1030 Petroleum Tower Corpus Christi, Texas 78474 l Donald M. Clements Gulf States Utilities Company Post Office Box 2951 ;
Beaumont, Texas 77704 l
-