ML18102B519

LER 97-008-00:on 970715,failure to Enter Action Statement for Having Both Radiation Monitors in Same Control Room Air Intake Duct Was Inoperable.Caused by Misjudgement by CR Supervisor.Personnel Was Held accountable.W/970814 Ltr

ML18102B519
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	08/14/1997
From:	Garchow D, Bernard Thomas Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-97-008-02, LER-97-8-2, LR-N970500, NUDOCS 9708210055
Download: ML18102B519 (5)

Text

e OPS~G Public pervice Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236 Nuclear Business Unit AUG 14 1997 LR-N970500 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Gentlemen:

LER 311/97-008-00 SALEM GENERATING STATION - UNIT 2 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-75 DOCKET NO. 50-311 This Licensee Event Report entitled "Failure to Enter Action Statement for having Both Radiation Monitors in the Same Control Room Air Intake Duct Inoperable," is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations 10CFR50. 73 (a) (2) (i) (B).

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David F. Ga General Manager -

Salem Operations Attachment BJT C Distribution LER File 3.7 9708210055 970814 PDR ADOCK 05000311 S PDR Illllll lllll lllll llllll llll llllll Ill llll

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• 95*2168 REV. 6/94

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104

• -,.* (4-95) EXPIRES 04/30/98 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATORY INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.

REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) LICENSING PROCESS ANO FED BACK TO INDUSTRY. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (T~ F33), U.S. NUCLEAR (See reverse for required number of REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 2055!Hl001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF digits/characters for each block) MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

'""CILITY N"llE (1) DOCKET NUllBER (2) PAGE (3)

SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 2 05000311 1 OF 4 TITLE (4)

Failure to Enter Action Statement for having Both Radiation Monitors in the Same Control Room Air Intake Duct Inoperable EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)

FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL I REVISION MONTH DAY YEAR I

NUMBER NUMBER SALEM UNIT 1 05000272 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 07 15 97 97 - 008 - 00 08 14 97 OPERATING 4 THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)

MODE(9) 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) x 50. 73(a)(2)(i) 50. 73(a)(2)(viii)

POWER 000 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 50. 73(a)(2)(ii) 50. 73(a)(2)(x)

LEVEL (10) 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50. 73(a)(2)(iii) 73.71 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 20.2203(a)(4) 50. 73(a)(2)(iv) OTHER 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.36(c)(1) 50. 73(a)(2)(v) Spec~in Abstract below or in C Form 366A 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50 .36( c )(2) 50. 73(a)(2)(vii)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)

Brian J. Thomas, Licensing Engineer 609-339-2022 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT {13)

CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO NPRDS TO NPRDS SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR SUBMISSION IYES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE). XINO DATE (15)

ABSTRACT (Limitto 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

As a result of channel checks of the Control Room radiation monitors on July 13, 1997, Operators determined that one of two radiation monitor channels in the Unit 2 outside air intake duct was inoperable and entered Unit 2 Technical Specification 3.3.3.1 Action b. 27 for the seven day action statement. On July 15, 1997, troubleshooting on the other Unit 2 intake radiation monitor channel rendered that channel inoperable. The Control Room Supervisor failed to identify that troubleshooting this channel would make both Unit 2 air intake radiation monitor channels inoperable and thus failed to enter the appropriate Technical Specification action statement.

This event is attributed to misjudgment by the Control Room Supervisor caused by a failure to validate and verify the impact of the troubleshooting work package.

Personnel involved with the occurrence were held accountable for their actions and the Operations Manager will discuss this event with the operating crews during Licensed Operator requalification training, emphasizing proper work planning methods and the use of the Technical Specification Action Statement Log.

This event is reportable under 10CFR50. 73 (a) (2) (i) (B) as, "any condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications."

NRC FORM 366 (4-95)

NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (4-95)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3) 2 OF 4 SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 2 97 - 008 - 00 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION Westinghouse - Pressurized Water Reactor Radiation Monitoring System {IL/-}*

• Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes and component function identifier codes appear as {SS/CCC} in the text.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE Unit 1 was defueled and Unit 2 was in Mode 3 prior to the event.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE At 0838 on July 13, 1997, the two radiation monitor channels in the Unit 2 Control Room outside air intake duct failed a channel check comparison. The Unit 1 and Unit 2 Control Rooms are in a common ventilation envelope, and during normal operation outside air is brought into the control room envelope and the adjoining areas by two outside air intake ducts (one intake duct per Unit) .

There are two radiation monitor channels in each of the outside air intake ducts. Technical Specification Table 3.3-6 states that a minimum of two radiation monitor channels per Control Room air intake shall be operable.

As a result of the failed channel check, one channel of the two radiation monitor channels which monitor the Unit 2 Control Room outside air intake duct was declared inoperable. The Operating shift entered Unit 2 Technical Specification 3.3.3.1 Action b.27 which states, in part:

"With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channels(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days or initiate and maintain operation of the Control Room Emergency Air Conditioning system (CREACS) in the pressurization or recirculation mode of operation ... "

In declaring the one Unit 2 intake Control Room radiation monitor channel inoperable, the Operating Shift did not adequately document that declaration nor clearly identify which specific Unit 2 intake channel was inoperable. Various Control Room logs included conflicting and inconsistent statements regarding the results of the failed channel checks.

At 0930 on July 15, 1997, maintenance technicians began troubleshooting (for the problem identified on July 13) on one of the radiation monitor channels associated with the Unit 2 Control Room intake duct which rendered the channel physically inoperable. In authorizing the work, the Control Room Supervisor thought that this channel was the channel that previously had been declared inoperable. In fact, it was the opposite radiation monitor channel in the Unit 2 Control Room intake duct that had been declared inoperable. Thus, the troubleshooting resulted in having no operable radiation NRC FORM 366A (4-95)

NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (4-95)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3) 0 5 0 0 0 311 YEAR I SEQUENTIAL NUMBER I REVISION NUMBER 3 OF 4 SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 2 97 - 008 - 00 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE (cont'd) monitor channels in the Unit 2 outside air intake duct. Unit 2 Technical Specification 3.3.3.1, Action b.27 states, in part:

" ... With no channels OPERABLE in a Control Room air intake, immediately initiate and maintain operation of the CREACS in the pressurization mode of operation. ..."

The CREACS was not imm~diately placed in the pressurization or recirculation mode of operation upon the inoperability of the second radiation monitor channel, which did not comply with the requirements of Technical Specifications.

The Unit 2 outside air intake duct channel which had been declared inoperable due to troubleshooting was returned to service at 1243 on July 15, 1997.

The failure to take the Technical Specification required action was identified at 1940 on July 15, 1997. The inoperable radiation monitor in the Unit 2 Control Room outside air intake duct was determined to have a tear in the Mylar covering of the detector, and was repaired and returned to service on July 18, 1997.

This event is reportable under 10CFR50.73{a) (2) (i) (B) as, "any condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications."

CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE This event is attributed to misjudgment by the Control Room Supervisor caused by a failure to validate and verify the impact of the troubleshooting work package.

The misjudgment by the Control Room Supervisor took the form of an inadequate review of the troubleshooting work order package and the Technical Specification Action Statement Log prior to authorizing troubleshooting to begin.

Contributing factors included inconsistent entries in the Control Room logs describing which radiation monitor channel was inoperable and the potentially confusing nomenclature for the Control Room radiation monitor channels.

PRIOR SIMILAR OCCURRENCES A review of LERs for Salem Units 1 and 2 submitted in the past two years identified two LERs associated with inadequate tracking of inoperable equipment (272/95-019 and 311/97-004).

LER 272/95-019 describes an occurrence involving the transition from Mode 5 to Mode 6 with inoperable containment purge valves. A contributing factor in this event was inadequate tracking of inoperable equipment. Corrective Actions for this event included revisions to the process for tracking Technical Specification Action Statements.

LER 311/97-004 describes an occurrence involving two AC electrical bus trains being inoperable longer than allowed by Technical Specifications. The cause of this event was personnel error by the Operating shift in documenting inoperable equipment.

NRC FORM 366A (4-95)

l

'* NRC FORM 366A (4-95)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3) 05000311 YEAR I SEQUENTIAL NUMBER IREVISION NUMBER 4 OF 4 SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 2 97 - 008 - 00 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE The Unit 2 air intake duct radiation monitor that was declared inoperable following the failed channel check surveillance test was found to have a tear in the Mylar covering on the detector. The tear in the Mylar caused a high background radiation level reading. During accident conditions, this higher than usual background reading would not have affected the ability of the monitor to perform its design function. Thus, there would not have been an adverse safety consequence had an accident occurred while the opposite channel was being tested.

There was no impact to the health and safety of the public.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

1. Personnel involved with the occurrence will be held accountable for their actions in accordance with PSE&G's disciplinary policy.

2. The Operations Manager will discuss this event with the operating crews during Licensed Operator requalification training, emphasizing proper work planning methods and the use of the Technical Specification Action Statement Log.

3. A change to the nomenclature of the Control Room Air Intake Duct Radiation Monitor channels to incorporate human factor improvements will be implemented by December 1, 1997.

NRC FORM 366A (4-95)