ML19260E299
| ML19260E299 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Saint Vrain  |
| Issue date: | 01/28/1980 |
| From: | PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF COLORADO |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19260E296 | List: |
| References | |
| P-800014, NUDOCS 8002150410 | |
| Download: ML19260E299 (13) | |
Text
8' '# . Enclosure (1) to P- 80514 FORT ST. VRAIN INSERVICE INSPECTION AND TESTING PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS PCRV AUXILIARY SYSTEM (11) 1960 261 4
so 02150 NO Draft Rev. 2 1
Draft Rev. 2
, 5.1-2 The drive mechanism will be used to exercise sequentially, all withdrawn rods over a short distance (about 6 inches) once a month. This test will assess the operability of the control rods and drives and position indicating instrumentation. Any binding of the rods in their channels can be determined by a slack cable indication.
Specification SR 5.1.2 - Reserve Shutdown System Surveillance The surveillance of the reserve shutdown system shall be as follows:
a) The ability to pressurize each of the 37 reserve shutdown hoppers to 10 psi above reactor pressure, as indicated by operation of the hopper pressure switch, shall be demonstrated every three months.
Operable reserve shutdown hoppers shall be capable of being pressurized. The ability to operate the ACM quick disconnect valves, which provide an alternate means of actuating the hopper pressurization valves, shall be demonstrated every three months, and the ACM valve actuation gas pressure shall be monitored weekly.
b) The test pressurizing gas pressure indicator shall be calibrated annually.
c) An off-line functional test of a reserve shutdown assembly shall be performed in the hot service faci-lity, or other suitable facility, following each of the first five refueling cycles and at two refueling cycle intervals thereafter. These tests will consist i960 252
Draft Rev. 2 5.1-2a of pressurizing reserve shutdown hopper to the point of rupturing the disc and releasing the poison ma-terial. If a reserve shutdown hopper rupture disc does not rupture at a differential pressure less than 300 psi and release the poison material, the reactor shall be placed in a shutdown condition until it can be shown that LCO 4.1.6 can be met.
d) The instrumentation which alarms a low pressure in the reserve shutdown actuating pressure lines shall be functionally tested in ;onjunction with the test, and at the same intervals, specified in part (a) above, and calibrated once a year. Operable reserve shutdown hoppers shall have an actuating bottle pressure
) 1500 psig.
e) The reserve shutdown hopper pressure switches shall be calibrated at the same interval that they are removed from the reactor for maintenance.
f) Visual examination shall be performed of pipe sections which require ' disassembly and reassembly within the refueling penetrations, after they have been disassembled as required for refueling or maintenance.
g) Demonstration shall be made at each refueling shutdown that each subsystem is operable by actuating each group of pressurizing valves from the control room. T,he 1960 263
Draft Rev. 2 S.1-3 capability of pressurizing the corresponding hoppers need not be demonstrated during this test. Valve position indication and fail safe operation shall be observed during this test.
Basis for Soecification SR 5.1.2 The reliability of the reserve shutdown system to perfcrm its function will be maintained by a control system pressure test and actual off-line rupture tests conducted in the hot service facility or other suitable facility. The control system pressure test demonstrates the ability to pressurize the hoppers and indicates the operability of the control system components. A successful test will increase the hopper pressure about 10 psi above reactor pressure. This differential is well below the minimum 115 psi differential required to burst the disc.
The off-line tests consist of actual disc ruptures and poison drops. These will be used to determine the reliability of the differential burst pressure of the disc, and the tendency of the poison material to hang up or deteriorate in the hoppers over extended periods of time. 1960 254 This test information will be used to verify the capability to shut down the reactor in an emergency situation. The reserve shutdown system hoppers operate in two subsystems. The first consists of the seven hoppers in refueling regions 1, 3, 5, 7, 22, 28, and 34; the second subsystem is comprised of the remaining tnirty hoppers in the remaining refueling regions. Safe control of the reactor by the reserve shutdown system can be accomplished
Draft Rev. 2 5.1-3a with one of the seven hoppers inoperative, and one of the re-maining 30 hoppers inoperative. A differential pressure of from 585 to 315 psi is available from the helium supply bottle with a pressure 3 1500 psig.
ACM valve actuation gas is provided by storage cylinders which can be manually connected to each subsystem valve air header by means of quick-disconnect valves. Availability and operability of the ACM valve actuation is demonstrated by testing.
LCO 4.1.6 prevents performing an overall control system operational test at power since it allows only one reserve shutdown hopper to be non-operable in each subsystem when the reactor is either at low power or at power. To prevent the release of reserve shutdown material in the core, all hoppers of a subsystem must be rendered inoperable when testing the control system. This can only be performed when the reactor is shutdown. Only valve actuation has to be tested since the ability to pressurize each hopper is demonstrated every three months.
1960 265
Draft Rev. 2 5.2.1 5.2 PRIMARY COOLANT SYSTEM - SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS Applicability Applies to the surveillance of the primary (helium) reactor coolant system excluding the steam generators.
Objective To ensure the capability of the components of the primary reactor coolant system to maintain the primary reactor coolant envelope as a fission product barrier and to ensure the capability to cool the core under all modes of operation.
Specification SR 5.2.1 - PCRV and PCRV Penetration Overpressure Protection Surveillance (a) Each of the two overpressure protection assemblies protecting the PCRV shall be tested at intervals not to exceed five years,on an alternating basis, with one overpressure protection assembly tested at a refueling shutdown.
The PCRV safety valve containment tank closure bolting shall be visually examined for absence of surface de-fects when the tank is opened for the above testing.
Tank closure flange leak tightness shall be determined at each refueling shutdown, follcwing tank closure.
(b) Each of the two overpressure protection assemblies 1960 266
Draft Rev. 2 5.2-la protecting a steam generator or a circulator penetra-tion interspace shall be tested at intervals not to exceed every five years, on an alternating basis, so that one overpressure protection assembly for each pe-netration interspace is tested at intervals of approxi-mately two and a half years.
(c) The instrumentation and controls associated with the overpressure protection assemblies in (a) and (b) above shall be tested and calibrated as follows:
- 1) The pressure switch and alarm for each inter-space between a rupture disc and the correspond-ing safety valve shall be functionally tested monthly and calibrated annually.
- 2) The position indication circuits associated with the PCRV overpressure protection system shutoff valves shall be functionally tested and calibrated when testing'either of the PCRV overpressure pro-tection assemblies. The pressure switch and alarm for the PCRV safety valve containment tank shall be functionally tested and calibrated annually.
The controls, fail safe operation, and position indication for the remote manual purified purge helium valve associated with the PCRV overpressure protection system shall be functionally tested at least every five years. The pressure swite,h and alarm for the PCRV safety valve bellows shall be functionally tested and calibrated before its associated safety valve is tested.
960 207
i .
Draft Rey, 2 5.2-lb
- 3) The control, interlock and position indication circuits associated with each of the PCRV pene-tration overpressure protection system shutoff valves shall be functionally tested and calibra-ted at least every five years.
s 1960 268
Draf t Rev. 2 5.2-2 Basis for Specification SR 5.2.1 Testing of a PCRV overpressure protection assembly can only be performed when closing the corresponding manual shutoff valve, located upstream of the rupture disc. LCO 4.2,7 does not allow isolation of such an assembly unless the primary pressure is less than 100 psia. Consequently, testing and examinations will be performed _at shutdown. One assembly will be isolated while the other one will remain in a fully opera-tional condition during the testing procedure, thus ensuring overpressure protection of the PCRV.
The rupture disc is designed to be removed from the sys-tem for bench testing. ' Verification is made of the correct deflection of the disc at the set pressure level, which would cause the membrane to be ruptured. The safety valve is tested for set point activation without removing it from the system.
. The pressurized portion of the assembly is monitored for leakage during plant operation. Leakage examination of the containment tank cover seals and visual examination of the cover bolts provides assurance that containment tank integrity is restored after the tank cover has been reinstalled.
Testing of a PCRV penetration overpressure protection assembly can be performed during plant operation since the assemblies are accessible and since LCO 4.2.7 requires only one assembly to be operable at any time. o 0 269
Draft Fev. 2 5.2-2a The safety valve in each assembly is tested while in place to demonstrate that it opens at the correct set pressure.
The rupture discs are not provided with a testable design feature and cannot be tested. However, the rupture disc in select -
ed assemblies is visually examined to verify that the me:abrane is free of defects and that the knife blade remains sharp.
The intervals specified for testing the overpressure pro-tection assemblies are adequate to demonstrate the operability of the overpressure protection systems.
The intervals specified for testing the associated in-strumentation and controls are adequate to assure reliability of rupture disc and safety valve operation, and to monitor the integrity of the PCRV safety valve piping and containment tank.
1960 270
Draft Rev. 2 5.2-13 defects in the event of some unexpected and unpredicted changes in the liner characteristics. The provisions are discussed in Section 5.13 of the FSAR.
Tha interval for surveillance after the fifth year following initial power oparation may be adjusted based on the analysis of, prior results.
Specification SR 5.2.15 - PCRV Penetration Interspace Pressure Surveillance The instrumentation which monitors the pressure differential between the purified helium supply header to the FCRV penetra-tion interspaces and the primary coolant system will be functionall' tested once every month and calibrated annually.
Basis for Specification SR 5.2.15 This calibration and test frequency is adequate to insure that the purified helium being supplied to the PCRV penetration interspaces shall be at a higher pressure than the primary coolant pressure within the PCRV.
Specification SR 5.2.16 - PCRV Clcsure Leakage, Surveillance Requirements The surveillance of PCRV closure leakage shall be a llo s:
a) PCRV primary and secondary closure leakage shall be de-termined once each quarter, or as soon as practicable after an unanticipated increase in pressurization gas flow.is alarmed.
b) The instrumentation monitoring PCRV penetration closure interspace pressurization gas flows, including alarms and high flow isolation, shall be functionally tested
Draft Rev. 2 5.2-14 c) The instrumentation which monitors or alarms pressure and
.noisture in the core support floor and core support floor columns shall be functionally tested and calibrated annually.
d) The controls, position indication, and failsafe operation for remote manual isolation valves associated with pres-surizing, purging and venting PCRV closures shall be functionally tested and calibrated at least once every five years, and for automatic isolation valves at least once each year.
e) The check valves on the HTFA purge lines shall be tested at least once every five years, f) The check valves which are part of the HTFA or refueling penetrations shall only be tested when such a penetraticn is open for refueling or maintenance, if the check valves have not been tested in the last five years.
Basis for Specification SR 5.2.16 The interval specified for determining the actual primary and secondary closure leakage is adequate to assure compliance with LCO 4.2.9.
In the determination of closure leakage at the reference differential pressure, laminar leakage flow shall be conserve-tively assumed, therefore, in correcting the determined closure leakage to reference differential pressure, the ratio of'the reference differential pressure, and test differential pressure shall be used.
1960 272
Draft Rev. 2 5.2-14a The interval specified for functional testing and calibra-tion of the instrumentatica and alarms monitoring the penetration closure interspace pressurization gas flow will assure sensing and alarming any change in pressurization gas flow.
The interval specified for functional test and calibration of the instrumentation and alarms monitoring the core support floor and columns will assure sensing and alarming any change in their structural integrity.
The interval specified for valve testing is adaquate to assure proper valve operation when isolation of the closure auxiliary piping is required.
1960 273