ML19269D337

Motion for Consideration of Emergency Planning Issue.Parties Should Be Given Opportunity to Discuss Sufficiency of Emergency Plans Prior to Issuance of Cp.Certificate of Svc Encl

ML19269D337
Person / Time
Site:	05000471
Issue date:	04/27/1979
From:	Burt L, Wright F MASSACHUSETTS, COMMONWEALTH OF
To:
References
NUDOCS 7906010265
Download: ML19269D337 (14)

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NRC PUDLIC DOCUMENT RO0li UNITED STATES OF AMERICA \ 8 ,

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION qp$

BEFORE THE ATOMIC LICENSING Y g \N AND SAFETY BOARD d, h $2 a

In the Matter of )

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BOSTON EDISON COMPANY, et al., )

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) Docket No.

(Pilgrim Nuclear Generating ) 50-471 Station, Unit 2) . )

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MOTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS FOR CONSIDERATION OF THE ISSUE OF EMERGENCY PLANNING The Commonwealth of Massachusetts hereby moves that the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, pursuant to its discretionary authority under 10 CFR SS 2.711(a) and 2.751a (d) ,

allow the parties to present evidence and argument on the following two contentions:

1. Given the population densities, transportation network, land use and other unique characteristics of the area surrounding the proposed Pilgrim.2 site, no emergency plan can be developed that will adequately protect the public in the event of a major radiological accident.

2. The applicant's preliminary plans for ,

protecting the public in the event of a major radiological accident at the Pilgrim site, as set forth in its Preliminary Safety Analysis Report, are inadequate under the guidelines established in Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and the proposed amendment thereto. .

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In support of its motion, the Commonwealth states as follows:

1. While not required to consider the details of a proposed emergency plan in rendering a decision on an application for a construction permit, the Licensing Board must at the very last determine whether surrounding population densities, transportation routes, land use and other unique site characteristics might combine to render any emergency plan ineffective. Southern California Edison Comoany, et al. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), ALAB-248, RAI-74-12 957, 962-63 (December 24, 1974); Consumers Power Company (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2) , ALAB-123, RAI-73-5 331, 342-43 (May 18,1973) ; 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Sections I-III. In addition, an applicant for a construction permit is required under 10 CFR 5 50.34 (a) to provide in its Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) a discussion of its " preliminary plans for coping with emergencies". Once again, while consideration of the operative details of such plans may be more appropriately deferred to the operating license stage, there must at least be some consideration given to the scope of these plans, and a threshold determination of whether they effectively extend to that portion of the public that can be said to be at risk in the event of a serious reactor accident.

Public Service Company of New Hampshire, et al. (Seabrook Station Units 1 and 2), 5 NRC 733 (1977), ALAB-390

("Seabrook"). It is the Commonwealth's contention that (1) serious questions exist with respect to the feasibility of 2265 107

. developing any workable emergency plans for the area surrounding Rocky Point, (2) Boston Edison's proposed plans fall far short of even the preliminary showing required under 10 CFR 5 50. 34 (a) and Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, and (3) both such issues are appropriate for resolution during the presently pending construction permit stage of these proceedings.

2. Becausc this motion comes well af ter the Licensing Board's 1975 order setting forth the contentions it intended to consider with respect to the Pilgrim 2 application, it is addressed to the Board's discretion under 10 CFR SS 2.711(a) and

2. 7 51a (d) . Upon a showing of good cause, under both of these provisions, belated consideration can be given to the issues a

described above. In the recent months a number of events have occurred that now make it not only appropriate but necessary for the Board to allow the parties to address these matters.

To the extent that the Commonwealth's motion is analogous to a motion to reopen the record, it clearly satisfies the standard set forth in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station) , ALAB-138 (1973), that such motions be timely and of " major significance to plant safety."

With respect to Vermont Yankee's first requirement, i.e.

that the issue sought to be raised could not have been raised earlier, it is only the events of recent months that have prompted this motion and rendered the emergency planning issue both pertinent to this stage of the proceedings and demanding of consideration. These events, which will be discussed in more detail below, all serve to signal an inchoate but 2265 108

unmistakeable shift in regulatory policy that calls into question many of the assumptions upon which emergency planning heretofore had been based.

With respect to the significance or gravity of the issue, emergency planning must by its very nature be treated as such, since it is both a necessary component of any contemplated response to a postuleted accident and virtually the only rc0ponse in the event of those major reactor accidents denominated Class 9; upon breach of containment and the consequent uncontrolled release of airborn radioactive materials, it is only by means of swift evacuation and sheltering that the surrounding population can be protected.

If the emergency planning is critical to plant safety, the unique demographic and geographic characteristics of the area surrounding the Pilgrim 2 site make it all the more so: (1) there are high population levels surrounding the site, swollen during the summer months with both seasonal residents and tourists who will have had no prior instructions as to evacuation or sheltering, and (2) the site is in'close proximity of Cape Cod, with its limited capacity to handle large volumes of traffic, a capacity which which would be even more diminished by the fact F;at one of the two primary routes of egress from the Cape comes so close to the plant site as to preclude its practical use in the event of a major radioactive release.

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. The applicant will in all likelihood argue that the Commonwealth's first issue, that of the feasibility of evacuation, has already been proposed as a contention by one of the intervenors, a position supported by the Staff but rejected by the Board. The details of this earlier ruling will be discussed immediately below, but to the extent that it now stands as a bar to the Commonwealth's motion, we request that it be reconsidered, for the same reasons set forth above.

3. Commonwealth's Contention 1: Given the Population Densities, Transportation Network, Land Use and Otner Uniaue Characteristics of the Area Surrounding the Proposed Pilgrim 2 Site, No Emergency Plan Can Be Developed That Will Adecuatelv Protect the Public in the Event of a Maior Radiological Accident.

On February 18, 1975, the Licensing Board rejected Contention F of Intervenors Alan and Marion Cleeton (the "Cleetons"), a contention which raised the very issue now proposed by the Commonwealth. A motion to reconsider was filed by the Cleetons and supported by the Staff, which took the position that feasibility of evacuation was an appropriate subject for consideration during the construction permit stage of licensing proceedings (NRC Staff's Response to the Cleeton's Motion to Reconsider, Amend and Modify Order, pp.1-2) . As restated by the Staff and accepted by the Cleetons, Contention F was as follows:

No procedure for public evacuation can be developed for Pilgrim 2 which will be compatible with the proposed site location with respect to access routes, surrounding population distribution, and surrounding land use as required by Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50.

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On April 2, 1975, the Licensing Board declined to reconsider its ruling, on the procedural ground that the motion for reconsideration had been filed Jut of time without any showing of good cause, and on the substantive ground that an emergency evacuation plan already existed for Pilgrim I, thus obviating the need for any consideration of the evacuation issue, at least at the construction permit stage of the Pilgrim 2 proceedings. An appeal to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board was dismissed as interlocutory, the Board holding that the Cleeton's right of appeal from the Licensing Board's determination could only be exercised by means of an exception to the its ultimate decision. ALAB -269 ( April 28,1975) .

As noted above, this Board declined to accept Cleeton's Contention F because an emergency evacuation plan already existed for Pilgrim I. That plan, however, was prepared pursuant to Appendix E of 10 CFR Part 50, which at the time did not require development of such plans for any area beyond the LPZ. Accordingly, the Pilgrim 1 plan addresses off-site emergency measures only in an estimate for the evacuation time from the 4.25 mile LPZ,and in its incorporation of a number of vaguely worded agreements with state and local police to the effect that those agencies would participate in the evacuation of the public from the " vicinity of the site" and will prevent access to the " vicinity of the site." (See Appendix N to the Final Safety Analysis Report, N 4.2.3 and the agreements attached thereto.)

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- On August 16, 1978 the NRC proposed to amend Appendix E with respect to emergency planning beyond the LPZ, and directed that pending promulgation of a final rule, "the proposed amendment will be used as interim guidance in reviewing an applicant's emergency plan for a construction permit." 43 FR 37475 (8/23/78).1/ As proposed,Section I to Appendix will now read:

1/As noted at 43 FR 37475, the proposed amendment was deemed necessary in light of the Appeals Board's Seabrook decision in ALAB-390, which construed the provisions of Appendix E to foreclose any consideration in the licensing process of the need for evacuation from that area lying beyond the perimeter of the LPZ; although both the Staff and the Advisory Committee on Nuclear Safeguards had taken a position to the contrary, the Appeals Board held that only evacuation from the LPZ need be considered, relying primarily on the dose levels set forth in 10 CFR Part 100, that portion of the NRC's health and safety regulations pertaining to reactor siting criteria. There is growing concern, however, with just how much credence should be given these dose levels, at least with respect to emergency planning (see concurring opinions of Appeal Board members Salzman and Farrar in Seabrook, pp.

748-53). Indeed, EPA and a number of states have adopted Protective Action Guides that call for the taking of emergency measures to avoid radiation doses well below those set forth in Part 100, while fn. 2 to 10 CFR 5100. 11(a) (1) explicitely disavows any intent "to imply that [the Part 100 dose levels]

constitute acceptable limits for emergency doses to the public under accident conditions.

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. For nuclear power reactors, provisions for emergency protective measures to reduce exposures from an accidental release of radioactive material shall be considered, at a minimum, within the low population zone (LPZ) as specified in 10 CFR Part 100. The extent to which emergency planning, which may include planning for evacuation measures, should extend to areas beyond the LPZ shall be based on the design features of the facility and the physical characteristics of the environs in the vicinity of the site, taking into account the emergency protective action criteria developed by appropriate Federal authorities, and by appropriate State and local governmental authorities in cooperation with the Commission.

Given the unique site characteristics mentioned above, the evacuation plma prepared for Pilgrim 1 is now seriously deficient, and can no longer be said to support the Board's earlier refusal to look at evacuability with respect to Pilgrim

2. To the extent that it addresses evacuation and sheltering at a'J1, it does so only for the LPZ, paying no attention to the special problems arising from the site's proximity to both the Plymouth Rock area and Cape Cod, both which experience an influx of summer residents, tourists and day trippers that cannot help but compromise the most carefully developed emergency protective measures. In addition, one of the two evacuation routes from the Cape (Route 3) comes within three miles of the site (SER, 2-16), rendering its availability in the event of a major accident highly questionable.

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Furthermore, in December of 1978 the NRC/ EPA Task Force on Emergency Planning issued a report entitled " Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants (NUREG-0396), which recommeaded adoption of two generic " Emergency Planning Zones" around nuclear plants, an inner zone of about 10 miles for the plume exposure pathway and an outer zone of about 50 miles for the ingestion exposure pathway. Sheltering and evacuation are major concerns within the 10 mile EPZ in the event of a major release, and once again the Pilgrim 1 emergency plan does not address such eventualities; as noted above, to the extent that it deals with off-site emergency actions at all, it only does so with respect to the 4.25 mile LPZ. Similarly, the Route 3 evacuation route from the cape lies well within the 10 mile zone, and the Sagamore Bridge, one of the two connecting the Cape with the mainland, is just barely outside the perimeter of the zone (PSAR, Figure 2.1-1). To the extent that the Cape or a portion thereof must be evacuated, therefore, the issue has yet to be addressed by the applicant.

Finally, on March 30, 1979 the Comptroller General issued a report to Congress entitled " Areas Around Nuclear Facilities should be Better Prepared for Radiological Emergencies", which reviewed emergency preparedness throughout the country with respect to nuclear facilities and concluded:

Presently, there is only limited assurance that the people near most fixed nuclear facilities will be adequately protected from the radiological 2265 114

. consequences of a serious nuclear accident. While this does not mean that public protective measures will not be carried out in a nuclear emergency, it does cast serious doubt on the preparedness and capabilities of some emergency response authorities to adequately perform the activities necessary to protect the public. As a result, the public-health impact of such accidents may be much greater than need be. Report, pg. 32.

Unless there is far more to the Pilgrim 1 emergency plan than that contained in Appendix N to the FSAR, its cursory treatment of evacuation and sheltering must be viewed as the epitome of that type of planning that prompted the above-quoted warning. Given the proposed Amendment to Appendix E, the Task Force Report and that of the Comptroller General, this Board's earlier conclusion that the Pilgrim 1 emergency plan eliminated any need to further consider evacuability must be reconsidered, and all parties be allowed to address this issue prior to any decision on the issuance of a construction permit.

4. Commonwealth's Contention 2: The Applicant's Preliminarv Plans for Protectino the Public in the Event of a Major Radiological Accident at the Pilgrim Site, as Set Forth in its Preliminary Safety Analysis Report, are Inadequate Under the Guidelines Established in Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and the Proposed Amendment Thereto.

As noted above, an applicant for a construction permit is required under 10 CFR 5 50.34 (a) to provide in its PSAR a discussion of its " preliminary plans for coping with emergencies", Appendix E sets forth the requirements for such preliminary plans, and although the proposed amendment to the appendix has yet to be made final, it is to be used "as interim guidance in reviewing an applicant's emergency plans for a construction permit", 43 FR 37475. Given the unique problems 2265 115

. associated with emergency planning for the Rocky Point site, this is clearly an instance in which the proposed amendment's directive to look beyond the LPZ applies. Since both the PSAR and SER were completed prior to issuance of the proposed amendment, however, neither deals with emergency protection beyond the LPZ; indeed, they both rely solely on the plans developed for Pilgrim 1, which as noted above are cursory even for the limited area that was under consideration at the time.

With issuance of the proposed amendment to Appendix E and the Task Force Report, the Pilgrim 2 emergency plans can no longer be considered sufficiently comprehensive in scope and detail to warrant issuance of a construction permit. All parties should therefore be given the opportunity to address this issue prior to any decision on the issuance of that permit.

For the above-stated reasons and pursuant to this Board's discretionary authority under 10 CFR SS 2.711(a) and 2.751a (d) ,

both of the Commownwealth's contentions with respect to emergency planning should be accepted for consideration by the Board.

Respectfully submitted, FRANCIS X. BELLOTTI, FRANCIS S. WRfGHT Assistant Attorney General

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. LAURIE BURT Assistant Attorney General Environmental Protection Division Public Protection Bureau One Ashburton Place, 19th Floor Boston, Massachusetts 02108 (617) 727-2265 2265 117 e

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD  %

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE.

I, FRANK S. WRIGHT, hereby certify that the foregoing

" Motion of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts for Consideration of the Issue of Emergency Planning" submitted by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Intervenor, has been served on the following by depositing copies thereof in the United States Mail, first class postage prepaid, this 27th day of April 1979:

EDWARD LUTON, ESQ.

BARRY H. SMITH, ESQ.

Chairman, Atomic Safety and MARCIA E. MULKEY, ESQ.

Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of the Executive Legal Director Washington, D.C. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 DR. A. DIXON CALLIHAN Union Carbide Corporation ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING P. O. Box Y BOARD PANEL Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 DR. RICHARD F. CCLE Atomic Safety and Licensing Board WILLIAM S. ABBOTT, ESQ.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 50 Congress Street, Suite 925 Washington, D.C. 20555 Boston, MA 02109 ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY APPEAL BOARD Docketing and Service Section U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 2265 118

MR. DANIEL F. FORD MR. AND MRS. ALAN R. CLEETON 1208 Massachusetts Avenue 22 Mackintosh Street Cambridge, MA 02138 Franklin, MA 02038 HENRY HERRMANN, ESQ. DALE G. STOODLEY, ESQ.

151 Tremont Street Boston Edison Company Boston, MA 02111 800 Boylston Street Boston, MA 02199 CHIEF LIBRARIAN Plymouth Public Library GEORGE H. LEWALD, ESQ.

North Street Ropes and Gray Plymouth, MA 02360 225 Franklin Street Boston, MA 02110 FRANK S. WRIGH Assistant Attorney General Environmental Protection Division One Ashburton Place, 19th Floor Boston, MA 02108 (617) 727-2265 2265 119