ML19210D030
| ML19210D030 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Zimmer |
| Issue date: | 11/14/1979 |
| From: | Borgmann E CINCINNATI GAS & ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7911200439 | |
| Download: ML19210D030 (150) | |
Text
,
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..~ C TIIE CINCINNATI GAS & ELECTitIC CONII*ANY G,. - - - - -
m CINCIN N ATI OHIO 4 5 201 E. A. BORG M AN N vict ent s.ot ut Docket No. 50-358 November 14, 1979 Mr. Harold Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 RE:
WM. H.
ZIMMER NUCLEAR POWER STATION -
UNIT 1 "NEDO-24708, ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REQUIRED FOR NRC STAFF GENERIC REPORT ON BWR REACTORS"
Dear Mr. Denton:
This information is provided in response to the NRC letter dated July 23 from John F.
Stolz to Earl A.
Borgmann.
This information respor.ds to the long term plant specific information request of the Bulletins and Orders Task Force.
Very truly yours, THE CINCINNATI GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY f' y;' W 'f n* -
a By E. A.
BORGMANN Senior Vice President EAB: dew Enclosure cc:
Charles Lechhoefer State of Ohio
)
Glenn O. Bright County of Hamilton)ss Frank F.
Hooper Sworn to and subscribed before me this
/VM day of November, 1979.
ir s e
ker Steven G. Smith William J. Moran J.
Robert Newlin William G.
Porter, Jr.
Q James D.
Flynn Thomas A.
Luebbers d Notary Public Leah S.
Kosik VWO Mei P. f. UHuiOFER Jashn D. Woliver retuy em s:m cf onio M Co,mssu bpts My 28.1982
/
f371 001 4"<3*7 1
7971200 k'
PLANT ZIMMER UNIT (S) 1 BYPASS CAPACITY Plant Steam Bypass Capacity, % Rated 25 1371 002'
PLAT 1T ZIMMER SYSTEMS APID COMP 0t4ENTS SHARED BETWEEf1 UtilTS PAGE 1 C0flTINUED PAGE Single-unit plant check here X) and do not complete Shared Between System or Ccmoonent Uni ts tiumbers T 371.003 O
PLAflT ZIMMER UNIT (S) 1 PLANT-SPECIFIC SYSTEM INFORMATI0tl General Water Sources Instrumentation and Control Frequency of Safety Seismic Safety Seismic
$afety Seismic System and *3 System Classification Category Classification Category Classif.
Category Component Tests The information S.P.(1)
I necessary to com-92 da.
1.
RCIC I
18 Mo.
C.S.T. (2)
NA plete this portion is quite volum'inous 3.
IIPCS I
S.P.
I and is available at 18 Mo.
C.S.T.
NA the site.
5.
LPCS I
I 18 Mo.
6.
LPCI I
I 18 Mo.
7.
ADS I
18 Mo.
8.
SRV I
I 9.
RilR (including shutdown cooling, steam condensing, I
I 92 da.
suppression pool cooling, containment spray modes) 92 da.
10.
SSW I
I 31/TI da. s 18 K6 11.
RBCCW I
NA 31 da./18 Mo.
12.
CRDS I
NA
- TA 13.
CST NA NA NA
- 14. Main Feedwater NA NA LA 15.
Recirculation I
I/NA NA
' Pump / Motor Cooling u
1.
Suppression Pool.
N 2.
Condensate Storage Tank.
3.
This information is from proposed Tech Specs.
4.
Tables 3.2-1, 3.2-2, and 3.2-3 designate safety classification, seismic category and QA classification for each of the systems requested.
The tables are enclosed here gor your g
g 2,.
rev.tew.
.h' e
ps I
TABLE 3 2-1 gl4MTJfES. EQUIlkEllT. AND CtMP08937 CIAS3tFICATIm3 QlALITY(ba)
QUALITY (bb)
SEIGNIC(5) cNuuF AUSupANCE I4JIs'HASE PkIIK'IFAL CtMfGElrT(ll' IDCATION(3)
CATlX;ORY CIASSIFICATION REylIRINDIT DATE(2)
OANENTS 1.
Peactor system 1.
Peactor v=ssel IC I
A I
11/69 2.
Peactor vessel suplert skirt FC I
NA I
II/71 3.
Peactor vessel appurtenances, pressure retaining portions IC I
A I
b.
Cle housing supports IC I
MA I
2/71 (15)
- 5.
Reactor internal atrwetures, engineered safety features FC I
MA I
6.
Core support structures IC I
RA I
9/71 7.
Other internal structurea (i.e. dryers, separators)
IC NA NA II 1/71 (15) 8.
Contael rods rc I
NA I
(15) 9.
Control rod drives FC I
NA I
8/71 10.
Inwer range detector harittere PC I
B I
FC I
MA I
(15) 11.
tuel assemblies 12.
lu actor vessel stabilleer IC I
RA I
6/72 (15) h,
- 13. Iteactor vessel insulation FC MA NA II
,e,
{
14.
In-core Nousing Fenettetten FC I
A I
(22) l53 i
II.
Nuclear Ikiller System 1.
Vessels, instrumente. ton condensing chambers FC I
A/B I
2.
Vessels, air accumulators IC I
C I
(16)
( 14 3.
Pipins, rensef valve discharge FC I
C II b.
l'iping, main steam within outermost isolation valve PC I
A I
2/72 5.
Pipe suspension, matr. steam IC I
A I
5/73 6.
Piping, restratate, main steam FC 1
NA I
7.
Piping, feedwater, within outerisost isolation valve IC,kB.T I
A I
8 Other primary coolant pressure boundary piping within teolation valves PC I
A 1
9 Piping instrumentation beyond outermost isolation valves RB RA D
II (10)
E Safetyfreller valves It I
A I
1/71
- }
10 11.
Valves, main steam isolation valves FC.RB I
A I
12/70
('))
gg z
12.
Valves, feedwater isolation valves and within IC,RB I
A I
g
- 13. Valves, other, teolation valves and within primary containment It,RS I
A I
og Ib. Valves, safety related instrument air that operate ADS and RB C
I (16) (to)
~
NSIV valves
- 15. Electrical modules with safety function FC,RB, A I
MA I
(15)
- 16. Cable, with merety function NA NA I
N a1he key to information referenced numerically in the table headings and la the "th= ants! colens of this table appears on 1p. 3.2-15 ff.
O O
i LD
ustm 3.2-1 (cont'd)
OfALITY(ba)
QUALITY (bb)
SEISMIC (5)
CROUP ASSUNueCE ItlacttASE Pit 1NCIPAL COMror. tart (1)
IDCATICH(3)
CATEGORY CIASSIFICATION REQilIRFMYF LATE COD 90Yr3 III.
Recirculation System 1.
Piping PC I
A I
2/71 2.
Pipe suspension, rectreulation line IC I
A I
5/73 3.
Pipe restraints, rectreulation line PC I
MA I
6/71 b.
Ibmps IC I
A I
5/71 5.
Valves IC I
A I
3/71 6.
Motor, pump PC Special NA I
6/71 (19)(15) 7 Electrical modules with safety IC I
MA I
(IS) 8.
Cable with safety function IC BA NA I
I IV.
CHD flydreulle System Y
7 1.
Yelves, teolation, water return Itne IC.RB I
A I
lves, scram discharge volume lines RB I
B I
2.
e 3.
.alves insert and withdraw !!nes RB I
B I
(6) b.
II 5.
Heing, water return line within isolation valves IC,RB I
A 1
6.
Piping, scram discharge volume lines RB I
B I
7.
Piping, insert and withdraw 11aes FC.RB I
B I
II 9.
II 11/71 (35
II 6/71 (35 11.
Itydraulle control unit and shtoff valves RB I
E I
6/71 (g) (g3)
- 12. Mritor RB NA MA 11 l
- 13. Cable, with safety function MA RA I
~
lb. Electrical modules with safety function RB,A NA NA I
w N
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pl eb r
eb s
et b vevg I'
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b t
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PVEC t
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.~
e TABLE 3.2-1 (Cont'd)
UJALITT(be)
QUALITT(bb)
SEIEMIC(5) caouP ASSURANCE IUlb31ASE PRINCIPAL COMIM'NF(l)
IOCATION(3)
CATIDORT CIASSIFICATION req)llehElrF DATT(2)
CED9WWrS II.
M(31 Heat Remval System Igig 1.
Heat eschangere, p.imasy side RB I
B I
5/71 2.
Heat emela gers, secondary side RB I
C I
5/71 3.
Piping, connected to RCPB within outerw>9%
tooletion valves PC RB I
A I
b.
Piping, beyond outermost teolation valves RB I
B I
5.
Puses RB I
B I
8/10 6.
1%mp setore RB I
MA I
11/70 (13) 7.
Talves, teolation, t.FCI and shutdown Innes IC.RB I
A I
8.
Valves, isolation, other IC,RB I
B I
9.
Valves, beyond feelstion valves RB I
B I
10.
Electrical modules with safety functior.
RB.A I
MA I
(15)
NA NA I
- 11. Cable, with amfety funetton l
s,o E.
Low Pressure Core Spray System 1.ICS 1.
Piping, within outernost isolation valv-s PC RB I
A I
2.
Piping, beyond outernost isolation valves RB I
B I
3.
Pumps RB I
B I
8,'70 h.
Ibsp sotors RB I
NA I
lip 30 (15) l S.
Valves, isolation and within PC.RB I
A I
6.
Valves, beyond outermost isolation valves RB I
B I
7.
Electrical sedules with safety function RB A I
MA I
(ii) 8.
Cable, with safety function BA NA I
a II.
High Pressure Core Srray Systen HICS
]i 1.
Piping, within outernost isolation valves l
A I
2.
Piping, beyond outermost isolation valvea RB I
B I
3 Piptog, return test Itne to condensate storage j
tank beyond Reactor tha!! ding O.T NA D
II 3%mp discharge line l
RB I
B I
u 5.
Pap RB I
B I
1/71 6.
Talves, within outeruoat isolation valve i
A I
1/72 q
- 7. Talves, return test line to condensate storage RB I
B I
8.
Valves, other RB I
B I
9 HFCS diesel,
A I
NA I
10 Electrical modules with safety function RB.A I
NA I
(15)
C
- 11. Cable, with safety ibnct'on NA NA I
g
- 12. Motor RB I
NA I
(IS)
C
,.m TAB 12 3.2-1 (Cont'd)
@ALITY(ba)
QlALITI(4b)
SE2SMIC(5)
CROUP ASSURANCE ItlpmASg PRINCIFAL QMFUNE!rf(1)
IOCATION(3)
CATELORY CIASSIFICATION RE4f!RDGET DATE(2)
(XHe3TS III.
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System RCIC 1.
Piptag, within outermost teolation valves FC.RB I
A I
2.
Pipinc, beyond outernost toolattoa valves RB I
B I
3.
Piping, return test line to condensate storage I
tank beyond Reactor Building O
NA D
II b.
Vacuun pismp discimrge line from vacuun pump to containment isolation valves BB M
D II 5.
Pumpe RB I
B I
lo/p 6.
Valves, teolation and within PC,RB I
A I
7.
Valves, return test anne to condensate storage RB I
B I
8.
Valves, other RB I
B I
9.
Turbine RB I
E 10/-l0 (gg){g7)(35) 10.
Electrical modules with safety function RB,A I
NA I
(35) i{
- 11. Cable, with safety function M
NA I
=
J.
IIII.
Fel Service Equirment 1.
Fuel preparation machine RB I
MA I
(35) 2.
General pteepose grapple BB I
MA I
(35)
IIV.
Reactor Vessel Serviu Equirment 1.
Steamline pluge RB I
MA I
gg$
2.
Dryer and separator sling RB I
MA I
h/73 (15 3 Head strongback RB I
MA I
(g5 IV.
In-Vessel Service Ewirment 1.
Control rod grapple R3 I
MA I
(gg)
IVI.
Rerueling Equireent 1.
Refbeling platform RB I
MA I
10/73 2.
Refueling bellowe, reactor cavity PC I
MA II 3.
New fuel inspectico stand RB RA h
II (gg)
J W
(y
6
(
e TABI2 3.2 1 (Cont'd)
QIALITY(ba)
QMLITY(hb)
SE13MIC(5)
GROUP ASSURANCE EURCliASE PRINCIIAL CGUVNENT(1)
IDCATION(3)
CATEGORY CIASSIFICATION RE@IRIM2rF DATE(2)
CO HfhTG IVII.
Storage Equipment 1.
Fuel storage racks RB I
NA I
(I s) 2.
Defective fuel storage container RB I
MA I
(1%)
3.
Spent fuel pool, dner/sep. pool, Its tell RB I
NA I
IVIII.
Radweste System 1.
Tanks, atmspheric RW,7 NA D
II 2.
Elest exchangers RW,T NA D
II 3.
Piping, containment isolation IC,RB I
B I
b.
Valves, containment isolation FC.RB 1
B I
5.
II j
6.
II s.
b 7.
Valves, flow control and filter system RW,T MA D
II E
8
II III.
Reactor Water Cleanu o System 1.
Vessels: filter /demineraliser BB NA C
II 6/"I 2.
Heat exchangers RB NA C
II b/?D (14) 3.
Piping, within outermost isolation valves RB,PC I
A I
b.
Piping, beyond outerwist isolation valves RB NA C
II S.
I' umps /mtors RB NA C
II 8
6/3 (3h) 6 Valves, isolation valves and within RB I
A I
7.
Valves, beyond outermost isolation valves 13 NA C
11 6/71 11.-
Nel Ibol Cooling and Cleanup System 1.
Demineraliser vessel RB NA C
II 2.
Filters RB NA C
II 3.
hanps, purification RB NA C
II 4
Piping esc!cdtng item 7 RB NA C
II
'I hg U
5.
II 6.
Heat enchanger RB NA C
II e
N 7.
Puel pool cooling piping RB 1
C II l.j s,
8.
Cocling pumps and heat enchanger supports BB I
C II 16 Q
TABLE 3.2-1 (Cont'd)
@ALITT(ba)
QUALITY (Isb) sEisurC(5) GROUP ASSURANCE IUBmASE PRINCIPAL C[MIONKirt(1)
IOCATION(3)
CATEGORY CIASS!FICATION REQt!!RDElf?
DATE(2)
COH4ENTS III.
C<mtrol ihm Fanels 1.
Electrical panels with safety function A
I M
I (15) 2.
Cable, with safety fianction M
MA I
Yb Q'b NS 6
E4
- Uw HN
TABLE 3.2-1 (Cont'J)
QJALITT(ba)
QUALITT(%b)
SEISMIC (5)
GROUP ASSURANCE t*J"shalASE PRINCIPAI. COMH)MEart(1)
I4 CAT 10N(3)
CATEY10RY CIASSIFICATION REQllI RD5's:f DATE(2)
C(PsOET3 IIII.
Incal Panels 1.
Electrical panels with safety function A.RB I
BA I
il5) 2.
Cable, with safety thnction li4 NA I
3.
Demote staatdown panel A
I NA I
IIIII.
Off gas System (20) 1.
Atmospheric glycol tanks A
E D
II 2.
Heat eschangers A
NA D
II 3 Piping an4 valves (up to and including charcoal beds)
T,A NA D
II Piping and valves (after charcoal t ds)
A NA D
FI S.
Valves, flow control T,A RA D
Il g
6 Steam jet mir ejectors T
RA D
II I'*
7.
Charcoal vessels A
RA D
11 Y
8 Recombiners A
MA D
II E
9 titters a
uA D
II 10 A f ter-filter A
EA D
II IIIV Service Water Systen 1.
Piping, safety-related RB,0,P,A I
C I
2.
Piping, other T
RA D
II 3.
Pumps P
I C
I Pump motors P
I I
5.
Valves, isolation P.A,RB I
C I
6.
Valves, other T,0,P RA D
II 7.
Electrical modules, with aaraty finnetton RB,P,A I
I 8
Chble, with safety function RA I
'l.
KIV.
Instrument ara Service Air System 1.
Vessels, accumulators, supporting safety-related systems FC,RB I
C I
e 2.
Piping in lines between accussalators and safety-related s
C I
(16) d 3 Valves in lines between accussalatora and safety-related (16)
N systems FC.RB I
C I
4.
Piping, conteirosent isolation PC,RB I
B I
5.
Valves, containment isolation Ic,RB I
B I
6.
Electrical modules, with safety function PC,RB,A I
MA I
7.
Cables, with safety funetton RA NA I
g
i TABt2 ).2-1 (Cont'i)
QJALITY(ka)
QlALITY(kb)
SEISMIC (5)
GRUUP ASSURANCE FtF13tASE rRINCIPAL COMNNENT(1)
IDCATIOE(3)
CATIIiORY CIASSIFICATION ItEQJIHEN!rf DATE(2)
(Int 4ENT3 IIVI.
Ut esel Generator Systems 1.
Day tanks A
I C
I 2.
Piping, het oli system and diesel service water system A
I C
I 3.
Valves, het oil system and diesel service water system A
I C
I 4.
Iumps, het oil system and diesel service water system A
I C
I 5.
I%mp setors, hel oli system and diesel service water system A
I C
I 6.
Diesel g nerators A
I ItA I
7.
Electrical amtutes, with safety function A
I C
I 8.
Cable, with safuty function A
HA NA I
9 Diesel fuel storage tanks A
I C
I 10.
Diesel air tanks A
I C
I 1.!
64 e
L IIVII.
Flossmbility Control System A
1.
Piping RB I
B I
2.
Valves RB I
B I
3.
Flasanability control unit on skid I
B I
b.
Electriest satules, with safety h netton RB.A I
NA I
( ")
5.
Cables, with safety function IRA HA I
IIVIII.
Stamtby Gas Treatment System e
1.
Piping and isolation valves with safet; hnctton RB I
MA I
2.
Blowers RB I
ItA I
3.
Electrical / mechanical sedules, with darety function RB.A 1
NA I
(15) 9 b.
Cable, with safety ftsetton NA IIA I
IIII.
Primary containswnt Ventilatf or. lysten
% it 1.
All components FC,RB M
MA II N.ll.
N C
e TABIE 3.2 1 (Cont'd)
@ALITY(ka)
QUALITY %)
SEISMIC (*))
Cit 00P ASSURANL4 IVIDIASE FBINCIPAL CorGufENT(!)
14 CATION (3)
CATECORY CIASSIFICATION Rt.Q'flRtM3rT DATE(2)
Cut #ET:1 XXX.
Power Corversion System 1.
Itain steam piping between outereost isolation valv*s up to turbine stop valves BB,7 I
D II (7,21) 2.
Main steam branch piping to first valve closed or apable of automatte actuation T RB I
D 11 (7,23) 3.
Main turbine bypass piping up to t$ypass valve T
I D
II (7.28) b.
First valve that is either normally closed or e4pable of automatic closurs in branch 9
piping connected to main steam and turbine bypass piping T.RB I
D II (8,21) 5.
Turbine stop valves, turbine control valves, i
amt turbine typass valves
?
NA D
II (21) 6 Main steam leads from turbine control valve y
J.
to tu bine casing NA NA NA NA No piping (21) 7.
Feedwater and conder. sate system beyond third isolation valve RB,7 NA D
II (9)
XXXI.
Cycled Condensste Storage and Transfer System 1.
Consensate storage tank 0
NA D
II (12) 2.
Piping, suction line to illCS, BCIC 0,RB,T A,BW I
B I
3, Piping, other 0
NA D
II 4 Valves and other components 0,RB,T,A RW NA D
II XXXII.
Stamtby A-C Fower System 1.
All components with safety ibaction A
I NA I
XXXIII.
Emergency D-C R>wer System 1.
All components with aarety fusntion A
I RA I
[
_a XXXIV.
Miscellaneous Comeponents a
N 1.
Reactor Building BB I
MA I
2.
,I B
I 0
s- ~
TABIE 3.2-1 (Cnnt'd)
@ALITT(ba)
@AfJTI(bb)
SEIGNIC(5) GROUP ASSURANCE IVitCliASE PRINCIPAL COMitmENT(1)
IOCATION(3)
CATE00RT CIASSIFICATION REWIRDEFF DATE C0HO.1rTS IIIV.
Reactor Building Closed Cooling unter System 1.
Ihaps and heat enchangers RB I
C 1
(18) 2.
Valves, containment isolation IC,RB I
B I
3 Piping and valves for spent fuel pool IG3 ECC8 e
pump coolers, and other aarety-related equipment RB,A I/RA C/D I/NA (18) 4.
Fumps and piping for motor generator 8E3 set coolers A
HA D
II (18) 5.
II 6.
II 7.
Intertte to spent met pool III RB I
C I
l16 XXXVI.
Equipment an.I Floor Drainare System
(
II
!5 g.,
2.
II ue 3.
Piping, containment isolation RB 1
B I
b.
Valves, containment taolation RB I
B I
5.
Cable, with a safety function RA IIA I
6.
Piping, other RB T.IEW.A.P IIA D
II 7.
Valves, other RB,T,RW,A,P RA D
II IIIVII.
Miscellaneous Ventilation Systems 1.
Battery room H & V A
I NA I
2.
Service water structure P
I MA I
3.
Relay and emergency switchgens II & T A
I NA I
b.
Control room air conditioning A
I RA I
5 Emergency diesel generator ventilation system A
I IIA I
IIIVIII.
Area Radiation ninttoring System 1.
All components
.Td,T,A RB IIA NA II
- j t
d W
il
,,g O
.I TAM.E 1.2 1 (cont'd)
@ALITy(ka)
QJALITY(hb)
SEISMIC ($)
GRXfP ASSURANCE
.URO{ASE FRINCIPAL COMIMElft(1)
IOCATICE(3)
CATE00RT CIASSIFICATION REQtlIREMN7 DATE(2)
C040]fTS IIIII.
Isak Detection System 1.
BA I
flS) 2.
Temperature switch M.RB,T I
MA I
(15) 3 Differential temperature switch N,RB.T I
BA I
i,1$
i Differential flow switch PC,kB I
NA I
ft$
i 5.
Pressure switch FC RB I
NA I
[15 i
6.
Differential pressure switch PC.RB I
BA I
l 1$l 7.
Differential flow sumuner RB I
NA I
flh 8.
Reactor bulloing floor drain en RB NA NA II 9.
Reactor butIdtng floor drata Innes and piping RB NA NA II h
IL.
P1re Protection System w
1.
Water sprsy deluge systems NA NA II b
2.
Sprinklers, carbon dioxide systems NA NA II M
3.
IDrtable and wheeled estinguishers NA NA II h.
Halon system NA NA II ILI.
Civil Structures 1.
Reactor building RB I
NA I
2.
Service water pump structure P
I NA II 3.
Radwaste building BW NA NA II b.
f.uzillary butiding A
I BA II 5.
Turbine butiding T
NA NA II 6.
servlee water pipe supports & encasements o
I NA II N
_.u a
TABLE 3.2-1 (Cont'd)
KEY TO INFORMATION REFERENCED NUMERICALLY IN TABLE HEADINGS AND " COMMENTS" COLITMNS (1) A module is an assembly of interconnected components which consti-tute an identifiable device or piece of equipment. For example, electrical modules include sensors, power supplies, and signal pro-cessors, and mechanical modules include filters, strainers, and flow (element) assemblies / orifices.
(2) Purchase order dates are given for cerrain equipment as a basis for determining certain applicable codes in Table 3.2-2 and applicabi-lity system safety class requirements in Table 3.2-3.
(3) PC = within, imary containment RB = within reactor building 0 = outdoors onsite P = service water pump structure A = auxiliary building T = turbine building RW = radwaste building Quality group uassification per Table 3.2-2.
For items where (4) a.
two classes are.l'.sted (e.g., B/C), the first letter indicates classification for ZPS-1.
(
b.
Conformance to q'uality assurance requirements:
I - The equipment meets the quality assurance requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B.
II - The equipment meets the quality assurance requirements de-fined in the purchasu specification.
(5) 1 - The equipment is designed in accordance with the seismic require-ments for the SSE.
NA - The seismic requirements for the SSE are not applicable to the equipment.
(6) The control rod drive insert and withdraw lines from the drive flange up to and including the first valve on the hydraulic control unit are Quality Group B.
(7) The main steamlines between the outermost containment isolation valve up to the turbine stop valve, the main turbine bypass lines up to the turbine bypass valve, and all branch lines connected to these portions of the main steam and turbine bypass lines up to the first valve cap-able of timely actuation are classified D.
These sections of pipes meet all of the pressure integrity requirements of code practice for steam power plants plus the following additional requirements:
All longitudinal and circumferential butt weld joints are radio-a.
graphed (or ultrasonically tested to equivalent standards).
3.2-15 1371 017
OC10bt.s ad o TABLE 3.2-1 (Cont'd)
Where size or configuration does not permit effective volumetric examination, magnetic particle or liquid penetraut examination is substituted.
Examination procedures and a:ceptance stahdards are at least equivalent to those specified as supplementary types of examination, in ANSI B31.1 Code.
b.
All fillet and socket welds are examined by either magnetic par-ticle or liquid penetrant methods. All' structural attachment welds to pressure-retaining materials are examined by excher =ag-netic particle or liquid penetrant methods.
Examination proce-dures and acceptance standards are at least equivalent to thoJe specified as supplementary types of examinations in ANSI B31.1 Code.
c.
All inspection recorda are maintained for the life of the plant.
These records include data pertaining to quali.#1 cation of inspec-tion personnel, examination procedures, and examination results.
(8) The first valve capable of timely actuation in branch lines connected to the main steamlines between the outer ost containment isolation valve and turbine stop valve and in branch lines connected to turbine bypass valve, including the turbine stop/ control valve and turbine bypass l 18 valv2, meet all the pressure integrity requirements of code practice for steam power plants plus the following additional requirements:
\\
a.
Pressure-retaining components of all cast parts of valves of a size and configuration for which volumetric examination methods are effective are radiographed. Ultrasonic examination to equivalent standards may be used as an alternate to radio-graphic methods.
If size or configuration does not permit effec-tive. volumetric examination, magnetic particle or liquid pene-trant methods may be substituted. Examination procedures and acceptance standards are at leapt equivalent to those specified as supplementary types of examination in Paragraph 136.4.3, ANSI B31.1 Code.
b.
All inspection records are retained for the life of the plant.
These records incivde data pertaining to the qualification of inspection personnel, examination procedures, and examination results.
It is therefore concluded that the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.26 12 is met.
(9) The outermost valve of the three isolacion valves in the feedwater lines and the control rad drive system water return line is a posi-tive acting motor-operated valve of high leaktight integrity. The check valve outside the containment is sin 11ar to a pump check valve.
The classification of the feedwater lines from the reactor vessel to
's and including the third isolation valve is Quality Group A; beyond the third valve is Quality Group D.
3.2-16' 1371 018
zp3_1 c2..sivu 14 JUNE 1976 TABLE 3.2-1 (Cont'd)
Where size or configuration does not permit effective volumetric examination, magnetic particle or liquid penetrant examination is substituted.
Eramination procedures and acceptance standards are at least equivalent to those specified as supplementary types of examination, in ANSI B31.1 Code, b.
All fillet and soc ket welds are examined by either magnetic par-ticle or liquid penetrant methods. All e ductural attachment velds to pressure-retaining materials are examined by either mag-netic particle or liquid penetrant methods.
Examination proce-dures and acceptance standards are at least equivalent to those specified as supplementary types of examinations in ANSI B31.1 Code.
c.
All inspection records are maintained for the life of the plant.
These rccords include data pertaining to qualification of inspec-tion personnel, examination procedures, and examination results.
(8) The first valve capable of timely actuation in branch lines connected to the main steamlines between the outermost containment isolation valve and turbine stop valve and in branch lines connected to turbine bypass valve, including the turbine stop valve and turbine bypass 12 valve, meet all the precsure integrity requirements of code practice
\\
for steam power plants plus the following additional requirements:
a.
Pressure-retaining components of all cast parts of valves of a size and configuration for which volumetric examination Th methods are effective are radiographed. Ultrasonic examination to equivalent standards may he used as an alternate to radio-graphic methods.
If size or configuration does not permit effec-tive volumetric examination, magnetic particle or liquid pene-trant methods may be substituted.
Examination procedures and acceptance standards are at least equivalent to those specified as supplementary types of examination in Paragraph 136.4.3, ANSI B31.1 Code, b.
All inspection records are retained for the life of the plant.
These records include data pertaining to the qualification of inspection personnel, examination procedures, and examination results.
It is therefore concluded that the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.26 12 is met.
(9) The outermost valve of the three isolation valves in the feedwater lines and the control rod drive system water return line is a posi-tive acting motor-operated valve of high leaktight integrity.
The check valve outside the containment is sbnilar to a pump check valve.
The classification of the feedwater lines from the reactor vessel to and including the third isolation valve is Quality Group A; beyond the third valve is Quality Group D.
3.2-16 j }[j qjg
ZPS-1 IABLE 3.2-1 (Cont'd)
(10) a.
Lines equivalent to a 3/4-inch or smaller liquid line which are part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary are Quality Group B, ASME III, Class 2, and Seismic Category I.
b.
All instrument 11 hich are connected to the reactor coolant pressure boundary and are utilized to actuate safety systems are Quality Group B, ASME III, Class 2 from the outer isolation valve or the procesc fautoff valve (root value) to the sensing instrumentation.
(Figure 3.2-1) c.
All instrument lines which are connected to the reactor coolant pressure boundary and are not utilized to actuate safety systems are Quality G. oup D and B31.1.0 from the outer isolation valve or the process shutoff valve (root varvs) to the sensing instru-mencation.
d.
All other instrument and sample lines:
- 1) Instrument and sample lines through the root value are of the same classification as the system to which they are attached.
2)
Instrument and sample lines beyond the root value, if used to actuate a safety system, are of the same classification as the system to which they are attach ed.
3)
Instrument and sample lines beyond the root value, if not used to actuate a safety system, are Quality Group D and B31.1.0.
e.
ASME/ ANSI Code Case 78 (included in ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code) is applied to lines 3/4-inch and smaller classi-fied as Quality Group A or B.
(11) The RCIC turbines are categorized as machinery. To assure that the turbine is fabricated to the standards commensurate weih their safety and performance requirements, General Electric has estab-lished specific design requirements for this component, which are as follows:
a.
All welding is qualified in accordance with Section IX, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.
b.
All pressure containing castings and fabrications are hydro-tested to 1.5 x design pressure.
c.
All high-pressure castings are radiographed according to:
ASTM E-94 E-142 20% coverage, minimum E-71, 186,or 280 severity level 3 371 020 3.2-17
-:a -
TABLE 3.2-1 (Cent 'd) d.
As-cast surfaces are magnetic particle or liquid penetrant tested according to ASME,Section III, Paragraph NB-2575 or NB-2576.
e.
Wheel and shaf t forgings are ultrasonically tested according to ASTM A-388.
f.
Butt-welds are radiographed according to ASME Section III, NB-2573,and magnetic particle of liquid penetrant tested accord-ing to ASME Section III, NB 2575,or NB-2576.
g.
GE is to be notified of major repairs and records are to be main-tained thereof.
h.
Record system and traceability according to ASME Section III, Code, Paragraphs NA-4442.1 and NB-2151.
1.
Control and identification according to ASME Section III, Code, Paragraphs NA-4442.1 and NB-2151.
- j. Procedures conform to ASME Section III, NB-5520.
k.
Inspection personnel are qualified according to ASME Section III, IX-400.
(12) Condensate storage tanks are Quality Group D+QA.
The condensate storage tanks are designed, fabricated, and tested to meet the intent of ANSI B96.1.
In addition, the NDE requirement for the tank requires 1) 100% surface examination of nozzle welds, and
- 2) volume examination of the shell weld joints in accordance with ANSI B96.1.
(13) The hydraulic control unit (HCU) is a General Electric factory-assembled engineered module of valves, tubing, piping, and stored water which controls a single control rod drive by the application of precisely timed sequences of pressures and flows to accomplish slow insertion or withdrawal of the control rods for power control, and rapid insertion for reactor scram.
Although the hydraulic contro4 ait, as a unit, is field installed and connected to process piping, many of its internal parts differ markedly from process piping components because of the more com-plex functions they must provide. Thus, although the codes and standards invoked by Groups A, B, C, and D pressure integrity quality levels clearly apply at all levels to the interfaces between the HCU and the connecting conventional piping components (e.g.,
pipe nipples, fittings, simple hand valves, etc.), it is considered that they do not apply to the apecialty parts (e.g., solenoid valves, pneumatic components,and instruments). The HCU shutoff (isolation) valves are Quality Group B.
1,371 021 3.2-18
~
TABLE 3.2-1 (Cont'd)
The design and construction specifications for the HCU (.o invoke such. odes and standards as can be reasonably applied to individual parts in developing required quality levels, but these codes and standards are supplemented with additional requirements for these parts and for the remaining parts and details. For example, 1) all welds are LP inspected, 2) all socket welds are inspected for gaps between pipe and socket bottom, 3) all welding is performed by qualified welders, 4) all work is done per written procedures.
Quality Group D is generally applicable because the codes and stan-dards invoked by that group contain clauses which permit the use of manufacturer's standards and proven design techniques which are not explicitly defined within the codes of Quality Groups A, B, or C.
This is supplemented by the QC techniques described above.
(14) Reactor Water Cleanup A high leaktight integrity isolation valve will be provided in the reactor water cleanup discharge line connecting to tne feedwater header outside of the containment. This valve will be remote manually operated from the control room using signals which indicate loss of flow of cleanup water.
The reactor water cleanup discharge line from the feedwater header to and including the high leaktight valve and the suction line from the reactor to and including the outermost isolation valve will be classified Group A.
The remainder of the cleanup system will be Group C.
(15) No principal industrial code is applicable.
(16) Pneumatic systems associated with actuatien of safety-related valves to accomplish safety functions (e.g., main steam isolation valves, main steam safety / relief valves) are classified GE Quality Group C.
This classification is intended to apply to components such as the air piping, fittings, and accumulator tanks (Ref er to Figure 3.2-1).
This classification does not apply to components of the system such as air control valves, air check valves, and cylinder (or diaphragm) air actuators. These components are classified as "special equip-ment" and are selected based on engineering reviews, operating experience and testing as being the most suitable for the applica-tion.
Such equipment is required to be qualified to demonstrate operability during normal and emergency ambient conditions.
Com-ponents normally furnished with the process valve (e.g., air con-trol valves, air actuators) are performance tested with the valve as part of its acceptance test procedure. Group C classification has not been applied to these components due to the nonavailability of the equipment with "N" symbol stamp and due to the inappropriate restrictions (e.g., materials, minimum allowable wall thickness) in gosed by the code on the equipment in the relatively low pres-sure, low-temperature air service. The special equipment designa-tion for the above described components is based on considerations 1371 022 3.2-19
ZPS-1 FIVISION 9 MAY 1976 TABLE 3.2-1 (Cont'd) consistent with those of Comment 15 above.
(17) RCIC turbine steam exhaust line is Quality Group B except that hydrostatic testing of this portion of the line is not required.
(18) Fuel pool (cooling) supply (RHR intertie) is Quality Group B and Seismic Category I; the. rest of system is Seismic NA.
(19) Special (engineered design-quality) requirements (motors, pumps, tanks, and equipment).
The engineering QC requirements for the specified equipment have been prc:ured/ designed to the horizontal and vertical values in Subsection 3.9.2.
This equipment is capable of withstanding in-ertial forces equal to the weight multiplied by the seismic coeffi-cient specified in Subsection 3.9.2 as applied to each member and to the system as a whole.
The QA/QC requirements are as required by either:
- 1) ASME B&PVC Section III, Appendix II or equivalent; equipment ordered prior to January 1, 1970 apply QC plan "in effect" based on purchase order requirements.
- 2) A QA plan / program at least equivalent to that required by QAR 2 as specified in Chapter 17.0.
(20) The unprocessed radwaste piping will meet Group D requirements and the following supplementary requirements:
a.
Piping For sizes over 4 inches nominal, random radiography of 20% of the joints will be performed on girth and longitudinal butt-welds. Sockets and fillet welds in sizes over 4 inches nominal
-will be given random magnetic particle and liquid penetrant av== h ation on 20% of the joints.
b.
Pump and Valves Welds in pumps and valves of pipe size over 4 inches will be given random magnetic particle or liquid penetrant examination. Random examination is defined as examination of the linear dimension of a weld in a pump or valve with piping connecting over 10-inch nominal size or as examination of all of the welding in 20% of the pump and valves with piping connecting 10-inch nominal or less.
(21) The main steamline from the outermost main steamline containment isolation valve, up to and including the main stop and control 9
valve assembly, and all branch line 2 " (IPS inches) diameter and
-2 1371 023
JANUARY 19/9 IABLE 3.2-1 (Cont'd) 51 larger, up to and including the first valve (including their restraints), have been designed by the use of an appropriate dynamic seismic systems analysis to withstand the OBE and DBE loads, in combination with other appropriate loads within the limits of the ANSI B31.1 piping code and the PSAR Group B requirements for OBE and DBE loading combinations.
The main steamline (MSL) for the outermost MSL containment isola-tion valve up to and including the main stop and control valve assembly and all branch lines 2 1/2 IPS inches diameter and larger up to and including their first valve (including their restraints) have been designed by the use of appropriate dynamic seismic system analyses to withstand the OBE and DBE loads, in cambination with other appropriate loads, within the limits of the ANSI B31.1 piping code and the PSAR Group B requirements for OBE and DBE loading combinations. The MSL analysis confirmed that the main stop and control valve assembly and branch lines terminal stop valves, including their directly associated sup-9 porting structures connected to the turbine building, do not produce an amplified response input into the MSL (natural fre-quencies above 33 cps).
The dynamic input loads for design of the MSL are derived from a time history modal analysis (or rm equivalent method) of the auxiliary, reactor, and applicable portions of the tuttine buildings.
The pressuze-retaining portions of the main stop and control valve assembly and the branch line terminal valves have been designed to withstand the OBE and DBE loads within the PSAR Group B requirements.
The turbine building housing portions of the main steamlines may undergo some plastic deformation under the DBE.
However, the plastic deformation will be limited to a ductility factor of two, and an elastic multi-degree of freedom system analysis will be used c determine the input to the main steamline.
It is therefore concluded that the intent of Regulatory Guide 12 1.29 is met.
(22) ASME Code Case N-196 used.
51 1371 024 3.2-20a
TABLE 3.2-2 CODE CROUP DESIGNATION - IIIDUSTRY CODES AND STANDARDS FOR MECilANICAL COMPONENTS QUALITY ASME B&PV COMPONENTS ORDERED COMPONENTS ORDERED ON COMPONENTS ORDERED ON CROUP CODE CLASSES /DIV.
PRIOR TO OR AFTER JAN. 1, 1970 OR AFTER JULY 1, 1971 AND Cl.ASSIFICATION 1968 ED./1971 ED.
JAN. 1, 1970***
TO JULY 1, 1971 PRIOR To JULY 1,1974 l9 A
A 1
ASME III, A
ASME III.
A ASME III, 1
ANSI B31.1.0 ANSI B31.7 I
NA & HB Subsections NP & VC I
B31.7 I**
TEMA C TEMA C TEMA C See Note (a)
See Note (a) and (f)
See Note (c) l18 B
B*,C 2,MC*
ASME III, B*,C ASME III, B*,C ASME III, 2 & MC*
ANSI B31.1.0 ANSI B31.7, 11 NA & NC Subsections NP & VG, II HA & NE Subsections TEMA C TEMA C TEMA C See Notes (a) and (e) TANKS API 620/650 TANKS ****
See Notes (a), (e) and (f)
See No es (c) and (e) l18 C
I 3
ASME VIII, Div. 1 ASME VIII, Div. 1 ASME III, 3 ANSI B31.1.0 ANSI B31.7, III HA & ND Subsections HP & VC III e
('
U See Notes (b) and (e) TANKS API 620/650 TANKS ****
See Notes (b),(e)and (f)
See Notes (c) and (e) l18 e'
D 1
1 ASME VIII, Div. 1 ASME VIII, Div. 1 ASME VIII, Div. 1 ANSI B31.1.0 ANSI B31.1.0 ANSI B31.1.0 TEMA C TEMA C TEMA C See Hotes (b) and (e) TANKS API 620/650 TANKS API 620/6';0 See Notes (b), (e) and (f)
See Notes (d) and (e) l18 E
SPECIAL ENGINEERED EQUIPMENT WITH CODES AND STANDARisS AS SPECIFIED IN NOTES AND COMMENTS IN TABLE 3.2-1
- Hetal containment vessel only.
Ltd N
Section III - 71 Ed. requires design of pipe supporting elements to be in accordance with the requirement of ANSI 631. 7-6a, Divisions 1-720 and 1-721.
No piping procared prior to Jan. 1. 1970.
O
.N
- See Connent 12 of Table 3.2-1.
9 LT1 8 i!l W.
Ah W [:
ers -
REVIS10F 19 NOVEMIER 1976 TABLE 3.2-2 (Cont'd)
NOTES (a) Pumps Classified A and B The requirements of ASME Section III, C, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, are used as a guide in calculating the thickness of pressure-retaining portions of the pump and in sizing cover bolting.
(b) rumps Classified C or D and Operating Above 150 psig or 212" F The requirements of ASME Section VIII, Div. 1, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code are used as a guide in calculating the thickness of pressure-retaining portions of the pump and in sizing cover bolting. Pumps classified D and operating below 150 psig and 212*F use manufacturer's standard pump for service intended.
(c) Pumps Classified A, B, and C Use applicable ASME Section III Subsections NB, ND or ND respectively for vessel design as a guide in calculating the thickness of pressure-retaining portions of the pump and in sizing cover bolting.
(d) Pumos Classified D ani Operating Above 150 psig and 212' F The requirements of ASME VIII, Div. 1 are used as a guide in calculating the thickness of pressure-retaining portions of the pump and in sizing cover bolting. Pumps operating below 150 psis and 212' F use manufacturer's standard pump for service intended.
(e) Tanks are not fully covered by ASME codes. Groups B and C tanks ordered on or after July 1, 1972, apply Winter 1971 Addenda of ASME Section III,197L Edition.
Other tanks are designed, constructed, and tested to meet the intent of API Standards 620/650, AWWA itandard D100 or ANSI B96.1 Standard for Aluminum Tanks.
(f) All pumps a7d valves for lines over 2 inches, up to and including 4 inches, in systems which are classified as Group A, B, and D+ for h9 73 main steam and turbine bypass lines were purchased to the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III.
Also additional testing was performed for these castings in accordance with Section 3.2.1 of the Wm. H. Zimmer Safety L9 Evaluation Report.
t371 026 3.2-22
TABLE 3.2-3
SUMMARY
OF SAFETY CLASS DESIGN REQUIREMENTS (Minimum)
. SAFETY CLASS DESIGN REQUIREMENTS 1
2_
3 OTHER ASME/ SYSTEM CODE Classification (a) 1 2/E 3/E D
(D)
B B
B/E N/A Quality Assurance Requirement Seismic Category (C)
I I
I/NA NA (a) The equipment is constructed in accordance with the indicated code group listed in Table 3.2-1 and defined in Table 3.2-2.
The above classes are as per ASME III 1971 edition.
(b) B - The equipment shall be constructed in accordance with the quality assurance requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix 3 as delineated in Chapter 17.0.
N/A - The equipment shall be constructed in accordance with the quality assurance requirements consistant with accepted practice for steam power plants.
E - Special items are manufactured to a QA program generally consistent with ASME III, Appendix II,1968 edition requirements.
(c)
I - The equipment of these safety classes shall be constructed in accordance with the seismic requirements for the safe shutdown earthquake as described in Section 3.7.
NA - The seismic requirements for the safe shutdown earthquake are not applicable to the equipment of this classification.
~
371 027
=
3.2-23
THE CINCINNATI GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY PLANT ZIMMER UNIT 1
PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM DATA The information requested can be found in Table 2.2-6 of NEDO-24708, " Additional Information Required for NRC Staff Generic Report on Boiling Water Reactors."
This table was taken from the Zimmer FSAR.
The drawings that are attached, were taken from Volume XI of Zimmer FSAR, pages Q0.41.48-1 through 41.
$71028 A 4 79-G E.
.a e
ZPS-1 REVISION 16 SEPTEMBER 1976 POSITION 041.48 (6.2.4)
" Provide the following information related to the containment isolation systems.
Table 6.2-8 should be revised where practical to show this addi-tional information.
a.
In Table 6.2-8 identify all fluid system lines and all 21uid instrument lines that penetrate the primary containment.
Not all penetrations where identified and labeled as such.
An example is the 'LPCS to Reactor' line (higure 6.3-4) where two 3/4 inch lines (1LP24A3/4 and ILP25A3/4) pete' rated the c
containment and were not labeled. For each penetration, identi-fy all branch lines that require isolation. An example would be line ILP12A3/4 (Figure 6.3-4).
No indication of isolaticn requirement exists in Table 6.2-8 for this line.
b.
Provide simplified sketches for each containment penetration.
Show the isolation valves on each sketch along with the Quality group and Seismic categroy of the pipe. Provide a cross-reference to the appropriate sketch in Table 6.2-8.
Indicate in Table 6.2-8 the position of each isolation valve e.
in the event of power failure. Indicate which valves are in systems needed for safe shutdown, or, are in engineered safety feature systems.
g.
For each remote manual containment isolation valve, indicate the provisions made to allow the operator in the main con-trol room to know when to isolate by remote manual means.
Such provisions may include instruments to measure flow rate, sump water level, temperature, pressure, and radiation level."
RESPONSE
Table 6.2-8 has been revised to identify all fluid system lines a.
and all fluid instrument lines that penetrate the primary contain-ment. This table has been redesigned to list the lines by pene-tration number. All lines connecting or being a part of the main (process line) penetration have been listed under the particular penetration number.
Instrument lines, which include up to seven lines for each penetration, have been grouped into particular categories. The majority of the instrument lines all qualify for being exempted from Type C leak rate testing in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.11.
Those penetration instrument lines that do not qualify under the regulatory guide have been listed individually to indicate whether or not they receive a Type C leak rate test. The note associated with that particular line identifies either the justification for not testing or the type of test this line will receive. The two 3/4-inch lines (ILP24A 3/4 and LP25A 3/4) referred to in part of the questions.do not Q041.48-1 1371 029
ZPS-1 REVISION 16 SEPTEMBER 1976 penetrate the primary containment.
The figure is correct as shown.
Since this line does not show the penetration symbol on the P&ID, it does not penetrate the primary containment.
As stated above, all branch lines that require isolation have now been identified on Revision 14 of Table 6.2-8.
The example given in the question above for line ILP12A 3/4 (Figure 6.3-4) does not penetrate the containment. Line ILP12A (Figure 6.3-4) is a 16-inch line which is the suction for RNR pump "A" suction from the cycled condensate storage tank.
b.
Simplified sketches (Figures Q041.48-1 to Q041.48-34) are provided for each containment penetration that will be Type C tested.
These sketches show the isolation valves along with the test connections, test vents, and test boundary valves where applicable.
The quality group and seismic category of the pipes are included in Table 6.2-8.
The sketches are identified by penetration number corresponding to the penetration number in Table 6.2-8.
The position of each valve indicated on the sketches is not that position which is required during the Type C leak rate testing but rather the position of the valve during normal plant operation (position indicated on SAR Figures).
Revision 14 of Table 6.2-8 now includes a column for valve positions.
e.
This column includes the Normal Position - Shutdown Position -
Post-LOCA Position and Power Failure Position.
Those valves which are in systems needed for safe shutdown or are in engineered safety feature systems are identified in Table 6.2-8 under the heading Engineered Safety Feature. All valves which are in Engineered Safety Feature Systems are identified as Yes in this particular column.
g.
Remote manual feedwater injection and control rod drive isolation valves are closed by the operator from control room in accordance with FSAR Subsections 6.2.4.3.2.1.1.1 and 6.2.4.3.2.1.1.4, res-pectively.
It should be noted that the majority of the remote valves listed in Table 6.2-8 are normally closed and remain closed in a post-LOCA condition.
Shown below is a list of remote manual isolation valves that would normally be open following a LOCA.
In accordance with Subsection 7.5.1.4.1, no operator action or assistance is assumed to take place during the first 10 minutes following a LOCA.
Each valve on the following list will be open or opened by operator action following a LOCA to mitigate the effects of the LOCA. After the 10-minute "no operator action" period, the operator has che option (based on the information avail-able to him as described in Subsection 7.5.1.4.2) to position the remote manual valves as required by reactor system parameters.
In the case where the containment will be isolated, containment pene-tration isolation valves in idle systems will be manually closed.
Q041.48-2 1371 030
ZPS-1 REVISION 27 MAY 1977 Af ter the 10-minute "no operator action" period, some valves may be positioned by the operator in accordance with post-LOCA operating procedures. These procedures direct such events as containment atmosphere sampling and subsequent cleanup and ventilation system operation, i.e., cooling water to sump coolers in drywell, etc.
These operation decisions are based on reactor system parameters sva11able as described in Subsection 7.5.1.4.2.
Additional indications available to the operator during the post-LOCA condition are valve position indicators and pump or blower motor status lights. These safety-related indicators can be used in conjunction with other indications outlined in Subsection 7.5.1.4.2 to indicate system malfunctions requiring operator action (i.e., the need to close remote manual valves to maintain contaf -
ment isolation).
Valve Penetration Number Post-LOCA RBCCW supply M-23 Open-Closed RBCCW return M-9 Open-Clcsed Hydrogen gas control supply M-54 Open-Closed Hydrogen gas control return M-104 Open-Closed ADS Instrument Air M-95 Open-closed 27 ADS Instrument Air M-96 Open Closed 1371 031 s.
Q041. 48-3
T.V. -TEST VENT PENETRATION M-1(A) 1.V. -lSOLATION VALVE M-2(B)
T.C.-TEST CONNECTION MAIN STEAM u-stC)
M A tD)
PRIMARY CONTAINMENT T.V.
kghh I
INSIDE OUTSIDE L.C IB21F 301C
.,i OID IB21F028A l0$ $k lB21F300A B
L.Ch iB21F300B l V-lB21F028D JL IB21F300C f F V i
IB21F300D g
g TURBINE T.VII.C' n F. C.
FLOW IE32F004A
-- IE21F022 A IE32F004B M
- l. V.
IE32f001A lE32FOO2A
~
IE32FOO4C IE32FOOlB IE32F002B C
IB21 FO228 IE32FOO4D](IE32F005A lE32F00lC IE32F002C IE21F022C IE32F00lO lE32F0020 IB21F0220 IE32F005B IE32F005C IM ITEUl le21F319A T.V' z
IE2lF319B 182iF026A n LEAKAGE d
IB21F319C IB2iF0268
(
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(
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- 8
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E
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c
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5IFWD49 IB21F065 A L
T. V.
M. O' I B21FOll A IB21FOIOA IB2iF32 A RPV M
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/
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d J k L.C.
g
'g L.C.
TO THIS LN n
r POIN T N
r-
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p T.V.
g.V/ T.C.
T IG33F356 FEE.l) WATER
}
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LINE FILLED N
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T.v./ T.C.
T TO THIS P9lhT
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T.B.- TEST BOUNDARY PENE TR ATION M -7 T.V.- T EST VEN T (M-21 -4)
I.V.- ISOL ATION VA LVE T.C - TEST CCNNECTION MAIN STEAM
[
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p C
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O I -t o
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4 LII Q -'
- y NOTE
Test pressure is not in the same direction as the pressure existing A
m 7
when the valve is required to mM*
=$
perform its safety function as j $
required by Appendix "J" to H
o0 h
=5 10CFR50.
P s
41':
e l
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==
L a
L
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T. B.- TEST BOUNDARY PENETRATION M-9 T.C.- TEST CONNECTION T.V.- TEST V E N T I.Vr ISOL ATION VALVE R.S.C.C.W. RETURN F R il.l A RY CCNTAINMENT INSIDE O U TSIDE T. V.
F1 1
074 1, V, IWRl37 S
M. O.
I 6
s DRYWELL HEAT COOLING COILS F. C EXOiANGERS '
d T' B' '
T. B.
FLOW IWROSS I
k b
['
A g
lk REACTOR lWRO77 IWh067A o
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,f g RECIRC. FUMPS T. B.
O "b
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= "l
>=
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.=
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48
T.C.-TEST CONNEC TlON T.B. 'EST BTNDARY PENETRATION M-lo T.V.-TEST VENT 0a-52-2) l.V.- ISCLATIOh VALVE P
REACTOR CORE T.V./ T.C'rT r,. v.
T ISOLATION COOLING lEl2F062 PRIMARY lEl2F3508 CONTAINMENT R. P. V. H E A D INSIDE OUTSIDE IEl2F061 lE12F350A M.O lEl2F086 INSTAL L lEl2FOjg I
RHR T. B.
O V.
BLINO FLANGE t,i.B.
T IE51F066 lEl2F023 IE51FOl3 IE51FOl2 S
M.O.
N 13
- RCIC,
>g l ll ew FLOW TESTABLE V-T. B.
PUMP H CHECK VALVE M,
lE5lF065 (E51F034 I
4 7
,e
] (L.C -
m e
m E
2 Rm "E M.O.l Rs
- 2 J
ESlFO22 a
I IE5lF035 0m J L 'C '
L 3 F 1 -e c Egg Q IE 51F 338 IESlFO23 o(
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34 I b o
b 0E u
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T.C.
E TO CYCLED 4
CCNDENSATE w
=
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I. V.-ISOL ATIO N V ALV E PE NE TR ATION M - 14 T. B.-TE ST BOUNDARY T. C.-TEST CONNECTION T. V.-TE ST VE N T c
CONTROL ROD DRIVE PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ICllF32 3-}
INSIDE OUTSIDE n TN/L C
'v ICllF085 df
] (ICllF355 I
ICilFOlB IClitO B, g
ICilF084 Ml T. B.
ICliF087 ICilF086 f.V IC liFO72 5
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ICilF360 ICilF358 j IC il F357 u
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7 3
$ l1 ICilF361 ICllF359 ICilF356 ca w
if !!
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T u
e S
am 9
IN E
i 25 s
2
i T.V. IEST VEN T PENETRATION M-lB l.V. - ISOL ATION val.VE T.C.-TEST CONNECTION STEAM TO RHR HX f
IESIF076 PRIMARY MO CONTAINMENT.
INSIDE OUTSIDE MAIN STEAM DRAIN IL5tF063+
IESIF004 MO M0 RESIDUAL HEAT MAIN STEAM T.V.
-C><j
>4 T. V.
l.v' D.C.
REMOVA L
{
FLO W g,y, IE51F072 ji TO o
p, PENE IRATION
=
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U-24 IE51F073
-s x
4 r-r C *$
NOTE:
Test pressure is not in the same T. C.
- 1. " 8 E*
direction as the pressure existing "5 E Eo when the valve is required to P
k Ek perform its safety function as mm required by Appendix "J"
to 9E M*
3"
{* *f
[
h7j N
88 E
2s 8
d z
"m 2
9
'e 3"
?
O u
m
-4 u
h G
I. V,-ISOLArl0N VALVE PENE TR ATION M-20 T. B.-TEST BC UNDARY M - 51 SHT. 3, D - 7 T. C.- TEST CONNEC TlON T. V._ TEST VENT RHR SD SUCTION T. C.
p RIM ARY R
CONTAINM FN T llJSIE OUTSIDE R] IEI2FOO5 M.O.
IE12F353 IEl2FCC9 N
IE12 F 3( 6 lM.O.l y.0, l
T. B.
I'EClh C.
LESIDUAL clNE T. B.
I. v.
g, y, HEAT REMOVAL
}' '
I'CW IEl2FCO8 IEl2FOCl IEl2F 305 7
7 IE l2 F36 8 y 7 IE l2 F0 67 AU o
n i ~j y
T. B.
f Ea IE12FOO2 IEl2FOO7 J
I k IE12F370 m n g. V./T. C.
IE12F369(f O
N3 f
T T. B.
c m m 4 m IE 12F371 Y
8 E
[lFCO34 5$ $ 5y N
8 *g o
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o c
[2 h
IFC O3 5 o
FPC 8
b g
c E
G::a
I.V.-ISOL ATION VALVE PENETRATION M - 21 T. B.-TEST BOUNDARY (M 1)
T.C.-TEST CONNE CTIO N i
I T. V.
T. V.-TE ST V ENT R.H.R.
D.W.
SPRAY
{ IEl2F366 PRIMARY p
CONTAIN MENT INSIDE OUTSIDE h IE12F367 T.C.3 7 IE12FOIOA lEl2FOO3A D
M.O.
M.O.
M.O.
c CONT AINM EN T SPRAY 1
j T. V*
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M T. B.
c-
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- NOTE:
Test pressure is not in the same M. O.
lEl2F3498
?* 8
'33 3 ;; o direction as the pressure existing gl2 O
M ] T. V.
when the valve is required to T.B. F '
IEl2 F349A "b
3%
perform its safety function as IEl2F042A A i' 3*
required by Appendix "J"
to g
{E
=y 10CFR50.
gg 3
5
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e
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me
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- 1. V.-ISOL ATIO N VA LVE
~
PE NE TR ATION M - 17 T. B.-TEST BOUNDARY (M 2 )
T. C.-TEST CONNECTION T. V.-TE ST V E N T
(
IE12F350B IE12F350A IEl2F039D L
R.H.R. D.W.
T.e. $
M N.C TB IEl2FO86 SPRAY e
IEl2F023 PRIMARY CONTAIN ME NT u
INSIDE OUTSIDE n T* V*
w p
r T. C.FTIEl2FOIO8 dlE12F351B /YlE12F0488 n
CD T. B~
IEl2F335 u
M.O.
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T. B.
p(
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1.
IEl2 FOS 3B IE12FOO3B d
IE 12 FOl7B*
IE12FOIE 8 1 P e
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[
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T. B IEl2F049 M. O.
IEl2F0278 T.B-T. B.
ga
- g T.B.m s x o
=
g5 ~h r,
IEI2 F042 8 3 7 IEl2F0248 P is j
GB *
&,y T. V.
T. B'
=-
n n
o m e 3 9L 5
M M
lE 12F375 IE12 F 374 m o a
h h
e c._,
NOTE:
Test pressure is not in the same US d
- z direction as the pressure existing
-.9 b
e c
"L when the valve is required to
$w
^
perform its safety function as required by Appendix "J"
to 10CFRSO.
1.V.- ISOLATION VALVE T.B.- TEST BOUNDARY T.C.- TEST CONNECTION PENETRATION M -23 T.V.- TEST VENT M - 58 SHT. 4, B-7 R.B.C.C.W.
SUPPLY PRIMARY IWR064A CONTAIN ME NT T. B.
T. B.
lWRO80 T. V.
n IWRO73 IWRO54 r
S M.O.
glWRl35 T
s x
DRYWELL IWRI34 COOLING COILS X
k
!E T. B.
JLOW T. B.
va o
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r-IWR066A IWRISO IWREl2O EXCHANGERS k3 {!
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REACTOR IWR066B T. C.
g{ I9 RECIRC. PUMPS g
m-5, um A
M O 4 O4
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I.V. -ISOLATION VALVE T. B.-TEST BOUr.DAftY PENE1 R ATION M-18 & M-24 T.C.-TEST CONNECTION (M. 52 - 1)
T.V.-1EST VEN1 STtAM TO RCIC.
r
- 1. V.
IE51FO64 M -18 M. 0'
~
M.O.
IE5lF063*
INSICF C U TSIDE
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I.V.
g LINE FILLED
, TO R.H. F\\.
T. B~
N
" ' H. E X.
f flE5lF340 I f j { IESIFO72 y
IESIF076 T. B.
IE 51F341 IEl2 f $1Ebtf073 NO32B IE 51F336 J L U
'l T ' V' M.O.
y T. V
" e J
IE51F337 TO R.H.R.
T. C '
M-24 lE 12Y52 A H.EX.
IN SIDE CUTSIDE T.B.
y z
j!
M O.
- A U
l o
[> <j.V
=
N r
IE5lFO3C 3
h IE51F054 O
yy S, 3
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M g
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ptyjl{g}
g
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3h
- g c
-i 3 -e IE5tF039 IEttFL's cm g
E
- 5 85 d
2 NOTE: Test pressure is not in the same
- w C
direction as the pressure existing IE5lF053 o
?
m" when the valve is required to perform M
] T. V.
its safety function as required by IE 51FC52 No Appendix "J"
to 10CFR50.
I.V.-ISOLATION VALVE T.B.-T EST BOUNDARY T.C.-TEST CONNECTION PENETRATION M-27 REACTOR WAT,ER M-55 S HT.1, E-7 T.v.-TEST VENT CLEAN-UP PRIMAfiY CON TAINMENT IG 33F307 17 INSIDE OUTSIDE g
p, y
T. B.
IG33F358 g
IG33FOO4 IG33 FOOL M.O.
HEAT IG 33 F357 d 5
/
EXCHANGER S IG33FOO5A 3 L
- (REACTOR
{
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T. B.
FLOW#
I. V.
y z
4
,e IG33FOO6
[
[E hIG33FOO2
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IG33FIO2 FIG 33F007
- 8 3p U
T. B IG33103 o-2- ]T. B.
{ {IG33F003 yA
[$
T.v/T. C.
$$ $ ll C
T.s T.v./r.c
~
h
!9 IG33F101 IG33F005B
.o
(
C P
2" w
a 8
A" j $
T. B.
RA B
E 5
m 85
=
2 nn
?
8
-9 C
2 58
I. V.-I S OL A TI ON VALVE PENETRATION N-49 T. B.-TES T BOUNDARY DRYWELL SUMP (M i)
T. C.-TEST CONNECTION T. V.-TE S T VE N T DRM N PRIMARY CONTAINMENT IN S IDE O U TSIDE F' 1 T. V.
IRE 048 $
IREO49 (IRE 079 E
E IREOSOA 7\\:
5 1S_i S
k IRE 5IM A DRYWELL EQUIPMENT DRAIN SUMP f ':u)
'u' F
- 1. V.
- 1. V.
T. B.
"H "
FLOW T. V.
g IRE 065 z
A jE T.C.
IRE 050B
- A p DRAIN o
r;,
Rg
- E P
"9 a
0
- O
?" 8 E"
T*B*
o
- NOTE:
Test pressure is not in th'e same gy 3 ;j direction as the pressure existing g
y
--~
x when the valve is required to perform kh
=$
its safety function as required by o2
- j 3 h Appendix "J" to 10CFRSO.
85 h
5 O
g 3*
c 08 sl
I.V. - I SOLATION VALVE PENETRATION M-50 T B.- TEST BOUNDARY (M l)
T C.- TEST CONNECTION S
f.v._TcST VENT DRYWELL SUMP IRF00 7 DRAIN k
y, y, PRIMARY CONTAINMENT r
INSIDE OUTSIDE h IRFOM T. B.
L I
IRFOOI %
IRFOO2 Q
S S
M I RFSIMC
/c-
%3)
-1 m
/\\
DRYWE L L FLOOR DRAIN SUMP I.V.
1.V.
\\;;hi FLOW T V-l
[$IRF050
=
JL DRAIN b
T.c 5E d.
m
?N O'
F r-
=
92
- i
^8 n
h y y S
g N
i x
NOTE:
Test pressure.is not in the same g3 3
- [o direction as the pressure existincJ x
m m O
when the valve is required to kk
={
Q required by Appendix "J"
to perform its safety function as g>
33 wm E
E "3
g$
gg
{=
5 g
-9 38 MN
I. V.-ISOL ATIO N VALVE T. B.-T E ST BOUNDARY PE N E TR ATION M-51 T. C.-TEST CONNECTION M 2 T. V.-TEST VENT CYCLED CONDENSATE PRIMARY CONTAINMEN T INSIDE OUTSIDE R T. C/T.V.
R T. V.
ICYO53 ICY 052 k
x 4
,e ICYO47 ICYO46 I CYO 45 T.V.
ICYO 51 2
ll T, C. [
>4
^
A CONDENSATE L C.
L.C.
T. B.
m n PUMPS N5 38 i. V.
ICYO54
- 1. V.
yA y
+ FLEX HOSE 2 _4 o
,=
t_j
$g p ll E[,
T. V.
a m
~ $;
m
- a o
mo
-i
- U s
>=
Q bE
_4 b
g S4 -G OD C
- 8
I.V.-IS OL ATION VALVE T. B.-T E ST BOUNDARY COM BUSTABLE T. C.-TE ST CONN EC TION T. V.-T E ST V E NT GAS CONTROL PENETRATION M - 54 P RIMA RY M - 74, F - 8 CONTAINMENT INSIDE OUTSIDE IT49FOO2 A IN TAKE IT49 FOOL M.O.
D001 -14 A C
g T. B.
5 FLOW T. 8-I V-
- S N -~
z c
x IT49FOO2 B A
3E M.O.
M.O.
i r o
E T. B.
DI D4 m n Rs i. v.
E
- P t4
-m m 4 M Nt r4 o s
IT49F3OO a,2 y.
U T.V.
- S P o
L_l J T. C.
g i:
m M. O. DOOI-14 B EL 4.
A*
i.s 8
E is IHGCO8 RM 2
d
- z e'
E 85 E
42 f
- 9 08
PENE TR ATION M - 56 M -57 C-2/3 I. V.-IS O L ATIO N VALVE STAND-BY LIQUID
- 1. v~
T. B.-TE ST BOUNDARY P RIM A RY f
IC4tFO21 T. C--TEST CONNECTION CONTAINMENT T. V.-TEST VE N T INSIDE OUTSIDE a
IC41FOl7 m
m F
T. 8.
CAUTION
}lC41FOl6 T. V.
IC41FOO4A IC41FC 03A IC 41FO27 yq X
l. V.
T. B.
IC 41F026 I C41FOO8 IC41FOO7 IC4lFOO6 IC4 Fhs4 L.O.
- 1. V.
' ' ~
FLOW g
T.B.
e r
b IC41F305 IC4 tF303
}
T. B.
z g
J L IC41F025 u
ji m
r o
o ey IC4IF304 CAUTION T. B.
E2 IC4lF306 8
E L
I4 M
va yA 2E N
1.V ICAIFOO4B I C4lFOO3 B U
hlC41F020
~~
$[ $ !y mg r a
T. C.
- a
(_n IC41FOl4 a
m wm g
IC41FOl9 5
IC4tFOIO m
o IC4tF302
-9 c
m
-Cx3 N
T B-l IC41FOO9
I. V.-IS OL ATION VALVE T. B.-TE ST BOUNDARY PE NETR ATION M -70 T. C.- TE ST CONNECTION (M 1)
T. V.- TEST VENT DRYWELL INST. SUPP i4 PRIMARY
/
CONTAINMENT INSIDE
'CUTSIDE
/
T. V.
R CIC.
M IIN 06i FLOW M.O.
IINO87 IE5lF066 AIR II N 0 6 3 T. B.
'A
/
W AFTER RLTER I
V.
IINO74 x
II N 0 5 7
/
IIN126 M
1 j
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!E
\\lE12F04l A T.C.
n "9
/
LJ r-m m RE i8 j [IIN156 g"
gr, 3A 2E T. V.
'lIN108
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- 3 L_J aa S ;g R
=.,
o m a=
u N
a Ch "I
- a2 E
- 2. a 8:5 45 z
a o
L a
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Appendix "J"
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TYPICAL INSTRUMENT PENETRATION El TO I-80 EXCEPT AS NOTED F RIM ARY CONTAINMENT INSIDE OUTS 1DF I
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PRIMARY CONT.
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to 10CFR50.
P ENETRATION 1 -18 I-22 ADS.& M.S. IS0. VALVE ACCUMULATION PENET RATION P
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[ACCUMUL ATOR ]
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REACTOR IB 33F059 l
PROCESS A
SAMPLE M
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[
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- w "J"
to 10CFR50.
"o
PLANT ZIMMER UNIT (S) 1 DESIGN REQUIREMENTS FOR CONTAINMENT ISOLATION BARRIERS Ouestion:
Discuss the extent to which the quality standards and seismic design classification of the containment isolation provisions follow the recommendations of Regulatory Guides 1.26, " Quality Group Classifications and Standards for Water, steam, and Radioactive-Water-Containing Components of Nuclear Power Plants",
and 1.29, " Seismic Design Classification".
Resconse:
The Zimmer FSAR does not contain a response to Regulatory Guide 1.26.
Page 6,2-43 of the Zimmer FSAR indicates that we have designed to ASME Section III, Class B or better.
All penetrations have been designed to Seismic Categroy 1 in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.29.
1371 070
PLANT ZIMMER UNIT (S) 1 PROVISIONS FOR TESTING Ouestion:
Discuss the design provisions for testing the operability of the isolation valves.
Resconse:
The design provisions for testing the operability of Isolations Valves are discussed in FSAR Sections 6.2.4, 6.2.1.4.1.2, 5.2.1.7 and associated tables.. Additional information contained in the FSAR Sections dealing with General Criteria 55, 56, and 57 have also been included for clarity purposes.
In general, the Isolation Valves undergo testing during construction, preoperational test program, in-service test program, and plant outages.
The valves are designed and located such that this testing is possible with a high level of reliability.
The design uses redundancy in equipment and control, administrative controls, and proven industry test programs to maintain this reliability level.
1371 071
s REVISION 2 ZPS-1 NOVEMBER 1975 6.2.4 Primary Containment Isolation System l2 6.2.4.1 Design Bases 6.2.4.1.1 Safety Design Bases a.
Primary containment isolation valves shall provide the l2 necessary isolation of the primary containment in the event of accidents or other conditions when the free release of primary containment contents cannot be permitted.
l2 b.
The design of isolation valving for lines penetrating the primary containment shall follow the requirements of General l2 Design Criteria 54 through 57 or be designed on some other basis consistent with safety and reliability, c.
Isolation valving for instrument lines which penetrate the primary containment shall conform to the requirements of l2 Regulatory Guide 1.11.
d.
Isolation valves, actuators, and controls shall be protected against loss of safety function by missiles, e.
Design of the primary containment isolation valves and f2 associated piping and penetrations shall be Seismic Cate-gory I.
f.
Primary containment isolation valves and associated piping l2 and penetrations shall meet the requirements of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section II, Classes 1 or 2, as applicable.
g.
Nuclear steam supply isolation valve closure speeds limit radiological effects from exceeding guidelines values estab-lished by 10 CFR 100.
The primary objective of the primary containment isolation systems is l2 to provide protection against releases of radioactive materials to the environment as a result of accidents occurring to the nuclear boiler system, auxiliary systems and support systems. This objective is accomplished by automatic isolation of appropriate lines that penetrate the primary containment vessel. Actuation of the primary containment l2 isolation systems is automatically initiated at specific limits defined for reactor plant operation and af ter the isolation function is initia-ted, it goes to completion.
The primary containment isolation systems, in general, close tho se fluid lines penetrating primary containment that support systems not l2 required for emergency operation. Those fluid lines penetrating primary containment and which support engineered safety feature systems have remote manual isolation valves which may be closed from the control room, if required.
1371 072 6.2-43
N REVISION 2 ZPS-1 NOVEMBER 1975 The isolation criteria for the determination of the quantity and res-pective locations of isolation valves for a particular syst.em conform to the General Design Criteria 54, 55, 56, 57, and Regulatory Guide 1.11.
Redundancy and physical separation are required in the elec-trical and mechanical design to ensure that no single failure in the primary containment isolation system prevents the system from perform-l2 ing its intended functions.
Protection of the primary containment isolation system components from l2 missiles is considered in the design, as well as the integrity of these components to withstand seismic occurrences without loss of cpataoility.
The isolation system is designed to Seismic Category I.
Classification of equipment and systems is found in Table 3.2-1.
Actuation of the primery containment isolation systems is initiated by l2 the signals listed in Table 6.2-7.
The criteria for the design of the primary containment and reactor l2 vessel isolation control system are listed in Subsection 7.1.2.1.2.1.1.
The bases for assigning certain signals for primary containment isola-l2 tion are listed and explained in Subsections 7.3.1.1.2.3, 7.6.1.3.6, 7.6.1.6.5, and 7.6.1.6.7.
On signals of high drywell pressure or low water level in the reactor vessel, all isolation valves that are part of systems not required for emergency shutdown of the plant are closed.
The same signals will initiate the operation of systems associated with the emergency core cooling system. The isolation valves which are part of the ECCS may be closed remote manually from the control room or close automstically, as appropriate.
Instrument lines that penetrate the primary containment will conform to l2 Regulatory Guide 1.11, and General Design Criteria 55 and 56.
6.2.4.2 Svstem Design The general criteria governing the design of the primary containment l2 isolation systems is provided in Subsections 3.1.2 and 6.2.4.1.
Tables 6.2-7 and 6.2-8 summarize the primary containment penetrations and con-l2 tain information as to:
a.
Open or closed status under normal operating conditions and accident situations.
b.
The primary and secondary modes of actuation provided for isolation valves.
c.
The parameters sensed to initiate isolation valve closure.
d.
The closure time and sequence of timing for principal iso-lation valves to secure primary containment isolation.
l2 i ')l \\
6.2-44
9 REVISION 2 ZPS-1 NOVENBER 1975 e.
Applicable General Design Criteria.
Protection is provided for isolation valves, actuators, and controls against damage from missiles. All potential sources of missiles are evaluated. Where possible hazards exist, protection is afforded by separation, missile shields, or by location.
Isolation valves are designed to be operable under the most adverse environmental conditions such as operation under maximum differential pressures, extreme seismic occurrences, steam laden atmosphere, high temperature, and high hunidity. Electrical redundancy is provided for power operated valves. Power for the actuation of two isolation valves in a line (inside and outside cf primary containment) is supplied by l2 two redundant, independent power sources without cross ties.
In general, outboard isolation valves receive power from the Division 1 power supply while isolation valves within primary containment receive l2 power from the Division 2 power supply.
In general, the supply is a-c for Division 2 valves and d-c for Division 1 valves depending upon the system under consideration.
The main steamline isolation valves are spring loaded, pneumatic, piston operated globe valves designed to fail closed on less of pneumatic pres-sure or loss of power to the solenoid-operated pilot valves.
Each valve has two independent pilot valves supplied from independent power sources. Each main steamline isolation valve has an air accumulator to assist in its closure upon loss of air supply, loss of electrical power to the pilot valves, and/or failure of the loaded spring. The separate and independent action of either air pressure or spring force is capable of closing an isolation valve.
It should be noted that all motor operated isolation valves remain in their last position upon failure of valve power. On the other hand, all air operated valves, (not applicable to air-testable check valves),
close on loss of air.
The design of the isolation valve system includes consideration to the possible adverse effects of sudden isolation valve closure when the plant systems are functioning under normal operation.
6.2.4.3 Design Evaluation 6.2.4.3.1 Introduction The main objective of the primary containment isolation system is to l2 provide protection by preventing releases to the environment of radio-active materials. This is accomplished by complete isolation of system lines penetrating the primary containment.
Redundancy is provided in all design aspects to satisfy the requirement that any active failure of a single valve or component does not prevent primary containment l2 isolation.
371 074 6.2-45
ZPS-1 REVISION 26 MAY 1977 Mechanical components are redundant, such as isolation valve arrange-ments to provide back-up in the event of accident conditions.
Isola-tion valve arrangements satisfy all requirements specified in General Design Criteria 54, 55, 56, and 57, and Regulatory Guide 1.11.
The arrangements with appropriate instrumentation are described in Tables 6.2-8 and 6.2-9.
The isolation valves have redundancy in the mode of 4
actuation with the primary mode being automatic and the secondary mode being remote manual. A program of testing, described in Subsection 6.2.4.4, is maintained to ensure valve operability and leaktightness.
The bases for conformance to the NRC criteria and the General Design Criteria are summarized in Subsection 6.2.4.3.2 and Table 6.2-10.
26 The design specifications require each isolation valve to be operable under the most severe operating conditions that it might experience.
Each isolation valve is afforded protection by separation and/or adequate barriers from the consequences of potential missiles.
Electrical redundancy is provided in isolation valve arrangements which eliminates dependency on one power source to attain isolation. Elec-trical cables for isolation valves in the same line have been routed separately. Cables have been selected and based on the specific environment to which they may be subjected, such as magnetic fields, high radiation, high temperature, and high humidity.
Provisions for administrative control and/or locks ensure that the position of all nonpowered isolation valves is maintained and known.
For a.1 power operated valves the position is indicated in the main contral room. Discussion of instrumentation and controls for the isolation valves is included in Chapter 7.0.
6.2.4.3.2 Evaluation against NRC Criteria 6.2.4.3.2.1 Evaluation against Criterion 55 The reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB) as defined in 10 CFR 50, Section 50.2(v) consists of the reactor pressure vessel, pressure retaining appurtenances attached to the vessel, valves and pipes which extend from the reactor pressure vessel up to and including the outer-most isolation valve. The lines of the reactor coolant pressure bound-ary which penetrate the primary containment are capable of isolating the primary containment, thereby precluding any significant release of 2
radioactivity. Similarly, for lines which do not penetrate the primary containment but which form a portion of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, the design ensures that isolation from the reactor coolant pressure boundary can be achieved.
6.2.4.3.2.1.1 Influent Lines Influent lines which penetrate the primary containment and connect directly to the RCPB are equipped with at least two isolation valves, one inside the drywell, and the other as close to the external side of the primary containment as practical. Protection of the environment is l2 provided by these isolation valves.
i371 075 6.2-46
ZPS-1 REVISION 39 JANUARY 1978 Tables 6.2-8 and 6.2-9 contain those influent pipes that comprise the l4 reactor coolant pressure boundary and penetrate the primary containment.
6.2.4.3.2.1.1.1 Feedwater Line The feedwater line is part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary as it penetrates the drywell to connect with the reactor pressure vessel.
It has three isolation valves. The isolation valve inside the drywell is a y-pattern check valve, located as close as practicable to t he primary containment wall. Outside the primary containment is a tother y-pattern check valve located as close as practicable to the primary containment wall and farther away from the primary containment is a l2 i
motor operated gate valve. Should a break occur in the feedwater line, the check valves prevent significant loss of reactor coolant inventory and offer immediate primary containment isolation. During the postu-l2 laced loss-of-coolant accident, it is desirable to maintain reactor coolant makeup from all sources of supply. For this reason, the outer-most valve does not automatically isolate upon signal from the protec-tion system, However, this valve will be procedurally controlled and will be remotely closed from the control room to provide long-term leakage protection after 20 minutes of a postulated loss-of-coolant accident. All valves meet the primary containment leak rate criteria using air as the testing medium.
(See Table 6.2-10, Penetrations M-5 and -6, for more information.)
The ZPS-1 feedwater cbutainment isolation valves are plug type, y-pattern check valves similar to Figure 6.'2-51.
In addition to meeting the ser-39 vice requirements for normal plant operation, the valves are designed to withstand the reverse flow due to a feedwater line rupture outside con-tainment and also to maintain low leakage characteristics with low con-tainment backpressure.
The plug type, y-pattern, check design has been specially designed for 26 this application to meet the large variation in conditions as well as to address operating problems associated with containment leak testing.
The ZPS-1 valve design with the plug inclined to the vertical signifi-cantly improves the closing and the shutoff requirements as compared to a simple swing check valve. Whereas a swing check requires reverse flow or significant backpressure to position and properly seat the dise due to its horizontal seating characteristics, the plug type check utilizes the weight of the plug to seat properly. Any backpressure provides greater seating force and leaktightness.
6.2.4.3.2.1.1.2 HPCS Line The HPCS line penetrates the drywell to inject directly into the reactor pressure vessel. Isolation is provided by an air testable check valve and closed remote manual globe valve located inside the drywell with l 26 position indicated in the main control room, and a remote-manually actuated gate valve located as close as practicable to the exterior wall of the primary containment. The system is also a closed system outside the 39 containment. Long term leakage control is maintained by the outboard gate valve.
If a loss-of-coolant accident occurred, this gate valve 26 6.2-47
ZPS-1 REVISION 57 APRIL 1979 t,ald rec:ive an automatic signal to open and provide core cooling.
The bypass valve is interlocked with the check valve and is used to equalize the pressure across the check valve to permit testing of the 26 check valve during normal plant operation.
(Also see Table 6.2-10, Penetration M-16, for more information.)
6.2.4.3.2.1.1.3 LPCI and LPCS Lines Satisfaction of isolation criteria for the LPCI and the LPCS system is accomplished by use of remote-manually operated gate valves, air testable 39 check valves, and a closed system outside of the containment. Both types of valves are normally closed with the gate valves receiving an sutomatic signal to open at the appropraite time to assure that acceptable fuel design limits are not exceeded in the event of a loss-of-coolant accident.
The air testable check valves with remote manual bypass globe valves are located as close as practicable to the RPV. The normally closed check 26 valves protect against primary containment pressurization in the event of pipe rupture between the check valve and primary containment. Once the 126 system is in oper. scion, the low energy of the influent fluid (185* F 2
maximum) excludes any possibility of primary containment overpressurization should a break occur. The bypass valves are interlocked with the check valve to permit testing the check valves during plant operation. The globe 26 valves automatically close upon completion of the test.
(Also see Table 6.2-10, Penetrations M-ll, -12, -13, and -15, for more information.)
6.2.4.3.2.1.1.4 Control Rod Drive Lines The control rod drive system, located between the reactor vessel and primary containment, has three influent lines; the supply line that penetrates the primary containment and injects into the reactor pressure vessel and the insert and withdraw lines that penetrate the drywell.
The line which injects into the reactor vessel from the control rod drive system has three isolation valves.
In addition to a simple check valve inside the drywell and a check valve outside the drywell, a normally closed motor-operated gate valve functions as a third isolation 37 valve. All valves will meet the primary containment leak rate criteria using air as the testing medium.
The CRD insert and withdraw lines are not part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary since they do not directly communicate with the reactor coolant.
The classification of these lines is quality group B, and they are therefore designed in accordance with ASME Section III, Class 2.
The basis to which the CRD insert and withdraw lines are designed is commensurate with the safety importance of maintaining pressure integrity of these lines.
1371 077 6.2-48
- PS-1 REVISION 26 MAY 1977 lhe control rod drive insert and withdraw lines can be isolated by the solenoid valves outside the primary containment. These lines that extend outside the primary containment are small, and terminate in a system that is designed to prevent out-leakage. Solenoid valves nor-mally are closed, but open on rod movement and during reactor scram.
In addition, a ball check valve located in the control rod drive flange housing automatically seals the insert line in the event of a break.
Primary containment overpressurization will not result from a line break in the primary containment since these lines contain small volumes l 2 at low energy levels.
(Also see Table 6.2-10, Penetration M-14, for b6
~
more information.)
I 6.2.4.3.2.1.1.5 RHR and RCIC Lines The RHR head spray and RCIC lines meet outside the primary containment l2 to form a common line which penetrates the drywell and discharge di-rectly into the reactor pressure vessel. The testable check valve and bypass globe valve inside the drywell are normally closed and have posi-tion indication lights in the main control room to verify their position.
26 The testable check valve is located as close as practicable to the reac-cor pressure vessel. Two types of valves, a check valve and a remote anual tJock valve, are located outside the primary containment. The check valve assures immediate isolation of the primary containment in l2 the event of a line break. The block valve on the RER line receives an automatic isolation signal while the block valve on the RCIC line is remote manually actuated to provide long-term leakage control. The in-board bypass globe valve is interlocked with the check valve and is used to equalize the pressure across the check valve to permit testing 26 of the check valve during normal plant operation.
(Also see Table 6.2-10, Penetration M-10, for more information.)
6.2.4.3.2.1.1.6 Standbv Liquid Control System Lines The standby liquid control system line penetrates the drywell and con-nects to the reactor pressure vessel. In addition to a simple check valve inside the dryvell, a check valve together with an explosive actuated valve are located outside the drywell. Since the standby liquid control line is a normally closed, nonflowing line, rupture of this line is extremely remote. The explosive actuated valve, though, functions as a third isolation valve. This valve provides an absolute seal for long term leakage control as well as preventing leakage of sodium pentaborate into the reactor pressure vessel during normal reactor operation.
6.2.4.3.2.1.1.7 Reactor Water Cleanup System l2 The reactor water cleanup (RWCU) pumps, heat exchangers, and filter demineralizers are located outside the primary containment. The return line frem the filter demineralizers connects to the feedwater line out-side the primary containment between the primary containment wall and the outside primary containment feedwater check valve. Isolation of this l2 line is provided by the feedwater system check valve inside the primary containment and a check valve and motor-operated gate valve outside the primary containment. The motor-operated gate valve functions as a l2 third isolation valve.
6.2-49 137 078
ZPS-1 REVISION 26 MAY 1977 Should a break occur in the reactor water cleanup return line, the check valves would prevent significant loss of inventory and offer immediate isolz. tion, while the outermost isolation valve would provide long term 4
leakage control. The motor-operated gate valve closes automatically upon receipt of an isolation signal.
[12 6.2.4.3.2.1.1.8 Recirculation Pumo Seal Water Supoly Line The recirculation pump seal water line extends from the recirculation pump through the drywell and connects to the CRD supp1f line outside the primary containment. The seal water line forms a part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, therefore the consequences of failing this line has been evaluated. This evaluation shows that the consequences of breaking this line is less severe than that of failing an instrument line. The recirculation pump sea. water line is 3/4 in. Class B from the recirculation pump through the second check valve (located outside the primary containment). From this valve to the CRD connection, the l2 line is Class D.
Should this line be postulated to fail and either one of the check valves is assumed not to close (single active failure),
the flow rate through the broken line has been calculated to be sub-stantially less than that permitted for a broken instrument line.
Therefore, the two check valves in series provide sufficient isolation capability for postulated failure of this line.
6.2.4.3.2.1.2 Effluent Lines Effluent lines which form part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary and penetrate primary containment are equipped with at least two isola-l2 tion valves; one inside the drywell and the other outside and located as close to the primary containment as practicable or justified on an alternative basis.
26 Tables 6.2-8 and 6.2-9 also contain those effluent lines that comprise l4 the reactor coolant pressure boundary and which penetrate the primary l2 containment.
6.2.4.3.2.1.2.1 Main Steam and RHR Shutdown Cooling Lines The main steamlines extend from the reactor pressure vessel to the main turbine and condenser system, penetrating the primary containment. The RHR steam supply line and RCIC turbine steamline connect to the main steamline inside the drywell and penetrate the primary containment. For these lines, isolation is provided by.utomatically actuated gate valves, one inside the primary containment and one just outside the primary con-tainment. The RCIC steamline is also provided with a normally closed remote manual globe valve which bypasses the inboard isolation valve for heatup purposes. The RHR shutdown cooling effluent line is pro-26 vided with automatically actuated gate valves.
(Also see Table 6.2-10, Penetration M-18, for more information.)
2 6.2.4.3.2.1.2.2 Recirculation System Samole Lines A sample line from the recirculation system penetrates the drywell. The sample line is 3/A-in. diameter and designed to ASME Section III, Class 2.
6.2-50 1371 079
ZPS-1
^
REVISION 26 MAY 1977 A sample probe with a 1/8-in.-diameter hole is located inside the recirculation line inside the drywell. In the event of a line break, the probe acts as a restricting orifice and limits the escaping fluid.
Two air-operated valves which fail closed are provided, one inside and one outside the primary containment.
l2 6.2.4.3.2.1.3 Summary In order to assure protection against the consequences of accidents in-volving the release of radioactive material, pipes which form the reactor coolant pressure boundary have 'veen shown aoove and in Table 6.2-10 to provide adequate isolation capabilities and conformance to General
- Design Criterion 55 and Section 6.2.4 of the Standard Review Plan. In 26 all cases, a minimum of two barriers were shown to protect against the release of radioactive materials.
In addition to meeting the isolation requirements stated in Criterion 55, the pressure-retaining components which comprise the reactor coolant pressure boundary are designed to meet other appropriate requirements which miMmf ze the probability or consequences of an accident rupture.
The quality requirements for these components ensure that they are de-signed, fabricated, and tested to the highest quality standards of all reactor plant components. The classification of components which com-prise the reactor coolant pressure boundary are designed in accordance with the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III, Class 1.
It is, therefore, concluded that the design of piping systems which comprise the reactor coolant pressure boundary and penetrate primary l2
- containment satisfies Criterion 55. For further discussion, see the following subsections of the FSAR:
a.
Quality Group Classification Diagram, Table 3.2-1.
b.
Primary Containment and Reactor Vessel Isolation Control System - Section 7.3.
6.2.4.3.2.2 Evaluation Against Criterion 56 Criterion 56 requires that lines which penetrate the primary containment and communicate with the primary containment interior must have two isolation valves; one inside the primary containment, and one outside 2
unless it can be demonstrated that the primary containment isolation provisions for a specific class of lines are acceptable on some other basis.
Tables 6.2-8 and 6.2-9 include those lines that penetrate the primary 14 containment and connect to the drywell and suppression chamber.
Table 6.2-10 provides additional information for demonstrating conformance to General Design Criterion 56 and Standard Review Plan 6.2.4 or provides 26 justification for demonstrating adequate isolation provisions.on some other defined basis.
1371 080 6.2-51
ZPS-1 REVISION 28 JULY 1977 6.2.4.3.2.2.1 Influent Lines to Suppression Pool 6.2.4.3.2.2.1.1 LPCS, HPCS, and RHR Test Lines The LPCS, HPCS, and RER test lines have test isolation capabilities commensurate with the importance to safety of isolating these lines.
Each line has a normally closed motor-operated valve located outside the h
primary containment. Primary containment isolation requirements are met l 2 on the basis that the test lines are low-pressure lines constructed to the same quality standards as the primary containment. Furthermore, the l 2 systems are Quality Group B. Seismic Category I, and meet the require-ments of Section 6.2.4 of the Standard Review Plan for closed systems.
26 The isolation valves are also located in a leakage controlled area served by the SGTS. Remote manual isolation can be accomplished from the main control room.
The test return lines are also used for suppression chamber return flow during other modes of operation which are ESF-related. In this manner l26 the number of penetrations are reduced, minimizing the potential path-ways for radioactive material release. Typically, pump
4n4="
flow bypass lines join the respective test return lines downstream of the test return isolation valv9. The bypass lines are isolated by automatic motor-operated valvea with a restricting orifice downstream of the motor-26 operated valve.
(Also see Table 6.2-10, Penetrations M-44, -46, -47, and -98 for more information.)
6.2.4.3.2.2.1.2 RCIC Turbine Exhaust and Vacuum Pump Discharge and Pump Minimum Flow Bypass These lines which penetrate the primary containment and connect to the suppression chamber below water are equipped with a normally open or normally closed motor-operated, remote manually actuated gate valve 2
located as close to the primary containment as possible. In addition, there is a simple check valve upstream of the gate valve which provides positive actuation for immediate isolation in the event of a break up-stream of this valve. The gate valve in the RCIC turbine exhaust is designed to be open and interlocked to preclude opening of the inlet steam valve to the turbine while the turbine exhaust valve is not in a full open position. The RCIC vacuum pump discharge line is also normally open. All piping and valves are located in a leakage controlled area, and the RCIC equipment areas are monitored for leak detection on 26 high temperature. The RCIC pump minimum flow bypass line is isolated by a normally closed valve with a check valve installed upstream. The valve is capable of being closed remote manually from the control room in addition to its automatic operation for minimum flow bypass.
(Also l2 see Table 6.2-10, Penetrations M-39, -40, and -42 for more information.)
6.2.4.3.2.2.1.3 RHR Reat Exchanger Vent Lines The RHR heat exchanger vent lines discharge to the suppression chamber via relief valve discharge lines and are provided with two normally closed remotely controlled motor-operated globe valves. The relief 26 s
discharge lines are isolated by the relief valves themselves. The 1371 081 6.2-52
ZPS-1 REVISION 26 MAY 1977
' addition of block valves to the relief valve discharge line would defeat the purpose for which the relief valves are installed and is not per-mitted by ASME Section III.
(See Table 6.2-10, Penetrations M-79 and 26
-97, for more information.)
6.2.4.3.2.2.2 Effluent Lines from Suppression Chamber 6.2.4.3.2.2.2.1 RHR, RCIC, LPCS, and HPCS Suction Lines These valves are motor-operated, remote manually operated gate valves which provide assurance of isolating these lines in the event of a break and also provide long-term leakage control. In addition, the suction piping from the suppression chamber is considered an extension of primary containment since it must be available for long-term usage l2 following a design basis loss-of-coolant accident, and as such, is de-signed to the same quality standards as the primary containment. Thus, l 2 the need for additional isolation is obviated by providing a high quality l26 system. The ECCS discharge line fill system (ECCS waterleg pumps) takes suction from the respective ECCS pump effluent line from the suppression pool downstream of the isolation valve. The ECCS discharge line fill system suction line has a manual valve for operational pur-poses. This system as isolated from the primary containment by the l2 respective ECCS pump suction valve from suppression pool as listed in Tables 6.2-8 and 6.2-9.
(For additional information, see Table 6.2-10, l 4 26 Penetrations M-34, -35, -36, -37, -38 and -41.)
6.2.4.3.2.2.3 Influent and Effluent Lines from Drywell and Suppression Pool Air Volume 6.2.4.3.2.2.3.1 Combustible Gas Control and Post-LOCA Atmosphere Samoling Lines Thepost-LOCAsamplingsystemlineswhichpenetratetheprimarycontaind2 ment and connect to the drywell and suppression chamber air volume are equipped with two normally closed, solenoid operated isolation valves in series located as close to the primary containment as possible.
l2 The combustible gas control system lines which penetrate the primary containment are equipped with two motor-operated valves in parallel, normally closed, remote manually actuated from the control room. Addi-tional isolation valves would reduce the capability of this ESF system to perform its safety function.
26 In addition, the piping outside containment forms a closed system and is considered an extension of primary containment, since it must be l2 available for long-term usage following a design-basis loss-of-coolant accident, and, as such, is designed to the same quality standards as the primary containment, including Standard Review Plan 6.2.4.
- Thus, the need for additional isolation provision is obviated.
(Also see Table 6.2-10, Penetrations M-54 and -104, for more information.)
6.2.4.3.2.2.3.2 Primary Containment Purge and Primarv Containment Drain Lines 2
The drywell and suppression chamber purge and primary containment drain lines have isolation capabilities commensurate with the importance to l 26 6.2-53
!3[}
Q@2
ZPS-1 REVISION 26 MAY 1977 safety of isolating these lines. Each line has two normally closed air to open, spring to close, valves located outside the primary contain-ment. Primary containment isolation requirements are met on the basis l2 that the purge and drain lines are normally closed, low-pressure lines constructed to the same quality standards as the primary containment.
12 The isolation valves for the purge lines are designed to be closed from the main control room. These isolation valves are interlocked to pre-clude opening of the valves while a primary containment 1 solation signal l2 exists as noted in Tables 6.2-8 and 6.2-9.
Furthermore, the drain valves 4 are located'in a leakage controlled area outside containment to preclude exposing the valves to suppression pool atmo.aphere and associated hydro-26 dynamic loads.
(See Table 6.2-10, Penetrations M-49, -50, -101, -102,
-103 and -104 for more information.)
6.2.4.3.2.2.3.3 Drvwell and Suppression Chamber Air Sampling Lines These air sampling lines branch from the post-LOCA atmosphere sampling lines which penetrate the primary containment. The air sampling lines are used for continuously drawing primary containment air during normal l2 operation as part of the leak detection system. These lines are equipped with two normally open, air to open, spring to close valves in series located as close as possible outside the primary containment. This manner of routing the system piping reduces the number of primary con-l2 tainment penetrations and =4n4=4'es the potential pathways for radio-active material release. In addition, the piping upstream of the air sampling isolation valves is considered an extension of primary con-l2 tainment since it must be available for long-term usage following a design-basis loss-of-coolant accident as part of the post-LOCA atmos-phere sampling system, and as such, is designed and fabricated to the sane quality standards as the primary containment. Primary containment l2 isolation requirements are met on the basis that these lines are low-pressure lines constructed to the same quality standards as the primary containment. Furthermore, the consequences of a break in these lines result in no significant safety consideration.
l3 6.2.4.3.2.2.4 Summary In order to assure protection against the consequences of accidents involving release of significant amounts of radioactive materials, pipes that penetrate the primary containment have been demonstrated above and 26 in Table 6.2-10 to provide irolation capabilities in accordance with Criterion 56 or on an alternative basis. In addition, the isolation provisions have been demonstrated to conform to Section 6.2.4 of the Standard Review Plan.
In addition to meeting isolation requirements, the pressure-retaining components of these systems are designed to the same quality standards as the primary containment.
l2 6.2.4.3.2.3 Evaluation Against Criterion 57 Lines penetrating the primary containment and for which neither Cri-terion 55 nor Criterion 56 govern, comprise the closed system isolation valve group.
6.2-54 37 083
ZPS-1 REVISION 26 MAY 1977
'Both influent and effluent lines are isolated by automatic or remote manual isolation valves located as close as possible to the primary l2 containment boundary.
(Also see Table 6.2-10, Penetrations M-9, -23,
-95, -96, -68,
'69, -74, -75, -76 and -77 for more information.)
26 6.2.4.3.2.3.1 Evaluation Against Regulatory Guide 1.11 Instrument lines which penetrate the primary containment from the reac-l2 tor coolant pressure boundary conform to Regulatory Guide 1.11 in that they are equipped with a restricting orifice located inside the drywell and an excess flow check valve located outside and as close as prac-ticable to the primary containment. Those instrument lines which do l2 not connect to the reactor coolant pressure boundary also conform to l26 Regulatory Guide 1.11 in that they are equipped with isolation valves whose status will be indicated in the control room.
6.2.4.3.3 Evaluation of Single Failure A single failure can be defined as a failure of some component in any safety system which results in a loss or degradation of the system's capability to perform its safety function. Active components are de-fined in Regulatory Guide 1.48 as components that must perform a mechanical motion during the course of accomplishing a system safety function. Appendix A to 10 CFR 30 requires that electrical systems also be designed against passive single failures as well as active single failures. Chapter 3.0 describes the implementation of these standards as well as General Design Criteria 17, 21, 35, 38, 41, 44, 54, 55, and 56.
In single failure analysis of electrical systems, no distinction is made between mechanically active or passive components; all fluid system components such as valves are considered " electrically active" whether or not " mechanical" action is required.
Electrical systems as well as mechanical systems are designed to meet the single failure criterion for both mechanically active and passive fluid system components regardless of whether that component is re-quired to perform a safety action in the nuclear safety operational analysis outlined in Appendix B.
Even though a component such as an electrically operated valve is not designed to receive a signal to change state (open or closed) in a safety scheme, it is assumed as a single failure that the system component changes state or fails.
Electrically operated valves include valves that are electrically piloted but air operated as we]1 as valves that are directly operated by an electrical device. In addition, all electrically operated valves that are automatically actuated also can be manually actuated from the main control room. Therefore, a single failure in any electrical sys-tem is analyzed regardless of whether the loss of a safety function is caused by a component failing to perform a requisite mechanical motion or a component performing an unnecessary mechanical motion.
6.2.4.4 Tests and Inspections The primary containment isolation system is scheduled to undergo per-l2 iodic testing during reactor operation. The functional capabilities 6.2-55 1371 084
ZPS-1 REVISION 26 MAY 1977
~ f power-operated isolation valves are tested remote manually from the o
main control room. By observing position indicators and changes in the affected system operation, the closing ability of a particular isolation valve is demonstrated.
Air testable check valves are provided on influent emergency core cool-ing lines of the LPCS, HPCS, and RHR systems whose operability
.s relied upon to perform a safety function.
A discussion of testing and inspection pertaining to isolation valves is provided in Subsection 6.2.1.4 and in Chapter 16.0.
Tables 6.2-8 4
and 6.2-9 list all isolation valves and systems to be tested.
- l. 6 2
Instruments will be periodically tested and inspected. Test and/or calibration points will be supplied with each instrument.
Excess flow check valves (EFCV) will be periodically tested by opening a te'st drain valve downstream of the EFCV and verifying pcoper opera-tion. As these valves are outside the primary containment and access-l2 ible, periodic visual inspection is performed in addition te the opera-tional check.
1371 085' 6.2-55a
ZPS-1 REVISION 39 JANUARY 1978 6.2.1.4.1.2 Preoperational Leak Rate Testing After the structural integrity test of the containment has been per-formed, integrated leak rate tests will be performed at the maximum calculated pressure of 40.4 psig. The purpose of this test is to con-firm that the actual containment leak rate is within the design require-ments of 0.5% of the containment volume in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> at 40.4 psig.
The leakage rate test method to be used will be the absolute method.
The absolute merh:J of leakage rate testing shall constitute the determination and calculation of air losses by containment leakage over a stated period of ttne by the means of direct pressure, temperature, and humidity observations during the period of test, with temperature detectors properly located to provide an average air temperature.
l 27 The initial leak rate test will be performed in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J.
Type A tests will be considered acceptable if the total leakage rate does not exceed 75% of the design leakage rate over a 24-hour period.
Prior to the performance of the initial containment leak rate test, the following Type B and. Type C tests of 10 CFR 50, Appandix J, will be performed on the indicated components:
a.
Type B tests:
1.
equipment access hatch, 2.
personnel air lock, 3.
drywell head, 4.
suppression chamber access hatches, 5.
CRD removal hatch, and 6.
electrical penetrations.
30 b.
Type C tests:
Containment isolation valves identified in Table 6.2-8 will be Type "C" leak rate tested. Valves which are tested with air or nitrogen as the test fluid shall be tested in accor-dance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Section III C.2(a).
Valves 39 which are tested using water as the test fluid shall be tested in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Section III C.2(b).
The acceptance criteria of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Section III C.3 shall apply.
See Question Q041.40 for additional infor-mation and the acceptance criteria.
The type B and C tests will be considered acceptable if the combined leakage does not exceed 60% of the design leakage rate over a 24-hour period.
6.2-26
ZPS-1 REVISION 39 JANUARY 1978 6. 2.1. 4.1. 3 Drywell Floor Bypass Leakage Test The preoperational high-and low pressure bypass leakage integrity of 31 the suppression chamber /drywell barrier will be determined by two 27 separate bypass tests. Each test will be conducted at designated times during the construction /preoperational test periods respectively.
The high-pressure bypasr test is performed at a test pressure differ-ential of 16 psid. Acceptance criteria will be the measured leakage corresponding to a flow path of A/VK b.025 ft2 at 16 psid. The low-pressure bypass test is performed at a test pressure differential of 3 psid. Acceptance criteria will be measured leakage corresponding to a flow path'of A/VE k.004 ft2 at 3 psid. The calculated allowable bypass flow rates at 70* F are 2093 cfm for the high-pressure test and 145 cfm for the low-pressure test.
Prior to the suppression V. amber /drywell barrier structural integrity and bypass tests, the downcomers will be sealed by the jet deflection plates.
In addition, a visual inspection of the drywell floor will be performed to uncover any evidence of structural deficiencies which may affect leaktightness.
The high-pressure bypass test will be performed af ter completion of the Containment Structural Integrity Test and Drywall Floor Structural Integrity Test. This high-pressure leak test is a "once in the lifetime of the containment" test and will therefore not be periodically repeated as will the low-pressure bypass test.
The low-pressure bypass test will be performed after completion of the Type "A" contaimment leakage rate test.
The frequency of the periodic low-pressure bypass test will be 27 in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Section III.D.l.
The high-pressure floor bypass test will be conducted during the de-pressurization of the contaimment drywell following the successful com-pletion of the drywell floor loading test (described in Subsection 3.8.3.7).
Drywell pressure will be reduced to 16 psid. The low-pressure bypass test will be conducted upon successful completion of the con-tainment integrated leakage rate (Type "A") test. A 3-psid differential will be created between the drywell and suppression chamber.
The te.st shall consider the following methods either in combination or individually:
a.
Outleakage Flow Test Once test pressure differential is reached, the suppression pool vent will be closed and ficar leakage will be measured by measuring out leakage via a flow rate instrument from the suppression chamber to atmospheric pressure, b.
Inflow Pump Test The downcomers will be sealed at the drywell floor for the high-pressure floor bypass test.
A water seal in the down-comer will be used for the low-pressure bypass test.
The
[
6.2-26a
1 ZPS-1 REVISION 31 AUGUST 1977 A Type B test will be performed on the equipment access hatch, personnel air lock, drywell head, suppression chamber access hatches, and CRD removal hatch as outlined in Section III.D.2 of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J.
The electrical penetrations for ZPS-1 are pressurized containers. These containers are pressurized to P at an ambient temperature of 700 F.
a During all normal and abnormal conditions the pressure in the container will be greater than primary containment pressure. See Subsection 31 8.3.1.11.4 for further information on the electrical penetrations.
The Type B test of the electrical penetrations will be considered satis-factory by performing a review of the quality control log to insure the leaktightness of all the penetrations. The installation requirements for the electrical penetrations require a permanent periodic log of pressure gauge indication beginning with a set of readings at the time of instal-lation and is kept as a lifetime record. Additional inservice testing 31 is performed in accordance with the technical specifications (Subsection 16.3/4.6.1).
In the event that a leak is noted, the installation manual provides re-pair procedures. All penetration leaks will be tested for leak rate before and after repair.
Testing in addition to this program would not aid in determining the leaktightness of the penetrations. Additional active testing could also degrade the physical condition of penetration pressurization 31 provisions, reducing their reliability.
Type C tests will be performed on containment isolation valves as out-lined in Section III.D.3 of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J.
Provisions for periodic leak rate testing of the containment will be provided for Type A, B, and C tests in the following manner:
a.
Type A test 1.
one containment penetration for pressurizing and depres-surizing the containment; 2.
two containment penetrations for instrumentation connec-tions required for the leak rate test; and 3.
provisions inside the containment for installing the required instrumentation.
b.
Type B test 1.
permanent connections outside the containment for leak rate testing all access hatches by pressurizing double gasketed plenums on the closure flange (Figure 3.8-35).
2.
Leak rate testing of the personnel air lock 'will be performed by pressurizing the interior and by pressur-30 izing double-gasketed plenums of both the interior and 6.2-27
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Z?S-1 RI7ISION 38 DECEGER 1977
".L3LI 6.2-3 (Cent'd)
ISOLATION VAC/E
SUMMARY
FOR LDTES PETE'" RATING CONTADTMDIT KIT:
I.C.
Inside Primat7 Conta1==ent 0.C.
Outside Primary Contain=ent 0
Open L.C.
Locked Closed C.
Closed M.0.
Motor Opsrated A.O.
Air Operated S.O.
Solenoid Operated NOTES:
- u:r #2iiima t'f EaEu'd yalves.: cam.b.e o T.
swit'ch.durinsf any modp_cDaaE nr, penedemclosod>by remoca-man $al cpar=Hmescanc.when automatic signaliscpraeg 2.
For signal legend see T&ble 6.2-7.
~
N Wst**?.%Q1.'?*'",T"'3*^%?'9utE*&h.AT.hoth to.'. *M piroco-bw.
' -deenergizek. tat cIs.a..s v.al..ia..s_,J V... ~ =."1 = tar.s... a.i,::.y 11ots are deenerf,e,ss.ure 21gg,mering w.
. pr.
s
..i ace,co,347,g7=y es.Wgen bjt.h 2
,g
.w.7oltagstfail-
-=
ura at.anir one pilot.h,tro?GUsWea h h ;.3 n a v=bror are f== g--
- e Witt$ed. W '~ 7.' ' " 7o62*.'se#mEds?.~ Enc. 23'u~o~c' Iase than 3,,em s. 2.
~., ~. n,-+-~ -, - - - - -- % :.r* %
.. m See-L.Lwi.1co'5 5~$.1 for an pf'tl e.,ETT~C2WGur6 i:r thsefiEM*l i:ritaria. ~The principal cri aric W Td--d
_gi:me is[q-thip. Ihi.RfadfAdM'ahitEiiA~61tYitrduidEG*N
> 10L"h!CG'.~. ' Supsectin' 5+4hwS:3 seconds:.MSITelosura-T 31 3e insatr= o&
f chac~ therSt'iw.rti.mera.: sth.==+.=.
egab== -.*.... '. * ' -.' Q srevi.de. a ssursuce iel'as2nytt"meri:mmte._qba.consegnancaeLolcr.2.st rom exceeding,the W d " --- af.1G_C7K.100.
4.
Deleted.
3a W ALL aemn-age. -~ -.~... ~
..lv..aaJ a== h.. in,J.sse positiotr upon fail-rscadLiaolatie gva M b d.. U N /. M M. TAP 3.=> E._*. t N CIC 1803.y Me~41r fa11ure N
- w - ~,. _.
6.
ha. See d eb;staizus. 1catsg
-s~f%~a'ut *eHLisolacion -valves is
'12 inchee. g:er.mine.:a.fjgenverstetr.. co closing-time ca:: her.=ada. en.his, basis,using, che actual size of' che '11ca in which the valve
.s i:staned.
7~'heon, oparated-valves' reqef'ead~ f at"-iselscierr-funetions are powered f:cm. the.w,_ standby pewar buses. D-e-ocerated isolati:n velves are
- cvsred. from the stati
- n 5atteries.
~
1371 100 s. :-n DM 0 *0%yv.
E
- 1 Jt i _k o ci
ZPS-1 REVISION 54 FEBRUARY 1979 TABLE 6.2-8 (Cont'd) 8.
a.
Containment spray valves are interlocked to prevent both ftom being open at the same time unless the isolation signcis shown are present. This allows containment spray for high drywell pressure conditions. When the automatic signals are not present, these valves may be opened for test or operating convenience.
54 b.
Suppression cooling valves have interlocks to allow them to be opened after automatic closure. This allows for cuppression pool cooling. When the automatic signals are not present these valves may be opened for test or operating convenience.
9.
Criterion 55 concerns those lines of the reactor coolant pres-sure boundary penetrating t'ne primary reactor containment. The control rod drive (CRD) insert and withdraw lines are not part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary.
The basis to which the CRD lines are designed is commensurata with the safety importance of isolating these lines. Since these lines are vital to the scram function, their operability is of utmost concern.
In the design of this system, it has been accepted practice to omit automatic valves for isolation purposes, as this intro-duces a possible failure mechanism. As a means of providing positive actuation, manual sautof f valves (1C11D001-101 and -102) are used. The charging water, drive water and cooling water headers are provided with a check valve (IC11D001-115, -138 and -137) within the hydraulic control unit (HCU), a Seismic Category I 44 module, and the normally closed solenoid valves (IC11D001-120,
-121, -122 and -123).
These valves will prevent any direct flow away from containment. These valves are shown in Figure 4.2-19 (Sheet 2).
If an insert ine fails, a ball check valve provided in each 43 drive is designed to seal off the broken line by using reactor pressure to shift the ball check valve to the upper seat.
This feature also prevents any direct flow away from the primary containment.
A piping integrity test is accomplished for leaks of the HCU's during daily inspection (HCU operating pressure above 1000 psi).
In addition, several indicators in the contrcl room, such as temperature and pressure of CRD cooling water or drywell sump pump operation, would indicate if leakage is excessive. The maxi-mum leakage expected at this penetration is 3 gpm when the RPV is still pressurized (about 1000 psi). This leakage also assumes a single active failure of a check valve inside the HCU. After the reactor vesselsis depressurized, the CRD leakage will de-crease to about 0.5 gpm.
It may also be said that leakage moni-toring of the CRD insert and withdraw lines is provided by the overall type A leakage rate test.
Since the RPV and non-44 seismic portions of the CRD system are vented during the per-formance of the type A test, any leakage from these lines would be included in the total type A test leakage.
01 6.2-95
ZPS-1 REVISION 54 FEBRUARY 1979 TABLE 6.2-8 (Cont'd)
The flowout of the CRD is restricted through the HCU by perfor-mance test requirements to ensure that HCU leakage does not exceed 0.2 gpm.
The maximum leakage expected for these pene-trations is 0.2 gpm per HCU. If a single failure is assumed, the maximum leakage would be 3 gpm. Seismic tests have demon-strated the seal integrity of the CRD system. Maximum laakage following these tests did not exceed 3 gpm.
The system design criteria are as follows:
, Quality Seismic Quality Group Assurance Component Category Classification Classification Valves; return line within containment boundary I
A I
43 Valves; insert and withdraw I
B I
Return line piping within isolation valves I
A I
Insert and withdraw line piping I
B I
The CRD insert and withdraw lines are compatible with the criteria intended by 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, for Type C testing, since the accept-ance criterion for Type C testing allows demonstration of fluid leakage rates by associated bases. The maximum leakage expected has been factored in with the total allowable containment penetration leakege and determined to be acceptable.
10.
Main steamline isolation valves to be type "C" tested in accordance with Subsection 5.5.4.
Leakage is exempt from Appendix J total 31 measured leakage criteria.
11.
Test pressure will be applied between the valves. The total leakage recorded will be assigned to each penetration.
12.
Penetration paths for M-18 and M-24 will be tested sicultaneously.
14 The total leakage recorded will be assigned to each penetration.
13.
Deleted 43 14.
Deleted.
38 15.
Deleted.
- h} \\
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6.2-95a
ZPS-1 REVISION 54 FEBRUARY 1979 TABLE 6.2-8 (Cont'd) 16.
The Zimmer 1 TIP system design specifications require that the maxi-26 mum leakage rate of the ball and shear valves shall be in accordance with the Manufactureres Standardization Society (Hydrostatic Testing of Valves). The ball valves are 100% leak tested to the following criteria by the manufacturer:
Pressure 0 - 62 psig Tempersture 340 F3 Leak Rate 10 cm /s 17 A statistically chosen sample of the shear valves is tested by the manufacturer to the following criteria:
Pressure 0 - 125 psig Temperature 340' F 3
Leak Race 10 cm /sec STP The shear valves have explosive squibs and require testing to destruc-tion. They cannot therefore be 100% tested.
17.
Deleted.
l37 18.
Test pressure is not in the same direction as the pressure existing when the valve is required to perform the safety function as required 16 by Appendix "J" to 10 CFR 50.
19.
Since the traversing incore probe (TIP) system lines do not com-municate freely with the containment atmosphere or the reactor coolant General Design Criteria 55 and 56 are not directly applicable to this specific class of lines. The basis to which these lines are designed is more closely described by General Design Criterion 54, which states in effect that isolation capability of a system should be commensurate with the safety importance of that isolation.
Further-more, even though the failure of the TIP system lines presents no safety consideration, the TIP system has redundant isolation capa-bilities. The safety features have been reviewed by the NRC for BWR/4 (Duane Arnold), BWR/5 (Nine Mile Point) and BWR/6 (GESSAR),
and it was concluded that the design of the containment isolation system meets the objectives and intent of the General Design Crtieria.
43 Isolation is accomplished by a seismically qualified solenoid-operated ball valve, which is normally closed. To ensure isolation capability, an explosive shear valve is installed in each line. Upon receipt of a signal (manually initiated by the operator), this explosive valve will shear the TIP cable and seal the guide tube.
When the TIP system cable is inserted, the ball valve of the selected tube opens automatically so that the probe and cable may advance.
A maximum of four valves may be opened at any one time to conduct calibration, and any one guide tube is used, at most, a few hours per year.
6.2-95b
ZPS-1 REVISION 54 FEBRUARY 1979 (ABLE 6.2-8 (Cont'd)
If closure of the line is required during calibration, a signal causes the cable to be retracted and the ball valve to close auto-natically after completion of cable withdrawal.
If a TIP cable fails to withdraw or a ball valve fails to close, the explosive shear valve is actuated. The ball valve position is indicated in the control room.
As stated above, the penetration is normally closed (oEgn ag/sec.
average of 15 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br /> per month), and the design leak rate is 10 cm If a failure occurred, such as not being able to withdraw the TIP cable, theshearvalvewouldisolatetgepg/sec netration, and the resulting maximum leakage would be 10 cm The shear valves are shop tested by statistical sampling methods to ensure that the -3 legkage limits conform to the design specification limits of 10 43 cm /sec.
Testing of the ball valve is not recommended, since a very small amount of leakage is expected, and any testing would need to be performed from inside the drywell, exposing the operator to radiation dose estimated to be about 50 mR.
These lines should therefore be exempted from the 10 CFR 50 Appendix J Type C tests.
20.
Closed system outside the containment. The inlet isolation valves l 38 will always be pressurized to a higher pressure than the containment pressure. The system is seismic Category I and single-failure-proof.
31 A Seismic Category I water supply for makeup is available for 30 days.
54 The makeup rate into the RBCCW surge tank is established at 300 gpm and therefore provides sufficient fluid inventory to assure 38 the sealing function for at least 30 days at a pressure greater than 1.10 P,.
The RBCCW Class C piping will be subject to the ASME Section XI.
45 Inservice. Inspection Program.
21.
These lines satisfy the requirements of General Design Criterion 54.
They are Seismic Category 1 and terminate in instruments that are Seismic Category 1.
They are provided with manual isolation valves.
38 These lines are connected to the essential ADS accumulators. On loss of the drywell pneumatic system, they are pressurized by the ni-trogen suosystem. These lines will always be pressurized to 165 psig. They terminate in a pressure switch that alarms ar 145 psig.
1371 104 6.2-95c
ZPS-1 REVISTON 43 MAY 1978 TABLE 6.2-8 (Cont'd)
These lines are always under test as they are always pressurized.
Leakage would be detected by either the low-pressure alarm or normal weekly surveillance inspections.
The accumulators are sized such that the ADS valves may be cycled two times without reducing the pressure in these lines to below 50 psig (5 psi above design containment pressure).
22.
To satisfy the requirements of General Design Criterion 55 and system functionality, these instrument lines have been designed to meet the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.11 (Safety Guide 11), Section C.
Regulatory Position, Provisions la, b, c, d, and e; and Provision 2a.
These lines are Seismic Category I and terminate in instruments that are Seismic Category I.
They are provided with restricting orifices, manual isolation valves, and excess flow check valves.
Isolation is provided by the excess flow check valve.
In the event of a line rupture, downstream of the check valve, this valve would close to limit the amount of leakage. The flow-restricting orifice is sized to assure that in the event of a postulated failure of the piping or component, the potential offsite exposure will be substan-tially below the guidelines of 10 CFR 100.
The function of these lines will be tested during reactor plant opera-38 tion. These lines and their associated instruments will be pressurized to reactor operating pressure. Surveillance inspections will be per-formed weekly to ensure the leaktight integrity of these lines and their associated instruments. Additional inservice inspection is included in the Technical Specifications, Section 16.3/4.6.3.
This inservice inspection will verify the function of the excess flow check valves and their leakage rates.
23.
To satisfy the requirements of General Design Criterion 56 and perform their function, these instrument lines have been designed to meet the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.11 (Safety Guide 11), Section C, Regulatory Position, Provisions la, b, c, d, and e; or Provision 2a.
These lines are Seismic Category I and terminate in instruments that are Seismic Category I.
They are provided with manual isolation valves and excess flow check valves.
These lines are located below the suppression pool water level. They would always be flooded during all accident and postaccident phases.
Any leakage from these lines would be water leakage.
The integrity of these lines will be tested during the Type "A" Test.
These lines and their associated instruments will be pressurized to Pa-Surveillance inspections will be performed weekly to ensure the leak-tight integrity of these lines and their associated instruments. Addi-tional inservice inspection is included in the Technical Specifications, 1371 105 143 6.2-95d
ZPS-1 REVISION 43 MAY 1978 TABLE 6.2-8 (Cont'd)
Section 16.3/4.6.3.
This inservice inspection will verify -he function of the excess flow check valves and their leakage rates.
Isolation is provided by the excess flow check valve.
In the event of a line ruprure downstream of the check valve, this valve would close to limit the amount of leakage.
24.
To satisfy the requirements of General Design Criterion 56, and to perform their function, these instrument lines have been designed to meet the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.11 (Safety Guide 11),
Section C, Regulatory Position, Provisions la, b, c, d, and e; and Provision 2a.
These lines are Seismic Category I and terminate in instruments that are Seismic Category I.
They are provided with flow-restricting orifices, manual isolation valves, and excess flow check valves.
The flow-restricting orifice is s'ized to assure that in the event of a postulated failure of the piping or component, the potential offsite exposure will be substantially below the guidelines of 10 CFR 100.
Isolation is provided by the excess flow check valve. In the event of a line rupture downstream of the check valve, this valve would close to limit the amount of leakage.
The integrity of these lines will be tested during the Type "A" Test.
38 Surveillance inspections will be performed weekly to ensure the leak-tight integrity of these lines and their associated instruments.
Additional inservice inspection is included in the Technical Specifi-cations, Section 16.3/4.6.3.
This inservice inspection will verify the function of the excess flow check valves and their leakage rates.
25.
This line is provided with two isolation valves outside the containment.
The inboard valve is a hard-faced check valve, and the outboard valve is an automatic isolation valve. This arrangement meets the intent of General Design Criterion 56.
The piping inside the containment is nonessential. The inboard check valve was located outside the con-tainment to facilitate repair operations and reduce radiation exposure to personnel.
Both the check valve and the automatic isolation valve will be tested with air.
26.
Penetrations 39 nd 40 - RCIC Turbine Exhaust and. Vacuum Pump Discharge Valves Flow paths associated with these valves terminate significantly below the normal water level in the suppression pool. A water seal is assured during normal operation and for more than 30 days following a loss-of-coolant accident. The end of the piping is 4 feet below the lowest water level allowed in the suppression pool.
It is not credible that these isolation valves will be exposed to the containment atmo-sphere at any time following a loss-of-coolant accident.
- 6. 2-95 e (43 1371 106
ZPS-1 REVISION 43 MAY 1978 TABLE 6.2-8 (Cont'd)
The penetration M-39 isolation valves 1E51F068 and IE51F040 will be water leak tested. The test pressure will be applied between the valves, and the total measured leakage will be assigned to that penetration path. Valve IE51F068 (inboard automatic valve) will be reverse tested and valve IE51F040 (outboard check valve) will be tested in the proper direction. Valve 1E51080 (RCIC turbine exhaust vacuum breaker isolation valve) is also part of the M-39 penetration path. This valve will be water tested in the reverse direction. This leakage will be assigned to M-39 penetration path leakage rate. (Notes this valve is a globe valve, and reverse testing will tend to unseat the valve.)
Penetration M-40 isolation valves lE51F069 (automatic isolation) and IE51F028 (outboard check) will be water leak tested. The test pressure will be cpplied between the valves and the total measured leakage will be assigned to that penetration path. Valve IE51F069 (inboard isolation) will be reverse tested, and valve 1E51F028 will be tested in the proper direction.
38 27.
Penetration I-5D and I-21C - Reactor Recirculation Pump Seal Water Lines These lines are high pressure lines coming from the discharge of the CRD pumps to the recirculation pumpa. They are provided with a check valve inside the containmene and a check valve outside.
The inside check valves will be water leak tested during the re-fueling. At this time, the reactor vessel water level will be at the top of the pool (elevation 626 feet 9 inches). The water head will provide a pressure of 1/4 psi on the line to the "A" pump and ~46.5 psi to the "B" pump. The check valves outside the containment will be locally tested with water at 1.10 P,.
28.
Penetrations M-68 and M-69 contain lines for the hydraulic control of the reactor recirculation flow control valve. These lines con-tain corrosive hydraulic fluid used to position the reactor recircu-lation flow control valve.
43 These lines inside of the containment are Seismic Category 1 and have been upgraded to Quality Group B.
They are provided with automatic isolation valves outside the containment which receive an automatic isolation signal on high drywell pressure.
1371 107 6.2-95f
ZPS-1 REVISION 43 MAY 1978 These lines meet the requirement of General Design Criterion 57 and therefore require only single automatic isolation valves outside of the containment.
In addition, these lines also meet the require-ment of Standard Review Plan 6.2.4.
They are desigend to Seismic Category 1, Class B.
They:
do not communicate with either the reactor coolant system -
a.
or the containment atmosphere, b.
are protected against missiles and pipe whip, are designe.d to withstand temperatures at least equal to c.
the containment design temperature, d.
are designed to withstand the external pressure frem the containment structural acceptance test, and are designed to withstand the loss-of-coolant accident e.
transient and environment.
This system is under constant hydrostatic test because the normal operating pressure'is 1800 psig. Any leakage through this system would be noticed because operation would be erratic and indications provided on the hydraulic control unit.
43 In addition, the reactor recirculation flow control valve is located such that the control unit is approximately 20 feet above the valve actuator. The penet ation and isolation valve are therefore at such an eleva: ion that should the valve fail to close there would be a fluid seal between that valve and the valve actuator.
NRC Document for Qualification Raview, Palo Verde Generating Station, Units 1, 2 and 3, Docket Nos. 5-528/529/530 issued December 12, 1977, Section E item 30 n. states as follows:
Locked closed containment isolation valves have not been n.
identified as being subject to type C tests. In addition, the majority of the containment isolation valves that fall under General Design Criterion 57 (closed systems inside containment) have not been identified as being subject to Type C leak testing. Unless it can be demonstrated that the system can withstand a single failure of any active component (e.g., valve failure, pump seal failure) and maintain a fluid seal; i.e., prevent containment atmosphere leakage through the valve (s), it is our position that the valves should be Type C tested. Discuss your plans to Type C test these valves or provide justification for exempting these valves from Type C testing.
For the above penetrations, the only single active failure possible is for an isolation valve not to close. In this case the closed system would remain filled with fluid for the duration of the accident.
6.2-95,
)371 108
ZPS-1 REVISION 43 MAY 1978 Leak detection is provided by the instruments, although non-seismic, on the hydraulic control unit.
In order to perform Type C tests of these lines, the system would have to be disabled and drained of the hydraulic fluid. This is 43 considered to be detrimental to the proper operation of the system in that possible damage could occur in establishing the test con-dicion or restoring the system to normal.
These lines and associated isolation valves should therefore be considered to be exempt from Type C testing.
6.2-95h
TABLE 6.2-9 CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS PRIMARY CONTAINMENT
~
PENETRATION SYSTEM P&lD FSAR FIGURE
- H-1 H-21-1 5.1-4, Sheet 1 5.2-1, Sheet 2 7.3-30, Sheet 1 10.3-1, Sheet 1 H-21-4 5.1-4, Sheet 1 in.1-1, Sheet 4 H-73-2 9.3-8, Sheet 2 H-2 H-21-1 5.1-4, Sheet 1 5.2-1, Sheet 2 7.3-30, Sheet 1 10.3-1. Sheet 1 H-21-4 5.1-4, Sheet i 10.3-1. Sheet 4 H-73-2 9.3-8, Sheet 2 H-3 H-21-1 5.1-4. Sheet 1 5.2-1, Sheet 2 7.3-30, Sheet 1 10.3-1. Sheet 1 M-21-4 5.1-4 Sheet 4 10.3-1, Sheet 4 M-73-2
- 9. 3-8, Shee t 2 y
H-4 H-21-1 5.1-4, Sheet 1 5.2-1, Sheet 2 7.3-30, Sheet 1 10.3-1. Sheet 1 H-21-4 5.1-4, Sheet 4 10.3-1 Sheet 4 34 H-73-2 9.3-8, Sheet 2 H-5 H-23 5.1-5 10.4-4 H-6 H-23 5.1-5 10.4-4 H-55-1 5.5-14, Sheet 1 7.6-3, Sheet 1 H-7 H-21-4 5.1-4, Sheet 4 10.3-1, Sheet 4 H-8 (spare) r* <
H-9 H-58-4 9.2-4, Sheet 4 7.3-34, Sheet 4
-:g 7o
-~
~z CZ)
- FSAR figures listed in the same horizontal row are identicail.
1
TABl.E 6.2-9 (Cont'd)
PRIMARY CONTAINHENT PENETRATION SYSTEM P&lD FSAR FICURE*
H-10 H-51-2 5.5-13, Sheet 2 7.3-10, Sheet 2 H-52-2 5.5-9, Sheet 2 7.4-1 Sheet 2 H-11 H-51-2 5.5-13. Sheet 2 7.3-10, Sheet 2 H-12 H-51-3 5.5-13. Sheet 3 7.3-10, Sheet 3 H-13 H-51-1 5.5-13, Sheet 1 7.3-10, Sheet H-14 H-56-2 4.2-19, Sheet 1 7.7-1 Sheet 2
(
H-15 H-50 6.3-4 7.3-8 y
M 1
b d
M-16 H-49 6.3-1 7.3-2 14 H-17 H-51-2 5.5-13 Sheet 2 7.3-10, Sh>et 2 H-18 H-52-1 5.5-9, Sheet 1 7.4-1, S~.eet 1 H-19 (spare)
H-20 H-51-3 5.5-13. Sheet 3 7.3-10, sheet 3 H-21 H-51-1 5.5-13 Sheet 1 7.3-10, Seeet 1 h.< $
H-22 (spare)
N U
H-23 H-58-4 9.2-4, Sheet 4 7.3-34, Sheet 4 U
]f
$0
- FSAR figures listed in the same horizontal row are identical.
6
TABLE 6.2-9 (Cont'd)
PRIMARY CONTAlfetENT PENETRATION SYSTEM P&ID FSAR FICURE*
H-24 H-52-1 5.5-9 Sheet 1 7.4-1 Sheet 1 H-25 H-51-2 5.5-13 Sheet 2 7.3-10, Sheet 2 H-26 H-51-1 5.5-13 Sheet 1 7.3-10, Sheet 1 H-27 H-55-1 5.5-14, Sheit 1 7.6-3, Sheet 1 H-28 None 5.6-1 l15 H-29 H-56-3 4.2-19 Sheet 2 7.7-1, Sheet 3 L
U H-30 T
34 C*
(equipment hatch)
H-31 (personnel hatch)
H-32 (access hatch)
H-33 (access hatch)
H-34 H-51-2 5.5-13, Sheet 2 7.3-10, Sheet 2 H-35 H-51-3 5.5-13 Sheet 3 7.3-10, Sheet 3 8
u N
O!U H-36 H-51-1 5.5-13 Sheet 1 7.3-10, Sheet 1 H$
~ ~~
- FSAR figures listed in the same horizontal rcw are identical, g
N
TABLE 6.2-9 (Cont 'd)
PRIMARY CONTAINHENT PENETRATION SYSTDI P&ID FSAR FICURE*
H-37 H-50 6.3-4 7.3-8 H-38 H-49 6.3-1 7.3-2 H-39 H-52-1 5.5-9, Sheet 1 7.4-1, Sheet 1 H-40 H252-1 5.5-9,.
Sheet 1 7.4-1, Sheet 1 H-41 H-52-2 5. 5-9,.
Sheet 2 7.4-1, Sheet 2 H-42 H-52-2 5.5-9, Sheet 2 7.4-1 Sheet 2 m
L S
1 H-43 H-51-1 5.5-13, Sheet 1 7.3-10, Sheet 1 Y
w w
H-44 H-50 6.3-4 7.3-8 14 H-51-1 5.5-13, Sheet 1 7.3-10, Sheet 1 H-45 H-51, 5.5-13, Sheet 2 7.3-10, Sheet 2 Sheet 2 H-46 H-51-2 5.5-13, Sheet 2 7.3-10, Sheet 2 i
H-51-3 5.5-13 Sheet 3 7.3-10, Sheet 3 H-47 H-49 6.3-1 7.3-2 N
H-48 (hatch)
"N d
H-49 H-62-1 11.2-1. Sheet I r$
- 0 tr4 H-50 H-62-1 11.7-1 Sheet 1
~
- FSAR figures listed in the same horizontal row are suentical.
TABLE 6.2-9 (Cont'd)
PRIMARY CONTAINHENT PENETRATION SYSTEM P&ID FSAR FICURE*
H-51 H-27-1 9.2-10, Sheet 1 45 H-52 H-40-1 9.3-1, Sheet 1 H-40-2 9.3-1, Sheet 2 H-53 (spare)
H-54 H-74 6.2-36 (deleted)
.{
H-55 (spare) y i
En
$l H-56 H-57 4.2-24 7.4-3 14 4
o H-57 (spare)
H-58 (spare)
H-59 (spare)
H-60 (spare)
H-61 (spare)
U N
H-62 (spare)
~
H-63 (spare) s$
'S 9.
]
H-64 (spare)
"g H-65 H-40-1 9.3-1, Sheet 1 45
- FSAR figures listed in the samc horizontal row are identical.
TABLE 6.2-9 (Cont'd)
PRIMARY CONTAINHENT PENETRATION SYSTDi P&ID FSAR FIGURE
- H-66 (spare)
H-67 (spare)
H-68 H-47-1 5.5-2, Sheet 1 H-69 H-47-2 5.5-2 Sheet 2 H-70 H-40-1 9.3-1, Sheet 1 H-71 H-72-2 9.3-2, Sheet 2 N
Y H-72 H-49 6.3-1 7.3-2 5
M-51-1 5.5-13 Sheet 1 7.3-10, Sheet 1 b
[o 14 H-73 H-50 6.3-4 7.3-8 H-51-3 5.5-13, Sheet 3 7.3-10, Sheet 3 H-51-4 5.5-13, Sheet 4 7.3-10, Sheet 4 H-74 H-88-1 9.2-12 H-75 H-88-1 9.2-12 H-76 H-88-1 9.2-12 Ltd N
H-77 H-88-1 9.2-12
'g
?
H-78 through H-48 5.2-1, Sheet 3 7.3-30, Sheet 2 m
g H-92
- OyZ
' *FSAR figures listed in the same horizontal row are identical.
TABLE 6.2-9 (Cont'd)
PRIMARY CONTAINHENT PENETRATION SYSTEM P&ID FSAR FIGURE
- H-93 H-40-1 9.3-1, Sheet 1 H-40-2 9.3-1, Sheet 2 H-94 (spare) 45 H-95 H-40-2 9.3-1, Sheet 2 H-96 H-40-2 9.3-1, Sheet 2 H-97 H-51-2 5.5-13, Sheet 2 7.3-10, Sheet 2 H-51-3 5.5-13, Sheet 3 7.3-10, Sheet 3 H-51-4 5.5-13, Sheet 4 7.3-10, Sheet 4 n
Y H-98 H-51-1 5.5-13, Sheet 1 7.3-10, Sheet 1 3
14 H-99 (spare)
H-100 (spare)
H-101 H-103 9.4-7 H-102 H-88-2 9.4 H-103 9.4-7 H-103 H-103 9.4-7 H-74 6.2-36 (deleted)
< w
[.
H-104 H-52-1 5.5-9, Sheet 1 7.4-1, Sheet 1 i5 H-103 9.4-7
!. Ei y
th
- FSAR figures listed in the same horizontal row are identical.
e
.m TABLE 6.2-9 (Cont'd) s I
PRIMARY ColffAINMENT FSAR FIGURE
- PENETRATION SYSTD1 P6ID H-105 M-51-4 5.5-13. Sheet 4 7.3-10, Sheet 4 H-lO6 M-51-4 5.5-13, Sheet 4 7.3-10, Sheet 4 o
Li
?
14 l.
w k
w a
w un gg AFSAR figures listed in the same horizontal row are identical.
ya w
~
W 6
TABI.E 6.2-9 (Cont'd)
PRIMARY CONTAINHENT PENETRATION
O I-1 (6)
H-47-1 5.5-2, Sheet 1 H-83-1 5.1-3, Sheet 1 7.3-6, Sheet 1 H-83-2 5.1-3, Sheet 2 7.3-6, Sheet 2 1-2 (5)
H-83-2 5.1-3, Sheet 2 7.3-6, Sheet 2 I-3 (5)
H-83-2 5.1-3, Sheet 2 7.3-6, Sheet 2 I-4 (6)
H-21-1 5.1-4, Sheet 1 5.2-1, Sheet 2 7.3-30, Sheet 1 10.3-1, Sheet 1 H-83-2 5.1-3, Sheet 2 7.3-6, Sheet 2 I-5 (5)
H-47-1 5.5-2, Sheet 1 l
H-83-2 5.1-3, Sheet 2 7.3-6, Sheet 2 n
v a
O I-6 (6)
H-51-1 5.5-13 Sheet 1 7.3-10 Sheet I
,L H-f:.3-2 5.1-3, Sheet 1 7.3-6, Sheet 2 1-7 (3)
H-51-3 5.5-13 Sheet 3 7.3-10 Sheet 3 14 H-81-1 7.6-35 Sheet 1 I-8 (4)
H-47-1 5.5-2, Sheet 1 I-9 (6)
H-21-1 5.1-4, Sheet 1 5.2-1, Sheet 2 7.3-30 Sheet 1 10.3-1, Sheet 1 H-47-2 5.5-2, Sheet 2 I-10 (5)
H-47-1 5.5-2, Sheet 1 H-47-2 5.5-2, Sheet 2
[
y
~~
Cr4 q
Go 4
- Figures in parentheses in this column indicate number of lines.
y'
~
- FSAR figures listed in the same horizontal row are identical.
7
. TABLE 6.2-9 (Cont'd)
PRIMARY CONTAINHENT PENETRATION
I-11 (4)
H-50 6.3-4 7.3-8 H-81-1 7.6-35, Sheet 1 H-83-1 5.1-3, Sheet 1 7.3-6, Sheet 1 I-12 (1)
H-81-2 7.6-35, Sheet 2-I-13 (2)
H-49 6.3-1 7.3-2 H-83-2 5.1-3, Sheet 2 7.3-6, Sheet 2 I-14 (1)
H-83-1 5.1-3, Sheet 1 7.3-6, Sheec 1 I-15 (6)
H-21-1 5.1-4, Sheet 1 5.2-1, Sheet 2 7.3-20 Sheet 1 10.J-1, Sheet 1 H-47-1 5.5-2, Sheet 1 (j
g 4
H-47-2 5.5-2, Sheet 2 y
0 1-16 (6)
H-47-1 5.5-2, Sheet 1 H-47-2 5.5-2, Sheet 2 14 H-52-1 5.5-9, Sheet 1 7.4-1, Sheet 1 1-17 (7)
H-47-1 5.5-2, Sheet 1 H-47-2 5.5-2, Sheet 2 H-51-2 5.5-13, Sheet 2 7.3-10 Sheet 2 H-51-3 5.5-13, Sheet 3 7.3-10 Sheet 3 I-18 (6)
H-40-2 9.3-1, Sheet 2 h(j h
I-19 (5)
H-47-1 5.5-2, Sheet I H-SI-1 7.6-35, Sheet 1 Cl Co
- Figures in parentheses in this column indicate number of lines.
gZ
- FSAR figures listed in the same horizontal row are identical.
g 4
TABLE 6.2-9 (Cont'd)
PRIMARY CONTAINHENT PENETRATION
I-20 (1)
H-81-2 7.6-35 Sheet 2 I-21 (5)
H-47-2 5.5-2, Sheet 2 H-52-1 5.5-9, Sheet 1 7.4-1. Sheet 1 I-22 (5)
H-40-2 9.3-1, Sheet 2 H-83-1 5.1-3, Sheet 1 7.3-6, Sheet 1 1-23 (2)
H-40-1 9.3-1, Sheet i H-83-1 5.1-3, Sheet 1 7.3-6, Sheet 1 I-24 (6)
H-21-1 5.1-4, Sheet 1 5.2-1, Sheet 2 7.3-20 Sheet 1 10.3-1, Sheet 1 Y
1-25 (6)
H-21-1 5.1-4, Sheet 1 5.2-1, Sheet 2 7.3-20 Sheet 1 10.3-1, Sheet 1 y
5 H-52-1 5.5-9, Sheet 1 7.4-1, Sheet 1 y
H-51-3 5.5-13 Sheet 3 7.3-10 Sheet 3 10 I-26 (1) (spare)
I-27 (1)
H-81-1 7.6-35 Sheet 1 I-28 (1) (spare)
I-29 (2)
H-81-1 7.6-35 Sheet 1 U
I-30 (1)
H-81-2 7.6-35 Sheet 2 his A0
~
en h.h
{
- Figures in parentheses in this column indicate number of lines.
- FSAR figures listed in the same horizontal row are identical.
g g
I 9
9
t TABLE 6.2-9 (Cont'd)
PRIMARY CONTAINHENT PENETRATION
I-31 (1) (spare)
I-32 (1)
H-81-2 7.6-35, Sheet 2 I-33 (1) (spare)
I-36 (6)
H-21-1 5.1-4, Sheet 1 5.2-1, Sheet 2 7.3-20, Sheet 1 10.3-1, Sheet 1 I-37 (1)
H-81-2 7.6-35, Sheet 2 I-38 (1)
H-81-2 7.6-35, Sheet 2
(
I-39 (1)
H-81-2 7.6-35, Sheet 2 is I-40 (6)
H-21-1 5.1-4, Sheet 1 5.2-1, Sheet 2 7.3-20, Sheet 1 10.3-1, Sheet 1
[
I-41 (1)
H-81-2 7.6-35, Sheet 2 g
1-42 (1)
H-81-2 7.6-35, Sheet 2 I-43 (1)
H-81-2 7.6-35, Sheet 2 I-44 (1)
H-81-2 7.6-35, Sheet 2 I-45 (1)
H-81-2 7.6-35, Sheet 2 I-46 (1)
H-81-2 7.6-35, Sheet 2 m
-s
- Figures in parentheses in this column indicate number of lines.
80
.N ** FSAR figures listed in the same horizontal row are identical.
>-4
TABLE 6.2-9 (Cont'd) l PRutARY CONTAINHENT PENETRATION
I-47 (4) (spare)
I-48 (2)
H-55-1 5.5-14, Sheet 1 7.6-3, Sheet 1 I-49 (6) (spare)
I-50 (2)
H-81-1 7.6-35, Sheet 1 1-51 (1)
H-81-2 7.6-35, Sheet 2 I-52 (1)
H-81-2 7.6-35, Sheet 2 I-53 (1)
H-81-2 7.6-35, Sheet 2 o'
~
N h
1-54 (6)
H-21-1 5.1-4, Sheet 1 5.2-1, Sheet 2 7.3-20, Sheet 1 10.3-1, Sheet 1
[
cn I-65 (4)
H-81-1 7.6-35, Sheet 1 14 I-66 (5)
H-81-1 7.6-35, Sheet 1 I-67 (4)
H-81-1 7.6-35, Sheet 1 1-68 (1)
H-83-1 5.1-3, Sheet 1 7.3-6, Sheet 1 I-69 (1)
H-83-1 5.1-3, Sheet 1 7.3-6, Sheet 1 h$
1-70 (1)
H-83-1 5.1-3, Sheet 1 7.3-6, Sheet I
.< d u
J N
- Figures in parentheses in this column indicate number of lines.
8O
~
- FSAR figures listed in the same horizontal row are identical.
g g
hJ
e i
TABLE 6.2-9 (Cont'd)
PRIMARY CONTAINHENT PENETRATION
I-71 (1)
H-83-1 5.1-3, Sheet 1 7.3-6, Sheet 1 I-72 (1)
H-83-1 5.1-3, Sheet 1 7.3-6. Sheet 1 I-73 (1)
H-83-1 5.1-3, Sheet 1 7.3-6, Sheet 1 I-74 (1)
H-83-1 5.1-3, Sheet'l 7.3-6, Sheet 1 I-75 (1)
H-83-1 5.1-3, Sheet 1 7.3-6, Sheet 1 I-76 (1)
H-83-1 5.1-3, Sheet 1 7.3-6, Sheet 1 I-77 (1)
H-83-1 5.1-3, Sheet 1 7.3-6, Sheet 1 h
I w
e 14 E8si
- w. -
N G;
u
- Figures in parentheses in this column indicate number of lines.
m,
- FSAR figures listed in the same horizontal row are identical.
Nu i
ZPS-1 REVISION 26 MAY 1977 TABLE 6.2-10 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES GENERAL DESIGN CRITERIA CONFORMANCE PENETRATION LINE NUMBER ISOLATED BASIS M-5, 6 Feedwater 1.
Line is provided with a check valve inside containment and a non-simple check valve outside containment.
The check valves are special check type valves which do not require reverse flow to isolate. See Sub-section 6.2.4.3.2.1.1.1 for a description of the valves. Since the outboard check valves are not simply check valves, the design meets the requirements of the standard review plan and GDC 55.
2.
The valves hav been designed with 26 low leakage characteristics and will be leak tested using air as the test fluid in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix 3.
3.
The valves outside containment are located in the main steam tunnel.
The main steam tunnel is provided with automatic safety-related temperature and differential tem-perature leak-detection provisions.
The leak-detection annunciator alarms in the main control room are divisional, redundant, and non-safety-related.
4.
In addition, to provide further assurance and reliability for maintaining long-term leaktightness, a remote manual third isolation valve is provided downstream of the check valves frem the containment.
The third isolation valve will be procedurally closed after 20 minutes of an accident.
13 7 i i 2.t 6.2-110
ZPS-1 REVISION 26 MAY 1977 TABLE 6.2-10 (Cont'd)
PENETRATION LINE NUMBER ISOLATED BASIS M-10 RPV head spray 1.
The outside containment isolation valve is interlocked with the steam supply valve to the RCIC turbine drive. The head sprayline is part of the RCIC system.
Automatic, safety-related leak detection is provided on the RCIC steam supply line. RPV head spray will isolate auto-matically upon autoclosure of the RCIC steam supply line.
2.
Automatic isolation of steam supply will be initiated on any of the following signals:
a.
RCIC turbine trip from high RPV water level, b.
high turbine exhaust
- pressure, c.
RCIC turbine overspeed 26 trip, and d.
high temperature in RCIC piping and equip-ment areas.
3.
RCIC pump discharge (RPV head spray) is maintained at positive pressure with the RCIC saf ety-related water leg pump. Since the RPV head spray valve is normally closed, excessive leakage due to valve not fully closed will be alarmed upon low system pressure.
4.
The bypass line around the it-board check valve is normally closed and is interlocked with the inboard isolation check valve.
I371 125 6.2-111
g e
ZPS-1 REVISION 57 APRIL 1979 TABLE 6.2-10 (Cont'd)
PENETRATION LINE NUMBER ISOLATED BASIS M-14 CRD return 1.
The outboard check isolation valve N
is a low leakage type check valve to assure acequate leaktightness and will be leaktested to the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J.
2.
A remote manual third isolation valve is provided downstream of the outboard check valve to ensure long-term leaktightness. The remote. manual valve is normally closed during all modes of plant 57 operation.
M-18 Steam to 1.
All small branch lines are either RER Ex locked closed or procedurally main-tained closed except during shut-down for testing and/or maintenance.
All small branch lines are either 26 M-15 LPCS locked closed or procedurally M-16 HPCS maintained closed except during shutdown for testing and/or maintenance.
2.
The bypass valves around the in-board check valves are electrically interlocked with the check valves to ensure that the bypass valves will be normally closed except when exercising the check valves.
3.
The piping is always maintained at positive pressure with its respec-tive safety-related water leg pump.
This feature will ensure system integrity during normal plant operation. Low pressure is annunciated in the main control room.
1371 126 6.2-112
ZPS-1 REVISION 26 MAY 1977 6
TABLE 6.2-10 (Cont'd)
PENETRATION LINE NUMBER ISOLATED BASIS 4.
The entire system outside containment is Quality Group B, Seismic Category I, segregated, meets the design pressure and temperature of the containment, and meets the requirements of a closed system as defined in SRP 6.2.4.
M-17, 21 Drywell 1.
Valves are always maintained in spray the closed position.
2.
The piping and isolation valves are located in a controlled leakage area served by the standby gas treatment system.
3.
The containment isolation valves are gate type valves with a double wedge disc to preclude exposing the stem packing to the containment atmosphere and to prevent packing leakage.
26 M-49, 50 Drywell 1.
The inboard containment isolation drains valves are located outside containment to preclude locating the inboard isolation valv's in the suppression pool and exposing them to hydrodynamic loads.
2.
The isolation valves are all located in a controlled leakage area which is served by the standby gas treatment system.
3.
The isolation valves are globe type valves positioned such that flow from the containment is under the seat to preclude exposing the stem packing and to prevent packing leakage.
M-34, 35, 36 RHR suction 1.
The entire system outside the from containment is Quality Group suppression B, Seismic Category I.
The pool systems are closed outside the containment and meet the require-ments of SRP 6.2.4 for closed systems.
6.2-1371 127
ZPS-1 REVISION 26 MAY 1977 IABLE 6.2-10 (Cont'd)
PENETRATION LINE NUMBER ISOLATED BASIS M-37 LPCS from 2
All small branch lines arc either suppression locked closed or procedurally main-pool tained closed except during shutdown M-33 EPCS from for testing and/or maintenance suppression purposes.
pool 3.
The entire system is maintained at M-41
- CIC from a positive pressure by a safety-suppression related water leg pump during nor-pool mal plant operation. Low pressure due to excessive leakage is alarmed in the main control room. The annunciator alarms are redundant and non-safety-related.
4.
All isolation valves are gate type with double wedge and backseat to preclude exposing the stem packing and to prevent packing leakage either in the fully closed or fully open position. The system is designed so that the valve is either fully open or fully closed.
26 5.
Approximately 6-inch decrease in suppression pool level will alarm in the main control room. Any leakage can be selectively traced to a system by the individual equipment room sump pump leak detection alarms. High leakage will alarm in the main control room for for each room. The annunciator alarms are non-safety-related. The sump pumps are redundant and non-safety-related.
M-40 RCIC vacuum 1.
Line provided with two containment pump isolation valves outside contain-discharge ment. The inboard valve is motor operated; the outboard valve is a check valve.
2.
Although-the system is non-ESF, the RCIC system is safety-related, Quality Group B and Seismic Cate-gory I.
Additional power-operated isolation valves would reduce the reliability of the safety system.
1371 128 6.2-114
ZPS-1 REVISION 26 MAY 1977 TABLE 6.2-10 (Cont'd)
PENETRATION LINE NUMBER ISOLATED 3.
The system, piping, and valves are located in a leakage controlled area which is treated by the stand-by gas treatment system.
4.
The RCIC area and steam supply pipe routing is monitored for high area temperature and dif-ferential temperature as part of the leak-detection system. The automatic functions of the leak-detection system are ESF grade.
The annunciator alarms are redun-dant and non-safety-related.
5.
The motor-operated isolation valve is a " diaphragm" sealed valve. A metal diaphragm sepa-rates the valve fluid boundary from the stem, thereby precluding the stem packing from contacting the fluid. Stem packing leakage is effectively reduced to zero.
Figure Q212.38-1 shows the metal 26 diaphragm valve and the metal diaphragm itself which separates the environment from the process fluid.
M-42 RCIC pump 1.
Containment isolation valve lo-discharge cated in a leakage controlled area which is served by the standby gas treatment system.
2.
The second barrier is the RCIC system, which is Quality Group B, Seismic Category I, and meets the requirements of SRP 6.2.4 for closed systems. The piping sys-ten is normally pressurized by the safety-related water leg pump.
Excessive leakage will alarm in the main control room on low pres-sure.
3.
All pump discharge lines including branch lines are maintained at a positive pressure. All branch lines are administrative 1y closed except during system testing and during shutdown for testing and/or maintenance.
6.2-115 j}Jj j}g
ZPS-1 REVISION 26 MAY 1977 TABLE 6.2-10 (Cont'd)
PENETRATION LINE NUMBER ISOLATED BASIS M-43, 45 Suppression 1.
Containment isolation valve pool spray located outside primary containment in a leakage controlled area served by the standby gas treatment system.
2.
Second barrier is the RHR system which is Quality Group B, Seismic Category I and meets the requirements of SRP 6.2.4 for closed systems. A second auto-matic isolation valve would re-duce the reliability of providing suppression pool spray for bypass leakage of suppression pool.
3.
The pump discharge piping is normally maintained at a positive pressure with a safety-related water leg pump. Excessive 26 leakage in the piping including branch lines would alarm in the main control room on low pressure.
4.
Isolation valves are located out-side containment to preclude the valves from becoming exposed to the suppression pool atmosphere and associated hydrodynamic loads.
M-44, 46, 98 RER test 1.
The single containment isolation return valve is located outside the M-47 HPCS test containment in a leakage controlled return area which is served by the stand-by gas treatment system.
2.
The second barrier is the RHR or HPCS syetem, which is Quality Grcup B, Seismic Category I and meets the requirements of SRP 6.2.4 for closed systems.
3.
The system including branch lines will be maintained at a positive system pressure to prevent containment leakage assuming a single failure of the isolation valve following a postulated accident.
6.2-117 1371 130
ZPS-1 REVISION 26 MAY 1977 TABLE 6.2-10 (Cont'd)
PENETRATION LINE NUMBER ISOLATED BASIS 4.
The isolation valve design meets the intent of GDC 56 on an alternative basis, with the second barrier being the closed HPCS or RHR system.
M-101, 102, Drywell and 1.
Valves are located outside 103 suppression containment in a leakage pool purge controlled area which is served by the standby gas treatment system.
2.
Suppression pool purge valves are located outside containment to preclude exposing valves to suppression pool atmosphere and associated hydrodynamic loads and to provide access to valves for backup hydrogen control upon failure of the combustible gas 26 control system.
3.
Drywell purge valves are located outside containment due to space limitations inside the drywell for these valves and to provide access to the valves for backup hydrogen control upon failure of the combustible gas control system.
M-104 Suppression 1.
Two valves in parallel are pool purge provided on the combustible gas H control control system discharge since 2
it is an ESF system for post-LOCA hydrogen control. A second isolation valve in series would reduce the reliability of the ESF systen.
2.
The combustible gas control isolation valves are procedurally maintained closed except for post-LOCA operation.
1371 13I 6.2-118
ZPS-1 REVISION 26 MAY 1977 TABLE 6.2-10 (Cont'd)
PENETRATION LINE NUMBER ISOLATED BASIS 3.
The isolation valves are located outside containment in a leakage controlled area which is served by the standby gas treatment system.
4.
The isolation valves are located outside containment to preclude exposing valves to suppression pool atmosphere and associated hydrodynamic loads.
5.
The system outside containment is a closed system which meets Quality Group B, seismic require-ments, and SRP 6.2.4 for closed systens.
M-70 Drywell 1.
The check valve and automatic pneumatic motor-operated valve are located instrument outside containment in a leakage supply controlled area which is served by the standby gas treatment system.
26 2.
Although the air system is non-ESF, the system supplies control air to the inboard MSIV's and safety / relief valves.
3.
The isolation valve design met the intent of GDC 56 at the time of design.
M-73, 97 IPCS, RER 1.
The piping forms part of an ESF-relief related system.
2.
Relief valves which provide containment isolation have set pressures in accordance with SRP 6.2.4.
A second isolation valve on either side of a relief valve is not allowed by ASME Section III and Regulatory Guide 1.26.
3.
Globe, remote manual valves which provide containment isolation are located in series providing two barriers and are procedurally maintained closed except for temporary hot scandby operation to
})f}
)b2 6.2-119
ZPS-1 REVISION 26 MAY 1977 TABLE 6.2-10 (Cont'd)
PENETRATION LINE NUMBER ISOLATED _
BASIS vent the RHR heat exchanger of noncondensible gases and for plant shutdown cooling. The valves are an operational requirement for plant shutdown.
4.
All containment isolation valves are located in a leakage controlled area which is served by the stand-by gas treatment system.
5.
For those lines with one ise Lation valve, the second barrier is the RHR-LPCS system which is Quality Group B, Seismic Category I, and meets the requirements of SRP 6.2.4 for closed systems.
6.
RHR equipment rooms including RHR heat exchanger areas are provided with safety-related temperature and differential temperature switches for leak-detection purposes. Excessive 26 leakage would alarm in the main control room on high temperature.
The annunciator alarms are redundant and non-safety-related.
M-71 Service air 1.
Meets all requirements of GDC 56 and SRP 6.2.4.
2.
Two locked-closed valves provided for containment isolation, one inside containment and one outside containment.
M-9, 23 RBCCh 1.
Closed system inside and outside containment is Quality Group C and Seismic Category I except that the outboard isolation valve is Quality Group B.
2.
Closed system meets all require-ments of SRP 6.2.4 except quality group class.
1371 133 6.2-120
ZPS-1 REVISION 26 MAY 1977 TABLE 6.2-10 (Cont'd)
PENETRATION LINE LINE ISOLATED BASIS 3.
The non-closed portion of the system inside containment is automatically isolated on loss of offsite power or loss of air.
Piping and valves meet SRP 6.2.4 except that they are Quality Group C.
Quality Group C is identical to Quality Group B except that no x-ray is performed on valve body, bonnet and disc.
4.
Leak-detection capability is provided by the use of the RBCCW expansion tank level indicator /
control system. The leak-detection provisions are ESF grade, redundant, divisional, and Seismic Category I.
5.
The system is part of an ESF-related system.
M-54 Hydrogen 1.
The line forms a part of an ESF-control related system for post-LOCA 26 hydrogen control.
2.
Two valves in parallel are provided for containment isolation.
The valves are located outside the containment in a leakage controlled area which is served by the standby gas treatment system.
3.
One of the two valves in parallel is maintained closed during system operation. Both valves are maintained closed during normal plant operation.
4.
Since the system is ESF-related, additional containment isolation valves in series would reduce the reliability of the system to perform its safety function.
i37i i34 6.2-121
ZPS-1 REVISION 26 MAY 1977 TABLE 6.2-10 (Cont'd)
PENETRATION LINE NUMBER ISOLATED BASIS 5.
The second barrier provided is the combustible gas control system, which is a closed system.
The system is Quality Group B, Seismic Category I and meets the requirements of SRP 6.2.4 for -
closed systems.
6.
The isolation valves are located outside the containment due to access limitation near the top of the drywell as well as to provide post-LOCA access to the valves.
M-95, %
N, bottle 1.
The system forms part of an ESF-sCpply related system to provide control air to the ADS valves.
2.
The piping system form a closed system inside the contuament and outside the containment.
Outboard isolation valves are located in a leakage controlled area.
3.
The containment isolation valves 26 are Quality Group B and Seismic Category I.
All other piping and valves meet the requirements of SRP 6.2.4 for closed systems except that the piping system is Quality Group C.
M-68, 69 Recirculation 1.
Piping inside t he containment FCV hydraulic forms a closed system which is control Quality Group B, Seismic Category I, and meets the requirements of SRP 6.2.4 for closed systems.
2.
Outboard containment isolation valves will be provided which will automatically isolate on high dryvell pressure. Table 6.2-8 is revised to incorporate this design.
1371 135 6.2-122
ZPS-1 REVISION 26 -
MAY 1977 TABLE 6.2-10 (Cont'd)
PENETRATION LINE NUMBER 70 LATED BASIS M-74, 75, Drywell 1.
The outboard containment isolation 76, 77 chilled valves automatically close on water high drywell pressure or low reactor water level.
2.
Inboard contaiment isolation valves have been added. The chilled water supply is provided with check valves, and the chilled water return is provided with automatic motor-operated gate type valves. The valves will automatically isolate on low reactor water level or high dry-26 well pressure.
3.
The outboard valves are located in a leakage controlled area which is served by the standby gas treatment system.
4.
The inboard valves will be installed as soon as possible, but not later than the first refueling outage.
1371 136 '
6.2-123
ZPS-1 REVISION 29 JULY 1977 ensure site boundary limits are not exceeded.
b.
Valves required for emergency cooling systems shall remain operable, for both opening or closing as required for sys-tem functions, af ter an accident.
c.
Valve operation shall be controlled by the signals described in Subsection 7. 3.1.2 and in Table 6.2-8.
5.2.1.6.2.6 Pipe Rupture Protection against dynamic effects of pipe rupture are described in Section 3.6.
Protection has been provided on the assumption that either longitudinal or circumferential breaks may occur at the locations speci-fled in Subsection 3.6.1.'2.
5.2.1. 7 Design of Active Pumps and Valves In order to assure the functional performance of active valves of the RCPB, stringent design requirements were applied. There are no active pumps in the RCPB. Valve operability was demonstrated by the following paragraphs.
All active valves are being qualified for operability assurance by first being subjected to the following tests:
a.
Shop tests which include hydrostatic tests and seal leakage tests as specified in the applicable code, b.
The valves were required to open and close within specified time limits when subjected to design or environmental con-dicions as required by applicable codes and regulatory guides. Vibrational levels will also be monitored when 1371 137 5.2-9
ZPS-1 REVISION 3 FEBRUARY 1976 required.
There are also other tests, such as the cold hydro tests and the hot functional tests to be performed. Pre-operational tests on each system will be performed on site.
Valves are considered rigid under seismic disturbances.
Thus, conservative seismic accelerations of.20g horizontal l3 and.14g vertical were used simultaneously in the structural analyses.
With the loads known from above, the structural analyses were performed with other conservative loads to mee*. the stress criteria.
This will assure that the critical parts of the concerned component will not be damaged during and after the faulted condition.
Fin' ally, active valves are also required to be operated periodically as specified in the Technical Specification. This repeated operability re-quirement throughout the life of the specified valve further provides a complete operability assurance program.
The list of RCPB Class 1 active valves is given in Table 5.2-5.
The list of ASME III, Classes 2 and 3 pumps and valves is given in Table 3.9-23.
l2 The representative combination of loads and analysis to assure oper-ability is summarized in Table 5.2-3B.
l2 5.2.1.8 Inadvertent operation of Valves A discussion of the design-basis events and their appropriate limits for this plant is given in Chapter 15.0.
The events in Chapter 15.0 have been selected to envelope the most severe change in critical parameters from events which have been postulated to occur during planned opera-tion.
5.2.1.9 Stress and Pressure Limits Paragraphs NB-3655 and NB-3656 (Piping Sections) of ASME Section III are not directly applicable to pumps and valves. On the basis of the utilized method of establishing system design pressures, however, it can be stated that the permissible pressure requirements of NB-3655.1 sad NB-3556.1 are met.
The allowable stress limits and design loads based on applicable codes for RCPB components are summarized in Table 5.2-3B.
Active or inactive l2 components of the RCPB are delineated in Table 5.2-5.
5.2.1.10 Stress Analysis for Structural Adequacy Stress analysis was used to determine structural adequacy of pressure components of the reactor coolant pressure boundary under various operat-ing conditions and earthquakes.
1371 138 5.2-10
~
REVISION 3 TEBRUARY 1976 2FS-1 TABLE 5.2 5 RCPT PtHP AND VA1.VF OESCRIPTION MAXIMUM ISOLATION CLOSURE TIME velvesi SicNAL Jactive VALVE ACTIVE /
teettve velvem Ng INACTIVE LOCATION Instantaneous vALvt otSchrPTiog Check A0 E12F041 Active N/A RMR Veneet in Remote manual E12F042 Active Instantaneous Check A0 E12F050 Active 2 min RNR/ Recirculation IVCS E12F053 Line In Active Instantaneous staple check E12F019 Active 12 inlain Head Spray IvCS E12F023 Active 29 sec TVCS 29 esc E12F009 IVCS Active E12F008 Recirculation Active N/A Line Suction Remote manual E51F0%
Active RCIC Vessel out E51F072 inactive E31F073 Inactive Instantaneous Remote AO E3170%
Active Instantaneous RCIC Vessel Head in Remote Ao E31F065 Active 821F001 Insctive (suclear Boiler) 521F002 Rescror Veeeel Head Inactive 521F005 Insceive Simple check 521F010 Accive Feedvater in 521F011 Inac tive Remote manual Check 821F032 Active Remote manual B21F065 Active Remote manual AO 5217061 Active Safety Relief (through FOLS}
Remote 821F016 Active Manual I
521F019 Active 5 5 sec*
l3 Drain to Condeneer IVCS 5.5 esc a 821F022 Active ItSIV IVCS 521F028 Active IVCS MSIV 521F067 Remote manual Active 521F016 Drain to Condeneer Active C33F103 Insettve Reactor Water Cleanup System l3 initiate valve closure af ter the break.
- Includes 0.5 esconda f or instrumentation to B71 139 5.2-47 O
- m
>m
,-mww MOR6 & O WW 9&&
L m
- S C E! **!
PJ.Y. 'J.~.5 r-LOCAT!ON IN/,CT!t*E NINSEg y ttve ar a'.~es t
.actwe vz:<si a.....
Reactor Water Inactive G33F102 s/A Inactive G33F103 s/A 12 cleanup Discharge C33F100 N/A Inactive Inactive G33F101 N/A Inac tive G33F106 N/A Active G33F001 High a Temperature N/A High a Flow High Ambient Temperature l12 IVCS*
Active G33F004 High a Temperature N/A High a Flow High Ambient Temperature High NR Ex Outlet Tamperature SLC Actuation 12 IVCS*
Remote Mtnual Reactor Water In Active C33F039 Simple check Instantaneous N/A Active G33F040 High A Temperature High a Flow High Ambient Temperature IVCS*
29 (Recirculation)
Inactive B33F023 Remote manual Recirculation Pump Suction Reactor Vessel Drain Inactive B33F029/F030 N/A Pump Discharge Inactive B33F060 N/A Pump Discharge Inactive B33F067 Remote manual l26 15 (Control Rod Drive Hyd.)
CRD Water Return Inactive C11F087 N/A CRD Water Return Active C11F086 Simple check Instmataneous Active C11F082 Remote manual N/A Active CllF083 Simple check Instantaneous Active E227005 Simple check Instantaneous 12 HPCE In Inactive E22F021 N/A Acti"e E22F004 Remote manual N/A Inac tive E22F022 N/A LPCS In Active E217006 Simple check Ins tantaneous Active E21F005 Remote manual N/A Inactive E21F013 N/A Inactive E21F014 N/A
- IVCS = Reactor low water level signal 5.2-48 l
5.2-49 1371 140 e
PLAtlT ZIMMER Uti!T(S) 1 CODES, STAtlDAR05 Ai40 GUIDES Oues tion :
Identify the codes, standards, and guides applied in the design of the containment isolation system and system components.
Resconse:
The codes, standards, and guides applied in the design of the containment isolation system and system components can be found on page 6.2-43 of the Zimmer FSAR.
This page is included in the response to the question pertaining to the provisions for testing the operability of the isolation valves.
G l
1371 141
PLANT zIMMI;R UNIT (S) 1 NORMAL OPERATING MODES AND ISOLATION MODES Ouestion:
Discuss the normal operating modes and containment isolation provision and procedures for lines that transfer potentially radioactive fluids out of the containment.
Resconse:
The Primary Containment and Reactor Vessel Isolation System (PCEVIS) provides protection against the release of radioactive materials to the environment'as a result of accidents occurring to the nuclear boiler, auxiliary systems and support systems.
By the use of sensors and switches arranged in redundant channels adhering to the single failure criteria, autcmatic isolation of appropriate containment penetrations insures release protections.
Remotely operated manual isolation valves are provided for those penetrations not having auto Isolation valves.
Station Technical Specification set forth the rules for determining operability of these isolation valves.
The technical specifications state that the containment isolation valves and the reactor instrumentation line excess flow check valves (listed in attachment 1) be operable with the isolation times shown in attachment 1.
Valve Operability is determined through the surveillance testing program conducted within the guideline of Technical Speci-fications.
Also covered in the FSAR Section 6.2.4, Primary Containment Isolations.
Primary Containment and Feactor Vessel Isolations are divided into groups.
The individual groups consists of various signals and setpoints which when received cause the various isolation valves to function.
A summary of the group isolation signals and associated valves are contained in attachment 2.
The PCRVIS is operated only during abnormal conditions and operational tests.
During normal plant operation, the various isolation valves are automatically closed when an isolation signal is received.
The initiating signals are sealed in, and once initiated the valves will go full closed.
As a back-up to the auto close function, the isolation valves are provided with remote manual switches in the main control rocm which allows the control room operator to manually close the isolation valves in the event an accident condition exists and automatic circuits fail.
The operator will be warned of these conditions via the annunciator system and will respond to determine if manual actions are required.
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CONTAllMENT ISOLATION VALVES v,
APPLICABLE l
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- l IVQ003A and 3 3When handTing Irradiated fuel or a spent fuel shipping cask in the secondary containment.
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CONTAINNENT ISOLATION VALVES 1(
APPLICABLE N
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i CJHIAINHENT ISOLATION VALVES N
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g CONDITIONS i
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@ b(
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c.
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h Shutdownrangelevelreferenceleg.1$1Fko N
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CONTAIHMENT ISOLATION VALVES APPL.lCA8tE l[;J 7.,
i OPERATIONAL.
v.
i-CONDITIONS-I N(
l Reactor Instrumentation Excess flow Check Valves (Continued)
D d
JetPumpNo.liflowtop,l!!if366 G2 3
11.
- ag; iL Jet PN No.15 upper (16w tap,1821/167.
i 12.
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Jet Pump No. 16 lower fl9W tap, 1021f460 13.
h flj JetPumpHo,]$flowtap,IS$ff369 M
14.
JetPumpHQ,17flowtap,lR2(F370
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15.
N Jet Pump Ho,16 flow tap, Ip2(F171 N
16.
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JetPumpHo,20lowerflow' tap,IDE(Fa74 i
1 19.
Pressure above fore plate cap, 1821F375 I
1F376 ll 20.
Reactor Pressure reference for CR0 and cooling water;pressur control,102
'l 21 Pressurebelowcoreplatetojetpumpflowinstruments,182(F377,lp21F390 i,
22.
Jet Pump Ho. I flow tap, lp21F378 23.
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Jet Pump Ho. 2 flow tap, IB21,F379 U.
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Jet Pump No. 3 flow tap, lp21F380 25.
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CONTAl WENT ISOLATIDH VALVES APPLICABLE Y
OPERATIONAL l
O CONDITIONS l'
h G3 h
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Reactor Instrumentation Excess Flow Check Valves (Continued) g l
94flowtap,182f381 26.
Jet i
Jetfump
.5upperflowtap,182),F382 EE's) 27.
I Jetgumpgo.5lowerflowtap,182f383 28.
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Jetgumph.6flowtap,IB21,F384 M
i 29.-
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'30.
J61,funn80. 7flowtap,182f385 p
31.
Jet lap flo. 8 flow tap, 182}386 j
32.
Jet'P' ump (Nb.9flowtap,182(F387 33.
Jetkhep(do.10upperflowtap,182 388 l
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Jet hamptyo.10 lower flow tap,1921,F389 j l, N
35.
PressureabovecoreplatetollPCSlinebreakdetectioninsitument,1821f391
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Downconerpressuretoletpumpdevelopedhea'dinstrument,102f392
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36.
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37.
Steap line A f'ow taps 1117 F468A, lh21F369A,1821F470A,182(F470A,1821f472A, Lj 1821f473A,182J474A,IB2(FESA q
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CONTAINHENT IsotATION VALVES N
, L 8
h APPLICABLE l
t OPERATIONAL N,
VALVE FLINCTION AND NUMBER CONDITIONS M
d.
F.eactor Instrumentation Excess Flow Check Valves (Continued) l l
C
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W 53.
RCICsteamflowinstruments,1E5}F3178,IE51F3188,IE51F3198,IE51F3208 i,
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Reactorwatercleanupsuctionflowinstruments,IG3f314,IG33f315,1G3}F316 54.
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Primary Containment and Reactor Vessel Isolation Signals Group I Isolation Signals and Setpoints (B) 1.
Reactor Vessel Low (Level 2) Water Level
-38 in.
(C) 2.
Main Steamline High Radiation 3 x Normal (D) 3.
Main Steamline High Flow 140 % of Rated Flow *
(E) 4.
Main Steamline Low Pressure 840,psig *
(Bypassed with Reactor _ Mode Switch __in Shutdown) _ _ _
(F) 5.
Main-Steamline Tunnel High Temperature 140 F
- Main Steamline Tunnel High DifferentiaJ Temperature *50 F (J) 8.
Condensar Vacuum Low 23 in EgA *
(Bypassed with Turbine Stop and Bypass Valves Closed, Reactor Pressure less than-lO50 psia, and Bypass Switch in Bypass Position) and mode switch not in "RUN" (RM) 9.
Remote Manual from Control Room Pushbutton
- - Settings will be established upon accumulation of operating data.
Group I Functions (a)
Main steamline isolation valves (b)
Main steamline drain valves (c)
Turbine trip (d)
Open vacuum break valve 1371 153 Valves that close on group I Isolation POWER SUPPLY ISOLATION ISOLATION VALVE DESCRIPTION VALVE NUMBER Air / Spring 1B21F002A Inboard Main Steamline Air / Spring 1321F022B Inboard Main Steamline Air / Spring 1B21F022C Inboard Main Steamline Air / Spring 1321F022D Inboard Main Steamline Air / Spring 1B21F028A outboard Main Steamline Air / Spring 1B21F028B Outboard Main Steamline 1B21F028C Outboard Main Steamline Air / Spring 1B21F028D Outboard Main Steamline
. Air / Spring 480 VAC ABMCC 1E Inboard Main Steamline Drain 1B21F016 Outboard Main Steamline Drain 250 VDC RXMCC 13 1B21F019 1B21F067A-Outboa Main Steamline Drain 250 VDC RXMCC 1B 1B21F067B Outboard Main Steamline Drain 250 VDC RXMCC 1B 1321F067C Outboard Main Steamline Drain 250 VDC RXMCC1B Outboard Main Steamline Drain 250 VDC RXMCCl3 1321F067D Valves that open on group I isolation ISOLATION POWER SL"dPLY ISOLATION VALVE DESCRIPTION VALVE NUMBEF 480 VAC TRMCC 1G 1TD021 Vacuum break valve 1371 154 G ust C
5- ::- : >- : 5 nec St~rt:n?S
--.=_=:
(B)
Reactor vessel low water level (Level 2)
-38 in.
(c)
Main steam line high radiation 3 x normal RM Remote manual Lines that isolate are:
1.
Reactor water sanple valves 1B33-F019 Reactor water sample inboard RPS Bus B 1333-F020 Reactor water sample outboard RPS Bus A 1371 155
-m -
Group III Signals and Setpoints
. (A)
Reactor Vessel Low Water Level (Level 3)
+12.5 in.
(L)
Drywell Pressure High
+2 psig (RM) Remote Manual from Control Room Pushbutton Lines that isolate are:
1.
RER Sample Line 2.
TIP System 1371 156 e
Valves that close on Group III Isolation ISOLATION VALVE NUMBER ISOLATION VALVE DESCRIPTION POWER SUPPLY lE12F060A Inboard RER Sampla L.1.ne 120 VAC RPS Bus B lE127060B 2nboard RER Sample line 120 VAC RPS Bus B lE12F075A Outboard RER Sarple Line 120 VAC RPS Bus A 1E12F075B Outboard RER Sample Line 120 VAC RPS Bus A TIP Ball Valve 480 VAC RXMCC 22 O
e 9
1371 157 Group IV Signals and Setpoints
~
(A)
Reactor Vessel Low Water Level (Level 2)
. -38 in.
(W)
High Temperature at Outlet of Cleanup Non-Regenerative 140 F Heat Exchanger Outboard Standby Liquid Control System Actuated Handswitch valves only (RM)
Remote Manual from Control Room Pushbutton (N)
RWCU Leak Detection 140 F 50 F A T RWCU High Differential Flow 20% with time delay Lines that isolate are:
1.
Reactor Water Cleanup Pump Suction 2.
Reactor Water Cleanup Return Valves that close on Group IV Isolation ISOLATION VALVE NUMBER ISOLATION VALVE DESCRIPTION POWER SUPPLY 1G33F001 Reactor Water Cleanup System Inlet 48 0 VAC ABMCC lE Inboard 1G33F004 RWCU System Inlet outboard 250 VDC RXMCC 1B 1G33 F040 Reactor Water Cleanup System Roturn 480 VAC RXMCC 1A Outboard 1371 158 9
Group V Signals and Setpoints.
(R)
RER Shutdown Return Line High Differential Pressure (S)
RER Equipment Area High Differential Temperature (T)
RHR Equipment Area High Temperature (V)
RCIC System Steam 1dne to Turbine:
1.
High Steamline Space Temperature 2.
Low Steamline Pressure 3.
High Steamline flow 4.
High Turbine Exhaunt Pressure 5.
RCIC Area High Temperature 6.
RCIC Area High Differential Temperature (RM) Remote Manual from Control Room Lines that isolate are:
1.
Steam Supply to RCIC 2.
Steam Supply to RHR w
ISOLATION POWER SUPPLY VALVE NUMBER ISOLATION VALVE DESCRIPTION 480 VAC RXMCC 1B 1E51F063 Steam Supply to RCIC 250 VDC RXMCC 1A lE51F008 250 VDC RXMCC 1A 1E51F064 Steam Supply to RER k
Group VI Signals and Setpoints (A)
Reactor Vessel Low Water Level (Level 3)
+12.5 in.
(T)
RER Shutdown Return Line High Flow 300%
(S)
RER Equipment Area High Differential Temperature 100 F RER Equipment Area High Temperature 200 F (RM) Remote Manual from Control Room--
Pushbutton (G)
Eigh__ Reactor Pressure 135 psig Lines that' isolate are:
1.
RER Head Spray valves That Close on Group VI Isolation ISOLATION VALVE NUMBER ISOLATION VALVE DESCRIPTION POWER SUPPLY lE12F023 RHR Head Sprey 250 VDC RXMCC 1B lE12F009 RER Shutdown Cooling Suction Inboard 480 VAC ABMCC 1B 1E12F008 RER Shutdown Cooling Suction Outboard 250 VDC RXMCC 1B lE12F053A RER Shutdown Cooling Return 480 VAC RXMCC 1A lE12F053B RER Shutdown Cooling Return 480 VAC RXMCC 1A 9
1371 160' Group VII Signals and Setpoints (A)
Reactor Vessel Low Water Level (Level 3)
+12.5 in.
(L)
Drywell Pressure High
+2 psig
( T)
RHR Shutdown Return Line High Flow 3007.
(S)
RER Equipment Area High Differential Temperature 100 F RHR Equipment Area High Temperature 200 F (RM) Remote Manual from Control Room Pushbutton (G)
High Reactor Pr_ essure 135 psig Lines that isolate are:
1.
RER Shutdown Suction 2.
RER Shutdown Return Valves that close on Group VII Isolation ISOLATION VALVE NUMBER ISOLATION VALVE DESCRIPTION POWER SUPPLY 1E12 F099A Shutdown Cooling Testable 480 VAC ABMCC lE Check Bypass lE12 F099B Shutdown Cooling Testable 480 VAC RXMCC IB Check Bypass 480 VAC ABMCC 1A lE12 F040 RER Discharge to Radwaste 480 VAC ABMCC 1B lE12 F049 RER Di charge to Radwaste Inboard 1371 161' e
o e
-. -.. =.. -
Group VIII Isolation Signalt and Setpoints (B)
Reactor Vessel Low Water Level (Level 3)
-38 in.
(L)
Drywell Pressure High
+2 psig (Z)
Refueling Floor Exhaust Radiation High 35 mr/hr (M)
Plant Exhaust Planum High Radiatirm
' 4.5 mr/hr (RM) Remote Manual Pushbutton ACTIONS 1.
Drywell Purge Isolation a.
Inlet b.
Exhaust 2.
Suppression Chamber Purge Isolation a.
Inlet b.
Exhaust 3.
Drywell Air Sample 1 solation 4.
Suppression Chamber Air Sample Isolation 5.
Drywell Pneumatic Isolation a.
Supply b.
Return c.
Purge 6.
Start Standby Gas Treatment System[] } [)2 7. Open Post LOCA Containment Monitoring System Valves Valves that close on Group VIII Isolation ISOLATION VALVE NUMBER ISOLATION VALVE DESCRIPTION PCWER SUPPLY lvQOOlA Drywell Purge Inlet IA/ Spring lvQ001B IA/ Spring lvQ002A Drywell Purge Exhaust IA/ Spring lvQ0023 IA/ Spring IVQOO3A Suppression Chamber Purge Inlet IA/ Spring lvQOO3B IVQOO4A Suppression Chamber Purge Exhaust IA/ Spring lvQ004B IA/ Spring 1CM003 Drywell Air Sample ICM004 IA/ Spring 1CM005 Drywell Air Samp1'e IA/ Spring ICM006 IA/ Spring 1CM012 Suppression Chamber Air Sample IA/ Spring 1CM014 IA/ Spring IN061 Drywell Pneumatic Supply 250 VDC RXMCC 1B IN011 Drywell Pneumatic Return 480 VAC ABMCC 1D INO12 Drywell Pneumatic Return 480 VAC ABMCC lE IN170 Drywell Pneumatic ??".t LOCA Purge 480 VAC ABMCC 1D IN171 Drywell Pneumatic Post LOCA Purge 480 VAC ABMCC lE 1371 163 = Valves that open on Group VIII Isolation ISOLATION VALVE NUMBER ISOLATION VALVE DESCRIPTION POWER SUPPLY 1CM007 Post LOCA Containment Monitoring IA/ Spring 1CM008 Post LOCA Containment Monitoring IA/ Spring 1CM009 Post LOCA Containment Monitoring IA/ Spring ICM010 Post LOCA Containment Monitoring IA/ Spring 1CM011 Post LOCA Containment Monitoring IA/ Spring 1CM013 Post LOCA Containment Monitoring IA/ Spring 1CM019 Post LOCA Containment Monitoring IA/ Spring 1CM020 Post LOCA Containment Monitoring IA/ Spring 1CM021 Post LOCA Containment Monitoring IA/ Spring 1CM022 Post LOCA Containment Monitoring IA/ Spring 1CM023 Post LOCA Containment Monitoring. IA/ Spring 1CM024 Post LOCA Containment Monitoring IA/ Spring 1371 16'4 4 _~ Isolation Signals ~~ -' ~ ~ ~~ ~ ' ~ - '~~~ ~ (B) Reactor vessel Low (Level 2) -38 in. (L) Drywell Pressure High 2 psig RM Remote Manual Pushbutton Lines that isolate are: 1. Radwaste a. Drywell Equipment Drain Sump b. Drywell' Floor Drain Sump 2. Primary Containment Ventilation Chilled Water System 3. Reactor Building Ventilation Supply and Exhaust Dampers ISOLATION VALVE NUMBER ISOLATION VALVE DESCRIPTION PCWER SUPPLY 1RE048 D N Equipment Drain Isolation IA/ Spring 1RE049 D N Equipment Drain Isolation IA/ Spring 1RF001 DN Floor Drain Isolation IA/ Spring 1RF002 DN Floor Drain Isolation .IA/ Spring IVP006A Primary Containment Ventilation Chilled Water Supply 250 VDC RXMCC 1A IVPOO6B Primary Containment Ventilation Chilled Water Supply 250 VDC RXMCC 1B IvP012A Primary Containment Ventilation Chilled Water Return 250 VDC RXMCC 1A lVPO12B Primary Containment Ventilation Chilled Water Return 250 VDC RXMCC la IVPO45A Primary Containment Ventilation Chilled Water Return 480 VAC ABMCC lE IVPO45B Primary Containment Ventilation = Chilled Water Retu.n 480 VAC ABPcC lE !3[l lbb . = - VALVE NUMBER ISOLATION VALVE DESCRIPTION POWER SUPPLY IVG03YA Reactor Building Ventilation Supply Damper IA/ Spring IVG03YB Reactor Building Ventilation Supply Damper IA/ Spring IVGO4YA Reactor Building Ventilation Exhaust Damper IA/ Spring IVG04YB Reactor Building Ventilation Exhaust Damper IA/ Spring 1371 166 t }}