IR 05000327/2019010

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NRC Design Bases Assurance Inspection (Team) Report 05000327/2019010 and 05000328/2019010
ML19115A223
Person / Time
Site: Sequoyah  Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 04/25/2019
From: Jonathan Montgomery
NRC/RGN-II/DRS/EB1
To: James Shea
Tennessee Valley Authority
References
IR 2019010
Download: ML19115A223 (22)


Text

April 25, 2019

SUBJECT:

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC DESIGN BASES ASSURANCE INSPECTION (TEAM) REPORT 05000327/2019010 AND 05000328/2019010

Dear Mr. Shea:

On March 14, 2019, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2, and discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. Matt Rasmussen and other members of your staff. On April 10, 2019, the NRC inspectors discussed the final results of this inspection with Mr. Jonathan Johnson and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

NRC inspectors documented one finding of very low safety significance (Green) in this report.

This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements.

If you contest the violation or significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:

Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC resident inspector at Sequoyah.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Jonathan M. Montgomery, Acting Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety

Docket Nos.: 05000327 and 05000328 License Nos.: DPR-77 and DPR-79

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000327/2019010 and 05000328/2019010

Inspection Report

Docket Number(s):

05000327 and 05000328

License Number(s):

DPR-77 and DPR-79

Report Number(s):

05000327/2019010 and 05000328/2019010

Enterprise Identifier:

I-2019-010-0025

Licensee:

Tennessee Valley Authority

Facility:

Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2

Location:

Chattanooga, TN 37402

Inspection Dates:

February 25, 2019, to March 14, 2019

Inspectors:

C. Franklin, Reactor Inspector

M. Greenleaf, Reactor Inspector

R. Patterson, Reactor Inspector

E. Stamm, Senior Reactor Inspector

M. Yeminy, NRC Contractor

H. Leake, NRC Contractor

Approved By:

Jonathan M. Montgomery, Acting Chief

Engineering Branch 1

Division of Reactor Safety

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a Design Bases Assurance Inspection at Sequoyah Units 1 and 2 in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. Findings and violations being considered in the NRCs assessment are summarized in the table below.

List of Findings and Violations

Failure to Demonstrate AC Power System Calculations Conform to Design Bases Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000327,05000328/2019010-01 Closed None 71111.21M The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated Non-cited Violation (NCV) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the licensee's failure to verify or check the adequacy of design of the AC power system.

INSPECTION SCOPE

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

REACTOR SAFETY

===71111.21M - Design Bases Assurance Inspection (Teams)

The inspectors evaluated the following components with listed applicable attributes, permanent modifications, and operating experience:

Design Review - Large Early Release Frequency (LERFs) (IP Section 02.02)===

Unit 2 Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves [2-PCV-068-0340A-A, 0334-B]

Technical Specifications (TS), and Technical Requirements Manual (TRM)

  • Adequacy of design and licensing documents
  • Adequacy of operating procedures
  • Adequacy of recent modifications
  • System health reports accurately reflect system health
  • Translation of vendor specifications
  • Design verification of control logic for automatic functions

Design Review - Risk-Significant/Low Design Margin Components (IP Section 02.02) (5 Samples)

(1) Unit 0 Emergency Raw Cooling Water Travelling Water Screens [0-SCN-067-0471, 475, 480, 485]
  • Accuracy of design and licensing basis documents
  • Material condition and configuration
  • Adequacy of the operating procedures
  • Adequacy of corrective actions
  • Surveillance testing satisfies all essential parameters
  • Backwash pump and traveling screen preventive and corrective maintenance is adequate to maintain required availability
  • Compliance with vendor instructions for installation, maintenance, and operation of the pumps
  • Adequacy of recent modifications
  • System Health Reports accurately reflect system health
  • Adequacy of internal flood evaluations
(2) Unit 1 6900V Shutdown Board 1A-A [1-BDA-202-CM-A]
  • Compliance with UFSAR, TS, and TS Bases
  • Adequacy of maintenance and corrective action activities
  • Material condition and configuration
  • Design requirements (Voltage, Current, etc.)
  • Coordination and relaying
  • Design verification of bounding design basis events, including fast bus transfer between offsite power sources
(3) Unit 2 Charging Pump 2A-A/Room Cooler [2-PMP-062-0108, 2-CLR-030-0183]
  • Accuracy of design and licensing basis documents
  • Material condition and configuration
  • Adequacy of the operating procedures
  • Adequacy of corrective actions
  • Adequate net positive suction head (NPSH) and available margin
  • Sufficient pump head and flow rate to account for all scenarios
  • Surveillance testing satisfies all essential parameters
  • Pump preventive and corrective maintenance is adequate to maintain required availability
  • Room heat load vs cooling capacity to maintain maximum allowable room temperature
  • Impact of turbine building environment on room temperature
  • Single failure criterion for room cooling
  • Compliance with vendor instructions for installation, maintenance, and operation of the pumps
  • Adequacy of recent modifications
  • Adequate calculations of pump minimum flow and NPSH (for all sources of suction)
  • System Health Reports accurately reflect system health
(4) Unit 1 Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) Level Transmitters [1-LT-063-0050-D, -

0051-E, 0052-F, 0053-G]

  • Compliance with UFSAR and TS
  • Accuracy of design and licensing basis documents
  • Adequacy of corrective actions
  • Consistency of tank and transmitter design drawings with design bases
  • Effectiveness of emergency operating procedures, including time-critical operator actions associated with RWST outlet valve failure to close
  • Capability of design, including calculations for instrumentation setpoints and uncertainties, tank capacity, vortexing limits, pump flow rates, and RWST inventory depletion during time-critical actions
  • Adequacy of required completion times for automatic and manual switchover from the RWST to the containment sump during safety injection
(5) Unit 2 Steam Generator Level Control Valves [2-LCV-003-148-B, -156-A]
  • Accuracy of design and licensing documents
  • Adequacy of operating procedures
  • Adequacy of corrective actions
  • Compliance with vendor instructions
  • Adequacy of recent modifications
  • System health reports accurately reflect system health

Modification Review - Permanent Mods (IP Section 02.03) (4 Samples)

(1) Replacement of 125V DC Vital Battery Charger I [DCN 23209]
(2) Degraded Non-Conforming MOV Modifications [DCN 23623]
(3) Replace 8 EDG Starting Air Compressors, Dryers, and Pressure Switches [DCN

===23634]

(4) Replacement of Shutdown Board PCB 6.9kV/480V Transformers [DCN 23680]

Review of Operating Experience Issues (IP Section 02.06)===

(1) NRC Information Notice (IN) 2017-06, Battery and Battery Charger Short-Circuit Current Contributions to a Fault on the Direct Current Distribution System
(2) NRC IN 1997-60, Incorrect Unreviewed Safety Question Determination Related to Emergency Core Cooling System Swapover from the Injection Mode to the Recirculation Mode

INSPECTION RESULTS

Failure to Demonstrate AC Power System Calculations Conform to Design Bases Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems

Green NCV05000327,05000328/2019010-01 Closed None 71111.21M The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated Non-cited Violation (NCV) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the licensee's failure to verify or check the adequacy of design of the AC power system.

Description:

On October 31, 2012, the NRC issued license amendment numbers 332 and 325 to the licensee, granting a change to their Technical Specifications 3.8.1 and 4.8.1. The change was necessary as a result of modifications to the plant design and operating configuration that would install generator circuit breakers (GCBs) and new unit station service transformers (USSTs) to allow their use as a qualified offsite power supply.

Technical Specification Bases B 3.8.1 stated, "Offsite power will normally be supplied from the USSTs to the 6.9kV Shutdown Boards via the 6.9 kV Unit Boards, and will automatically transfer at least one power supply to an alternate power supply ([Common Station Service Transformer] CSST A or CSST C) on a trip of the Power Circuit Breakers (PCBs)." Also stated in the licensees Bases, the licensee identified the following electrical configurations that demonstrate compliance with their Technical Specification requirement of maintaining two qualified offsite circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E AC Electrical Power Distribution System:

1. Two Common station service transformers (CSSTs) windings X and Y providing power

to their respective 6.9 kV unit boards.

2. A train and unit specific USST with the ability to fast transfer to a respective CSST

upon loss of a unit specific USST and a CSST different than that of the one receiving a postulated fast transfer (X and Y windings) providing power to their respective 6.9 kV unit boards.

In all analyzed cases, whenever a USST was being utilized as a qualified offsite source, the ability to fast transfer to a CSST was explicitly required to be available. The transfer is necessary because the opening of the stations PCBs (needed to isolate the generator in the event of a failure of the non-1E GCBs) would remove power to the USSTs, thereby removing their capability of providing offsite power during normal plant operations, as well as design basis accidents, and postulated environmental events.

In reviewing the licensees design of their fast transfer system and its impact on the safety related 6.9 kV shutdown boards, inspectors were referred to the licensees calculation SQNETAPAC, Auxiliary Power System, Rev. 89. The purpose of the calculation was to analyze and document the acceptability of the plant AC power system as defined in UFSAR Sections 8.2 and 8.3. Inspectors reviewed the calculation and determined that the calculation failed to model limiting voltage transients following design basis fast (automatic) transfers from the USSTs to the CSSTs, to verify that they would not result in actuation of the degraded voltage relays - leading to a loss of offsite power.

The licensee provided SQN-APS-005, Fast Bus Transfer, Rev. 2, as their documented analysis of the effect fast transfer would have on their 1E power system. As stated in the licensees response to a request for additional information (dated August 23, 2012), the calculation was intended to present an analysis demonstrating that the transfer would not exceed 1.33 Volts per Hertz, in accordance with American National Standards Institute (ANSI) standard C50.41. Inspectors reviewed the calculation and determined that, while the calculation analyzed a transfer from the CSST to the USSTa transfer that could be less limiting, the calculation failed to analyze a bus transfer from the USST to the CSST. In addition to this, inspectors determined that the calculation failed to comprehensively model the stations configuration including, but not limited to, the licensees failure to:

1. Evaluate the effects non-motor (static) loads would have on the voltage and phase

angle of the bus being transferred during the dead bus time.

2. Consider the tripping of the main generator excitation system prior to tripping the main

generator (approximately 10 cycles), during which time the voltage of the shutdown board could experience greater transient conditions due to the loss of some voltage regulation provided by the excitation system.

3. Consider the motoring of the main generator, and its lagging phase angle effects.

Inspectors concluded that calculations SQNETAPAC and SQN-APS-005 failed to demonstrate the adequacy of the design of the fast transfer scheme necessary to qualify the USSTs as offsite sources, and failed to ensure the integrity of the safety-related equipment powered by the offsite circuits. Additionally, inspectors noted that the station could not provide previous runs of the ETAP software which generated the outputs for calculation SQNETAPAC because the previous runs were not retrievable, and that the base model used in the calculation did not represent the as-designed condition of the stations electrical system.

Corrective Action(s): The licensee determined the equipment to be operable. The licensee plans to revise calculations SQNETAPAC and SQN-APS-005.

Corrective Action Reference(s): CRs 1494559, 1497075, and 1498362

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The team determined that the failure to check or verify the adequacy of the design of the AC power system was a performance deficiency of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone. Specifically, the revised outputs of the calculations would result in a significant loss of margin, reducing the reliability of the AC power system.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, Significance Determination of Reactor Inspection Findings for At - Power Situations. The finding was determined to be Green since it was a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating structure, system, or component and its operability was maintained.

Cross-cutting Aspect: Not Present Performance. No cross cutting aspect was assigned to this finding because the inspectors determined the finding did not reflect present licensee performance.

Enforcement:

Violation: Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, states, in part, that design control measures shall provide for verifying or checking the adequacy of design, such as by the performance of design reviews, by the use of alternate or simplified calculational methods, or by the performance of a suitable testing program.

Contrary to the above, since February 17, 2012, the licensee failed to verify or check the adequacy of design of the AC Power System. Specifically, the licensee failed to demonstrate the adequacy of the design of the fast transfer scheme necessary to qualify the USSTs as offsite sources and ensure the integrity of the safety-related equipment powered by the offsite circuits.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

  • On March 14, 2019, the inspectors presented the design bases assurance inspection results to Mr. Matt Rasmussen and other members of the licensee staff.
  • On April 10, 2019, the inspectors presented the final design bases assurance inspection results to Mr. Jonathan Johnson and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

71111.21M Calculations

03D53EPMWLL063094

AFW Hydraulic Analysis

Rev. 16

1-FCV-63-073

Documentation of Design Basis Review, Required

Thrust Calc and Valve & Actuator Capability

Assessment for 1-FCV-63-073

Rev. 6

2-FCV-63-040

Documentation of Design Basis Review, Required

Thrust Calc and Valve & Actuator Capability

Assessment for 2-FCV-63-040

Rev. 5

30-D053-EPM-BVC-

2788

Determination of Required ERCW and Air Flow rates

to ESF Room Coolers

Rev. 9

AFW Hydraulic Analysis

AFW Level Control Valve Opening Time

Rev. 1

B45 870106427

MELB Safe Shutdown Analysis

Rev. 4

B45870106428

MELB Flooding Study

Rev. 18

B87951205003

ERCW Screen Wash System Hydraulic Analysis

Rev. 3

CDQ0000632016000333

Evaluation of Refueling Water Storage Tank for

Beyond Design Basis Tornado and Flood Loads

Rev. 0

EDQ0000632014000103

Instrumentation Evaluation for RWST Volume during

Time Critical Action (TCA) Associated with RWST

Versus Sump Switchover - Level Monitoring, System

Rev. 0

GEN-EEB-MS-TI28-0002 Generic Accuracy Calculation - Eagle 21 I/O

Demonstrated Accuracy Calculation

Rev. 2

MDQ0009992106000323 Damage Assessment & Repair Strategy for Appendix

R Cold Shutdown Motor Operated Valves

Rev. 0

MDQ0072980034

CCP, SIP, and RHR Pump NPSH Evaluation

Rev. 11

MDQ0999-980039

MOV Thrust Requirements Considering Pressure Lock

Using ComEd Methodology

Rev. 5

OSG7-0020

Safety Injection System (063) 10CFR50.49 Category

and Operating Times

Rev. 20

SCG4M01104

Steam Generator AFW Level Control Valves Seismic

Qualification Evaluations

Rev. 0

71111.21M

Calculations

SQN-00-D059 EPM-

RJP-061091

Generic Letter 89-10 MOV Population At Sequoyah

Units 1 & 2

Rev. 19

SQN-30-D53-EPM-

ASD01-031287

HVAC Cooling Load Calculation Auxiliary Building

CCP Rooms Elevation 669

Rev. 3

SQN-63-D053 EPM-

RJP-030191

Documentation of Design Basis Review, Required

Thrust Calc and Valve & Actuator Capability

Assessment for 1-FCV-63-025

Rev. 7

SQN-APPR-1

Analysis of AC/DC Instrument and Control (I&C)

Power Systems to Identify Associated Circuits - 10 CFR 50 Appendix R

Rev. 20

SQN-APS-003

480VAC APS Class 1E Load Coordination Study

Rev. 88

SQN-APS-005

Fast Bus Transfer Analysis

Rev. 2

SQN-CPS-051

Circuit Protection Device Evaluation

Rev. 67

SQN-EEB-MS-TI28-0015 Instrument Accuracy Calc: 1-LT-63-50, -51, -52, -53

Rev. 13

SQN-EEB-PL&S

Precautions, Limitations and Setpoint for NSSS

Rev. 55

SQN-NTB-

NDQ0063980038

RWST and Containment RHR Safety and Operational

Limits, RWST Setpoint Required Accuracy, and

LBLOCA and SBLOCA Sump Minimum Levels

Rev. 17

SQN-NTB-SQS20110

Emergency and Abnormal Procedure Setpoints

Rev. 34

SQN-QN-EEB-MS-TI28-

25

Instrument Accuracy Calc: 1-LT-63-50, -51, -52, -53

RWST PAM Indication

Rev. 14

SQN-SQS2-0010

Chemical and Volume Control System Operating

Modes

Rev. 12

SQN-SQS2-169

Maximum Temperature of the Piping on the Discharge

of the Pressurizer SRVs and PORVs Following Valve

Actuation.

Rev. 0

SQNETAPAC

Auxiliary Power System

Rev. 89

TPS-SQN-PLN-EDX000-

000-2002-001

Planning Transmission Study (TSS) - Grid Off-Site

Power, Transient Stability, and Fault Current

Calculation for 2012 and 2016

Rev. 3

71111.21M

Corrective Action

Documents

CR 1133416

CR 1158718

CR 1161344

CR 1170545

CR 1175834

CR 1177144

CR 1180402

CR 1181710

CR 1183483

CR 1184239

CR 1205951

CR 1210311

CR 1215848

CR 1296320

CR 1316043

CR 1328776

CR 1345254

CR 1389095

CR 1406471

CR 1416535

CR 1435427

CR 1472289

CR 1475587

CR 1476134

CR 1476273

CR 1493816

CR 168601

CR 759027

CR 760336

CR 787960

CR 818759

CR 934663

PER 753504

PER 771351

71111.21M Corrective Action

Documents

PER 934663

Corrective Action

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

CR 1493643

Drawing Needs to be Updated

CR 1493816

SQN-DC-V-12.2 Issues Found

CR 1493833

FSAR Section 3.1.2 not Updated to Reflect USST

Modification

CR 1493963

Identified Plant Light Out in ERCW Room

CR 1493966

Identified Standing Water in 1A-A Bay

CR 1493970

Identified FME in ERCW Room Sump

CR 1493973

Identified Clogged Drains in ERCW Building

CR 1494101

Inadequate Testing of Discharge Check Valves

CR 1494419

Unconservative Heat Load from Surface of Pipes

CR 1494452

Comprehensive Pump Test Lists Quarterly Pump Test

as Alternate

CR 1494461

Quarterly Pump Test is not Credited for Check Valve

Closure

CR 1494559

SQNETAPAC Rebaseline Needed

CR 1494707

Apparent Inadequate 50.59 Evaluation for PIC 23696

CR 1496014

Calculation SQNETAPAC, Revision 90, Documents

Several Instances of Using MVARs for 30 Seconds

After a LOCA to Support Grid Voltage

CR 1496213

NRC-Identified RWST Tornado Vulnerability

CR 1496325

Plant Grid Interface Meeting Minutes Reference Typo

CR 1496841

Incorrect TRM References in Calculation SQN-EEB-

MS-TI28-0025, Rev. 14

CR 1497075

SQNETAPAC Revisions using Base Revision Rather

than As-designed Condition

CR 1497921

Calculation Error in NDQ0063980038

CR 1497928

Calculation Error in EDQ0000632014000103

Enhancement

CR 1498200

FSAR Not Revised to Capture New SBLOCA Limiting

Scenario

71111.21M Corrective Action

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

CR 1498253

Lack of Critical Thinking When Evaluating the Last 2B-

B CCP Pump Comprehensive Test

CR 1498291

2012 NRC Submittal Validation Information

CR 1498327

FSAR TSS Clarification Needed

CR 1498336

Higher Pump Motor Horse Power Was Not Used in a

Heat Load Calculation

CR 1498356

CCP Comprehensive Pump Test Uses Computer

Points Rather Than M&TE Equipment

CR 1498362

Calculations SQNETAPAC and SQN-APS-005 Not

Bounding with Regard to Fast Bus Transfer Scenario

CR 1498642

NRC Identified (NDQ0063980038 Needs an

Enhancement Revision to Clarify)

CR 1498643

The PM Issued for Replacement of Unit 2 Room

Coolers Was In an Inactive Status and Should Be

Reactivated

CR 1498719

Reynolds Number Outside the Range for Equation

Applicability

CR 1498781

Based on Frequency of Cleaning the CCP Room Unit

Coolers, Reevaluate Whether a Fouling Factor of

0.001 is Adequate

CR 1499162

1E to Non-1E Coordination Issue

Drawings

0-15E500-1

Key Diagram, Station Aux Power System

Rev. 56

0-15E500-3

Transformer Taps & Voltage Limits - Aux Power

System

Rev. 44

1, 2 - 47W610-63-2

Mechanical Control Diagram Safety Injection System

Rev. 34

1, 2 - 47W610-68-6

Mechanical Control Diagram Reactor Coolant System

Rev. 17

1,2-45N657-5

Wiring Diagrams, Separation & Mis Aux RLYS

Schematic Diagrams

Rev. 27

1,2-45N703-1

Wiring Diagrams 125V Vital Battery Board I Single

Line - Sheet 1

Rev. 83

1,2-45N703-2

Wiring Diagrams 125V Vital Battery Board II Single

Line - Sheet 2

Rev. 44

1,2-45N703-3

Wiring Diagrams 125V Vital Battery Board III Single

Line - Sheet 3

Rev. 49

71111.21M Drawings

1,2-45N765-1

Wiring Diagram 6900V Shutdown Aux Power

Schematic Diagram SH-1

Rev. 35

1,2-47W309-3

Mechanical Large Reservoirs

Rev. 0

1-47W600-143

Mechanical Instruments & Controls

Rev. 9

1-47W600-241

Mechanical Instruments & Controls

Rev. 8

1-5655D26-16

Functional Diagrams, Turbine Trips, Runbacks &

Other Signals

Rev. 1

2-47W803-2

Flow Diagram Auxiliary Feedwater

Rev. 78

2-47W809-1

Flow Diagram Chemical and Volume Control System

Rev. 75

Engineering

Changes

D23169

Addition of Leak off Piping and Collection System to

ERCW Pumps

Rev. 0

D23623

Degraded Non-Conforming MOV Modifications -

Gears/Actuators/Motor/Cable Reroute

Rev. A

DCN 23209

Replacement of 125V DC Vital Battery Charger I

Rev. A

DCN 23396A

RWST Swap-over Revised Procedural Actions

Considering Interruption of ECCS Flow

Rev. A

Miscellaneous

B25900219001

Letter Westinghouse to TVA Sequoyah CH/SI Pump

Motor Horsepower

Dated

2/8/90

CNL-16-011

Letter TVA to NRC Technical Specification Change to

Extend the Allowed Completion Time to Restore

Essential Raw Cooling Water System Train to

Operable from 72 Hours to 7 Days

Dated

3/11/16

DCN 23680

Replacement of Shutdown Board PCB 6.9kV/480V

Transformers

Rev. A

IST Evaluation

for 2-LCV-3-156

Completed

6/23/16

IST Evaluation

for 1-LCV-3-148

Completed

10/19/16

IST Evaluation

for 1-LCV-3-156

Completed

7/14/16

Letter from NRC to TVA

Apparent Violation Closure Inspection Report 05000327/2013014 NS 05000328/2013014

Dated

2/11/13

71111.21M Miscellaneous

Memorandum

Memorandum from James

R. Regg, Chief

Transmissions Systems operations Manager, to

Ronald

K. Gladney, Communications Requirements

for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN) Alternate

Alignment

Dated

10/21/02

Memorandum

Memorandum from John M. Campbell to James R.

Regg and

B. David Till, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

(SQN) - Off-Site Power Requirements &

Communications Protocols

Dated

3/31/06

NEDP-4

Q-List and UNID Control

Rev. 26

NUREG-001

Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2

Dated

March 1979

OPT200.AC6.9KV

6.9 KV Electrical Distribution System

SCN 17-52

SAR Change Request

Dated

5/17/01

SEG#OPL273S1902

AFW Inside Out

Rev. 0

SO-18-040

2-FCV-67-146 Degraded Stroke Values

Dated

11/30/18

SQN-DC-V-11.2

Design Criteria Document, 125V Vital Battery System

Rev. 12

SQN-DC-V-11.4.1

Design Criteria Document, Normal and Emergency AC

Auxiliary Power Systems

Rev. 24

SQN-DC-V-12.2

Design Criteria Document, Separation of Electric

Equipment and Wiring

Rev. 16

SQN-DC-V-13.9.3

Design Criteria Document, Auxiliary Building

Ventilation and Cooling

Rev. 6

SQN-DC-V-13.9.8

Design Criteria Document, Auxiliary Feedwater

System

Rev. 29

SQN-DC-V-27.2

Design Criteria Document, Chemical and Volume

Control System

Rev. 35

SQN-DC-V-27.3

Design Criteria Document, Safety Injection System

Rev. 24

SQN-DC-V-27.4

Design Criteria Document, Reactor Coolant System

Rev. 24

SQN-DC-V-27.9

Design Criteria Document, Reactor Protection System

Rev. 17

SQN-DC-V-3.0

Design Criteria Document, The Classification of

Piping, Pumps, Valves, and Vessels

Rev. 21

71111.21M Miscellaneous

SQN-DC-V-46.0

Design Criteria Document, Seismic/Structural

Qualification of Seismic Category I and I(L) In-Line

Valves and Other In-Line Fluid System Components

Rev. 3

SQN-VD-A391-0963

Anchor/Darling Valve CO. Carbon Steel Nuclear

Valves

Dated

3/4/12

SQN-VD-A391-2863

Anchor/Darling Valve CO. Maximum Thrust

Calculations

Dated

3/4/12

SQN-VTD-A998-0010

200 AMP Battery Charger Instriction [Sic] Manual

Rev. 1

SQN-VTD-G182-0050

Installation/Maintenance Instructions for ITE Medium

Voltage Power Circuit Breakers 7.5HK

Rev. 3

SQN-VTD-G182-0710

Brown Boveri Instructions for I-T-E Single Phase

Voltage Relays

Rev. 1

SQN-VTD-G182-0720

Brown Boveri Instructions for Single Phase Voltage

Relays ITE-27N Undervoltage Relay ITE-59N

Overvoltage Relay

Rev. 2

SQN-VTD-T020-0030

Project Technical Manual Power Operated Relief

Valves

Rev. 3

SQN-VTD-W120-3810

Instruction Manual for Unit 1 and 2 Centrifugal

Charging Pumps

Rev. 22

SQN-VTM-G182-0030

Gould Inc. (Formally I-T-E Imperial Corporation) Indoor

and Outdoor Metal Clad Switchgear and Components

Rev. 54

SQN-VTM-T020-0010

Target Rock Corp. Solenoid Operated Valves

Rev. 17

SS-E18.10.01

Standard Specification for Environmental Qualification

Requirements for Safety Related Electrical Equipment

Rev. 4

TVA-7493

Westinghouse Letter

Dated

8/15/79

TVA-DT-01

Standard Specification, Dry Type, Power & Distribution

Transformer

Rev. 0

Operability

Evaluations

PDO 1496213

PDO 753504

Procedures

0-AR-M26-A

Annunciator 0-XA-55-26A

Rev. 43

71111.21M Procedures

0-PI-EBM-000-001.2

Battery Bank High Level Equalize Charge (Systems

2, 244, 250)

Rev. 39

0-SO-250-1

25 Volt DC Vital Power System

Rev. 76

0-TI-OPS-000-004.0

Time Critical Operator Actions

Rev. 9

1-AR-M1-C

AC/DC Control Power 1-XA-55-1C

Rev. 59

2-SI-ICC-068-455.0

2-SI-ICC-068-455.0 COPS PCV-68-340A CC

Rev. 18

2-SI-IFT-068-456.0

2-SI-IFT-068-456.0 COPS PCV-68-334 FT

Rev. 18

2-SI-SXP-062-201.B

Centrifugal Charging Pump 2B-B Performance Test

Completed

1/31/19

2-SI-SXP-062-203.0

Centrifugal Charging Pumps 2A-A and 2B-B

Comprehensive pump Test and Check Valve Test

Completed

11/28/18

2-SI-SXV-003-232.1

Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Check

Valve Test Unit 2

Rev. 4

AOP-M.08

Internal Flooding

Rev. 4

AOP-N.03

External Flooding

Rev. 59

AOP-P.07

Degraded Grid or Abnormal Voltage Conditions

Rev. 15

DS-M18.2.21

Motor Operated Valve Thrust and Torque Calculations

Rev. 24

DS-M18.2.22

MOV Design Basis and JOG Review Methodologies

Rev. 8

E-0

Reactor Trip or Safety Injection

Rev. 40

ES 1.3

Transfer to RHR Containment Sump

Rev. 22

ES 1.3

Transfer to RHR Containment Sump

Rev. 21

ES-1.3

Transfer to RHR Containment Sump

Rev. 23

GOI-6

General Operating Instructions, Apparatus Operations

Rev. 184

NEDP-2

Design Calculation Process Control

Rev. 23

NEDP-8.0

Evaluations for Procurement of Materials, Items, and

Services

Rev. 5

NPG-SPP-01.16

Condition Report Initiation

Rev. 2

NPG-SPP-06.9.3

Post-Modification Testing

Rev. 10

NPG-SPP-09.14

Generic Letter 89-13 Implementation

Rev. 4

NPG-SPP-09.26.14

Motor Operated Valve Program

Rev. 4

NPG-SPP-09.3

Plant Modifications and Engineering Change Control

Rev. 30

NPG-SPP-09.4

CFR 50.59 Evaluations of Changes, Tests, and

Experiments

Rev. 12

NPG-SPP-22.300

Corrective Action Program

Rev. 12

71111.21M Procedures

NPG-SPP-22.500

Operating Experience Program

Rev. 7

NPG-SSP-09.1.20

Inservice Testing Program Requirements

Rev. 1

NPG-TREND

NPG Trending Manual

Rev. 9

OPDP-8

Operability Determination Process and Limiting

Conditions for Operation Tracking

Rev. 24

TI-28

Technical Instruction, Curve Book

Rev. 334

Work Orders

111842240

114412576

114605899

115320081

115420993

115420998

116532954

116859442

117064518

117107091

117352923

117353016

117673650

117732985

117908899

117908901

118021552

118266140

118318157

118594134

118799855

118817993

119127713

119145564

119198833

119199046

119201492

119266171

71111.21M Work Orders

119421920

119793040

119819464

119819466