ML19254D996
| ML19254D996 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas, Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 09/26/1979 |
| From: | Clark R, Cyphert S, Parmenter F JUSTICE, DEPT. OF |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7910300421 | |
| Download: ML19254D996 (20) | |
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGUI ATORY COMMISSION ((? ' 9 S D N[A s
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t BEFORE TIIE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICEUSING '30ARD ,
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In the Matter of )
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HOUSTON LIGHTING AND POWER ) Docket Hos. 50-49PA COM PldlY , et al. (South Texas ) 50-499A Project, Units 1 and 2) )
)
TEXAS UTILITIES GENERATmG ) Docket Nos. 50-445A
) 40-446A COMPAMY (Commanche Peak Steam Cloctric Gtation, )
Units 1 and !) )
)
ANSWER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE IN OPE'OSITIO'4 TO Tile M3TIO< Or' 'IOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY TO CO"'t'L PRODUCTION BY TliE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTIL OF CERTAIN DRAFTS OF TESTIMONY PREPARED BY WILLIAM E. SCOTT Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. S 2.730(c) of the NRC Rules of Practice the Departraent of Justice (" Department") respectfully submits its Ansucr to the Motion of Houston Lighting & Power Company to Coupel Production by the Department of Justice of Certain Drafts of Testimony Prepared by Williaia E. Scott
(" Motion"), filed September 10, 1979. Houston Lighting and Power Company ("IlL&P") has taken Mr. Scott's deposition, has been provided with all documents Mr. Scott will rely on for his testimony and will have the opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Scott during the hearing. For reasons more fully set forth below, the Depart;nant urgeu the Board to deny the Motion.
1236 013 7910300 4- 2 I
A.
I. Background On April 3, 1979, the Department fil ed its response 1/ to IlL&P's second set of interrogatories, dated February 9, 1979, 2/
identifying William F. Scott as a potential expert witness.
On June 25, 2979, HL&P requested thct the Department update its interrogatory response in alticipation of Mr. Scott's depo';ition. 3/
On July 11, 1979, the Department promptly provided counsel for llL&P with copies of Mr. Scott's published articles and papers which were in the possession of the Department. In addition, on July 17, 1979, the Department f urnished IIL&P with all the docu-ments to which it was entitled, that were respons.ve to a subpoena duces tecum addressed to Mr. Sca t a.
l/ " Response of the Department of Justice to the Second Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents from Houston Lighting & Power Company tc the Antitrust Division.
2/ In its Motion IIL&P has again challenged the good faitnThe of the Department in providing timely discovery to IIL&P.
Department's initial Response to llL&P's Second Set of Interroga tories was delayed because IIL&P refused to answer the Depart-ment's first set of interrogatories, dated November 22, 1978.
Chairman Miller set this matter to rest at the March 20, 1979 Prehearing Conference when he acknowledged that any delay in the discovery phase was attributable to HL&P. See Transcript at 153-55. HL&P's claim that the Department delayed in respond-ing to interrogatory Request 2(e) as it may relate to preliminary
- drafts of Mr.. Scott's testimony is likewise unfounded. The Department aas refused to provide such documents on the ground that production of such documents is not required either by the Rules or practice of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission or by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
3/ "First Supplemental Response of the Department of Justice to the Second Set of Interrogatories and Requests for the Pro-duction of Documents f: rom Houston Lighting & Power Company to Antitruct Division."
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The deposition of Mr. Scott was held on July 17-18, 1979. During the deposition, Mr. Scott stated taat he had prepared and sent several preliminary drafts of his proposed tcctimony to the attorneys for the Department.
These preliminary drafts were prepared at the request of the staff attorneys for the Department to assist them in the preparction of this case.
The Department has provided HL&P with all relevant dis-covery of Mr. Scott as required by the Rules of Practice of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC") and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. HL&P's discovery of Mr. Scott has includeo interrogatory responses, document production pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum, production of published articles and papers, and a full two-day deposition. Thus, HL&P's Motion te compel Jisclosure of the drafts of Mr. Scott's testimony should be denied.
II. Drait Testimony of Expert Witnesses Is Not Discoverable Absent a Showing of " Substantial Need."
Discovery regarding an expert witness is governed by Sec-tion 2.740 of the NRC Rules of Practice, which is similar to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26. 4/ Fed. R. Civ. P.'26(b)(4)(A)(i) states:
4/ The NRC has consistently recognized that its discovery rules are to be interpreted harmoniously with the Federal nules of Civil Procedure. The fact that the NRC Rules of Practice do not specifienlly incorporate hule 26(b)(4), but only Rule 26(b)(3), does not affect the relevance ofSeethe Federal Rules General 1;lec t r i c of Civil Procedure to this proceeding.
" :" ! m - C o n t- o r , qmmr,1 Floctric Tont Co: e (Valloci',
lica c t o r i , la v- i v -J 3, n i..R.C. .ui ( 1 " ~/ ).
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A party may through interrogatories require any other party to identify each person vnom fit]
expects to call as an expert witness at trial, to state the subject m tter on which the u"-
pert is expected to testity, and to state tne substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify and a summc.ry of the grounds for each opinion.
The Department has already fully complied witn this portion of Rule 26 by identifying Mr. Scott as an expert, stating the subject matter of his expected testimony, stating the substance of the facts and opinions of his expect 2d testimony, and furnishing a summary of the grounds for each of Mr. Scott's opinions both in its initial response to HL&P's interrogatories on April 3, 1979, and in the Department's supplemental response of .Tuly 13, 1979. Both of these documents were produced prior to the taking of Mr. Scott's deposition.
Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) permits discovery of the aforemen-
~
tioned itens only through interrogatories. Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) neither requires nor contemplates that any documents of an expert witness be produce,1. 5/ Accordingly, HL&P's request for copies of Mr. Scott's craft testimony does not fall within the ambit of Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i).
The discovery of documents prepared by expert witnesses in anticipation of litigation or trial is gcVerned by Ped. R.
5/ "Under the Rule [26(b)(4)(A)(i)] as framed, [the information to be elicited f r or.' the expert) must be sought by interrogatory rather than by deposition . . . . If that is insufficient, e party needing the information may move the court for permis. a to take the deposition of the expert [under Itule 26(b)(4)(A)sli)]."
4 Moor" Pederal Pratica "
96.66{31 at 26-AH? n.3.
-4~
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Under Rule 26(b)(3), " documents . . pre-Civ. P.
26(b)(3).
pared in anticipation of . . . trial by or for.another party" may be discovered "only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in the pre-p aration of his case and that he is unable without undue h ardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the matarials by other means." Courts have thus refused to require produc-tion of an expert's report absent a showing of necessity.
See, e.g., United States v. 145.31 Acres, 54 F.R.D. 359 (M.D. Pa. 1972). 6/
Courts and administrative agencies have broad discre-tion i: determining whether the circumstances justify dis-closure pursuant to Rule 26(b)(3). Generally, owever, "the factors to be taken into account in the exercise of
( that] discretion (are] the import.ance of the information sought in the preparation of tt._ case,of the party seeking it, and the difficulty it will face in obtaining substantially equivalent information from other sources if production is denied." 4 Moore's Federal Practice S 26.63[3] at 26.419-42 (footnotes omitted) (" Moore's"). In order to demonstrate "sub-stantial need," the party seeking discovery must show either 6/ The only reported case .which has dictt1m to the contrary is In Re IB!1 Peripheral 1:DP Devices Antitrust Litiaation, 77 P.R.D. 39 (N.D. Cal. 19 Tl ) (Motion to compel production was denied on ground of being overly broad. There is no indication that " drafts of testimony" were considered by the court to be among those documents being sought.)
_ 9 _
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that "the evidence in the case is wholly or largely in the control of one of the parties" or that "tne documents . . .
sought are directly related to the subject matters of the suit." 4 Moore's S 26.64[3] at 26-419 n.7.
In its Motion IIL&P has made no claim nor provided any justification to support a finding of " substantia) need."
The Department is not wholly or latgely in the control of the evidence in the case. Indeed, the engineering facts regard-ing the applicants are peculiarly within the exclusive control of IlL&P. IIL&P obviously exercises considerably more control Thus, over engineering evidence than does the Department.
even if IIL&P is not granted access to Mr. Scott's draft testimony, HL&P can easily obtain "substantially equivalent information from other sources. . . ." 4 Moore's t 26.64[3]
at 26-419-42. 7/
Finaliy, llL&P's Motion is bereft of any suggestion that if production is denied ilL&P will be " unable withaat undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means." Fed. R. C iv . P. 26(b)(3). As applied to the staten,ents of potential witnesses this portion of Rule 7/ llL&P's Motion does not suggest that thefDepartmcntthis case.
hasThe endeavored to conceal the relevant factt Motion in Iramed only in terms of seeking Mr. Scott's opinions, not any underlying facts.
t 1236 018
26 "usually turnt on whether the party requesting production of the statements can question the witness himself. This in turn depends first upon the availability of the witness and his willingness to give a statement, and second on the memory of the witness." 4 Moore's S 26.64[3] at 26-421 n.8. Thus, where a witness such as Mr. Scott has been the subject of a
interrogatories, deposition and document production, motion to require additional discovery will ordinarily be denied. See, e.g., Boyce v. Visi-Fla7h tentals Eastern, Inc.,
22 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1445 (D. Mass. 1476); United States v.
Real Estate Board of Metropolitan St. Louis, 59 F.R.D. 637 (E.D. Mo. 11973). 8/
HL&P has neither alleged nor shown any inadequacies in Mr. Scott's responses during his two-day deposition. Absent an allegation and a showing that existing discovery devices are inadequate, it would be irapprvpriate to mandate production of further documents from Mr. Scott. See Tinder v. McGowan, Finally, the 15 Fed.R. Serv. 2d 1608 (U.D. Pa. 1970).
possibility that Mr. Scott's draft testimony might yield useful impeachment information clearly does n : warrant 8/ Production has been required if the document is unique and cannot be duplicated through deposition or interviews. Unique-ness may exist, for example, as to a photographSee, of the scene of eg., Sc::d e r i an accident where the scene may have changed. No
- v. Boston Insurance Co., 34 F.R.D. 463 (D. Del. l 'J 6 4 ) .
such uniqueness exists regarding Mr. Scott's draft testimony >
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production of the drafts pursuant to Role 26(b)(3). Cf.
United Statec v. Chathan City Cor;., 72 P.R.b. 640 (S.D. Ga. 1976). See oenerallv 4 Meore's t 26.64(3] at 26.433 n.14 ("Most courts . . . have held that a mere suspicion of impeaching material is not sufficient to justify ordering the production of witness statenents.")
(case citations onitted).
On the few occasions en which the NRC has au' sed this specific issue, it has adhered to the legal precepts outlined in the above cited cases. In the Alabama Power Company pro-ceeding 9/ the Board held that the Department was not required to prod"ce draft naterials of an expert witness under Section 2.740(b)(2) of the NRC Rules of Practice. 10/ Chairman Glaser ruled that in the absence of a showing of " compelling need,"
opposing counsel could sufficiently inquire into differences between draft and final versions of an exhibit on cross-examination without the production of the draf t exhibits. 11/
9/ Alabama Power Company (Joseph M. Farley Plant, Units 1 and 2), Docket Mos. 50-348A, 50-364A.
10/ Id. at 1933 et seg. (transcript of December 18, 1974).
11/ Id. at 1934, 1944. Chair.aan Glaser stated that:
I consider this rule to be similar to Federal Rulo 26(b)(3) of the Rules.of Civil Procedure, and the same exact requirement in there; and drawing on my own experience, I k now many tilacs we ' ve been allowed to inquire into the substance of notes taken by parties without actua]1y being able to obtain the notes themselves, they being protected.
at 1943
--Id.
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In Public Service Co gany of New Hampshire, et al.
(Scabrook 5 ation, Units 1 and 2), Docket Nos. 50-443, 50-444, LBP-75-28, 1 NRC 513 (1975) ("Seabrook"), the Board expressly denied a motion to compel discovery of certain draft testimony on the ground that "it appeared to be in the form of trial preparation material of counsel." 1 NRC at 514. In attempting to distinguish S_eabrook, HL&P asserts that "the basis upon which the Board reached a different decision [than that sought by HL&P] is unclear." (Motion at 7). What is unclear is HL&P's attempt to distinguish Seabrook, not the .>eabrook holding itself. HL&P seems to argue that Seabrock is i.napplicable because the Board here "has already determined thet documents prepared by a tes-tifying expert in preparation ior trial are subject to discovery." (Id.) HL&P's reliance upon the June 1, 1979 Prehearing Conference ruline.in 'ppo,rt of this assertion is, however, misplaced. The only issue decided by the Board dt that time was that " working papers" 12/ of a testifying expert were producible. The term " working papers" does not include drafts of testimony, and HL&P has not cited any authorities to the coatrary. Indeed, the Department's research has not disclosed any judicial cases in which draft testimony was even sought,.much less required to be produced.
12/ Transcript at 414.
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Protection of drafts of testimony from discovery would not be inconsistent with the Board's June 1, 1979, ruling that opposing counsel has the right to obtain the facts and data the expert is relying on for his testimony, The Department has provided or identified to HL&P all material relied upon by Mr. Scott to date and recognizes its obligation to provide or identify any additional material which Mr. Scott may rely on for the testiraony he ultimately gives in this proceedir. . HL&P has deposed Mr.
Scott and will have the opportunity to cross-examine him on his conclusions and the manner in which he arrived at those conclusions. 13/
III. As a Matter of Policy, Draf t Testimony of an l'xpert Witness Should Not Be Producible Absent Special Circumstances.
The purported justification for seeking the production of Mr. Scott's draft testimony is that it will enhance HL&P's cross-examination of Mr. Scott. (Motita at 5.)
The Department respectfully submits that draft testimoity is an inherently unsuitab_e tocl for cross-examination and that as a matter of policy the NRC should generally refuse to allow its use for that purpose. Because draft testimony is not an appropriate subject ior cross-cxamination, the 13/ See Statenent of Chairman Miller at page 121-22 of the transcript of the June 21, 1973 prehearing conference in this proceeding quoted at 16, infra.
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NRC should gener;.11y not permit discovery of draft testimony absent special circumstances. 14/ Moreover, disclosure of an expert's preliminary draft testimony will impair the process by which expert testimony is prepared and presented to the Commission.
A. Disclosure of Preliminary Draft Testimony Hill Not Enhance Cross-Examination of Expert Witnesses.
An expert witness is charged with the responsibility of formulating an expert opinion regarding the facts of a particu-lar case. Such a witness is different from a " fact" witness, whose sole responsibility is to give an accurate rendition of factual circumstances relevant to the case which occurred generally before he contemplated any role as a witness. In
- contrast, an expert witness is responsible for explaining the significance of the facts in a case. The function of " fact" witnesses is essentially reporting, whereaa the role of the expert is interpretive.
In order to discharge his responsibilities, the expert witneas ordinarily undertakes an evaluative pro-cess that entails a continuous, intensive examination of incomplete factual data during different stages of dis-covery. Thus, the expert is constantly absorbing new NRC Rules of Practice, 10 C.F.R. S 2.743(b) require lf/
testimony to be filed in written form unless otherwise ordered by the 130ard. This necessarily contemplates that drafts of t'he testimony will be prepared. (Jnde r ilL& P 's interpretation of t he 130a rd 's June 1, 1979 roling, all . ;i on M a.'.
,mld h.._ t. o pr ov;ae co;;i . , ,, o ..
partii witnesses' dratt whenever opposing counsel ...u r a that a part of his discovery request.
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information, and attempting to reconcile this in f o r raa t ion with his earlier conclusions. At some point during this
- evolutionary process the expert's factual base will meld with his professional judgment, and a set of final conclu-sions will emerge.
In the course of ormulating his testimony, the ex-pert will customarily, perhaps even necessarily, consider and re-icct a host of different tentative conclusions and means of presenting his conclusions. In order to facilitate his thought processes the expert witness may decide to record some or all of these tentative conclusior.s as they emerge during the analytical process. These tentative conclusions may not, however, even accurately reflect the thoughts of the expert at any particular stage in the enaly-tical process because they are understood by the expert to be subject to change upon further analysis. The mere fact that the expert has recor.ed any particular set of these tentative conclusions does not, then, necessarily mean that he endorsed them in the past or that he will endorse them in the future. The only opinions which are necessarily 2ndarsed by the expert are those that he recognizes as being final conclurions which are reflected in his final testimony. To require an expert to defend each of his tentative conclusions 1236 024
merely because he has reduced thers to writing would nean that he would have to defend and explain conclusions which even whyn recorded he may not have endorsed. Ile would hcVe to defend every subsequent conclusion to justify any revis-ion he may have later made regardless of whether his final testinony incorporates any of those conclusions.
There is no necessary or probative relationship be-tween the tentative and final conclusions. Because of their ephemeral character. tentative concluciras would not be an appropriate tool for testing final conclusions.
The validity of final conclusions reached by an expert stand by themselves and should be tested by the underlying facts of the litigation, not by draft testimony. Since the strength of tae final conclusions can adequately be tested by interrogatory, deposition and cross-examination at trial, it would serve no useful purpose to go behind his recorded testimony and delve into the recesses of the expert's mind as reflected in his preliminary draft testimony. Allowing the use of draft testimony will thus divert attention from the central issues of the case into tangential matters.
Although draft testimony might be rich with opportunity to embarrass and frustre*e the expert witness, it is not li':ely to f eld anything of genuine probative value.
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Permitting discovery of draft testimony would be tantamoun to isolating a particular step in the expert's thought process, with the attendant risk of exaggeration.
What is important at trial are the conclusions expressed by the expert witness in his final testimony, not the manifold preliminary conclusions which the expert may have conceived in the course of formulating his final conclusicas.
B. Disclosure of Preliminary Draft Testimony Will Impair the Preparation of _EJ: pert Testimony.
Since it is common for expert witnesses to record tenta-tive conclusions in order to enhance their analyses, requiring the disclosure of draft testimcny would constitute a serious intrusion into the evaluative process commonly undertaken by
. expert witnesses. This would likely inhibit the manner in which experts conduct their analysis because they would be apprehensive that at some future point it would be necessary to identify and def'end under cross-examination each thought which they conceived during their analysis. The chilling effect of diaclosure would manifest itself in a deterioration in the quality of expert opinion, which would redound to the detriment of the fact-finding process at trial.
1 Requiring disclosure of draft tcstimony would a'_so im-pair the ability of attorneys to present their evidance and i The attorney's role to consult with their expert witnesses.
9 with respect to draf t testimony is no different than it is with i .14 -
1 1236 026 1
respect to oral testimony. Draft testimony of an expert wit-ness serves the same function as do oral testimony preparatory conferences. If oral testimony were to be used, it could not seriously be contended that opposing counsel has the right to participate in any or all of the preparatory conferences that an attorney has with his uwn expert witness. Since draft tes-timony stands on the same footing as oral consultations, the long-standing rule prohibiting disclosure to opposing counsel t'
is equally applicable. A contrary rule would simply cause
/
f i attorneys to avoid the use of written testimony or to undergo the charade of taking verbatim notes of their conferences with experts so that the expert's preliminary analysis would not be subject to discovery. The end result would be deterioration in the quality of expert testimony received at NRC hearings.
Finally, the use of draft testimony will consume enormous amounts of valuable judicial and administrative resources because the avenues of inquiry are likely to be limitless.
This will result in endless cross-examination with no promise of evidentiary benefit. Indeed, in this very proceeding, the Board, for similar reasons, has ruled that the testimony of the witnesses will be " live" rather than prefiled in written form as called for in section 2.743(b). Transcript of First Prehearing Conference, June 21, 1978 at 120-23.
-T' Thus, when the NRC Staff requested that the testimony of
- 1s - 1236 027
expert witnesses be filed in written form in advance of the hearing, Chairman Miller made the following respcase:
CHAIRMAN MILLER: We have found in these antitrust hearings of this kind almost everybody is an expert. People sitting L Side you are experts. The man on the stand is an expert and the man opposing him next week is an expert.
Remember, these are all public utility men that have been in the business for years.
Our experience is, when you get into written direct testimony you prolong very significantly the- cross-examination. You get 50 or 100 pages of direc testimony and counsel starts off, the gospel for the day is page 7 and he goes an for a week.
Then he goes to page 14, then he comes back to 9, and I tell you, that written testimony on the part of engineers, utility experts and economists, we found that --
- that why we exchange of summaries. (sic]
That will enable you to know what in essence he's going into.
You will have discovery. If you want to know, take his deposition. .
You will have a witness list in advance.
We want you to g.ive your witness list as you go along. In other words, don't wait until the end.
I 1 Now, he's going to testify, fine.
a Take his deposition. You can ask him a lot of t questions without bothering your mother, so to 1 speak, that you are not going to want to ask 1 here when you have many under oath. That is the reason for depositions. They aren't used nearly enough in our judgment.
f Surely, HL&P is not now contending that the Board, in its j- June 1, 1979 ruling reversed sub silentio its ruling of 4
1 -
i
June 21, 1978 and opened up discovery to include drafts of testimony. Such an interpretation would cause an even greater evil than that which the Board sought to prevent, i.e., prolonged and fruitless cross-examination conducted on the basis of tentacive conclusions instead of final testimony.
IV. Conclusion For all of the foregoing reasons, the Department respect-fully requests this Honorable Board to deny the Motion by HL&P to compel the production of draft testiomony of the Department's engineering expert witness, William E. Scott.
Due to the significance of the issue before the Board, the Department also requests the opportunity for oral argument on this matter.
Respectfully submitted,
% B.dunkh /w;) '
Susan B. Cyphert Ronald H. Clark Frederick H. Parmenter J
David A. Dopsovic Attorneys, Energy Section Antitrust Division j United States Department of Justice Washington, D.C.
September 26, 1979 i ~
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UNITED STATES CF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD
)
In the Matter of )
)
HOUSTON LIGHTING AND POWER ) Docket Nos. 50-498A CO., et al.(South Texas ) 50-499A Project, Units 1 and 2) )
) .
TEXAS UTILITIES GENERATING ) Docket Nos. 50-445A COMPANY (Comanche Peak Steam ) 50-446A Blectric Station, Units 1 )
and 2) )
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that service of the . foregoing ANSWER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE IN OPPOSITION TO THE MOTION OF HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY TO COMPEL PRODUCTION BY THE
, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OF CERTAIN DRAFTS OF TESTIMONY PREPARED i BY WILLIAM E. SCOTT has been made on the following parties
' listed hereto this 26th day of September 1979, by depositing i . copies thereof in the United States mail, first class,
- postage prepaid.
1 Marshall E. Miller, Esquire Atomic Safety and Licensing l Chairman Appeal Board Panel Atomic Safety & Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory f Panel Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Washington, D. C. 20555
) Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Richard S. Salzman, Esquire U.S. Nuclear Regulatory j
Michael L. Glaser, Esquire Commission 1150 17th Street, N.W. Washington, D. C. 20555 Washington, D. C. 20036 Jerome.E. Sharfman, Esquire 3
y Sheldon J. Wolfe, Esquire U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Commission Panel Washington, D. C. 20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Chase R. Stephens, Secretary Washington, D. C. 20555 Docketing and Service Branch j U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 1 Samuel J. Chilk, Secretary Commission Office of the Secretary of the Washington, D. C. 20555 Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Jerome Saltzman Commission Chief, Antitrust and i Washington, D. C. 20555 Indemnity Group j U.S. Nuclgar Regulatory Commission -
} Washington, D. C. 20555 i
1236 030
Roff Hardy Michael I. Miller, Esquire Chairman and Chief Executive David M. Stahl, Esquire Officer Thomas G. Ryan, Esquire Central Power and Light Martha E. Gibas, Esquire Company Isham, Lincoln & Beale P. O. Box 2121 One First National Plaza 78403 Chicago, Illinois 60603 Corpus Christi, Texas G.K. Spruce, General Manager Roy P. Lessy, Esquire City Public Service Board Michael Blume, Esquire U.S. Nuclear Regulatory P.O. Box 1771 San Antonio, Texas 78203 Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Perry G. Brittain President Jerry L. Harris, Esquire Texa3 Utilities Generating City Attorney, Company Richard C. Balough, Esquire 2001 Bryan Tower Assistant City Attorney Dallas, Texas 75201 City of Austin P.O. Box 1038 R.L. Hancock, Director Austin, Texas 78767 City of Austin Electric Utility Department Robert C. McDiarmid, Esquire Robert A. Jablon, Esquire P. O. Box 1088 Austin, Texas 78767 Spiegel and McDiarmid 2600 Virginia Avenue, N.W.
G. W. Oprea, Jr. Washington, D. C. 20036 Executive Vice President Houston Lighting & Power Dan H. Davidson i Company City Manager P. O. Box 1700 City of Austin I Houston, Texas 77001 P. O. Box 1088 Austin, Texas 78767 Jon C. Wood, Esquire W. Roger Wilson, Esquire Don R. Butler, Esquire Matthews, Nowlin, Macfe .ane 1225 Southwest Tower
& Barrett Austin, Texas 78701 -
1500 Alamo National Building San Antonio, Texas 78205 Joseph Irion Worsham, Esquire Merlyn D. Sampels, Esquire Joseph Gallo, Esquire Spencer C. Relyea, Esquire Richard D. Cudahy, Esquire Worsham, Forsythe & Sampels 1
Robert H. Loeffler, Esquire 2001 Bryan Tower, Suite 2500 Isham, Lincoln & Beale Dallas, Texas 75201 J
Suite 701 1050 17th Street, N.W. Joseph Knotts, Esquite j
1 Washington, D. C. 20036 Nicholas S. Reynolds, Esquire
- Debevoise & Liberman j 1200 17th Street, N.W.
1 Washington, D. C. 20036 s
1 1236 031
Douglas'F. John, Esquire R. Gordon Gooch, Esquire Akin, Gump, Hauer & Feld John P. Mathis, Esquire 1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W. Baker & Botts Suite 400 1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20036 Washington, D. C. 20006 Morgan Hunter, Esquire Robert Lowenstein, Esquire McGinnis, Lochridge & Kilgore J. A. Bouknight, Esquire 5th Floor, Texas State Bank William J. Franklin, Esquire Building Lowenstein, Newman, Reis, 900 Congress Avenue Axelrad & Toll Austin, Texas 78701 1025 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20036 Jay M. Galt, Esquire Looney, Nichols, Johnson E. W. Barnett, Esquire
& Hayes Charles G. Thrash, Jr., Esquire 219 Couch Drive J. Gregory Copeland, Esquire Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73101 Theodore F. Weiss, Jr., Esquire.
Baker & Botts Knoland J. Plucknett 3000 One Shell Plaza Executive Director Houston, Texas 77002 Committee on Power for the Southwest, Inc. Kevin B. Pratt, Esquire 5541 East Skelly Drive Assistant Attorney General Tulsa, Oklahoma 74135 P.O. Box 12548 Capital Station I
John W. Davidson, Esquire Austin, Texas 78711 Sawtelle, Goode, Davidson
& Tioilo Frederick H. Ritts, Esquire 1100 San Antonio Savings Law *Offices of Northcutt Ely Building Watergate 600 Building i San Antonio, Texas. 78205 Washington, D.C. 20037 W. S. Robson Donald M. Clements, Esq.
I General Manager Gulf States Utilities Company South Texas Electric P.O. Box 2951
- Cooperative, Inc. Beaumont, Texas 77704 Route 6, Building 102 Victoria Regional Airport Victoria, Texas 77901
%L S . [o (L NJd
- Robert M. Rader, Esquire Susan B. Cyphert, Attorney 1 Conner, Moore.& Corber Energy Section
' 1747 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W. Antitrust Division Washington, D.C. 20006 Department of Justice W.N. Woolsey, Esquire
% Dyer and Redford i 1030 Petroleum Tower Corpus Christi, Texas 78474 1236 0,2 3
1 .
.