ML18102B281

LER 97-006-00:on 970404,seismic Adequacy of Svc Water Header Was Invalidated Due to Unclear Work Instructions.Piping Has Been Reinstalled correctly.W/970505 Ltr

ML18102B281
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	05/05/1997
From:	Garchow D, Bernard Thomas Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-97-006-02, LER-97-6-2, LR-N97279, NUDOCS 9705140299
Download: ML18102B281 (4)

Text

Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236 Nuclear Business Unit MAY 05 1997 LR-N97279 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 LER 311/97-006-00 SALEM GENERATING STATION - UNIT 2 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 Gentlemen:

This Licensee Event Report . (LER) entitled "Seismic Adequacy of the Service Water Header Invalidated" is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations 10CFR50. 73 (a) (2) (ii).

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David F. ?archow

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General Manager Salem Operations I

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Attachment DVH C Distribution LER File 3.7 IlllfII lllll lllll llllll llllal//l//ll//ll/

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• 9705140299 970505 PDR ADOCK 05000311 S PDR l l1e po\wr is 111 your hands.

95-2168 REV. 6/94

-' NR~FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEA EGULATORY COMMISSION APPR ED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 (4-95) EXPIRES 04/30/98 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS I~ MANDATORY INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 60.0 HRS:

REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) LICENSING PROCESS ANO FED BACK TO INDUSTRY. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION ANO RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (T-e F33), U.S. NUCLEAR (See reverse for required number of REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20655-0001, ANO TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (315~104), OFFICE OF

~lglts/characters for each block) MANAGEMENT ANO BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAllE (1) DOCKET NUllBER (2) PAGE (3)

SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 2 05000311 1 of 3 TITLE (4)

Seismic Adequacy of the Service Water Header Invalidated.

EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)

FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL 'REVISION MONTH DAY YEAR NUMBER NUMBER I

FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 04 04 97 97 - 006 - 00 05 97 II o~~~ATING 5 THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)

DE(9) 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)

POWER 000 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) x 50. 73(a)(2)(ii) 50. 73(a)(2)(x)

LEVEL (10) 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 73.71 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 20.2203(a)(4) 50. 73(a)(2)(iv) OTHER 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.36(c)(1) 50. 73(a)(2)(v) Spec~in Abstract below or in C Form 366A 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(vii)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Aree Code)

Brian J. Thomas, Licensing Engineer 609-339-2022 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TONPROS TONPRDS IYES SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

(If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).

Ix1NO EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)

MONTH DAV VEAR ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On April 4, 1997, the seismic adequacy of the 21 Service Water (SW) header was determined to be invalid. A modification to the header was being performed, and piping was connected to the 21 SW header without the proper .pipe hangers being installed.

This occurrence was caused by unclear work instructions. This condition existed for a 11.mited period of time (approximately one week) during which no seismic activity was experienced. The condition was limited to only the 21 SW header.

The newly installed piping was disconnected from the 21 SW header. The work instructions were changed to clarify the requirements for connecting the new piping to the SW system. The piping has been re-installed correctly.

This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a) ( 2) (ii) , any condition outside of the plant's design bases.

NRC FORM 368 (4-95)

.,,.., NRC FORM 366A U.S. CLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (4-95) .

1 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 2 0 5 0 0 0 311 YEAR I SEQUENTIAL NUMBER IREVISION NUMBER 2 OF 3 97 - 006 - 00 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION Westinghouse - Pressurized Water Reactor Essential Service Water {BI/-}

• Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes and component function identifier codes appear as {SS/CC}

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE At the time of identification, Salem Unit 2 was in Mode 5.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE On April 4, 1997, the seismic adequacy of the 21 Service Water (SW) header was determined to be invaiid. A modification to the header was being performed, and piping was connected to the 21 SW header without the proper pipe hangers being installed.

• On March 25, 1997, the 21 SW header was removed from service to support modification work. While the 21 SW header was out of service, a Tee connection was installed on the 21 SW header, and the open connection on the newly installed Tee was closed with a blind flange. The Tee connection is part of a modification to address concerns with waterhammer as described in Generic Letter 96-06. The 21 SW Header was returned to service on March 28, 1997.

Modification work continued, with the new piping being constructed and installed. This piping was to be connected to SW Tee after all of the supports and hangers were installed; however, the craft persons assumed a temporary connection was acceptable. To facilitate sizing the pipe, the craft persons connected the new pipe to the Tee connection. This connection was completed sometime after March 28, 1997, and remained in place until April 4, 1997, when an engineer identified that this connection may adversely .impact the SW Header.

The blind flange on the Tee connection was not removed, so no SW flow was diverted; however, the connected pipe, with only temporary supports, could not be seismically analyzed.

This event is reportable in accqrdance with 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (ii), any condition outside of the plant's design bases.

CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE This occurrence was caused by unclear work instructions. The design change package required that all pipe supports be installed prior to "final tie-in of the new piping." The craft persons completing the work did not recognize that any tie in to the SW header was not allowed. Rather, they assumed that a temporary connection that would not divert SW flow was acceptable.

NRC FORM 366A (4-95))

NRC FORM 366A U.S. CLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (4-96) '

I LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION FACIUTY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 2 0 5 0 0 0 311 YEAR I SEQUENTIAL

. NUMBER IREVISION NUMBER 3 OF 3 97 - 006 - 00 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

PRIOR SIMILAR OCCURRENCES A review of LERs for Salem Units 1 and 2 issued in the last two years identified.

LER 311/96-015 discussed a similar concern where maintenance activities adversely impacted the plant design basis.

SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS The temporary supports for the new piping were adequate to support the static load of the piping. These temporary supports may not have been able to support the dynamic loads experienced in a seismic event. When the seismic hangers have been installed, the new piping will not impact the seismic adequacy of the SW header.

This condition existed for a limited period of time, (approximately one week) during which no seismic activity was experienced. The condition was limited to only the 21 SW header. The redundant 22 SW header was available to supply cooling water to emergency equipment and components.

Based on the above, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

1. The newly installed piping was disconnected from the 21 SW header

2. The work instructions were changed to clarify the.requirements for connecting the new piping to the SW system. The piping has been installed correctly.

3. The details of this event will be rolled out to the organizations involved with the work instructions and activities. This will be completed by May 15, 1997.

NRC FORM 366A (4-95))