ML18102B617

LER 97-003-00:on 970909,loss of Fire Protection Water to Auxiliary Bldgs & Containments Was Noted.Caused by Human Error Due to Inattention to Detail.Loss Prevention Tours Have Been revised.W/971014 Ltr

ML18102B617
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	10/15/1997
From:	Bakken A, Enrique Villar Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-97-003-03, LER-97-3-3, LR-N970674, NUDOCS 9710210010
Download: ML18102B617 (6)

Text

e OPS~G Publi~ Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge. New Jersey 08038-0236 Nuclear Business Unit OCT 14 1997 LR-N970674 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 SPECIAL REPORT 311/97-003 SALEM GENERATING STATION - UNIT 2 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR NO 75 DOCKET NO. 50-311 Gentlemen:

This Special Report addresses the isolation of the Fire Protection Water to the Salem Unit 1 and 2 Auxiliary Buildings and Containments due to the closure of 1FP186 and 1FP187. This report is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of Section 6.9.3 of the Salem Unit 2 Technical Specifications.

Sincerely, A. C. Bakken, III General Manager -

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NRCFORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 (4-95) EXPIRES 04/30/98 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATORY INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.

REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) LICENSING PROCESS AND FED BACK TO INDUSTRY.

COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION FORWARD AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (T-6 F33), U.S. NUCLEAR (See reverse for required number of REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF digits/characters for each block) MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) PAGE (3)

SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 2 05000311 1 OF 5 TITLE (4)

LOSS OF FIRE PROTECTION WATER TO THE SALEM UNIT 1 AND 2 AUXILIARY BUILDINGS AND CONTAINMENTS.

EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)

MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR I SEQUENTIAL NUMBER IREVISION NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAME STATION UNIT 1 DOCKET NUMBER 05000272 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 09 09 97 97 -- 003 -- 00 10 15 97 05000

! OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)

MODE(9) 20.2201 (b) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 50. 73(a)(2)(i) 50. 73(a)(2)(viii)

POWER 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 50. 73(a)(2)(ii) 50. 73(a)(2)(x)

LEVEL (10) 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50. 73(a)(2)(iii) 73. 71 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 20.2203(a)(4) 50. 73(a)(2)(iv) X OTHER 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.36(c)(1) 50. 73(a)(2)(v) ~rrnc~~ ~.~~~~~elow 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.36(c)(2) 50. 73(a)(2)(vii)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)

E. H. Villar (Station Licensing Enginner) 609 339 5456 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TONPRDS TO NPRDS SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR YES SUBMISSION I(If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE). DATE (15)

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

At 2210 hrs on September 16, 1997, a Unit 1 Nuclear Control Operator (NCO) identified that the fire protection water for Salem Units 1 and 2 Auxiliary Buildings and Containment was isolated. Fire protection water for these areas is supplied via valves 1FP186 and 1FP187, which were found closed.

While the exact cause of the valves being mispositoned could not be determined, the valves were most probably misaligned during relamping activities on September 9, 1997. The cause of the condition going unidentified is attributed to human error due to inattention to detail by the NCO and the Loss Prevention Operators during subsequent panel reviews.

Fire protection personnel were promptly notified, and the valves were opened at 2237 hrs.

• Pursuant to License Conditions 2.C. (10) and 2.I of the Unit 2 Facility Operating License, a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> report and a follow-up Special Report were made to the NRC on September 17 and September 30, 1997, respectively.

This Special Report is being made in accordance with Technical Specification Section 6.9.3, and supplements the September 30 Special Report.

NRC FORM 366 (4-95)

NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (4-95)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3) 05000311 YEAR I SEQUENTIAL NUMBER IREVISION NUMBER 2 OF 5 SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 2 97 -- 003 00 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

PLANT IDENTIFICATION:

Salem Generating Station - Unit 2 Public Service Electric and Gas Company Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Loss of Fire Protection Water to Salem Units 1 and 2 Auxiliary Buildings and Containments.

Date of Occurrence: September 9, 1997 Date of Identification September 16, 1997 Report Date: October 15, 1997 CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Salem Unit 1 - Defueled Salem Unit 2 - Mode 1 approximately 58% Power DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

The following is a timeline of the events, as recreated from operators logs, interviews, and a brief summary of the event recreation, as well as .a level one root cause investigation Timeline July 15, 1997 - Valves 1FP186 and 1FP187 were stroked open and closed using surveillance procedure SC.FP-ST.FS-0:07.

September 1, 1997- Valves 1FP186 and 1FP187 were locally position verified open by Loss Prevention personnel.

September 2, 1997 - 1FP147 was stroked open and closed during performance of procedure Sl.RA-IS.ZZ-0001, "Types B And C Leak Rate Test." The controls for 1FP147 are located on panel 1RP5, immediately to the right of the control for 1FP186 and 1FP187.

NRG FORM 366A (4-95)

NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (4-95)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3) 05000311 YEAR I SEQUENTIAL NUMBER I REVISION NUMBER 3 OF 5 SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 2 97 -- 003 00 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE (cont'd);

September 6, 1997 - I&C Craft personnel started relamping activities at panel 1RP5 per Work Order.

September 9, 1997 - I&C Craft personnel completed relamping 1RP5. Work Order notations and personnel interviews indicate that valves 1FP186 and 1FP187 were relamped on the second night the panel was worked on. This work was performed from 2100 hrs on September 8 to 0700 hrs on September 9, 1997.

September 16, 1997 - At 2210 hrs a Unit 1 NCO noted that the indicator for valves 1FP186 and 1FP187 was illuminated, and at 2225, the valves were field verified closed by Loss Prevention personnel. At 2237, Operations personnel opened the valves, and at 2243, the valves were field verified open by Loss Prevention personnel.

Pursuant to License Conditions 2.C. (10) and 2.I of the Unit 2 Facility Operating License, a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> report and a follow-up Special Report were made to the NRC on September 17 and September 30, 1997, respectively.

This Special Report is being made in accordance with Technical Specification Section 6.9.3, and supplements the September 30, Special Report.

CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE; The exact cause of how the 1FP186 and 1FP187 valves were closed, and could have potentially been closed from September 1, 1997, through September 16, 1997, could not be determined. These dates represent the times when the 1FP186 and 1FP187 valves were field verified open by Loss Prevention personnel.

However from the timeline of the events, as presented above, the most probable cause for the inadvertent closure of the 1FP186 and 1FP187 valves was relamping activities on 1RP5 panel on September 9, 1997.

NRG FORM 366A (4-95)

' NRC FORM 366A (4-95)

FACILITY NAME (1)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION DOCKET NUMBER (2)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3) 05000311 YEAR I SEQUENTIAL NUMBER I REVISION NUMBER 4 OF 5 SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 2 97 -- 003 00 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE (cont'd):

The cause for this condition going unidentified for the period from September 9, 1997, through September 16, 1997 is attributed to human error due to inattention to detail by the Nuclear Control Operators and the Loss Prevention Operators during subsequent panel reviews. The reviews did not focus on valve position indication, but were focused on verification of alarm status and lamp functionality.

PRIOR SIMILAR OCCURRENCES:

A search of the LER database using the phrase "fire protection" did not identify any LERs within the past five years related to mispositioned fire protection valves. Similar searches were performed using the same phrases as described above for the coirective action program database searches, and no applicable documents were identified.

SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS:

Although fire suppression was potentially unavailable during the period from September 1 (when the valves were field verified opened) to September 16 (when the valves were again field verified opened), there were hourly roving fire watch tours of the Unit 1 and 2 Auxiliary Buildings. These roving fire watch tours were established for other unrelated fire protection issues, but they did provide a level of assurance that a fire would not have gone undetected. PSE&G has an onsite dedicated Fire Protection Department. Additionally, the fire protection detection system for the Auxiliary Buildings and Containments was unaffected by the closure of the 1FP186 and 1FP187 valves, which provides the primary means of detection.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN:

The valves were opened at 2237 hrs on September 16, 1997, and locally verified open by Loss Prevention personnel at 2243 hrs.

NRC FORM 366A (4-95)

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NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSFE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3) 05000311 YEAR I SEQUENTIAL NUMBER I REVISION NUMBER 5 OF 5 SALEM.GENERATING STATION UNIT 2 97 -- 003 OD TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN (cont'd):

On September 18, 1997, Loss Prevention personnel completed a lineup verification of Fire Protection valves (C02 and Water) at Salem station, and as a temporary compensatory measure~ initiated position verification of the 1FP186 and 1FP187 valves on a twice per shift (every 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />) basis pending completion of the cause investigation. The monthly verification of Hope Creek valves was performed the week prior so no further action was initiated for Hope Creek.

Loss Prevention tours have been revised to include a once per shift verification of valve position for 1FP186 and 1FP187. This measure will remain in place until the 1RP5 panel status report checklist is revised to include verification of 1FP186 and 1FP187 indicator lamp test once per shift.

Operators will receive training on the controls associated with the 1FP186 and 1FP187 valves. This training will be completed by November 30, 1997.

An event notice will be issued to Operations, Work Control, Loss Prevention and Station Planning to share the lessons learned from this event. This notice will be issued by October 31, 1997.

NRC FORM 366A (4-95)