ML18127A034

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Summary of Public Telephone Conference Call Held on April 18, 2018, Between the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Entergy Regarding the Need for Additional Information to Support the RBS Unit 1 License Renewal Application Review
ML18127A034
Person / Time
Site: River Bend Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 05/25/2018
From: Sayoc E
NRC/NRR/DMLR/MRPB
To: Maguire W
Entergy Operations
Sayoc E, NRR-DMLR 415-4084
References
CAC MF9757
Download: ML18127A034 (8)


Text

May 25, 2018 Mr. William F. Maguire Site Vice President River Bend Station, Unit 1 Entergy Operations, Inc.

5485 U.S. Highway 61 N St. Francisville, LA 70775

SUBJECT:

SUMMARY

OF PUBLIC TELEPHONE CONFERENCE CALL HELD ON APRIL 18, 2018, BETWEEN THE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION AND ENTERGY REGARDING THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION TO SUPPORT THE RIVER BEND STATION, UNIT 1 LICENSE RENEWAL APPLICATION REVIEW (CAC NO. MF9757)

Dear Mr. Maguire:

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or the staff) and representatives of Entergy Operations, Inc. (the applicant) held a public telephone conference call on April 18, 2018, to discuss the applicants responses to previously issued Requests for Additional Information (RAIs). The telephone conference was held at the request of NRC to clarify the applicants responses to these RAIs.

Following the phone call, with the clarification provided by the applicant, the staff believed that it had sufficient information to proceed with the safety review without additional information requested for four topics (RAIs B.1.10-2, 3.1.2.1.2-1, 4.3.1-1 and 4.3.2-1). In addition, the staff will issue follow-up RAIs on three topics: RAIs 3.6.2.2.2-1, 4.3.1-2, and 4.7.3-1. Finally the applicant will provide supplemental information to one topic (RAI 3.2.2.3.2-1a). Enclosure 1 lists the participants; Enclosure 2 includes the chronology of these RAIs and the corresponding responses from the applicant, and Enclosure 3 summarizes the staffs concerns related to these RAIs and the path forward. For RAI 3.2.2.3.2-1a, Mr. Dave Lach of your staff agreed to provide supplemental information to the original responses within 30 days from the date of the conference call. For the follow-up RAIs stemming from 3.6.2.2.2-1, 4.3.1-2, and 4.7.3-1, Mr. Dave Lach agreed to provide responses within 30 day from the receipt of the follow-up RAIs. The applicant had an opportunity to comment on this summary.

W.

If you have any questions, please contact me by telephone at 301-415-4084 or via e-mail at Emmanuel.Sayoc@nrc.gov.

Sincerely,

/RA Albert Wong for/

Emmanuel Sayoc, Project Manager License Renewal Project Branch Division of Materials and License Renewal Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-458

Enclosures:

1. List of Participants
2. List of Topics Related to Previously Issued RAIs
3. Summary of the Topics Discussed

ML18127A034 OFFICE PM:MRPB:DMLR LA:MRPB:DMLR BC: MRPB:DMLR PM:MRPB:DMLR NAME ESayoc YEdmonds EOesterle(DDrucker) for ESayoc(AWong) for DATE 5/24/2018 5/24/2018 5/25/18 5/25/18 LIST OF PARTICIPANTS FOR THE APRIL 18, 2018 TELEPHONE CONFERENCE CALL PARTICIPANTS AFFILIATIONS Steve Bloom U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

Steve Ruffin NRC Eric Oesterle NRC Jim Medoff NRC Jim Gavula NRC Aaron Mink NRC Mohammad Sadollah NRC Emmanuel Sayoc NRC Albert Wong NRC Garry Young Entergy Nuclear Operations Inc. (Entergy)

Dave Lach Entergy Alan Cox Entergy Dave Wootten Entergy Steve McKissack Entergy Stan Batch Entergy Lori Potts Entergy Mark Spinelli Entergy Jim Morgan Entergy Lisa Borel Entergy Randy Gauthreaux Entergy Mark Sandusky Entergy Mike Cooper Entergy Steve Liu GEH

CHRONOLOGY OF RAIs AND RAI RESPONSES DISCUSSED DURING THE APRIL 18, 2018 TELEPHONE CONFERENCE CALL ORIGINAL RAI#

RAI Set #

Date of the Original RAI Issued Date of Applicants

Response

3.2.2.3.2-1a Generic Filtration 12 March 6, 2018 (ML18065A213)

April 3, 2018 (ML18093A099)

B.1.10-2 BWR Vessel Internals 10 February 8, 2018 (ML18043A008)

March 26, 2018 (ML18087A188) 3.1.2.1.2-1 BWR Vessel Internals 10 February 8, 2018 (ML18043A008)

March 26, 2018 (ML18087A188) 4.3.1-1 Class 1 Fatigue 10 February 8, 2018 (ML18043A008)

March 26, 2018 (ML18087A188) 4.3.1-2 Class 1 Fatigue 10 February 8, 2018 (ML18043A008)

March 26, 2018 (ML18087A188) 4.3.2-1 Non-Class 1 Fatigue 10 February 8, 2018 (ML18043A008)

March 26, 2018 (ML18087A188) 4.7.3-1 Fluence Effect for Reactor Vessel Internals 10 February 8, 2018 (ML18043A008)

March 26, 2018 (ML18087A188) 3.6.2.2.2-1 High Voltage Insulators 8

January 22, 2018 (ML18022A941)

February 20, 2018 (ML18051A531)

SUMMARY

OF THE TOPICS DISCUSSED DURING THE APRIL 18, 2018 TELEPHONE CONFERENCE CALL The following topics related to the applicants RAI responses were discussed with the applicant during the call. The conclusions of these topics are noted in the parenthesis.

Topic 1 RAI 3.2.2.3.2-1a Generic Filtration The applicant revised LRA Sections A.1.34 and B.1.34 to include additional inspection activities in the Periodic Surveillance and Preventive Maintenance Program. However, no new AMR items are added to LRA Tables 3.2.2-2, 3.2.2-3, 3.2.2-4, and 3.2.2-5 to reflect these changes.

The LRA is not adequate without additional new AMR items to the aforementioned tables.

(Resolution: The applicant stated that they would supplement their previous response within 30 days from the date of the call.)

Topic 2 RAI B.1.10-2 BWR Vessel Internals Scoping of standby liquid control system for portions of the standby liquid control (SLC) lines located inside of the reactor vessel (matter is being reviewed with DSS/SXRB) - use of the applicants basis for using BWRVIP-27-A as the sole basis for resolving the issue raised in RAI B.1.10-2. (Resolution: The applicant provided sufficient clarification that allowed the staff to conclude that there is sufficient information to proceed with the safety review without additional information requested.)

Topic 3 RAI 3.1.2.1.2-1 BWR Vessel Internals Use of a one-time inspection for managing loss of material in reactor vessel internals. The applicants basis provided in the response simply restates basis in original LRA, and the applicant relies only on the fact the AMR Item IV.C1.RP-158 (an AMR item for Class 1 piping components) exists in the GALL Revision 2 report. The applicant does not provided adequate demonstration that IV.C1.RP-158 is an acceptable alternative AMR item to apply to aging management of BWR RVI components. (Resolution: The applicant provided sufficient clarification that allowed the staff to conclude that there is sufficient information to proceed with the safety review without additional information requested.)

Topic 4 RAI 4.3.1-1 Class 1 Fatigue For listed reactor pressure vessel (RPV) components that have been analyzed with a CUF analysis, why does the response indicate that the CUF values were only based on an assessment of heatup and cooldown transients. That is not consistent with the transients that are listed as assumed transients for RPV component CUF analyses in USAR Section 3.9B.

(Resolution: The applicant provided sufficient clarification that allowed the staff to conclude that there is sufficient information to proceed with the safety review without additional information requested.)

Topic 5 RAI 4.3.1-2 Class 1 Fatigue For reactor vessel internal (RVI) components that have been analyzed with a CUF - the applicant listed BWRVIP reports for aging management of the component under 10 CFR 54.

21(c)(1)(iii). The recommendations of each individual report may not include inspection of the RVI component identified as having a CUF analysis. For example, BWRVIP-18 cannot be

credited as the basis for components in the core plate assembly because the BWRVIP report does not recommend inspection of BWR-6 core plates or any of the components in the core plate assembly. (Resolution: The staff plans to issue a follow-up RAI on this topic.)

Topic 6 RAI 4.3.2-1 Non-Class 1 Fatigue Question on LRA Section 4.3.2.1 - Scope/list of non-Class 1 systems that have been analyzed with a design basis cycle-dependent expansion stress and maximum allowable stress range reduction analysis based only on an assessment of plant heatups and cooldowns. (Resolution:

The applicant provided sufficient clarification that allowed the staff to conclude that there is sufficient information to proceed with the safety review without additional information requested.)

Topic 7 RAI 4.7.3-1 Fluence Effect for Reactor Vessel Internals Regarding Part 4 of the RAI: For reactor vessel internal (RVI) components that were projected to exceed the fluence threshold values, the applicant indicated that these components must meet additional strain criteria. The applicants RAI response did not describe how the strain criteria were derived. Therefore, the staff would like to discuss the applicants additional strain requirements and the calculated projected strain values for each RVI component compared to these additional strain criteria. (Resolution: The staff plans to issue a follow-up RAI on this topic.)

Topic 8 RAI 3.6.2.2.2-1 High Voltage Insulators Regarding the applicants response for Material and Aging Effects Requiring Management, the staff identified missing relevant information for Polymer High-voltage Insulators. These are identified in the listings below. The further evaluation discussion does not address the missing items. The staff needs to discuss these items and the applicants justification for conclusion that no aging management program is required.

Missing Material:

Epoxy Silicone Gel Sealant Ductile Iron Missing Aging Effects Requiring Management:

Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC) of glass fibers Swelling of insulator layer due to chemical contamination SCC of glass fibers Sheath wetting caused by chemicals absorbed by oil from SIR compound Brittle fracture of rods resulting from discharge activity/flashunder/flashover Chalking and crazing of resulting in contamination, arcing, and flashover Water penetration followed by electrical failure Bonding failure at rod-sheathing interface Sheath layer damage from birds and rodents Water ingress through end fitting causing corrosion and fracture of glass fibers

Polymer insulators have shown to have unique failure modes with little advance indications. In addition, contamination can be worse for SIR (compared to porcelain insulators) due to silicone oil, especially in late stages of service life. (Resolution: The staff plans to issue a follow-up RAI on this topic.)