ML18106A400

LER 98-002-01:on 971217,auxiliary Building Ventilation (Abv) Excess Flow Damper Was Found Wired Open W/Spring Removed. Caused by Personnel Error.Repaired 1ABS8 Damper & Inspected Other Abv Excess Flow Dampers in Abv sys.W/980320 Ltr

ML18106A400
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	03/20/1998
From:	Bakken A, Enrique Villar Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-98-002, LER-98-2, LR-N980135, NUDOCS 9803310142
Download: ML18106A400 (5)

Text

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Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236 Nuclear Business Unit MAR.2 O 1996 LR-N980135

u. s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Gentlemen:

LER 272/98-002-01 SALEM GENERATING STATION - UNIT 1 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO .. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 This Supplement Licensee Even_t Report entitled "Auxiliary Building Excess Flow Damper Found Wired Open With Spring Removed" is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of the.Code of Federal Regulations 10CFR50. 73 (a).(2) (ii).

Sincerely,

~~g A. C. Bakken III General Manager -

Salem Operations Attachment MKG c Distribution LER File 3.7 9803310142 980320 PDR ADOCK 05000272 S PDR The power is in your hands.

95-2168 REV. 6/94

NRCFORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 (4-95) -. . .* :. EXPIRES 04/30198 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS

~* MANDATORY INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (l~R). - REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE LICENSING PROCESS AND FED BACK TO INDUSTRY. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (T-6 F33), U.S. NUCLEAR (See reverse for required number of REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF digits/characters for each block) MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) IDDIOKET NUMBER (2) PAGE (:S)

SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 05000272 1 OF 4 TITLE (4)

Auxiliary Building Ventilation Excess Flow_ Damper Found Wired Open With Spring Removed EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)

FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY 17 YEAR 97 YEAR 98 I-SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 002 -

IREVISION NUMBER 01 MONTH 03 DAY 2

O YEAR 9

B FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 12

-*** ... G THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11) 11 MC>C*1E-'(a9) 5 20.2201 (b) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 50. 73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)

POWER 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) X 50. 73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(x)

LEVEL (10) 0 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 73.71 LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)

E. H. Villar (Senior Licensing Engineer) 609 339 5456 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS RE.PORT (13)

CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER R~b0:1:~iE ,1111111,1,,.._c_A_us_E_.j.-_sy_s_TE_M_._c_oM_P_O_N_ENT-._MA_N_U_FA_c_T_UR_E_R-4--R-~b-oN_Rl_:_~s_LE--ll 11-----:...+-----+------+-----1------£~~1-----+-----+------1-------4-~---~1 SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR YES SUBMISSION I(lfyeil, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

DATE (15)

In the course of performing flow balancing on the Salem Unit 1 Auxiliary Building Ventilation (ABV) System, a section of the 1ABS8 damper was identified as being .wired in the open position with the spring removed.

The 1ABS8 damper is an excess flow damper in the exhaust ductwork from the mechanical penetration area to the ABV exhaust plenum. The damper is designed to close on high flow during a high energy line break (HELB) in the penetration area. During a postulated HELB this function prevents steam intake into the ABV exhaust filters and steam transfer to adjacent areas via connected exhaust ductwork. With the damper wired open and the spring removed, this function was defeated.

Corrective actions include repairing the 1ABS8 damper and inspecting other ABV excess flow dampers in the* Salem Unit 1 and 2 ABV Systems. The safety significance of this condition is being evaluated by Gothic modeling of this system configuration. This LER will be supplemented with the results by March 20, 1998.

NRC FORM 366 (4-95)

NRC FORM 366A (4-95)

• LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION

• U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3) 05000272 YEAR I SEQUENTIAL NUMBER IREVISION NUMBER 2 OF 4 SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 98 - 002 - 01 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

PLANT IDENTIFICATION:

Salem Generating Station - Unit 1 Public Service Electric and Gas Company.

Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

"Auxiliary Building ,, Ventilation Excess Flow Damper Found Wired Open With Spring Removed Date of Occurrence: Unknown Date of Identification December 17, 1997 Report Date: March 20, 1998 CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Salem Unit 1 - Mode 5 DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

In December 1997 the Auxiliary Building Ventilation (ABV) System was being flow balanced in accordance with a design change package special test procedure. When balanced air flow could not be achieved in the penetration area ductwork, engineers initiated a troubleshooting action plan which included damper inspections. In the course of completing damper inspections, on December 17, 1997, a section of excess flow damper 1ABS8

{VF/DMP} was identified as being wired in the open position with the spring removed. The 1ABS8 damper is an excess flow damper in the exhaust ductwork from the Salem Unit 1 mechanical penetration area to the ABV exhaust plenum. The damper is designed to close on high flow during a high energy line break (HELB) in the penetration area. 1ABS8 damper closure during a HELB would prevent steam intake into the ABV exhaust plenum and steam transfer to other adjacent areas via exhaust ductwork. With the damper wired open and the spring removed this function was defeated. The wire was removed, spring replaced and the 1ABS8 was returned to service (Reference W0#971210125). Subsequently the ABV air flow balance was completed successfully.

On January 20, 1998, following a thorough review of the damper work history, it was concluded that the 1ABS8 was not placed in this condition during the current refueling outage. Therefore Salem Unit 1 had been operated with a section of the 1ABS8 damper wired in the open position with the spring removed. This was considered to be reportable under 10CFR50. 73 (a) (2) (ii).

NRC FORM 366A (4-95)

NRC FORM 366A (4-95)

• _, \'

• LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION

• U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3) 05000272 YEAR I SEQUENTIAL NUMBER IREVISION NUMBER 3 OF 4 SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 98 - 002 - 01 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

The cause of occurrence is personnel error. Prior to the current Salem Unit 1 refueling outage personnel failed to restore the 1ABS8 damper to operable status.

PRIOR SIMILAR OCCURRENCES:

A sear~h of the LER database and a manual search of hardcopy LERS for past two years did not identify any reportable events due to personnel error related to inadequate maintenance.

SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS:

The 1ABS8 damper is an excess flow damper in.the exhaust ductwork from the Salem Unit 1 mechanical penetration area to the ABV exnaust plenum. The design function of the damper is to close on a high energy line break (HELB) in the penetration area to prevent steam intake into the ABV exhaust plenum. The 1ABS8, in conjunction with other dampers in adjoining ABV system ducts, is designed to isolate the penetration area on a HELB and direct steam flow to the penetration area pipe break vent penthouse for relief through the blowout panels. This is discussed in Salem UFSAR Section 3.6.5.10.

There was no event which required the 1ABS8 to perform its design function.

Therefore the event did not have any safety consequences.

A review of the work history did not provide evidence that the 1ABS8 damper was wired in the open position with spring removed during the current Salem Unit 1 refueling outage. Therefore it is concluded that the 1ABS8 damper was in this condition in the past when the plant was operating and piping in the penetration area was in service. If a HELB had occurred during this period, the 1ABS8 would not have been capable of performing its design function to close on high flow. This could have resulted in steam intake into the ABV exhaust plenum, saturating the ABV roughing and HEPA filters and degrading their capability to filter radioactive effluents. Since the penthouse panels are designed to relieve pressure during a HELB directly to atmosphere, the ABV filters are not credited for filtering. Therefore the effect on ABV filtering during a postulated HELB would not have safety implications.  :

However, during a postulated HELB event, steam from the line break could be transported to adjacent areas via the open 1ABS8 damper through exhaust ducts connected to the ABV plenum. PSE&G is evaluating the potential for this occurrence by modeling the system using a Gothic computer model. The NRC FORM 366A (4-95)

NRC FORM 366A (4-95)

• LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION

• U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3) 05000272 YEAR I SEQUENTIAL NUMBER IREVISION NUMBER 4 OF 4 SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 98 - 002 - 01 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17) .l SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS (cont'd):

effect on equipment in adjacent areas will be evaluated based on the model results. This License Event Report (LER) will be supplemented to report these results. This supplement will be issued by March 20, 1998.

PSE&G.evaluated the.potential for this occurrence by modeling the system using a Gothic computer model. Based on the results of the analysis, it can be concluded that the safety implications were minimal. Two break cases were analyzed: 1) the largest possible break that the would result in the opening of the roof blow-out panels, and 2) the largest possible break that would not result in the opening of the roof blow-out panels. In both cases the analysis demonstrated that the steam flows towards the ABV exhaust fans and filters, and does not flow backwards towards any adjacent room. From a dose assessment point of view, these two events are bounded by the LOCA and Steam Line Break analyses.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN:

1. During the current Salem Unit 1 outage, PSE&G management has completed intervention actions within the Salem Maintenance Department. These actions include clearly communicating expectations for quality work, establishing a low threshold for reporting problems, and holding personnel accountable for their actions. This intervention will help ensure quality maintenance and preclud.e this type of event at Salem Station in the future.

2. The 1ABS8 damper spring was installed and the damper returned to service. The Salem Unit 1 ABV system was successfully balanced.

3. Other excess flow dampers and backdraft dampers in the Salem Unit 1 and 2 ABV systems were inspected. The springs were installed on these dampers as required and the dampers were in the correct position.

4. PSE&G will complete modeling of the Salem Unit 1 ABV system with the 1ABS8 in the open position to fully assess the safety implications of this conditipn in the past. This LER will be supplemented by March 20, 1998.

NRC FORM 366A (4-95)