05000272/LER-1996-040, :on 961223,buffer Relays Omitted from TS Required Response Time Surveillance Tests.Caused by Inadequate Implementation of TS Requirements.Revised Response Procedures

:on 961223,buffer Relays Omitted from TS Required Response Time Surveillance Tests.Caused by Inadequate Implementation of TS Requirements.Revised Response Procedures

ML18102A771
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	01/19/1997
From:	Hassler D Public Service Enterprise Group
To:
Shared Package
ML18102A770	List: 05000272/LER-1996-040, :on 961223,buffer Relays Omitted from TS Required Response Time Surveillance Tests.Caused by Inadequate Implementation of TS Requirements.Revised Response Procedures
References
LER-96-040, LER-96-40, NUDOCS 9701240312
Download: ML18102A771 (3)

LER-1996-040, on 961223,buffer Relays Omitted from TS Required Response Time Surveillance Tests.Caused by Inadequate Implementation of TS Requirements.Revised Response Procedures

Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion:	10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation
2721996040R00 - NRC Website

text

NRCFORM398 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OllB NO. 3150-0104

(~116)

EXPIRES 04130l98 l!STlllATED BURDEN PER Rl!SPONSI! TO CC>lm"LY

• WITH THiii LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

MANDATORY INFORMATION COll.ECTION REQUEST: 80.0 HRS.

REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE LICENSING PROCE811 AND FED BACK TO INDUllTR't'.

FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION (See reverse for required number of AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (T-4 ~IJ

~NUCLEAR REGULATORY COllMl8810Ncn::.AllHINGTON, DC

, AND TO digits/characters for each block)

THE PAPERWORK REOU PROJECT ::11J0.0104), OFFICE OF ltANAGEllENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, 20503.

FACILITY NAllE (1)

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

PAGE(8)

SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 05000272 1 OF 3 TITLE (4)

BUFFER RELAYS OMITTED FROM TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED RESPONSE TIME SURVEILLANCE TESTS EVENT DATE (5)

LER NUMBER (8)

REPORT DATE (7)

OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)

YEAR I FACILITY NAME

. DOCKET NUllBER MONTH DAY YEAR SEQUENTIAL

'REVISION llONTH DAY YEAR NUllSER NUMBER Salem Unit 2 05000311 12 23 96 96 040 00 01 19 97 f'ActUTT NAME

"""""'I NUMBER OPERATING 6

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)

MODE(9) 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) x 50.73(*)(2)(i)

50. 73(a)(2)(viii)

POWER 000 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(3)(i)

50. 73(a)(2)(ii)

50. 73(a)(2)(x)

LEVEL(10) 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)

50. 73(a)(2)(iii) 73.71

~M&,twr

~ignm 20.2203(a)(2)(il) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a)(2)(iv)

OTHER 11111111.itb

~!!foJffi 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.36(c)(1)

50. 73(a)(2)(v)

~~In Abstract below or In 0 Form 386A i~m~i~i~~

20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.38(0)(2)

50. 73(a)(2)(vii)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include ANa Code)

Dennis v. Hassler, LER Coordinator 609-339-1989 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE

8YllTEll COllPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE

CAUSE

SY STEii COllPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TONPRDS TONPRDS

~[~ft~~t1tj SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

EXPECTED MONTH DAY

• YEAR

'YES XINO SUBMISSION (If yea, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).

DATE(15)

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 aingle-spaced typewritten lines) (18)

On December 23, 1996, a review of the ES FAS initiating logic determined that the time response procedures did not include buffer relays that are part of the logic for initiating feedwater isolation, containment isolation and containment

• spray pump.

These functions are initiated by the ES FAS actuating signals.

Technical Specification 4.3.2.1.3 requires that the Engineered Safety Features Response Time of each Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ES FAS)

Functions (Table 3.3-5) shall be demonstrated to be within the limit at least once per 18 months.

The cause of this occurrence was determined to be inadequate implementation of Technical Specification requirements.

Corrective actio!ls include procedure revisions, testing of the relays, and continuation of the TSSIP project.

This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50. 73 (a) (2) {i) {B), any condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.

9701240312 970119 PDR ADOCK 05000272 s

PDR NRO FORM 386 (4-96)

NRC FORM'388A (4-96)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMl~ISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1)

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

LER NUMBER (8)

PAGE(S)

SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 05000272 YEAR I SEQUENTIAL I REVISION NUMBER NUMBER 2

96 -

040 -

00 TEXT (If more apace i* required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION

Westinghouse - Pressurized Water Reactor Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System {JE/-}*

• Energy Industry Identification system (EIIS) codes and component function identifier codes appear as {SS/CC}

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE At the time of occurrence, Salem Unit 2 was in Mode 6.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE OF Technical Specification 4.3.2.1.3 requires that the Engineered Safety Features Response Time of each Engineered Safety Feature Actuation system (ESFAS)

Function (Table 3.3-5) shall be demonstrated to be within the limit at least once per 18 months.

3 On December 23, 1996, a review of the ESFAS initiating logic determined that the time response procedures did not include buff er relays that are part of the logic for initiating feedwater isolation, containment isolation, and the Train B initiation for the containment spray pump.

These functions are initiated by the ESFAS actuating signals.

This review was initiated in response to master time response procedure issues identified in LER 272/96-020-00.

The procedures that omitted these relays are being revised to include the time response for the relays.

The time response testing will be re-performed, as necessary, to acquire the additional data and verify that time response limits of Technical Specification Table 3.3-5 are satisfied.

The potential exists that the omission of the buffer relays from the procedures may have affected the performance of previous surveillances as well.

CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE The cause of this occurrence was determined to be inadequate implementation of Technical Specification requirements.

This resulted in inadequate procedures for testing of the ESFAS functions.

PRIOR SIMILAR OCCURRENCES The identification of programmatic issues related to the Technical Specification requirement implementation resulted in the initiation of the Technical Specifications Surveillance Improvement Program (TSSIP) described in LER 311/95-008.

The TSSIP should ensure that Technical Specification surveillance requirements are adequately proceduralized and will also identify potentially deficient Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation.

NRC FORM-388A

(<MS)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATOR'f.COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1)

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 05000272 TEXT (If more space is required, uae additional copiea of NRC Form 388A) ( 17)

PRIOR SIMILAR OCCURRENCES (Cont'd)

LER NUMBER 8)

YEAR I SEQUENTIAL NUllBER 96 -

040 -

00 PAGE(3) 3 OF A review of LERs for Salem Units 1 and 2 over the last two years identified twenty two LERs (272/95-004, 272/95-013, 272/95-015, 272/95-019, 272/95-024, 272/95-028, 272/96-003, 272/96-004, 272/96-005, 272/96-008, 272/96-016, 272/96-023, 272/96-024, 272/96-026, 311/94-012, 311/95-006, 311/95-008, 311/96-003, 311/96-007, 311/96-010, 311/96-011, 311/96-013 and 311/96-016-00) that were due to inadequate implementation of Technical Specification requirements.

The corrective actions were specific to the missed surveillance issues addressed in each LER.

SAE'ETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS 3

There were no safety consequences in failing to include the buffer relays in the time response procedures.

The omitted relays are in logic paths that parallel identical logic paths for which the time response testing has been within the Technical Specification requirements.

Also, the omitted relays were included in the appropriate channel functional tests and any anomalous time response of the relays would have been identified.

There was no impact on the public health and safety.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

1. The Salem Unit 2 time response procedures will be revised and testing of the omitted relays will be completed prior to Salem Unit 2 entering Mode 4.

2. The procedures for Salem Unit 1 will be revised and testing performed prior to Unit 1 entering Mode 4.

3. A Technical Specification Surveillance Improvement Program (TSSIP) has been initiated for Salem Units 1 and 2.

The scope and content of the TSSIP program was described previously in LER 311/96-008-00.

The TSSIP review is expected to be completed by December 31, 1997.